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Famous Roman generals. Introduction At the very beginning: From leader and hero to politician and commander

Pharaoh Ramses II, who ruled Egypt for more than 60 years, was not without reason mentioned in ancient Egyptian texts with the title “Victor”. He won many victories, the most important of which was over the Hittite kingdom, which had long been Egypt's main enemy.

Its most famous episode was the Battle of Kadesh, which involved several thousand chariots on both sides.

The battle went on with varying degrees of success. At first, success was on the side of the Hittites, who took the Egyptians by surprise. But the reserves arrived in time and turned the tide of the battle. The Hittites found themselves pressed against the Orontes River and suffered heavy losses during their hasty crossing. Thanks to this, Ramses was able to conclude a profitable peace with them.

In the wars of the Egyptians and the Hittites, chariots were one of the main striking forces. Sometimes knives were attached to their wheels, literally mowing down the enemy’s ranks. But when fleeing or losing control of the horses, this terrible weapon sometimes involuntarily turned against its own. The chariots of the Hittites were more powerful, and the warriors on them often fought with spears, while the more maneuverable chariots of the Egyptians had archers.

Cyrus the Great (530 BC)

When Cyrus II became the leader of the Persian tribes, the Persians were divided and were in vassal dependence on Media. By the end of Cyrus's reign, the Persian Achaemenid power extended from Greece and Egypt to India.

Cyrus treated the vanquished humanely, left the conquered regions substantial self-government, respected their religions, and, thanks to this, avoided serious uprisings in the conquered territories, and some opponents preferred submission to war on such lenient terms.

In the battle with the legendary Lydian king Croesus, Cyrus used an original military stratagem. In front of his army, he placed camels taken from the convoy, on which archers were sitting, firing at the enemy. The enemy's horses were frightened by unfamiliar animals and caused confusion in the ranks of the enemy army.

The personality of Cyrus is covered in numerous legends, in which it is difficult to distinguish truth from fiction. So, according to legend, he knew by sight and by name all the soldiers of his large army. After 29 years of reign, Cyrus died during another campaign of conquest.

Miltiades (550 BC - 489 BC)

The Athenian commander Miltiades became famous, first of all, for his victory in the legendary battle with the Persians at Marathon. The positions of the Greeks were such that their army blocked the path to Athens. The Persian commanders decided not to engage in a land battle, but to board ships, bypass the Greeks by sea and land near Athens.

Miltiades seized the moment when most of the Persian cavalry was already on the ships, and attacked the Persian infantry.

When the Persians came to their senses and launched a counteroffensive, the Greek troops deliberately retreated in the center and then surrounded the enemies. Despite the Persian superiority in numbers, the Greeks were victorious. After the battle, the Greek army made a 42-kilometer forced march to Athens and prevented the remaining Persians from landing near the city.

Despite the merits of Miltiades, after another unsuccessful military expedition against the island of Paros, where the commander himself was wounded, he was accused of “deceiving the people” and sentenced to a huge fine. Miltiades was unable to pay the fine, and was listed as an insolvent debtor who was prohibited from engaging in government activities, and soon died of his wounds.

Themistocles (524 BC - 459 BC)

Themistocles, the greatest Athenian naval commander, played a key role in the Greek victories over the Persians and the preservation of Greece's independence. When the Persian king Xerxes went to war against Greece, the city-states united in the face of a common enemy, and adopted Themistocles' plan for defense. The decisive naval battle took place off the island of Salamis. In its vicinity there are many narrow straits and, according to Themistocles, if it were possible to lure the Persian fleet into them, the enemy’s large numerical advantage would be neutralized. Frightened by the size of the Persian fleet, other Greek commanders were inclined to flee, but Themistocles, sending his messenger to the Persian camp, provoked them to immediately begin battle. The Greeks had no choice but to accept the battle. Themistocles' calculations were brilliantly justified: in the narrow straits, large and clumsy Persian ships turned out to be helpless in front of the more maneuverable Greek ones. The Persian fleet was defeated.

Themistocles' merits were soon forgotten. Political opponents expelled him from Athens, and then sentenced him to death in absentia, accusing him of treason.

Themistocles was forced to flee to his former enemies, to Persia. King Artaxerxes, the son of Xerxes, defeated by Themistocles, not only spared his longtime enemy, but also gave him several cities to rule. According to legend, Artaxerxes wanted Themistocles to participate in the war against the Greeks, and the commander, unable to refuse, but not wanting to harm his ungrateful homeland, took poison.

Epaminondas (418 BC - 362 BC)

The great Theban general Epaminondas spent much of his life fighting against the Spartans, who dominated mainland Greece at the time. At the Battle of Leuctra, he first defeated the Spartan army, which until then had been considered invincible in land combat. Epaminondas' victories contributed to the rise of Thebes, but aroused the fears of other Greek city-states, who united against them.

In his last battle at Mantinea, also against the Spartans, when victory was almost in the hands of the Thebans, Epaminondas was mortally wounded, and the army, confused without a commander, retreated.

Epaminondas is considered one of the greatest innovators in the art of war. It was he who first began to distribute forces unevenly along the front, concentrating the main forces in the direction of the decisive blow. This principle, called “oblique order tactics” by contemporaries, is still one of the fundamental principles in military science. Epaminondas was one of the first to actively use cavalry. The commander paid great attention to cultivating the fighting spirit of his warriors: he encouraged Theban youths to challenge young Spartans to sports competitions so that they would understand that these opponents could be defeated, not only in the palaestra, but also on the battlefield.

Phocion (398 BC - 318 BC)

Phocion was one of the most cautious and prudent Greek commanders and politicians, and in difficult times for Greece, these qualities turned out to be most in demand. He won a number of victories over the Macedonians, but subsequently, realizing that fragmented Greece was unable to resist the strong Macedonian army and believing that only Philip II could stop the Greek strife, he took a moderate position, which seemed treacherous to the famous orator Demosthenes and his supporters.

Thanks to the respect that Phocion enjoyed among the Macedonians, including Alexander the Great, he managed to achieve easy peace terms for the Athenians.

Phocion never sought power, but the Athenians elected him as a strategist 45 times, sometimes against his will. His last election ended tragically for him. After the Macedonians took the city of Piraeus, eighty-year-old Phocion was accused of treason and executed.

Philip of Macedon (382 BC - 336 BC)

Philip II, the Macedonian king, is best known as the father of Alexander the Great, but it was he who laid the foundation for his son’s future victories. Philip created a well-trained army with iron discipline, and with it he managed to conquer all of Greece. The decisive battle was the Battle of Chaeronea, as a result of which the united Greek troops were defeated, and Philip united Greece under his command.

Philip's main military innovation was the famous Macedonian phalanx, which his great son later used so skillfully.

The phalanx was a close formation of warriors armed with long spears, and the spears of subsequent rows were longer than those of the first. The bristling phalanx could successfully resist cavalry attacks. He often used various siege machines. However, being a cunning politician, he whenever possible preferred bribery to battle and said that “a donkey loaded with gold is capable of taking any fortress.” Many contemporaries considered this method of waging war, avoiding open battles, unworthy.

During his wars, Philip of Macedon lost an eye and received several severe wounds, as a result of one of which he remained lame. But he died as a result of an assassination attempt by one of the courtiers, outraged by the king’s unfair judicial decision. At the same time, many historians believe that the killer’s hand was directed by his political enemies.

Alexander the Great (356 BC - 323 BC)

Alexander the Great is probably the most legendary commander in history. Having ascended the throne at the age of twenty, in less than thirteen years he managed to conquer most of the lands known at that time and create a huge empire.

From childhood, Alexander the Great prepared himself for the hardships of military service, leading a harsh life that was not at all typical for a royal son. His main feature was the desire for fame. Because of this, he was even upset about his father’s victories, fearing that he would conquer everything himself, and there would be nothing left for his share.

According to legend, when his teacher, the great Aristotle, told the young man that other inhabited worlds could exist, Alexander exclaimed bitterly: “But I don’t even own one yet!”

Having completed the conquest of Greece begun by his father, Alexander set off on an eastern campaign. In it, he defeated the Persian Empire, which had seemed invincible for a long time, conquered Egypt, reached India and was going to capture it too, but the exhausted army refused to continue the campaign, and Alexander was forced to return. In Babylon he became seriously ill (most likely from malaria) and died. After the death of Alexander, the empire fell apart, and a long-term war began between his generals, the diadochi, for the possession of its parts.

Alexander's most famous battle was the battle with the Persians at Gaugamela. The army of the Persian king Darius was an order of magnitude larger, but Alexander managed to break its front line with graceful maneuvers and delivered a decisive blow. Darius fled. This battle marked the end of the Achaemenid Empire.

Pyrrhus (318 BC - 272 BC)

Pyrrhus, king of the small state of Epirus in the Balkans, a distant relative of Alexander the Great, is considered one of the greatest generals in history, and Hannibal even ranked him first, above himself.

Even in his youth, Pyrrhus received combat training, participating in the wars of the Diadochi for the division of the inheritance of Alexander the Great. Initially, he supported one of the diadochi, but soon began to play his own game and, despite the relatively small forces of his army, almost became the king of Macedonia. But the main battles that made him famous were fought against Rome by Pyrrhus. Pyrrhus fought with both Carthage and Sparta.

