Secret Committee for Peasant Affairs. Liberation of peasants Duties of temporarily obliged peasants

Yakov Ivanovich Rostovtsev

At the same time, to consider these notes, it was decided to form a Secret Committee, which included mainly ministers and dignitaries of the previous reign. This committee was formed in January 1857.

In this committee, the Minister of Internal Affairs Lanskoy was an unconditional supporter of peasant reform. Then, among the persons included in this committee was also General Ya. I. Rostovtsev, the chief head of military educational institutions, who was very sympathetic to the idea of ​​​​peasant reform. Rostovtsev was one of the people close to Alexander, personally very devoted to him, but he was completely inexperienced in the peasant business. Therefore, at the beginning, when he, along with two other members of the committee, was barred. M.A. Korf and Prince. P.P. Gagarin, - the committee was entrusted with familiarizing itself with all the notes and projects circulating in the society, he even tried to avoid this. On the other hand, in public opinion at that time Rostovtsev did not seem to be a particularly attractive figure: there was a stain on him, which was that the legend had been preserved that Rostovtsev was an informer and a traitor in the Decembrist cause. This legend, however, depicted his participation in these events in a distorted form. In 1825, Rostovtsev was still a young officer (22 years old); he was personally close to the influential leaders of the December 14 conspiracy, Ryleyev and especially Prince. Obolensky, with whom he lived in the same apartment. During the famous interregnum of 1825, thus, not only did individual phrases accidentally reach Rostovtsev’s ears, revealing the intentions of the conspirators, but, apparently, Ryleev and Obolensky also made a direct attempt to attract Rostovtsev to their cause. He was a completely loyal person in his views and not only did not sympathize with the plans of the Decembrists and secret societies in general, but was also not inclined to participate in revolutionary political enterprises. In any case, he not only flatly refused to take part in the secret society, but even began to persuade Ryleev and Obolensky to give up their plans, and finally warned them that if they did not give up these plans, he would consider it is his duty to warn the government of the danger that threatens him. Seeing that the conspiracy was continuing, Rostovtsev carried out his threat, came to Nicholas and told him that they were very excited against him, that something was being prepared, and even convinced Nicholas either to renounce the throne, or to persuade Konstantin to come and abdicate. publicly. At the same time, Rostovtsev did not name a single name, and after his meeting with Nikolai (December 10, 1825), he himself immediately informed Ryleev and Obolensky about this. From this it is already clear that the impression of vileness and selfish calculations that is usually associated with political denunciation was not present in this case, and Rostovtsev’s personality was hardly rightly branded with the name of a traitor and informer. It is now known that both Ryleev and Obolensky, who knew the full course of this matter, retained respect for Rostovtsev even after Rostovtsev’s visit to Nikolai, and when Obolensky returned from exile, he did not refuse to resume friendly relations with Rostovtsev. But at that time, all this was not known for sure and lay a big stain on Rostovtsev’s personality, and Herzen systematically persecuted him in “The Bell” until his death.

Rostovtsev's real role in the peasant reform, in fact, began later; his participation in the affairs of the Secret Committee at this time was not yet as great and decisive as later.

The remaining members of the Secret Committee either treated the matter more or less indifferently and formally, or secretly did not sympathize with it. Nevertheless, none of them dared to deny in their answers to the question directly posed by Alexander that the matter was ripe and that at least some limitation of landowner arbitrariness and a change in the existing state of affairs were necessary. But still, the mood of the majority was such that work proceeded extremely slowly. The only engine of work at this time was the Ministry of the Interior, which was headed by a person who sympathized with the reform and had the means to prepare it, since it had in its hands a whole series of collected materials, projects and considerations.

In the summer of 1857, the Ministry of Internal Affairs presented a fairly definite reform plan drawn up by Levshin, which consisted in declaring the peasants personally free, but strong on the land, after a certain period of time, preserving for them for a certain or indefinite time the obligation to perform duties for the assigned duties. allotments with the obligation to purchase the estate ownership, and the landowners of non-black earth provinces would be given the opportunity to enter so-called fishing benefits into the valuation of estates.

