Does North Korea have nuclear weapons? Countries with nuclear weapons. North Korea's nuclear potential: how big is the threat to international security? Good afternoon Though

Since the opening of the first nuclear reactor on the territory of the DPRK in 1965, the world has been arguing about how dangerous Korea's policy is. Pyongyang regularly makes statements that the republic is developing and testing weapons of mass destruction that will be used in the event of a threat to the system. However, experts disagree on how great North Korea's power really is. Questions also arise over whether the country is receiving outside help - and if so, who is the ally in creating weapons that could cause untold casualties.

Military potential of the DPRK

North Korea is one of the twenty poorest countries on the globe. There are many reasons for this, and one of them is the Juche political system, aimed at militarizing the country.

The needs of the army come first economically, and this is bearing fruit: North Korea’s army is the largest in the world.

But the number of soldiers is not a guarantee of success. Insufficient funding leads to the army using outdated equipment and weapons.

At the same time, the North Korean government has maintained since 1974 that the country is continuously working on the creation of nuclear weapons. Since 2004, Pyongyang has been conducting tests, and this has become an additional reason for dissatisfaction among countries trying to resolve the conflict. North Korea claims that the weapons are being created solely for defensive purposes, but it is difficult to confirm the veracity of the claims.

At a military parade in 2015 in Pyongyang, a thermonuclear weapon, the hydrogen bomb, was demonstrated. The government claimed that it existed for ten years, but the world community was skeptical about the information. In January 2017, a powerful earthquake was recorded in China near the border with the DPRK. Pyongyang authorities explained this as a test of a hydrogen bomb, and then its presence was confirmed by foreign intelligence data.

Sources of financing

The question of where North Korea got its nuclear weapons is closely related to the economic state of the country. Testing requires money, with the help of which it would be possible to solve most of the humanitarian and energy problems of the peninsula. This raises thoughts about outside financial help. China is considered North Korea's official partner, but during Kim Jong-un's reign, relations between the countries have deteriorated. The PRC does not approve of nuclear experiments conducted by Pyongyang.

It is assumed that a new alliance – the DPRK and Russia – will enter the world political arena, but there are no solid grounds for this. Kim Jong-un shows respect to President Putin, but there are no more reciprocal “courtesy” from Moscow. This means that financing comes from internal sources.

Experts suggest that money for the development of nuclear weapons comes from the following industries:

• social;
• agricultural;
• energy;
• heavy industrial.

There are reports in the media that North Korea is facing an energy crisis. Electricity in residential buildings is turned on only for 3-4 hours a day; the rest of the time people are forced to do without electricity. Night images of the DPRK from space confirm this information. Next to the electrified territory of China and South Korea, the North looks like a solid dark spot. The beginning of this phenomenon coincided with the start of the nuclear program.

Claims that North Koreans are starving are unfounded. In the last decade, there has been economic growth in the country, which has also affected the food situation. The government has canceled the cards that previously used to issue food rations. So the information that missiles are being created at the expense of hungry Koreans is not confirmed.

North Korea's nuclear potential

The times when threats about the presence of weapons of mass destruction were considered a bluff are behind us. The presence of powerful weapons in the DPRK is a confirmed fact. Moreover, analysts claim that Korea has enough materials to create 6 to 12 new missiles.

However, their production is associated with a number of difficulties:

• the materials required to assemble nuclear warheads are not produced in North Korea and must be imported into the country;
• even with the creation of new charges, the problem remains with the construction of carriers for them;
• waste generated during the production of nuclear fuel is not exported from the country, and the conditions for its safe storage can only be met in small volumes.

However, all these difficulties do not deter the DPRK from continuing its experiments. To date, at least six explosions have been confirmed in different parts of the country, mainly on the border with Russia, China and South Korea. Pyongyang claims there are more. The government's official line is defensive. Under threat from the United States, the DPRK can only afford one position: balancing power. To Washington's latest aggressive statement, Kim Jong-un responded that the DPRK would strike if necessary.

Kim Jong-un, unlike his relatives and predecessors, is not blackmailing the world with nuclear developments, but is creating a real nuclear missile arsenal.

Explosion for the holiday

On September 9, 2017, North Korea celebrated the 69th anniversary of the founding of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with another nuclear weapons test.

First, several countries immediately recorded increased seismic activity in North Korea, which could mean a nuclear explosion.

Then the fact of nuclear testing was officially confirmed by Pyongyang. “The DPRK will continue to take measures to strengthen the national nuclear forces in quantitative and qualitative terms to ensure the country's dignity and right to exist in the face of the growing nuclear threat from the United States,” the official North Korean news agency KCNA said in a statement.

South Korea, the United States and Japan have initiated an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council, at which the issue of tightening sanctions against Pyongyang is expected to be raised.

The problem, however, is that sanctions on North Korea have virtually no effect. Moreover, there has been significant progress in North Korea's nuclear missile program.

How it all began

Even during the Korean War, the US command considered the possibility of launching nuclear strikes on the North. Although these plans were not realized, the North Korean leadership was interested in gaining access to technologies that would allow the creation of weapons of this type.

The USSR and China, acting as allies of the DPRK, were cool about these plans.

Nevertheless, in 1965, with the help of Soviet and Chinese specialists, a nuclear research center was founded in Yongbyon, where the Soviet nuclear reactor IRT-2000 was installed. Initially, it was assumed that the reactor would be used for work exclusively on peaceful programs.

In the 1970s, Pyongyang, with the support of China, began the first work on creating nuclear weapons.

In 1985, the Soviet Union obtained the DPRK to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In exchange for this, the USSR supplied a 5 MW gas-graphite research reactor to Korea. An agreement was also signed on the construction of a nuclear power plant in North Korea with four light water reactors of the VVER-440 type.

