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Denunciation or mistake: why the creators of Katyusha were shot. "Katyusha"

Among the legendary weapons that became symbols of our country’s victory in the Great Patriotic War, a special place is occupied by guards rocket mortars, popularly nicknamed “Katyusha”. The characteristic silhouette of a truck from the 40s with an inclined structure instead of a body is the same symbol of perseverance, heroism and courage of Soviet soldiers as, say, the T-34 tank, Il-2 attack aircraft or ZiS-3 cannon.

And here’s what’s especially noteworthy: all these legendary, glorious weapons were designed very shortly or literally on the eve of the war! The T-34 was put into service at the end of December 1939, the first production IL-2s rolled off the production line in February 1941, and the ZiS-3 gun was first presented to the leadership of the USSR and the army a month after the start of hostilities, on July 22, 1941. But the most amazing coincidence happened in the fate of Katyusha. Its demonstration to the party and military authorities took place half a day before the German attack - June 21, 1941...

Salvos of Katyushas. 1942 Photo: TASS Photo Chronicle

From heaven to earth

In fact, work on the creation of the world's first multiple launch rocket system on a self-propelled chassis began in the USSR in the mid-1930s. An employee of the Tula NPO Splav, which produces modern Russian MLRS, Sergei Gurov, managed to find in the archives agreement No. 251618с dated January 26, 1935 between the Leningrad Jet Research Institute and the Automotive and Armored Directorate of the Red Army, which included a prototype rocket launcher on the BT-5 tank with ten rockets.

A volley of guards mortars. Photo: Anatoly Egorov / RIA Novosti

There is nothing to be surprised here, because Soviet rocket scientists created the first combat rockets even earlier: official tests took place in the late 20s - early 30s. In 1937, the RS-82 missile of 82 mm caliber was adopted for service, and a year later the RS-132 missile of 132 mm caliber was adopted, both in a version for underwing installation on aircraft. A year later, at the end of the summer of 1939, the RS-82s were used for the first time in a combat situation. During the battles at Khalkhin Gol, five I-16s used their "eres" in battle with Japanese fighters, surprising the enemy with a new weapon. And a little later, already during the Soviet-Finnish war, six strikes were carried out on Finnish ground positions twin-engine bombers SB, already armed with RS-132.

Naturally, impressive - and they really were impressive, although to a large extent due to the unexpectedness of the application new system weapons, and not their ultra-high efficiency - the results of the use of "eres" in aviation forced the Soviet party and military leadership to rush the defense industry to create a ground-based version. Actually, the future “Katyusha” had every chance to make it to the Winter War: the main design work and tests were carried out back in 1938–1939, but the military was not satisfied with the results - they needed a more reliable, mobile and easy-to-handle weapon.

IN general outline what a year and a half later would go down in soldiers’ folklore on both sides of the front as “Katyusha” was ready by the beginning of 1940. In any case, author’s certificate No. 3338 for a “rocket launcher for a sudden, powerful artillery and chemical attack on the enemy using rocket shells” was issued on February 19, 1940, and among the authors were employees of the RNII (since 1938, which bore the “numbered” name Research Institute-3) Andrey Kostikov, Ivan Gvai and Vasily Aborenkov.

This installation was already seriously different from the first samples that entered field testing at the end of 1938. Launcher for rockets was located along the longitudinal axis of the car, had 16 guides, each of which had two projectiles installed. And the shells themselves for this vehicle were different: aircraft RS-132s turned into longer and more powerful ground-based M-13s.

Actually, in this form, a combat vehicle with rockets came out to review new models of weapons of the Red Army, which took place on June 15–17, 1941 at a training ground in Sofrino, near Moscow. Rocket artillery was left as a “snack”: two combat vehicles demonstrated firing on the last day, June 17, using high-explosive fragmentation rockets. The shooting was observed by People's Commissar of Defense Marshal Semyon Timoshenko, Chief of the General Staff Army General Georgy Zhukov, Head of the Main Artillery Directorate Marshal Grigory Kulik and his deputy General Nikolai Voronov, as well as People's Commissar of Armaments Dmitry Ustinov, People's Commissar of Ammunition Pyotr Goremykin and many other military personnel. One can only guess what emotions overwhelmed them as they looked at the wall of fire and the fountains of earth rising on the target field. But it is clear that the demonstration made a strong impression. Four days later, on June 21, 1941, just a few hours before the start of the war, documents were signed on the adoption and urgent deployment of mass production of M-13 missiles and a launcher, which received official name BM-13 - “combat vehicle - 13” (according to the missile index), although sometimes they appeared in documents with the index M-13. This day should be considered the birthday of “Katyusha”, who, it turns out, was born only half a day ago earlier than the start who glorified her as the Great Patriotic War.

First hit

The production of new weapons took place at two enterprises at once: the Voronezh plant named after the Comintern and the Moscow plant "Compressor", and the capital plant named after Vladimir Ilyich became the main enterprise for the production of M-13 shells. The first combat-ready unit - a special reactive battery under the command of Captain Ivan Flerov - went to the front on the night of July 1-2, 1941.

Commander of the first battery rocket artillery"Katyusha", captain Ivan Andreevich Flerov. Photo: RIA Novosti

But here's what's remarkable. The first documents on the formation of divisions and batteries armed with rocket mortars appeared even before the famous shootings near Moscow! For example, the General Staff directive on the formation of five divisions armed new technology, published a week before the start of the war - June 15, 1941. But reality, as always, made its own adjustments: in fact, the formation of the first units of field rocket artillery began on June 28, 1941. It was from this moment that, as determined by the directive of the commander of the Moscow Military District, three days were allotted for the formation of the first special battery under the command of Captain Flerov.

The famous Katyusha installation was put into production a few hours before Nazi Germany attacked the USSR. A multiple launch rocket artillery system was used for massive attacks on areas and had an average effective firing range.

Chronology of the creation of rocket artillery combat vehicles

Gelatin gunpowder was created in 1916 by Russian professor I.P. Grave. The further chronology of the development of rocket artillery of the USSR is as follows:

five years later, already in the USSR, the development of a rocket began by V. A. Artemyev and N. I. Tikhomirov;
in the period 1929 – 1933 a group led by B. S. Petropavlovsky created a prototype of a projectile for MLRS, but the launch units were used on the ground;
rockets entered service with the Air Force in 1938, were labeled RS-82, and were installed on I-15 and I-16 fighters;
in 1939 they were used at Khalkhin Gol, then they began to assemble warheads from RS-82 for SB bombers and L-2 attack aircraft;
starting in 1938, another group of developers - R. I. Popov, A. P. Pavlenko, V. N. Galkovsky and I. I. Gvai - worked on a multi-charge installation of high mobility on a wheeled chassis;
the last successful test before the launch of the BM-13 into mass production was completed on June 21, 1941, that is, a few hours before the attack fascist Germany to the USSR.

On the fifth day of the war, the Katyusha apparatus in the amount of 2 combat units entered service with the main artillery department. Two days later, on June 28, the first battery was formed from them and 5 prototypes that participated in the tests.

The first combat salvo of Katyusha officially took place on July 14. The city of Rudnya, occupied by the Germans, was shelled with incendiary shells filled with thermite, and two days later the crossing of the Orshitsa River in the area of the Orsha railway station was fired upon.