Since progress in the committee itself was slow, Emperor Alexander, dissatisfied with the committee headed by Prince. Orlov, who was unsympathetic to the cause of reform, introduced his brother, Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich, into its composition, from which he expected a great acceleration of the matter, since Konstantin showed great sympathy for the cause of reform. And indeed, he brought great excitement to the general course of business, but due to his inexperience he was then inclined to make many compromises harmful to the interests of the peasants, just to speed things up. By the way, he proposed introducing a certain degree of transparency into the entire matter, publicly announcing the government’s intentions, at least in general terms. On August 18, a decisive meeting of the Secret Committee took place, where Konstantin Nikolaevich’s project was discussed. Konstantin Nikolaevich argued that glasnost would calm the peasants and enable society to take a more active part in developing the details of the reform. However, the committee certainly rejected this proposal; it was decided that there should be no announcement of the types of government, that the work of reform should be carried out gradually and thoughtfully, dividing it into periods, and in the first period, the period of which was not even determined, it was supposed to collect various information, notes, etc. among those in the know, for example Levshin, things tended to delay the reform, in the hope that the thought of it would finally fall asleep.

Until recently, completely reliable information about the work of this committee was available only in the two articles mentioned above: “Memorable minutes of my life” A. I. Levshina and "Notes" Y. A. Solovyova, partly replenished by those compiled by D. P. Khrushchev and “Materials on the history of the abolition of serfdom”, printed abroad, Berlin, 1860–1862, three volumes. Now the history of the work of the Secret Committee is presented on the basis of a study of its archive by Mr. A. Popelnitsky in "Bulletin of Europe" for 1911, No. 2, p. 48. This study, however, only confirmed the accuracy of the information reported in the notes of Levshin and Solovyov.

Important documents about Rostovtsev were published in "Russian Archive" for 1873, No. 1, pp. 510 et seq. See also about him in Barsukov (“The Life of Pogodin”), vol. XIV, p. 465 and passim and in A. V. Nikitenko in different places of his “Notes from the Diary”. Compare also the last review of Rostovtsev after his death by the publishers of Kolokol Herzen And Ogareva in “Voices from Russia,” book, VIII, p. 8.

The need for transformations - improvement of “internal improvement” - was first declared in the manifesto of Alexander II on the end of the Crimean War on March 19, 1856. Abstract good wishes were somewhat concretized in the speech delivered by the emperor to the Moscow leaders of the nobility on March 30, 1856. Increasing cases of peasant discontent and rumors about the government's secret intentions on the peasant issue seriously alarmed the Moscow nobles, and Governor-General Count A.A. Zakrevsky turned to Alexander II with a request to dispel the unfounded rumors. But the sovereign’s speech only increased the anxiety of the landowners. Having assured the noble leaders of his reluctance to free the peasants, Alexander II at the same time expressed disappointment at the growing hostility between peasants and landowners and spoke of the objective inevitability of the abolition of serfdom, if not “from above,” then “from below,” which is undesirable. Zakrevsky called the tsar’s speech “embarrassing,” and the agitated nobles had to be cajoled with a circular from the Minister of Internal Affairs, which guaranteed the preservation of landowner power.

The Emperor hesitated. He understood the inevitability of change, but could not go into direct conflict with the nobility. Therefore, he instructed the Vilna Governor-General V.I. Nazimov to find out the opinion of the nobles of the northwestern region on the possibility of changing serfdom, and during the coronation in August 1856, the Minister of Internal Affairs S.S. Lanskoy and Comrade (Deputy) Minister A.I. Levshin, on the instructions of the sovereign, conducted confidential negotiations with the leaders of the nobility of different provinces of Russia. Conversations with the leaders, who were frightened by even a faint hint of the impending liberation of the peasants, turned out to be unproductive. Only the leaders of the nobility of the western provinces, who had suffered losses from the introduced inventories, expressed their readiness to abolish serfdom, but free the peasants without land - following the example of the Baltic region, where such a reform took place back in 1816-1819. The government decided to begin preparing a bill on peasant affairs for the western provinces of the empire, in order to then begin gradually implementing reform in other individual localities. Alexander II made a reservation at the same time that he would not take any steps until he received from the “well-meaning owners of populated estates” ideas about improving the peasant “lot.”