Having defeated the Romans during the two-day battle of Ausculum and realizing that the losses were too great, Pyrrhus exclaimed: “Another such victory, and I will be left without an army!”

This is where the expression “Pyrrhic victory” comes from, meaning success that came at too great a cost.

The great commander was killed by a woman. During Pyrrhus's assault on the city of Argos, street fighting broke out. The women helped their defenders as best they could. A piece of tile thrown from the roof of one of them hit Pyrrhus in an unprotected place. He fell unconscious and was finished off or crushed by the crowd on the ground.

Fabius Maximus (203 BC)

Quintus Fabius Maximus was not at all a warlike man. In his youth, for his gentle character, he even received the nickname Ovikula (lamb). Nevertheless, he went down in history as a great commander, the winner of Hannibal. After crushing defeats from the Carthaginians, when the fate of Rome hung in the balance, it was Fabius Maximus that the Romans elected dictator for the sake of saving the fatherland.

For his actions at the head of the Roman army, Fabius Maximus received the nickname Cunctator (procrastinator). Avoiding, as far as possible, direct clashes with Hannibal's army, Fabius Maximus exhausted the enemy army and cut off its supply routes.

Many reproached Fabius Maxim for slowness and even treason, but he continued to stick to his line. As a result, Hannibal was forced to retreat. After this, Fabius Maximus stepped down from command, and other commanders took over the war with Carthage on enemy territory.

In 1812, Kutuzov used the tactics of Fabius Maximus in the war with Napoleon. George Washington acted similarly during the American War of Independence.

Hannibal (247 BC - 183 BC)

Hannibal, the Carthaginian general, is considered by many to be the greatest general of all time and is sometimes called the "father of strategy." When Hannibal was nine years old, he swore eternal hatred of Rome (hence the expression “Hannibal’s oath”), and followed this in practice all his life.

At the age of 26, Hannibal led the Carthaginian troops in Spain, for which the Carthaginians were engaged in a fierce struggle with Rome. After a series of military successes, he and his army made a difficult transition through the Pyrenees and, unexpectedly for the Romans, invaded Italy. His army included African fighting elephants, and this is one of the few cases when these animals were tamed and used in warfare.

Rapidly moving inland, Hannibal inflicted three severe defeats on the Romans: on the Trebbia River, at Lake Trasimene and at Cannae. The latter, in which the Roman troops were surrounded and destroyed, became a classic of military art.

Rome was on the verge of complete defeat, but Hannibal, who did not receive reinforcements in time, was forced to retreat and then completely leave Italy with his exhausted army. The commander said with bitterness that he was defeated not by Rome, but by the envious Carthaginian Senate. Already in Africa, Hannibal was defeated by Scipio. After defeat in the war with Rome, Hannibal was involved in politics for some time, but was soon forced to go into exile. In the East, he helped the enemies of Rome with military advice, and when the Romans demanded his extradition, Hannibal, in order not to fall into their hands, took poison.

Scipio Africanus (235 BC - 181 BC)

Publius Cornelius Scipio was only 24 years old when he led the Roman troops in Spain during the war with Carthage. Things were going so badly for the Romans there that there were no others willing to take the position. Taking advantage of the disunity of the Carthaginian troops, he inflicted sensitive blows on them in parts, and, in the end, Spain came under the control of Rome. During one of the battles, Scipio used a curious tactic. Before the battle, for several days in a row he withdrew the army, built in the same order, but did not start the battle. When the opponents got used to this, Scipio on the day of the battle changed the location of the troops, brought them out earlier than usual and launched a rapid attack. The enemy was defeated, and this battle became a turning point in the war, which could now be transferred to enemy territory.

Already in Africa, on the territory of Carthage, Scipio used military stratagem in one of the battles.

Having learned that the allies of the Carthaginians, the Numidians, were living in reed huts, he sent part of the army to set fire to these huts, and when the Carthaginians, attracted by the spectacle of the fire, lost their vigilance, another part of the army attacked them and inflicted a heavy defeat.

In the decisive battle of Zama, Scipio met Hannibal on the battlefield and won. The war is over.

Scipio was distinguished by his humane attitude towards the vanquished, and his generosity became a favorite theme for future artists.

Marius (158 BC - 86 BC)

Gaius Marius came from a humble Roman family; he achieved eminence thanks to his military talents. He acted very successfully in the war against the Numidian king Jugurtha, but he earned real glory in the battles with the Germanic tribes. During this period, they became so strong that for Rome, weakened by numerous wars in different parts of the empire, their invasion became a real threat. There were significantly more Germans than Maria's legionnaires, but the Romans had order, better weapons and experience on their side. Thanks to the skillful actions of Mary, the strong tribes of the Teutons and Cimbri were practically destroyed. The commander was proclaimed “the savior of the fatherland” and “the third founder of Rome.”

The fame and influence of Marius were so great that Roman politicians, fearing his excessive rise, gradually pushed the commander out of business.

At the same time, the career of Sulla, a former subordinate of Marius who became his enemy, was going uphill. Both sides did not disdain any means, from slander to political assassinations. Their enmity eventually led to civil war. Expelled from Rome by Sulla, Mari wandered around the provinces for a long time and almost died, but managed to gather an army and take the city, where he remained until the end, pursuing Sulla’s supporters. After the death of Marius, his supporters did not last long in Rome. Returning Sulla destroyed the grave of his enemy and threw his remains into the river.

Sulla (138 BC - 78 BC)

The Roman commander Lucius Cornelius Sulla received the nickname Felix (happy). Indeed, luck accompanied this man all his life, both in military and political affairs.

Sulla began his military service during the Numidian War in North Africa under the command of Gaius Marius, his future implacable enemy. He conducted affairs so energetically and was so successful in battles and diplomacy that popular rumor attributed to him much of the credit for victory in the Numidian War. This made Maria jealous.

After successful military campaigns in Asia, Sulla was appointed commander in the war against the Pontic king Mithridates. However, after his departure, Marius ensured that Sulla was recalled and he was appointed commander.

Sulla, having secured the support of the army, returned, captured Rome and expelled Marius, starting a civil war. While Sulla was at war with Mithridates, Marius recaptured Rome. Sulla returned there after the death of his enemy and was elected permanent dictator. Having brutally dealt with the supporters of Marius, Sulla some time later resigned his dictatorial powers and remained a private citizen until the end of his life.

Crassus (115 BC - 51 BC)

Marcus Licinius Crassus was one of the richest Romans. However, he made most of his fortune during the dictatorship of Sulla, appropriating the confiscated property of his opponents. He achieved his high position under Sulla thanks to the fact that he distinguished himself in the civil war, fighting on his side.

After the death of Sulla, Crassus was appointed commander in the war against the rebel slaves of Spartacus.

Acting very energetically, unlike his predecessors, Crassus forced Spartacus to take a decisive battle and defeated him.

He treated the vanquished extremely cruelly: several thousand captive slaves were crucified along the Appian Way, and their bodies remained hanging there for many years.

Together with Julius Caesar and Pompey, Crassus became a member of the first triumvirate. These generals actually divided the Roman provinces among themselves. Crassus got Syria. He planned to expand his possessions and waged a war of conquest against the Parthian kingdom, but was unsuccessful. Crassus lost the battle of Carrhae, was treacherously captured during negotiations and brutally executed, having molten gold poured down his throat.

Spartacus (110 BC - 71 BC)

Spartacus, a Roman gladiator originally from Thrace, was the leader of the largest slave revolt. Despite the lack of command experience and relevant education, he became one of the greatest commanders in history.

When Spartacus and his comrades fled from the gladiator school, his detachment consisted of several dozen poorly armed people who took refuge on Vesuvius. The Romans blocked all the roads, but the rebels performed a legendary maneuver: they descended from a steep slope using ropes woven from grape vines and struck the enemies from the rear.

The Romans initially treated the runaway slaves with contempt, believing that their legions would easily defeat the rebels, and they paid dearly for their arrogance.

The relatively small forces sent against Spartak were one by one defeated, and his army, meanwhile, was strengthened: slaves from all over Italy flocked to it.

Unfortunately, there was no unity among the rebels and no common plan for further actions: some wanted to stay in Italy and continue the war, while others wanted to leave before the main Roman forces entered the war. Part of the army broke away from Spartak and was defeated. An attempt to leave Italy by sea ended in failure due to the betrayal of the pirates hired by Spartak. The commander for a long time avoided a decisive battle with the legions of Crassus superior to his army, but in the end he was forced to accept a battle in which the slaves were defeated and he himself died. According to legend, Spartak continued to fight, already being seriously wounded. His body was literally littered with the corpses of the Roman legionnaires he had killed in the last battle.

Pompey (106 BC - 48 BC)

Gnaeus Pompey is known primarily as an opponent of Julius Caesar. But he received his nickname Magnus (Great) for completely different battles.

During the civil war he was one of Sulla's best generals. Then Pompey successfully fought in Spain, the Middle East, and the Caucasus and significantly expanded Roman possessions.

Another important task of Pompey was clearing the Mediterranean Sea from pirates, who had become so insolent that Rome experienced serious difficulties in transporting food by sea.

