Battle of Kursk in WoT. Tank battles

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Commanders!

This summer marks the 75th anniversary of the Battle of Kursk, one of the most important episodes of World War II. In the summer of 1943, one of the most ambitious tank battles took place near Prokhorovka.

To properly celebrate this date, the developers have prepared a large-scale 50-day gaming event. And we already have the first details that we will tell you about!

Where, what and how

From July 5 9:00 (MSK) to August 24 9:00 (MSK) Daily combat missions will appear in the game - a new task every day. For each completed task you will receive a reward. The value of the rewards will increase as the event progresses, and at the end a truly excellent trophy will await you.

The more tasks you complete, the more prizes you will receive.

Three most important awards

Premium tank V T-34 shielded in a unique style. A limited series of such vehicles was produced in 1943, shortly before the start of the Battle of Kursk.

Special styles dedicated to the Battle of Kursk, which can be applied to any vehicle in your Hangar.

Both award styles are historical. This means they will be displayed to all players.

A medal that can be received for participating in a game event.

Choose your path tanker!

Certain vehicles from the Soviet Union took part in the Battle of Kursk. So those who play on historical vehicles will have a significant advantage.

• II T-60
• III T-70
• III M3 light
• V T-34
• V T-34 shielded
• V KV-1S
• V Churchill III
• V SU-85
• VII SU-152

Although the list of tasks remains unchanged throughout the event, the developers offer you, dear player, a choice of one of two paths - depending on the equipment you have.

• Northern direction- for those who have any equipment of level IV and higher, except historical. The tasks here will be more difficult.
• South direction- for those whose Hangar has a suitable historical technology from the list above. The tasks here will be easier.

When entering battle, the game will automatically select a direction depending on the vehicle - and so on for each combat mission.

And a couple more words about awards

• Rewards for tasks will be the same regardless of the direction you choose.
• After a task for one direction is completed, a similar task in another direction will become unavailable.
• And the most important thing: tasks can be “mixed”, performing one part of the tasks in the South direction, and the other part in the North direction.

In addition to daily rewards, for each completed task you will receive one point - and so on up to 50 points. The prize fund will be divided into seven stages, and each step forward will provide a reward many times better than the previous one.

5 points

• Commemorative medal for participation in the event.
• 1 day of premium account.
• 5 Large repair kits.
• 5 Large first aid kits.

10 points

• Reinforced aiming drives.
• 5 Automatic fire extinguishers.
• 5 Large repair kits.
• 5 Large first aid kits.

15 points

• Coated optics.
• 5 Automatic fire extinguishers.
• 5 Large repair kits.
• 5 Large first aid kits.

20 points

• Gun rammer large caliber.
• 5 Automatic fire extinguishers.
• 5 Large repair kits.
• 5 Large first aid kits.

30 points

• Tank T-34 E with 100% crew and unique style.
• Slot in the Hangar.
• 5 Automatic fire extinguishers.
• 5 Large repair kits.
• 5 Large first aid kits.

40 points

• 7 days of premium account.
• 5 Automatic fire extinguishers.
• 5 Large repair kits.
• 5 Large first aid kits.

50 points

• A style that can be applied to any car.
• 5 Automatic fire extinguishers.
• 5 Large repair kits.
• 5 Large first aid kits.

Pay attention!

• You will receive a V T-34 shielded in a historical style for 30 completed tasks.
• You will receive a unique historical style that can be applied to any car for completing all tasks.

If you don’t particularly want to complete tasks to get a tank, you can purchase it in the Premium Store.

And a note at the end

Every day a new combat mission will await you, and you will try to complete them all - after all, your maximum reward depends on it.

It is very important to understand: if you do not complete a task, you will not be able to receive a reward for it later, in any way.

Despite the artistic exaggerations associated with Prokhorovka, Battle of Kursk was indeed the last attempt by the Germans to win back the situation. Taking advantage of the negligence of the Soviet command and inflicting a major defeat on the Red Army near Kharkov in the early spring of 1943, the Germans received another “chance” to play the summer offensive card according to the models of 1941 and 1942.

But by 1943, the Red Army was already different, just like the Wehrmacht, it was worse than itself two years ago. Two years of bloody meat grinder were not in vain for him, plus the delay in starting the offensive on Kursk made the very fact of the offensive obvious to the Soviet command, which quite reasonably decided not to repeat the mistakes of the spring-summer of 1942 and voluntarily conceded to the Germans the right to launch offensive actions in order to wear down them on the defensive, and then destroy the weakened strike forces.

In general, the implementation of this plan once again showed how much the level of strategic planning Soviet leadership since the start of the war. And at the same time, the inglorious end of the “Citadel” once again showed the subsidence of this level among the Germans, who tried to reverse the difficult strategic situation with obviously insufficient means.

Actually, even Manstein, the most intelligent German strategist, had no special illusions about this decisive battle for Germany, reasoning in his memoirs that if everything had turned out differently, then it would have been possible to somehow jump from the USSR to a draw, that is, in fact admitted that after Stalingrad there was no talk of victory for Germany at all.

In theory, the Germans, of course, could have pushed through our defenses and reached Kursk, encircling a couple of dozen divisions, but even in this wonderful scenario for the Germans, their success did not lead them to solving the problem of the Eastern Front, but only led to a delay before the inevitable end, because By 1943, Germany's military production was already clearly inferior to the Soviet one, and the need to plug the “Italian hole” did not make it possible to assemble any large forces to conduct further offensive operations on the Eastern Front.

But our army did not allow the Germans to amuse themselves with the illusion of even such a victory. The strike groups were bled dry during a week of heavy defensive battles, and then the roller coaster of our offensive began, which, starting in the summer of 1943, was practically unstoppable, no matter how much the Germans resisted in the future.

In this regard, the Battle of Kursk is truly one of the iconic battles of the Second World War, and not only due to the scale of the battle and the millions of soldiers and tens of thousands of military equipment involved. It was definitively demonstrated to the whole world and, above all, to the Soviet people that Germany is doomed.

Remember today all those who died in this epoch-making battle and those who survived it, reaching from Kursk to Berlin.

Below is a selection of photographs of the Battle of Kursk.

Commander of the Central Front, Army General K.K. Rokossovsky and member of the Front Military Council, Major General K.F. Telegin at the forefront before the start of the Battle of Kursk. 1943

Soviet sappers install TM-42 anti-tank mines in front of the front line of defense. Central Front, Kursk Bulge, July 1943

Transfer of "Tigers" for Operation Citadel.

Manstein and his generals are at work.

German traffic controller. Behind is an RSO crawler tractor.

Construction of defensive structures on the Kursk Bulge. June 1943.

At a rest stop.

On the eve of the Battle of Kursk. Testing infantry with tanks. Red Army soldiers in a trench and a T-34 tank that overcomes the trench, passing over them. 1943

German machine gunner with MG-42.