On January 3, 1857, the Secret Committee on Peasant Affairs was established, designed to prepare draft measures to improve the life of landowner peasants. The committee was chaired by the tsar himself, and in his absence, by the chairman of the State Council and the Committee of Ministers, Prince A.F. Orlov. The committee included senior government officials. Seasoned statesmen took a wait-and-see attitude, delaying the consideration of the assigned issue. The committee slowly collected ideas from various people about the future peasant reorganization, and disagreements emerged between its members, which led the activities to a dead end. There were proposals to free the peasants according to the “Baltic Sea” model, others insisted on ensuring the actual implementation of the decrees on free cultivators of 1803 and on obligated peasants of 1842. Finally, there was an opinion to completely rid the government of an inconvenient problem by entrusting the development of conditions for the abolition of serfdom to the shoulders of local nobility. Only the Minister of Internal Affairs S.S. Lanskoy introduced for the consideration of the committee members qualitatively new principles of reform (the author of the project was A.I. Levshin): the liberation of the peasants, the purchase of their estates for 10-15 years and the preservation of the plots for the use of the peasants for their services. At the same time, he considered it necessary to leave the solution of the issue in the hands of the government with the advisory participation of the nobility. Prince A.F. Orlov opposed the liberation of the peasants and was about to curtail the work of the committee, and, as usual, transfer the received considerations to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. However, Alexander II broke this scenario by demanding specific decisions. In the summer of 1857, the sovereign’s brother, Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich, was appointed a member of the committee. The bureaucratic idyll was disrupted by heated debate, and in August the committee made a fundamental decision to begin the abolition of serfdom, dividing its implementation into the following stages: preparation of the reform, personal emancipation of the peasants while maintaining their land dependence, and complete emancipation of the peasants.

Attempts to continue the red tape were suddenly thwarted in October 1857 by the arrival of V.I. in St. Petersburg. Nazimov, who obtained the consent of the nobility of the Vilna, Grodno and Kovno provinces entrusted to him to replace the inventory system with the gratuitous but landless emancipation of the peasants. The Governor-General demanded instructions from the government, and on November 20, 1857, Alexander II approved the rescript to Nazimov developed by the Secret Committee. The rescript, which became the first government program on the peasant issue, consolidated the beginnings of the project drawn up in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The nobility of the region was supposed to form provincial committees and a commission common to the three provinces to draw up projects “on the arrangement and improvement of the life of the landowner peasants,” but could not go beyond the principles established by the supreme authority. Government principles confirmed the ownership of landowners “to all the land.” However, the peasants retained their “estate settlement”, received the right to purchase the estate land as their own and could not be arbitrarily deprived of an additional “amount of land” subject to payment of quitrent or serving corvée. Thus, the government prevented the expulsion of peasants from the land. It was supposed to establish self-government for the peasants, but in order to keep them in obedience, the patrimonial police were transferred to the disposal of the landowners. To avoid noble discontent, the thesis about the abolition of serfdom was carefully veiled in the document.

Peasant reform in Russia, also known as abolition of serfdom- a reform carried out in 1861 that abolished serfdom in the Russian Empire. It was the first and most significant of the reforms of Emperor Alexander II; proclaimed by the Manifesto on the abolition of serfdom of February 19, 1861.

Background

The first steps towards the abolition of serfdom were taken by Alexander I in 1803 by signing the “Decree on Free Plowmen,” which spelled out the legal status of peasants released into freedom.

In 1816-1819 serfdom was abolished in the Baltic (Baltic) provinces of the Russian Empire (Estonia, Courland, Livonia).

Contrary to the existing erroneous opinion that the overwhelming majority of the population of pre-reform Russia was in serfdom, in fact, the percentage of serfs to the entire population of the empire remained almost unchanged at 45% from the second revision to the eighth (that is, from 1747 to 1837), and by the 10th revision (1857) this share fell to 37%. According to the population census of 1857-1859, 23.1 million people (of both sexes) out of 62.5 million people inhabiting the Russian Empire were in serfdom. Of the 65 provinces and regions that existed in the Russian Empire in 1858, in the three Baltic provinces (Estonia, Courland, Livonia), in the Land of the Black Sea Army, in the Primorsky region, the Semipalatinsk region and the region of the Siberian Kyrgyz, in the Derbent province (with the Caspian region) and in the Erivan province there were no serfs at all; in another 4 administrative units (Arkhangelsk and Shemakha provinces, Transbaikal and Yakutsk regions) there were also no serfs, with the exception of several dozen courtyard people (servants). In the remaining 52 provinces and regions, the share of serfs in the population ranged from 1.17% (Bessarabian region) to 69.07% (Smolensk province).

