Russia Day: First Marshals of the Soviet Union. Marshals of the Great Patriotic War Ivan Stepanovich Konev

On November 20, 1935, the highest military rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union, established in September, was awarded to V.K.

Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov


Born on January 23 (February 4), 1881, “not far from the crossing of the Catherine Railway,” Russian. After the October Revolution, K. E. Voroshilov - Petrograd Commissioner for Civil Affairs, Chairman of the City Protection Committee (December 1917-March 1918), commander of a partisan detachment (until April 1918), commander of the army (until November 1918 .). Then People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Ukraine (until May 1919), commander of the troops of the Kharkov Military District (until June 1919), commander of the army (until August 1919), commander of the Ukrainian Front (until October 1919), chief of the rifle division (until November 1919), member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the First Cavalry Army (until March 1921), commissar of the Southern Group of Forces (until April 1921), commander of the North Caucasus Military District (until March 1924), member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR (until May 1924), Commander of the Moscow Military District (until January 1925), Deputy People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs (until November 1925), People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs (until June 1934), People's Commissar Defense of the USSR (until May 1940), Chairman of the Military Council of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR (until April 1937), member of the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (until March 1938), Chairman of the Main Military Council of the Red Army (until May 1940) , Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and Chairman of the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

During the Great Patriotic War, K. E. Voroshilov was a member of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, a member of the State Defense Committee, Commander-in-Chief of the North-Western Direction (until September 1941), commander of the Leningrad Front (until September 1941), representative of the Headquarters for the formation of troops (until February 1942), representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on the Volkhov Front (until September 1942), Commander-in-Chief of the partisan movement (until May 1943), chairman of the Trophy Committee under the State Defense Committee (until September 1943), chairman of the Commission for Armistice issues (until June 1944), Chairman of the Allied Control Commission in Hungary (until February 1947).

After the war, K. E. Voroshilov was Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR (since March 1946), Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (since March 1953), member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (May 1960-1966).

K. E. Voroshilov - twice Hero of the Soviet Union (02/3/1956, 02/22/1968), Hero of Socialist Labor (05/7/1960). He was awarded 8 Orders of Lenin (23.02.1935, 22.02.1938, 3.02.1941, 21.02.1945, 3.02.1951, 3.02.1956, 7.05.1960, 3.02. 1961); 6 Orders of the Red Banner (06/26/1920, 03/1921, 12/2/1925, 02/22/1930, 11/3/1944, 06/24/1948); Order of Suvorov, 1st degree (02/22/1944), Tuvan Order of the Republic (10/28/1937), 3 Orders of the Red Banner of Labor of the Union Republics (ZSFSR, Uzbek SSR, Tajik SSR), 12 medals, as well as orders and medals foreign states.

Member of the CPSU since 1903, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee (1926 - 1960), deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of the 1st-7th convocations.

http://www.marshals.su/BIOS/Voroshilov.html

Mikhail Nikolaevich Tukhachevsky


Born on February 4 (February 16), 1893 in the Aleksandrovskoye estate (now Safonovsky district of the Smolensk region), “nobleman, Great Russian.” He graduated from the cadet corps and the Alexander Military School (1914). Participant in the First World War, second lieutenant. In February 1915 he was captured, escaped and in October 1917 arrived in Russia, “cooperated in the Military Department of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee until the 20th of May 1918”, for one month he was the military commissar of the military commissariat of the Moscow region, after which he was commander of 1 1st Army (since June 26, 1918). Then - assistant commander of the Southern Front (from January 10, 1919), commander of the 8th Army (from January 20, 1919), 5th Army (from April 5, 1919), 13th Army (from November 19, 1919 g.), acting commander of the Caucasian Front (from January 31, 1920), commander of the Western Front (from April 28, 1920).

On May 22, 1920, Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic Sklyansky E.M., Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Republic Kamenev S.S. and member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic Kursky D.I. signed order No. 868, which read: “... commander On the Western Front, M. N. Tukhachevsky, having joined the ranks of the Red Army and possessing natural military abilities, continued to continuously expand his theoretical knowledge in military affairs.

Acquiring new theoretical knowledge in military affairs every day, M. N. Tukhachevsky skillfully carried out planned operations and excellently led troops both as part of the army and as commander of the armies of the fronts of the Republic, and gave the Soviet Republic brilliant victories over its enemies on the Eastern and Caucasian fronts .

Assessing the above military activities of the commander of the Western Front, M. N. Tukhachevsky, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic transfers M. N. Tukhachevsky to the General Staff.”

From May 6, 1921, M. N. Tukhachevsky was commander of the troops of the Tambov province, head of the Military Academy of the Red Army (until August 5, 1921), commander of the troops of the Western Front (until January 24, 1922), assistant chief of staff of the Red Army and military commissar ( until April 1, 1924), Deputy Chief of Staff of the Red Army (until July 18, 1924), chief strategy officer of the Military Academy of the Red Army (until October 1, 1924), commander of the Western Military District (until February 7, 1925), Chief of Staff of the Red Army (until November 13, 1925), Commander of the Leningrad Military District (from May 5, 1928), Deputy People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs (from June 11, 1931), Chief of Armaments of the Red Army (from June 11 1931), member of the Military Council of the NGOs of the USSR, second deputy people's commissar of defense of the USSR (from November 22, 1934), commander of the Volga Military District (from March 11, 1937).

For military distinctions in the tsarist army he was awarded the Order of Anna 2nd, 3rd and 4th degree, Stanislav 2nd and 3rd degree, Vladimir 4th degree, in the Red Army he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner (08/07/1919), Honorary Revolutionary Weapon ( 12/17/1919), Order of Lenin (02/21/1933).

Member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR since 1925, CPSU since 1918, candidate member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) since 1934, member of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR of all convocations.

By order of NKO No. 00138 dated May 25, 1937, M. N. Tukhachevsky was dismissed from the army. “By the decision of the Special Presence of the Supreme Court of the USSR, he was sentenced to death. The sentence was carried out on June 12, 1937.” (certificate of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR).

January 31, 1957 By decision of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union M. N. Tukhachevsky was rehabilitated. By order of the USSR Minister of Defense dated February 6, 1957, “the clause of the NKO order dated May 25, 1937 was cancelled.”

http://www.marshals.su/BIOS/Tukhachevski.html

Alexander Ilyich Egorov


Born on October 13 (October 25), 1883 in the city of Buzuluk, from the bourgeoisie, Russian. In 1905 he graduated from the Kazan Infantry Junker School. In the tsarist army he “served as commander of an infantry regiment with the military rank of lieutenant colonel.”

In the Soviet Army from December 1917: member of the board of the Commissariat for Army Demobilization (until May 1918), chairman of the Central Board for Prisoners and Refugees, military commissar of the All-Russian Main Staff, chairman of the Higher Certification Commission for the selection of officers for the Red Army (by August 1918), army commander (until 1919), front commander (until 1921), district commander (until September 1921), front commander (until February 20, 1922), commander of the Separate Caucasian Red Banner Army (until April 1924), commander of all the Armed Forces of Ukraine and Crimea (until November 1925), military attaché in China (until May 1926), deputy head of the military-industrial department of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR (until May 5, 1927 ), commander of the troops of the Belarusian Military District (until 1931), chief of staff of the Red Army (until 1935), chief of the General Staff (until 1937), deputy people's commissar of defense of the USSR (until 1938), commander of the troops of the Transcaucasian Military District (until 1939).

Awarded 4 Orders of the Red Banner (1919, 1921, 1930, 1934), an Honorary Revolutionary Weapon with a saber (02/17/1921) and the medal “XX Years of the Red Army” (1938).

Member of the CPSU since 1918, candidate member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (1934–1938), deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of the 1st convocation.

http://www.marshals.su/BIOS/Egorov.html

Semyon Mikhailovich Budyonny


Born on April 13 (April 25), 1883 on the Kozyurin farm, Rostov region, from peasants, Russian. In 1908 he graduated from equestrian courses at the officer school, in 1932 - a special group of the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze.

He began his service in the tsarist army as a soldier (from 1903 to 1907), then as a rider (from 1908 to 1913) and as a cavalry platoon commander (from 1914 to 1917).

In the Soviet Army - commander of a cavalry detachment (February-June 1918), chief of staff of a division (December 1918 - March 1919), division commander (until June 1919), commander of a cavalry corps (until November 1919). ), commander of the First Cavalry Army (until October 1923).