Panthers are preparing for Operation Citadel.

Self-propelled howitzers "Wespe" of the 2nd battalion of the artillery regiment "Grossdeutschland" on the march. Operation Citadel, July 1943.

German Pz.Kpfw.III tanks before the start of Operation Citadel in a Soviet village.

The crew of the Soviet tank T-34-76 "Marshal Choibalsan" (from the "Revolutionary Mongolia" tank column) and the attached troops on vacation. Kursk Bulge, 1943.

Smoke break in German trenches.

A peasant woman tells Soviet intelligence officers about the location of enemy units. North of the city of Orel, 1943.

Sergeant Major V. Sokolova, medical instructor of anti-tank artillery units of the Red Army. Oryol direction. Kursk Bulge, summer 1943.

German 105-mm self-propelled gun "Wespe" (Sd.Kfz.124 Wespe) from the 74th regiment self-propelled artillery 2nd Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht, passes next to an abandoned Soviet 76-mm ZIS-3 gun near the city of Orel. German offensive Operation Citadel. Oryol Region, July 1943.

The Tigers are on the attack.

Photojournalist of the newspaper "Red Star" O. Knorring and cameraman I. Malov are filming the interrogation of the captured chief corporal A. Bauschof, who voluntarily went over to the side of the Red Army. The interrogation is conducted by Captain S.A. Mironov (right) and translator Iones (center). Oryol-Kursk direction, July 7, 1943.

German soldiers on the Kursk Bulge. Part of the body of the radio-controlled B-IV tank is visible from above.

German B-IV robot tanks and Pz.Kpfw control tanks destroyed by Soviet artillery. III (one of the tanks has the number F 23). Northern face of the Kursk Bulge (near the village of Glazunovka). July 5, 1943

Tank landing of sapper demolitions (sturmpionieren) from the SS division "Das Reich" on the armor of the StuG III Ausf F assault gun. Kursk Bulge, 1943.

Destroyed Soviet T-60 tank.

The Ferdinand self-propelled gun is on fire. July 1943, village of Ponyri.

Two damaged Ferdinands from the headquarters company of the 654th battalion. Ponyri station area, July 15-16, 1943. On the left is the headquarters "Ferdinand" No. II-03. The car was burned with bottles of kerosene mixture after its undercarriage was damaged by a shell.

The Ferdinand heavy assault gun, destroyed by a direct hit from an aerial bomb from a Soviet Pe-2 dive bomber. Tactical number unknown. Area of ​​Ponyri station and state farm "May 1".

Heavy assault gun "Ferdinand", tail number "723" from the 654th division (battalion), knocked out in the area of ​​the "1 May" state farm. The track was destroyed by projectile hits and the gun was jammed. The vehicle was part of the "Major Kahl's strike group" as part of the 505th heavy tank battalion of the 654th division.

A tank column is moving towards the front.

Tigers" from the 503rd heavy tank battalion.

Katyushas are firing.

Tiger tanks of the SS Panzer Division "Das Reich".

Company American tanks M3s "General Lee", supplied to the USSR under Lend-Lease, is moving to the front line of defense of the Soviet 6th Guards Army. Kursk Bulge, July 1943.

Soviet soldiers near a damaged Panther. July 1943.

Heavy assault gun "Ferdinand", tail number "731", chassis number 150090 from the 653rd division, blown up by a mine in the defense zone of the 70th army. Later, this car was sent to an exhibition of captured equipment in Moscow.

Self-propelled gun Su-152 Major Sankovsky. His crew destroyed 10 enemy tanks in the first battle during the Battle of Kursk.

T-34-76 tanks support the infantry attack in the Kursk direction.

Soviet infantry in front of a destroyed Tiger tank.

Attack of T-34-76 near Belgorod. July 1943.

Abandoned near Prokhorovka, faulty "Panthers" of the 10th "Panther Brigade" of the von Lauchert tank regiment.

German observers are monitoring the progress of the battle.

Soviet infantrymen hide behind the hull of a destroyed Panther.

The Soviet mortar crew changes its firing position. Bryansk Front, Oryol direction. July 1943.

An SS grenadier looks at a T-34 that has just been shot down. It was probably destroyed by one of the first modifications of the Panzerfaust, which were first widely used at the Kursk Bulge.

Destroyed German Pz.Kpfw tank. V modification D2, shot down during Operation Citadel (Kursk Bulge). This photograph is interesting because it contains the signature “Ilyin” and the date “26/7”. This is probably the name of the gun commander who knocked out the tank.

Leading units of the 285th Infantry Regiment of the 183rd Infantry Division engage the enemy in captured German trenches. In the foreground is the body of a killed German soldier. Battle of Kursk, July 10, 1943.

Sappers of the SS division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" near a damaged T-34-76 tank. July 7, area of ​​the village of Pselets.

Soviet tanks on the attack line.

Destroyed Pz IV and Pz VI tanks near Kursk.

Pilots of the Normandie-Niemen squadron.

Reflecting a tank attack. Ponyri village area. July 1943.

Shot down "Ferdinand". The corpses of his crew lie nearby.

Artillerymen are fighting.

Damaged German equipment during the battles in the Kursk direction.

A German tankman examines the mark left by a hit in the Tiger's frontal projection. July, 1943.

Red Army soldiers next to a downed Ju-87 dive bomber.

Damaged "Panther". I made it to Kursk as a trophy.

Machine gunners on the Kursk Bulge. July 1943.

Self-propelled gun Marder III and panzergrenadiers at the starting line before the attack. July 1943.

Broken Panther. The tower was torn down by an explosion of ammunition.

Burning German self-propelled gun "Ferdinand" from the 656th regiment on the Oryol front of the Kursk Bulge, July 1943. The photo was taken through the driver's hatch of the Pz.Kpfw control tank. III robotic tanks B-4.

Soviet soldiers near a damaged Panther. A huge hole from a 152-mm St. John's wort is visible in the turret.

Burnt tanks of the column "For Soviet Ukraine". On the tower torn down by the explosion one can see the inscription “For Radianska Ukraine” (For Soviet Ukraine).

Killed German tankman. In the background is a Soviet T-70 tank.

Soviet soldiers inspect a German heavy self-propelled artillery installation of the Ferdinand tank destroyer class, which was knocked out during the Battle of Kursk. The photo is also interesting because of the SSH-36 steel helmet, rare for 1943, on the soldier on the left.

Soviet soldiers near a disabled Stug III assault gun.

A German B-IV robot tank and a German BMW R-75 motorcycle with a sidecar destroyed on the Kursk Bulge. 1943

Self-propelled gun "Ferdinand" after the detonation of ammunition.

The crew of an anti-tank gun fires at enemy tanks. July 1943.

The picture shows a damaged German medium tank PzKpfw IV (modifications H or G). July 1943.

