The war in Chechnya is a black page in the history of Russia. Aerial bombing of Chechnya

Armed conflict in 1994-1996 (first Chechen war)

The Chechen armed conflict of 1994-1996 - military actions between Russian federal troops (forces) and armed formations of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, created in violation of the legislation of the Russian Federation.

In the fall of 1991, in the context of the beginning of the collapse of the USSR, the leadership of the Chechen Republic declared the state sovereignty of the republic and its secession from the USSR and the RSFSR. The bodies of Soviet power on the territory of the Chechen Republic were dissolved, the laws of the Russian Federation were repealed. The formation of the armed forces of Chechnya began, led by Supreme Commander-in-Chief President of the Chechen Republic Dzhokhar Dudayev. Defense lines were built in Grozny, as well as bases for waging sabotage warfare in mountainous areas.

The Dudayev regime had, according to the calculations of the Ministry of Defense, 11-12 thousand people (according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, up to 15 thousand) of regular troops and 30-40 thousand people of armed militia, of which 5 thousand were mercenaries from Afghanistan, Iran, Jordan, and the North Caucasus republics and etc.

On December 9, 1994, President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2166 “On measures to suppress the activities of illegal armed groups on the territory of the Chechen Republic and in the zone of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict.” On the same day, the Government of the Russian Federation adopted Resolution No. 1360, which provided for the disarmament of these formations by force.

On December 11, 1994, the movement of troops began in the direction of the Chechen capital - the city of Grozny. On December 31, 1994, troops, by order of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, began the assault on Grozny. Russian armored columns were stopped and blocked by Chechens in different areas of the city, and the combat units of the federal forces that entered Grozny suffered heavy losses.

(Military encyclopedia. Moscow. In 8 volumes, 2004)

The further course of events was extremely negatively affected by the failure of the eastern and western groupings of troops; the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs also failed to complete the assigned task.

Fighting stubbornly, federal troops took Grozny on February 6, 1995. After the capture of Grozny, the troops began to destroy illegal armed groups in other settlements and in the mountainous regions of Chechnya.

From April 28 to May 12, 1995, according to the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, a moratorium on the use of armed force in Chechnya was implemented.

Illegal armed groups (IAF), using the negotiation process that had begun, redeployed part of their forces from mountainous regions to the locations of Russian troops, formed new groups of militants, fired at checkpoints and positions of federal forces, and organized terrorist attacks of unprecedented scale in Budennovsk (June 1995), Kizlyar and Pervomaisky (January 1996).

On August 6, 1996, federal troops, after heavy defensive battles, having suffered heavy losses, left Grozny. INVFs also entered Argun, Gudermes and Shali.

On August 31, 1996, cessation of hostilities agreements were signed in Khasavyurt, ending the first Chechen war. After the conclusion of the agreement, the troops were withdrawn from the territory of Chechnya in an extremely short period of time from September 21 to December 31, 1996.

On May 12, 1997, a Treaty on Peace and Principles of Relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was concluded.

The Chechen side, not observing the terms of the agreement, took the line towards the immediate secession of the Chechen Republic from Russia. Terror against employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and representatives of local authorities intensified, and attempts to rally the population of other North Caucasian republics around Chechnya on an anti-Russian basis intensified.

Counter-terrorism operation in Chechnya in 1999-2009 (second Chechen war)

In September 1999, a new phase of the Chechen military campaign began, which was called the counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus (CTO). The reason for the start of the operation was the massive invasion of Dagestan on August 7, 1999 from the territory of Chechnya by militants under the overall command of Shamil Basayev and the Arab mercenary Khattab. The group included foreign mercenaries and Basayev’s militants.

Fighting between federal forces and invading militants continued for more than a month, ending with the militants being forced to retreat from the territory of Dagestan back to Chechnya.

On these same days - September 4-16 - a series of terrorist attacks were carried out in several cities of Russia (Moscow, Volgodonsk and Buinaksk) - explosions of residential buildings.

Considering Maskhadov’s inability to control the situation in Chechnya, the Russian leadership decided to conduct a military operation to destroy the militants on the territory of Chechnya. On September 18, the borders of Chechnya were blocked by Russian troops. On September 23, the President of the Russian Federation issued a Decree “On measures to increase the effectiveness of counter-terrorism operations in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation,” providing for the creation of a Joint Group of Troops (Forces) in the North Caucasus to conduct counter-terrorism operations.

On September 23, Russian aircraft began bombing the capital of Chechnya and its environs. On September 30, a ground operation began - armored units of the Russian army from the Stavropol Territory and Dagestan entered the territory of the Naur and Shelkovsky regions of the republic.

In December 1999, the entire flat part of the territory of the Chechen Republic was liberated. The militants concentrated in the mountains (about 3,000 people) and settled in Grozny. On February 6, 2000, Grozny was taken under the control of federal forces. To fight in the mountainous regions of Chechnya, in addition to the eastern and western groups operating in the mountains, a new group “Center” was created.

On February 25-27, 2000, units of the “West” blocked Kharsenoy, and the group “East” closed the militants in the area of ​​Ulus-Kert, Dachu-Borzoi, and Yaryshmardy. On March 2, Ulus-Kert was liberated.

The last large-scale operation was the liquidation of Ruslan Gelayev’s group in the area of ​​the village. Komsomolskoye, which ended on March 14, 2000. After this, the militants switched to sabotage and terrorist methods of warfare, and federal forces countered the terrorists with the actions of special forces and operations of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

During the CTO in Chechnya in 2002, hostages were taken in Moscow at the Theater Center on Dubrovka. In 2004, hostages were taken at school number 1 in the city of Beslan in North Ossetia.

By the beginning of 2005, after the destruction of Maskhadov, Khattab, Barayev, Abu al-Walid and many other field commanders, the intensity of sabotage and terrorist activities of the militants decreased significantly. The only large-scale operation of the militants (the raid on Kabardino-Balkaria on October 13, 2005) ended in failure.

From midnight on April 16, 2009, the National Anti-Terrorism Committee (NAC) of Russia, on behalf of President Dmitry Medvedev, abolished the CTO regime on the territory of the Chechen Republic.

The material was prepared based on information from open sources

On September 30, 2015, Russia launched a military campaign in Syria. After the end of World War II, the USSR and then Russia participated in dozens of military operations in which they suffered losses. From China and Cuba to Angola and Czechoslovakia - where and what the Russian armed forces achieved - in a special project by Kommersant

At the beginning of August 1999, armed clashes began on the border of Dagestan and Chechnya. On August 7, gangs of more than 400 people under the leadership of field commanders Shamil Basayev and Khattab invaded the territory of the Botlikh region of Dagestan from Chechnya. The fighting continued until the end of August, after which federal forces began an assault on the Wahhabi villages of Karamakhi, Chabanmakhi and Kadar in Dagestan.
On the night of September 5, about 2 thousand extremists again crossed the Chechen-Dagestan border. The fighting in Dagestan continued until September 15. By the end of September, up to 90 thousand soldiers and about 400 tanks were concentrated on the border with Chechnya. The combined group of federal forces was commanded by Colonel General Viktor Kazantsev. The separatist forces were estimated at 15–20 thousand militants, up to 30 tanks and 100 armored vehicles.

On October 2, 1999, Russian troops entered Chechnya. They managed to occupy the northern part of Chechnya with minimal losses and take control of the cities of Urus-Martan and Gudermes without a fight.

On December 22, Russian border guards and airborne units landed in the south of the Argun Gorge, blocking the path to Georgia. The assault on Grozny took place in December 1999-January 2000.

On February 1–3, as part of Operation Wolf Hunt, militant groups were lured out of the Chechen capital with the help of disinformation and sent to minefields (the militants lost approximately 1,500 people).

The last major combined arms operation was the destruction of a detachment of militants in the village of Komsomolskoye on March 2–15, 2000 (about 1,200 people were destroyed and captured). On April 20, Deputy Chief of the General Staff Valery Manilov said that the military part of the operation in Chechnya had been completed and now its “special part was being carried out - conducting special operations to complete the defeat of the remaining undead gangs.” It was announced that about 28 thousand military personnel would be stationed in the republic on a permanent basis, including the advanced units of the 42nd motorized rifle division, 2.7 thousand border guards, and nine battalions of internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation.

Moscow has relied on resolving the conflict by attracting some of the local elites to its side. On June 12, 2000, by decree of the President of the Russian Federation, Akhmat Kadyrov, a former close associate of Maskhadov and the Mufti of Ichkeria, was appointed head of the administration of the Chechen Republic.

Since the spring-summer of 2000, the militants switched to guerrilla actions: shelling, mining of roads, terrorist attacks. Terrorist activity quickly spread beyond the republic. Militants took hostages at the Nord-Ost musical in Moscow, organized a bombing of a government building in Grozny (2002), an explosion at the Wings rock festival in Tushino (2003), suicide bombings in the Moscow metro and on board passenger planes (2004) .

On May 9, 2004, Akhmat Kadyrov was killed in an explosion at the Dynamo stadium in Grozny.
Interview of Vladimir Putin to Sergei Dorenko (1999)
On September 1, 2004, the most notorious terrorist attack in Russian history was committed - the taking of more than 1 thousand hostages at a school in Beslan. The attack killed 334 people.

On October 13, 2005, militants made their last major attack - up to 200 people attacked 13 objects in Nalchik, including the airport, FSB and police buildings. 95 militants were killed and 71 were detained over the next year.

On July 10, 2006, Shamil Basayev, who took responsibility for the attack on Nalchik and a number of other high-profile terrorist attacks, was killed during a special operation by the FSB in Ingushetia. By that time, many separatist leaders had already been killed, including the President of Ichkeria Aslan Maskhadov.

In 2007, Ramzan Kadyrov, the son of Akhmat Kadyrov, came to power in Chechnya.

From 00:00 on April 16, 2009, the counter-terrorist operation regime on the territory of the Chechen Republic was canceled. The message from the National Anti-Terrorism Committee stated that from now on, measures to combat terrorism in Chechnya will be carried out by local law enforcement agencies, as in other regions of the country. This moment is considered the official end of the second Chechen war.

The total losses of security forces during the active phase of hostilities (from October 1999 to December 23, 2002) amounted to 4,572 dead and 15,549 wounded. According to Ministry of Defense statistics, from 1999 to September 2008, 3,684 military personnel were killed in the line of duty in Chechnya. According to the Main Personnel Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the losses of internal troops in August 1999-August 2003 amounted to 1,055 people. The losses of the Chechen Ministry of Internal Affairs, according to data for 2006, were estimated at 835 people killed. It was also reported that in 1999–2002, 202 FSB officers were killed in Chechnya. The total losses of Russian law enforcement agencies can be estimated at at least 6 thousand people.

According to the OGV headquarters, 15.5 thousand militants were killed in 1999–2002. From 2002 to 2009, security forces reported the elimination of about 2,100 more members of illegal armed groups: the bulk in 2002 (600) and 2003 (700). Separatist leader Shamil Basayev in 2005 estimated militant losses at 3,600 people. The human rights organization Memorial in 2004 estimated civilian casualties at 10–20 thousand people, Amnesty International in 2007 - up to 25 thousand dead.

As a result of the second Chechen campaign, Russia managed to completely take control of the territory of the republic and provide a government loyal to the center. At the same time, the terrorist organization “Caucasus Emirate” was formed in the region, with the goal of creating an Islamist state on the territory of all the Caucasian republics of the Russian Federation. After 2009, the gang underground organized a number of major terrorist attacks in the country (explosions in the Moscow metro in 2010, at Domodedovo airport in 2011, at a train station and in a trolleybus in Volgograd in 2013). The counter-terrorism operation regime is periodically introduced in the territories of the republics of the region.

Territory: Chechen Republic
Period: August 1999-April 2009
Duration: 9.5 years
Participants: Russia / Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, “Caucasus Emirate”
USSR/Russian forces involved: joint group of troops numbering up to 100 thousand people
Losses: more than 6 thousand people, of which 3.68 thousand were military personnel of the Ministry of Defense (as of September 2008)
Supreme Commander-in-Chief: Boris Yeltsin
Conclusion: two Chechen wars helped to “pacify” Chechnya, but turned the entire North Caucasus into a powder keg

In 2002, the threat of complete defeat loomed before the Chechen militants. Although the Ichkerian press continued to cheerfully report on the incredible losses of the “occupiers,” the Mujahideen were obviously losing the war. The militant detachments became smaller and smaller, soldiers died less and less, and Russian special forces caught one partisan cell after another. Abundantly provided amnesties not only allowed militants to legalize themselves, but actually pulled people out of the ranks of the “forest brothers”: voting with their feet and handing over their machine gun, or even getting a job in the new Chechen police, was more convenient and easier than going crazy in a cache, every waiting for a minute for Russian hunters with helicopters.

In addition, the population did not support the militants as unanimously as it seemed from the outside. Many Chechens greeted their compatriots emerging from the forest without enthusiasm - they brought with them new purges and new problems. Finally, not all field commanders could act in a coordinated manner or even consciously. Basayev was at best the most authoritative.