President Clinton's Failed War

The collapse of the Soviet Union changed the situation in the world. The West and South Korea expected the imminent fall of the North Korean regime, while at the same time conducting peace negotiations with it in hopes of liberalizing the political system and its dismantling according to the version of Eastern Europe.

The United States, in exchange for abandoning its nuclear program, promised Pyongyang economic and technical assistance in the development of peaceful atoms. North Korea responded by agreeing to allow IAEA inspectors into its nuclear facilities.

Relations began to deteriorate sharply after IAEA inspectors suspected that a certain amount of plutonium was being hidden. Based on this, the IAEA requested a special inspection of two spent nuclear fuel storage facilities that had not been declared, but was refused, motivated by the fact that the facilities were in no way connected with the nuclear program and were of a military nature.

As a result, in March 1993, the DPRK announced its withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Negotiations with the United States made it possible to slow down this process, but on June 13, 1994, North Korea not only abandoned the agreement, but also withdrew from the IAEA.

During this period, as Newsweek magazine stated in 2006, the administration of US President Bill Clinton ordered the study of a military operation against North Korea. The military report stated that the operation would require expenditures of $100 billion, and the forces of South Korea and the United States would lose about a million people, with the losses of the US Army amounting to at least 100,000 people killed.

As a result, the United States returned to negotiation tactics.

Threats and promises

At the end of 1994, with the assistance of former US President Jimmy Carter, a “framework agreement” was reached, according to which North Korea pledged to abandon its nuclear weapons program in exchange for supplies of fuel oil and the creation of two new light water nuclear reactors, which cannot be used for work on nuclear weapons.

Stability was established for several years. Both sides, however, fulfilled their obligations only partially, but internal difficulties in the DPRK and the distraction of the United States to other problems ensured a stable situation.

A new escalation began in 2002, when President George W. Bush came to power in the United States.

In January 2002, in his speech, Bush included the DPRK in the so-called “axis of evil.” Coupled with the intention to create a global missile defense system, this caused serious concern in Pyongyang. The North Korean leadership did not want to share the fate of Iraq.

In 2003, negotiations began on the DPRK's nuclear program with the participation of the PRC, the USA, Russia, South Korea and Japan.

No real progress was achieved on them. The aggressive policy of the United States gave rise to the confidence in the DPRK that it could only ensure its own security if it had its own atomic bomb.

North Korea has made no secret of the fact that nuclear research continues.

Bomb: birth

Exactly 12 years ago, on September 9, 2004, a South Korean reconnaissance satellite recorded a powerful explosion in a remote area of ​​the DPRK (Yangang Province), not far from the border with China. A crater visible from space remained at the site of the explosion, and a huge mushroom cloud with a diameter of about four kilometers grew above the scene.

On September 13, the DPRK authorities explained the appearance of a cloud similar to a nuclear mushroom as explosive work during the construction of the Samsu hydroelectric power station.

Neither South Korean nor American experts confirmed that it was indeed a nuclear explosion.

Western experts believed that the DPRK did not have the necessary resources and technologies to create a full-fledged atomic bomb, and we were talking about a potential, not an immediate danger.

On September 28, 2004, North Korea's Deputy Foreign Minister told the UN General Assembly that North Korea had already turned enriched uranium obtained from 8,000 reprocessed fuel rods from its nuclear reactor into nuclear weapons. He stressed that the DPRK had no other choice in creating a nuclear deterrent force in conditions when the United States declared its goal to destroy the DPRK and threatened preventive nuclear strikes.

On February 10, 2005, the DPRK Foreign Ministry for the first time officially announced the creation of atomic weapons in the country. The world treated this statement as another bluff by Pyongyang.

A year and a half later, on October 9, 2006, the DPRK announced for the first time that it had successfully tested a nuclear charge, and its preparation had been publicly announced before. The low power of the charge (0.5 kilotons) raised doubts that it was a nuclear device and not ordinary TNT.

North Korean acceleration

On May 25, 2009, North Korea conducted another nuclear test. The power of the underground nuclear explosion, according to Russian military estimates, ranged from 10 to 20 kilotons.

Four years later, on February 12, 2013, North Korea conducted another atomic bomb test.

Despite the adoption of new sanctions against the DPRK, the opinion remained that Pyongyang is far from creating powerful devices that can be used as real weapons.

On December 10, 2015, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un announced that his country had a hydrogen bomb, which meant a new step in the creation of nuclear weapons. On January 6, 2016, another test explosion was carried out, which the DPRK declared to be a test of a hydrogen bomb.

South Korean sources call the current test the most powerful in the entire nuclear program of the DPRK. It is also noteworthy that the interval between tests was the shortest in all years, which indicates that Pyongyang has made serious progress in improving technology.

Most importantly, North Korea stated that this test was carried out as part of the development of nuclear warheads that can be placed on ballistic missiles.

If this is indeed the case, then official Pyongyang has come close to creating real military nuclear weapons, which will radically change the situation in the region.

The rockets are flying further and further

Media reports about the situation in the DPRK, often from South Korean sources, give the wrong impression of North Korea. Despite the poverty of the population and other problems, this country is not backward. There are quite enough specialists in advanced industries, including nuclear and missile technologies.

People talk about the tests of North Korean missiles with a chuckle - they exploded again, missed the target again, fell again.

Military experts monitoring the situation claim that North Korean specialists have made a powerful technological leap in recent years.

By 2016, the DPRK had created a mobile single-stage liquid-propellant ballistic missile, the Hwasong-10, with a firing range of about three thousand kilometers.

In the summer of this year, the Pukkyukson-1 rocket was successfully tested. This solid-fuel missile is designed to arm submarines. Its successful launch was carried out precisely from a submarine of the DPRK Navy.

This does not at all fit with the idea of ​​North Korea as a country with rusty old Soviet planes and Chinese tanks.