History of the nickname Katyusha

Since the history of Katyusha, as the nickname of the MLRS, does not have accurate objective information, there are several plausible versions:

some of the shells had an incendiary filling with the KAT marking, indicating the “Kostikov automatic thermite” charge;
the bombers of the SB squadron, armed with RS-132 shells, taking part in the fighting at Khalkhin Gol, were nicknamed Katyushas;
in the combat units there was a legend about a partisan girl with that name, who became famous for the destruction of a large number of fascists, with whom the Katyusha salvo was compared;
the rocket mortar was marked K (Comintern plant) on its body, and the soldiers liked to give the equipment affectionate nicknames.

The latter is supported by the fact that previously rockets with the designation RS were called Raisa Sergeevna, the ML-20 howitzer Emelei, and the M-30 Matushka, respectively.

However, the most poetic version of the nickname is considered to be the song Katyusha, which became popular just before the war. Correspondent A. Sapronov published a note in the Rossiya newspaper in 2001 about a conversation between two Red Army soldiers immediately after an MLRS salvo, in which one of them called it a song, and the second clarified the name of this song.

Analogues of MLRS nicknames

During the war, the BM rocket launcher with a 132 mm projectile was not the only weapon with its own name. Based on the abbreviation MARS, mortar artillery rockets (mortar launchers) received the nickname Marusya.

Mortar MARS - Marusya

Even the German towed Nebelwerfer mortar was jokingly called Vanyusha by Soviet soldiers.

Nebelwerfer mortar - Vanyusha

When fired in an area, Katyusha's salvo exceeded the damage from Vanyusha and the more modern analogues of the Germans that appeared at the end of the war. Modifications of the BM-31-12 tried to give the nickname Andryusha, but it did not catch on, so at least until 1945 any domestic systems MLRS.

Characteristics of the BM-13 installation

The BM 13 Katyusha multiple rocket launcher was created to destroy large enemy concentrations, therefore the main technical and tactical characteristics were:

mobility - the MLRS had to quickly deploy, fire several salvos and instantly change position before destroying the enemy;
firepower - from the MP-13 batteries of several installations were formed;
low cost - a subframe was added to the design, which made it possible to assemble the artillery part of the MLRS at the factory and mount it on the chassis of any vehicle.

Thus, the weapon of victory was installed on railway, air and ground transport, and production costs decreased by at least 20%. The side and rear walls of the cabin were armored, and protective plates were installed on the windshield. The armor protected the gas pipeline and fuel tank, which dramatically increased the “survivability” of the equipment and the survivability of combat crews.

The guidance speed has increased due to the modernization of the rotating and lifting mechanisms, stability in the combat and traveling position. Even when deployed, Katyusha could move over rough terrain within a range of several kilometers at low speed.

Combat crew

To operate the BM-13, a crew of at least 5 people and a maximum of 7 people was used:

driver - moving the MLRS, deploying to a firing position;
loaders - 2 - 4 fighters, placing shells on the guides for a maximum of 10 minutes;
gunner - providing aiming with lifting and turning mechanisms;
gun commander - general management, interaction with other crews of the unit.

Since the BM guards rocket mortar began to be produced from the assembly line already during the war, there was no ready-made structure of combat units. First, batteries were formed - 4 MP-13 installations and 1 anti-aircraft gun, then a division of 3 batteries.

In one salvo of the regiment, enemy equipment and manpower were destroyed over an area of 70–100 hectares by the explosion of 576 shells fired within 10 seconds. According to Directive 002490, the headquarters prohibited the use of Katyushas of less than a division.

Armament

A Katyusha salvo was fired within 10 seconds with 16 shells, each of which had the following characteristics:

caliber – 132 mm;
weight – glycerin powder charge 7.1 kg, bursting charge 4.9 kg, jet engine 21 kg, combat unit 22 kg, shell with fuse 42.5 kg;
stabilizer blade span – 30 cm;
projectile length - 1.4 m;
acceleration – 500 m/s 2 ;
speed - muzzle 70 m/s, combat 355 m/s;
range – 8.5 km;
funnel – 2.5 m in diameter maximum, 1 m deep maximum;
damage radius - 10 m design, 30 m actual;
deviation - 105 m in range, 200 m lateral.

M-13 projectiles were assigned the ballistic index TS-13.

Launcher

When the war began, the Katyusha salvo was fired from rail guides. Later they were replaced by honeycomb type guides to increase the combat power of the MLRS, then spiral type to increase the accuracy of fire.

To increase accuracy, a special stabilizer device was first used. This was then replaced with spirally arranged nozzles that twisted the rocket during flight, reducing terrain spread.

History of application

In the summer of 1942, BM 13 multiple rocket launch vehicles in the amount of three regiments and a reinforcement division became mobile impact force on the Southern Front, they helped hold back the advance of the enemy’s 1st Tank Army near Rostov.

Around the same time, a portable version, the “Mountain Katyusha”, was manufactured in Sochi for the 20th Mountain Rifle Division. In the 62nd army by installation launchers An MLRS division was created for the T-70 tank. The city of Sochi was defended from the shore by 4 railcars with M-13 mounts.

During the Bryansk operation (1943), multiple rocket launchers were spread along the entire front, making it possible to distract the Germans to carry out a flank attack. In July 1944, a simultaneous salvo of 144 BM-31 installations sharply reduced the number of accumulated forces of Nazi units.

Local conflicts

Chinese troops used 22 MLRS during artillery preparation before the Battle of Triangular Hill during Korean War in October 1952. Later, the BM-13 multiple rocket launchers, supplied until 1963 from the USSR, were used in Afghanistan by the government. Katyusha remained in service in Cambodia until recently.

"Katyusha" vs. "Vanyusha"

Unlike the Soviet BM-13 installation, the German Nebelwerfer MLRS was actually a six-barreled mortar:

a carriage from anti-tank gun 37 mm;
the guides for the projectiles are six 1.3 m barrels, united by clips into blocks;
the rotating mechanism provided a 45-degree elevation angle and a horizontal firing sector of 24 degrees;
the combat installation rested on a folding stop and sliding frames of the carriage, the wheels were hung out.

The mortar fired turbojet missiles, the accuracy of which was ensured by rotating the body within 1000 rps. The German troops had several mobile mortar launchers on the half-track base of the Maultier armored personnel carrier with 10 barrels for 150 mm rockets. However, all German rocket artillery was created to solve a different problem - chemical warfare using chemical warfare agents.

By 1941, the Germans had already created powerful toxic substances Soman, Tabun, and Sarin. However, none of them were used in WWII; the fire was carried out exclusively with smoke, high-explosive and incendiary mines. The main part of the rocket artillery was mounted on towed carriages, which sharply reduced the mobility of units.

The accuracy of hitting the target of the German MLRS was higher than that of the Katyusha. However, Soviet weapons were suitable for massive attacks over large areas and had a powerful psychological effect. When towing, Vanyusha’s speed was limited to 30 km/h, and after two salvos the position was changed.

The Germans managed to capture a sample of the M-13 only in 1942, but this did not bring any practical benefit. The secret was in powder bombs based on smokeless powder based on nitroglycerin. Germany failed to reproduce its production technology; until the end of the war, it used its own rocket fuel recipe.