By 2002, most of the detachments not only did not obey anyone, but were also mainly concerned with issues of their own survival. True, even this turned out badly. The long row of names of exterminated “brigadier generals,” “ministers,” and “right-hand men” said little to the Russian public, but in reality it was much more impressive than the corpse of some Khattab: in the conditions of a chaotic guerrilla war in small groups, the defeat of small detachments was achieved to the stream. The lover of female suicide bombers, Tsagarayev, died, a sniper’s bullet found one of the leaders of the campaign against Dagestan, Bakuev, six of the nine famous slave traders, the Akhmadov brothers, died or went to prison, and Shirvani’s brother died from wounds and sepsis. Maskhadov issued an order on this matter, in which the handwriting of a former career military man is felt:

“Due to negligence and personal carelessness, underestimating the enemy... some commanders and government members were ambushed, died heroically in an unequal battle or were captured.” The less refined one, shortly before his death, put it more simply: “We are getting wet.”

In addition, Chechnya gradually lost its attractiveness for foreign sponsors. The war dragged on, and various “humanitarian foundations” gradually slowed down their activity. But the capabilities of militants within the country increased. Basayev, in particular, established work with the growing and wealthy Chechen diaspora in Russia, whose representatives he either persuaded or forced to cooperate.

The separatist leaders were not going to give up just like that. In the summer of 2002, at a meeting of field commanders, it was decided to sharply change the direction of the struggle.

The militants' first strategy - as far as they could still pursue a meaningful strategy - was to take the war outside of Chechnya. By that time, they had strongly shifted from national slogans towards religious ones, had a clear image of the future (a theocratic Islamic state in the Caucasus) and clearly knew what exactly they were going to offer to other mountaineers. Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, Ingushetia - Chechnya was now becoming only a part in the chain of jamaats, underground terrorist groups. Part of the underground infrastructure - bases, training centers and many militants - was also transferred outside of Chechnya. These seeds were expected to grow wildly.

The second point was closely related to the first. The terrorist attacks had already begun, but now they had to be brought to the level of a full-fledged terrorist campaign. Basayev and many commanders close to him were going to make the civilian population the main target of attacks. Yes, in 1999, the bombings of houses in Moscow, Buynaksk and Volgodonsk caused, instead of fear, rage and a desire to end Chechnya.

However, Basayev also well remembered another result of his escapades: in 1995, the mass hostage taking in Budennovsk gave the militants many months of respite, allowing them to recover from past attacks - perhaps, otherwise the Chechen underground would not have survived. Now the Chechens are planning not just a single high-profile terrorist attack, but a series of attacks that will paralyze the will and break any willingness to fight.

Aslan Maskhadov personally became a key element of this plan. Simple intimidation would not have any effect other than calls to unite and crush the reptile completely. The Chechens could not win the war by defeating Russian troops on the battlefield. Therefore, a “good” one was required to pair with the “evil investigator” - a political leader representing the moderate wing of the movement (albeit completely virtual). Maskhadov could convincingly call for peace, Russian politicians would agree to talk with him, and the West was also happy with him.

“Nord-Ost” made a mixed impression. The authorities did not know how to talk to the public and journalists. The rescue operation was organized with monstrous mistakes and missteps, which cost the lives of one hundred and thirty people, and the health of many survivors. The interaction between departments completely failed, which led to a tragedy of enormous proportions.

At the same time, the military part of the special operation was carried out brilliantly. The infamous gas attack at that moment turned out to be the only way out of the situation. “Alpha” and “Vympel” worked flawlessly and walked through the building of the cultural center like armed surgeons, eliminating all the militants, but without inflicting a scratch on the hostages. The suicide bombers were literally a second late - but this second in battle separates the living from the dead, and the frostbitten Chechen gopot with old machine guns from the counter-terrorism professionals.

The people in the hall generally behaved with dignity. Muscovites demonstrated restraint and nobility. The hostages helped those who tried to escape to escape, and morally supported those remaining in the hall - they even managed to calm down Barayev at one of the critical moments. Almost all public and political figures whom the terrorists allowed into the hall behaved in an exemplary manner. The doctors carried out their duty, not paying attention to the thugs around them. Russian society turned out to be much more stable and courageous than it was accustomed to think about itself.

Finally, in the background, even such a clumsy operation looked completely new. Although heavy losses could not be avoided, this time the invaders went after the terrorist attack not for an interview, but for an autopsy. No peace negotiations were held with the moderate murderers, despite calls from the progressive public. It is difficult to say whether this change has reached Basayev and Maskhadov. Most likely, they decided that Nord-Ost was not conducted tough enough.

“The maidens are waiting for me there, they are all without blemish”

In 2002–2004, suicide attacks came in a continuous stream. Arbi Barayev, who sent his cousin to explode, became a pioneer, but for a real terrorist war, the militants needed to establish “industrial production” of female suicide bombers. The North Caucasus in this sense was a fertile place. The patriarchal way of life, deeply traditional morals - all this gave rise to the type of woman who is modest, obedient to the orders of men, most often poorly educated, with a limited outlook, and easily suggestible. The militants used these features of society to the fullest. In addition, the harsh purges and the war itself produced enough young widows or simply teenage girls in love with the brutal and athletic forest Robinhoods.

Although the women were prepared to die in the flames of the explosion, some of them, for one reason or another, survived and were able to talk in detail about how they become kamikazes. Zarema Inarkaeva (sixteen years old) tried to blow up a police station in the Staropromyslovsky district. The bomb she brought there worked abnormally and did not explode completely. This girl’s story paints a monstrous picture both in terms of the morals of society and in the sense of the behavior of the militants themselves:

It all started long before that. Shamil Garibekov looked after me. He smiled and said how beautiful I was. And then - this was in December - I was walking down the street, his car stopped, and the guys jumped out and pushed me into the car. I didn’t even have time to come to my senses. What did I think then? Well, whatever. I thought: that’s it, they kidnapped me, now I’ll be my wife. I started telling Shamil that I didn’t want to get married, that I needed to warn my mother. Then they fed me and I fell asleep. It seems to me that they added something to the food, because my head was spinning, my arms and legs became heavy, and I fell asleep, although I didn’t want to sleep before.

I wake up - my clothes are already here. They went to my house, said that I got married, and my mother gave them everything.

I say: when will it be possible to see my mother? And Shamil answers me: never, forget about mom, you will be with us now. I sat crying, the girls calmed me down.

And then in the evening Shamil came to me. And I slept with him. Well, like a wife. When I cried, his people shouted at me. And then more and more often they began to add something to my food, give me some pills, which made me feel so calm. Somehow it doesn’t even matter. I realized that I couldn’t get out of there. Then I started cooking food and doing laundry for all the men who lived in this apartment. First I washed them, then I started sleeping with them all. They say this: he is my brother, and today I give you to him. Do you think someone asked me, persuaded me? He came in, hit him in the face, threw him on the bed - and that’s it.

I was often sleepy and lethargic, they definitely gave me something. I no longer cared what was happening. The guys always had a lot of weapons - machine guns, pistols, and grenades. Mine, Shamil, worked in the police, so at first I didn’t think that he was a Wahhabi. It was then that he began to give me some books to read - Wahhabi ones. After that, Shamil came to me, closed the door and said that he had an important matter for me: to give a bag to some friend. I immediately realized that something was unclean here. I say: why don’t you give it yourself?

“No,” he says, “it’s impossible for someone to see me giving him this bag.”

“What’s so special about it?”

“It’s none of your business. You just go into his office and say what they asked you to deliver for him. That's all."

He got terribly angry. He said that I would have to do this on February 5th. I said that I didn’t want to give anything to anyone. He grinned and said: “You’ll do it and you won’t get anywhere.”

(...) I used to love Shamil, he flirted with me before, courted me, I thought that everything was for real.

In the morning we were waiting for the person to whom I was supposed to give the bag. He was still not at work. Shamil was freaking out, cursing, we circled around the city, and I prayed to Allah that he would not appear for a longer time. These were the last hours of my life. I understood that there was something wrong in the bag, it was so heavy. I understood why they had filmed me before and asked me to say some words. Something about Allah. I was no longer alive or dead. There is nowhere to run. Death - both here and there. That’s why, when I entered the police department, I took my bag off my shoulder and walked slowly so that fewer people would die around me.

I walk and think: now! Right now! I wonder if I will feel pain or won’t have time? And what will be left of me? And who will bury me? Or they won’t bury him at all - like a murderer. How scary, mommy! While I was thinking, it exploded. Shamil detonated the explosives in the car.

There was such a noise, screams, my leg hurt, blood was pouring out of me. But I'm alive! The police immediately realized that if they took me to the hospital, they would kill me there. I'm crying, trying to explain something. They brought the doctors straight to the police station. There I was operated on - in the department.

Then they transported me under guard to the police department, cleared out some office for me, set up a bed, and this is where I’ve been living for four months now. Then I was informed that Khaled - the one who ordered Shamil to send me - was blown up by a landmine.

In Staropromyslovsky, no one was injured then except the girl herself. The level of moral degradation of the underground is simply amazing. The history of Caucasian terror does not shine at all, but the manner of using suicide bombers stands out as abomination even against the general background.

Usually they tried to make suicide bombers out of women with problems. Thus, two suicide bombers who died in “Nord-Ost” were registered in a psychiatric hospital due to causeless hysterics and severe headaches, and because of this, no one wanted to marry them until suitors from the jamaats were found. Widows were also used. Sometimes a suicide bomber was driven to the point of explosion by some completely wild trajectory: for example, the young widow (and also an orphan) Zarema Muzhakhoeva fell into terror after she tried to escape with her little daughter from relatives who had taken her child away from her, and for the sake of this escape she stole family members' jewelry.

After the deception was revealed and the escape did not take place, the woman, disgraced and “put on the counter” by kind-hearted relatives, became a suicide bomber. The recruiters offered her a good package of services from a totalitarian sect: the opportunity to see her daughter (but not in person, but in a dream), debt forgiveness (after death) and heaven (too). The liaisons were a deeply Wahhabi family, in which out of nine children, four men died in battle, and two daughters, including a fifteen-year-old one, were shot at Dubrovka.

The recruiters and female recruiters were especially successful in working with girls. Then, after the bombings, many female suicide bombers were described as young, modest, obedient and romantic, almost children (or not almost). There were very few real fanatics, despite all the lofty religious and national rhetoric, among the suicide bombers - convinced avengers like the sister of the famous field commander Luisa Bakueva made up a vanishingly small part of them.

Usually the girls were simply pumped full of psychotropic substances, and then they began psychological treatment as straightforward as a club. It was explained to future living bombs that paradise awaits them after death, that they are the chosen ones. Moreover, the ideas about heaven were the most primitive: the girls were literally offered a garden with flowers, in which they had to serve male martyrs. Not God knows what kind of propaganda, but it worked tolerably well on the intimidated, infantile and poorly educated target audience. In addition, Chechen girls were not pampered at home, and often a suicide bomber could be bought with a simple affection. One of the suicide bombers, before blowing herself up, bought herself for the first time... an elegant robe. Before exploding, the girls were glad that their friend’s peignoir fit well.

At the same time, in Nord-Ost, for example, no one counted on death - it was assumed that the Russians would surrender and the belts could be removed.

As can be seen from the story of the failed suicide bomber, many brides of Allah were not eager to explode - the militants mercilessly rejected them. “Girls for whom everything is fine, who study, work, will never do this in their lives,” noted Zarema Muzhakhoeva, also a failed suicide. However, it is not that terrorists require the consent of a living bomb. Sometimes for the sale of a daughter or sister, relatives were paid one and a half thousand dollars - large and cruel families could amass quite a capital by the standards of impoverished Chechnya.

The peak of suicide activity occurred at the end of 2002 and 2003. One explosion followed another. Shortly after Nord-Ost in Grozny, terrorists attacked a complex of government buildings. One of the suicide bombers this time was a man who, in his fanaticism, went so far as to deceitfully kidnap his own little daughter - from a Russian woman, by the way - from Yaroslavl, and kill her and himself. More than seventy people were killed and more than six hundred were injured.

On May 12, two women in cars destroyed the administration building of the Nadterechny district in Znamensky - almost 60 more corpses. A day later, another explosion near Grozny - 16 killed.

And in July, Moscow again became the target of suicide bombers.

Two female suicide bombers showed up at the rock festival in Tushino. The first, Zulikhan Elikhadzhieva, managed to kill only herself. A security policeman noticed a nervous girl speaking on the phone in an incomprehensible language and tried to pull her aside. Here the terrorist lost her nerve and detonated her bomb. Fortunately, only the detonator exploded, tearing open the suicide bomber’s stomach.

A kilogram of plastic and two kilos of metal balls and chopped nails, which were usually used to stuff belts, remained lying like dead weight. The stunned policeman turned to the suicide bomber dying next to the beer bottle: “What’s your last name? Where are you from?" “Go away,” she answered, “I couldn’t... Now I won’t get to Allah.” A few seconds later she died.

The second living bomb reached its target. Ten minutes later she blew herself up at the cash register.