In his 1921 certification, the following entry attracts attention: “A born cavalry commander. Has operational and combat intuition. He loves cavalry and knows it well. The missing general educational baggage has been intensively and thoroughly replenished and self-education continues. He is gentle and courteous with his subordinates... In the position of commander of the Cavalry, he is irreplaceable...”

Until January 1922, S. M. Budyonny headed the Armed Forces in the Kuban and Black Sea region, remaining in the position of commander of the First Cavalry Army, and was deputy commander of the troops of the North Caucasus Military District (until August 1923), then assistant to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic for cavalry (until April 1924), inspector of the cavalry of the Red Army (until July 1937).

Until January 1939, S. M. Budyonny was commander of the troops of the Moscow Military District and until August 1940 - Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, until September 1941 - First Deputy People's Commissar of Defense.

During the war years, while remaining in this (last) position, “he concurrently served as: a) commander of the reserve army group of the High Command; b) deputy commander of the troops of the Western Front; c) Commander-in-Chief of the troops of the South-Western direction; d) commander of the troops of the Western Reserve Front" (until October 1941), then authorized by the State Defense Committee for the formation, training and cobbling together of units (until March 1942), Chairman of the Central Commission for the collection of captured weapons and property (until April 1942) , commander of the troops of the North Caucasus direction (until May 1945), commander of the troops of the North Caucasus Front (until September 1942). Being Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, “concurrently, from January 1943, he was the commander of the cavalry of the Red Army.” From May 1943, he was the commander of the cavalry of the Red Army (until May 1953). “From February 1947 to May 1953, he worked part-time as Deputy Minister of Agriculture of the USSR for horse breeding.”

From May 1953 to September 1954 - inspector of cavalry of the Ministry of Defense, then at the “order of the USSR Minister of Defense” (until October 1973).

For services to the Motherland, S. M. Budyonny was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union three times (1958, 1963, 1968); awarded 8 Orders of Lenin (1953, 1939, 1943, 1945, 1953, 1956, 1958, 1973), 6 Orders of the Red Banner (1918, 1919 , 1923, 1930, 1944, 1948), Order of Suvorov, 1st degree (1944); Order of the Red Banner of the Azerbaijan SSR (1923), Red Banner of Labor of the Uzbek SSR (1930). In addition, S. M. Budyonny was awarded an Honorary revolutionary weapon - a saber with the Order of the Red Banner on the scabbard (11/20/1919), an Honorary revolutionary firearm - a pistol (Mauser) with the Order of the Red Banner on the handle (01/1921), an Honorary weapons with a gold image of the State Emblem of the USSR (02/22/1968), 14 medals, as well as 8 St. George crosses and medals. orders and medals of Mongolia.

Member of the CPSU since March 1919, member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee since 1922, member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) since 1939, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee since 1952; Deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of the 1st-8th convocations.

He was buried on Red Square in Moscow.

http://www.marshals.su/BIOS/Budenny.html

Vasily Konstantinovich Blucher


Born on November 19 (December 1), 1890 in the village of Barshchinka, Yaroslavl province, in a peasant family, Russian. In 1927 he graduated from the land management and reclamation technical school, in 1935 from the metallurgical institute, in 1936 from the “regimental school with a specialty as a tankman.”

In 1914, “sent to the front as a private, ... promoted to junior non-commissioned officer.”

In 1917, he “volunteered in the 102nd reserve infantry regiment”, then commissar of the Red Guard detachment (November 1917 - September 1918).

On September 28, 1918, V.K. Blucher was awarded “... the first in time... Order of the Red Banner.”

Until January 1919 - head of the division, assistant commander of the 3rd Army, head of the fortified area (until August 1920), commander of the strike group (October-November 1920), Minister of War of the Far Eastern Republic and Commander-in-Chief of the People's Revolutionary Army (June 1921), commander-commissar of the rifle corps (1922 - 1924), chief military adviser to the Chinese revolutionary government (1924 - 1927), assistant commander of the Ukrainian Military District (1927 - 1929 .), commander of the armed forces located in the Far East (special Far Eastern Army) (1929 - October 1938).

On May 13, 1930, “noting the outstanding and skillful leadership of the commander of the special Far Eastern Army,” the USSR Central Executive Committee awarded V.K. Blucher the newly established Order of the Red Star.

In the summer of 1938, V.K. Blucher commanded the Far Eastern Front during the military conflict in the area of ​​Lake Khasan.

Awarded the Order of Lenin. 5 Orders of the Red Banner, Order of the Red Star, medal “XX Years of the Red Army”, 2 Crosses of St. George and St. George Medal.

Member of the CPSU since 1916, member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (1921 - 1924), member of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR (1930 - 1938), deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of the 1st convocation.

In October 1938, Blucher was repressed and died in Lefortovo prison (Moscow) from beatings.

Rehabilitated in 1956

http://www.marshals.su/BIOS/Blucher.html

September 22 marks 75 years since the title of “Marshal of the Soviet Union” was introduced in the USSR.

The military rank of the highest officer in the Armed Forces of the USSR - Marshal of the Soviet Union, “personally assigned by the Government of the USSR to outstanding and especially distinguished persons of the High Command,” was introduced by the Resolution of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated September 22, 1935.

By the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated September 2, 1940, persons awarded the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union were awarded a diploma of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and a special insignia - the “Marshal Star”, made of an alloy of precious metals.

(Military encyclopedia. Chairman of the Main Editorial Commission S.B. Ivanov. Military Publishing House. Moscow. in 8 volumes -2004 ISBN 5 - 203 01875 - 8)

The "Marshal's Star" insignia is a five-pointed gold star with smooth dihedral rays on the front side. A platinum five-pointed star with diamonds is mounted in the middle of the sign; in the center there is a diamond weighing 2.62 carats, in the rays there are 25 diamonds weighing a total of 1.25 carats. The "Marshal's Star" is connected by means of a triangular eyelet in the upper beam to a semi-oval mount measuring 14 mm, through which a moiré ribbon 35 mm wide is threaded. The total weight of the Marshal's insignia is 36.8 g. After the death or demotion of the Marshal, the star was subject to surrender to the Diamond Fund.

This star existed without changes until the abolition of the marshal rank.

Marshals of the Soviet Union were granted the right to use a state dacha and a service car for life, to have a personal driver, adjutant and officer on special assignments. The marshal's wife was provided with a company car.

The first to be awarded the title of marshal were On November 20, 1935, five people at once: People's Commissar of Defense Klim Efremovich Voroshilov, Chief of the (General) Staff of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA) Alexander Ilyich Egorov and three civil war commanders - Vasily Konstantinovich Blyukher, Semyon Mikhailovich Budyonny and Mikhail Nikolaevich Tukhachevsky.

Of the first marshals, the fate of three was tragic. During the period of repression, Tukhachevsky and Egorov were convicted, stripped of their military ranks and executed. In the mid-1950s. they were rehabilitated and reinstated to the rank of marshals. Blucher died in prison before the trial and was not stripped of his marshal rank.

The next relatively massive conferment of marshal ranks occurred in May 1940, when they were received by Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko, Grigory Ivanovich Kulik (stripped of the rank in 1942, posthumously restored in 1957) and Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov.

During the Great Patriotic War, the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union becomes not so much an official title as an honorary one; it is awarded to front commanders “individually” for specific operations (Zhukov and Vasilevsky - for the Stalingrad operation, Govorov - for the breakthrough on the Karelian Isthmus, etc.).

During the Great Patriotic War, Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov was the first to receive it in January 1943. That year, Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky and Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin also became marshals. The rest of the wartime marshals received the highest military rank in 1944, then it was awarded to Ivan Stepanovich Konev, Leonid Aleksandrovich Govorov, Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky, Rodion Yakovlevich Malinovsky, Fyodor Ivanovich Tolbukhin and Kirill Afanasyevich Meretskov.

In the future, the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union is assigned primarily to the highest ranks of the Ministry of Defense and the Warsaw Pact organization, commanders of military branches.

After the war, the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union was given to Lavrenty Beria (1945, stripped of the rank in 1953), Vasily Sokolovsky (1946), Nikolai Bulganin (1947, demoted to Colonel General in 1958).

Until 1955, the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union was awarded only on an individual basis by special decrees.

In the 1950s The marshals were: Ivan Bagramyan (1955), Sergei Biryuzov (1955), Andrei Grechko (1955), Andrei Eremenko (1955), Kirill Moskalenko (1955), Vasily Chuikov (1955), Matvey Zakharov (1959).