When Julius Caesar refused to submit to the Senate and thereby started a civil war, Pompey was entrusted with command of the troops of the republic. The struggle between the two great commanders went on for a long time with varying success. But in the decisive battle of the Greek city of Pharsalus, Pompey was defeated and forced to flee. He tried to raise a new army to continue the fight, but was treacherously killed in Egypt. Pompey's head was presented to Julius Caesar, but he, contrary to expectations, did not reward, but executed the murderers of his great enemy.

Julius Caesar (100 BC - 44 BC)

Gaius Julius Caesar truly became famous as a commander when he conquered Gaul (now mostly French territory). He himself compiled a detailed account of these events, writing Notes on the Gallic War, which is still considered an example of military memoirs. Julius Caesar's aphoristic style was also evident in his reports to the Senate. For example, “I have arrived.” Saw. “Won” went down in history.

Having come into conflict with the Senate, Julius Caesar refused to surrender command and invaded Italy. At the border, he and his troops crossed the Rubicon River, and since then the expression “Cross the Rubicon” (meaning to take a decisive action that cuts off the path to retreat) has become popular.

In the ensuing civil war, he defeated the troops of Gnaeus Pompey at Pharsalus, despite the enemy's numerical superiority, and after campaigns in Africa and Spain he returned to Rome as a dictator. A few years later he was assassinated by conspirators in the Senate. According to legend, the bloody body of Julius Caesar fell at the foot of the statue of his enemy Pompey.

Arminius (16 BC - 21 AD)

Arminius, the leader of the German Cherusci tribe, is known primarily for the fact that with his victory over the Romans in the battle in the Teutoburg Forest, he dispelled the myth of their invincibility, which inspired other peoples to fight the conquerors.

In his youth, Arminius served in the Roman army and studied the future enemy well from the inside. After an uprising of Germanic tribes broke out in his homeland, Arminius led it. According to some sources, he was even his ideological inspirer. When three Roman legions sent against the rebels entered the Teutoburg Forest, where they could not line up in the usual order, the Germans, led by Arminius, attacked them. After three days of battle, the Roman troops were almost completely destroyed, and the head of the unlucky Roman commander Quintilius Varus, the son-in-law of Emperor Octavian Augustus himself, was shown around German villages.

Knowing that the Romans would certainly try to take revenge, Arminius tried to unite the Germanic tribes to repel them, but did not succeed. He died not at the hands of the Romans, but as a result of internal strife, killed by someone close to him. However, his cause was not lost: following the wars with the Romans, the Germanic tribes defended their independence.

The exploits of the heroes of the ancient world still excite the imagination of descendants, and the names of the greatest commanders of antiquity are still heard. The battles they won remain classics of military art, and modern military leaders learn from their examples.

Its most famous episode was the Battle of Kadesh, which involved several thousand chariots on both sides.

Cyrus the Great (530 BC)

Miltiades (550 BC – 489 BC)

Miltiades seized the moment when most of the Persian cavalry was already on the ships, and attacked the Persian infantry.

Themistocles (524 BC – 459 BC)

Themistocles' merits were soon forgotten. Political opponents expelled him from Athens, and then sentenced him to death in absentia, accusing him of treason.

Epaminondas (418 BC – 362 BC)

Phocion (398 BC – 318 BC)

Thanks to the respect that Phocion enjoyed among the Macedonians, including Alexander the Great, he managed to achieve easy peace terms for the Athenians.

Philip of Macedon (382 BC – 336 BC)

Philip's main military innovation was the famous Macedonian phalanx, which his great son later used so skillfully.

Alexander the Great (356 BC – 323 BC)

According to legend, when his teacher, the great Aristotle, told the young man that other inhabited worlds could exist, Alexander exclaimed bitterly: “But I don’t even own one yet!”

Pyrrhus (318 BC – 272 BC)

Having defeated the Romans during the two-day battle of Ausculum and realizing that the losses were too great, Pyrrhus exclaimed: “Another such victory, and I will be left without an army!”

This is where the expression “Pyrrhic victory” comes from, meaning success that came at too great a cost.

Fabius Maximus (203 BC)

In 1812, Kutuzov used the tactics of Fabius Maximus in the war with Napoleon. George Washington acted similarly during the American War of Independence.

Hannibal (247 BC – 183 BC)

Scipio Africanus (235 BC – 181 BC)

Already in Africa, on the territory of Carthage, Scipio used military stratagem in one of the battles.

In the decisive battle of Zama, Scipio met Hannibal on the battlefield and won. The war is over.

Scipio was distinguished by his humane attitude towards the vanquished, and his generosity became a favorite theme for future artists.

Marius (158 BC – 86 BC)

The fame and influence of Marius were so great that Roman politicians, fearing his excessive rise, gradually pushed the commander out of business.

Sulla (138 BC – 78 BC)

The Roman commander Lucius Cornelius Sulla received the nickname Felix (happy). Indeed, luck accompanied this man all his life, both in military and political affairs.

Crassus (115 BC – 51 BC)

After the death of Sulla, Crassus was appointed commander in the war against the rebel slaves of Spartacus.

Acting very energetically, unlike his predecessors, Crassus forced Spartacus to take a decisive battle and defeated him.

He treated the vanquished extremely cruelly: several thousand captive slaves were crucified along the Appian Way, and their bodies remained hanging there for many years.

Spartacus (110 BC – 71 BC)

The Romans initially treated the runaway slaves with contempt, believing that their legions would easily defeat the rebels, and they paid dearly for their arrogance.

The relatively small forces sent against Spartak were one by one defeated, and his army, meanwhile, was strengthened: slaves from all over Italy flocked to it.

Unfortunately, among the rebels there was no unity and no common plan for further actions: some wanted to stay in Italy and continue the war, while others wanted to leave before the main Roman forces entered the war. Part of the army broke away from Spartak and was defeated. An attempt to leave Italy by sea ended in failure due to the betrayal of the pirates hired by Spartak. The commander for a long time avoided a decisive battle with the legions of Crassus superior to his army, but in the end he was forced to accept a battle in which the slaves were defeated and he himself died. According to legend, Spartak continued to fight, already being seriously wounded. His body was literally littered with the corpses of the Roman legionnaires he had killed in the last battle.

Pompey (106 BC – 48 BC)

Gnaeus Pompey is known primarily as an opponent of Julius Caesar. But he received his nickname Magnus (Great) for completely different battles.

During the civil war he was one of Sulla's best generals. Then Pompey successfully fought in Spain, the Middle East, and the Caucasus and significantly expanded Roman possessions.

Another important task of Pompey was clearing the Mediterranean Sea from pirates, who had become so insolent that Rome experienced serious difficulties in transporting food by sea.

Julius Caesar (100 BC – 44 BC)

Arminius (16 BC – 21 AD)

History of the Ancient World Bulletin of Nizhny Novgorod University named after. N.I. Lobachevsky, 2013, No. 4 (3), p. 27-38

UDC 94(37).07

ROMAN COMMANDER IN BATTLE:

IMAGES, DISCOURSES AND PRAGMATS OF MILITARY LEADERSHIP (II)

Nizhny Novgorod State University named after. N.I. Lobachevsky

[email protected]

Received by the editor 12/15/2013

The evidence from literary and epigraphic sources of the personal participation of Roman commanders in battle is analyzed from the point of view of the correlation between the pragmatic and ideological aspects of military leadership. It is shown that the so-called Achilles complex was by no means alien to the Romans and the corresponding images and examples reveal a clear Greek influence, coming through historiographical, poetic and rhetorical topoi, as well as through iconographic patterns, which should be considered as a special discourse. At the same time, this discourse was based on Roman traditions proper and expressed specifically Roman ideology and practice of military leadership. These traditions, which placed great emphasis on individual military prowess and military “charisma,” remained a powerful resource for legitimizing power both for the statesmen of the Roman Republic and for most emperors, who used corresponding images and models in their propaganda.

Key words: Ancient Rome, military history of antiquity, Roman commanders, pragmatics and ideology of military leadership, narrative and ideological discourses.

In this article, the main subject of our research will be evidence from literary and epigraphic sources of the personal participation of Roman generals in battle. Taken together, they present a picture that significantly contradicts the prescriptions of military theory discussed in the first part of this work. It even seems that following these postulates was a much less common practice than the active intervention of commanders in hostilities and personal participation in battle. Displays of individual military valor, including the destruction of enemies in hand-to-hand combat, were not only actively promoted through the means of the fine arts, but were also expected of high-ranking military leaders by both subordinates, inspired by the personal example of the commander, and public opinion, which finds expression in literary works.

Of course, in ancient literary texts (primarily in poetic and rhetorical texts) it is not difficult to find equally unrealistic episodes of a military leader’s personal participation in battle as on pictorial monuments. Thus, in the Aeneid, Anchises, prophesying about the coming glory of Marcellus, the nephew of Augustus, described

puts his military prowess completely in home-

roving spirit:

No enemy could escape from him unharmed,

let the young man fight on foot, let him drive his spurs into his sides

combat horse (Verg. Aen. VI. 879-881; trans. S. Osherov, edited by F. Petrovsky).

Another eloquent example is the lines of Horace from an ode addressed to Augustus in connection with the victories won by his stepsons Tiberius and Drusus in 15 BC. e. over the Alpine tribes:

Enemy regiments

Tiberius pressed tirelessly,

Rushing into the fight with a horse.