The commander of the Pz.kpfw VI "Tiger" tank No. 323 of the 3rd company of the 503rd battalion of heavy tanks, non-commissioned officer Futermeister, shows the mark of a Soviet shell on the armor of his tank to Sergeant Major Heiden. Kursk Bulge, July 1943.

Statement of combat mission. July 1943.

Pe-2 front-line dive bombers on a combat course. Oryol-Belgorod direction. July 1943.

Towing a faulty Tiger. On the Kursk Bulge, the Germans suffered significant losses due to non-combat breakdowns of their equipment.

T-34 goes on the attack.

The British Churchill tank, captured by the "Der Fuhrer" regiment of the "Das Reich" division, was supplied under Lend-Lease.

Tank destroyer Marder III on the march. Operation Citadel, July 1943.

and in the foreground on the right is a damaged Soviet T-34 tank, further on the left edge of the photo is a German Pz.Kpfw. VI "Tiger", another T-34 in the distance.

Soviet soldiers inspect an exploded German tank Pz IV ausf G.

Soldiers from the unit of Senior Lieutenant A. Burak, with the support of artillery, are conducting an offensive. July 1943.

A German prisoner of war on the Kursk Bulge near a broken 150-mm infantry gun sIG.33. On the right lies a dead German soldier. July 1943.

Oryol direction. Soldiers under the cover of tanks go on the attack. July 1943.

German units, which include captured Soviet T-34-76 tanks, are preparing for an attack during the Battle of Kursk. July 28, 1943.

RONA (Russian People's Liberation Army) soldiers among captured Red Army soldiers. Kursk Bulge, July-August 1943.

Soviet tank T-34-76 destroyed in a village on the Kursk Bulge. August, 1943.

Under enemy fire, tankers pull a damaged T-34 from the battlefield.

Soviet soldiers rise to attack.

An officer of the Grossdeutschland division in a trench. Late July-early August.

Participant in the battles on the Kursk Bulge, reconnaissance officer, guard senior sergeant A.G. Frolchenko (1905 - 1967), awarded the Order of the Red Star (according to another version, the photo shows Lieutenant Nikolai Alekseevich Simonov). Belgorod direction, August 1943.

A column of German prisoners captured in the Oryol direction. August 1943.

German SS soldiers in a trench with an MG-42 machine gun during Operation Citadel. Kursk Bulge, July-August 1943.

On the left is an Sd.Kfz anti-aircraft self-propelled gun. 10/4 based on a half-track tractor with a 20-mm FlaK 30 anti-aircraft gun. Kursk Bulge, August 3, 1943.

The priest blesses Soviet soldiers. Oryol direction, 1943.

A Soviet T-34-76 tank knocked out in the Belgorod area and a tanker killed.

A column of captured Germans in the Kursk area.

Germans captured at the Kursk Bulge anti-tank guns PaK 35/36. In the background is a Soviet ZiS-5 truck towing a 37 mm 61-k anti-aircraft gun. July 1943.

Soldiers of the 3rd SS Division "Totenkopf" ("Death's Head") discuss a defensive plan with the Tiger commander from the 503rd Heavy Tank Battalion. Kursk Bulge, July-August 1943.

German prisoners in the Kursk region.

Tank commander, Lieutenant B.V. Smelov shows a hole in the turret of a German Tiger tank, knocked out by Smelov’s crew, to Lieutenant Likhnyakevich (who knocked out 2 fascist tanks in the last battle). This hole was made by an ordinary armor-piercing shell from a 76-mm tank gun.

Senior Lieutenant Ivan Shevtsov next to the German Tiger tank he destroyed.

Trophies of the Battle of Kursk.

German heavy assault gun "Ferdinand" of the 653rd battalion (division), captured in good condition along with its crew by soldiers of the Soviet 129th Oryol Rifle Division. August 1943.

The eagle is taken.

The 89th Rifle Division enters liberated Belgorod.

Situation and strengths of the parties

In the early spring of 1943, after the end of the winter-spring battles, a huge protrusion formed on the Soviet-German front line between the cities of Orel and Belgorod, directed to the west. This bend was unofficially called the Kursk Bulge. At the bend of the arc were located the troops of the Soviet Central and Voronezh fronts and the German army groups “Center” and “South”.

Some representatives of the highest command circles in Germany proposed that the Wehrmacht switch to defensive actions, exhausting the Soviet troops, restoring its own strength and strengthening the occupied territories. However, Hitler was categorically against it: he believed that the German army was still strong enough to inflict a major defeat on the Soviet Union and again seize the elusive strategic initiative. An objective analysis of the situation showed that the German army was no longer capable of attacking on all fronts at once. Therefore, it was decided to limit offensive actions to only one segment of the front. Quite logically, the German command chose the Kursk Bulge to strike. According to the plan, German troops were to strike in converging directions from Orel and Belgorod in the direction of Kursk. At successful outcome this ensured the encirclement and defeat of the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts of the Red Army. The final plans for the operation, codenamed "Citadel", were approved on May 10-11, 1943.

Unravel the plans of the German command regarding exactly where the Wehrmacht will advance in summer period 1943, was not difficult. The Kursk salient, extending many kilometers into the territory controlled by the Nazis, was a tempting and obvious target. Already on April 12, 1943, at a meeting at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the USSR, it was decided to move to a deliberate, planned and powerful defense in the Kursk region. The Red Army troops had to hold back the onslaught of Nazi troops, wear down the enemy, and then launch a counteroffensive and defeat the enemy. After this, it was planned to launch a general offensive in the western and southwestern directions.

In case the Germans decided not to attack in the Kursk Bulge area, a plan of offensive actions was also created with forces concentrated on this section of the front. However, the defensive plan remained a priority, and it was its implementation that the Red Army began in April 1943.

The defense on the Kursk Bulge was built thoroughly. In total, 8 defensive lines with a total depth of about 300 kilometers were created. Great attention was paid to mining the approaches to the defense line: according to various sources, the density of minefields was up to 1500-1700 anti-tank and anti-personnel mines per kilometer of front. Anti-tank artillery was not distributed evenly along the front, but was collected in so-called “anti-tank areas” - localized concentrations of anti-tank guns that covered several directions at once and partially overlapped each other’s sectors of fire. In this way, the maximum concentration of fire was achieved and shelling of one advancing enemy unit was ensured from several sides at once.

Before the start of the operation, the troops of the Central and Voronezh Fronts totaled about 1.2 million people, about 3.5 thousand tanks, 20,000 guns and mortars, as well as 2,800 aircraft. The Steppe Front, numbering about 580,000 people, 1.5 thousand tanks, 7.4 thousand guns and mortars, and about 700 aircraft, acted as a reserve.

On the German side, 50 divisions took part in the battle, numbering, according to various sources, from 780 to 900 thousand people, about 2,700 tanks and self-propelled guns, about 10,000 guns and approximately 2.5 thousand aircraft.