Experts point out that the number of tests in the DPRK has been growing rapidly in recent years, and the technology is becoming more and more complex.

Within a few years, North Korea is capable of creating a missile with a flight range of up to 5,000 km, and then a full-fledged intercontinental ballistic missile. Moreover, it will be equipped with a real nuclear warhead.

What to do with North Korea?

There is almost no doubt that sanctions against North Korea will be tightened. But previous experience shows that this does not affect Pyongyang in any way.

Moreover, Comrade Kim Jong-un, unlike his relatives and predecessors, is not blackmailing the world with nuclear developments, but is creating a real nuclear missile arsenal.

Moreover, he is not stopped even by the outright irritation of his main ally, Beijing, which is not interested in escalating the situation in the region.

The question arises: what can be done with North Korea? Even those who have an extremely negative perception of Comrade Kim’s regime are convinced that it will not be possible to shake up the situation from within. Neither friends nor enemies can convince Pyongyang to “behave well.”

A military operation against North Korea today will cost the United States much more than in the early 1990s, when the Clinton administration made similar plans. In addition, neither Russia nor China will allow a war on their borders, which has every prospect of turning into the Third World War.

In theory, Pyongyang could be satisfied with guarantees that would ensure the preservation of the regime and the absence of attempts to dismantle it.

But recent history teaches that the only such guarantee in the modern world is the “nuclear baton”, which North Korea is working to create.

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Does North Korea have the resource base for a nuclear program?

Nuclear charges can be made from either weapons-grade plutonium (plutonium-239) or highly enriched uranium (uranium-235). The DPRK conducted its first two nuclear tests - in 2006 and 2009 - using charges made from weapons-grade plutonium, writes the American non-governmental Arms Control Association. North Korea's key nuclear facility, which houses most of the country's equipment, research and development related to both peaceful and military nuclear activities, is the Yenbyon Center, located 90 km north of Pyongyang. In 1986, a gas-graphite reactor was launched there; experts consider it the main source of weapons-grade plutonium (capable of producing up to 6 kg per year).

How much weapons-grade plutonium the DPRK has accumulated is unknown. According to data for 2008, cited by the Nuclear Threat Initiative website, North Korea could have received 39 kg of weapons-grade plutonium. However, the head of the Center for International Security at IMEMO RAS, Alexey Arbatov, believes that as of 2017, Pyongyang has approximately 50-60 kg of weapons-grade plutonium.

In 2016, North Korea admitted that it was producing highly enriched uranium from low enriched uranium, the Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reported. The plant, opened back in 2010, according to the Arms Control Association, is capable of annually producing 2 tons of low-enriched uranium or about 40 kg of highly enriched uranium. Alexey Arbatov says that North Korea acquires nuclear technologies, materials and even specialists on the global black market. “There is a huge market for nuclear materials - low-enriched uranium, uranium ore. Having certain technologies, it is possible to make highly enriched uranium from low-enriched uranium,” says Arbatov.

Total: reserves of weapons-grade plutonium - 39-60 kg, production capabilities of weapons-grade plutonium - ​6 kg per year​, highly enriched uranium - up to 40 kg per year.

How many ready-made nuclear warheads does North Korea have?

On September 3, North Korea announced that it had tested a thermonuclear bomb (the sixth nuclear test in the country's history, the first took place in 2006). However, there is no independent confirmation of this information. International experts reported that on the day of the test, an earthquake measuring 5.8 on the Richter scale occurred in North Korea. According to the Norwegian Foundation for Geophysical Research (NORSAR), the power of the underground explosion that caused it was 120 kt of TNT equivalent. It is possible to verify that it was a hydrogen bomb that was tested only by taking samples of rocks in the testing area, the researchers point out. ​

Regardless of what type of bomb Pyongyang tested, NORSAR notes that the power of North Korea's explosive devices increases with each new test. If the charge power during the first test in 2006 was approximately 1 kt in TNT equivalent, then ten years later, in September 2016, it reached about 20 kt, the report says.

According to SIPRI, North Korea has 10-20 nuclear warheads. Bloomberg, citing American military analysts, claims that the DPRK's arsenal includes 60 nuclear warheads. ​

Total: ​the number of nuclear warheads is at least ten, the power is at least 20 kt in TNT equivalent.

What means of delivering nuclear weapons does the DPRK have?

North Korea has been developing a missile program since the 1960s. The USSR, China, and the countries of the Middle East provided assistance in this. According to the Arms Control Association, North Korea had 15 types of ballistic missiles in August 2017.

The Nodong-1 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) is capable of covering a distance of about 1.5 thousand km, that is, it is capable of hitting Japan and South Korea. Another MRBM, Musudan, can theoretically cover up to 4 thousand km (its tests were not successful). Tested in May 2017, the Hwasong-12 can hit targets within a radius of approximately 4.5 thousand km (American Guam is located 3.4 thousand km from the DPRK). The Hwasong-14 intercontinental ballistic missile, first tested in July 2017, is capable of delivering a charge over a distance of more than 10 thousand km, that is, it can reach the United States. According to some reports, missiles of these modifications are capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

In addition, the DPRK is developing KN-08 and KN-14 missiles, the flight range of which can be up to 11.5 thousand km.

The exact number of missiles in the strategic forces of the North Korean army is unknown. According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative website, North Korea has about 200 Nodong missiles. , however, independent experts consider this number to be overestimated.

Alexey Arbatov, in a conversation with RBC, said that North Korea has from 80 to 100 ballistic missiles of different ranges (from 100-200 km to 1000-1500 km).