“At first I rushed to the man, thrown aside by the blast wave,” said the doctor, one of the first to be on the spot. - He called for help. I ran up to him, I remember, I was happy: alive, we’ll save him. And then he saw that the ball had pierced his neck artery and blood was gushing out like from a pipe. He lived for a few seconds, we couldn’t do anything.”

16 people were killed or soon died. The authorities and organizers made, perhaps, the only right decision. Cell phone service was cut off and people outside were sent home. Those who had already gone inside were not told anything about what had happened: panic and crush would have killed much more people than two suicide bombers, and they could have started very easily, given that there were thousands of not particularly sober people at the festival. They let everyone out, but didn’t let anyone back in, so the celebration continued. The people inside simply had no idea what had happened. 200 buses were assembled on Volokolamsk Highway to take people to metro stations.

Five days later, a not exactly unique, but rare incident occurred: the suicide bomber fell into the hands of the authorities alive. Security at the cafe on 1st Tverskaya-Yamskaya drew attention to a girl with her hand in her bag. She either approached the establishment, not daring to enter, then walked away. The guards called the police. Sergeant Mikhail Galtsev, who came to the call, asked what was in the bag... and Zarema told the truth: “A suicide belt.” Further versions diverge: the suicide bomber herself claimed that she surrendered herself. However, a policewoman who was present says that the suicide bomber tried to press the bomb button several times, but for some reason it did not work. The frightened Muzhakhoeva was immediately pushed into the car, and the bag with the bomb was left in place.

The sapper robot was unable to open the bag, and then a living sapper, FSB Major Georgy Trofimov, an experienced specialist who had been involved in mine clearance for six years and participated in the deactivation of land mines and belts taken at Dubrovka, went to the suicide bomber’s belt. As soon as he bent over the bomb, an explosion occurred, killing the bomb technician on the spot.

It should be noted that Muzhakhoeva, although she did not want to die, did not cooperate with the investigation very willingly either. She brought FSB agents to the base in the village of Tolstopaltsevo, where the suicide bombers lived before the explosion, only a few days later. The rest of the group had already managed to evacuate, so the security guards only got six equipped suicide bomber belts.

It turned out that the suicide bombers arrived in Moscow separately. They were already met at the scene by the organizers of the terrorist attack. For future suicide bombers, they rented a private house in the Moscow region, where the belts were kept. From there the suicides went to Tushino, and Muzhakhoeva to the cafe. The group consisted of only a few people who had little contact with the outside world. Judging by the abundance of belts, Muzhakhoeva’s misfire with self-detonation interrupted the entire conveyor belt for transporting suicide bombers to Moscow.

True, there are other versions about Muzhakhoeva herself. She herself called herself a simple suicide bomber, but in the spring of 2004, the revelations of her cellmate in the pre-trial detention center were published. Moreover, this cellmate was an informant for the prison administration, and the material itself was clearly processed. It is unknown who leaked this information and why, but according to this version, Muzhakhoeva commanded a group of female suicide bombers. Some details of the story are indeed atypical for the behavior of a suicide - for example, she was carrying explosives not attached to herself, but in her bag.

Strange for a suicide bomber, but quite logical if she wanted to give a bomb to someone. Moreover, Muzhakhoeva’s behavior in prison clearly indicated that in the hands of the special services it was not a deceived village fool, but a completely conscious, cruel and resourceful enemy. The unlucky suicide bomber rejoiced at the news of new terrorist attacks. Let us note that this version also fits perfectly with Zarema’s long silence about the location of the terrorist base. Her friends had already exploded, who was she supposed to get out from under the blow - the men who sent her to her death?

And the detective story itself, which Muzhakhoeva told about herself, does not really fit with the image of the deceived unfortunate woman. She actively moved around Moscow, and did not just drive from the resting place to the explosion site. In short, there are too many unusual details in Zarema’s stories to calmly take them on faith. Taking into account all these points, it is easy to understand the jury who unanimously found her guilty and not deserving of leniency.

Zarema Muzhakhoeva was sentenced to twenty years in prison. After the verdict was announced, she screamed, “I’m going to get out of prison and blow you all up!” In 2009, the court rejected her request for clemency.

The terrorist attacks in Moscow confronted the country with a grim fact: Russian law enforcement agencies are unable to ensure the safety of citizens. The absence or extreme weakness of agents among militants, the inability to adequately resist the underground even in their own capital - three years have passed since the terrorist attacks of 1999, but the special services turned out to be just as helpless in the face of a series of terrorist attacks. Attempts to infiltrate someone into the militants in the early 2000s usually ended badly. Moreover, terrorists could encourage imaginary recruitments, in reality supplying the FSB with disinformation and receiving agents protected from searches and inspections at checkpoints.

Suicide attacks continued non-stop throughout 2003. Terrorists rammed a hospital in Mozdok, exploded at public transport stops, blew up electric trains... Next year in 2004, they had an even more impressive benefit performance ahead of them.

Succession Rumbles

As the intensity of the shooting decreased, the number of independent loyalist groups in Chechnya grew. They influenced politics to varying degrees. One of the most combat-ready and at the same time the most apolitical formations was the “West” battalion of Said-Magomed Kakiev. Kakiyev’s detachment was formed and operated under the patronage of the GRU. This detachment, which on principle did not accept former militants, showed excellent fighting qualities, and its commander never gave any reason to doubt his loyalty.

The phrase “I swear to Allah, I am ready to die for Russia” sounded very serious in the mouth of this man. However, Kakiyev was an officer - first, second and third. He had no taste for politics. The machine gun in his hands and the enemy in the line of fire attracted him much more than any chair, so after a bright debut he quickly left the stage. It is characteristic that in modern Chechnya he received an honorary position, but not associated with any real power.

It is interesting, by the way, that Kakiyev fiercely criticized the very idea of ​​mass amnesties for former militants:

Amnesty personally raises a lot of questions for me. How can we unconditionally forgive those who fought against us? Everyone says that they are innocent, they are not Wahhabis, they did not kill spiritual leaders, and so on. What should they do with the souls of the 18-year-old conscripts whom they executed? That's why I don't understand this amnesty. Yes, we need to forgive those who got into the gang by accident, by mistake, who were lured or intimidated under the threat of death. And amnesty for those who fought so much is a time bomb.

Look, people are fighting against the country, so many soldiers have died during this time, and they bear no responsibility at all! I will never get over this. We are mortal - and how will we look into the eyes of eighteen-year-old boys there? Blood cannot be forgiven. Whoever killed people must answer. In any war, the treatment of prisoners must be humane, and what these animals did defies description. These bandits have lost their dignity. It turns out that the terrorist attacks are carried out by Basayev alone, and the others are not guilty of anything.

The history of the Chechen riot police under the command of Musa Gazimagomadov and Buvadi Dakhiev was somewhat different. The commander of this detachment had a blood count against the militants, like many of his subordinates, so the riot police fought not for fear, but for conscience. However, the loyalty of the riot police and the Chechen Ministry of Internal Affairs in general to the president was in question. The Minister of Internal Affairs of Chechnya, Ruslan Tsakaev, was appointed to the post from Moscow in early 2003.

Kadyrov resisted this appointment, and later his relationship with Tsakaev did not work out. Tsakaev started a reform of the Chechen police, squeezing out former militants from there. Kadyrov, on the contrary, insisted on the most active involvement of those who came out of the forest to serve in the police. Regular amnesties led to the fact that many hundreds of former privates and minor Mujahideen commanders found themselves in a legal position. Most of them no longer wanted and could not completely let go of the machine gun, and many simply spied for the underground.

Be that as it may, Kadyrov wanted to use them to build new power structures of the republic, but the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs did not cause the slightest enthusiasm for this idea. In April 2003, Tsakaev resigned “of his own free will.” Shortly before this, Musa Gazimagomadov was involved in a strange car accident: his car was rammed at full speed by a Kamaz that drove into oncoming traffic. Gazimagomadov was urgently taken to the Burdenko hospital, but the riot police commander could not be saved; he died from severe injuries. Tsakaev wrote his resignation shortly after this accident and literally a few hours before Gazimagomadov’s death.

Although the new OMON commander was Kadyrov’s man, the soldiers and officers could not establish relations with him for a long time. The troublemaker was Buvadi Dakhiev, the second known leader of the Chechen riot police and also a complete loyalist who had never fought against the Russians. The riot police and the Kadyrov clan looked at each other like wolves until 2006, and then Dakhiev was killed in a ridiculous shootout on the Ingush border under the most foggy circumstances.

Finally, the most famous independent formation of loyal Chechens, not associated with the Kadyrov clan, was the “Vostok” detachment of the Yamadayev brothers. The Yamadayevs had political ambitions and business interests in Chechnya. Ruslan, one of the brothers, joined the local United Russia and has been a Duma deputy since 2003. Sulim became deputy military commandant of Chechnya and entered the military academy. Frunze. The “Vostokovites” also acted effectively and harshly, and worked as a counterweight to the influence of the Kadyrovs in the republic. However, the two clans have not yet clashed openly.

Kadyrov himself initially relied on his own security service, which soon grew to the size of a private army. Its units within the Ministry of Internal Affairs gradually increased and multiplied - the PPS regiments, the “oil” regiment, the Anti-Terrorist Center (later, its fighters formed the “North” and “South” battalions). Kadyrov initially recruited fellow villagers and relatives into his troops, and soon switched to former militants.

In 2002–2003, the first signs of the future unlimited power of the Kadyrov clan became visible. Relying on the amnestied militants who were personally loyal to him (for some time they even planned to bring in Gelayev!) the elder Kadyrov systematically fought with other leaders of Chechnya and eliminated potential competitors.

The easiest way turned out to be to remove Bislan Gantamirov (the commander of the “Gantamirov” detachment who fought on the side of the Russians). He was listed as the republic's Minister of Press and Information, and in the summer of 2003, during the presidential election campaign in Chechnya, he announced a break with Kadyrov. Gantamirov immediately lost all his posts. It is difficult to understand what the essence of this demarche was, but Kadyrov dealt with his first serious opponent very easily.

Akhmat Hadji continued to strengthen his power. In the spring of 2003, a referendum on the constitution and elections of parliament and president was held in Chechnya. The elections themselves took place in the fall. Notable figures included the famous politician Aslambek Aslakhanov and businessman Malik Saidullaev. Gantamirov and Khasbulatov, characteristically, decided not to participate in the elections. Already during the campaign, Saidullaev was removed from the race by the election commission, and Aslakhanov refused to participate himself, saying that he could not conduct a normal election campaign. Kadyrov had no competitors left, and he won with a stunning result of 80% of the votes.

It was not necessary to falsify the results - all possible and impossible pressure was put on the candidates even before the voting. In addition, Chechens were unlikely to go out into the squares with ironic posters about the stolen elections. By this time, the Republic was inhabited by exhausted and demoralized people.

The militants are only a few thousand people, a statistically insignificant force even with their accomplices. If in the late 90s quite a few Chechens believed that the Mujahideen were protecting them from the authorities, now the forest brother who came down from the mountains was rather frightening. The separatists could live only at the expense of the population, which they, in fact, considered as a resource, and concealment meant a quick cleanup with those killed or missing. Moreover, the federal authorities and Kadyrov’s men gave a ghostly hope for a normal life, which no one had seen for ten years, and it was clear who the militants were, administrators and infrastructure builders.

The population plunged into deep apathy. The average Chechen automatically turned into an empty place next to any soldier, policeman or militant. They were ready to vote for anyone, as long as they promised a minimum of security and some kind of income in exchange.

In this sense, Kadyrov did not spoil his voters. The money allocated for the restoration of the republic was traditionally stolen, and the deadlines for the restoration of destroyed objects were constantly missed. But gradually Chechnya was restored, albeit in a peculiar order - starting with administrative buildings and oil pipelines. Unemployment remained huge. Nevertheless, refugees were gradually returned to the republic, and even a slow movement towards normality looked better than the complete lack of work, infrastructure and prospects under the radicals.

Kadyrov Sr. won a convincing victory. However, he was no longer able to enjoy its fruits.

On May 9, 2004, a loud and rather mysterious event took place in Grozny in every sense. was present at the Grozny stadium at the celebrations on the occasion of Victory Day. Renovations have just finished there. Neither Kadyrov himself nor those present could know that a powerful landmine from a traditional 152-mm howitzer shell was built into the concrete structures of the stand. A bomb exploded right under Kadyrov, killing several people and the president of Chechnya himself.

The main intrigue of the terrorist attack: Kadyrov was not necessarily blown up by militants. Although Basayev soon took responsibility, few believed him. Moreover, even the Russian authorities, who usually gladly dumped everything possible and impossible on dead terrorists, showed unexpected restraint. Both the press and officials cautiously reported that the version of underground involvement was not the main one, and they mentioned a certain “mole” in their own ranks. Finally, Ramzan Kadyrov said in an interview that Basayev and Maskhadov had nothing to do with it: “There are other forces. We know them."

Let us note that Kadyrov initially did not intend to sit on this podium, and they could not have aimed at him at all. Another high-ranking Chechen died along with him, and the commander of the group of troops in Chechnya, Valery Baranov, was seriously wounded. However, it is more likely that the killers actually reached their target.