The main reasons for the reform were: the crisis of the serfdom system, peasant unrest, which especially intensified during the Crimean War. The peasants, to whom the tsarist government turned for help, conscripting them into the militia, believed that by their service they would earn themselves freedom from serfdom. The hopes of the peasants were not justified. The number of peasant protests grew. If in 1856 there were 66 speeches, then in 1859 there were already 797. A significant role in the abolition of serfdom was played by the moral aspect and the issue of state prestige.

Preparation of reform

On January 3, 1857, a new Secret Committee on Peasant Affairs was established, consisting of 11 people (former chief of gendarmes A.F. Orlov, M.N. Muravyov, P.P. Gagarin, etc.) On July 26, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and member Committee S. S. Lansky presented an official reform project. It was proposed to create noble committees in each province that would have the right to make their own amendments to the draft. This program was legalized on November 20 in a rescript addressed to the Vilna Governor-General V. I. Nazimov.

The government program, set out in the rescript of Emperor Alexander II dated November 20, 1857 to the Vilna Governor-General V.I. Nazimov, provided for the destruction of the personal dependence of the peasants while maintaining all the land in the ownership of the landowners (patrimonial power over the peasants also, according to the document, remained with the landowners) ; providing peasants with a certain amount of land, for which they will be required to pay quitrents or serve corvee, and, over time, the right to buy out peasant estates (a residential building and outbuildings). Legal dependence was not eliminated immediately, but only after a transition period (12 years). The rescript was published and sent to all governors of the country.

In 1858, provincial committees were formed to prepare peasant reforms, within which a struggle began for measures and forms of concessions between liberal and reactionary landowners. The committees were subordinate to the Main Committee for Peasant Affairs (transformed from the Secret Committee). The fear of an all-Russian peasant revolt forced the government to change the government program of peasant reform, the projects of which were repeatedly changed in connection with the rise or decline of the peasant movement.

The new program of the Main Committee for Peasant Affairs was approved by the Tsar on April 21, 1858. The program was built on the principles of the rescript to Nazimov. The program provided mitigation serfdom, but not her liquidation. At the same time, peasant unrest became more frequent. The peasants, not without reason, were worried about landless liberation, arguing that “will alone will not feed bread.”

On December 4, 1858, a new peasant reform program was adopted: providing peasants with the opportunity to buy out land and creating peasant public administration bodies. Unlike the previous one, this program was more radical, and the government was largely pushed to adopt it by numerous peasant unrest (along with pressure from the opposition). This program was developed by Ya. I. Rostovtsev. The main provisions of the new program were as follows:

• peasants gaining personal freedom
• providing peasants with plots of land (for permanent use) with the right of purchase (especially for this, the government allocates a special loan to peasants)
• approval of a transitional (“urgently obligated”) state

To consider projects of provincial committees and develop peasant reform, in March 1859, Editorial Commissions were created under the Main Committee (in fact, there was only one commission) chaired by Ya. I. Rostovtsev. In fact, the work of the Editorial Commissions was led by N. A. Milyutin. The project drawn up by the Editorial Commissions by August 1859 differed from that proposed by the provincial committees by increasing land allotments and reducing duties.

At the end of August 1859, deputies from 21 provincial committees were summoned. In February of the following year, deputies from 24 provincial committees were summoned. After the death of Rostovtsev, the place of chairman of the Editorial Commissions was taken by the conservative and serf owner V. N. Panin. The more liberal project aroused discontent among the local nobility, and in 1860 the project, with the active participation of Panin, slightly reduced allotments and increased duties. This direction in changing the project was preserved both when it was considered by the Main Committee on Peasant Affairs in October 1860, and when it was discussed in the State Council from the end of January 1861.

On February 19 (March 3), 1861, in St. Petersburg, Emperor Alexander II signed the Manifesto “On the Most Merciful Granting of the Rights of Free Rural Citizens to Serfs” and the Regulations on Peasants Emerging from Serfdom, which consisted of 17 legislative acts.

The manifesto was published in Moscow on March 5 (old style), 1861, on Forgiveness Sunday in the Assumption Cathedral of the Kremlin after the liturgy; at the same time it was published in St. Petersburg and some other cities; in other places - during March of the same year.