Modifications of Katyusha

Initially, the BM-13 installation was based on the ZiS-6 chassis and fired M-13 rockets from rail guides. Later modifications of the MLRS appeared:

BM-13N - since 1943, the Studebaker US6 was used as a chassis;
BM-13NN – assembly on a ZiS-151 vehicle;
BM-13NM - chassis from ZIL-157, in service since 1954;
BM-13NMM - since 1967, assembled on ZIL-131;
BM-31 – projectile 310 mm in diameter, honeycomb type guides;
BM-31-12 – the number of guides has been increased to 12;
BM-13 SN – spiral type guides;
BM-8-48 – 82 mm shells, 48 guides;
BM-8-6 - based on heavy machine guns;
BM-8-12 - on the chassis of motorcycles and snowmobiles;
BM30-4 t BM31-4 – frames supported on the ground with 4 guides;
BM-8-72, BM-8-24 and BM-8-48 - mounted on railway platforms.

T-40 and later T-60 tanks were equipped with mortar mounts. They were placed on a tracked chassis after the turret was dismantled. The USSR's allies supplied Austin, International GMC and Ford Mamon all-terrain vehicles under Lend-Lease, which were ideal for the chassis of installations used in mountain conditions.

Several M-13s were mounted on KV-1 light tanks, but they were taken out of production too quickly. In the Carpathians, Crimea, Malaya Zemlya, and then in China and Mongolia, North Korea torpedo boats with MLRS on board were used.

It is believed that the Red Army's armament consisted of 3,374 Katyusha BM-13s, of which 1,157 on 17 types of non-standard chassis, 1,845 units on Studebakers and 372 on ZiS-6 vehicles. Exactly half of the BM-8 and B-13 were lost irretrievably during the battles (1,400 and 3,400 units of equipment, respectively). Of the 1,800 BM-31s produced, 100 units of equipment out of 1,800 sets were lost.

From November 1941 to May 1945, the number of divisions increased from 45 to 519 units. These units belonged to the artillery reserve of the Supreme Command of the Red Army.

Monuments BM-13

Currently, all military MLRS installations based on the ZiS-6 have been preserved exclusively in the form of memorials and monuments. They are located in the CIS as follows:

former NIITP (Moscow);
"Military Hill" (Temryuk);
Nizhny Novgorod Kremlin;
Lebedin-Mikhailovka (Sumy region);
monument in Kropyvnytskyi;
memorial in Zaporozhye;
Artillery Museum (St. Petersburg);
WWII Museum (Kyiv);
Monument of Glory (Novosibirsk);
entry to Armyansk (Crimea);
Sevastopol diorama (Crimea);
Pavilion 11 VKS Patriot (Cubinka);
Novomoskovsk Museum (Tula region);
memorial in Mtsensk;
memorial complex in Izium;
Museum of the Korsun-Shevchenskaya Battle (Cherkasy region);
military museum in Seoul;
museum in Belgorod;
WWII Museum in the village of Padikovo (Moscow region);
OJSC Kirov Machinery Plant May 1;
memorial in Tula.

Katyusha is used in several computer games; two combat vehicles remain in service with the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Thus, the Katyusha MLRS installation was a powerful psychological and rocket-artillery weapon during the Second World War. The weapons were used for massive attacks on large concentrations of troops, and at the time of the war they were superior to enemy counterparts.

Katyusha - appeared during the Great Patriotic War 1941-45 unofficial name barrelless field rocket artillery systems (BM-8, BM-13, BM-31 and others). Such installations were actively used Armed Forces USSR during World War II. The popularity of the nickname turned out to be so great that post-war MLRS on automobile chassis, in particular BM-14 and BM-21 Grad, were often referred to colloquially as “Katyushas”.

Back in 1921, employees of the Gas Dynamics Laboratory N.I. Tikhomirov and V.A. Artemyev began developing rockets for aircraft.

In 1929-1933, B. S. Petropavlovsky, with the participation of other GDL employees, conducted official tests of rockets of various calibers and purposes using multi-shot and single-shot aircraft and ground launchers.

In 1937-1938, rockets developed by the RNII (GDL together with the GIRD in October 1933 formed the newly organized RNII) under the leadership of G. E. Langemak were adopted by the RKKVF. RS-82 rockets of 82 mm caliber were installed on I-15, I-16, and I-153 fighters. In the summer of 1939, RS-82 on I-16 and I-153 were successfully used in battles with Japanese troops on the Khalkhin Gol River.

In 1939-1941, RNII employees I. I. Gvai, V. N. Galkovsky, A. P. Pavlenko, A. S. Popov and others created a multi-charge launcher mounted on a truck.

In March 1941, field tests of the installations, designated BM-13 (combat vehicle with 132 mm caliber shells), were successfully carried out. The RS-132 132 mm rocket and a launcher based on the ZIS-6 BM-13 truck were put into service on June 21, 1941; It was this type of combat vehicle that first received the nickname “Katyusha”. During the Great Patriotic War, a significant number of variants of RS shells and launchers for them were created; In total, Soviet industry produced more than 10,000 rocket artillery combat vehicles during the war years
It is known why BM-13 installations began to be called “guards mortars” at one time. The BM-13 installations were not actually mortars, but the command sought to keep their design secret for as long as possible:
When, at range shooting, soldiers and commanders asked a GAU representative to name the “true” name of the combat installation, he advised: “Name the installation as usual artillery piece. This is important for maintaining secrecy."
There is no single version of why the BM-13 began to be called “Katyusha”. There are several assumptions:
Based on the title of Blanter’s song “Katyusha”, which became popular before the war, based on the words of Isakovsky. The version is convincing, since for the first time Captain Flerov’s battery fired at the enemy on July 14, 1941 at 10 o’clock in the morning, firing a salvo at the Market Square of the city of Rudnya. This was the first combat use of Katyushas, confirmed in historical literature. The installations were fired from high steep mountain- the association with the high steep bank in the song immediately arose among the fighters. Finally, the former sergeant of the headquarters company of the 217th separate communications battalion of the 144th Infantry Division of the 20th Army, Andrei Sapronov, is alive, now a military historian, who gave it this name. Red Army soldier Kashirin, having arrived with him at the battery after the shelling of Rudnya, exclaimed in surprise: “What a song!” “Katyusha,” answered Andrei Sapronov (from the memoirs of A. Sapronov in the Rossiya newspaper No. 23 of June 21-27, 2001 and in the Parliamentary Gazette No. 80 of May 5, 2005).
What kind of verses they didn’t come up with at the front based on their favorite song!
There were battles at sea and on land,
Shots roared all around -
Sang songs "Katyusha"
Near Kaluga, Tula and Orel.
- - - - - - - - - - - - -
Let the Fritz remember the Russian Katyusha,
Let him hear her sing:
Shakes out the souls of enemies,
And it gives courage to its own!
Through the communications center of the headquarters company, the news about a miracle weapon called “Katyusha” within 24 hours became the property of the entire 20th Army, and through its command - the entire country. On July 13, 2012, the veteran and “godfather” of Katyusha turned 91, and on February 26, 2013 he passed away. On the desk he left his latest work - a chapter about the first salvo of Katyusha rockets for the multi-volume history of the Great Patriotic War, which is being prepared for publication.
There is also a version that the name is associated with the “K” index on the mortar body - the installations were produced by the Kalinin plant (according to another source, by the Comintern plant). And front-line soldiers loved to give nicknames to their weapons. For example, the M-30 howitzer was nicknamed “Mother”, the ML-20 howitzer gun was nicknamed “Emelka”. Yes, and the BM-13 was at first sometimes called “Raisa Sergeevna,” thus deciphering the abbreviation RS (missile).
The third version suggests that this is how the girls from the Moscow Kompressor plant, who worked on the assembly, dubbed these cars. [source not specified 284 days]
Another, exotic version. The guides on which the projectiles were mounted were called ramps. The forty-two-kilogram projectile was lifted by two fighters harnessed to the straps, and the third usually helped them, pushing the projectile so that it lay exactly on the guides, and he also informed those holding that the projectile stood up, rolled, and rolled onto the guides. It was supposedly that they called it “Katyusha” (the role of those holding the projectile and the roller was constantly changing, since the crew of the BM-13, unlike barrel artillery, was not explicitly divided into loader, aimer, etc.) [source not specified 284 days]
It should also be noted that the installations were so secret that it was even forbidden to use the commands “fire”, “fire”, “volley”, instead they were sounded “sing” or “play” (to start it was necessary to turn the handle of the electric generator very quickly), that , may also have been related to the song “Katyusha”. And for our infantry, a salvo of Katyusha rockets was the most pleasant music. [source not specified 284 days]
There is an assumption that initially the nickname “Katyusha” had a front-line bomber equipped with rockets - an analogue of the M-13. And the nickname jumped from an airplane to a rocket launcher via shells. [source not specified 284 days]