Claudius was so thunderous,

rushing into mortal combat. Dressed in armor of barbarians without losses;

Mowing both back and front,

He covered the ground with corpses victoriously2.

(Carm. IV. 14. 22-24; 29-32; trans. N.S. Ginzburg)

If we turn to rhetorical texts, it should be noted that instructions on rhetoric

they are directly ordered to dwell in detail on the battles with the participation of the emperor (Menander. Peri etbektkyu // Rhetores Graeci. III, p. 373, 17-32 Spengel). As an illustrative example of the implementation of such an attitude, we can cite a passage from the panegyric to Emperor Constantine, delivered by an unknown speaker in 313 AD. e.:

But do you, Emperor, think that I glorify everything you did in this battle? And I'm complaining again. You foresaw everything, arranged everything, fulfilled all the duties of the supreme commander-in-chief, but why did you fight yourself? Why did you rush into the midst of enemies?<...>Do you really think that we don’t know how, overwhelmed by excessive zeal, you burst into the very middle of the enemy army and, if you had not paved the way for yourself, smashing [enemies] right and left, you would have deceived the hopes and aspirations of the entire human race?<... ">Those who are destined to either win or be killed should fight; but why should you be exposed to any danger, on whose life the fate of everyone depends?<... >Do you, Emperor, need to defeat the enemy yourself? You shouldn't even be doing this3.

(Pan. Lat. IX. 9. 2-6; trans. I.Yu. Shabaghi).

Another matter, however, is the evidence of historiographical narratives. In the battle scenes depicted by ancient authors, of course, there is a fair amount of rhetoric, but nevertheless, facts are reported that are hardly legitimate to consider as pure fiction and rhetorical exaggeration.

The model of heroic leadership, originating in the Homeric epic, was fully formed in the Hellenistic era. As a normative feature of the image of a commander, it assumed the inextricable unity of individual military valor and military leadership itself, including knowledge of tactics and military tricks. An example of a Hellenistic king-commander who fully followed the military style of Alexander the Great (who, in turn, one might say, was consciously guided by the Homeric paradigm - the “Achilles complex”4) can undoubtedly serve as Pyrrhus of Epirus. Plutarch5 gives a vivid description of his heroic leadership in battle, talking about the Battle of Heraclea:

He... was the first to rush forward, spurring his horse. During the battle the beauty of his weapons and

the shine of his luxurious attire made him noticeable from everywhere, and he proved by deeds that his glory was fully consistent with his valor, for, fighting with weapons in his hands and bravely repelling the onslaught of enemies, he did not lose his cool and commanded the army as if he was watching the battle from afar, keeping up with help to everyone who seemed to be overwhelmed by the enemy

(Plut. Pyrrh. 16. 7-8; trans. S.A. Osherov).

In a similar way, the combination of military leadership qualities and purely military courage is often emphasized with obvious respect (including by Roman authors) in other military leaders of the late classical and Hellenistic times. For example, according to Justin, Epaminondas at Mantinea not only led the battle, but also fought as the bravest warrior (Iust. VI. 7. 11: non ducis tantum, verum et fortissimi militis officio fungitur). For Velleius Paterculus, Mithridates Eupator is “a leader in plans, a warrior in battle” (Vell. Pat. II. 18. 1: consiliis dux, miles manu).

It must be emphasized that this model of heroic leadership was by no means alien to Roman military leaders throughout almost the entire period of Roman history, and not just in its early stages, when, according to Livy, it was considered honorable for the generals themselves to start the battle: decorum est tum ipsis capes- sere pugnam ducibus (Liv. II. 6. 8). Let us present a selection of relevant evidence, arranging them in chronological order to more clearly show the continuity of the tradition. But first, it should be noted that the unity of military valor itself and the art of generalship undoubtedly belongs to the original, one might say, basic features of Roman military culture, due to the competitive nature of the “meritocratic” political system that developed during the early Republic6. In this system, the Roman elite largely substantiated its claims to political leadership by demonstrating not just real military achievements, but also the possession of such military valor (virtus), in its “physical”, combat aspect,7 which was available to every Roman citizen who performed his military duties. duty . It is significant that in the ideal image of a Roman statesman, which is outlined in the speech of Qu. Metellus at the funeral of his father Lucius Caecilius Metellus, military leader of the I Punic War, consul of 231 BC, along with other qualities, the desire to be among

le first warriors and the bravest commander, under whose leadership the greatest deeds would be accomplished.

The history of the classical Republic is rich in examples of such behavior, and in tradition they are assessed as exemplary rather than exceptional. Livy, talking about the war with the Samnites, puts into the mouth of Valery Corvus a speech in which those military leaders who are brave only in words, but not versed in military affairs, are contrasted with those who own different types of weapons, know how to break out before the banners and manage the thickest of battle9. Frontinus (Strat. IV. 5. 3) mentions a certain consular Postumius, who, in response to the soldiers asking what he demanded of them, declared that he demanded that they follow his example (ut se imitarentur), and, seizing the banner, was the first rushed at the enemy. It is noteworthy that the same Livy, in his comparison of the potential capabilities of the Roman generals and Alexander the Great, mentions Manlius Torquatus and Valerius Corva, who “acquired the glory of warriors before the glory of generals” (insignes ante milites quam duces) and would hardly have yielded to the fighting prowess of Alexander on the battlefield10 , which “added a lot to his glory” (VII. 17. 7; trans.

N.V. Braginskaya).

The era of the Punic Wars as a whole was, apparently, characterized by the adherence of Roman military leaders to a heroic model of leadership based on personal example and direct participation in the dangers of battle11. This model was followed by the consul Flaminius at the battle of Lake Trasimene (Liv. XXII. 6. 1-4) and Aemilius Paulus at Cannae (Polyb. III. 116. 1 sqq.; Liv. XXII. 49. 1 sqq.). This, of course, entailed a mortal risk. Thus, the consul Gaius Atilius Regulus, who personally led the attack of the Roman cavalry in the battle of Telamon with the Gauls (225 BC), fell in hand-to-hand combat, fighting, according to Polybius (II. 28. 10), “like a desperate fighter" (^apaßoXw? aywvi£ó|aevov èv xèLpûv vó|iw). Claudius Marcellus also dies, having attacked the enemy at the head of a cavalry detachment during a small skirmish (App. Hannib. 50; Polyb. X. 32. 9-10; Liv. XXVII. 27. 11; Plut. Marc. 29).

However, despite the mortal risk12, many Roman military leaders - and not only in critical situations, when a valiant death could wash away the shame of defeat or turn the tide of the battle - fought in the front ranks, dragging their subordinates with them, such as the praetor (186 or 185 BC) Cal-purnius Piso, who during one of

battles in Spain at the head of the cavalry “he was the first to crash into the enemy ranks and went so far into them that it was difficult to discern on which side he was fighting” (Liv. XXXIX. 31. 8-9; trans. E.G. Yunets). Cato the Elder more than once led in battle at the risk of his life when he fought in Spain (App. Hiber. 40).

In this era, a military leader could even more likely deserve the reproach for not participating directly in battles. According to Frontin (Strat. IV. 7. 4), Scipio the Younger (who in his youth became famous for his victory in single combat with an enemy leader13) even had to justify this, declaring that his mother gave birth to him as a commander, not a fighter (imperatorem me mater , non bellatorem peperit).

Perhaps, the Roman ideal of a military leader-fighter was embodied most fully in the figure of Gaius Marius, whom Pliny the Elder calls manipularis imperator14 Marius, as far as our sources allow us to judge, in his command style was fully consistent with the self-characterization given in the speech quoted by Sallust: “I myself am in on campaign and in battle I will be your adviser and comrade in danger, and under all circumstances I will be by your side”15 (translated by V.O. Gorenshtein). Declaring that he is well acquainted with all aspects of military service (namely: hostem ferire, praesidia agitare, nihil metuere nisi turpem famam, hiemem et aestatem iuxta pati, humi requiescere, eodem tempore inopiam et laborem tolerare), Marius calls command useful and worthy of a citizen (hoc est utile, hoc civile imperium) is when the military leader shares all the hardships and labors with his subordinates on equal terms (B. Iug. 85. 33-35). This style of military leadership is in direct contrast to that followed by some Roman nobles at that time, who relied not so much on practical military experience as on the theoretical instructions of the Greeks (Ibid. 85. 12-13; 32). We find corresponding examples of Marius’ actions in battle in Sallust (B. Iug. 98.1), and in Plutarch’s description of the battle of Aquae Sextiae (C. Mar. 20.6), and in the review of Diodorus Siculus (XXXIV. 35. 38). And this model of command was perceived as exemplary in subsequent eras (SHA. Pesc. Nig. 11. 3). In certain critical situations, other Roman generals of his time acted in the same way as Mari. For example, during the Battle of Orkhomenes, when the Roman army fled, Sulla, jumping from his horse and grabbing the banner, rushed towards the enemies (Plut. Sulla. 21.2; App. Mithr. 49). In a similar manner

Caesar also acted in critical situations (Caes. BG. II. 25. 2; VII. 87-88; B. Afr. 83. 1; Val. Max. III. 2. 19; App. BC. II. 104; 152; Vell. Pat. II. 53. 3-4; Flor. II. 13. 81-82).