Who could wish Kadyrov dead, except militants? They talked about the struggle for Chechen oil between the president and other centers of power. At the beginning of the war, oil in the republic was extracted using artisanal methods, but later local deposits inevitably went to more serious players. Kadyrov Sr. intended to take an active part in dividing the pie.

Back in 2000, he began to raise the issue of control of the Chechen authorities over the local oil industry. After the intensity of the fighting began to decline, the military, various groups of loyalist Chechens, and, of course, Russian oil corporations joined the struggle for control of the black gold. In particular, the well-known giant Rosneft came to Chechnya.

The price of the issue was very high: by 2007, the republic was producing one and a half billion dollars worth of oil annually, and in 2004 everyone already understood that the future of the local oil industry was decent. Among the candidates for profitable “feeding” were a variety of people who were ready, if necessary, to ensure their interests by force - for example, the former field commander Khozh-Akhmed Nukhaev, the influential clan of the Magomadov brothers and many others. Oil affairs, however, remain only one of the hypothetical reasons for the murder. Political differences could also have killed the elder Kadyrov.

For example, in 2009 he stated that the Yamadayev brothers, who had long disputed the monopoly of the Kadyrov clan on leadership, were involved in the terrorist attack. It is clear that Kadyrov could blame his main competitors for anything, even for the sinking of the Titanic, but they really had a motive. The situation with opportunities was worse.

Be that as it may, the investigation into this case lasted until 2007 and ended in nothing: not a single suspect remained, no one was detained. In 2009, on the initiative of Ramzan (!), the investigation was resumed, but stopped on the same day by decision of the leadership of the Investigative Committee. Apparently, the death of Akhmat Kadyrov is destined to forever remain one of the many dirty and bloody mysteries of the war in Chechnya.

Then the second son of Akhmat Kadyrov appeared on stage for the first time. His conversation with Vladimir Putin, shown on TV, was remembered by many for both the sympathetic, almost intimate intonation of communication and Ramzan’s tracksuit. Thus, a new star lit up on the horizon of Chechen politics.

One might have expected that Kadyrov's death would weaken the position of the loyalists. This, however, did not happen. The transfer of power took place quite calmly. Ramzan had not yet reached the age when he could legally lay claim to his father’s seat: he was only 28 years old, and he was allowed to become president of Chechnya at 30.

In addition, he needed to cut his teeth a little at the top of local politics. Until now, the younger Kadyrov served as an assistant to the Minister of Internal Affairs of the republic and a member of the State Council; after the death of his father, he became an adviser to the plenipotentiary representative of the Russian Federation, and later - acting. O. Chairman of the Government. While the Dauphin was entering manhood in sweatpants, the regent in Chechnya was Alu Alkhanov, an experienced apparatchik.

It is interesting that a few months after the death of Akhmat Kadyrov, his eldest son Zelimkhan died. It is difficult to call Zelimkhan Kadyrov an independent politician. He is more of a hedonist and a playmaker than a statesman and military leader. In the Kadyrov police, Zelimkhan, we note, had the title of company foreman, which was very modest for his origin. He had a reputation, but a very bad one. In 1997, he shot a man during an argument, and in the 2000s he took part in a shooting incident in Kislovodsk. Then two groups of Russians dissatisfied with each other began to shoot in the hotel with Stechkin pistols.

Moreover, among the people whom Zelimkhan unsuccessfully shot, FAPSI warrant officer Vladimir Shevelev was discovered. The arriving Kislovodsk police managed to disarm the cowboys, and, according to some unconfirmed reports, they found drugs in the hotel room of the shooters. As the press reported, the incident itself occurred due to Zelimkhan’s attempt to commit violence against a woman and the intention of the warrant officer and his comrade to stop the dissolute young man. The Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of Chechnya announced on this occasion that a “political provocation” had been organized against Zelimkhan Kadyrov.

Such was the man who died soon after the death of his powerful father. There is hardly anything wrong with his death. Heartbroken sons die of heart attacks. Seniority in Chechen society in our times does not mean nearly as much as before, and Zelimkhan had no taste for politics, and certainly was not suitable for the role of the puppet heir of Akhmat-Khadzhi. Moreover, his antics did not compromise the entire Kadyrov clan at all. None of the worthy relatives of the deceased could wish for his death.

Before they are hanged. Death of Yandarbiev

Bombings and political assassinations are a spectacular way of fighting, but two can play this game. In February 2004, the Russians carried out a daring, successful operation far beyond the borders of their own country.

After Friday prayers, Zelimkhan Yandarbiev was returning to his home in Doha, the capital of Qatar. They had already attached a bomb to his car. As soon as the car drove away from the mosque, an explosion occurred under the bottom. Yandarbiev’s minor son received burns, but survived, two guards died on the spot, and Yandarbiev himself died in the hospital without regaining consciousness an hour later.

During the war, Yandarbiev remained in the shadow of brutal lovers of waving weapons on camera, but his real role was much more significant than that of most field commanders. He built bridges between militants in Chechnya and their patrons abroad. As an ideologist, this man did a lot to include Chechnya in the global jihadist movement.

In Qatar, as he himself claimed, he lived as an honored guest of the emir. Whether this is true or whether Yandarbiev was simply trying to fill his own price is unknown, but until his death he absolutely represented Ichkeria in foreign relations with the countries of the Muslim East, including on monetary issues. Apparently, he also did not give up planning terrorist attacks: for some reason, Movsar Baraev spoke to him on the phone from the captured cultural center on Dubrovka.

Russia's attempts to extradite Yandarbiev through diplomatic means yielded nothing, and Moscow decided to play big. The game was a success. Ichkeria has lost an experienced diplomat. The militants in the east had no other figures of this magnitude.

The spectacular success of the operation was somewhat spoiled by subsequent events - three days later, Qatari special services arrested three Russians at a villa rented by diplomats. One enjoyed diplomatic immunity, and nothing could be done with him, but the other two were brought to trial. The agents did not deny involvement with the special services, but they had already done the job.

The bomb was sent to Qatar from Moscow in a bag with diplomatic mail, and to eliminate it, the military used a rented van, which they rented and appeared on video cameras. On June 30, a Qatari court found them guilty of the murder of Yandarbiev and sentenced them to life imprisonment, but the crisis was soon resolved through diplomatic channels. Already on December 23, both officers descended onto the runway of the Moscow airport along the carpet.

Second Chechen war

(officially called the counter-terrorism operation (CTO)— combat operations on the territory of Chechnya and the border regions of the North Caucasus. It began on September 30, 1999 (the date of the entry of Russian troops into Chechnya). The active phase of hostilities lasted from 1999 to 2000, then, as the Russian Armed Forces established control over the territory of Chechnya, it developed into a smoldering conflict, which actually continues to this day. From 0 o'clock on April 16, 2009, the CTO regime was cancelled.

1. Background

After the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements and the withdrawal of Russian troops in 1996, there was no peace and tranquility in Chechnya and the surrounding regions.

Chechen criminal structures made a business out of mass kidnappings with impunity,

hostage taking (including official Russian representatives working in Chechnya), theft of oil from oil pipelines and oil wells, drug production and smuggling, issuance and distribution of counterfeit banknotes, terrorist attacks and attacks on neighboring Russian regions. On the territory of Chechnya, camps were created to train militants - young people from Muslim regions of Russia. Mine demolition instructors and Islamic preachers were sent here from abroad. Numerous Arab mercenaries began to play a significant role in the life of Chechnya. Their main goal was to destabilize the situation in the Russian regions neighboring Chechnya and spread the ideas of separatism to the North Caucasian republics (primarily Dagestan, Karachay-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria).

At the beginning of March 1999, Gennady Shpigun, plenipotentiary representative of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs in Chechnya, was kidnapped by terrorists at the Grozny airport. For the Russian leadership, this was evidence that the President of the Chechen Republic, Maskhadov, was unable to independently fight terrorism. The federal center took measures to strengthen the fight against Chechen gangs: self-defense units were armed and police units were strengthened throughout the entire perimeter of Chechnya, the best operatives of units fighting ethnic organized crime were sent to the North Caucasus, several Tochka-U missile launchers were deployed from the Stavropol region ", intended for delivering targeted strikes.

“Tochka-U”

An economic blockade of Chechnya was introduced, which led to the fact that the cash flow from Russia began to dry up sharply. Due to the tightening of the regime at the border, it has become increasingly difficult to smuggle drugs into Russia and take hostages. Gasoline produced in clandestine factories has become impossible to export outside Chechnya. The fight against Chechen criminal groups that actively financed militants in Chechnya was also intensified. In May-July 1999, the Chechen-Dagestan border turned into a militarized zone. As a result, the income of Chechen warlords fell sharply and they had problems purchasing weapons and paying mercenaries. In April 1999, Vyacheslav Ovchinnikov, who successfully led a number of operations during the First Chechen War, was appointed commander-in-chief of the internal troops.

In May 1999, Russian helicopters launched a missile attack on the positions of Khattab militants on the Terek River in response to an attempt by gangs to seize an outpost of internal troops on the Chechen-Dagestan border. After this, the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Vladimir Rushailo, announced the preparation of large-scale preventive strikes.

Meanwhile, Chechen gangs under the command of Shamil Basayev and Khattab were preparing for an armed invasion of Dagestan. From April to August 1999, conducting reconnaissance in force, they made more than 30 forays in Stavropol and Dagestan alone, as a result of which several dozen military personnel, law enforcement officers and civilians were killed and injured. Realizing that the strongest groups of federal troops were concentrated in the Kizlyar and Khasavyurt directions, the militants decided to strike the mountainous part of Dagestan. When choosing this direction, the bandits proceeded from the fact that there were no troops there, and it would not be possible to transfer forces to this inaccessible area in the shortest possible time. In addition, the militants were counting on a possible attack in the rear of federal forces from the Kadar zone of Dagestan, controlled by local Wahhabis since August 1998.

As researchers note, the destabilization of the situation in the North Caucasus was beneficial to many. First of all, Islamic fundamentalists seeking to spread their influence throughout the world, as well as Arab oil sheikhs and financial oligarchs of the Persian Gulf countries, who are not interested in starting to exploit the oil and gas fields of the Caspian Sea.

On August 7, 1999, a massive invasion of Dagestan by militants was carried out from the territory of Chechnya under the overall command of Shamil Basayev and the Arab mercenary Khattab.

The core of the militant group consisted of foreign mercenaries and fighters of the Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade, associated with Al-Qaeda. The militants’ plan to have the population of Dagestan come over to their side failed; the Dagestanis offered desperate resistance to the invading bandits. The Russian authorities proposed that the Ichkerian leadership conduct a joint operation with federal forces against Islamists in Dagestan. It was also proposed to “resolve the issue of liquidating bases, storage and rest areas of illegal armed groups, which the Chechen leadership in every possible way denies.” Aslan Maskhadov verbally condemned the attacks on Dagestan and their organizers and instigators, but did not take real measures to counter them.
Fighting between federal forces and invading militants continued for more than a month, ending with the militants being forced to retreat from the territory of Dagestan back to Chechnya.

On the same days - September 4-16 - a series of terrorist attacks were carried out in several cities of Russia (Moscow, Volgodonsk and Buinaksk) - explosions of residential buildings.

Explosion of No. 6 on Kashirskoye Highway in Moscow 09/13/1999

Considering Maskhadov’s inability to control the situation in Chechnya, the Russian leadership decided to conduct a military operation to destroy the militants on the territory of Chechnya. On September 18, the borders of Chechnya were blocked by Russian troops.

On September 23, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree “On measures to increase the effectiveness of counter-terrorism operations in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation.” The decree provided for the creation of a Joint Group of Forces in the North Caucasus to conduct a counter-terrorism operation.

On September 23, Russian troops began massive bombing of Grozny and its environs, and on September 30 they entered the territory of Chechnya.

2. Character

Having broken the resistance of the militants by the force of the army and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (the command of the Russian troops successfully uses military tricks, such as, for example, luring militants to minefields, raids on the rear of gangs and many others), the Kremlin relied on the “Chechenization” of the conflict and luring side with some of the elite and former militants. Thus, in 2000, the former supporter of the separatists, the chief mufti of Chechnya, Akhmat Kadyrov, became the head of the pro-Kremlin administration of Chechnya in 2000.

The militants, on the contrary, relied on the internationalization of the conflict, involving armed groups of non-Chechen origin in their struggle. By the beginning of 2005, after the destruction of Maskhadov, Khattab, Barayev, Abu al-Walid and many other field commanders, the intensity of sabotage and terrorist activities of the militants decreased significantly. During 2005-2008, not a single major terrorist attack was committed in Russia, and the only large-scale militant operation (Raid on Kabardino-Balkaria on October 13, 2005) ended in complete failure.