On February 19 (March 3), 1861 in St. Petersburg, Alexander II signed the Manifesto on the abolition of serfdom and the Regulations on peasants emerging from serfdom, which consisted of 17 legislative acts. The manifesto “On the Most Gracious Granting of the Rights of Free Rural Citizens to Serfs” dated February 19, 1861 was accompanied by a number of legislative acts (22 documents in total) concerning the issues of the emancipation of peasants, the conditions for their purchase of landowners’ land and the size of the purchased plots in certain regions of Russia.

Main provisions of the reform

The main act - “General Regulations on Peasants Emerging from Serfdom” - contained the main conditions of the peasant reform:

• Peasants received personal freedom and the right to freely dispose of their property;
• Peasants received elected self-government, the lowest (economic) unit of self-government was the rural society, the highest (administrative) unit was the volost.
• The landowners retained ownership of all the lands that belonged to them, but were obliged to provide the peasants with a “homestead settlement” (a house plot) and a field allotment for use; Field allotment lands were not provided to peasants personally, but for the collective use of rural societies, which could distribute them among peasant farms at their own discretion. The minimum size of a peasant plot for each locality was established by law.
• For the use of allotment land, peasants had to serve corvee or pay quitrent and did not have the right to refuse it for 9 years.
• The size of the field allotment and duties had to be recorded in charters, which were drawn up by landowners for each estate and verified by peace intermediaries;
• Rural societies were given the right to buy out the estate and, by agreement with the landowner, the field allotment, after which all obligations of the peasants to the landowner ceased;
• The state, on preferential terms, provided landowners with financial guarantees for receiving redemption payments (redemption operation), taking over their payment; peasants, accordingly, had to pay redemption payments to the state.

Allotment size

According to the reform, the maximum and minimum sizes of peasant plots were established. Allotments could be reduced by special agreements between peasants and landowners, as well as upon receipt of a gift allotment. If peasants had smaller plots of land for use, the landowner was obliged to either cut off the missing land from the minimum amount (the so-called “cut”), or reduce duties. Reductions took place only if the landowner retained at least a third (in the steppe zones - half) of the land. For the highest shower allotment, a quitrent was set from 8 to 12 rubles. per year or corvee - 40 men's and 30 women's working days per year. If the allotment was larger than the highest one, then the landowner cut off the “extra” land for his own benefit. If the allotment was less than the highest, then the duties were reduced, but not proportionally.

As a result, the average size of a peasant allotment in the post-reform period was 3.3 dessiatines per capita, which was less than before the reform. In the black earth provinces, landowners cut off a fifth of their lands from the peasants. The Volga region peasants suffered the greatest losses. In addition to sections, other instruments for infringing on the rights of peasants were resettlement to infertile lands, deprivation of pastures, forests, reservoirs, paddocks and other lands necessary for every peasant. The striping also posed difficulties for the peasants, forcing the peasants to rent land from the landowners, who protruded like wedges into the peasant plots.

Duties of temporarily obliged peasants

The peasants were in a temporary state of obligation until the conclusion of the redemption transaction. At first, the duration of this condition was not indicated. It was finally installed on December 28, 1881. According to the decree, all temporarily obliged peasants were transferred to redemption from January 1, 1883. A similar situation occurred only in the central regions of the empire. On the outskirts, the temporarily obliged state of the peasants remained until 1912-1913.

During the temporary obligatory state, peasants were obliged to pay rent for the use of land and work in corvee. The quitrent for a full allotment was 8-12 rubles per year. The profitability of the allotment and the size of the quitrent were in no way connected. The highest quitrent (12 rubles per year) was paid by the peasants of the St. Petersburg province, whose lands were extremely infertile. On the contrary, in the black earth provinces the amount of quitrent was significantly lower.

Another flaw of the quitrent was its gradation, when the first tithe of land was valued more expensive than the rest. For example, in non-chernozem lands, with a full allotment of 4 dessiatines and a quitrent of 10 rubles, for the first tithe the peasant paid 5 rubles, which was 50% of the quitrent amount (for the last two dessiatines, the peasant paid 12.5% ​​of the total quitrent amount). This forced peasants to buy land, and gave landowners the opportunity to profitably sell infertile land.

All men aged 18 to 55 and all women aged 17 to 50 were required to serve corvée. Unlike the previous corvee, the post-reform corvee was more limited and orderly. For a full allotment, a peasant was supposed to work in corvee no more than 40 men's and 30 women's days.