Thus, by the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Red Army had a numerical advantage. However, we should not forget that these troops were located on the defensive, and therefore, the German command had the opportunity to effectively concentrate forces and achieve the required concentration of troops in breakthrough areas. In addition, in 1943, the German army received in fairly large quantities new heavy tanks "Tiger" and medium "Panther", as well as heavy self-propelled guns "Ferdinand", of which there were only 89 in the army (out of 90 built) and which, however, , themselves posed a considerable threat, provided they were used correctly in the right place.

The first stage of the battle. Defense

Transition date German troops both commands of the Voronezh and Central Fronts predicted the offensive quite accurately: according to their data, the attack should have been expected in the period from July 3 to July 6. The day before the start of the battle, Soviet intelligence officers managed to capture “tongue,” who reported that the Germans would begin the assault on July 5.

The northern front of the Kursk Bulge was held by the Central Front of Army General K. Rokossovsky. Knowing the time of the start of the German offensive, at 2:30 a.m. the front commander gave the order to conduct a half-hour artillery counter-training. Then, at 4:30, the artillery strike was repeated. The effectiveness of this measure was quite controversial. According to reports from Soviet artillerymen, the Germans suffered significant damage. However, apparently, this was still not true. It is precisely known about small losses in manpower and equipment, as well as about the violation of lines wired communication enemy. In addition, the Germans now knew for sure that a surprise attack would not work - the Red Army was ready for defense.

At 5:00 am the German artillery preparation began. It had not yet ended when the first echelons of Nazi troops went on the offensive following the barrage of fire. German infantry, supported by tanks, launched an offensive along the entire defensive line of the 13th Soviet Army. Main blow fell on the village of Olkhovatka. The most powerful attack was experienced by the right flank of the army near the village of Maloarkhangelskoye.

The battle lasted approximately two and a half hours, and the attack was repulsed. After this, the Germans shifted their pressure to the left flank of the army. The strength of their onslaught is evidenced by the fact that by the end of July 5, the troops of the 15th and 81st Soviet divisions were partially surrounded. However, the Nazis had not yet succeeded in breaking through the front. In just the first day of the battle, German troops advanced 6-8 kilometers.

On July 6, Soviet troops attempted a counterattack with the forces of two tank, three rifle divisions and a rifle corps with the support of two regiments guards mortars and two regiments of self-propelled guns. The impact front was 34 kilometers. At first, the Red Army managed to push the Germans back 1-2 kilometers, but then Soviet tanks came under strong fire German tanks and self-propelled guns and, after 40 vehicles were lost, were forced to stop. By the end of the day, the corps went on the defensive. The counterattack attempted on July 6 did not have serious success. The front managed to be “pushed back” by only 1-2 kilometers.

After the failure of the attack on Olkhovatka, the Germans shifted their efforts in the direction of the Ponyri station. This station was of serious strategic importance, covering railway Orel - Kursk. Ponyri were well protected by minefields, artillery and tanks buried in the ground.

On July 6, Ponyri was attacked by about 170 German tanks and self-propelled guns, including 40 Tigers of the 505th heavy tank battalion. The Germans managed to break through the first line of defense and advance to the second. Three attacks that followed before the end of the day were repulsed by the second line. The next day, after persistent attacks, German troops managed to get even closer to the station. By 15:00 on July 7, the enemy captured the “1 May” state farm and came close to the station. The day of July 7, 1943 became a crisis for the defense of Ponyri, although the Nazis still failed to capture the station.

At the Ponyri station, German troops used the Ferdinand self-propelled guns, which turned out to be a serious problem for the Soviet troops. Soviet guns were practically unable to penetrate the 200 mm frontal armor of these vehicles. Therefore, the Ferdinanda suffered the greatest losses from mines and air raids. The last day when the Germans stormed the Ponyri station was July 12.

From July 5 to July 12, heavy fighting took place in the 70th Army's zone of action. Here the Nazis launched an attack with tanks and infantry, with German air superiority in the air. On July 8, German troops managed to break through the defense, occupying several settlements. The breakthrough was localized only by introducing reserves. By July 11, Soviet troops received reinforcements as well as air support. The dive bomber strikes caused quite significant damage to German units. On July 15, after the Germans had already been completely driven back, in the field between the villages of Samodurovka, Kutyrki and Tyoploye, military correspondents filmed damaged German equipment. After the war, this chronicle began to be mistakenly called “footage from near Prokhorovka,” although not a single “Ferdinand” was near Prokhorovka, and the Germans failed to evacuate two damaged self-propelled guns of this type from near Tyoply.

In the zone of action of the Voronezh Front (commander - General of the Army Vatutin), combat operations began in the afternoon of July 4 with attacks by German units on the positions of the front's military outposts and lasted until late at night.

On July 5, the main phase of the battle began. On the southern front of the Kursk Bulge, the battles were much more intense and were accompanied by more serious losses of Soviet troops than on the northern one. The reason for this was the terrain, which was more suitable for the use of tanks, and a number of organizational miscalculations at the level of the Soviet front-line command.

The main blow of the German troops was delivered along the Belgorod-Oboyan highway. This section of the front was held by the 6th Guards Army. The first attack took place at 6 a.m. on July 5 in the direction of the village of Cherkasskoe. Two attacks followed, supported by tanks and aircraft. Both were repulsed, after which the Germans shifted the direction of the attack towards the village of Butovo. In the battles near Cherkassy, ​​the enemy almost managed to achieve a breakthrough, but at the cost of heavy losses, Soviet troops prevented it, often losing up to 50-70% of the units' personnel.

During July 7-8, the Germans managed, while suffering losses, to advance another 6-8 kilometers, but then the attack on Oboyan stopped. The enemy was looking for weakness Soviet defense and seemed to have found it. This place was the direction to the still unknown Prokhorovka station.

The Battle of Prokhorovka, considered one of the largest tank battles in history, began on July 11, 1943. On the German side, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps and the 3rd Wehrmacht Panzer Corps took part in it - a total of about 450 tanks and self-propelled guns. The 5th Guards Tank Army under Lieutenant General P. Rotmistrov and the 5th Guards Army under Lieutenant General A. Zhadov fought against them. There were about 800 Soviet tanks in the Battle of Prokhorovka.

The battle at Prokhorovka can be called the most discussed and controversial episode of the Battle of Kursk. The scope of this article does not allow us to analyze it in detail, so we will limit ourselves to only reporting approximate loss figures. The Germans irretrievably lost about 80 tanks and self-propelled guns, the Soviet troops lost about 270 vehicles.

Second phase. Offensive

On July 12, 1943, Operation Kutuzov, also known as the Oryol offensive operation, began on the northern front of the Kursk Bulge with the participation of troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts. On July 15, troops of the Central Front joined it.