3. Chronology

3.1. 1999

Aggravation of the situation on the border with Chechnya

• June 18 - Chechnya attacked two outposts on the Dagestan-Chechen border, as well as an attack on a Cossack company in the Stavropol Territory. The Russian leadership is closing most of the checkpoints on the border with Chechnya.
• June 22 - for the first time in the history of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, an attempt was made to commit a terrorist attack in its main building. The bomb was defused in time. According to one version, the terrorist attack was a response of Chechen militants to threats from the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Rushailo, to carry out acts of retaliation in Chechnya
• June 23 - shelling from the side of Chechnya at the outpost near the village of Pervomaiskoye, Khasavyurt district of Dagestan.
• June 30 - Rushailo said: “We must respond to the blow with a more crushing blow; “on the border with Chechnya, the order was given to use preventive strikes against armed gangs.”
• July 3 — Rushailo said that the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs “is beginning to strictly regulate the situation in the North Caucasus, where Chechnya acts as a criminal “think tank” controlled by foreign intelligence services, extremist organizations and the criminal community.” Deputy Prime Minister of the ChRI government Kazbek Makhashev stated in response: “We cannot be intimidated by threats, and Rushailo knows this well.”
• July 5 - Rushailo stated that “early in the morning of July 5, a preemptive strike was launched against concentrations of 150-200 armed militants in Chechnya.”
• July 7 - a group of militants from Chechnya attacked an outpost near the Grebensky Bridge in the Babayurt region of Dagestan. Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation and Director of the FSB of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin said that “Russia will henceforth take not preventive, but only adequate actions in response to attacks in the areas bordering Chechnya.” He emphasized that “the Chechen authorities do not fully control the situation in the republic.”
• July 16 - Commander of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation V. Ovchinnikov stated that “the issue of creating a buffer zone around Chechnya is being considered.”
• July 23 - Chechen militants attacked an outpost on the territory of Dagestan protecting the Kopayevsky hydroelectric complex. The Ministry of Internal Affairs of Dagestan stated that “this time the Chechens carried out reconnaissance in force, and large-scale actions by gangs will soon begin along the entire perimeter of the Dagestan-Chechen border.”

Attack on Dagestan

Militant invasion of Dagestan, also known as Dagestan War(actually considered the beginning Second Chechen campaign), - armed clashes that accompanied the entry of forces based in the territory Chechnya detachments "Islamic Peacekeeping Brigade" under the command Shamilya Basayeva And Khattaba to the territory Dagestan August 7 - September 14, 1999 Initially, militant groups entered Botlikhsky(operation "ImamGhazi-Muhammad » - August 7-23), and then on Novolaksky district Dagestan(operation "ImamGamzat-bek » - September 5-14).

According to Russian military sources, the number of bandits ranged from 1,500 to 2,000 militants. Most of the militants were processed in terrorist center "Caucasus" and in the camp of the Urus-Martan jamaat. Some residents Dagestan supported gangs.

The leader of the gang was the famous Chechen terrorist, Emir Congress of the Peoples of Ichkeria and Dagestan, Divisional General of the Armed Forces of ChRI Shamil Basayev, and his closest assistant was the head of the terrorist center “Caucasus”, Colonel of the Armed Forces of the ChRI Khattab. Russian sources reported that bandit groups also participated in the invasion of Dagestan Vahi Arsanova , Ruslana Gelayeva , Arbi Barayeva And Hunkara Israpilova, however, independent sources confirm the participation of only Barayev’s bandit group “ IPON ».

The religious leader of the invasion was Bagautdin Kebedov, which since autumn 1998 lived on the territory of Ichkeria. Political leadership was taken over by the so-called. "Islamic Shura of Dagestan", which included Sirazhudin Ramazanov, Magomed Tagaev, Nadirshakh Khachilayev , Adallo Aliyev, Akhmad Sardali, Magomed Kuramagomedov and others

Bagautdin Kebedov

• August 7 - September 14 - from the territory of the ChRI, detachments of field commanders Shamil Basayev and Khattab invaded the territory of Dagestan. Fierce fighting continued for more than a month. The official government of the ChRI, unable to control the actions of various armed groups on the territory of Chechnya, dissociated itself from the actions of Shamil Basayev, but did not take practical action against him.
• August 12 - Deputy Head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation I. Zubov reported that a letter was sent to the President of the Chechen Republic of Ichristia Maskhadov with a proposal to conduct a joint operation with federal troops against Islamists in Dagestan.
• August 13 - Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said that “strikes will be carried out on bases and concentrations of militants regardless of their location, including on the territory of Chechnya.”
• August 16 - President of the Chechen Republic of Ingushetia Aslan Maskhadov introduced martial law in Chechnya for a period of 30 days, announced the partial mobilization of reservists and participants in the First Chechen War.

Aerial bombing of Chechnya

• August 25 - Russian aircraft strike militant bases in the Vedeno Gorge in Chechnya. In response to the official protest from the ChRI, the command of the federal forces declares that they “reserve the right to strike militant bases in the territory of any North Caucasus region, including Chechnya.”
• September 4 - 16 - explosions of residential buildings in Buinaksk, Moscow and Volgodonsk
• September 6 - 18 - Russian aviation carries out numerous missile and bomb attacks on military camps and militant fortifications in Chechnya.

• September 11 - Maskhadov announced general mobilization in Chechnya.
• September 14 - V. Putin said that “the Khasavyurt agreements should be subjected to an impartial analysis”, as well as “a strict quarantine should be temporarily introduced” along the entire perimeter of Chechnya.
• September 18 - Russian troops block the border of Chechnya from Dagestan, Stavropol Territory, North Ossetia and Ingushetia.
• September 23 - Russian aircraft began bombing the capital of Chechnya and its environs. As a result, several electrical substations, a number of oil and gas complex factories, the Grozny mobile communications center, a television and radio broadcasting center, and an An-2 aircraft were destroyed. The press service of the Russian Air Force stated that “aircraft will continue to strike targets that gangs can use in their interests.”
• September 27 — Chairman of the Russian Government V. Putin categorically rejected the possibility of a meeting between the President of Russia and the head of the ChRI. “There will be no meetings to let the militants lick their wounds,” he said.

Start of ground operation

• September 30 - Vladimir Putin, in an interview with journalists, promised that there would be no new Chechen war. He also stated that “combat operations are already underway, our troops have entered the territory of Chechnya several times, already two weeks ago they occupied commanding heights, liberated them, and so on”. As Putin said, “We need to be patient and do this work - completely clear the territory of terrorists. If this work is not done today, they will return and all the sacrifices made will be in vain.". On the same day, armored units of the Russian army from the Stavropol Territory and Dagestan entered the territory of the Naursky and Shelkovsky regions of Chechnya.
• October 4 - at a meeting of the military council of the ChRI, it was decided to form three directions to repel attacks by federal forces. The western direction was headed by Ruslan Gelayev, the eastern direction by Shamil Basaev, and the central direction by Magomed Khambiev.

M. Khambiev

• October 6 - in accordance with Maskhadov’s decree, martial law began to apply in Chechnya. Maskhadov proposed that all religious figures in Chechnya declare a holy war on Russia—Gazavat.
• October 15 - troops of the Western group of General Vladimir Shamanov entered Chechnya from Ingushetia.

V. Shamanov

• October 16 - federal forces occupied a third of the territory of Chechnya north of the Terek River and began the second stage of the anti-terrorist operation, the main goal of which was the destruction of gangs in the remaining territory of Chechnya.
• October 18 - Russian troops crossed the Terek.
• October 21 - federal forces launched a missile attack on the central market of the city of Grozny, which killed 140 civilians
• November 11 - field commanders brothers Yamadayev and Mufti of Chechnya Akhmat Kadyrov surrendered Gudermes to federal forces
• November 16 - federal forces took control of the settlement of Novy Shatoy.
• November 17 - the first major losses of federal forces since the beginning of the campaign. A reconnaissance group of the 31st separate airborne brigade was lost near Vedeno (12 dead, 2 prisoners).
• November 18 - according to the NTV television company, federal forces took control of the regional center of Achkhoy-Martan “without firing a single shot.”
• November 25 - President of the ChRI Maskhadov addressed the Russian soldiers fighting in the North Caucasus with an offer to surrender and go over to the side of the militants.
• December 7 - Federal forces occupied Argun.
• By December 1999, federal forces controlled the entire flat part of Chechnya. The militants concentrated in the mountains (about 3,000 people) and in Grozny.
• December 8 - federal forces began the assault on Urus-Martan
• December 14 - federal forces occupied Khankala
• December 17 - a large landing of federal forces blocked the road connecting Chechnya with the village of Shatili (Georgia).
• December 26, 1999 - February 6, 2000 - siege of Grozny

3.2. 2000

• January 5 - federal forces took control of the regional center of Nozhai-Yurt.
• January 9 - militant breakthrough in Shali and Argun. Control of federal forces over Shali was restored on January 11, over Argun - on January 13.
• January 11 - federal forces took control of the regional center of Vedeno
• January 27 - during the battles for Grozny, field commander Isa Astamirov, deputy commander of the southwestern front of the militants, was killed.
• February 4 - 7-8 a.m. the bombing of the peaceful village (with a population of 25,000 people including refugees) of Katyr-Yurt began.
  From February 4 to February 11, the bombing of a small village lasted. About 450 people died, about a thousand were injured. Many cases have been won and even more are pending before the European Court.
• February 5 - During the breakthrough from Grozny, besieged by federal troops, the famous field commander Khunker Israpilov died in the minefields.
• February 9 - Federal troops blocked an important center of militant resistance - the village of Serzhen-Yurt, and in the Argun Gorge, so famous since the times of the Caucasian War, 380 military personnel landed and occupied one of the dominant heights. Federal troops blocked more than three thousand militants in the Argun Gorge, and then methodically treated them with volume-detonating ammunition.

• February 10 - federal forces took control of the regional center Itum-Kale and the village of Serzhen-Yurt
• February 21 - 33 Russian servicemen, mainly from the GRU special forces unit, were killed in a battle in the Kharsenoy area.
• February 29 - capture of Shatoy. Maskhadov, Khattab and Basayev again escaped the encirclement. First Deputy Commander of the joint group of federal forces, Colonel General Gennady Troshev, announced the end of a full-scale military operation in Chechnya.
• February 28 - March 2 - Battle at Height 776 - breakthrough of militants (Khattab) through Ulus-Kert. Death of paratroopers of the 6th parachute company of the 104th regiment.

The battle in the Argun Gorge during the second Chechen War, when an entire company of Pskov paratroopers died

Argun Gorge

Before the fight

Today in Russia there is another tragic date...

Today in Russia there is another tragic date - February 29 In 2000, in Chechnya, at height 776 (in the Argun Gorge), the 6th company of the 104th regiment of the 76th Pskov Airborne Division died in a fierce battle with Chechen militants. Of the ninety paratroopers who took the battle against superior terrorist forces, 84 were killed, including 13 officers. They did not flinch, did not retreat, and fulfilled their military duty to the end, stopping the advance of the gang.

Then, in February 2000, the military phase - an important stage - of the second Chechen war was ending. After the fall of Grozny and Shatoy (the last large settlements in Chechnya remaining in the hands of militants), according to the federal command, the defeated militants should have divided into small detachments and dispersed to mountain bases. However, the militants concentrated. Most of their commanders, including Sh.Basayev and Khattab, proposed to break through in a north-eastern direction, towards the Dagestan border. One of the most obvious routes of retreat was the Argun Gorge. In total, in the area of ​​the village of Ulus-Kert, then, according to various sources, from 1.5 to 2.5 thousand well-trained militants were concentrated.

On the part of the federal troops, to cover this direction, among other units, the 6th company was sent - a combined detachment of paratroopers under the command of Guard Lieutenant Colonel M. Evtyukhin, who was given the task of occupying a line four kilometers southeast of Ulus-Kert, with the goal to prevent a possible breakthrough of militants in the direction of Vedeno.

The 6th company gained a foothold on the dominant height 776. But the militants went ahead. The battle near Ulus-Kert began on February 29, 2000 and continued throughout the next day. Although the paratroopers received no help other than the breakthrough of 10 scouts of the 4th company and fire support from artillery units, they fought to the death. The artillerymen “worked” on the heights all night. On the morning of March 1, hand-to-hand fighting ensued, and at a critical moment, Lieutenant Colonel Evtyukhin called in artillery fire: “On yourself!” On March 2, the remaining militants were scattered by an air and artillery raid.

The soldiers of the 1st company of the 1st battalion also tried to help their comrades. But while crossing the Abazulgol River, they were ambushed and were forced to gain a foothold on the bank. Only on the morning of March 2 did they manage to break through, but it was too late - the 6th company died, only 6 soldiers remained alive. According to federal forces, militant losses ranged from 400 to 700 people. The remaining militants managed to break out of the Argun Gorge. They went to the mountains and disappeared. Later, some field commanders were killed.

The death of the paratroopers, left without help and cut off from reinforcements, raised a large number of questions among the public and relatives of the victims about the authorities and military command. According to many military analysts and media representatives, the death of the 6th company was caused by a number of mistakes and miscalculations of the Russian command.