As Vasily Kashin, senior researcher at the Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies at the Higher School of Economics, notes, according to the most conservative estimates, the DPRK has only a few Hwasongs and it is unlikely that their number reaches even ten. These missiles are still in the development and testing stage, which means they have not yet been put into service and are not ready for mass production. In addition, the DPRK simply will not be able to support more than 20-30 Hwasong-12 and Hwasong-14 missiles, even if tests are completed and mass production begins. The maintenance of such missiles is very expensive: in addition to production, they require a certain infrastructure for maintenance and safety, explains Kashin. The DPRK has about 100 missiles of the Nodon family, the expert believes.

Total: about 100 missiles with a flight range of up to 1.5 thousand km, less than ten missiles with a flight range of more than 4 thousand km.

Are North Korea's neighbors capable of defending themselves?

In response to the continuing threat from the DPRK, South Korea began deploying the American THAAD missile defense system. The United States began deploying THAAD systems in South Korea in March of this year and has deployed two of at least six planned.

THAAD in South Korea is not yet capable of covering the Seoul agglomeration, where 25 million people live, that is, half of the country’s population, notes Kashin. “It covers 60% of the territories of South Korea, so its usefulness has always raised certain doubts,” says the expert. Considering the fact that only two of the six complexes have been deployed so far, Seoul’s vulnerability is obvious, but if the remaining four complexes are deployed closer to the demilitarized zone, that is, to the border between the DPRK and South Korea, then the chances of minimizing the North Korean threat will increase, Kashin believes.

​Japan, after the July tests of the DPRK, also decided to strengthen its defense. Tokyo is considering acquiring new installations for the US sea-based Aegis missile defense system and deploying its sister system, Aegis Ashore, on the coast to strengthen its defense capabilities.

Japan already has a two-level missile defense system - the naval Aegis and the Patriot complexes (Patriot Advanced Capability-3, or PAC-3), equipped with surface-to-air missiles to hit targets at an altitude of 12 km. The Patriot complex will be used if the Aegis system fails to intercept flying objects; Aegis Ashore increases the likelihood of successful interception of missiles.

If the American missile defense system is able to intercept a missile with a nuclear warhead, it will simply collapse, but at the same time a radioactive substance will be released, explains Kashin. “A very complex process must take place for a nuclear charge to detonate. If the charge and rocket are destroyed, a release of radioactive material will occur. The interception itself occurs at an altitude of several tens of kilometers, so the consequences of this release will be insignificant. The contamination of the area will not be very strong,” the expert concludes.​

However, the probability of interception of North Korean missiles by American missile defense systems in Japan and South Korea, even under ideal conditions, “will not be one hundred percent, because most of the tests were carried out in a situation far from combat,” Kashin believes. North Korea can launch dozens of missiles at a time, and intercepting such a salvo is unlikely. “It is impossible to determine among the missiles coming in this salvo which of them have a nuclear warhead and which has a conventional one. Accordingly, the likelihood that you will intercept a nuclear missile is small,” the expert concludes.

Even if Pyongyang hits Japan, the country will not cease to exist and will not turn into ashes despite the threats of the DPRK, notes Japanese scholar Dmitry Streltsov, head of the department of Oriental Studies at the Faculty of International Relations of MGIMO. However, in his opinion, in the event of an attack on Japan, “we can talk about major damage” and colossal casualties, given the high population density. However, this does not mean that “the islands will drown in the sea,” as Kim Jong-un promised.

South Korea is in a more difficult position: the DPRK can use conventional weapons to attack it. For example, the heavy artillery of North Korea, deployed near the border, is capable of causing irreparable damage to Seoul in the very first hours of the war. However, we are not talking about the immediate destruction of South Korea. Finally, there are reasonable doubts about the ability of the DPRK to use nuclear missile weapons to inflict at least some damage on the island of Guam or the continental United States, not to mention “wipe the United States into ashes and darkness.”

North Korea nuclear tests

North Korea conducted its first nuclear tests, the power of the explosion was about 1 kiloton of TNT. The tests triggered an earthquake measuring 4.2 on the Richter scale.

The power of the explosion is about 5 kt in TNT equivalent. The magnitude of the earthquake after testing was 4.7 on the Richter scale.

The power of the third underground nuclear explosion was 10-15 kt, the tests caused an earthquake with a magnitude of about 5 on the Richter scale. North Korean authorities said they have tested a miniature nuclear warhead that can be placed on ballistic missiles of various ranges.

Pyongyang announced its fourth nuclear test - a hydrogen bomb. Its power, according to various sources, ranged from 15 to 20 kt. The explosion triggered an earthquake measuring 5 on the Richter scale.

The power of the fifth test was, according to the American Arms Control Association, 20-25 kt of TNT equivalent. The magnitude of the earthquake after the explosion reached 5.2 on the Richter scale.

North Korean authorities said that a hydrogen bomb was used again during the sixth nuclear test. According to the NORSAR Foundation, the explosion, with a yield of about 120 kt of TNT, led to an earthquake measuring 5.8 on the Richter scale.

Sources: Norwegian Foundation for Geosciences, American Arms Control Association

The North Korean nuclear problem does not have a one-size-fits-all solution

On May 9, the news feeds were literally blown up by a message from the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) that a test launch of a powerful Korean strategic ballistic missile from a submarine took place in the DPRK, which was accompanied by a television picture. This event indicates that the DPRK is improving and increasing its missile potential, striving to eventually become the owner of a nuclear triad.

In this regard, it seems interesting to assess the DPRK’s potential for the creation and production of nuclear weapons, as well as their delivery vehicles.

Counting bombs

Currently, the DPRK nuclear industry has limited capacity to produce weapons-grade materials and produce nuclear weapons from them.

The country has the only nuclear center in Yongbyon, located 86 kilometers north of Pyongyang. Its production complex includes:

• a gas-graphite reactor with an electrical power of five megawatts (thermal power - 25 MW), commissioned in 1986 (it is capable of producing three to four kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium per year);
• nuclear fuel plant;
• a radiochemical plant for separating plutonium from irradiated nuclear fuel (SNF), which is capable of processing up to 110 tons of SNF per year;
• a uranium isotope enrichment plant that can produce up to 26 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium annually.