Local provisions

The rest of the “Local Provisions” basically repeated the “Great Russian Provisions”, but taking into account the specifics of their regions. The features of the Peasant Reform for certain categories of peasants and specific areas were determined by the “Additional Rules” - “On the arrangement of peasants settled on the estates of small landowners, and on benefits to these owners”, “On people assigned to private mining factories of the Ministry of Finance”, “On peasants and workers serving work at Perm private mining factories and salt mines”, “About peasants serving work in landowner factories”, “About peasants and courtyard people in the Land of the Don Army”, “About peasants and courtyard people in the Stavropol province”, “ About peasants and courtyard people in Siberia”, “About people who emerged from serfdom in the Bessarabian region”.

Liberation of the domestic peasants

The “Regulations on the Settlement of Household People” provided for their release without land and estate, but for 2 years they remained completely dependent on the landowner. Household servants at that time made up 6.5% of serfs. Thus, a huge number of peasants found themselves practically without a livelihood.

Redemption payments

The regulation “On the redemption of peasants who have emerged from serfdom, their settled estates and the government’s assistance in the acquisition of field land by these peasants” determined the procedure for the redemption of land by peasants from landowners, the organization of the redemption operation, the rights and obligations of peasant owners. The redemption of a field plot depended on an agreement with the landowner, who could oblige the peasants to buy the land at his request. The price of land was determined by quitrent, capitalized at 6% per annum. In case of redemption by voluntary agreement, the peasants had to make an additional payment to the landowner. The landowner received the main amount from the state.

The peasant was obliged to immediately pay the landowner 20% of the redemption amount, and the remaining 80% was contributed by the state. The peasants had to repay it annually over 49 years in equal redemption payments. The annual payment was 6% of the redemption amount. Thus, the peasants paid a total of 294% of the redemption loan. In modern terms, the buyout loan was a loan with annuity payments for a term of 49 years at 5.6% per annum. Payment of ransom payments was stopped in 1906 under the conditions of the First Russian Revolution. By 1906, peasants paid 1 billion 571 million rubles in ransom for lands worth 544 million rubles. Thus, the peasants actually (including interest on the loan) paid triple the amount. The loan rate of 5.6% per annum, taking into account the non-mortgage nature of the loan (for non-payment of redemption fees, it was possible to seize the personal property of the peasants, which does not have production value, but not the land itself) and the manifested unreliability of the borrowers, was balanced and consistent with the existing lending rates of all other types borrowers at that time.

Reform Analysis

Historians who lived in the era of Alexander II and studied the peasant question commented on the main provisions of these laws as follows. As M.N. Pokrovsky pointed out, the entire reform for the majority of peasants boiled down to the fact that they ceased to be officially called “serfs”, but began to be called “obligated”; Formally, they began to be considered free, but absolutely nothing changed in their situation or even worsened: in particular, the landowners began to flog the peasants even more. “To be declared a free man by the tsar,” the historian wrote, “and at the same time continue to go to corvée or pay quitrent: this was a glaring contradiction that caught the eye. The “obligated” peasants firmly believed that this will was not real...” The same opinion was shared, for example, by the historian N.A. Rozhkov, one of the most authoritative experts on the agrarian issue of pre-revolutionary Russia, as well as a number of other authors who wrote about the peasant issue.

There is an opinion that the laws of February 19, 1861, which meant the legal abolition of serfdom (in legal terms of the second half of the 19th century), were not its abolition as a socio-economic institution (although they created the conditions for this to happen over the following decades ). Serfdom in Russia arose at the end of the 16th and beginning of the 17th centuries. as a ban on peasants leaving the land they cultivated, and the term itself (serfdom) appeared later than this ban, which for several decades existed as a kind of temporary measure taken due to emergency circumstances (Troubles of 1598-1613, economic crisis, devastation, etc.). Only during the first half of the 17th century. (finally in the Code of 1649) serfdom was legally recorded as the permanent attachment of peasants to the land. But the emergence of serfdom is clearly dated by historians not from the moment of its full legal registration, but from the moment of its actual emergence (late 16th - early 17th centuries). Accordingly, after the reform of 1861, until 1906, despite the legal abolition of serfdom, there remained an actual ban on the departure of “obligated” and “redemption” peasants from their plot of land, which indicates the preservation of serfdom as a socio-economic Institute. Earlier in history, the disappearance of this institution also did not happen in one day; for example, in Western Europe it lasted for 2-3 centuries (XI-XIV centuries).