August 2, 2000, on the day of the 70th anniversary of the Airborne Forces, President of the Russian Federation V.Putin came to the Pskov division and personally apologized to the relatives of the victims for “gross miscalculations that have to be paid for with the lives of Russian soldiers,” admitting the Kremlin’s guilt. But even years later, neither the president nor the military prosecutor’s office explained who exactly made these gross miscalculations, paid for with the lives of soldiers.

Monument to the 6th company in Pskov

Subsequently, all the dead paratroopers were forever included in the lists of the 104th Guards Regiment. By decree of the President of the Russian Federation, 22 paratroopers were awarded the title of Heroes of Russia (21 posthumously), and 68 were awarded the Order of Courage (63 posthumously). All of them are guys from 47 republics, territories and regions of Russia and neighboring republics.

The films “I Have the Honor”, ​​“Breakthrough”, “Russian Sacrifice”, the musical “Warriors of the Spirit”, the books “Company”, “Breakthrough”, “Step into Immortality”, songs are dedicated to the memory of the Pskov paratroopers. The streets of their native cities were named in their honor, and memorial plaques were installed in educational institutions where the hero-paratroopers studied. Monuments were erected to them in Moscow and Pskov.

However, the anniversary of this fight is not usually celebrated at the official level. Commemorative events in the last days of February - early March are carried out, as a rule, by public organizations and relatives.

Paratroopers of the 6th company of the 104th regiment of the 76th Pskov Guards Airborne Division died heroically in the Argun Gorge on February 29 and March 1, 2000:

Guard Captain Romanov Viktor Viktorovich
Guard Senior Lieutenant Panov Andrey Alexandrovich
Guard Senior Lieutenant Alexey Vladimirovich Vorobyov
Guard Lieutenant Ermakov Oleg Viktorovich
Guard Lieutenant Kozhemyakin Dmitry Sergeevich
Guard Major Dostavalov Alexander Vasilievich
Guard Lieutenant Colonel Evtyukhin Mark Nikolaevich
Guard Private Shevchenko Denis Petrovich
Guard Private Zinkevich Denis Nikolaevich
Guard Sergeant Dmitry Viktorovich Grigoriev
Guard Private Arkhipov Vladimir Vladimirovich
Guard Private Shikov Sergei Alexandrovich
Guard junior sergeant Shvetsov Vladimir Aleksandrovich
Guard Private Travin Mikhail Vitalievich
Guard Private Islentyev Vladimir Anatolyevich
Guard Private Ivanov Dmitry Ivanovich
Guard Senior Lieutenant Kolgatin Alexander Mikhailovich,
Guards Private Vorobyov Alexey Nikolaevich,
Guard Senior Lieutenant Sherstyannikov Andrey Nikolaevich
Guard Private Alexey Alexandrovich Khrabrov
Guard Captain Sokolov Roman Vladimirovich,
Guard Private Nishchenko Alexey Sergeevich
Guard Lieutenant Ryazantsev Alexander Nikolaevich,
Guard Corporal Lebedev Alexander Vladislavovich
Guard Senior Lieutenant Petrov Dmitry Vladimirovich
Guard Private Karoteev Alexander Vladimirovich
Guard senior sergeant Medvedev Sergey Yurievich
Guard Private Mikhailov Sergey Anatolyevich,
Guard Private Shukaev Alexey Borisovich,
Guard Private Trubenok Alexander Leonidovich
Guard Private Alexey Anatolyevich Nekrasov
Guard Private Kiryanov Alexey Valerievich
Guard Senior Sergeant Siraev Rustam Flaridovich,
Guard Private Savin Valentin Ivanovich,
Guard Private Grudinsky Stanislav Igorevich,
Guard Junior Sergeant Khvorostukhin Igor Sergeevich,
Guard junior sergeant Konstantin Valerievich Krivushev,
Guard Private Piskunov Roman Sergeevich,
Guard Private Batretdinov Dmitry Mansurovich,
Guard Private Timoshinin Konstantin Viktorovich,
Guard junior sergeant Lyashkov Yuri Nikolaevich,
Guard Private Zaytsev Andrey Yurievich,
Guard Private Sudakov Roman Valerievich,
Guard Private Ivanov Yaroslav Sergeevich
Guard Private Chugunov Vadim Vladimirovich
Guard Private Erdyakov Roman Sergeevich,
Guard Private Pakhomov Roman Alexandrovich
Guard junior sergeant Sergei Valerievich Zhukov.
Guard Private Alexandrov Vladimir Andreevich.
Guard junior sergeant Shchemlev Dmitry Sergeevich,
Guard Sergeant Kuptsov Vladimir Ivanovich,
Guard junior sergeant Vladislav Anatolyevich Dukhin,
Guard junior sergeant Alexey Yurievich Vasiliev,
Guard junior sergeant Khamatov Evgeniy Kamitovich,
Guard Private Shalaev Nikolai Vasilievich,
Guard Private Lebedev Viktor Nikolaevich,
Guard Private Zagoraev Mikhail Vyacheslavovich.
Guard junior sergeant Denis Sergeevich Strebin,
Guard Private Timashev Denis Vladimirovich,
Guard Junior Sergeant Pavlov Ivan Gennadievich
Guard Private Tregubov Denis Aleksandrovich,
Guard junior sergeant Kozlov Sergey Olegovich,
Guard Private Vasilev Sergei Vladimirovich,
Guard Private Ambetov Nikolai Kamitovich,
Guard Corporal Sokovanov Vasily Nikolaevich,
Guard junior sergeant Ivanov Sergey Alekseevich,
Guard Private Izyumov Vladimir Nikolaevich,
Guard Senior Sergeant Aranson Andrey Vladimirovich.
Guard Private Rasskaz Alexey Vasilievich,
Guard Junior Sergeant Eliseev Vladimir Sergeevich
Guard Corporal Gerdt Alexander Alexandrovich,
Guard Private Kuatbaev Galim Mukhambetovich,
Guard Private Biryukov Vladimir Ivanovich,
Guard Private Isaev Alexander Dmitrievich,
Guard junior sergeant Afanasyev Roman Sergeevich,
Guard Private Belykh Denis Igorevich,
Guard junior sergeant Sergey Mikhailovich Bakulin,
Guard Junior Sergeant Evdokimov Mikhail Vladimirovich,
Guard Sergeant Isakov Evgeniy Valerievich,
Guards Private Kenzhiev Amangeldy Amantaevich,
Guard Private Popov Igor Mikhailovich,
Guard Sergeant Komyagin Alexander Valerievich

• March 2 - tragic death of the Sergiev Posad riot police as a result of “friendly fire” *
• March 5 - 20 - Battle for the village of Komsomolskoye

The Battle for the village of Komsomolskoye (2000) is an episode of the Second Chechen War, when federal forces (commander - Colonel General Mikhail Labunets) surrounded a large formation of Chechen militants (retreating from the fallen Grozny in February 2000), under the command of field commander R. Gelayev) in his native village of Komsomolskoye (Saadi-Kotar) (Urus-Martan district) and carried out an operation to block and destroy him. During the fighting in the village, at least 552 people died, of which about 350 died while trying to escape from the encirclement. In addition, more than 70 were captured (mostly wounded and shell-shocked). The federal side also suffered losses. According to unconfirmed reports, more than 50 servicemen of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Defense were killed and more than 300 were wounded. Commander Seifulla's detachment (about 300 people) responded to Gelayev's calls for help, but on the way to the village they were destroyed by air fire and artillery. Gelayev and several groups of militants still managed to break through the encirclement and retreat to Georgian territory (to the Pankisi Gorge). During the assault on the village, Buratino launchers were used.

According to the commander of the federal troops during the hostilities, Gennady Troshev, “the operation in Komsomolskoye practically ended the active phase of hostilities in Chechnya.”

• March 12 - in the village of Novogroznensky, terrorist Salman Raduev was captured by FSB officers and brought to Moscow; he was subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment and died in prison.
• March 19 - in the area of ​​the village of Duba-Yurt, FSB officers detained the Chechen field commander Salautdin Temirbulatov, nicknamed Tractor Driver, who was subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment.
• March 20 - on the eve of the presidential elections, Vladimir Putin visited Chechnya. He arrived in Grozny on a Su-27UB fighter piloted by the head of the Lipetsk aviation center, Alexander Kharchevsky.
• March 29 - death of the Perm riot police near the village of Dzhanei-Vedeno. More than 40 people died.
• April 20 - First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Colonel General Valery Manilov, announced the end of the military part of the counter-terrorism operation in Chechnya and the transition to special operations.
• May 19 - Deputy Minister of Sharia Security of the ChRI Abu Movsaev was killed.
• May 21 - in the city of Shali, security officers detained (in his own house) one of Aslan Maskhadov's closest accomplices - field commander Ruslan Alikhadzhiev.
• June 11 - by decree of the President of the Russian Federation, Akhmat Kadyrov was appointed head of the administration of Chechnya
• July 2 - as a result of a series of terrorist attacks using bombed trucks, more than 30 police officers and federal servicemen were killed. The greatest losses were suffered by employees of the Chelyabinsk Regional Department of Internal Affairs in Argun.
• October 1 - during a military clash in the Staropromyslovsky district of Grozny, field commander Isa Munayev was killed.
• 3.3. 2001
• June 23-24 - in the village of Alkhan-Kala, a special joint detachment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the FSB conducted a special operation to eliminate a detachment of militants of field commander Arbi Barayev. 16 militants were killed, including Barayev himself.
• July 11 - in the village of Mayrtup, Shalinsky district of Chechnya, during a special operation of the FSB and the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, Khattab's assistant Abu Umar was killed.
• August 25 - in the city of Argun, during a special operation by FSB officers, field commander Movsan Suleimenov, nephew of Arbi Barayev, was killed.
• September 17 - attack by militants (300 people) on Gudermes, the attack was repulsed. As a result of the use of the Tochka-U missile system, a group of more than 100 people was destroyed. In Grozny, an Mi-8 helicopter with a General Staff commission on board was shot down (2 generals and 8 officers were killed).
• November 3 - during a special operation, the influential field commander Shamil Iriskhanov, who was part of Basayev’s inner circle, was killed.
• December 15 - In Argun, federal forces killed 20 militants during a special operation.

3.4. 2002

• January 27 - an Mi-8 helicopter was shot down in the Shelkovsky district of Chechnya. Among the dead were the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, Lieutenant General Mikhail Rudchenko, and the commander of the group of internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Chechnya, Major General Nikolai Goridov.
• March 20 - as a result of a special operation by the FSB, terrorist Khattab was killed by poisoning.

• April 14 - in Vedeno, an MTL-B was blown up, in which there were sappers, cover machine gunners, and an FSB officer. The explosion occurred as a result of false information among the population about the poisoning of a water source by militants. 6 servicemen were killed, 4 were injured. Among the dead is an FSB officer
• April 18 - in his Address to the Federal Assembly, President Vladimir Putin announced the end of the military stage of the conflict in Chechnya.
• May 9 - a terrorist attack occurred in Dagestan during the celebration of Victory Day. 43 people were killed and more than 100 were injured.
• August 19 - Chechen militants using Igla MANPADS shot down a Russian military transport helicopter Mi-26 in the area of ​​the Khankala military base. Of the 147 people on board, 127 died.
• September 23 - Raid on Ingushetia (2002)
• October 23 - 26 - hostage taking in the theater center on Dubrovka in Moscow, 129 hostages died. All 44 terrorists were killed, including Movsar Barayev.

October 23, 2002 At 21:15, armed people in camouflage burst into the building of the Theater Center on Dubrovka. At that time, the musical “Nord-Ost” was playing at the cultural center; there were more than 700 people in the hall. The terrorists declared all people - spectators and theater workers - hostages and began to mine the building.

At 10 pm it became known that the theater building was captured by a detachment of Chechen militants led by Movsar Barayev, among the terrorists there were female suicide bombers, hung with explosives.

Movsar Baraev

At 19:00 the next day, the Qatari TV channel Al-Jazeera showed an appeal from the militants of Movsar Barayev, recorded a few days before the capture of the Palace of Culture: the terrorists declare themselves suicide bombers and demand the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya. From seven in the evening until midnight, unsuccessful attempts continued to persuade the militants to accept food and water for the hostages.

State Duma deputy from Chechnya Aslambek Aslakhanov, Joseph Kobzon, British journalist Mark Franchetti, and two Red Cross doctors took part in the negotiations. On October 25, at 1 a.m., terrorists allowed Leonid Roshal, head of the emergency surgery and trauma department of the Center for Disaster Medicine, into the building. He brought medicines to the hostages and provided them with first aid.

In the morning, a spontaneous rally arose at the cordon near the recreation center. Relatives and friends of the hostages demanded that all the terrorists' demands be fulfilled. At 15:00 in the Kremlin, Russian President Vladimir Putin held a meeting with the heads of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the FSB. Following the meeting, FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev said that the authorities were ready to save the lives of the terrorists if they freed all the hostages.