An experienced squadron of SV bombers (commander Doyar) in the battles on Khalkhin Gol was armed with RS-132 missiles. SB (fast bomber) bombers were sometimes called "Katyusha". It seems that this name appeared during civil war in Spain in the 1930s.
IN German troops these machines were called "Stalin's organs" due to the external resemblance of the rocket launcher to the pipe system of this musical instrument and the powerful stunning roar that was produced when missiles were launched. [source not specified 284 days]
During the battles for Poznan and Berlin, the M-30 and M-31 single-launch installations received the nickname “Russian Faustpatron” from the Germans, although these shells were not used as an anti-tank weapon. With “dagger” (from a distance of 100-200 meters) launches of these shells, the guards broke through any walls.

In 2007, Colonel Yakov Mikhailovich Lyakhovetsky conveyed his war memories to the portal “Uninvented Stories about War”. After publication, he continued working on the text. Additions and clarifications have been made. New archival documents (combat orders, instructions, award lists, etc.) made it possible to tell in more detail about the military operations of the 28th OGMD, in which Yakov Mikhailovich served, and his combat path. And, most importantly, to supplement the memories with a story about the military exploits of the division’s guardsmen, to name many by their last names (more than 40 last names).

The disbandment of the brigade continued until mid-October. Most of the officers had already left for Moscow, to the personnel department of the GMCH, and me and a small group of officers were still detained in Sormovo to carry out various tasks related to the liquidation of the unit. Finally, on October 15, I received the necessary documents. At the beginning of October we were given certificates: at the brigade headquarters - to receive the medal “For Victory over Germany in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945”, at the plant - the medal “For Valiant Labor in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945”. I still have this factory certificate – seventy years old – (I was awarded the medal “For Victory over Germany” as a participant in hostilities).

I provide this certificate:

On October 17 I arrived in Moscow. And there - the personnel department in the 2nd NGO House, and then the already familiar Officer Reserve Division on Khoroshevskoye Highway.

The division was as crowded as ever. Some were awaiting assignment to units, others an order for demobilization. Some officers, who had already formalized their transfer to the reserve and received a substantial severance pay, either hoping to increase it, or simply out of excitement, sat in the evening card game and literally lost every penny. Often among those to whom they lost were two officers who always played together, officers in brand new, well-fitted uniforms, from the division’s regular employees.

In the barracks next to my bed there was the bed of an officer who, as it turned out, also studied at the Omsk school, albeit in a different battery, and fought on the Western Front.

Naturally, it was interesting for us to remember our days at school and mutual friends. They were interested in whether our units had to operate in the neighborhood and participate in the same combat operations. It turned out that we supported different connections and in different areas.

We also touched upon issues related to the history of the Katyusha. One day we started talking about the strange omission of the name Kostikov, who was considered the creator of the Katyusha. Last names and photos of the creators military weapons and after the war they began to publish techniques, but Kostikov was not among them. In general, for us, who fought on Katyushas, there was a lot of unclear and contradictory things here. This also affected the former commander of the GMCh, Lieutenant General V. Aborenkov. An acquaintance of mine heard from one of the officers that the general was in trouble because he allegedly tried to take credit for the authorship of the Katyusha.

And later, for a long time in the post-war years, there was no clarity on these issues.

One could notice that gradually Kostikov’s name completely disappeared from the pages of newspapers and magazines and ceased to be mentioned in official publications.

In the early 80s, while I was in Leningrad, I visited the Military Historical Museum of the History of Artillery, engineering troops and signal troops. In the exhibition dedicated to rocket artillery and guards mortar units, I did not see either Kostikov’s name or portrait.

Kostikov was not mentioned among the creators of the Katyusha in the third edition of the Bolshoi Soviet Encyclopedia(TSB), Encyclopedia “The Great Patriotic War of 1941 -1945”, in the book “Rocketmen”, published by DOSSAF publishing house in 1979, etc.

To some extent, the situation began to become clearer at the end of 1988, when publications appeared in the magazines “Ogonyok”, “Agitator”, and then twice in the “Military Historical Journal”, questioning the authorship and very participation of Kostikov in the creation of “ Katyusha”, accusing him of involvement in arrests at the research institute in 1937-1938. I. T. Kleimenov, G. E. Langemak, S. P. Korolev, V. P. Glushko, as “enemies of the people”, in order to advance to the leadership of the institute.

In “Military Historical Journal” No. 10 for 1989 it was written:

« In 1939, after successful field tests, having somehow pushed aside the main participants in the development, testing and introduction of new weapons, Kostikov and Gvai made an application to be recognized as the authors of the invention. When the deputy head of the artillery department of the People's Commissariat of Defense (NKO) Aborenkov expressed a desire to join them, they did not dare refuse... It is possible that it was after his insistent petitions that the invention department of the NKO recognized all three as the inventors of the M-13 machine unit and issued them copyright certificates».

/ « VIZH" No. 10, 1989 Anisimov N.A., Oppokov V.G. “Incident at NII-3” .P.85./

The magazine published the conclusions of a technical examination carried out in 1944 after Kostikov was removed by the State Defense Committee resolution of February 18. this year from the post of director of the institute and his arrest for disrupting the government task for the development rocket engine for a jet fighter-interceptor.

The investigator for particularly important cases of the People's Commissariat of State Security of the USSR, who interrogated Kostikov and doubted his scientific credibility, brought in Academician S.A. for the examination. Khristianovich, professors A.V. Chesalova, K.A. Ushakova, deputy Head of the weapons department of laboratory No. 2 TsAGI (Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute) A.M. Levina.

Answering the investigator’s question whether Kostikov, Gvai, Aborenkov are the authors of the M-8, M-13 projectiles and launching devices for them, the experts stated that Kostikov, Gvai, Aborenkov, who received an author’s certificate for a machine installation for firing rocket projectiles, have nothing to do with had no involvement in their development. Arguments: smokeless powder missiles M-8 and M-13 differ only in minor modifications from the RS-82 and RS-132 projectiles developed at NII-3 in 1934 - 1938; The idea of creating a launcher was put forward back in 1933 by G. Langemak and V. Glushko in the book “Missiles, their design and application.”