The construction of a nuclear power plant with an experimental North Korean light water reactor (ELWR) is nearing completion. Its estimated electrical power will be from 25 to 30 megawatts (thermal power - over 100 MW). It is expected to be capable of producing up to 20 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium per year. Commissioning is possible at the end of this year or early next year.

"The prototype of the Hwasong-11 was the Soviet-made Tochka OTR, samples of which were transferred to the DPRK by Syria in the mid-90s"

Uranium reserves in the DPRK are estimated at 15–20 thousand tons. Currently, uranium ore is mined in the Pakchon and Pyeongsan areas (70 km north and 95 km southeast of Pyongyang, respectively). Uranium enrichment factories are also located here, supplying raw materials for the nuclear fuel plant at the Yongbyon Nuclear Center, their total capacity is up to 150 tons of concentrate per year.

According to estimates, a total of 40–42 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium were separated from all spent fuel extracted over different years from the above-mentioned North Korean gas-graphite reactor. For the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices tested in 2006, 2009 and 2013 at the Kilchu test site (North Hamgyong Province), 10–12 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium were used. Taking this into account, at the beginning of 2015, the DPRK's accumulated reserves of weapons-grade plutonium were at least 30 kilograms.

There are no reliable expert estimates regarding North Korea's reserves of highly enriched uranium (HEU), since it is unclear when and in what volumes the corresponding capacities were put into operation in the DPRK. There is a strong assumption that by the beginning of 2015, this country could have produced up to 200 kilograms of weapons-grade HEU.

However, it should be taken into account that in 2013–2014, the production area was doubled at the uranium isotope enrichment plant at the Yongbyon Nuclear Center and an additional number of centrifuges were installed. With the commissioning of these installations (as expected in the second half of the year), the production capacity of the above-mentioned plant for the production of weapons-grade HEU can increase to 60 kilograms per year.

The DPRK's stockpiles of weapons-grade nuclear materials as of January 2015 are believed to be sufficient to manufacture 10–16 implosion-type nuclear warheads of a simplified design (6–8 plutonium and 4–8 weapons-grade uranium). Most likely, these warheads are now used in nuclear bombs, which can be delivered to targets by Chinese-made Hong-5 front-line bombers. This bomber is an analogue of the front-line Soviet-made Il-28, which is certified as a carrier of a nuclear bomb weighing up to three thousand kilograms. There is no reliable data on the presence of nuclear warheads for ballistic missiles in the DPRK today.

At the same time, fairly authoritative sources confirm the international community’s suspicions that the DPRK is conducting research and development work in the interests of reducing the weight and size characteristics of nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal is to create such a compact ammunition that could be equipped with the warhead (MC) of a ballistic missile. One of the areas of such work, which has become known to the expert community, is associated with the development of a pulsed neutron source for a nuclear warhead, which will significantly increase the power of the explosion. This will make it possible to reduce the weight and size parameters of the ammunition while maintaining the required power.

But the capabilities of the DPRK nuclear weapons complex to create new types of nuclear warheads should not be exaggerated. Publications that have appeared recently in foreign media that North Korean specialists have allegedly mastered the secrets of nuclear fusion and are about to create thermonuclear weapons do not correspond to reality, since the DPRK has neither the scientific, nor design, nor production or testing base for this. There is also no basis for the creation of low-energy nuclear weapons, the so-called super-EMP weapons, the threat of which the DPRK had in the summer of 2014 was announced by former US CIA Director James Woolsey.

Photo: i.ytimg.com

The historical experience of developing and improving nuclear weapons shows that breakthroughs in this area of ​​weapons simply do not happen: they have nowhere to come from until the corresponding scientific and production infrastructure is formed. This requires enormous resources, which, it seems, the DPRK will not have access to not only in the near future, but also in the long term.

Therefore, based on a realistic assessment of the capabilities of the country’s nuclear weapons complex, it should be expected that for the foreseeable future the efforts of North Korean specialists will be aimed mainly at increasing the production of nuclear weapons of the existing type with their simultaneous miniaturization. Reducing the mass of nuclear weapons to 1000 kilograms will make it possible to place them in the warheads of the Nodong-type ballistic missiles the DPRK already has. But before this, it will be necessary to conduct a full-scale test of such ammunition. So the next nuclear test at the Kilchu test site, as they say, is not far off, since Pyongyang is doing its best to equip its long-range ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads.

The American-Korean Institute at Johns Hopkins University, together with the US National Defense University, prepared a forecast of the development of the North Korean nuclear program until 2020, the presentation of which took place in February of this year in Washington. It is alleged that in five years the DPRK's nuclear arsenal could increase to 50-100 weapons. An arsenal of 50–60 such munitions seems realistically achievable.

“But we make rockets”

According to available estimates, by the beginning of 2015, the DPRK armed forces could have the following missile forces:

• one separate missile regiment and three separate missile divisions armed with the Luna-M tactical missile (TR) (a total of 21 mobile launchers on a wheeled chassis);
• four separate missile divisions armed with the KN-02 operational-tactical missile (OTR) (a total of 16 mobile launchers on a wheeled chassis);
• one separate missile regiment armed with Scud-type OTR (28 mobile launchers on a wheeled chassis);
• three separate missile divisions armed with the Nodon-1 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) (a total of 9 mobile launchers on a wheeled chassis).

The single-stage solid fuel TR "Luna-M" (North Korean name - "Hwasong-3") with a launch weight of 2.3 tons is equipped with an inseparable warhead weighing 450 kilograms and has a firing range of up to 65 kilometers. The first samples of this unguided rocket with its production technology were purchased by the DPRK from the Soviet Union in the late 60s.