On October 26, at 5:30 a.m., three explosions and several bursts of machine gun fire were heard near the Palace of Culture building. At about six o'clock the special forces began the assault, during which nerve gas was used. At half past seven in the morning, an official representative of the FSB reported that the Theater Center was under the control of the special services, Movsar Barayev and most of the terrorists had been killed. The number of neutralized terrorists in the building of the Theater Center on Dubrovka was 50 people - 18 women and 32 men.

On November 7, 2002, the Moscow prosecutor's office published a list of citizens who died as a result of the actions of terrorists who seized the Dubrovka Theater Center. This mournful list included 128 people: 120 Russians and 8 citizens from countries near and far abroad.

• December 27 - explosion of the Government House in Grozny. As a result of the terrorist attack, more than 70 people were killed. Shamil Basayev took responsibility for the terrorist attack.

3.5. 2003

• May 12 - in the village of Znamenskoye of the Nadterechny district of Chechnya, three suicide bombers carried out a terrorist attack in the area of ​​​​the buildings of the administration of the Nadterechny district and the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. A KamAZ car filled with explosives demolished the barrier in front of the building and exploded. 60 people were killed and more than 250 were injured.
• May 14 - in the village of Ilshan-Yurt, Gudermes region, a suicide bomber blew herself up in a crowd celebrating the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad, where Akhmat Kadyrov was present. 18 people were killed and 145 people were injured.
• July 5 - terrorist attack in Moscow at the Wings rock festival. 16 people were killed and 57 were injured.
• August 1 - Bombing of a military hospital in Mozdok. A KamAZ army truck loaded with explosives rammed the gate and exploded near the building. There was one suicide bomber in the cockpit. The death toll was 50 people.
• September 3 - terrorist attack on the Kislovodsk-Minvody train on the Podkumok-Bely Ugol section, the railway tracks were blown up using a landmine.
• December 5 - suicide bombing on an electric train in Essentuki.
• December 9 - suicide bombing near the National Hotel (Moscow).
• 2003-2004 - Raid on Dagestan by a detachment under the command of Ruslan Gelayev.

3.6. 2004

• February 6 - terrorist attack in the Moscow metro, on the stretch between the Avtozavodskaya and Paveletskaya stations. 39 people were killed and 122 were injured.
• February 28 - famous field commander Ruslan Gelayev was mortally wounded during a shootout with border guards
• April 16 - during the shelling of the Chechen mountains, the leader of foreign mercenaries in Chechnya, Abu al-Walid al-Ghamidi, was killed
• May 9 - in Grozny at the Dynamo stadium, where the parade in honor of Victory Day was taking place, at 10:32 a powerful explosion occurred on the newly renovated VIP stand. At that moment, there were the President of Chechnya Akhmat Kadyrov, the Chairman of the State Council of the Chechen Republic Kh. Isaev, the commander of the United Group of Forces in the North Caucasus General V. Baranov, the Minister of Internal Affairs of Chechnya Alu Alkhanov and the military commandant of the republic G. Fomenko. 2 people died directly in the explosion, 4 more died in hospitals: Akhmat Kadyrov, Kh. Isaev, Reuters journalist A. Khasanov, a child (whose name was not reported) and two Kadyrov security officers. In total, 63 people were injured from the explosion in Grozny, including 5 children.
• May 17 - as a result of an explosion in the suburbs of Grozny, the crew of an armored personnel carrier of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was killed and several people were injured
• June 22 - Raid on Ingushetia
• July 12 - 13 - a large detachment of militants captured the village of Avtury, Shali district
• August 21 - 400 militants attacked Grozny. According to the Chechen Ministry of Internal Affairs, 44 people were killed and 36 were seriously injured.
• August 24 - explosions of two Russian passenger airliners, killing 89 people.
• August 31 - terrorist attack near the Rizhskaya metro station in Moscow. 10 people were killed, more than 50 people were injured
• September 1 - terrorist attack in Beslan, which killed over 350 people, including hostages, civilians and military personnel. Half of the dead are children.

On September 1, 2004, a group of armed masked people drove up to the building of School No. 1 in Beslan in several cars and took 1,128 people hostage—children and their parents—right from the school line, driving them into the school gym.

The terrorists were armed with at least 20 Kalashnikov assault rifles of various modifications, including those with under-barrel grenade launchers; 2 Kalashnikov light machine guns (RPK - 74); 2 modernized Kalashnikov machine guns (PKM); 1 Kalashnikov tank machine gun (PKT); 2 hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers (RPG-7v) and “Mukha” grenade launchers; explosive devices: two improvised explosive devices of similar design, made using explosives - plasticite and hexogen, ready-made destructive elements - metal balls, electric detonators, with a damage radius of at least 200 m, at least six improvised explosive devices made on the basis of anti-personnel fragmentation weapons OZM-72 all-round mines of industrial production with homemade modifications, as well as the so-called “suicide belts” - homemade explosive devices.

The terrorists demanded that the authorities release militants previously detained on suspicion of participation in the attack on Ingushetia on June 21-22, 2004, and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya. They also demanded that the President of Ingushetia Murat Zyazikov, the President of North Ossetia Alexander Dzasokhov and the children's doctor Leonid Roshal, who took part in the negotiations during the terrorist attack on Dubrovka in October 2002, appear at the negotiations with them. At the same time, the terrorists threatened to blow up the school building in the event of an assault and kill 50 hostages for each eliminated terrorist. The prosecutor of Beslan and the mufti of North Ossetia volunteered to act as negotiators, but the terrorists did not allow them into the school building.

On the first day, the terrorists shot 12 (according to other sources - 14) men who were among the hostages.

On the night of September 2, negotiations between the terrorists and Dr. Roshal took place. Representatives of the special services told the terrorists that they were ready to provide them with the opportunity to safely travel to Ingushetia and Chechnya. In addition, it was proposed to replace child hostages with adults. There was no response to these offers; the terrorists also refused to accept food and medicine for those taken hostage.

On September 2, the former President of Ingushetia, Ruslan Aushev, visited the seized school. At his request, the militants released a group of hostages of 26 people (mothers with infants). Then, at headquarters, Aushev and Alexander Dzasokhov contacted Akhmed Zakayev by phone with a request that he contact Aslan Maskhadov and ask him to fly to Beslan and enter into negotiations with the terrorists. The latter expressed agreement in principle, however, stating that his relationship with Maskhadov was one-sided. On September 3 at 12-00, Zakayev informs Dzasokhov of Maskhadov’s consent (subject to security guarantees being provided to Maskhadov) to come to Beslan (no guarantees were provided). Zakayev informed Dzasokhov about his conversation with Maskhadov and his and Maskhadov’s readiness to immediately arrive in Beslan and release the hostages “on any conditions,” however, demanding security guarantees. Dzasokhov replied that “our conversation is an invitation to talk about this.” Zakaev expressed his readiness to fly out immediately, but Dzasokhov asked him to call back in an hour and a half (according to other sources, two) hours, which he needed to resolve technical issues regarding the arrival of Zakaev and Maskhadov. However, Zakayev did not call back, because an hour after the conversation, explosions were heard at the school and the assault began.

At 12:40, the operational headquarters managed to negotiate with the terrorists to evacuate the bodies of the killed hostages from the school. At 12:55, emergency workers from the Ministry of Emergency Situations arrive at the school to pick up the bodies of those killed. At 13:03-13:05 two explosions were heard in the school building, hostages began to run out of the school. After which special forces of the Russian army and the FSB launched an assault. As a result of the assault, both the terrorists and the attackers suffered losses (10 special forces soldiers were killed). Casualties among hostages: 331 dead, about 500 wounded.

3.7. 2005

• February 18 - as a result of a special operation in the Oktyabrsky district of Grozny, the forces of the PPS-2 detachment killed the “Emir of Grozny” Yunadi Turchaev, the “right hand” of one of the terrorist leaders Doku Umarov.
• March 8 - during a special operation by the FSB in the village of Tolstoy-Yurt, the President of the Chechen Republic of Ichryssia, Aslan Maskhadov, was eliminated
• May 15 - Former vice-president of the Chechen Republic of Ichryssia Vakha Arsanov was killed in Grozny. Arsanov and his accomplices, while in a private house, fired at a police patrol and were destroyed by arriving reinforcements.
• May 15 - in the Dubovsky forest of the Shelkovsky district, as a result of a special operation of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the “emir” of the Shelkovsky district of the Chechen Republic, Rasul Tambulatov (Volchek), was killed.
• October 13 - Militants attack the city of Nalchik (Kabardino-Balkaria), as a result of which, according to Russian authorities, 12 civilians and 35 law enforcement officers were killed. According to various sources, from 40 to 124 militants were destroyed.

3.8. 2006

• January 3-5 - in the Untsukulsky district of Dagestan, federal and local security forces are trying to eliminate a gang of 8 militants under the command of field commander O. Sheikhulayev. According to official information, 5 militants were killed, the terrorists themselves admit the death of only 1. The losses of the federal forces amounted to 1 killed, 10 wounded.
• January 31 - Russian President Vladimir Putin said at a press conference that it is now possible to talk about the end of the counter-terrorism operation in Chechnya.
• February 9-11 - in the village of Tukuy-Mekteb in the Stavropol Territory, 12 so-called militants were killed during a special operation. “Nogai battalion of the Armed Forces of the ChRI”, federal forces lost 7 people killed. During the operation, the federal side actively uses helicopters and tanks.
• March 28 - In Chechnya, the former head of the state security department of the ChRI Sultan Gelikhanov voluntarily surrendered to the authorities.
• June 16 - “ChRI President” Abdul-Halim Sadulaev was killed in Argun

• July 4 - in Chechnya, a military convoy was attacked near the village of Avtury, Shalinsky district. Representatives of the federal forces report 6 servicemen killed, militants - more than 20.
• July 9 - the website of Chechen militants "Caucasus Center" announced the creation of the Ural and Volga fronts as part of the Armed Forces of the ChRI.
• July 10 - in Ingushetia, one of the terrorist leaders Shamil Basayev was killed as a result of a special operation (according to other sources, he died due to careless handling of explosives).
• July 12 - on the border of Chechnya and Dagestan, the police of both republics destroy a relatively large but poorly armed gang consisting of 15 militants. 13 bandits were destroyed, 2 more were detained.
• August 23 - Chechen militants attacked a military convoy on the Grozny-Shatoy highway, not far from the entrance to the Argun Gorge. The column consisted of a Ural vehicle and two escort armored personnel carriers. According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Chechen Republic, four federal servicemen were wounded as a result.
• November 7 - Seven riot policemen from Mordovia were killed in Chechnya.
• November 26 - the leader of foreign mercenaries in Chechnya, Abu Hafs al-Urdani, was killed in Khasavyurt. Along with him, 4 more militants were killed.

3.9. 2007

• April 4 - in the vicinity of the village of Agish-batoy, Vedeno district of Chechnya, one of the most influential militant leaders, commander of the Eastern Front of the Chechen Republic of Ingushetia, Suleiman Ilmurzaev (call sign “Khairulla”), involved in the murder of Chechen President Akhmat Kadyrov, was killed.
• June 13 - in the Vedeno district on the Verkhnie Kurchali - Belgata highway, militants shot at a convoy of police cars.
• July 23 - battle near the village of Tazen-Kale, Vedeno district, between the Vostok battalion of Sulim Yamadayev and a detachment of Chechen militants led by Doku Umarov. The death of 6 militants was reported.

• September 18 - as a result of a counter-terrorist operation in the village of New Sulak, “Amir Rabbani” - Rappani Khalilov - was killed.

3.10. 2008

• January - during special operations in Makhachkala and the Tabasaran region of Dagestan, at least 9 militants were killed, 6 of them were part of the group of field commander I. Mallochiev. There were no casualties on the part of the security forces in these clashes. At the same time, during the clashes in Grozny, the Chechen police killed 5 militants, among them was the field commander U. Techiev, the “emir” of the capital of Chechnya.
• May 5 - a military vehicle was blown up by a landmine in the village of Tashkola, a suburb of Grozny. 5 policemen were killed, 2 were injured.
• June 13 - night attack by militants in the village of Benoy-Vedeno
• September 2008 - major leaders of the illegal armed formations of Dagestan Ilgar Mallochiev and A. Gudayev were killed, a total of up to 10 militants.
• December 18 - battle in the city of Argun, 2 policemen were killed and 6 were wounded. One person was killed by the militants in Argun.
• December 23-25 ​​- special operation of the FSB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the village of Verkhny Alkun in Ingushetia. Field commander Vakha Dzhenaraliev, who fought against federal troops in Chechnya and Ingushetia since 1999, and his deputy Khamkhoev were killed, a total of 12 militants were killed. 4 illegal armed formation bases have been liquidated.
• June 19 - Said Buryatsky announced his joining the underground.