After his death, academicians S. Korolev and V. Glushko launched an active campaign against Kostikov, believing that it was he who, for careerist purposes, was guilty of their arrest. In an appeal to the publishing house of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, a copy of which was sent and published in the magazine “Ogonyok” No. 50 for 1988, they wrote: “Kostikov, who worked at the institute as an ordinary engineer, made a lot of efforts to achieve the arrest and conviction as enemies the people of the main leadership of this institute, including the main author of a new type of weapon, a talented designer, deputy director of the institute for scientific affairs G.E. Langemaka. Thus, Kostikov turned out to be the head of the institute and the “author” of this new type of weapon, for which he was generously awarded at the beginning of the war.” /“Ogonyok” No. 50, p.23/.

At the insistence of V. Glushko, the portrait and surname of A. Kostikov were confiscated from the exhibition of the Military History Museum, as well as in Leningrad. Ch. The censor was instructed not to mention Kostikov's name in the open press.

But in 1989-1991, materials in defense of A. Kostikov began to appear in a number of publications. The newspapers “Socialist Industry”, “Radyanska Ukraina”, “Krasnaya Zvezda”, “Trud” and some others published materials refuting the statements of the authors in the magazines “Ogonyok”, “Agitator”, etc., and which made it possible to analyze the facts without bias and assignments.

As Colonel V. Moroz wrote in the article “Katyusha”. Triumph and Drama”, published in the newspaper “Red Star” on July 13, 1991, the idea outlined in the book by G. Langemak and V. Glushko “Rockets, their design and use”, “... is not identical to the idea of the Katyusha... military engineer 1st rank G. Langemak, deputy director of the institute, launchers on the vehicle were not designed at all, and attempts to arm others with rockets vehicles ended in failure." And only as a result of a closed competition announced at the Research Institute in 1938 for the creation of object 138 (launcher), in which 18 leading engineers of the institute took part, did a completely original project of a “mechanized multi-charger located on ZIS-5 car installation for firing rockets.”

Sending the project signed by A. Kostikov and I. Gvai to the customer, the director of the institute B. Slonimer officially named A. Kostikov “the initiator of the creation of the installation.” In February 1939, after the combat vehicle passed trial tests at the Sofrinsky artillery range, and then received the go-ahead from the State Commission headed by the famous artilleryman V. Grendal, A. Kostikov and I. Gvai submitted a joint application (written in the hand of I. Gvai ) about issuing a copyright certificate to them. In September of this year, another co-author was added to the application - V.V. Aborenkova. On February 19, 1940, A. Kostikov, I. Gvai, and V. Aborenkov were issued a non-public copyright certificate by the invention department of the NPO.

During interrogations from the investigator, and then from the Central Committee of the CPSU, I. Gvai argued that without Kostikov there would have been no Katyusha. Gvay, Kostikov, Aborenkov told the investigator that although they are related to the development of the rocket, they do not claim authorship in its invention, that although the idea of the launcher was expressed in the book by G. Langemak and V. Glushko “Missiles, their design and application,” but there was no launcher as such and there was no specific clarity of what it should be until the Gwai project appeared.

During interrogations, it was also proven that V. Aborenkov was included in the application, not as a “punchy person,” but as one of the active participants in the creation of the machine installation. In particular, they were asked to increase the length of the guides to 5 meters, use separate ignition of the pyracartridges from an electrical circuit (Gwai suggested simultaneous ignition), use an artillery panorama and a sight for aiming.

In November 1989, the newspaper “Socialist Industry” introduced readers to the conclusions of a special commission chaired by Candidate of Technical Sciences Yu. Demyanko, created by the CPSU Central Committee. The commission concluded:

« The authors of the invention of a mechanized installation for salvo firing of rockets - and even more broadly - the authors of the proposal for a fundamentally new type of weapon - multiple launch rocket systems are A. Kostikov, I. Gvai, V. Aborenkov. The most meticulous analysis shows that there is no person who could claim inclusion in this team».

“The Prosecutor's Office of the USSR most carefully studied the materials related to the arrest of prominent scientists of the Scientific Research Institute No. 3 in the 30s. In the materials of the criminal cases against Korolev S.P., Langemak G.E., Glushko V.P., Kleymenov I.T. there is no data indicating that they were arrested following Kostikov’s denunciation.”

The Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper wrote that it was not failures at work, “... battles at party meetings, which were not typical for that time, nor signals from informants from the walls of the institute, became the reason for the arrest of I. Kleimenov, G. Langemenok, V. Glushko, S. Korolev, and later V. Luzhin.” Danger already loomed over them during the period of exposure as “enemies of the people” (later rehabilitated) by the deputy. People's Commissar of Defense Marshal M. Tukhachevsky, who was in charge of weapons and for a long time looked after scientifically - Research institute, and the leader Osoviakhim R. Eideman, under whose auspices the Moscow group of GDL S. Korolev worked.”

/gas. “Red Star” 07/13/1991 V. Moroz, “Katyusha”: triumph and drama.”/

As noted in a number of publications, Andrei Grigorievich Kostikov was not such a careerist as the authors of articles from Ogonyok, Agitator, and others tried to present him.

He was born on October 17 (old style) 1899 in the city of Kazatin, in the family of a railway worker. Participant in the Civil War. Graduated from Kyiv military school communications, then - the Air Force Academy named after N. E. Zhukovsky. Upon graduation, he was sent to the Rocket Research Institute, where he worked his way up from engineer to department head, chief engineer, and director of the institute. Major General, hero Socialist Labor, Laureate Stalin Prize 1st degree, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. In February 1944, by decree of the State Defense Committee, he was removed from the post of director of NII-3 for failure to fulfill a government assignment and was brought to justice by the USSR Prosecutor's Office criminal liability. He spent 11.5 months in a pre-trial prison. But no hostile intent was established in his actions (within the established eight months, Kostikov failed to ensure the creation of a liquid-propellant rocket engine for an interceptor fighter), and he was released.

Despite his serious illness, he continued to work fruitfully and raised many students. After his release from custody, Kostikov continued to be summoned for questioning by the CPSU Central Committee and investigative authorities. All this affected his health, his heart could not stand it. He died on December 5, 1950 at the age of 51, and was buried in Moscow.

The life of I.I. ended no less tragically. Guaya. Endless interrogations and groundless accusations led to the same thing. He died five years later, in 1955, in the prime of his creative powers.

Publications in defense of A. Kostikov received an inadequate assessment. Some publications, in particular the Military Historical Journal, tried to question the conclusions of the commission of the CPSU Central Committee, created under the leadership of Yu. Demyanko.

And although the question about Kostikov and his role remained open, it is wrong to deny his merits as one of the creators of “Katyusha”. There is also no doubt that a large team of talented scientists and engineers took part in the creation of Katyusha. Their success was facilitated by many years of experimental work to develop rocket weapons creators of rocket technology.

Posthumously this high title was awarded to Ivan Terentyevich Kleymenov, Georgy Erikhovich Langemak, Vasily Nikolaevich Luzhin, Boris Sergeevich Petropavlovsky, Boris Mikhailovich Slonimer, Nikolai Ivanovich Tikhomirov. All of them made a great contribution to the creation of domestic jet weapons.

N. Tikhomirov- in 1921 he founded and headed until his death in 1930 the Gas Dynamic Laboratory (GDL) in Petrograd (Leningrad), the main object of which was a powder rocket.

B. Petropavlovsky– graduate of the Military Technical Academy. Continued leadership of the GDL. His inventions were reminiscent of today's recoilless rifles and rocket-propelled grenade launchers. He died in 1933 from a cold.