In the 1960s this title was awarded to Philip Golikov (1961), Nikolai Krylov (1962), Ivan Yakubovsky (1967), Pavel Batitsky (1968), Pyotr Koshevoy (1968).

In the 1970s Marshals became: Leonid Brezhnev (1976), Dmitry Ustinov (1976), Viktor Kulikov (1977), Nikolai Ogarkov (1977), Sergei Sokolov (1978), in the 1980s. - Sergey Akhromeev (1983), Semyon Kurkotkin (1983), Vasily Petrov (1983).

The last Marshal of the Soviet Union was the penultimate Minister of Defense of the USSR Dmitry Yazov (1990). After the collapse of the USSR, the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union was abolished.

Throughout history, 41 people have received the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union. Semyon Budyonny wore the marshal insignia for the longest time - 38 years. The youngest marshal (42 years old) was Mikhail Tukhachevsky, the oldest at the time of receiving the rank (69 years old) was Leonid Brezhnev.

Currently, four holders of this title are alive: Viktor Georgievich Kulikov (1921), Sergei Leonidovich Sokolov (1911), Vasily Ivanovich Petrov (1917) and Dmitry Timofeevich Yazov (1923).

In 1993, the law “On Military Duty and Military Service” introduced the rank of Marshal of the Russian Federation.

For the first time, the military rank of Marshal of the Russian Federation, by decree of the President of the Russian Federation of November 21, 1997, was awarded to the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, Army General Igor Dmitrievich Sergeev; after his death on November 10, 2006, no one has the title of Marshal of the Russian Federation.

The material was prepared based on information from open sources

years of life: 5.5.1923-24.8.1991

date of title conferment: 25.3.1983

In WWII, battalion commander, pom. beginning regimental headquarters; in 1979-84 1st Deputy Chief of the General Staff, in 1984-88 Chief of the General Staff, since 1988 advisor to M. S. Gorbachev. Offered his services to the Emergency Committee; After his failure, he committed suicide in the Kremlin office, condemning the State Emergency Committee as an “adventure” in his suicide note.
years of life: 2.12.1897-21.9.1982

date of title conferment: 11.3.1955

In WWII - chief of staff of the fronts, army commander; in 1943-45 com. 1st Baltic, from April 1945 - 3rd Belorussian Front, army general (1943). After the war, commander of the PribVO (1946-54), deputy Minister of Defense, Chief of Logistics (1958-68).
years of life: 27.6.1910-17.2.1984

date of title conferment: 15.4.1968

In WWII - division chief of staff, division commander, corps commander, major general (1943); 1950-1953 - beginning Air Force General Staff, 1963-78 - Air Defense Commander.
years of life: 29.3.1899-23.12.1953

date of title conferment: 9.7.1945; deprived 26.6.1953

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR(1938-45), General Commissioner of State Security (1941). The rank of Marshal was awarded when the GB's own ranks were replaced by general military ranks. Minister of the Interior (March-June 1953). Arrested on June 26, 1953. According to official data, he was brought to trial by the Special Judicial Presence and executed.
years of life: 21.8.1904-19.10.1964

date of title conferment: 11.3.1955

In WWII - chief of staff of the fronts, army commander, colonel general (1944). 1st deputy Air Defense Commander-in-Chief(1954-55), Commander-in-Chief of Air Defense (1955-62), Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Missile Forces (1962-63), Chief of the General Staff (1963-64). Died in a plane crash.
years of life: 1.12.1890-9.11.1938

date of title conferment: 20.11.1935

In the Civil War, commander of the army, commanded armies and fronts in the Far East: commander-in-chief of the army of the Far Eastern Republic (1921-22), chief military adviser in China (1924-27), com. Special Far Eastern Army (1929-38). After a clash with Japan on the lake, Khasan was arrested following a denunciation and soon died in prison; already posthumously “sentenced” to death. It is unknown whether he was stripped of his title. Rehabilitated in 1956
years of life: 19.12.1906-10.11.1982

date of title conferment: 7.5.1976

In WWII - commissar of a regiment, front, major general (1944); in the early 1950s Political Directorate of the Navy, in 1960-64 and 1977-82 - Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces; in 1964-82 - 1st sec., General Secretary (1966) Central Committee of the CPSU. Received the title of Marshal Chairman of the USSR Defense Council. Knight of the Order of Victory (the decree was canceled in 1989).
years of life: 25.4.1883-26.10.1973

date of title conferment: 20.11.1935

In the Civil War and after it - commander of the 1st Cavalry Army. Inspector of the Red Army Cavalry(1924-37); led the cavalry intermittently until 1954. Com. troops of the Moscow Military District (1937-39), deputy. and 1st deputy People's Commissar of Defense (1939-Sept. 1941). During the Second World War he commanded fronts and armies, was a member of the Headquarters, and in 1942 he was transferred to rear positions.
years of life: 11.6.1895-24.2.1975

date of title conferment: 3.11.1947; deprived of rank 11/26/1958

Party activist. In WWII, member of the military council of the fronts, army general (1944). In 1947-49 - Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR, in 1953-55 - Minister of Defense, in 1955-58 - Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Dismissed by N.S. Khrushchev and demoted in rank (retired Colonel General).
years of life: 30.9.1895-5.12.1977

date of title conferment: 16.2.1943

In 1942-45 Chief of the General Staff. Developed many brilliant operations. In 1945, commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, then Commander-in-Chief in the war with Japan. In 1949-53 - Minister of the Armed Forces and Minister of War of the USSR. Twice Knight of the Order of Victory.
years of life: 4.2.1881-2.12.1969

date of title conferment: 20.11.1935

Professional revolutionary, participant of Oct. revolution, commander of the Civil War; in 1925-34 People's Commissar of Military Affairs, People's Commissar of Defense(1934-40) USSR. A consistent supporter and apologist for Stalin, he lost his trust after the Finnish War. During the Second World War he commanded the fronts (until 1942), was a member of the Supreme Command Headquarters, then removed from the real leadership of the troops (Commander-in-Chief of the Partisan Movement, 1942-43). after the war - pred. Union Control Commission in Hungary. In 1953-60 before. Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces.
years of life: 22.2.1897-19.3.1955

date of title conferment: 18.6.1944

From 1942 to the end of the war - commander of the Leningrad Front. After the war he commanded air defense (1948-52, 1954-55). Knight of the Order of Victory.
years of life: 30. (according to other sources 29.) 7.1900-29.7.1980

date of title conferment: 6.5.1961

Before the war (1940-1941) - head of the GRU, during World War II commander of the Bryansk and Voronezh fronts, colonel general (1943); in 1958-62 - Head of GlavPUR.
years of life: 26.2.1910-13.5.1988

date of title conferment: 28.10.1967

During World War II he commanded the Azov and Danube military flotillas, vice admiral (1944), in 1948-55 in the Black Sea Fleet. In 1956-85 Commander-in-Chief of the Navy - Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR. Creator of the ocean fleet of the USSR, author of the classic work "Sea Power of the State" and other works.
years of life: 17.10.1903-26.4.1976

date of title conferment: 11.3.1955

During World War II - Commander of the Guards Army, Colonel General (1943). Commander-in-Chief of a group of troops in Germany(1953-57), ground forces (1957-60), Allied Forces of the Warsaw Pact (1960-67), Minister of Defense of the USSR (1967-76).
years of life: 25.10.1883-23.2.1939

date of title conferment: 20.11.1935

In the Civil War the commander and front commander. Com. troops of the Belarusian Military District (1927-31), Chief of Staff of the Red Army(1931-1937; from 1935 General Staff). Arrested in the summer of 1938, shot; It is unknown whether he was stripped of his title. Rehabilitated in 1956
years of life: 14.10.1892-19.11.1970

date of title conferment: 11.3.1955

During World War II, commander of the fronts (including the Western in 1941, Stalingrad in 1942), ended the war as commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front, army general (1943). After the war commanding Prykarpatsky, West Siberian and North Caucasian IN.
years of life: 1.12.1896-18.6.1974

date of title conferment: 18.1.1943

The greatest commander of the Second World War. Chief of the General Staff (1941), front commander, member of the Supreme Command headquarters, deputy commander-in-chief. In 1955-57 - Minister of Defense of the USSR. Twice Knight of the Order of Victory.
years of life: 17.8.1898-31.1.1972

date of title conferment: 8.5.1959

In WWII - chief of staff of the fronts, army general (29.5.1945). In 1953-57 Commander of the Leningrad Military District, then troops in Germany (1957-60) and Chief of the General Staff (1960-63, 1964-71).
years of life: 22.8.1894-11.10.1967

date of title conferment: 3.3.1955; from May 25, 1945 he held the rank of “Admiral of the Fleet”, equivalent to the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union