On the German side, a group of troops consisting of 37 divisions was involved in the battles. By modern estimates, the number of German tanks and self-propelled guns that took part in the battles near Orel was about 560 vehicles. Soviet troops had a serious numerical advantage over the enemy: in the main directions, the Red Army outnumbered German troops by six times in the number of infantry, five times in the number of artillery and 2.5-3 times in tanks.

German infantry divisions defended themselves on well-fortified terrain, equipped with wire fences, minefields, machine gun nests and armored caps. Enemy sappers built anti-tank obstacles along the river banks. It should be noted, however, that work on the German defensive lines had not yet been completed when the counteroffensive began.

On July 12 at 5:10 a.m., Soviet troops began artillery preparation and attacked air strike on the enemy. Half an hour later the assault began. By the evening of the first day, the Red Army, waging heavy fighting, advanced to a distance of 7.5 to 15 kilometers, breaking through the main defensive line of German formations in three places. Offensive battles continued until July 14. During this time, the advance of Soviet troops was up to 25 kilometers. However, by July 14, the Germans managed to regroup their troops, as a result of which the Red Army offensive was stopped for some time. The Central Front offensive, which began on July 15, developed slowly from the very beginning.

Despite the stubborn resistance of the enemy, by July 25 the Red Army managed to force the Germans to begin withdrawing troops from the Oryol bridgehead. In early August, battles began for the city of Oryol. By August 6, the city was completely liberated from the Nazis. After this, the Oryol operation entered its final phase. On August 12, fighting began for the city of Karachev, which lasted until August 15 and ended with the defeat of the group of German troops defending this locality. By August 17-18, Soviet troops reached the Hagen defensive line, built by the Germans east of Bryansk.

The official date for the start of the offensive on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge is considered to be August 3. However, the Germans began a gradual withdrawal of troops from their positions as early as July 16, and from July 17, units of the Red Army began pursuing the enemy, which by July 22 turned into a general offensive, which stopped at approximately the same positions that Soviet troops occupied at the start of the Battle of Kursk . The command demanded the immediate continuation of hostilities, but due to the exhaustion and fatigue of the units, the date was postponed by 8 days.

By August 3, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts had 50 rifle divisions, about 2,400 tanks and self-propelled guns, and more than 12,000 guns. At 8 o'clock in the morning, after artillery preparation, Soviet troops began their offensive. On the first day of the operation, the advance of units of the Voronezh Front ranged from 12 to 26 km. The troops of the Steppe Front advanced only 7-8 kilometers during the day.

On August 4-5, battles took place to eliminate the enemy group in Belgorod and liberate the city from German troops. By evening, Belgorod was taken by units of the 69th Army and the 1st Mechanized Corps.

By August 10, Soviet troops cut the Kharkov-Poltava railway. There were about 10 kilometers left to the outskirts of Kharkov. On August 11, the Germans struck in the Bogodukhov area, significantly weakening the pace of the offensive of both fronts of the Red Army. Fierce fighting continued until August 14.

The steppe front reached the near approaches to Kharkov on August 11. On the first day, the attacking units were not successful. Fighting on the outskirts of the city continued until July 17. Both sides suffered heavy losses. In both Soviet and German units, it was not uncommon to have companies numbering 40-50 people, or even less.

The Germans launched their last counterattack at Akhtyrka. Here they even managed to make a local breakthrough, but this did not change the situation globally. On August 23, a massive assault on Kharkov began; This day is considered the date of the liberation of the city and the end of the Battle of Kursk. In fact, the fighting in the city stopped completely only on August 30, when the remnants of German resistance were suppressed.

The Battle of Kursk (also known as the Battle of Kursk) is the largest and most key battle during the Great Patriotic War and the entire Second World War. It was attended by 2 million people, 6 thousand tanks and 4 thousand aircraft.

The Battle of Kursk lasted 49 days and consisted of three operations:

• Kursk strategic defensive (July 5 - 23);
• Orlovskaya (July 12 - August 18);
• Belgorodsko-Kharkovskaya (August 3 – 23).

The Soviets involved:

• 1.3 million people + 0.6 million in reserve;
• 3444 tanks + 1.5 thousand in reserve;
• 19,100 guns and mortars + 7.4 thousand in reserve;
• 2172 aircraft + 0.5 thousand in reserve.

Fought on the side of the Third Reich:

• 900 thousand people;
• 2,758 tanks and self-propelled guns (of which 218 are under repair);
• 10 thousand guns;
• 2050 aircraft.

Source: toboom.name

This battle claimed many lives. But a lot of military equipment “sailed” to the next world. In honor of the 73rd anniversary of the start of the Battle of Kursk, we remember which tanks fought back then.

T-34-76

Another modification of the T-34. Armor:

• forehead - 45 mm;
• side - 40 mm.

Gun - 76 mm. The T-34-76 was the most popular tank that took part in the Battle of Kursk (70% of all tanks).

Source: lurkmore.to

Light tank, also known as “firefly” (slang from WoT). Armor - 35-15 mm, gun - 45 mm. The number on the battlefield is 20-25%.

Source: warfiles.ru

A heavy vehicle with a 76mm barrel, named after the Russian revolutionary and Soviet military leader Klim Voroshilov.

Source: mirtankov.su

KV-1S

He is also “Kvass”. High-speed modification of the KV-1. “Fast” implies reducing armor in order to increase the maneuverability of the tank. This doesn't make it any easier for the crew.

Source: wiki.warthunder.ru

SU-152

Heavy self-propelled artillery unit, built on the basis of the KV-1S, armed with a 152 mm howitzer. In the Kursk Bulge there were 2 regiments, that is, 24 pieces.

Source: worldoftanks.ru

SU-122

Medium-heavy self-propelled gun with a 122-mm pipe. 7 regiments, that is, 84 pieces, were thrown into the “execution near Kursk”.

Source: vspomniv.ru

Churchill

Lend-Lease Churchills also fought on the side of the Soviets - no more than a couple of dozen. The armor of the animals is 102-76 mm, the gun is 57 mm.

Source: tanki-v-boju.ru

Ground armored vehicles of the Third Reich

Full name: Panzerkampfwagen III. Among the people - PzKpfw III, Panzer III, Pz III. Medium tank, with a 37 mm cannon. Armor - 30-20 mm. Nothing special.

We continue the topic of the Kursk Bulge, but first I wanted to say a few words. Now I have moved on to the material about the losses of equipment in our and German units. Ours were significantly higher, especially in the Battle of Prokhorov. The reasons for the losses suffered by the 5th Guards Tank Army of Rotmistrov, was dealt with by a special commission created by Stalin's decision, chaired by Malenkov. In the commission's report in August 1943, the military actions of Soviet troops on July 12 near Prokhorovka were called an example of an unsuccessful operation. And this is a fact that is not at all victorious. In this regard, I would like to provide you with several documents that will help you understand the reason for what happened. I especially want you to pay attention to Rotmistrov’s report to Zhukov dated August 20, 1943. Although it sins in places against the truth, it still deserves attention.