I. Kleimenov- graduate of the Air Force Academy. N. E. Zhukovsky, was the last head of the GDL and the first head new structure– Jet Research Institute (RNII), formed on the initiative of M. Tukhachevsky by combining two teams – the Leningrad GDL and the Moscow Study Group jet propulsion, headed by S. Korolev. At the end of 1937, Kleimenov was arrested and executed in 1938;

G. Langemak– military engineer 1st rank, deputy. Head of the RNII, made a great contribution to bringing the missile to combat standards. He was also repressed and shot;

V. Luzhin- an engineer, together with other employees of the RNII, he found many original solutions in the creation of a powerful high-explosive fragmentation projectile, which during the war the Germans mistook for thermite, although the incendiary properties were given to it by hot fragments. In 1940 he was arrested, sentenced to 8 years, and died in prison.

B. Slonimer- Director of NII-3 (the name of the Jet Institute) from the end of 1937 to November 1940. Although he was not a jet designer, he did a lot to defend the new combat vehicle, to give it a “start in life”, taking on all the blows associated with its creation in extremely difficult conditions and a tense situation, with stubborn resistance from “rail” artillery from the head of the Main Artillery Directorate, Marshal G. Kulik, and others . /“Red Star” 07/13/1991/

The year 1945 was ending. Year of Victory Soviet people over Nazi Germany.

After almost a month in the reserves, I was sent to Ukraine, to the Carpathian Military District (PrikVO), where on December 1 I was appointed head of the reconnaissance division of the 61st Guards Mortar Regiment (61st GMP). The regiment had glorious military traditions and was awarded three orders of Kutuzov, Bogdan Khmelnitsky, and Alexander Nevsky. It was given the name "Zaporozhye". It was an honor to serve in such a regiment. But due to the reduction of the army, the 61st GMP was disbanded in June 1946. Some of the officers were demobilized. The rest began to be transferred to other units. As a rule, with a demotion. Not everyone agreed. They wrote reports and sought dismissal. I was left in the frames.

The certification for me from that period stated:

“...Comrade Lyakhovetsky, working as the division's intelligence chief, showed himself to be a demanding, strong-willed officer towards himself and his subordinates. Behind short period Service in the regiment managed to weld together a team capable of completing any task. At the inspection review by the commission of the Chief. Marshal of Artillery Voronov, the scouts trained by him received a good rating.

A competent, strong-willed officer, he enjoys well-deserved authority among his subordinates. Sociable, polite. Artillery and tactical training is quite satisfactory. He knows his personal weapons and is quite proficient with them. He works systematically to improve his knowledge. Has good organizational skills, combining them in caring for subordinates. Politically literate, morally stable...

Conclusions: In peacetime, the position is quite appropriate; it is advisable to remain in the armed forces.

Commander of the 2nd Division of the 61st GMP

Guard Major /Malyutin/

"I affirm"

Commander of the 61st Guards Mortar Zaporozhye Order of Kutuzov, Bohdan Khmelnitsky and Alexander Nevsky Regiment.

This was followed by service in the 87th (also later disbanded) and 5th Guards Mortar Regiments. However, over the years, the consequences of a serious wound received at the front became clear, and the frequent change of units no longer suited me, and I submitted my report for dismissal.

My generation had the chance hard fate. Literally after the school prom, the war began. Out of every hundred of my peers, only three returned from it. Many of those who returned lost their health, became disabled due to wounds, and died early. And although it was not easy for us, we do not complain about fate. We have fulfilled our duty to our Motherland. Our conscience before our descendants, our children and grandchildren, is clear.

Zhitomir, 2001-2005, 2015

Prepared and sent for publication: retired Colonel Yakov Mikhailovich Lyakhovetsky

History of Katyusha

The history of the creation of Katyusha dates back to pre-Petrine times. In Rus', the first rockets appeared in the 15th century. By the end of the 16th century, Russia was well aware of the design, methods of manufacturing and combat use of missiles. This is convincingly evidenced by the “Charter of Military, Cannon and Other Affairs Relating to Military Science,” written in 1607-1621 by Onisim Mikhailov. Since 1680, a special rocket establishment already existed in Russia. In the 19th century, missiles designed to destroy enemy personnel and materiel were created by Major General Alexander Dmitrievich Zasyadko . Zasyadko began work on creating rockets in 1815 on his own initiative using his own funds. By 1817, he managed to create a high-explosive and incendiary combat rocket based on a lighting rocket.
At the end of August 1828, a guards corps arrived from St. Petersburg under the besieged Turkish fortress of Varna. Together with the corps, the first Russian missile company arrived under the command of Lieutenant Colonel V.M. Vnukov. The company was formed on the initiative of Major General Zasyadko. The rocket company received its first baptism of fire near Varna on August 31, 1828 during an attack on a Turkish redoubt located by the sea south of Varna. Cannonballs and bombs from field and naval guns, as well as rocket explosions, forced the defenders of the redoubt to take cover in holes made in the ditch. Therefore, when the hunters (volunteers) of the Simbirsk regiment rushed to the redoubt, the Turks did not have time to take their places and provide effective resistance to the attackers.

On March 5, 1850, Colonel was appointed commander of the Rocket Establishment Konstantin Ivanovich Konstantinov – illegitimate son Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich from his relationship with actress Clara Anna Lawrence. During his tenure in this position, 2-, 2.5- and 4-inch missiles of the Konstantinov system were adopted by the Russian army. The weight of combat missiles depended on the type of warhead and was characterized by the following data: a 2-inch missile weighed from 2.9 to 5 kg; 2.5-inch - from 6 to 14 kg and 4-inch - from 18.4 to 32 kg.

The firing ranges of the Konstantinov system missiles, created by him in 1850-1853, were very significant for that time. Thus, a 4-inch rocket equipped with 10-pound (4.095 kg) grenades had maximum range firing range is 4150 m, and a 4-inch incendiary rocket is 4260 m, while a quarter-pound mountain unicorn arr. 1838 had a maximum firing range of only 1810 meters. Konstantinov's dream was to create an aerial rocket launcher that would fire missiles from hot air balloon. The experiments carried out proved the long range of missiles fired from a tethered balloon. However, it was not possible to achieve acceptable accuracy.
After the death of K.I. Konstantinov in 1871, rocketry in the Russian army fell into decline. Combat missiles were used sporadically and in small quantities in the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878. Missiles were used more successfully during the conquest of Central Asia in the 70-80s of the 19th century. They played a decisive role in. The last time Konstantinov missiles were used in Turkestan was in the 90s of the 19th century. And in 1898 combat missiles were officially withdrawn from service with the Russian army.
New impetus for development missile weapons was given during the First World War: in 1916, Professor Ivan Platonovich Grave created gelatin gunpowder, improving smokeless powder French inventor Paul Viel. In 1921, developers N.I. Tikhomirov and V.A. Artemyev from the gas dynamic laboratory began developing rockets based on this gunpowder.