In 1938-50 deputy. People's Commissar of the Navy; in 1941-43 and 1946-50 beginning. Head. Navy Headquarters, then Deputy. Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, deputy Minister of the Navy. Author of historical and fictional works, editor of the Marine Atlas, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences.
years of life: 28.12.1897-21.5.1973

date of title conferment: 20.2.1944

IN WWII commander of armies and fronts, from 1944 - 1st Ukrainian Front. In 1946-50 and 1955-56, Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces; in 1956-60 commander-in-chief of the Allied Forces of the Warsaw Pact. Knight of the Order of Victory.
years of life: 21.12.1904-30.8.1976

date of title conferment: 15.4.1968

In WWII - division commander, corps commander, lieutenant general (1944), had two combat Gold stars. In 1957-65, commander of the Siberian, Kyiv Military District, in 1965-69 commander of a group of troops in Germany.
years of life: 29.4.1903-9.2.1972

date of title conferment: 28.5.1962

In WWII - army commander, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel General (1944); after the war - Commander of the Moscow Military District(1960-63), commander-in-chief of the Strategic Missile Forces (1963-72).
years of life: 24.7.1904-6.12.1974

date of title conferment: 3.3.1955; 25.5.1945-3.2.1948 and 11.5.1953-3.3.1955 bore the rank of "Admiral of the Fleet", equivalent to the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union; 17.2.1956 demoted to vice admiral; 7/26/1988 posthumously restored

In 1939-46, People's Commissar of the Navy, member of the Supreme High Command: played an extremely important role in the Second World War. In 1948, he was put on trial on trumped-up charges and transferred to the Pacific Fleet. In 1953, Minister of the Navy, in 1953-56 Commander in Chief of the Navy. Since 1956 he has been in disgrace again.
years of life: 9.11.1890-24. (according to other sources 29.)8.1950

date of title conferment: 7.5.1940; stripped of rank 19.2.1942; posthumously restored 9/28/1957

In the Civil War, chief of artillery of the 1st Cavalry, 1937-41 Head of the (Main) Artillery Directorate of the Red Army. Then he commanded fronts and armies; for failure to ensure the defense of Kerch, he was put on trial, demoted to major general, expelled from the party and deprived of awards. After the war he served in the Volga Military District; arrested along with a number of generals in 1947 and executed. Rehabilitated in 1956
years of life: 5.7.1921-28.5.2013

date of title conferment: 14.1.1977

In WWII - chief of staff of a tank brigade, 1969-71 - commander-in-chief of troops in Germany; 1971-77 - Chief of the General Staff; 1977-89 - Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces of the Warsaw Pact.
years of life: 13.2.1917-16.9.1990

date of title conferment: 25.3.1983

In WWII, tank battalion commander and brigade commander; in 1968-71 com. ZakVO, in 1971-72 commander of a group of troops in Germany. In 1972-88 Chief of Logistics of the USSR Armed Forces.
years of life: 23.11.1898-31.3.1967

date of title conferment: 10.9.1944

IN WWII commanding armies, 2nd Ukrainian Front. In 1957-67, Minister of Defense of the USSR. Knight of the Order of Victory.
years of life: 7.6.1897-30.12.1968

date of title conferment: 26.10.1944

Vyborg took into the Finnish war; one of the first three Soviet army generals (1940). In 1940-January 1941, Chief of the General Staff, in June-September 1941 in prison; after liberation, he commanded the Volkhov Front (1941-1944, with a break). From February 1944 to the end of WWII commander of the Karelian Front, then the 1st Far Eastern Front against Japan. Knight of the Order of Victory.
years of life: 11.5.1902-17.6.1985

date of title conferment: 11.3.1955

During the Second World War and the first years after it - army commander, colonel general (1943). In 1953-60, commander of the Moscow Military District. In 1960-62 Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Missile Forces, in 1962-83 Chief Inspector of the USSR Ministry of Defense.
years of life: 30.10.1917-23.1.1994

date of title conferment: 14.1.1977

In WWII, divisional engineer. Since 1968 in the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, in 1977-84 Chief of the General Staff - 1st Deputy Minister of Defense.
years of life: 15.1.1917-1.2.2014

date of title conferment: 25.3.1983

In WWII battalion commander, in 1972-76 commander of the Far Eastern Military District, in 1980-85 Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces.
years of life: 21.12.1896-3.8.1968

date of title conferment: 29.6.1944

In 1937-40 he was imprisoned. In WWII he was a front commander, a participant in the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk. In 1944 com. 1m, then 2nd Belorussian Front. In 1949-56 in the Polish army; had the rank of Marshal of Poland, was Minister of National Affairs. defense of the People's Republic of Poland. Knight of the Order of Victory.
years of life: 1.7.1911-31.8.2012

date of title conferment: 17.2.1978

In WWII com. front tank forces, colonel (1943); in 1965-84 Commander of the Leningrad Military District, in 1967-84 1st Deputy Minister of Defense, in 1984-87 Minister of Defense of the USSR; lost his position after the scandalous landing of M. Rust’s plane in the center of Moscow. The oldest living marshal, holder of the Russian Order of Zhukov.
years of life: 21.7.1897-10.5.1968

date of title conferment: 3.7.1946

In WWII - chief of staff of the fronts commanded by Zhukov, army general (1943). After the war - commander in chief of troops in Germany(1946-49), Chief of the General Staff (1952-60).

Disgraced Marshal

February 18 marked the 120th anniversary of the birth of S.K. Timoshenko / History of WWII: facts and interpretations. Mikhail Zakharchuk

During the years of Soviet power, the high military rank of marshal was awarded 41 times. Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko(1895-1970) received it in May 1940, becoming the sixth and youngest Marshal of the Soviet Union at that time. No one subsequently surpassed him in age. Other parts of the project


Marshal Timoshenko


The future marshal was born in the village of Furmanovka, Odessa region. In the winter of 1914 he was drafted into the army. As a machine gunner he took part in battles on the Southwestern and Western fronts. He fought bravely and was awarded three Crosses of St. George. But he also had a cool character.

In 1917, a military court brought him to justice for daringly beating an officer. Miraculously freed from investigation, Tymoshenko takes part in suppressing the speeches of Kornilov and Kaledin. And then he decisively goes over to the Red Army. Commanded a platoon or squadron. At the head of a cavalry regiment, he participated in the defense of Tsaritsyn, where, according to some biographers of the military leader, he first came to the attention of Stalin. At the end of the Civil War, he commanded the 4th Cavalry Division in the famous 1st Cavalry Army. He was wounded five times and awarded three Orders of the Red Banner and an Honorary Revolutionary Weapon. What followed was study and simply rapid advancement up the military career ladder. In the early thirties, Semyon Konstantinovich was just an assistant to the cavalry commander of the Belarusian Military District. And after a few years, he was alternately assigned to command the troops of the North Caucasus, Kharkov, Kyiv, and Kyiv Special Military Districts. During the Polish campaign of 1939, he led the Ukrainian Front. In September 1935, Timoshenko became a corps commander, two years later he became an army commander of the 2nd rank, and from February 8, 1939, he was already an army commander of the 1st rank and a holder of the Order of Lenin.

In 1939, war with Finland began. Stalin’s opinion on this matter is known: “Did the Government and Party act correctly in declaring war on Finland? This question specifically concerns the Red Army. Could it be possible to do without war? It seems to me that it was impossible. It was impossible to do without war. The war was necessary, since peace negotiations with Finland did not yield results, and the security of Leningrad had to be ensured unconditionally, because its security is the security of our Fatherland. Not only because Leningrad represents 30-35 percent of the defense industry of our country and, therefore, the fate of our country depends on the integrity and safety of Leningrad, but also because Leningrad is the second capital of our country.”

On the eve of hostilities, the leader summoned the entire Soviet generals to the Kremlin and posed the question bluntly: “Who is ready to take command?” There was an oppressive silence. And then Timoshenko stood up: “I hope that I will not let you down, Comrade Stalin” - “Okay, Comrade Timoshenko. That’s what we’ll decide.”