Other evidence of personal courage demonstratively demonstrated by military leaders in battle can be cited. This quality was especially distinguished by Gnaeus Pompey, who participated in hand-to-hand battles and cavalry attacks, quite in the spirit of Alexander the Great,16 whom he, as is known, sought to imitate (see:), both at the beginning of his career and as a commander; Serto-rius, who from a young age became famous for his exceptional bravery in battle (Plut. Sert. 4.2; 19); Mark Antony, who, commanding the cavalry in the army of the consul Gabinius, gave, according to Plutarch (Plut. M. Ant. 3.5), “numerous proofs of both [his military] courage and the foresight of the military leader” (toHtsp? £ PYa ka! npovoi aÇ P ye^oviKH ç); Lucullus, who in one of the battles on foot with weapons rushed at the enemy at the head of two cohorts, thereby inspiring the rest of his warriors (Plut. Lucul. 28.3).

Both in general terms and in the presentation of individual military episodes, Roman authors often mention the inextricable combination in the mode of action of a particular military leader of purely military courage and the actual qualities of a commander. Taken together, such passages leave no doubt about the presence of a stable topos, used both in a purely rhetorical context and in historical narratives that claim authenticity. Thus, Cicero, speaking in defense of Valerius Flaccus, praises him as fortissimum militem and diligentissimum ducem - “the bravest warrior and the most judicious commander” (Flac.

3. 8). Catiline, according to Sallust (Cat. 60.4), in battle “was with the lightly armed in the front ranks, supported those who wavered... took care of everything, often fought himself, often hit the enemy; performed at the same time the duties of both a staunch soldier and a valiant commander” - strenui militis et boni imperatoris officia simul exsequebatur17 (translated by V. O. Gorenshtein with changes). Caesar's legate Cotta acts in the same way: “he not only addressed words of encouragement to the soldiers, but also took part in the battle himself and, thus, fulfilled the duties of both commander and soldier” (Caes. BG. V. 33. 2: imperatoris et in pugna militis officia praestabat. Translated by M.M. Pokrovsky). Even the young Octavian, who was not distinguished by either physical strength or courage, performed duties not only during the Mutin War

commander, but also a simple soldier: taking the eagle from the wounded standard-bearer, he carried it on his shoulders for a long time. Cicero praises the consuls Pansa and Hirtius for their actions in the same campaign, calling the first, who fought in the front ranks and twice wounded, a glorified emperor,19 and the second, who himself carried the eagle of the legion in battle, a hitherto unseen beautiful image of the emperor (Phil. XIV. 9.26;

10.27). Tacitus's description (Hist. GGG. 17.1) of the actions of Anthony Primus during one of the battles almost coincides with the testimony of Sallust about Catiline quoted above. Anthony, according to the historian, “did not miss a single duty of a firm commander and a brave soldier” (constantis ducis aut fortis militis officium): he restrained the hesitant, gave orders and personally entered the battle, piercing the fleeing standard-bearer with a spear and snatching the banner from him. Tacitus describes a similar episode in Hist. IV. 77: Petilius Cerial, in one of the battles with the rebellious Gauls, “with his own hand he stops the fleeing and rushes, without a shield, without armor, into a hail of darts” (translated by G.S. Knabe).

For the period of the early Empire, this is by no means the only evidence of the commander’s direct participation in battle. Suetonius reports about the participation of Drusus the Elder and Germanicus in hand-to-hand combat (Claud. 1. 4; Cal. 3. 1; cp.: Tac. Ann. II. 20. 3; 21. 2). Tacitus, comparing Vespasian with the generals of ancient times, writes (Hist. II. Z. 1) that if not for greed, then in all other qualities he would not be inferior to them in any way: he “usually himself went at the head of the army, knew how to choose a place for a camp, day and night he thought about victory over the enemy, and if necessary, he struck him down with a mighty hand (manu hostibus obniti), he ate what he had to, his clothes, his habits were almost no different from an ordinary soldier” (translated by G.S. Knabe ). The image, as you can see, is quite consistent with Gaius Marius. In personal courage and willingness to take risks on the battlefield, Titus was not inferior to his father, who often acted in the advanced formations (Ios. B. Iud. III. 7. 34; 10. 2-3;

10. W; V. 2. 2; 2. 4-Z; 6. W; 7. 3; Suet. Tit. 4. 3; Z. 2; Dio Cass. LXVI. Z. 1).

Sources do not report anything about such exploits of Trajan, but they unanimously note his personal courage and complicity in the labors and dangers of his soldiers (Plin. Pan. 10. 3; 13. 1;

19.3; Dio Cass. LXVIII. 14. 1). Septimius Severus, according to Dio Cassius, in a critical situation during the battle with Albinus

had to directly intervene in the battle. Other emperors of the 3rd century. n. e., apparently

often personally participated in hostilities, and not only “soldier emperors”, such as Maximin the Thracian (Herod. VII. 2. 67: SHA. Max. duo. 12. 3), Aurelian, who even earned the nickname Slayer - manu ad ferrem ( SHA. Aurel. 6. 1-2), the father and son of Decius, who died in the battle with the Goths (Aur. Vict. Caes. 29. 5; cf., however: Epit. de Caes. 29. 3), Probus, who , according to Zosimus (I. 67. 3), fought furiously in battles, going into battle in the front ranks. Participation in hand-to-hand combat is even attributed to the ideal “Senate” emperor Alexander Severus (most likely, contrary to reality, but in this case the very desire to add this feature to the image of the ideal, from the point of view of the author of the “Biographies of the Augustans”, ruler is indicative21). On the contrary, the soldier’s style of behavior of Caracalla (who even challenged enemy leaders to a duel) causes rejection among his prejudiced contemporary Dio Cassius, primarily because the emperor, who was carried away by this, poorly fulfilled the duties of a commander, that strat^uka (Dio Cass. LXXVII. 13. 1 -2).

Speaking about the time of the early Empire, one cannot fail to mention one important epigraphic evidence - a poetic dedication to Venus Erucina on behalf of Lucius Apronius Caesian, who, together with his father, proconsul of the province of Africa, successfully fought against the Numidians, who rebelled under the leadership of Tacfarinatus (Tac. Ann. III. 21). As is clear from the text of the inscription, Apronius (who calls himself a descendant of the commander and commander - duxque), dedicated as a gift to the goddess his own sword, which had become dull from blows to enemies, and other weapons, including a spear, with which the fleeing barbarian struck blows22. Emperor Tiberius awarded his father an honorary statue, also dedicated to the Temple of Venus, and his son with early election to the priestly college of the Septemvir-Epulones. Even allowing for poetic exaggeration, the contents of the inscription give reason to believe that Lucius himself (and possibly his father) actively participated in the battles.

For the period of the early Empire, we also have a number of narrative evidence of the participation and (or) death of high-ranking military leaders in battle. So, in the battle with the Sarmatians in 70 AD. e. The governor of Moesia, Fonteus Agrippa, died, “who fought bravely” (Ios. B. Iud. VII. 4. 3). Also, the governor of Moesia under Domitian, G. Oppius Sabinus, died in the war (Suet. Dom. 6. 1; Eutrop. VII. 23. 4; Jord. Get. XIII. 76; Oros. VII. 10. 3). During the reign of Commodus

in Britain, an unknown military leader died along with his army (Dio Cass. LXXII. 8. 2). Around 170 AD e. the Senate, on the initiative of Marcus Aurelius, decreed the installation of an honorary statue in the Forum of Trajan to the governor of Dacia, M. Claudius Fronto, who “died fighting bravely until his last breath

for the state against the Germans and Iazigs." During the Marcomannic War, M. Valerius Maximian, commanding one of the auxiliary units, defeated with his own hand the leader of the Narist tribe, Valaon, for which he received an award from Emperor Marcus Aurelius24 (he later held a number of high military and civil positions, including becoming a con-

The commander’s conscious readiness to expose himself to mortal danger in battle is evidenced by such a symbolic gesture as the military leader’s demonstrative refusal of his horse before the start of the battle. By placing himself in the same position as the mass of foot soldiers, the commander thus emphasized the unacceptability of any other outcome of the battle other than victory. This is what Caesar did more than once (Caes. BG.

I. 25. 1; B.Afr. 83.1); Agri-

stake at the battle of Mons Graupius (Tac. Agr. 35) and

other military leaders.

In the 4th century. n. e. the heroic model of military leadership was most fully embodied in the Emperor Julian, who quite consciously followed the ideal of a commander that he himself outlined in the 2nd Panegyric of Constantius (Or. 2. 87 B-88 B; cf. Or. 1. 39 B). According to him, a commander must teach his army not to be afraid of work and dangers, to act not only by exhortation, encouragement or severe punishment, but by personal example, showing that he himself is what he wants his soldiers to be. “For a soldier in a difficult battle, truly the most pleasant sight is a prudent emperor who diligently participates in the work ... who is cheerful and fearless in seemingly formidable circumstances, and where the soldiers are too brave, strict and unyielding. For subordinates usually imitate their

commanding in prudence and courage." Julian himself actually combined, in the words of Ammianus Marcellinus, both the emperor

commander, and advanced fighter, and comrade-in-arms

their soldiers.