Photo: turbosquid.com

The single-stage solid-propellant OTR KN-02 (“Hwasong-11”) with a launch weight of two tons is equipped with an inseparable warhead weighing about 480 kilograms and has a firing range of up to 120–140 kilometers. Entered into service in 2007–2008. Its prototype was the Soviet-made Tochka OTR, samples of which were transferred to the DPRK by Syria in the mid-90s. In August-September 2014, a series of test launches of an improved modification of the KN-02 (it is referred to in the media as the KN-10 short-range missile) was carried out.

The predicted maximum firing range is up to 200 kilometers.

The single-stage liquid OTR "Scud-V" ("Hwasong-5") with a launch weight of 6.4 tons is equipped with an inseparable warhead weighing 1000 kilograms and has a firing range of up to 300 kilometers. Entered service in 1987. A prototype of this Soviet-made missile (known as 8K14) was acquired by the DPRK from Egypt in 1980. In the late 80s, with the help of Chinese specialists, an improved model of the rocket was created, called Scud-S (Hwasong-6). By lengthening the fuel tanks and reducing the mass of the warhead to 700 kilograms, the firing range increased to 550 kilometers.

The single-stage liquid-fueled MRBM "Nodong-1" ("Hwasong-7") with a launch weight of 16 tons is equipped with a detachable warhead weighing 1000 kilograms and has a firing range of up to 1000 kilometers. Adopted into service in the late 90s. It was developed by scaling the Scud-type OTP. In 2010, a modernized model of this missile, called Nodong-1M (Hwasong-9), was demonstrated at a military parade in Pyongyang. Compared to the base model, the Nodon-1M missile has shortened fuel tanks (by 1.5 m) and is equipped with a lightweight warhead (weight 500 kg). Its estimated firing range could be 1,300–1,500 kilometers.

All missiles currently in service with North Korean missile units are equipped with two types of conventional warheads: high-explosive fragmentation and cluster. Potentially, the Nodon-1 MRBM could become a carrier of a nuclear warhead.

At the aforementioned 2010 parade, a new type of single-stage ballistic missile, called Musudan (Hwasong-10), was also shown. It was transported on a wheeled launcher. Its diameter was 1.5 meters and its length was 12 meters. In appearance, this missile resembled the Soviet sea-based liquid-propellant R-27 (the diameters of the hulls and the shape of the warhead are the same, but the length of the North Korean model is 1.5 meters longer). According to recent publications in foreign media, the maximum firing range of the Musudan can be 3200–4000 kilometers with a warhead mass of up to 650 kilograms.

Recently, information appeared, unconfirmed by official sources, that flight tests of the Musudan MRBM began this year and two short-range test launches have allegedly already been carried out. It was previously reported that the DPRK armed forces have formed two separate missile divisions (a total of 8 mobile launchers), which should be armed with the Musudan IRBM, and that these divisions are deployed near the eastern coast of the DPRK.

In April 2012, at the next military parade in Pyongyang, a new North Korean development was shown - the KN-08 (Hwasong-13) ballistic missile. It was transported on an eight-axle wheeled launcher and, in appearance, was a three-stage solid-fuel rocket with a diameter of two meters and a length of about 19 meters. It is claimed to have an intercontinental firing range, but this cannot be confirmed as test launches have not been carried out.

There are strong suspicions that a mock-up of the KN-08 missile was shown at the parade, which will take considerable time before being translated into a real model. As the South Korean news agency Rekhnap reported, in May and October 2014, the intelligence services of the United States and the Republic of Korea recorded testing of solid fuel engines for the KN-08 missile in the DPRK.

In addition to the creation of the Musudan and KN-08 ballistic missiles, the DPRK is implementing another project - the Taepodong-2 two-stage liquid-propellant ballistic missile. Testing of its elements was carried out during the launches of space launch vehicles “Unha-2” (April 2009) and “Unha-3” (April and December 2012). The first stage of these launch vehicles used four Nodon-1 MRSD propulsion systems connected by a common frame, and the second stage used the OTR Scud-S liquid-propellant rocket engine. Taking into account the successful launch of the Unha-3 launch vehicle in December 2012, which ended with the launch of a technological satellite for imaging the earth's surface into low Earth orbit, it can be assumed that the Koreans will be able to create the Taepodong-2 ballistic missile by the end of this decade. It is estimated that it will have a launch weight of about 65 tons, a length of up to 32 meters and a maximum hull diameter of 2.4 meters. The maximum firing range can be from 3,500 to 6,000 kilometers, depending on the mass of the warhead. A nuclear warhead can be created for this missile.

To ensure the upcoming tests of ballistic missiles being developed, since the beginning of 2014, work has been underway to modernize and expand the infrastructure of the test site at the North Korean Sohae test site (its other name is Tongchandong), located in North Pyongan province. It is expected that these works can be completed in 2015. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that testing of medium- and long-range ballistic missiles will resume at the test site in the near future.

A fundamentally new direction in increasing the DPRK's missile potential was the development of a submarine with ballistic missiles (SLBMs) ​​on board.

Information about ongoing work in this direction appeared in foreign media at the end of last summer. In particular, in August, the online publication Washington Free News wrote that American intelligence services managed to obtain data about a submarine being built in the DPRK to launch SLBMs and that the country already has such missiles. In March of this year, sources in diplomatic and military circles of the Republic of Korea announced that the DPRK had launched a Sinpo-class diesel submarine capable of launching ballistic missiles.

Therefore, the DPRK's May 9 test of an SLBM did not come as a surprise to those specialists who are professionally involved in issues related to the development of North Korean ballistic missiles.