This situation only at first glance looks simple and artless. In fact, everything was more than complicated, and it is difficult for us, even now, burdened with voluminous historical knowledge, to imagine the full extent of that complexity. At the end of the thirties, relations between the leader and those same generals became extremely strained. In those extreme conditions, Tymoshenko not only showed his loyalty to the leader, which in itself is also a lot, taking into account the above, but also fully shared with him the overwhelming burden of responsibility for the course and outcome of the unprecedented severity of the Finnish campaign. By the way, it was under the direct leadership of Semyon Konstantinovich that the “Mannerheim Line” was overcome - one of the most complex engineering and fortification structures at that time.

After the Finnish campaign, Tymoshenko was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for “exemplary fulfillment of command assignments and the courage and heroism shown at the same time”; he was appointed People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and became Marshal of the Soviet Union. The fact that this generosity of Stalin was not just a form of his gratitude, but was dictated by the strategic considerations of the leader, is perfectly evidenced by the following historical document, if not composed by Semyon Konstantinovich, then, of course, verified by him personally to the last dot and comma. So, in front of me is the “Act on the acceptance of the People’s Commissariat of Defense of the USSR Comrade. Timoshenko S.K. from Comrade Voroshilova K.E.” This document, classified as highly classified, contains over fifty pages of typewritten text. Here are excerpts from it. “The current regulations on the People's Commissariat of Defense, approved by the Government in 1934, are outdated, do not correspond to the existing structure and do not reflect the modern tasks assigned to the People's Commissariat of Defense. The newly created departments exist under temporary provisions. The structure of other departments (General Staff, Art. Directorate, Communications Directorate, Construction and Apartment Directorate, Air Force Directorate and Inspectorate) has not been approved. The army has 1,080 existing regulations, manuals and manuals, but the regulations: field service, combat regulations of the military branches, internal service, and disciplinary regulations require radical revision. Most military units exist on temporary staff. 1400 states and tables according to which the troops live and are supplied have not been approved by anyone. Issues of military legislation are not settled. Control over the execution of orders and decisions of the Government is extremely poorly organized. There is no living, effective leadership for troop training. On-site verification as a system was not carried out and was replaced by paper reports.

There is no operational plan for the war in the West due to the occupation of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus; in Transcaucasia - due to a sharp change in the situation; in the Far East and Transbaikalia - due to changes in the composition of troops. The General Staff does not have accurate data on the state of covering the state border along its entire perimeter.


Management of operational training of senior command personnel and headquarters was expressed only in planning it and issuing directives. The People's Commissar of Defense and the General Staff did not conduct classes with senior command staff. There is no control over operational preparation in the districts. There are no firmly established views on the use of tanks, aircraft and airborne troops. The preparation of theaters of military operations for war is extremely weak in all respects. The forefield system has not been fully developed, and this issue is being addressed differently in the districts. There are no instructions from NGOs and the General Staff on maintaining the old fortified areas in combat readiness. The new fortified areas do not have the weapons they are supposed to have. The troops' need for maps is not met. The People's Commissariat does not have an accurately established number of the Red Army at the time of reception. The plan for dismissal of assigned personnel is in the process of development. Organizational events for rifle divisions have not been completed. Divisions do not have new staff. The rank and file and junior command staff are weak in their training. Western districts (KOVO, ZapOVO and ODVO) are oversaturated with people who do not know the Russian language. No new regulations have been drawn up defining the procedure for serving.

The mobilization plan has been disrupted. The People's Commissariat of Defense does not have a new plan. Re-registration of those liable for military service has not been carried out since 1927. Unsatisfactory state of accounting of horses, carts, harnesses and vehicles. The shortage of vehicles is 108,000 vehicles. The instructions for mobilization work in the troops and military registration and enlistment offices are outdated. The shortage of command personnel in the army is 21 percent. to the staffing level. The quality of training of command personnel is low, especially in the platoon-company link, in which up to 68 percent. have only a short-term 6-month training for the junior lieutenant course. To fully mobilize the army in wartime, 290,000 reserve command personnel are missing. There is no plan for training and replenishment of reserve command personnel.

The orders on combat training tasks issued annually by the People's Commissar for a number of years repeated the same tasks, which were never fully carried out, and those who did not comply with the order remained unpunished.

The infantry is less prepared than all other branches of the military. The material part of the Red Army Air Force in its development lags behind the aviation of the advanced armies of other countries in terms of speed, engine power, armament and aircraft strength.


Airborne units have not received proper development. The availability of artillery material lags behind in large calibers. The supply of 152-mm howitzers and cannons is 78 percent, and for 203-mm howitzers - 44 percent. The supply of larger calibers (280 mm and above) is completely insufficient. Meanwhile, the experience of breaking through the Mannerheim Line showed that 203-mm howitzers are not powerful enough to destroy modern bunkers. The Red Army found itself unsupplied with mortars and unprepared to use them. The provision of engineering units with basic types of weapons is only 40-60 percent. The latest means of engineering equipment: trench diggers, deep drilling equipment, new road vehicles have not been introduced into the arsenal of the engineering troops. The introduction of new radio equipment is proceeding extremely slowly and on an insufficient scale. The troops are poorly supplied with almost all types of communications equipment. Of the 63 chemical weapons, only 21 have been approved and put into service. The condition and armament of the cavalry are satisfactory (Emphasis added by me - M.Z.). Issues of organizing intelligence are the weakest area in the work of the People's Commissariat of Defense. Adequate protection against air attack is not provided. Over the past two years, there has not been a single special logistics exercise in the army, there have been no training sessions for commanders of the logistics service, although the People's Commissar's order suggested that not a single exercise be conducted without studying logistical issues. The rear charter is classified and the command staff does not know it. The mobilization supply of the army in basic items (hats, overcoats, summer uniforms, underwear and shoes) is extremely low. Mutual stocks for parts and carryover stocks for sub-warehouses have not been created. Fuel reserves are extremely low and provide the army only for 1/2 month of the war.

The sanitary service in the Red Army, as the experience of the war with the White Finns showed, turned out to be insufficiently prepared for a major war; there was a shortage of medical personnel, especially surgeons, medical equipment and medical transport. The existing network of higher military educational institutions (16 military academies and 9 military faculties) and land military educational institutions (136 military schools) does not meet the army's need for command personnel. The quality of training both in academies and military schools requires improvement.

The existing cumbersome organization of the central apparatus with an insufficiently clear distribution of functions between departments does not ensure the successful and rapid implementation of the tasks assigned to the People's Commissariat of Defense, newly posed by modern war.

Passed - Voroshilov. Accepted - Tymoshenko. The chairman of the commission is the secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks - Zhdanov. Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party - Malenkov. Members - Voznesensky. TsAMO, f. 32, op. 11309, no. 15, no. 1-31".

And here are excerpts from Stalin’s speech to graduates of military academies on May 5, 1941: “Comrades, you left the army three or four years ago, now you will return to its ranks and will not recognize the army. The Red Army is no longer what it was several years ago. What was the Red Army like 3-4 years ago? The main branch of the army was infantry. She was armed with a rifle, which was reloaded after each shot, light and heavy machine guns, howitzers and a cannon with an initial speed of up to 900 meters per second. The planes had a speed of 400 - 500 kilometers per hour. The tanks had thin armor to withstand the 37 mm gun. Our division consisted of up to 18 thousand fighters, but this was not yet an indicator of its strength. What has the Red Army become today? We have rebuilt our army and armed it with modern military equipment. Previously, there were 120 divisions in the Red Army. Now we have 300 divisions in our army. Of the 100 divisions, two thirds are tank, and one third are mechanized. This year the army will have 50 thousand tractors and trucks. Our tanks have changed their appearance. We have first-line tanks that will tear up the front. There are tanks of the second and third line - these are infantry escort tanks. The firepower of tanks has increased. Modern warfare has amended and elevated the role of guns. Previously, aviation speed was considered ideal 400 - 500 km per hour. Now this is already behind the times. We have sufficient quantities and produce in large quantities aircraft that give a speed of 600 - 650 km per hour. These are the first line aircraft. In case of war, these aircraft will be used first. They will also clear the way for our relatively outdated I-15, I-16 and I-153 (Chaika) and SB aircraft. If we had let these cars in first, they would have been beaten. Previously, no attention was paid to such cheap artillery, but to a valuable type of weapon like mortars. We neglected them, now we are armed with modern mortars of various calibers. There were no scooter units before, now we have created them - this motorized cavalry, and we have them in sufficient quantities. To manage all this new equipment - a new army, we need command cadres who perfectly know the modern art of war. These are the changes that have taken place in the organization of the Red Army. When you come to the Red Army units, you will see the changes that have taken place.”