As for the specific conditions for the redemption of land, according to N. Rozhkov and D. Blum, in the non-black earth zone of Russia, where the bulk of serfs lived, the redemption value of land was on average 2.2 times higher than its market value, and in some cases it exceeded it even 5-6 times. Therefore, in fact, the redemption price established in accordance with the reform of 1861 included not only the redemption of land, but also the redemption of the peasant himself and his family - just as previously serfs could buy their freed land from the landowner for money by agreement with the latter. Thus, the conditions for the liberation of peasants in Russia were much worse than in the Baltic states, where they were liberated under Alexander I without land, but also without the need to pay a ransom for themselves.

Accordingly, under the terms of the reform, peasants could not refuse to buy out the land, which M. N. Pokrovsky calls “compulsory property.” And “to prevent the owner from running away from her,” writes the historian, “which, given the circumstances of the case, could have been expected,” it was necessary to place the “released” person in such legal conditions that are very reminiscent of the state, if not of a prisoner, then of a minor or feeble-minded person in prison. under guardianship."

Another result of the reform of 1861 was the emergence of the so-called. sections - parts of the land, averaging about 20%, which were previously in the hands of peasants, but now found themselves in the hands of landowners and were not subject to redemption. As N.A. Rozhkov pointed out, the division of land was specially carried out by the landowners in such a way that “the peasants found themselves cut off by the landowner’s land from a watering hole, forest, high road, church, sometimes from their arable land and meadows... [as a result] they were forced to rent the landowner’s land land at any cost, on any terms." “Having cut off from the peasants, according to the Regulations of February 19, lands that were absolutely necessary for them,” wrote M. N. Pokrovsky, “meadows, pastures, even places for driving cattle to watering places, the landowners forced them to rent these lands only for work , with the obligation to plow, sow and harvest a certain number of acres for the landowner.” In memoirs and descriptions written by the landowners themselves, the historian pointed out, this practice of cuttings was described as universal - there were practically no landowners' farms where cuttings did not exist. In one example, the landowner “bragged that his segments covered, as if in a ring, 18 villages, which were all in bondage to him; As soon as the German tenant arrived, he remembered atreski as one of the first Russian words and, renting an estate, first of all inquired whether this jewel was in it.”

Subsequently, the elimination of sections became one of the main demands not only of peasants, but also of revolutionaries in the last third of the 19th century. (populists, Narodnaya Volya, etc.), but also most revolutionary and democratic parties at the beginning of the 20th century, until 1917. Thus, the agrarian program of the Bolsheviks until December 1905 included the liquidation of landowner plots as the main and essentially the only point; the same demand was the main point of the agrarian program of the I and II State Duma (1905-1907), adopted by the overwhelming majority of its members (including deputies from the Menshevik, Socialist Revolutionary, Cadets and Trudoviks parties), but rejected by Nicholas II and Stolypin. Previously, the elimination of such forms of exploitation of peasants by landowners - the so-called. banalities - was one of the main demands of the population during the French Revolution.

According to N. Rozhkov, the “serfdom” reform of February 19, 1861 became “the starting point of the entire process of the origin of the revolution” in Russia.

Implementation of reform

The “Manifesto” and “Regulations” were published from March 7 to April 10 (in St. Petersburg and Moscow - March 5). Fearing the dissatisfaction of the peasants with the conditions of the reform, the government took a number of precautions (relocation of troops, sending members of the imperial retinue to places, appeal of the Synod, etc.). The peasantry, dissatisfied with the enslaving conditions of the reform, responded to it with mass unrest. The largest of them were the Bezdnensky uprising of 1861 and the Kandeyevsky uprising of 1861.

The implementation of the Peasant Reform began with the drawing up of statutory charters, which was basically completed by mid-1863. The statutory charters were concluded not with each peasant individually, but with the “world” as a whole. "The World" was a society of peasants who were owned by an individual landowner. On January 1, 1863, peasants refused to sign about 60% of the charters.

The purchase price of land significantly exceeded its market value at that time, in some areas by 2-3 times. (in 1854-1855 the price of all peasant lands was 544 million rubles, while the redemption amounted to 867 million). As a result of this, in a number of regions, peasants sought to receive gift plots and in some provinces (Saratov, Samara, Ekaterinoslav, Voronezh, etc.) a significant number of peasant gift-holders appeared.