At first, the gas-dynamic laboratory, where rocket weapons were created, had more difficulties and failures than successes. However, enthusiasts - engineers N.I. Tikhomirov, V.A. Artemyev, and then G.E. Langemak and B.S. Petropavlovsky persistently improved their “brainchild”, firmly believing in the success of the business. Extensive theoretical development and countless experiments were required, which ultimately led to the creation at the end of 1927 of an 82-mm fragmentation rocket with a powder engine, and after it a more powerful one, with a caliber of 132 mm. Test firing conducted near Leningrad in March 1928 was encouraging - the range was already 5-6 km, although dispersion was still large. For many years it was not possible to significantly reduce it: the original concept assumed a projectile with tails that did not exceed its caliber. After all, a pipe served as a guide for it - simple, light, convenient for installation.
In 1933, engineer I.T. Kleimenov proposed making a more developed tail, more than twice the caliber of the projectile in scope. The accuracy of fire increased, and the flight range also increased, but it was necessary to design new open - in particular, rail - guides for projectiles. And again, years of experiments, searches...
By 1938, the main difficulties in creating mobile rocket artillery had been overcome. Employees of the Moscow RNII Yu. A. Pobedonostsev, F. N. Poyda, L. E. Schwartz and others developed 82-mm fragmentation, high-explosive fragmentation and thermite shells (PC) with a solid propellant (powder) engine, which was started by a remote electric igniter.

At the same time, for firing at ground targets, the designers proposed several options for mobile multi-charge multiple rocket launchers (by area). Engineers V.N. Galkovsky, I.I. Gvai, A.P. Pavlenko, A.S. Popov took part in their creation under the leadership of A.G. Kostikov.
The installation consisted of eight open guide rails interconnected into a single unit by tubular welded spars. 16 132-mm rocket projectiles weighing 42.5 kg each were fixed using T-shaped pins at the top and bottom of the guides in pairs. The design provided the ability to change the angle of elevation and azimuth rotation. Aiming at the target was carried out through the sight by rotating the handles of the lifting and rotating mechanisms. The installation was mounted on a truck chassis, and in the first version, relatively short guides were located across the vehicle, which received the general name MU-1 (mechanized installation). This decision was unsuccessful - when firing, the vehicle swayed, which significantly reduced the accuracy of the battle.

Installation of MU-1, late version. The location of the guides is still transverse, but the ZiS-6 is already used as the chassis. This installation could simultaneously accommodate 22 projectiles and could fire directly. If they had guessed in time to add retractable paws, then this version of the installation would have surpassed the MU-2 in combat qualities, which was later adopted for service under the designation BM-12-16.

M-13 shells, containing 4.9 kg of explosive, provided a radius of continuous damage by fragments of 8-10 meters (when the fuse was set to “O” - fragmentation) and an actual damage radius of 25-30 meters. In soil of medium hardness, when the fuse was set to “3” (slowdown), a funnel with a diameter of 2-2.5 meters and a depth of 0.8-1 meter was created.
In September 1939 it was created jet system MU-2 on a ZIS-6 three-axle truck more suitable for this purpose. The car was an all-terrain truck with double tires on the rear axles. Its length with a 4980 mm wheelbase was 6600 mm, and its width was 2235 mm. The car was equipped with the same in-line six-cylinder water-cooled carburetor engine that was installed on the ZiS-5. Its cylinder diameter was 101.6 mm and its piston stroke was 114.3 mm. Thus, its working volume was equal to 5560 cubic centimeters, so that the volume indicated in most sources is 5555 cubic centimeters. cm is the result of someone’s mistake, which was subsequently replicated by many serious publications. At 2300 rpm, the engine, which had a 4.6-fold compression ratio, developed 73 horsepower, which was good for those times, but due to the heavy load, the maximum speed was limited to 55 kilometers per hour.

In this version, elongated guides were installed along the car, the rear of which was additionally hung on jacks before firing. The weight of the vehicle with a crew (5-7 people) and full ammunition was 8.33 tons, the firing range reached 8470 m. In just one salvo lasting 8-10 seconds, the combat vehicle fired 16 shells containing 78.4 kg of highly effective explosives at enemy positions substances. The three-axle ZIS-6 provided the MU-2 with quite satisfactory mobility on the ground, allowing it to quickly perform a march maneuver and change position. And to transfer the vehicle from the traveling position to the combat position, 2-3 minutes were enough. However, the installation acquired another drawback - the impossibility of direct fire and, as a result, a large dead space. However, our artillerymen subsequently learned to overcome it and even began to use it.
On December 25, 1939, the Artillery Directorate of the Red Army approved the 132-mm M-13 rocket and launcher, called BM-13. NII-Z received an order for the production of five such installations and a batch of missiles for military testing. In addition, the artillery department Navy also ordered one BM-13 launcher to test it in the coastal defense system. During the summer and autumn of 1940, NII-3 manufactured six BM-13 launchers. In the fall of the same year, BM-13 launchers and a batch of M-13 shells were ready for testing.

1 – switch, 2 – cabin armor shields, 3 – guide package, 4 – gas tank, 5 – rotating frame base, 6 – lifting screw casing, 7 – lifting frame, 8 – traveling support, 9 – stopper, 10 – rotating frame, 11 – M-13 projectile, 12 – brake light, 13 – jacks, 14 – launcher battery, 15 – towing device spring, 16 – sight bracket, 17 – lifting mechanism handle, 18 – turning mechanism handle, 19 – spare wheel, 20 – distribution box.

On June 17, 1941, at a training ground near Moscow, during the inspection of samples of new weapons of the Red Army, salvo launches were made from BM-13 combat vehicles. People's Commissar of Defense Marshal Soviet Union Timoshenko, People's Commissar of Armaments Ustinov and Chief of the General Staff Army General Zhukov, who were present at the tests, praised the new weapon. Two prototypes of the BM-13 combat vehicle were prepared for the show. One of them was loaded with high-explosive fragmentation rockets, and the second with illumination rockets. Salvo launches of fragmentation rockets were made. All targets in the area where the shells fell were hit, everything that could burn on this section of the artillery route burned. The shooting participants praised the new missile weapons. Immediately at the firing position, an opinion was expressed about the need to quickly adopt the first domestic MLRS installation.
On June 21, 1941, literally a few hours before the start of the war, after examining samples of missile weapons, Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin decided to launch mass production of M-13 rockets and the BM-13 launcher and to begin the formation of missile military units. Due to the threat of an impending war, this decision was made despite the fact that the BM-13 launcher had not yet passed military tests and had not been developed to the stage allowing mass industrial production.

The commander of the first experimental Katyusha battery is Captain Flerov. On October 2, Flerov’s battery hit. The batteries covered more than 150 kilometers behind enemy lines. Flerov did everything possible to save the battery and break through to his own. On the night of October 7, 1941, a convoy of vehicles from the Flerov battery was ambushed near the village of Bogatyri, Znamensky District. Smolensk region. Finding themselves in a hopeless situation, the battery personnel took up the fight. Under heavy fire they blew up the cars. Many of them died. Being seriously wounded, the commander blew himself up along with the main launcher.

On July 2, 1941, the first experimental battery of rocket artillery in the Red Army under the command of Captain Flerov set out from Moscow to the Western Front. On July 4, the battery became part of the 20th Army, whose troops occupied the defense along the Dnieper near the city of Orsha.