At the same time, the message about the test launch published by KCNA contained information from the category of “wishful thinking,” since in reality the missile was launched from a barge (test stand) submerged in the sea, and not from a submarine. In addition, this was a so-called throw test of the rocket, and not a full launch - the rocket flew only 150-200 meters.

It should be noted that conducting throw tests is a normal practice for testing and testing the performance of both the missile design and the launch silo at an early stage. Only after this can we begin full-scale flight tests of SLBMs using a submarine.

As for the type of SLBM tested, most credible sources believe that it is a prototype Musudan liquid-fuelled MRBM, adapted for launch from underwater. The Pentagon designated the SLBM KN-11.

The test showed that the DPRK has directly begun to create an underwater missile capability. South Korean government officials believe that within five years the DPRK will be able to have a limited submarine missile capability. It cannot be ruled out that by the end of this period some of the deployed SLBMs will be equipped with nuclear warheads.

Bargaining is appropriate

The hopes that remain among a certain part of the international community that the current North Korean authorities, under the pressure of the sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council and unilaterally by the governments of a number of states hostile to the DPRK, will abandon the implementation of national nuclear and missile programs, seem illusory. The tightening of these measures, which are now threatened by the United States, its allies and partners, will not change the situation. The DPRK has vast experience, acquired over the years of its existence, in terms of survival in harsh conditions.

The decisive thing is that Pyongyang considers the possession of nuclear and missile capabilities as the main guarantee of national security and the preservation of the existing political regime. This is, in particular, evidenced by an editorial published in September 2014 in the central North Korean party newspaper Rodong Sinmun, which stated the following: “The DPRK will continue to increase its nuclear capabilities for the purpose of self-defense in accordance with the legitimate right to provide protection states and nations."

As Joel Wheat, one of the leading researchers at the US-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University, quite rightly notes, “Today, Kim Jong-un (the country’s current leader) is increasingly imposing on the international community a choice: accept the fact that North Korea has nuclear weapons, or face with periodic instability and tension on the Korean Peninsula." Such a challenge, of course, is unpleasant for the international community, but it is forced to proceed from this premise when searching for a way out of the emerging North Korean nuclear impasse. Therefore, it seems that the resumption in the previous aspect of the six-party negotiations (in the format of the PRC, the USA, Russia, Japan, the Republic of Korea and the DPRK) on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, suspended in April 2009, has lost its meaning. The North Korean nuclear problem cannot be solved by the “all at once” principle; new approaches are needed that are adequate to the current realities.

Based on the above, the international community should take it for granted that the DPRK, like India, Pakistan and Israel, will not simply give up its nuclear and missile capabilities. Therefore, now international diplomatic efforts should be aimed at stopping the growth of these potentials through the normalization of relations with the DPRK, primarily in the DPRK-US format, and stabilizing the situation on the Korean Peninsula in order to prevent the outbreak of a new war here, which would most likely lead to the use nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction.

Only after the above task has been resolved and the parties have mutual trust regarding their peaceful coexistence, can we move on to solving the problem of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In this case, it will be necessary to provide the DPRK with significant guarantees, as well as certain preferences (their nature and scope are the subject of future agreements). And this kind of payment should not be regarded as a unilateral concession to Pyongyang. It appears that the preferences that the DPRK will need to provide will be insignificant compared to the significance for international security of the stability on the Korean Peninsula that will be ensured as a result of the “deal” on the nuclear disarmament of the DPRK. Another question is whether it will be possible to persuade Kim Jong-un and his entourage to do this. To a large extent, if not to a decisive extent, this will depend on the behavior of the members of the nuclear “five”, primarily the United States, towards the DPRK.

North Korea successfully tested an intercontinental missile, but it is not the only country threatening the world with nuclear weapons

The US military believes that the latest missile launched by the DPRK belongs to the intercontinental class. Experts say that it is capable of reaching Alaska, which means it poses a direct threat to the United States.

"A Gift for the Yankees"

North Korea launched the Hwangsong-14 missile on the morning of Tuesday, July 4. On this day, America celebrates Independence Day. The rocket flew 933 km in 39 minutes - not far, but this is because it was launched very high. The highest point of the trajectory was at a distance of 2,802 km above sea level.

The Hwangsong-14 rocket before launch. Photo: Reuters/KCNA

She fell into the sea between North Korea and Japan.

But if Pyongyang had a goal to attack any country, the missile would be capable of covering a distance of 7000-8000 km, which is enough to reach not only Japan, but also Alaska.

North Korea says it is capable of equipping its missile with a nuclear warhead. Nuclear weapons experts question whether Pyongyang currently has the technology to produce sufficiently compact warheads.

However, the Hwangsong-14 test occurred earlier and was more successful than expected, American missile expert John Schilling noted in a commentary for Reuters.

"Even if it's a 7,000-kilometer missile, a 10,000-kilometer missile that could hit New York is not a long shot," the director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies told The New York Times. Geoffrey Lewis.

Approximate range of the Hwangsong-14 missile. Infographic: CNN

The launch demonstrated that no sanctions apply to the DPRK. On the contrary, threats only encourage the country's leader Kim Jong-un to continue to rattle his weapons and demonstrate the power of his arsenal.

After the tests, he was quoted by North Korea's State News Agency as saying that the US would not like "a package of gifts for their Independence Day." Kim Jong-un ordered scientists and military personnel to “send large and small gift packages to the Yankees more often.”

China and Russia issued a joint statement calling on the DPRK to stop its missile and nuclear programs, and the United States and South Korea to refrain from conducting large-scale military exercises.

However, Washington did not heed the calls of Moscow and Beijing. On Wednesday morning, they carried out demonstration launches of Hyunmu II missiles, which are capable of hitting targets at a distance of 800 km.