Tymoshenko’s merit in the “changes that have taken place” simply cannot be overestimated. Sometimes you think: what if Hitler attacked us when the army was led by Klim Voroshilov, who really only cared about the cavalry?


However, Semyon Konstantinovich had the will, knowledge and skills to radically change the situation in the Red Army.

After all, the cited document not only named the shortcomings, but also proposed radical measures to eliminate them. At the same time, the young marshal headed the People's Commissariat of Defense for only 14 months! Of course, in such a short period it was impossible to completely complete the reorganization and technical re-equipment of the troops. But still, how much he did! In September 1940, Timoshenko wrote a memo addressed to Stalin and Molotov, in which he amazingly accurately predicted how military operations would develop if Germany attacked us, which he personally did not doubt one iota.

A book could be written about the Great Patriotic War of Marshal Timoshenko. In fact, it has already been written by three authors. Unfortunately, this collective work is in the spirit of the agitprop of the fifties, although the voluminous work was published in the so-called post-perestroika period. The main thing - the Kharkov operation of 1942 or the Second Kharkov Battle - is generally said in an indistinct tongue twister. Meanwhile, this strategic offensive of the Soviet troops ultimately ended in the encirclement and almost complete destruction of the attacking forces. Because of the disaster near Kharkov, the rapid advance of the Germans with subsequent access to Stalingrad became possible. In the “Barvenkovo ​​trap” alone, our losses amounted to 270 thousand people, 171 thousand were irrevocable. The deputy commander of the Southwestern Front, Lieutenant General F.Ya., was killed while surrounded. Kostenko, commander of the 6th Army, Lieutenant General A.M. Gorodnyansky, commander of the 57th Army, Lieutenant General K.P. Podlas, commander of the army group, Major General L.V. Bobkin and several division generals. The commander-in-chief of the troops of the South-Western direction was Marshal Timoshenko, the chief of staff I.Kh. Bagramyan, member of the Military Council N.S. Khrushchev. Semyon Konstantinovich himself barely escaped captivity and, returning to Headquarters, of course, prepared for the worst. However, Stalin forgave all the surviving military leaders, including Timoshenko. Some of them, like Bagramyan, R.Ya. Malinovsky, who commanded the Southern Front, subsequently fully justified the leader’s trust. But after this, Semyon Konstantinovich experienced another front-line tragedy.

As part of the strategic offensive plan, codenamed "Polar Star", the North-Western Front, commanded by Timoshenko, carried out the Demyansk and Starorusskaya offensive operations. Their plan inspired considerable optimism, and Marshal of Artillery N.N. later wrote very comprehensively about what actually happened. Voronov: “Near Demyansk it was necessary to repeat, albeit on a more modest scale, what had recently been accomplished on the banks of the Volga. But even then something confused me: the operation plan was developed without taking into account the nature of the terrain, the very unimportant road network, and most importantly, without taking into account the approaching spring thaw. The more I delved into the details of the plan, the more I became convinced of the truth of the saying: “It was smooth on paper, but they forgot about the ravines and walked along them.” It would have been difficult to choose a more unfortunate direction for the use of artillery, tanks and other military equipment than what was outlined in the plan.” As a result, the losses of our troops amounted to about 280,000 people killed and wounded, while the enemy Army Group North lost only 78,115 people. Stalin no longer instructed Timoshenko to command the fronts.

In fairness, it should be noted that Semyon Konstantinovich never transferred his miscalculations to other military leaders and never cowardly humiliated himself before Stalin, as the same Khrushchev did.


He endured disgrace courageously, stoically, and until the end of the war, being a representative of Headquarters, he very skillfully, kindly and knowledgeably coordinated the actions of a number of fronts, took part in the development and conduct of several operations, such as the Iasi-Kishinev one. In 1943, he was awarded the Order of Suvorov, 1st degree, for this, and following the results of the Great Patriotic War - the Order of Victory.

Regarding the marshal’s business qualities, I’m not using this as a figure of speech. “He had an unusual capacity for work,” wrote Army General A.I. Radzievsky. “He is amazingly resilient,” noted General I.V. Tyulenev. “Marshal Timoshenko worked 18-19 hours a day, often remaining in his office until the morning,” echoes G.K. Zhukov. Another time, he, a very ungenerous person with praise, admitted: “Tymoshenko is an old and experienced military man, a persistent, strong-willed and educated person both tactically and operationally. In any case, he was a much better people's commissar than Voroshilov, and during the short period that he was one, he managed to turn some things around in the army for the better. Stalin was angry with him both after Kharkov and in general, and this affected his fate throughout the war. He was a strong man. In fact, he should have been Stalin’s deputy, not me.” Tymoshenko’s special friendliness is noted in their memoirs by such military leaders as I.Kh. Bagramyan, M.F. Lukin, K.S. Moskalenko, V.M. Shatilov, S.M. Shtemenko, A.A. Grechko, A.D. Okorokov, I.S. Konev, V.I. Chuikov, K.A. Meretskov, S.M. Shtemenko. Frankly, it is quite rare for military leaders to have unanimity in their assessment of a colleague.

...In April 1960, Tymoshenko, who had always been in good health, became seriously ill. A heavy smoker, he even quit the habit and soon began to recover. He was elected chairman of the Soviet War Veterans Committee. Those responsibilities were not burdensome, so he spent most of his time at the dacha in Arkhangelskoye, next to Konev and Meretskov. I read a lot. His personal library contained more than two thousand books. The marshal was often visited by his children, grandchildren and relatives. Olga's husband served as a military attaché in France. Konstantin married the daughter of Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov. He named his son Semyon.

Tymoshenko died on his seventy-fifth birthday. Fate seemed to protect him from further tragic losses. Grandson Vasily died from drugs. Then another grandson, the marshal’s namesake, dies. Ninel Chuikova and Konstantin Timoshenko divorced. Ekaterina Tymoshenko died tragically and under unclear circumstances in 1988.

A bronze bust was erected to Marshal Tymoshenko in his homeland. A memorial plaque was installed on the building of the former headquarters of the Belarusian Military District. Streets in St. Petersburg, Voronezh, Kyiv, Izmail, Minsk, Rostov-on-Don bear his name. In Moscow there is also a street named after Timoshenko.


The anti-submarine ship "Semyon Timoshenko" plows the vastness of the world's oceans.

The Military Academy of Radiation, Chemical and Biological Defense Troops and Engineering Troops also bears his name. Postage stamps dedicated to the marshal were issued in the USSR and Kyrgyzstan. And in distant Honduras there is Timoshenko vodka. A local moonshine maker heard on the radio in the fall of 1941 that the commander of the Southwestern Front, Timoshenko, had captured the city of Rostov-on-Don during a counteroffensive and thus celebrated this victory. By the way, the capture of Rostov-on-Don was the first major defeat of the Germans. “Our troubles began in Rostov. It was an ominous omen,” admitted G. Guderian. On November 29, 1941, Stalin sent the first congratulations in the history of the Great Patriotic War to S.K. Tymoshenko.

On this topic: Stalin and the conspirators of '41 || Who missed the beginning of the Second World War

Disgraced Marshal
February 18 marked the 120th anniversary of the birth of S.K. Timoshenko / History of WWII: facts and interpretations. Mikhail Zakharchuk

During the years of Soviet power, the high military rank of marshal was awarded 41 times. Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko(1895-1970) received it in May 1940, becoming the sixth and youngest Marshal of the Soviet Union at that time. No one subsequently surpassed him in age. Other


Marshal Timoshenko


The future marshal was born in the village of Furmanovka, Odessa region. In the winter of 1914 he was drafted into the army. As a machine gunner he took part in battles on the Southwestern and Western fronts. He fought bravely and was awarded three Crosses of St. George. But he also had a cool character.

In 1917, a military court brought him to justice for daringly beating an officer. Miraculously freed from investigation, Tymoshenko takes part in suppressing the speeches of Kornilov and Kaledin. And then he decisively goes over to the Red Army. Commanded a platoon or squadron. At the head of a cavalry regiment, he participated in the defense of Tsaritsyn, where, according to some biographers of the military leader, he first came to the attention of Stalin. At the end of the Civil War, he commanded the 4th Cavalry Division in the famous 1st Cavalry Army. He was wounded five times and awarded three Orders of the Red Banner and an Honorary Revolutionary Weapon. What followed was study and simply rapid advancement up the military career ladder. In the early thirties, Semyon Konstantinovich was just an assistant to the cavalry commander of the Belarusian Military District. And after a few years, he was alternately assigned to command the troops of the North Caucasus, Kharkov, Kyiv, and Kyiv Special Military Districts. During the Polish campaign of 1939, he led the Ukrainian Front. In September 1935, Timoshenko became a corps commander, two years later he became an army commander of the 2nd rank, and from February 8, 1939, he was already an army commander of the 1st rank and a holder of the Order of Lenin.