A similar model of behavior in battle was followed by other emperors contemporary to Julian, in particular Constantius (Amm. Marc. XXI. 16. 7; cf.: Iulian. Or. 2. 53 A-C) and Gratian (Amm. Marc. XXXI. 10. 13), and even earlier - Constantine (Pan.

Lat. IX. 9. 2-6, op. higher). The corresponding paradigm is formulated in Pacatus's eulogy to Theodosius:

Striving for honor, you did not miss the opportunity to be the first or among the first to take on all the numerous military duties: to become the head of the formation, to carry out guard duty, to erect a rampart, to take a combat position, to conduct reconnaissance, to strengthen the camp, to go first into battle, come out of the battle last, as a commander (to act) with understanding, and as a warrior - by example...

(Pan. Lat. XII. 10. 3; trans. I.Yu. Shabaghi)

And this tradition of heroic leadership continued into the 6th century. But if direct Greek, “bookish” influence can really be seen in the style of military leadership that Julian followed30 and which is clearly represented in the work of Ammianus, then this, in our opinion, does not yet give reason to conclude, as J. Landon does, that Such “antique leadership” permeated the culture of the entire fourth-century Roman officer corps, which supposedly shared the Hellenistic concept of military command in the style of Alexander and Homeric heroes who acted simultaneously as tacticians, experts in military stratagems and frontline fighters.

The Roman tradition, which was preserved in the imperial army for centuries, although manifested with varying degrees of intensity, also provided corresponding examples in abundance. It was followed by military leaders who were well acquainted with Greek culture, like, say, Titus, and by those whose horizons, in fact, were limited only to army life, like Maximinus the Thracian. One cannot, of course, deny the influence of those exempla that Roman military leaders could glean from historical and rhetorical writings. According to the fair remark of A. Goldsworthy, “the connection between the literary ideal and practical reality is closer than it might seem at first glance. The image of the proper behavior of a commander shaped the actual behavior of a Roman aristocrat who served in the army or commanded it.” It should only be added that the literary and rhetorical topos express the ideology of military leadership, which is inherently associated with the competitive nature of the republican political system and the Roman military organization itself as a whole (cp.:).

This ideology has always cultivated the personal courage of the military leader, which found its most visible manifestation in duels with enemy leaders, which were a widespread tradition during the times of the classical Republic (see:). The Romans' passion for them, as well as their readiness for self-sacrifice, was noted by Polybius (VI. 54. 4). It's fair to say

O.V. Sidorovich, “a highly developed agonistic spirit” that manifested itself in duels, related “Roman aristocrats not to the politicians and military leaders of classical Greece, but to Homeric heroes.” S. Oakley, who gives a complete summary of sources for this period (he considers, however, only such fights that were preceded by a formal challenge to the enemy), comes to the conclusion that this kind of martial arts, rooted in ancient times, was widespread in the era of classical and the late Republic is much broader than is generally believed. In addition, the abundance of corresponding examples in Rome clearly contrasts with their paucity in Greece, which can be explained by the greater flexibility of the manipular system compared to the Greek phalanx31. With the establishment of the principate, the initiative of individual aristocrats in the military field was limited, which became one of the factors in the disappearance of the custom of martial arts.

Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that duels (albeit without a formal challenge), in which Roman military leaders, and not just young aristocrats or (from the time of the late Republic) ordinary fighters and centurions, participated, continued to be practiced, albeit sporadically, in the era Principate. The most famous of these episodes is the single combat between M. Licinius Crassus, the grandson of the triumvir, and the Bastarni leader Deldon, which took place in 29 BC. e. during the Roman invasion of Moesia in response to the devastation of Thrace by the Bastarnae (Dio Cass. LI. 24.4). Crassus, having defeated the enemy and removed his armor, thus repeated the outstanding feat that had previously been performed in Rome.

Only three people performed their work in history, and had the right to dedicate the “fat armor” (spolia opima) to the temple of Jupiter Feretrius, but due to the

I didn’t do this for any reason.

This act, which promised great glory, was sought to be repeated by Drusus the Elder, who, according to Suetonius (Claud. 1.4), “more than once in victories over the enemy obtained the most noble booty (opima quoque spolia), with great danger chasing the German leaders through the thick

Rice. Coin depicting an arch with an equestrian statue of Drusus on the reverse (The Roman Imperial Coinage / Ed. E.H.V. Sutherland. Vol. I2. L., 1984, no. 69-70).

battle" (translated by M.L. Gasparov). In connection with this evidence, it is worth noting that the arch posthumously erected in honor of Drusus (Dio Cass. LV. 2.3; Suet. Claud. 1.3), judging by its images on coins minted in 41-42. n. e. under the emperor Claudius, it was decorated with a statue representing Drusus as a horseman in battle - the only example of such an image on Roman triumphal arches (see picture).

Therefore, as J. Rich believes, there are quite good reasons to consider Drusus’s personal participation in battles as a very real fact; and although he failed to become the fourth Roman to dedicate spolia to Jupiter, such an ambitious desire of his may have been encouraged by Augustus, who hoped, if successfully implemented, to strengthen the prestige of the ruling house. It is likely that Drusus’ son Germanicus also sought to become famous for a similar feat. It is difficult to say how true Suetonius' statement is that Germanicus repeatedly defeated the enemy hand-to-hand (Cal. 3.2), but this information does not seem completely implausible when compared with the testimony of Tacitus. According to the latter (Ann.

II. 20.3; 21. 2), in one of the battles with the Germans, Germanicus “was the first at the head of the praetorian cohorts to burst into the forest and hand-to-hand combat ensued there” (translated by A.S. Bobovich); During this battle, he even took off his helmet from his head so that he could be more easily recognized among the Romans. Noteworthy is the message about the helmet being removed from the head - a characteristic detail, parallels of which are found both in the story of Pompey Magna (Plut. Pomp. 12.3), and in those depictions

nal monuments discussed in the first part of this work.

Apparently, for the ruling regime, which cared about the “symbolic capital” of potential successors to power and appealed in its propaganda to traditional Roman values, including such as reputation and glory (fama and gloria), acquired by personal valor in the military field, it was very important emphasize the courage of the imperial “princes”, although it would seem to be in complete contrast with Augustus’s convinced prudence in military affairs (cf.:). This prudence of the first princeps is clearly evidenced by his well-known sayings, which he often repeated in support of his opinion that the last thing for an exemplary commander to be hasty and rash: “A cautious commander is better than a reckless one” (Greek quote from Euripides: Phoen. 599); “It is better to do something successful than to start quickly,” etc. He compared those who strive for small benefits at the cost of great dangers to a fisherman who catches fish with a golden hook (Suet. Aug. 25. 4; cf.: Polyaen. VIII. 24. 4-6). In this context, it is probably appropriate to remember that before the Battle of Actium, Octavian twice refused Antony’s proposal to resolve their dispute by combat (Plut. Ant. 62.3; 75.1). Plutarch, who reports this, does not at all interpret such a challenge as something supernatural, but nothing is known about such a method of resolving conflicts during civil wars (except for the challenge of Sertorius to single combat rejected by Metellus Pius

(Plut. Sert. 13. 3-4), although at that time quite classic “duels” between fighters of opposing sides were still practiced (

B. Hisp. 25. 3-5).

In connection with the tradition of martial arts in the military history of Rome, one cannot help but mention that among the Roman aristocracy (including many emperors), skillful mastery of purely military skills, especially the handling of weapons, has always been prestigious - from ancient times to the late Empire (details). cm.: ). These skills, extolled in panegyric works, biographical and historical stories, were manifested not only on the Campus Martius or the camp parade ground where Roman aristocrats practiced, but also sometimes on the battlefield, in actual duels or hand-to-hand combat with the enemy. Nevertheless, very often references to the military skills of high-ranking commanders, who were not inferior in this regard to ordinary soldiers, are not so much a statement of facts as a tribute to rhetorical topics designed to emphasize the corresponding habitus of a ruler or military leader. The wide distribution of this topos can be evidenced by the words of Vegetius (III. 26), who, addressing the emperor, the addressee of his work, extols with excessive flattery not only his knowledge of tactics, but also his skill in throwing arrows, horse riding, speed of running (others sources see: ; about habitus cf.: ).

It should also be said that the Roman ideology of military leadership glorified the scars of wounds received in battles for the fatherland. The display of such scars as signs of valor displayed on the battlefield was, of course, a common rhetorical gesture in Roman political and judicial practice (see: his scars, he listed the campaigns [he completed]." As for the Dominant period, the anonymous panegyrist Constantius mentions imperatoris ipsius vulnus, “the wound of the emperor himself,” as clear evidence of his military prowess (Pan. Lat. VII. 6. 3; see: with commentary).

Thus, the prestige and image of a military leader distinguished by his personal prowess on the battlefield was undoubtedly crucial to the representation and legitimation of the power of the Roman aristocracy during the Republic and, during the Empire, imperial power. For most emperors, as well as for statesmen of the Roman Republic, individual military “charisma,” promoted by various means, remained a powerful resource for strengthening positions of power (cf.:, especially p. 181)35.