3.11. 2009

• March 21-22 - a major special operation by security forces in Dagestan. As a result of heavy fighting using helicopters and armored vehicles, the forces of the local Ministry of Internal Affairs and the FSB Directorate, with the support of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, eliminated 12 militants in the Untsukulsky district of the republic. The losses of the federal troops amount to 5 people killed (two servicemen of the special forces of the VV were later posthumously awarded the title of Hero of Russia for their participation in these hostilities). At the same time, in Makhachkala, the police destroy 4 more armed extremists in battle.
• April 15 is the last day of the counter-terrorist operation regime
• 4. Aggravation of the situation in the North Caucasus in 2009

Despite the official cancellation of the counter-terrorism operation on April 16, 2009, the situation in the region has not become calmer, quite the opposite. Militants waging guerrilla warfare have become more active, and incidents of terrorist acts have become more frequent. Beginning in the fall of 2009, a number of major special operations were carried out to eliminate gangs and militant leaders. In response, a series of terrorist attacks were carried out, including, for the first time in a long time, in Moscow.

Military clashes, terrorist attacks and police operations are actively taking place not only on the territory of Chechnya, but also on the territory of Ingushetia, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia. In certain territories, the CTO regime was repeatedly temporarily introduced.

Starting from May 15, 2009, Russian security forces intensified operations against militant groups in the mountainous regions of Ingushetia, Chechnya and Dagestan, which caused a retaliatory intensification of terrorist activities by militants. At the end of July 2010, there were all signs of an escalation of the conflict and its spread to nearby regions.

There are many wars written into the history of Russia. Most of them were liberation, some began on our territory and ended far beyond its borders. But there is nothing worse than such wars, which were started as a result of the illiterate actions of the country’s leadership and led to terrifying results because the authorities solved their own problems without paying attention to the people.

One of such sad pages of Russian history is the Chechen war. This was not a confrontation between two different peoples. There were no absolute rights in this war. And the most surprising thing is that this war still cannot be considered over.

Prerequisites for the start of the war in Chechnya

It is hardly possible to talk about these military campaigns briefly. The era of perestroika, so pompously announced by Mikhail Gorbachev, marked the collapse of a huge country consisting of 15 republics. However, the main difficulty for Russia was that, left without satellites, it was faced with internal unrest that had a nationalistic character. The Caucasus turned out to be especially problematic in this regard.

Back in 1990, the National Congress was created. This organization was headed by Dzhokhar Dudayev, a former major general of aviation in the Soviet Army. The Congress set its main goal to secede from the USSR; in the future, it was planned to create a Chechen Republic, independent of any state.

In the summer of 1991, a situation of dual power arose in Chechnya, since both the leadership of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic itself and the leadership of the so-called Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, proclaimed by Dudayev, acted.

This state of affairs could not exist for long, and in September the same Dzhokhar and his supporters seized the republican television center, the Supreme Council and the Radio House. This was the beginning of the revolution. The situation was extremely precarious, and its development was facilitated by the official collapse of the country carried out by Yeltsin. Following the news that the Soviet Union no longer existed, Dudayev's supporters announced that Chechnya was seceding from Russia.

The separatists seized power - under their influence, parliamentary and presidential elections were held in the republic on October 27, as a result of which power was completely in the hands of ex-General Dudayev. And a few days later, on November 7, Boris Yeltsin signed a decree stating that a state of emergency was being introduced in the Chechen-Ingush Republic. In fact, this document became one of the reasons for the start of the bloody Chechen wars.

At that time, there was quite a lot of ammunition and weapons in the republic. Some of these reserves had already been captured by the separatists. Instead of blocking the situation, the Russian leadership allowed it to get even more out of control - in 1992, the head of the Ministry of Defense Grachev transferred half of all these reserves to the militants. The authorities explained this decision by saying that it was no longer possible to remove weapons from the republic at that time.

However, during this period there was still an opportunity to stop the conflict. An opposition was created that opposed Dudayev's power. However, after it became clear that these small detachments could not resist the militant formations, the war was practically already underway.

Yeltsin and his political supporters could no longer do anything, and from 1991 to 1994 it was actually a republic independent of Russia. It had its own government bodies and had its own state symbols. In 1994, when Russian troops were brought into the territory of the republic, a full-scale war began. Even after the resistance of Dudayev’s militants was suppressed, the problem was never completely resolved.

Speaking about the war in Chechnya, it is worth considering that the fault for its outbreak, first of all, was the illiterate leadership of first the USSR and then Russia. It was the weakening of the internal political situation in the country that led to the weakening of the outskirts and the strengthening of nationalist elements.

As for the essence of the Chechen war, there is a conflict of interests and an inability to govern a vast territory on the part of first Gorbachev and then Yeltsin. Subsequently, it was up to the people who came to power at the very end of the twentieth century to untie this tangled knot.

First Chechen war 1994-1996

Historians, writers and filmmakers are still trying to assess the scale of the horrors of the Chechen war. No one denies that it caused enormous damage not only to the republic itself, but to all of Russia. However, it is worth considering that the nature of the two campaigns was quite different.

During the Yeltsin era, when the first Chechen campaign of 1994-1996 was launched, Russian troops could not act coherently and freely enough. The country's leadership solved its problems, moreover, according to some information, many people profited from this war - weapons were supplied to the territory of the republic from the Russian Federation, and militants often made money by demanding large ransoms for hostages.

At the same time, the main task of the Second Chechen War of 1999-2009 was the suppression of gangs and the establishment of constitutional order. It is clear that if the goals of both campaigns were different, then the course of action was significantly different.

On December 1, 1994, airstrikes were carried out on airfields located in Khankala and Kalinovskaya. And already on December 11, Russian units were introduced into the territory of the republic. This fact marked the beginning of the First Campaign. Entry was carried out from three directions at once - through Mozdok, through Ingushetia and through Dagestan.

By the way, at that time the Ground Forces were led by Eduard Vorobiev, but he immediately resigned, considering it unwise to lead the operation, since the troops were completely unprepared for conducting full-scale combat operations.

At first, Russian troops advanced quite successfully. The entire northern territory was occupied by them quickly and without much loss. From December 1994 to March 1995, the Russian Armed Forces stormed Grozny. The city was built up quite densely, and Russian units were simply stuck in skirmishes and attempts to take the capital.

Russian Defense Minister Grachev expected to take the city very quickly and therefore did not spare human and technical resources. According to researchers, more than 1,500 Russian soldiers and many civilians of the republic died or went missing near Grozny. The armored vehicles also suffered serious damage - almost 150 units were damaged.

However, after two months of fierce fighting, federal troops finally took Grozny. Participants in the hostilities subsequently recalled that the city was destroyed almost to the ground, and this is confirmed by numerous photographs and video documents.

During the assault, not only armored vehicles were used, but also aviation and artillery. There were bloody battles on almost every street. The militants lost more than 7,000 people during the operation in Grozny and, under the leadership of Shamil Basayev, on March 6 they were forced to finally leave the city, which came under the control of the Russian Armed Forces.

However, the war, which brought death to thousands of not only armed but also civilians, did not end there. The fighting continued first on the plains (from March to April), and then in the mountainous regions of the republic (from May to June 1995). Argun, Shali, and Gudermes were taken successively.

The militants responded with terrorist attacks carried out in Budennovsk and Kizlyar. After varying successes on both sides, a decision was made to negotiate. And as a result, on August 31, 1996, agreements were concluded. According to them, federal troops were leaving Chechnya, the republic's infrastructure was to be restored, and the question of independent status was postponed.

Second Chechen campaign 1999–2009

If the country's authorities hoped that by reaching an agreement with the militants, they would solve the problem and the battles of the Chechen war would become a thing of the past, then everything turned out to be wrong. Over several years of a dubious truce, the gangs have only accumulated strength. In addition, more and more Islamists from Arab countries entered the territory of the republic.

As a result, on August 7, 1999, the militants of Khattab and Basayev invaded Dagestan. Their calculation was based on the fact that the Russian government at that time looked very weak. Yeltsin practically did not lead the country, the Russian economy was in deep decline. The militants hoped that they would take their side, but they put up serious resistance to the bandit groups.

The reluctance to allow Islamists into their territory and the help of federal troops forced the Islamists to retreat. True, this took a month - the militants were driven out only in September 1999. At that time, Chechnya was led by Aslan Maskhadov, and, unfortunately, he was not able to exercise full control over the republic.

It was at this time, angry that they failed to break Dagestan, that Islamist groups began carrying out terrorist attacks on Russian territory. Horrible terrorist attacks were committed in Volgodonsk, Moscow and Buynaksk, which claimed dozens of lives. Therefore, the number of those killed in the Chechen war must include those civilians who never thought that it would come to their families.

In September 1999, a decree “On measures to increase the effectiveness of counter-terrorism operations in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation” was issued, signed by Yeltsin. And on December 31, he announced his resignation from the presidency.

As a result of the presidential elections, power in the country passed to a new leader, Vladimir Putin, whose tactical abilities the militants did not take into account. But at that time, Russian troops were already on the territory of Chechnya, again bombed Grozny and acted much more competently. The experience of the previous campaign was taken into account.

December 1999 is another painful and terrible chapter of the war. The Argun Gorge was otherwise called “Wolf Gate” - one of the largest Caucasian gorges. Here, the landing and border troops carried out the special operation "Argun", the purpose of which was to recapture a section of the Russian-Georgian border from Khattab's troops, and also to deprive the militants of the weapons supply route from the Pankisi Gorge. The operation was completed in February 2000.

Many people also remember the feat of the 6th company of the 104th parachute regiment of the Pskov Airborne Division. These fighters became real heroes of the Chechen war. They withstood a terrible battle on the 776th height, when they, numbering only 90 people, managed to hold back over 2,000 militants for 24 hours. Most of the paratroopers died, and the militants themselves lost almost a quarter of their strength.

Despite such cases, the second war, unlike the first, can be called sluggish. Perhaps that is why it lasted longer - a lot happened over the years of these battles. The new Russian authorities decided to act differently. They refused to conduct active combat operations carried out by federal troops. It was decided to exploit the internal split in Chechnya itself. Thus, Mufti Akhmat Kadyrov went over to the side of the federals, and situations were increasingly observed when ordinary militants laid down their arms.

Putin, realizing that such a war could last indefinitely, decided to take advantage of internal political fluctuations and persuade the authorities to cooperate. Now we can say that he succeeded. It also played a role that on May 9, 2004, Islamists carried out a terrorist attack in Grozny, aimed at intimidating the population. An explosion occurred at the Dynamo stadium during a concert dedicated to Victory Day. More than 50 people were injured, and Akhmat Kadyrov died from his injuries.

This odious terrorist attack brought completely different results. The population of the republic was finally disappointed in the militants and rallied around the legitimate government. A young man was appointed to replace his father, who understood the futility of the Islamist resistance. Thus, the situation began to change for the better. If the militants relied on attracting foreign mercenaries from abroad, the Kremlin decided to use national interests. The residents of Chechnya were very tired of the war, so they already voluntarily went over to the side of the pro-Russian forces.

The counterterrorism operation regime, introduced by Yeltsin on September 23, 1999, was abolished by President Dmitry Medvedev in 2009. Thus, the campaign was officially over, since it was not called a war, but a CTO. However, can we assume that veterans of the Chechen war can sleep peacefully if local battles are still taking place and terrorist acts are carried out from time to time?

Results and consequences for the history of Russia

It is unlikely that anyone today can specifically answer the question of how many died in the Chechen war. The problem is that any calculations will only be approximate. During the period of intensification of the conflict before the First Campaign, many people of Slavic origin were repressed or forced to leave the republic. During the years of the First Campaign, many fighters from both sides died, and these losses also cannot be accurately calculated.

While military losses can still be more or less calculated, no one has been involved in ascertaining losses among the civilian population, except perhaps human rights activists. Thus, according to the current official data, the 1st war claimed the following number of lives:

• Russian soldiers - 14,000 people;
• militants - 3,800 people;
• civilian population - from 30,000 to 40,000 people.

If we talk about the Second Campaign, the results of the death toll are as follows:

• federal troops - about 3,000 people;
• militants - from 13,000 to 15,000 people;
• civilian population - 1000 people.

It should be borne in mind that these figures vary greatly depending on which organizations provide them. For example, when discussing the results of the second Chechen war, official Russian sources talk about a thousand civilian deaths. At the same time, Amnesty International (an international non-governmental organization) gives completely different figures - about 25,000 people. The difference in these data, as you can see, is huge.

The result of the war is not only the impressive numbers of casualties among killed, wounded, and missing people. This is also a destroyed republic - after all, many cities, primarily Grozny, were subjected to artillery shelling and bombing. Their entire infrastructure was practically destroyed, so Russia had to rebuild the capital of the republic from scratch.

As a result, today Grozny is one of the most beautiful and modern cities. Other settlements of the republic were also rebuilt.

Anyone interested in this information can find out what happened in the territory from 1994 to 2009. There are many films about the Chechen war, books and various materials on the Internet.

However, those who were forced to leave the republic, lost their relatives, their health - these people hardly want to immerse themselves again in what they have already experienced. The country was able to withstand this most difficult period of its history, and once again proved that dubious calls for independence or unity with Russia are more important for them.

The history of the Chechen war has not yet been fully studied. Researchers will spend a long time looking for documents about losses among military and civilians and rechecking statistical data. But today we can say: the weakening of the top and the desire for disunity always lead to dire consequences. Only the strengthening of state power and the unity of people can end any confrontation so that the country can live in peace again.