This is only a small part of what explains our losses in that battle...

"Why was the Battle of Prokhorovsk won by the Germans, despite the numerical superiority of Soviet forces? The answer is given by combat documents, links to full texts which are given at the end of the article.

29th Tank Corps :

“The attack began without artillery bombardment of the occupied line by pr-kom and without air cover.

This made it possible for the pr-ku to open concentrated fire on the battle formations of the corps and bomb tanks and motorized infantry with impunity, which led to large losses and a decrease in the tempo of the attack, and this in turn made it possible for the pr-ku to conduct more effective artillery and tank fire from the spot . The terrain for the offensive was not favorable due to its ruggedness; the presence of hollows impassable for tanks to the northwest and southeast of the PROKHOROVKA-BELENIKHINO road forced the tanks to press against the road and open their flanks, without being able to cover them.

Individual units that took the lead, even approaching the storage facility. KOMSOMOLETS, having suffered heavy losses from artillery fire and tank fire from ambushes, retreated to the line occupied by the fire forces.

There was no air cover for the advancing tanks until 13.00. From 13.00 cover was provided by groups of fighters from 2 to 10 aircraft.

With the tanks coming out to the front line of the defense from the forest in the north. STORZHEVOYE and eastern. env. STORDOZHEVOYE pr. opened hurricane fire from ambushes of Tiger tanks, self-propelled guns and anti-tank guns. The infantry was cut off from the tanks and forced to lie down.

Having broken through into the depths of the defense, the tanks suffered heavy losses.

Parts of the project with support large quantity aviation and tanks launched a counterattack and parts of the brigade were forced to retreat.

During an attack on the front edge of the pr-ka self-propelled guns, operating in the first echelon of tank battle formations and even breaking out ahead of the tanks, they suffered losses from anti-tank fire (eleven self-propelled guns were put out of action)."

18th Tank Corps :

“Enemy artillery fired intensely at the corps’ battle formations.
The corps, lacking adequate support from fighter aircraft and suffering heavy losses from artillery fire and intense air bombardment (by 12:00, enemy aircraft had carried out up to 1,500 sorties), slowly moved forward.

The terrain in the corps' zone of action is crossed by three deep ravines running from the left bank of the river. PSEL to railway BELENIKHINO - PROKHOROVKA, why the 181st, 170th tank brigades advancing in the first echelon were forced to operate on the left flank of the corps line near a strong enemy stronghold. OCTOBER. The 170th Tank Brigade, operating on the left flank, had lost up to 60% of its combat equipment by 12.00.

By the end of the day, the enemy launched a frontal attack of tanks from the area of ​​KOZLOVKA, GREZNOE with a simultaneous attempt to bypass the battle formations of corps units from the direction of KOZLOVKA, POLEZHAEV, using their Tiger tanks and self-propelled guns, intensively bombarding battle formations from the air.

Carrying out the assigned task, 18th Tank Tank met a well-organized, strong enemy anti-tank defense with pre-buried tanks and assault guns at the boundary of heights 217.9, 241.6.

In order to avoid unnecessary losses in personnel and equipment, by my order No. 68, parts of the corps went on the defensive at the achieved lines.""

"The car is on fire"

Battlefield on the Kursk Bulge. In the foreground on the right is a damaged Soviet T-34

T-34 shot down in the Belgorod area and a tanker killed

T-34 and T-70, shot down during the battle on the Kursk Bulge. 07.1943

Destroyed T-34s during the battle for the Oktyabrsky state farm

Burnt T-34 “For Soviet Ukraine” in the Belgorod area. Kursk Bulge. 1943

MZ "Li", 193rd separate tank regiment. Central Front, Kursk Bulge, July 1943.

MZ "Li" - "Alexander Nevsky", 193rd separate tank regiment. Kursk Bulge

Destroyed Soviet light tank T-60

Destroyed T-70 and BA-64 from the 29th Tank Corps

OWL SECRET
Instance No. 1
TO THE FIRST DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF DEFENSE OF THE USSR UNION - MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION
Comrade Zhukov

In tank battles and battles from July 12 to August 20, 1943, the 5th Guards Tank Army encountered exclusively new types of enemy tanks. Most of the T-V (Panther) tanks were on the battlefield, in significant numbers T-VI tanks(“Tiger”), as well as modernized T-III and T-IV tanks.

Commanding tank units from the first days Patriotic War I am forced to report to you that our tanks today have lost their superiority over enemy tanks in armor and weapons.

The armament, armor and fire targeting of German tanks became much higher, and only the exceptional courage of our tankers and the greater saturation of tank units with artillery did not give the enemy the opportunity to fully exploit the advantages of their tanks. The presence of powerful weapons, strong armor and good sighting devices puts our tanks at a clear disadvantage against German tanks. The efficiency of using our tanks is greatly reduced and their breakdown increases.

The battles I conducted in the summer of 1943 convince me that even now we can successfully conduct a maneuverable tank battle on our own, taking advantage of the excellent maneuverability of our T-34 tank.

When the Germans go over to the defensive with their tank units, at least temporarily, they thereby deprive us of our maneuver advantages and, on the contrary, begin to fully use sighting range their tank guns, while at the same time being almost completely out of reach of our targeted tank fire.

Thus, in a collision with German tank units that had gone over to the defensive, we, as general rule, we suffer huge losses in tanks and have no success.

The Germans, having opposed our T-34 and KV tanks with their T-V (Panther) and T-VI (Tiger) tanks, no longer experience the former fear of tanks on the battlefields.

T-70 tanks simply cannot be allowed into tank battles, since they are more than easily destroyed by fire from German tanks.

We have to admit with bitterness that our tank equipment, apart from the introduction into service self-propelled units SU-122 and SU-152, during the war years, did not give anything new, and there were shortcomings on the tanks of the first production, such as: imperfection of the transmission group (main clutch, gearbox and side clutches), extremely slow and uneven rotation of the turret , exceptionally poor visibility and cramped crew accommodation have not been completely eliminated to this day.

If our aviation during the years of the Patriotic War, according to its tactical and technical data, has been steadily moving forward, producing more and more advanced aircraft, then unfortunately the same cannot be said about our tanks.

Now the T-34 and KV tanks have lost the first place that they rightfully had among the tanks of the warring countries in the first days of the war.

Back in December 1941, I captured a secret instruction from the German command, which was written on the basis of field tests of our KV and T-34 tanks conducted by the Germans.

As a result of these tests, the instructions read approximately the following: drive German tanks tank battle with Russian KV and T-34 tanks they cannot and must avoid tank combat. When meeting Russian tanks, it was recommended to take cover with artillery and transfer the actions of tank units to another section of the front.