The “Achilles complex” in its Alexander version was by no means alien to the Romans36. Whether it can be said with any certainty that the Roman ideology of military leadership in this regard was influenced by Greek models is another question. Such influence, through historiographical, poetic and rhetorical topoi, as well as iconographic patterns, is undoubtedly present in the evidence reviewed, in which the behavior of Roman military leaders is described in the same or very similar terms as the behavior of Hellenistic military leaders. However, if we talk about pragmatic aspects, then in no case should we underestimate the original Roman traditions of military leadership, on which the corresponding ideas and discourses were by no means based.

Returning to the pictorial monuments with which we began our research, it should be said that in them, as in poetic and some rhetorical texts, there is certainly a high degree of idealization of the image of the commander on the battlefield: the idealized military leader appears as a heroic figure, not so much a strategist and tactician who directs the course of the battle, as well as an advanced fighter, carrying the army along with him and inspiring him with the example of his own selfless courage37. Various variations of

whose images are often found in historiographical narratives. It would, however, be a mistake to see in the corresponding evidence of ancient historians only a tribute to literary topoi. The military traditions of Ancient Rome reveal the real historical origins and examples of this model of heroic leadership, which Roman military leaders and some emperors continued to follow in the era of the Empire.

The work was carried out with the financial support of a grant from the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation within the framework of the federal target program “Scientific and scientific-pedagogical personnel of innovative Russia” (action 1.2.1; Agreement No. 14.B3 7.21.0962).

Notes

1. See, for example, the analysis of the depiction of military leadership in the Roman epic:.

2. Historians telling about this campaign do not mention such exploits of members of the imperial family (cf.: Veil. Pat. II. 95. 1-2; Dio Cass. LIV. 22).

3. For this passage, see:. For the rhetorical technique used by panegyrists, see:. Similar motives are heard in other speeches; see, for example: Pan. Lat. II (X). 5. 3; IX (XII). 24.3; X (IV). 26. 1-5; XII (II). 10. 3.

4. Wed: . For more details on Alexander’s “Homeric” style of military leadership, see:.

5. Plutarch, by the way, also builds the image of the Epirus king, consciously focusing on the Homeric topic. On the features of Plutarch's narrative about the heroic deeds of Pyrrhus, see: ; cf: .

6. On Roman meritocracy, see:.

7. As M. Mac Donnell rightly emphasizes, “In Rome... physical prowess or courage, especially displayed in war, remained the central element of manliness throughout the Republican period and into the Empire. This both corresponds to the highly militaristic nature of Roman Republican society.” . The author develops and argues this point of view in detail in his monograph.

8. Plin. N.H. VII. 140: voluisse enim primarium bellatorem esse, optimum oratorem, fortissimum imperato-rem, auspicio suo maximas res geri. (=).

9. Liv. VII. 32. 11: .verbis tantam ferox, operum militarium expers; an qui et ipse tela tractare, procedere ante signa, versari media in mole pugnae sciat.

10. In this comparison, as in the portrait of Papirius Cursor drawn in the same excursion, Livy follows Sallust’s ideal of a military commander-fighter, outstanding in both physical and mental qualities - corpus and ingenium (Liv. IX. I6. I2; 9. I7 . I3; cp.: Sall. Cat. 1. 7; 60. 4). Cp.: .

11. However, already during this period a more cautious style of command became widespread,

when military leaders were close to the advanced formations, they moved along the line, encouraging the soldiers and directing reserves. For more information about this command option, see: ), but what about “emperor-fighter”? An analysis of the content that was put into this expression is given by R. Combe, without, however, dwelling in detail on the role of the commander’s personal participation in battle.

15. Sall. B. Iug. 85. 47: Egomet in agmine [a]ut in proelio consultor idem et socius periculi vobiscum adero, meque vosque in omnibus rebus iuxta geram.

16. Compare, for example: “At the head of the army was the king’s brother named Kosid; As soon as it came to hand-to-hand combat, he attacked Pompey, threw a dart at him and hit the flap of the shell. Pompey, piercing him with a spear, killed him on the spot” (Plut. Pomp. 35. 2-3; trans. G. A. Stratanovsky). Compare: Plut. Pomp. 7. 1-2; 12.3; 19.2.

17. The stability of such a formula can be evidenced by the words of Vegetius, concluding the third book of his “Epitomes”: “... by the valor of the soul and the mood of the mind, you show before the state a high example of the duty of both the emperor and the warrior” -et imperatoris officium exhiberes et militis (III. 26; trans. S.P. Kondratiev).

18. non modo ducis, sed etiam militis functum munere (Suet. Aug. 10. 4). Octavian was also wounded (Flor. II. 4. 5). During the Illyrian campaign, Octavian also took personal part in the battle and was wounded twice, once during the assault on the walls of Metoulus, when he himself rushed forward with a few companions and bodyguards, putting the army to shame and following him (App. Illyr. 20; 27; Flor. II. 12. 7; Suet. Aug. 20. 1; Plin. NH. VII. 148).

19. According to Appian (BC. III. 71), Hirtius died breaking into the enemy’s camp and fighting near the commander’s tent.

20. “When he saw that all his people had fled, he tore his cloak and, drawing his sword, burst into the ranks of the fleeing, hoping that

for they, ashamed, will turn back, or he himself will perish with them” (Dio Cass. LXXVI. 6. 7). However, according to Herodian (III. 7. 3), Severus simply fled with the others and, falling from his horse, threw off his purple cloak, which identified him as the emperor. According to another version (SHA.

S. Sev. 11.2), he fell from his horse and was wounded by a lead bullet from a sling.

21. SHA. Alex. Sev. 55. 1: “Alexander himself went around the flanks, encouraged the soldiers, was within reach of the spears, acted a lot with his own hand (manu plurimum faceret) ...” (translated by S.P. Kondratiev). On the contrary, in the biography of Maximinus the Thracian, who is clearly the antipode of Alexander, the former is credited with the opinion that the emperor should always act with his own hand, which the author regards as “barbaric recklessness” - barbarica temeritas (SHA. Max. duo. 12. 3 ). Thus, the same model of behavior could be interpreted in completely different ways depending on the nature of the character being described.

22. CIL X. 7257 (= ILS 939 = Anthologia Latina. Vol. II. Carmina Latina epigraphica / Conlegit Fr. Buecheler. Fasc. 2. Lipsiae, 1982, 1525):

us VII vir m

Vene]ri Erucinae d.

sule bella ius hostis felicem gladium

Aproni effigiem duxque hic idem fuit; hic ictor<...>

armaque quae gessit: scuto quanta patet virtus ens caedibus attritus, consummatque qua cecidit [f]os[s]u[s] barbar quo nihil est utrique magis vener hoc tibi sacrarunt filius atque pater].

About this inscription, see:.

23. CIL VI. 1377 = ILS. 1098:<..>huic senatus auctore imperatore M. Aurelio Antonino... / quod post aliquot secunda / proelia adversus Germanos et / Iazyges ad postremum pro r(e) p(ublica) fortiter / pugnans ceci-derit armatam statuam / in foro divi Traiani pecunia publica cenuit (“... the Senate, at the proposal of the Emperor M. Aurelius Antoninus, decided to erect a statue of the divine Trajan in military garb to him in the Forum of the Divine Trajan, since after several successful battles with the Germans and Iazyges he fell [in battle], bravely fighting for the state until his last breath" ).

See also: . For Fronton's career see: CIL III. 1457 = ILS 1097.

24. Année Epigraphique 1956, 124: ... praef(ecto) al(ae) I Aravacor(um) in procinc/tu Germanico ab Imp(eratore) Antonino Aug(usto) coram laudato et equo et phaleris / et armis donato quod manu sua ducem Nar-istarum Valaonem/intermisset.

2Z. For his career see: CIL III. 1122; CIL VIII. 2621; 2698 = 18247; 2749; 4234; 4600; CIL III. 13439 = ILS. 9122.

26. Spartacus even killed his horse before the battle (Plut. Crass. 11. b). Cm.: .

27. See: , and also: and in general about the relationship between Julian and the army: .

28. See: Amm. Marc. XXIII. Z. 19: imperator et an-tesignanus et conturmalis; cp. XXIV. 6. 1З: ignoratus ubique dux esset an miles magis; Wed also: XV. 8.13; XVI. 4.2; XVII. 12; XXIV. 1. 13; 4.18; XXIII. Z. 19;

Z. 11; 6.11; XXV. 3. Z-7; 4.10; 4.12.

29. See: (with links to sources, primarily to the works of Procopius of Caesarea). In Procopius, by the way, in the depiction of generals on the battlefield, a clear orientation towards the Homeric paradigm and the opposition of the “Achilles ethos” to the “ethos of Odysseus” is revealed. For details see:.

30. Indeed, even after he came to power, Julian paid great attention to studying military-theoretical and historical literature (Liban. Or. XVIII. 3S-39; 33; 72; 233; cp.: XII. 48; XV. 28) and even became the author of a special work on mechanics (loan. Lyd. Magistr. G. 49), as well as a historical work about his campaigns (Liban. Epist. 33; Eunap. P. 217).

31. This factor is also pointed out, albeit in passing, by R. Combe, noting in this regard that in Rome, unlike Greece, the development of manipulative and then cohort tactics determined the greater importance of individual actions of soldiers and the bold initiative of the commander.