In 1939, war with Finland began. Stalin’s opinion on this matter is known: “Did the Government and Party act correctly in declaring war on Finland? This question specifically concerns the Red Army. Could it be possible to do without war? It seems to me that it was impossible. It was impossible to do without war. The war was necessary, since peace negotiations with Finland did not yield results, and the security of Leningrad had to be ensured unconditionally, because its security is the security of our Fatherland. Not only because Leningrad represents 30-35 percent of the defense industry of our country and, therefore, the fate of our country depends on the integrity and safety of Leningrad, but also because Leningrad is the second capital of our country.”

On the eve of hostilities, the leader summoned the entire Soviet generals to the Kremlin and posed the question bluntly: “Who is ready to take command?” There was an oppressive silence. And then Timoshenko stood up: “I hope that I will not let you down, Comrade Stalin” - “Okay, Comrade Timoshenko. That’s what we’ll decide.”


This situation only at first glance looks simple and artless. In fact, everything was more than complicated, and it is difficult for us, even now, burdened with voluminous historical knowledge, to imagine the full extent of that complexity. At the end of the thirties, relations between the leader and those same generals became extremely strained. In those extreme conditions, Tymoshenko not only showed his loyalty to the leader, which in itself is also a lot, taking into account the above, but also fully shared with him the overwhelming burden of responsibility for the course and outcome of the unprecedented severity of the Finnish campaign. By the way, it was under the direct leadership of Semyon Konstantinovich that the “Mannerheim Line” was overcome - one of the most complex engineering and fortification structures at that time.

After the Finnish campaign, Tymoshenko was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for “exemplary fulfillment of command assignments and the courage and heroism shown at the same time”; he was appointed People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and became Marshal of the Soviet Union. The fact that this generosity of Stalin was not just a form of his gratitude, but was dictated by the strategic considerations of the leader, is perfectly evidenced by the following historical document, if not composed by Semyon Konstantinovich, then, of course, verified by him personally to the last dot and comma. So, in front of me is the “Act on the acceptance of the People’s Commissariat of Defense of the USSR Comrade. Timoshenko S.K. from Comrade Voroshilova K.E.” This document, classified as highly classified, contains over fifty pages of typewritten text. Here are excerpts from it. “The current regulations on the People's Commissariat of Defense, approved by the Government in 1934, are outdated, do not correspond to the existing structure and do not reflect the modern tasks assigned to the People's Commissariat of Defense. The newly created departments exist under temporary provisions. The structure of other departments (General Staff, Art. Directorate, Communications Directorate, Construction and Apartment Directorate, Air Force Directorate and Inspectorate) has not been approved. The army has 1,080 existing regulations, manuals and manuals, but the regulations: field service, combat regulations of the military branches, internal service, and disciplinary regulations require radical revision. Most military units exist on temporary staff. 1400 states and tables according to which the troops live and are supplied have not been approved by anyone. Issues of military legislation are not settled. Control over the execution of orders and decisions of the Government is extremely poorly organized. There is no living, effective leadership for troop training. On-site verification as a system was not carried out and was replaced by paper reports.

There is no operational plan for the war in the West due to the occupation of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus; in Transcaucasia - due to a sharp change in the situation; in the Far East and Transbaikalia - due to changes in the composition of troops. The General Staff does not have accurate data on the state of covering the state border along its entire perimeter.


Management of operational training of senior command personnel and headquarters was expressed only in planning it and issuing directives. The People's Commissar of Defense and the General Staff did not conduct classes with senior command staff. There is no control over operational preparation in the districts. There are no firmly established views on the use of tanks, aircraft and airborne troops. The preparation of theaters of military operations for war is extremely weak in all respects. The forefield system has not been fully developed, and this issue is being addressed differently in the districts. There are no instructions from NGOs and the General Staff on maintaining the old fortified areas in combat readiness. The new fortified areas do not have the weapons they are supposed to have. The troops' need for maps is not met. The People's Commissariat does not have an accurately established number of the Red Army at the time of reception. The plan for dismissal of assigned personnel is in the process of development. Organizational events for rifle divisions have not been completed. Divisions do not have new staff. The rank and file and junior command staff are weak in their training. Western districts (KOVO, ZapOVO and ODVO) are oversaturated with people who do not know the Russian language. No new regulations have been drawn up defining the procedure for serving.

The mobilization plan has been disrupted. The People's Commissariat of Defense does not have a new plan. Re-registration of those liable for military service has not been carried out since 1927. Unsatisfactory state of accounting of horses, carts, harnesses and vehicles. The shortage of vehicles is 108,000 vehicles. The instructions for mobilization work in the troops and military registration and enlistment offices are outdated. The shortage of command personnel in the army is 21 percent. to the staffing level. The quality of training of command personnel is low, especially in the platoon-company link, in which up to 68 percent. have only a short-term 6-month training for the junior lieutenant course. To fully mobilize the army in wartime, 290,000 reserve command personnel are missing. There is no plan for training and replenishment of reserve command personnel.

The orders on combat training tasks issued annually by the People's Commissar for a number of years repeated the same tasks, which were never fully carried out, and those who did not comply with the order remained unpunished.

The infantry is less prepared than all other branches of the military. The material part of the Red Army Air Force in its development lags behind the aviation of the advanced armies of other countries in terms of speed, engine power, armament and aircraft strength.


Airborne units have not received proper development. The availability of artillery material lags behind in large calibers. The supply of 152-mm howitzers and cannons is 78 percent, and for 203-mm howitzers - 44 percent. The supply of larger calibers (280 mm and above) is completely insufficient. Meanwhile, the experience of breaking through the Mannerheim Line showed that 203-mm howitzers are not powerful enough to destroy modern bunkers. The Red Army found itself unsupplied with mortars and unprepared to use them. The provision of engineering units with basic types of weapons is only 40-60 percent. The latest means of engineering equipment: trench diggers, deep drilling equipment, new road vehicles have not been introduced into the arsenal of the engineering troops. The introduction of new radio equipment is proceeding extremely slowly and on an insufficient scale. The troops are poorly supplied with almost all types of communications equipment. Of the 63 chemical weapons, only 21 have been approved and put into service. The condition and armament of the cavalry are satisfactory (Emphasis added by me – M.Z.). Issues of organizing intelligence are the weakest area in the work of the People's Commissariat of Defense. Adequate protection against air attack is not provided. Over the past two years, there has not been a single special logistics exercise in the army, there have been no training sessions for commanders of the logistics service, although the People's Commissar's order suggested that not a single exercise be conducted without studying logistical issues. The rear charter is classified and the command staff does not know it. The mobilization supply of the army in basic items (hats, overcoats, summer uniforms, underwear and shoes) is extremely low. Mutual stocks for parts and carryover stocks for sub-warehouses have not been created. Fuel reserves are extremely low and provide the army only for 1/2 month of the war.

The sanitary service in the Red Army, as the experience of the war with the White Finns showed, turned out to be insufficiently prepared for a major war; there was a shortage of medical personnel, especially surgeons, medical equipment and medical transport. The existing network of higher military educational institutions (16 military academies and 9 military faculties) and land military educational institutions (136 military schools) does not meet the army's need for command personnel. The quality of training both in academies and military schools requires improvement.

The existing cumbersome organization of the central apparatus with an insufficiently clear distribution of functions between departments does not ensure the successful and rapid implementation of the tasks assigned to the People's Commissariat of Defense, newly posed by modern war.

Passed - Voroshilov. Accepted - Tymoshenko. The chairman of the commission is the secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks - Zhdanov. Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party - Malenkov. Members – Voznesensky. TsAMO, f. 32, op. 11309, no. 15, no. 1-31".