In most books about the war - both scientific and fiction - Wednesday, July 16, 1941, is named as the day of the first use of the Katyusha. On that day, a battery under the command of Captain Flerov attacked the Orsha railway station that had just been occupied by the enemy and destroyed the trains that had accumulated there.
However, in reality Flerov battery was first deployed at the front two days earlier: on July 14, 1941, three salvos were fired at the city of Rudnya, Smolensk region. This town with a population of only 9 thousand people is located on the Vitebsk Upland on the Malaya Berezina River, 68 km from Smolensk at the very border of Russia and Belarus. On that day, the Germans captured Rudnya, and the town’s market square was crowded with a large number of military equipment. At that moment, on the high, steep western bank of Malaya Berezina, a battery of captain Ivan Andreevich Flerov appeared. From a direction unexpected for the enemy in the west, it struck the market square. As soon as the sound of the last salvo died down, one of the artillery soldiers named Kashirin sang at the top of his voice the popular song “Katyusha”, written in 1938 by Matvey Blanter to the words of Mikhail Isakovsky. Two days later, on July 16, at 15:15, Flerov’s battery struck the Orsha station, and an hour and a half later, the German crossing through Orshitsa. On that day, communications sergeant Andrei Sapronov was assigned to Flerov’s battery, ensuring communication between the battery and the command. As soon as the sergeant heard about how Katyusha came out onto a high, steep bank, he immediately remembered how missile launchers had just entered the same high and steep bank, and, reporting to the headquarters of the 217th separate communications battalion 144th Infantry Division of the 20th Army about Flerov’s completion of a combat mission, signalman Sapronov said: “Katyusha sang perfectly.”

On August 2, 1941, the chief of artillery of the Western Front, Major General I.P. Kramar, reported: “According to the statements of the command staff of the rifle units and the observations of the artillerymen, the surprise of such massive fire inflicts heavy losses on the enemy and has such a strong moral effect that enemy units flee in panic. It was also noted there that the enemy is fleeing not only from the areas fired by new weapons, but also from neighboring ones, located at a distance of 1-1.5 km from the shelling zone.
And here’s how the enemies talked about the Katyusha: “After the volley of Stalin’s organ, from our company of 120 people,” German Hart said during interrogation, “12 remained alive. Of the 12 heavy machine guns, only one remained intact, and even that one was without a carriage, and out of five heavy mortars - not a single one.”
The stunning debut of jet weapons for the enemy prompted our industry to speed up the serial production of a new mortar. However, at first there were not enough self-propelled chassis carriers for the Katyushas. rocket launchers. They tried to restore production of the ZIS-6 at the Ulyanovsk Automobile Plant, where the Moscow ZIS was evacuated in October 1941, but the lack of specialized equipment for the production of worm axles did not allow this to be done. In October 1941, a tank with an installation mounted in place of the turret was put into service. BM-8-24 . She was armed with rockets RS-82 .
In September 1941 - February 1942, NII-3 developed a new modification of the 82-mm M-8 projectile, which had the same range (about 5000 m), but almost twice as much explosive (581 g) compared to the aircraft projectile (375 g).
By the end of the war, the 82-mm M-8 projectile with a ballistic index TS-34 and a firing range of 5.5 km was adopted.
In the first modifications of the M-8 missile, a rocket charge made of nitroglycerin ballistic gunpowder, grade N, was used. The charge consisted of seven cylindrical blocks with an outer diameter of 24 mm and a channel diameter of 6 mm. The length of the charge was 230 mm, and the weight was 1040 g.
To increase the projectile's flight range, the rocket engine chamber was increased to 290 mm, and after testing a number of charge design options, OTB specialists from Plant No. 98 tested a charge made from NM-2 gunpowder, which consisted of five blocks with an outer diameter of 26.6 mm and a channel diameter of 6 mm and length 287 mm. The weight of the charge was 1180 g. With the use of this charge, the projectile range increased to 5.5 km. The radius of continuous destruction by fragments of the M-8 (TS-34) projectile was 3-4 m, and the radius of actual destruction by fragments was 12-15 meters.

Katyusha's younger sister - installation of BM-8-24 on a tank chassis

Installation of the BM-13-16 on the chassis of the STZ-5 tracked tractor. Prototypes of launchers for M-13 projectiles on the STZ-5 chassis passed field tests in October 1941 and were put into service. Their serial production began at the plant named after. Comintern in Voronezh. However, on July 7, 1942, the Germans captured the right bank part of Voronezh, and the assembly of the installations stopped.

STZ-5 tracked tractors and Ford-Marmont, International Jiemsi and Austin all-terrain vehicles received under Lend-Lease were also equipped with jet launchers. But the largest number of Katyushas were mounted on all-wheel drive three-axle vehicles. In 1943, M-13 projectiles with a welded body, with a ballistic index TS-39, were put into production. The shells had a GVMZ fuse. NM-4 gunpowder was used as fuel.
The main reason for the low accuracy of M-13 (TS-13) type rockets was the eccentricity of the thrust of the jet engine, that is, the displacement of the thrust vector from the rocket axis due to the uneven burning of gunpowder in the bombs. This phenomenon is easily eliminated when the rocket rotates. In this case, the thrust impulse will always coincide with the axis of the rocket. The rotation imparted to the finned rocket in order to improve accuracy is called rotation. Twist rockets should not be confused with turbojet rockets. The turning speed of the finned missiles was several tens, in extreme cases hundreds, of revolutions per minute, which is not enough to stabilize the projectile by rotation (moreover, rotation occurs during the active phase of the flight while the engine is running, and then stops). The angular velocity of turbojet projectiles that do not have fins is several thousand revolutions per minute, which creates a gyroscopic effect and, accordingly, higher hit accuracy than that of finned projectiles, both non-rotating and with rotation. In both types of projectiles, rotation occurs due to the outflow of powder gases from the main engine through small (several millimeters in diameter) nozzles directed at an angle to the axis of the projectile.

We called rockets with rotation due to the energy of powder gases UK - improved accuracy, for example M-13UK and M-31UK.
The M-13UK projectile differed in design from the M-13 projectile in that there were 12 tangential holes on the front centering thickening, through which part of the powder gases flowed out. The holes were drilled so that the powder gases flowing out of them created a torque. The M-13UK-1 projectiles differed from the M-13UK projectiles in the design of their stabilizers. In particular, the M-13UK-1 stabilizers were made of steel sheet.
Since 1944, new, more powerful BM-31-12 installations with 12 M-30 and M-31 mines of 301 mm caliber, weighing 91.5 kg each (firing range - up to 4325 m), began to be produced on the basis of Studebakers. To improve the accuracy of fire, M-13UK and M-31UK projectiles with improved accuracy that rotated in flight were created and developed.
The projectiles were launched from honeycomb-type tubular guides. The time to transfer to a combat position was 10 minutes. When a 301-mm projectile containing 28.5 kg of explosives exploded, a crater 2.5 m deep and 7-8 m in diameter was formed. A total of 1,184 BM-31-12 vehicles were produced during the war years.

BM-31-12 on a Studebaker US-6 chassis

The share of rocket artillery on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War was constantly increasing. If in November 1941 45 Katyusha divisions were formed, then on January 1, 1942 there were already 87 of them, in October 1942 - 350, and at the beginning of 1945 - 519. By the end of the war, there were 7 divisions in the Red Army, 40 separate brigades, 105 regiments and 40 separate divisions of guards mortars. Not a single major artillery barrage took place without Katyushas.

In the post-war period, Katyushas were going to be replaced with a BM-14-16, mounted on the chassis GAZ-63, but the installation adopted for service in 1952 was able to replace the Katyusha only partially, and therefore, until the very introduction into the troops, Katyusha installations continued to be produced on the chassis of the ZiS-151 car, and even ZIL-131.

BM-13-16 on ZIL-131 chassis

See also:

The world's first mobile phone was Soviet

Why were Chechens and Ingush deported in 1944?

Rating of countries in the world by the number of armed forces
Who sold Alaska and how

Why we lost the Cold War
The mystery of the 1961 reform
How to stop the degeneration of a nation

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