32. Legendary Romulus (Liv. I. 10. 4-7; Propert. IV. 10. W-b; Plut. Rom. 1b), Aulus Cornelius Cossus in 437 BC. e. (see:, with links to other sources) and Claudius Marcellus in 222 BC. e., who defeated the Gallic leader Britomatus in a duel (Verg. Aen. VI. 8З6-860; Plut. Marcell. 7-8; Flor. I. 20. З).

33. For this discussion, see: [Zb-37]. J. Rich argues convincingly that this right was never disputed, but Crassus himself chose not to insist on its implementation, either voluntarily or as a result of informal pressure.

34. ... ex hoste super victorias opima quoque spolia captasse summoque saepius discrimine duces Germano-rum tota acie insectatus.

35. On the use of Weber’s concept of “charismatic dominance” in the study of Republican Rome, see:.

36. It is noteworthy that two heroes of Roman military history received the nickname Achilles for their courage, including in fights. This is, firstly, the semi-legendary L. Siccius Dentatus, a plebeian tribune of 454 BC. e. (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. X. 37. 3; Val. Max. III. 2. 24; Plin. NH. VII. 101, Gell. NA. II. 11. 3; Fest. 208 L.) and Quintus Occius, legate in Spain in 143 BC. e. (Val. Max. III. 2. 21; Liv. Ep. Oxy. 3-34).

37. Compare, for example, Pan. Lat. XII (IX). 21. 4: ... quelemcumque militem fortissimum facias tuo, impera-

tor, exemplo. Wed. also: SHA. Hadr. 10. 4 (exemplo... virtutis suae).

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ROMAN GENERAL IN BATTLE:

IMAGES, DISCOURSES AND PRAGMATICS OF MILITARY LEADERSHIP (II)

The article examines literary and epigraphical sources concerning personal fighting of Roman generals in front ranks and points out the correlation between pragmatic and ideological aspects of military leadership. It is noticed that the so-called “Achilles' complex” was by no means alien to the Romans, but, while speaking of its pragmatics, corresponding images and examples, although influenced by the Greek historiographical, poetic and rhetorical topoi, as well as iconographical patterns, should be considered as a specific discourse, which was based on originally Roman traditions and expressed the specifically Roman ideology and practice of military leadership. These traditions, which put great store on personal military valor and military “charisma,” remained a powerful resource for legitimizing the authority of Roman republican politicians, as well as most of the emperors, who used corresponding images and models in their propaganda.

Keywords: Ancient Rome, ancient military history, Roman generals, ideology and practice of military leadership, ancient narrative, images, discourse.

Ramses II (XIII century BC)

Its most famous episode was the Battle of Kadesh, which involved several thousand chariots on both sides.

Cyrus the Great (530 BC)

Miltiades (550 BC – 489 BC)

Miltiades seized the moment when most of the Persian cavalry was already on the ships, and attacked the Persian infantry.

Themistocles (524 BC – 459 BC)

Themistocles' merits were soon forgotten. Political opponents expelled him from Athens, and then sentenced him to death in absentia, accusing him of treason.

Epaminondas (418 BC – 362 BC)

Phocion (398 BC – 318 BC)

Thanks to the respect that Phocion enjoyed among the Macedonians, including Alexander the Great, he managed to achieve easy peace terms for the Athenians.

Philip of Macedon (382 BC – 336 BC)

Philip's main military innovation was the famous Macedonian phalanx, which his great son later used so skillfully.

Alexander the Great (356 BC – 323 BC)

According to legend, when his teacher, the great Aristotle, told the young man that other inhabited worlds could exist, Alexander exclaimed bitterly: “But I don’t even own one yet!”

Pyrrhus (318 BC – 272 BC)

Having defeated the Romans during the two-day battle of Ausculum and realizing that the losses were too great, Pyrrhus exclaimed: “Another such victory, and I will be left without an army!”

This is where the expression “Pyrrhic victory” comes from, meaning success that came at too great a cost.

Fabius Maximus (203 BC)

In 1812, Kutuzov used the tactics of Fabius Maximus in the war with Napoleon. George Washington acted similarly during the American War of Independence.

Hannibal (247 BC – 183 BC)

Scipio Africanus (235 BC – 181 BC)

Already in Africa, on the territory of Carthage, Scipio used military stratagem in one of the battles.

In the decisive battle of Zama, Scipio met Hannibal on the battlefield and won. The war is over.

Scipio was distinguished by his humane attitude towards the vanquished, and his generosity became a favorite theme for future artists.

Marius (158 BC – 86 BC)

The fame and influence of Marius were so great that Roman politicians, fearing his excessive rise, gradually pushed the commander out of business.

Sulla (138 BC – 78 BC)

The Roman commander Lucius Cornelius Sulla received the nickname Felix (happy). Indeed, luck accompanied this man all his life, both in military and political affairs.

Crassus (115 BC – 51 BC)

After the death of Sulla, Crassus was appointed commander in the war against the rebel slaves of Spartacus.

Acting very energetically, unlike his predecessors, Crassus forced Spartacus to take a decisive battle and defeated him.

He treated the vanquished extremely cruelly: several thousand captive slaves were crucified along the Appian Way, and their bodies remained hanging there for many years.

Spartacus (110 BC – 71 BC)

The Romans initially treated the runaway slaves with contempt, believing that their legions would easily defeat the rebels, and they paid dearly for their arrogance.

The relatively small forces sent against Spartak were one by one defeated, and his army, meanwhile, was strengthened: slaves from all over Italy flocked to it.

Pompey (106 BC – 48 BC)

Gnaeus Pompey is known primarily as an opponent of Julius Caesar. But he received his nickname Magnus (Great) for completely different battles.

During the civil war he was one of Sulla's best generals. Then Pompey successfully fought in Spain, the Middle East, and the Caucasus and significantly expanded Roman possessions.

Another important task of Pompey was clearing the Mediterranean Sea from pirates, who had become so insolent that Rome experienced serious difficulties in transporting food by sea.

Julius Caesar (100 BC – 44 BC)

Arminius (16 BC – 21 AD)

The ancient Roman Empire was a constantly warring country, where the cult of the male warrior flourished for many centuries. It is not surprising, therefore, that this land gave birth to many outstanding commanders. And these seven strategists rightfully bear the title of great commanders.

1. Flavius Aetius (390s - 454)

Source: artprintimages.com

An outstanding commander, one of the last defenders of the Western Roman Empire. He led the army of the empire in 429, 19 years after the capital of the world, Rome, was sacked by the Visigoths of Alaric for the first time in 8 centuries. For the next 25 years, Aetius successfully repelled barbarian raids on the empire's possessions with small forces, being not so much a military leader as the de facto leader of the empire under the weak emperor Valentinian.

In 451, at the head of the Roman army in the battle on the Catalaunian fields, which had worldwide significance, he defeated the 300,000-strong army of the powerful leader of the Huns, Attila, who sought to conquer the entire West. As a result of this battle, Attila did not venture into the Western Roman Empire for several years. Contemporaries called Aetius "the last true Roman."

2. Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa (63-12 BC)

Source: 3.bp.blogspot.com

Famous Roman statesman and commander, friend and son-in-law of Emperor Octavian Augustus. Agrippa played a significant role in the military successes of Octavian Augustus, who did not possess any significant military talents. In 36 BC. e. he defeated Sextus Pompey in a naval battle, and in 31 BC. e. The victory over the Egyptian army of Antony and Cleopatra at the Battle of Cape Actium established the autocracy of Emperor Octavian.

3. Lucius Aemilius Paulus of Macedon (c. 229 - 160 BC)

Source: wikimedia.org

Roman statesman and commander. Consul of Rome in 182 and 168. BC e. He belonged to the ancient Roman patrician family of the Aemilii. In 181 BC. e. conquered the Ligurian tribes in the north of the Apennine Peninsula. In 168 BC, having defeated the Macedonian king Perseus at the Battle of Pydna, he conquered Macedonia. After this battle he received his famous nickname - Macedonian.

4. Constantine I the Great (272 - 337)

Source: wikimedia.org

This Roman emperor is known, first of all, for the fact that he was the first of the rulers of the Roman Empire not only to legalize Christianity, which had been prohibited until that time and was persecuted in every possible way, but also made it the dominant religion. In 330, he moved the capital of the empire from Rome to Byzantium, as a result of which the latter was renamed Constantinople (now Istanbul). To strengthen his power, he waged wars with his co-rulers. After defeating co-ruler Maxentius in 312 at the Malvian Bridge and over another co-ruler Licinius in 323, he became sole emperor.

5. Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus (the Great) (106 - 48 BC)

Source: images.wikia.com

Famous Roman commander. Participated in the suppression of the Spartacus uprising. From 66 BC e. commanded the Roman troops in the war against the ruler of the Greco-Persian kingdom of Pontus, Mithridates VI, which ended in victory for the Romans. After the Roman Senate refused to assert his authority in the east and grant his soldiers land in 60 BC. e. entered into an agreement with Crassus and General Shai Julius Caesar (1st triumvirate). After the collapse of the triumvirate (53 BC) he fought against Caesar.

6. Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus (236 - 186 BC)

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