And, indeed, if we recall our tank battles in 1941 and 1942, then it can be argued that the Germans usually did not engage us in battle without the help of other branches of the military, and if they did, it was with a multiple superiority in the number of their tanks, which it was not difficult for them to achieve in 1941 and 1942.

On the basis of our T-34 tank - the best tank in the world at the beginning of the war, the Germans in 1943 managed to produce an even more improved T-V tank"Panther"), which is essentially a copy of our T-34 tank, is significantly superior in quality to the T-34 tank and especially in the quality of weapons.

To characterize and compare our and German tanks, I provide the following table:

x) The barrel of a 75 mm gun is 1.5 times longer than the barrel of our 76 mm gun and the projectile has a significantly higher initial velocity.

I, as an ardent patriot of tank forces, ask you, Comrade Marshal Soviet Union, to break the conservatism and arrogance of our tank designers and production workers and will raise with all urgency the question of mass production by the winter of 1943 of new tanks, superior in their combat qualities and design to the present existing types German tanks.

In addition, I ask you to dramatically improve the equipment of tank units with evacuation means.

The enemy, as a rule, evacuates all his damaged tanks, and our tankers are often deprived of this opportunity, as a result of which we lose a lot in terms of tank recovery time. At the same time, in those cases when the tank battlefield remains with the enemy for some period, our repairmen find shapeless piles of metal instead of their damaged tanks, since this year the enemy, leaving the battlefield, blows up all our damaged tanks.

TROOPER COMMANDER
5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY
GUARDS LIEUTENANT GENERAL
TANK FORCES -
(ROMISTROV) Signature.

Active Army.
=========================
RCHDNI, f. 71, op. 25, building 9027с, l. 1-5

Something I would definitely like to add:

"One of the reasons for the staggering losses of the 5th Guards TA is also the fact that approximately a third of its tanks were light T-70. Frontal hull armor - 45 mm, turret armor - 35 mm. Armament - 45 mm 20K cannon, model 1938, armor penetration 45 mm at a distance of 100 m (one hundred meters!). Crew - two people. These tanks had nothing to catch at all on the field near Prokhorovka (although, of course, they could damage a German tank of the Pz-4 class and older, driving up point-blank and working in “woodpecker” mode... if you persuade the German tankers to look in the other direction; well, or an armored personnel carrier, if you’re lucky enough to find one, drive it into the field with a pitchfork). There is nothing to catch in the framework of an oncoming tank battle, of course - if they were lucky enough to break through the defenses, then they could quite successfully support their infantry, which is, in fact, what they were created for.

One should also not discount the general lack of training of the personnel of the 5th TA, which received reinforcements literally on the eve of the Kursk operation. Moreover, both ordinary tank crews and junior/middle-level commanders are untrained. Even in this suicidal attack it was possible to achieve best results, observing proper formation - which, alas, was not observed - everyone rushed into the attack in a heap. Including self-propelled guns, which have no place at all in attacking formations.

Well, and most importantly - monstrous ineffective work of repair and evacuation teams. This was generally very bad until 1944, but in this case the 5th TA simply failed on a massive scale. I don’t know how many were on the BREM staff by that time (and whether they were even in its combat formations in those days - they might have forgotten in the rear), but they couldn’t cope with the job. Khrushchev (then a member of the Military Council of the Voronezh Front), in a report on July 24, 1943 to Stalin about the tank battle near Prokhorovka, writes: “When the enemy retreats, specially created teams evacuate their damaged tanks and other materiel, and everything that cannot be taken out, including ours tanks and our materiel, burns and explodes. As a result, the damaged materiel captured by us in most cases cannot be repaired, but can be used as scrap metal, which we will try to evacuate from the battlefield in the near future" (RGASPI, f. 83, op.1, d.27, l.2)

………………….

And a little more to add. Regarding the general situation with command and control of troops.

The point is also that German reconnaissance aircraft discovered in advance the approach to Prokhorovka of the 5th Guards TA and 5th Guards A formations, and it was possible to establish that on July 12, near Prokhorovka, Soviet troops would go on the offensive, so the Germans especially strengthened the anti-tank missile defense on the left flank of the division." Adolf Hitler" 2nd SS Panzer Corps. They, in turn, were going to, after repelling the advance of the Soviet troops, go on a counteroffensive and encircle the Soviet troops in the Prokhorovka area, so the Germans concentrated their tank units on the flanks of the 2nd SS Tank Tank, and not in the center. This led to the fact that on July 12, the 18th and 29th Tank Tank had to attack the most powerful German anti-tank tanks head-on, which is why they suffered such heavy losses. In addition, German tank crews repelled the attacks of Soviet tanks with fire from the spot.

In my opinion, the best that Rotmistrov could have done in such a situation was to try to insist on canceling the counterattack on July 12 near Prokhorovka, but no traces were found that he even tried to do this. Here the difference in approaches is especially clearly evident when comparing the actions of the two commanders of tank armies - Rotmistrov and Katukov (for those who are bad with geography, let me clarify - Katukov’s 1st Tank Army occupied positions west of Prokhorovka at the Belaya-Oboyan line).

The first disagreements between Katukov and Vatutin arose on July 6. The front commander gives the order to launch a counterattack with the 1st Tank Army together with the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Corps in the direction of Tomarovka. Katukov sharply replies that, given the qualitative superiority of German tanks, this is disastrous for the army and will cause unjustified losses. The best way to conduct combat is maneuverable defense using tank ambushes, which allows you to shoot enemy tanks from short distances. Vatutin does not cancel the decision. Further events occur as follows (I quote from the memoirs of M.E. Katukov):

“Reluctantly, I gave the order to launch a counterattack. ... Already the first reports from the battlefield near Yakovlevo showed that we were doing not at all what was needed. As one would expect, the brigades suffered serious losses. With pain in my heart, I saw NP, how thirty-fours burn and smoke.

It was necessary, at any cost, to achieve the cancellation of the counterattack. I hurried to the command post, hoping to urgently contact General Vatutin and once again report to him my thoughts. But he had barely crossed the threshold of the hut when the communications chief reported in a particularly significant tone:

From Headquarters... Comrade Stalin. Not without some excitement I picked up the phone.

Hello, Katukov! - a well-known voice rang out. - Report the situation!

I told the Commander-in-Chief what I saw on the battlefield with my own eyes.

“In my opinion,” I said, “we were too hasty with the counterattack.” The enemy has large unspent reserves, including tank reserves.

What are you offering?

For now, it is advisable to use tanks to fire from a spot, burying them in the ground or placing them in ambushes. Then we could bring enemy vehicles to a distance of three to four hundred meters and destroy them with targeted fire.

Stalin was silent for some time.

“Okay,” he said, “you won’t launch a counterattack.” Vatutin will call you about this."