And here are excerpts from Stalin’s speech to graduates of military academies on May 5, 1941: “Comrades, you left the army three or four years ago, now you will return to its ranks and will not recognize the army. The Red Army is no longer what it was several years ago. What was the Red Army like 3-4 years ago? The main branch of the army was infantry. She was armed with a rifle, which was reloaded after each shot, light and heavy machine guns, howitzers and a cannon with an initial speed of up to 900 meters per second. The planes had a speed of 400 - 500 kilometers per hour. The tanks had thin armor to withstand the 37 mm gun. Our division consisted of up to 18 thousand fighters, but this was not yet an indicator of its strength. What has the Red Army become today? We have rebuilt our army and armed it with modern military equipment. Previously, there were 120 divisions in the Red Army. Now we have 300 divisions in our army. Of the 100 divisions, two thirds are tank, and one third are mechanized. This year the army will have 50 thousand tractors and trucks. Our tanks have changed their appearance. We have first-line tanks that will tear up the front. There are tanks of the second and third line - these are infantry escort tanks. The firepower of tanks has increased. Modern warfare has amended and elevated the role of guns. Previously, aviation speed was considered ideal 400 - 500 km per hour. Now this is already behind the times. We have sufficient quantities and produce in large quantities aircraft that give a speed of 600 - 650 km per hour. These are the first line aircraft. In case of war, these aircraft will be used first. They will also clear the way for our relatively outdated I-15, I-16 and I-153 (Chaika) and SB aircraft. If we had let these cars in first, they would have been beaten. Previously, no attention was paid to such cheap artillery, but to a valuable type of weapon like mortars. We neglected them, now we are armed with modern mortars of various calibers. There were no scooter units before, now we have created them - this motorized cavalry, and we have them in sufficient quantities. To manage all this new equipment - a new army, we need command cadres who perfectly know the modern art of war. These are the changes that have taken place in the organization of the Red Army. When you come to the Red Army units, you will see the changes that have taken place.”

Tymoshenko’s merit in the “changes that have taken place” simply cannot be overestimated. Sometimes you think: what if Hitler attacked us when the army was led by Klim Voroshilov, who really only cared about the cavalry?


However, Semyon Konstantinovich had the will, knowledge and skills to radically change the situation in the Red Army.

After all, the cited document not only named the shortcomings, but also proposed radical measures to eliminate them. At the same time, the young marshal headed the People's Commissariat of Defense for only 14 months! Of course, in such a short period it was impossible to completely complete the reorganization and technical re-equipment of the troops. But still, how much he did! In September 1940, Timoshenko wrote a memo addressed to Stalin and Molotov, in which he amazingly accurately predicted how military operations would develop if Germany attacked us, which he personally did not doubt one iota.

A book could be written about the Great Patriotic War of Marshal Timoshenko. In fact, it has already been written by three authors. Unfortunately, this collective work is in the spirit of the agitprop of the fifties, although the voluminous work was published in the so-called post-perestroika period. The main thing - the Kharkov operation of 1942 or the Second Kharkov Battle - is generally said in an indistinct patter. Meanwhile, this strategic offensive of the Soviet troops ultimately ended in the encirclement and almost complete destruction of the attacking forces. Because of the disaster near Kharkov, the rapid advance of the Germans with subsequent access to Stalingrad became possible. In the “Barvenkovo ​​trap” alone, our losses amounted to 270 thousand people, 171 thousand were irrevocable. The deputy commander of the Southwestern Front, Lieutenant General F.Ya., was killed while surrounded. Kostenko, commander of the 6th Army, Lieutenant General A.M. Gorodnyansky, commander of the 57th Army, Lieutenant General K.P. Podlas, commander of the army group, Major General L.V. Bobkin and several division generals. The commander-in-chief of the troops of the South-Western direction was Marshal Timoshenko, the chief of staff I.Kh. Bagramyan, member of the Military Council N.S. Khrushchev. Semyon Konstantinovich himself barely escaped captivity and, returning to Headquarters, of course, prepared for the worst. However, Stalin forgave all the surviving military leaders, including Timoshenko. Some of them, like Bagramyan, R.Ya. Malinovsky, who commanded the Southern Front, subsequently fully justified the leader’s trust. But after this, Semyon Konstantinovich experienced another front-line tragedy.

As part of the strategic offensive plan, codenamed "Polar Star", the North-Western Front, commanded by Timoshenko, carried out the Demyansk and Starorusskaya offensive operations. Their plan inspired considerable optimism, and Marshal of Artillery N.N. later wrote very comprehensively about what actually happened. Voronov: “Near Demyansk it was necessary to repeat, albeit on a more modest scale, what had recently been accomplished on the banks of the Volga. But even then something confused me: the operation plan was developed without taking into account the nature of the terrain, the very unimportant road network, and most importantly, without taking into account the approaching spring thaw. The more I delved into the details of the plan, the more I became convinced of the truth of the saying: “It was smooth on paper, but they forgot about the ravines and walked along them.” It would have been difficult to choose a more unfortunate direction for the use of artillery, tanks and other military equipment than what was outlined in the plan.” As a result, the losses of our troops amounted to about 280,000 people killed and wounded, while the enemy Army Group North lost only 78,115 people. Stalin no longer instructed Timoshenko to command the fronts.

In fairness, it should be noted that Semyon Konstantinovich never transferred his miscalculations to other military leaders and never cowardly humiliated himself before Stalin, as the same Khrushchev did.


He endured disgrace courageously, stoically, and until the end of the war, being a representative of Headquarters, he very skillfully, kindly and knowledgeably coordinated the actions of a number of fronts, took part in the development and conduct of several operations, such as the Iasi-Kishinev one. In 1943, he was awarded the Order of Suvorov, 1st degree, for this, and following the results of the Great Patriotic War - the Order of Victory.

Regarding the marshal’s business qualities, I’m not using this as a figure of speech. “He had an unusual capacity for work,” wrote Army General A.I. Radzievsky. “He is amazingly resilient,” noted General I.V. Tyulenev. “Marshal Timoshenko worked 18-19 hours a day, often remaining in his office until the morning,” echoes G.K. Zhukov. Another time, he, a very ungenerous person with praise, admitted: “Tymoshenko is an old and experienced military man, a persistent, strong-willed and educated person both tactically and operationally. In any case, he was a much better people's commissar than Voroshilov, and during the short period that he was one, he managed to turn some things around in the army for the better. Stalin was angry with him both after Kharkov and in general, and this affected his fate throughout the war. He was a strong man. In fact, he should have been Stalin’s deputy, not me.” Tymoshenko’s special friendliness is noted in their memoirs by such military leaders as I.Kh. Bagramyan, M.F. Lukin, K.S. Moskalenko, V.M. Shatilov, S.M. Shtemenko, A.A. Grechko, A.D. Okorokov, I.S. Konev, V.I. Chuikov, K.A. Meretskov, S.M. Shtemenko. Frankly, it is quite rare for military leaders to have unanimity in their assessment of a colleague.

...In April 1960, Tymoshenko, who had always been in good health, became seriously ill. A heavy smoker, he even quit the habit and soon began to recover. He was elected chairman of the Soviet War Veterans Committee. Those responsibilities were not burdensome, so he spent most of his time at the dacha in Arkhangelskoye, next to Konev and Meretskov. I read a lot. His personal library contained more than two thousand books. The marshal was often visited by his children, grandchildren and relatives. Olga's husband served as a military attaché in France. Konstantin married the daughter of Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov. He named his son Semyon.

Tymoshenko died on his seventy-fifth birthday. Fate seemed to protect him from further tragic losses. Grandson Vasily died from drugs. Then another grandson, the marshal’s namesake, dies. Ninel Chuikova and Konstantin Timoshenko divorced. Ekaterina Tymoshenko died tragically and under unclear circumstances in 1988.

A bronze bust was erected to Marshal Tymoshenko in his homeland. A memorial plaque was installed on the building of the former headquarters of the Belarusian Military District. Streets in St. Petersburg, Voronezh, Kyiv, Izmail, Minsk, Rostov-on-Don bear his name. In Moscow there is also a street named after Timoshenko.


The anti-submarine ship "Semyon Timoshenko" plows the vastness of the world's oceans.

The Military Academy of Radiation, Chemical and Biological Defense Troops and Engineering Troops also bears his name. Postage stamps dedicated to the marshal were issued in the USSR and Kyrgyzstan. And in distant Honduras there is Timoshenko vodka. A local moonshine maker heard on the radio in the fall of 1941 that the commander of the Southwestern Front, Timoshenko, had captured the city of Rostov-on-Don during a counteroffensive and thus celebrated this victory. By the way, the capture of Rostov-on-Don was the first major defeat of the Germans. “Our troubles began in Rostov. It was an ominous omen,” admitted G. Guderian. On November 29, 1941, Stalin sent the first congratulations in the history of the Great Patriotic War to S.K. Tymoshenko.

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