Tensions are rising and the world is once again talking about nuclear war. However, North Korea is not the only country capable of starting it. Today, seven more countries officially have a nuclear arsenal. We can safely add Israel to them, although it has never officially admitted that it has nuclear weapons.

Russia is the leader in terms of quantity

The United States and Russia together own 93% of the world's nuclear arsenal.

Distribution of the world's nuclear arsenal. Infographic: Arms Control Association, Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, U.S. Department of State

According to official and unofficial estimates, the Russian Federation has a total of 7,000 nuclear weapons. Such data is provided by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the American organization Arms Control Association.

According to data exchanged between the Russian Federation and the United States as part of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, as of April 2017, Russia had 1,765 strategic warheads.

They are deployed on 523 long-range missiles, submarines and strategic bombers. But this is only about deployed, that is, ready-to-use nuclear weapons.

The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) estimates that Russia has approximately 2,700 non-deployed strategic, as well as deployed and non-deployed tactical warheads. In addition, 2,510 warheads are awaiting dismantlement.

Russia, as the National Interest website claims in a number of publications, is modernizing its nuclear weapons. And in some respects it was ahead of its main enemy - the United States.

It is at them that the power of the Russian nuclear potential is mainly directed. And Russian propagandists never tire of reminding us of this. The most striking in this matter was, of course, Dmitry Kiselev with his “nuclear ash”.

However, there are also opposing assessments, according to which the lion's share of missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads are hopelessly outdated.

USA at a crossroads

In total, the Americans currently have 6,800 nuclear weapons. Of these deployed, according to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty as of April 2017, 1,411 are strategic warheads. They are deployed on 673 long-range missiles, submarines and strategic bombers.

FAS assumes that in addition the US has 2,300 non-deployed strategic warheads and 500 deployed and non-deployed tactical warheads. And another 2,800 warheads await dismantling.

With its arsenal, the United States threatens many adversaries, not only Russia.

For example, the same North Korea and Iran. However, according to many experts, it is outdated and needs modernization.

Interestingly, in 2010, Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev signed the aforementioned Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, also known as the “Fresh Start”. But the same Obama stimulated the deployment of missile defense systems in the United States and Europe, his administration launched the process of developing and deploying new ground-based launchers for long-range missiles.

The Trump administration has plans to continue the process of modernizing weapons, including nuclear,

Nuclear Europe

Among the European countries, the only ones that have nuclear arsenals are France and Great Britain. The first is armed with 300 nuclear warheads. Most of them are equipped to launch from submarines. France has four of them. A small number - for launch from the air, from strategic bombers.

The British have 120 strategic warheads. Of these, 40 are deployed at sea on four submarines. This is, in fact, the country's only type of nuclear weapons - it has neither ground nor air forces armed with nuclear warheads.

In addition, the UK has 215 warheads stored at bases but not deployed.

Secret China

Since Beijing has never made public information about its nuclear arsenal, it can only be estimated. In June 2016, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists suggested that China has a total of 260 nuclear warheads. Also available information indicates that it increases their number.

China also has all three main methods of delivering nuclear weapons - land-based installations, nuclear submarines and strategic bombers.

One of China's newest intercontinental ballistic missiles, Dongfeng-41 (DF41), was located near the border with Russia in January 2017. But in addition to difficult relations with Moscow, Beijing also has tense relations with neighboring India.

There is also an unconfirmed theory that China is helping North Korea develop its nuclear program.

Sworn neighbors

India and Pakistan, unlike the previous five countries, are developing their nuclear program outside the framework of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. At the same time, both countries have a long-standing enmity, regularly threaten each other with the use of force, and armed incidents regularly occur on the Indo-Pakistani border.

But in addition, they also have other conflicting relationships. For India it is China, and for Pakistan it is Israel.

Both countries do not hide the fact that they have nuclear programs, but their details are not publicly disclosed.

India is believed to have between 100 and 120 nuclear warheads in its inventory. The country is actively developing its arsenal. One of the latest achievements was the successful testing of Agni-5 and Agni-6 intercontinental missiles, which are capable of delivering warheads to a distance of 5000-6000 km.

At the end of 2016, India commissioned its first nuclear-powered submarine, the Arihant. It also plans to purchase from France 36 Rafale combat aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons by 2019. The country currently has several older aircraft for this purpose - the French Mirage, the Anglo-French SEPECAT Jaguar and the Russian Su-30.

Pakistan has between 110 and 130 nuclear warheads in its inventory. The country began to develop its nuclear program after India conducted its first nuclear weapons test in 1974. She is also in the process of expanding her arsenal.

Currently, Pakistan's nuclear missiles are short and medium range. There are rumors that he is developing the Taimur intercontinental missile with a range of 7,000 km. The country also intends to build its own nuclear submarine. And Pakistan's Mirage and F16 aircraft are rumored to have been modified to carry nuclear weapons.

Israel's deliberate ambiguity

SIPRI, FAS and other organizations that monitor the development of nuclear weapons in the world claim that Israel has 80 nuclear warheads in its arsenal. In addition, it has stockpiles of fissile material to manufacture an additional 200 warheads.

Israel, like India and Pakistan, has not signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, thereby retaining the right to develop them. But unlike India and Pakistan, it has never announced its nuclear program and pursues a so-called policy of deliberate ambiguity on this issue.

In practice, this means that Israel never confirms or denies the assumption that it has nuclear weapons.

It is believed that Israel developed nuclear warheads in a secret underground plant located in the middle of the desert. It is also assumed that it has all three main means of delivery: ground launchers, submarines and combat aircraft.

Israel is understandable. It is surrounded on all sides by states hostile to it, which do not hide their desire to “throw Israel into the sea.” However, the policy of ambiguity is often criticized by those who consider it a manifestation of double standards.

Iran, which also tried to develop a nuclear program, was severely punished for this. Israel did not experience any sanctions.