As a result, the counterattack was canceled, the tanks of all units ended up in the trenches, and July 6 became the darkest day for the 4th German Tank Army. During the day of fighting, 244 German tanks were knocked out (48 tanks lost 134 tanks and 2 SS tanks - 110). Our losses amounted to 56 tanks (mostly in their formations, so there were no problems with their evacuation - I again emphasize the difference between a knocked out tank and a destroyed one). Thus, Katukov’s tactics completely justified themselves.

However, the command of the Voronezh Front did not draw any conclusions and on July 8 gave new order to carry out a counterattack, only 1 tank (due to the stubbornness of its commander) is tasked not to attack, but to hold positions. The counterattack is carried out by 2 Tank Corps, 2 Guards Tank Corps, 5 Tank Corps and separate tank brigades and regiments. The result of the battle: the loss of three Soviet corps - 215 tanks irretrievably, the loss of German troops - 125 tanks, of which 17 were irretrievable. Now, on the contrary, the day of July 8 becomes the darkest day for the Soviet tank forces, in terms of its losses it is comparable to the losses in the Battle of Prokhorov.

Of course, there is no particular hope that Rotmistrov would be able to push through his decision, but it was at least worth a try!

It should be noted that limiting the battles near Prokhorovka only on July 12 and only to the attack of the 5th Guards TA is unlawful. After July 12, the main efforts of the 2nd SS Tank Tank and 3rd Tank Tank were aimed at encircling the divisions of the 69th Army, southwest of Prokhorovka, and although the command of the Voronezh Front managed to withdraw the personnel of the 69th Army from the resulting pocket in time, however, most of the weapons and they had to give up technology. That is, the German command managed to achieve very significant tactical success, weakening the 5 Guards A and 5 Guards TA and for some time depriving the 69 A of combat effectiveness. After July 12, on the German side there were actually attempts to encircle and inflict maximum damage on the Soviet troops (in order to calmly begin withdraw your forces to the previous front line). After which the Germans, under the cover of strong rearguards, quite calmly withdrew their troops to the lines they occupied until July 5, evacuating the damaged equipment and subsequently restoring it.

At the same time, the decision of the command of the Voronezh Front from July 16 to switch to a stubborn defense on the occupied lines becomes completely incomprehensible, when the Germans are not only not going to attack, but, on the contrary, are gradually withdrawing their forces (in particular, the “Totenkopf” division actually began withdrawing on July 13 ). And when it was established that the Germans were not advancing, but were retreating, it was already too late. That is, it was already too late to quickly catch the Germans’ tail and peck them in the back of the head.

It seems that the command of the Voronezh Front had little idea of ​​what was happening at the front in the period from July 5 to 18, which manifested itself in a too slow reaction to the rapidly changing situation at the front. The texts of orders for advancement, attack or redeployment are replete with inaccuracies and uncertainties; they lack information about the opposing enemy, its composition and intentions, and there is no at least approximate information about the outline of the front line. A significant part of the orders in the Soviet troops during the Battle of Kursk was given “over the heads” of subordinate commanders, and the latter were not informed about this, wondering why and why the units subordinate to them were carrying out some incomprehensible actions.

So it is not surprising that the chaos in the units was sometimes indescribable:

So on July 8, the Soviet 99th Tank Brigade of the 2nd Tank Corps attacked the Soviet 285th Infantry Regiment of the 183rd Infantry Division. Despite the attempts of the commanders of the units of the 285th regiment to stop the tankers, they continued to crush the soldiers and fire guns at the 1st battalion of the said regiment (result: 25 people were killed and 37 wounded).

On July 12, the Soviet 53rd Guards Separate Tank Regiment of the 5th Guards TA (sent as part of the combined detachment of Major General K.G. Trufanov to help the 69th Army) without accurate information about the location of its own and the Germans and without sending forward reconnaissance (into battle without reconnaissance - this is close and understandable to us), the tankers of the regiment immediately opened fire on the battle formations of the Soviet 92nd Infantry Division and the tanks of the Soviet 96th Tank Brigade of the 69th Army, defending against the Germans in the area of ​​​​the village of Aleksandrovka (24 km southeast of Prokhorovka station). Having fought through their own, the regiment came across advancing German tanks, after which it turned around and, crushing and dragging along separate groups of its own infantry, began to retreat. The anti-tank artillery, which was following the same regiment (53 Guards Tank Regiment) to the front line and had just arrived at the scene of events, mistaking the tanks of the 96 Tank Brigade for German tanks pursuing the 53 Guards Separate Tank Regiment, turned around and did not open fire on its infantry and tanks only thanks to serendipity.

Well, and so on... In the order of the commander of the 69th Army, all this was described as “these outrages.” Well, that's putting it mildly.

So we can summarize that the Germans won the Battle of Prokhorovka, but this victory was a special case against a generally negative background for Germany. The German positions at Prokhorovka were good if a further offensive was planned (which Manstein insisted on), but not for defense. But it was impossible to advance further for reasons not directly related to what was happening near Prokhorovka. Far from Prokhorovka, on July 11, 1943, reconnaissance in force began from the Soviet Western and Bryansk fronts (mistaken by the German command of the OKH ground forces for an offensive), and on July 12, these fronts actually went on the offensive. On July 13, the German command became aware of the impending offensive of the Soviet Southern Front in the Donbass, that is, practically on the southern flank of Army Group South (this offensive followed on July 17). In addition, the situation in Sicily became more complicated for the Germans, where the Americans and British landed on July 10. Tanks were also needed there.

On July 13, a meeting was held with the Fuhrer, to which Field Marshal General Erich von Manstein was also summoned. Adolf Hitler ordered the end of Operation Citadel in connection with the activation of Soviet troops in various sectors of the Eastern Front and the sending of part of the forces from it to form new German formations in Italy and the Balkans. The order was accepted for execution despite the objections of Manstein, who believed that Soviet troops on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge were on the verge of defeat. Manstein was not directly ordered to withdraw his troops, but was forbidden to use his only reserve, the 24th Tank Corps. Without the deployment of this corps, a further offensive would lose perspective, and therefore there was no point in holding the captured positions. (soon 24 Tank Tank already repelled the advance of the Soviet Southwestern Front in the middle reaches of the river Seversky Donets). The 2nd SS Tank Tank was intended for transfer to Italy, but it was temporarily returned for joint operations with the 3rd Tank Tank with the aim of eliminating the breakthrough of the troops of the Soviet Southern Front on the Mius River, 60 km north of the city of Taganrog, in the defense zone of the German 6th Army.

The merit of the Soviet troops is that they slowed down the pace of the German offensive on Kursk, which, combined with the general military-political situation and a combination of circumstances that were not in favor of Germany everywhere in July 1943, made Operation Citadel unfeasible, but to speak purely military victory Soviet army in the Battle of Kursk - this wishful thinking. "