Under the influence of the Polish uprising of 1863, changes occurred in the conditions of the Peasant Reform in Lithuania, Belarus and Right Bank Ukraine: the law of 1863 introduced compulsory redemption; redemption payments decreased by 20%; peasants who were dispossessed of land from 1857 to 1861 received their allotments in full, those dispossessed of land earlier - partially.

The peasants' transition to ransom lasted for several decades. By 1881, 15% remained in temporary obligations. But in a number of provinces there were still many of them (Kursk 160 thousand, 44%; Nizhny Novgorod 119 thousand, 35%; Tula 114 thousand, 31%; Kostroma 87 thousand, 31%). The transition to ransom proceeded faster in the black earth provinces, where voluntary transactions prevailed over compulsory ransom. Landowners who had large debts, more often than others, sought to speed up the redemption and enter into voluntary transactions.

The abolition of serfdom also affected appanage peasants, who, by the “Regulations of June 26, 1863,” were transferred to the category of peasant owners through compulsory redemption under the terms of the “Regulations of February 19.” In general, their plots were significantly smaller than those of the landowner peasants. The average size of the former appanage peasant's allotment was 4.8 tithes per capita. The purchase of land by appanage peasants was carried out on the same terms as serfs (that is, capitalization of 6% of the quitrent). Unlike landowner peasants, who were transferred to redemption after 20 years, appanage peasants were transferred to redemption after 2 years.

The law of November 24, 1866 began the reform of state peasants. They retained all the lands in their use. According to the law of June 12, 1886, state peasants were transferred to redemption. At his own request, the peasant could either continue to pay the quitrent to the state, or enter into a buyout deal with it. The average size of a state peasant's allotment was 5.9 dessiatines.

The peasant reform of 1861 entailed the abolition of serfdom in the national outskirts of the Russian Empire.

On October 13, 1864, a decree was issued on the abolition of serfdom in the Tiflis province; a year later it was extended, with some changes, to the Kutaisi province, and in 1866 to Megrelia. In Abkhazia, serfdom was abolished in 1870, in Svaneti - in 1871. The conditions of the reform here retained the remnants of serfdom to a greater extent than under the “Regulations of February 19”. In Armenia and Azerbaijan, peasant reform was carried out in 1870-83 and was no less enslaving in nature than in Georgia. In Bessarabia, the bulk of the peasant population was made up of legally free landless peasants - tsarans, who, according to the “Regulations of July 14, 1868,” were allocated land for permanent use in exchange for services. The redemption of this land was carried out with some derogations on the basis of the “Redemption Regulations” of February 19, 1861.

Memory

The idea of ​​building a temple in honor of the abolition of serfdom in the Russian Empire appeared in society immediately after the publication of the Manifesto. Among the initiators of this project was the famous Russian historian, member of the Russian Academy M.N. Pogodin.

The result of this movement was the construction of the Alexander Nevsky Cathedral in Moscow. The temple was founded in 1911, on the 50th anniversary of the reform, and completed in 1917. Subsequently, during the years of Soviet power, it was destroyed.

The activities of the Secret Committee of 1857 are fairly fully covered in general works on the abolition of serfdom and in special studies. Of all the government institutions involved in preparing the reform, only the Secret Committee was studied. However, many issues of its history remained poorly understood, in particular: the difference from the previous Secret Committees, contradictions and clashes in the activities of the last Secret Committee and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, differences in the position of these two parts of the state mechanism of the absolute monarchy on programmatic issues of reform, departure from traditional forms and methods of state practice.

§ 1. SECRET COMMITTEE: COMPOSITION, ACTIVITIES

The Secret Committee on Peasant Affairs was created on January 3, 1857. Alexander II established the Committee “under his direct jurisdiction” and himself outlined its composition. In the absence of the Tsar, the Adjutant General Prince presided over the Committee. A. F. Orlov.

70-year-old A.F. Orlov had by this time reached the pinnacle of his bureaucratic career. He was the chief of the gendarmes and the head of the III department of his own e.i. V. chancellery from 1844 to 1856 (after A. X. Benckendorf). Nicholas I considered him his friend. In 1856, Orlov led the Russian delegation at the conclusion of the Paris Peace Treaty and received the title of prince; in the same year he was appointed chairman of the State Council and the Committee of Ministers. A participant in the Patriotic War of 1812 (Borodinsky and many other battles), the Russian-Turkish War of 1828-1829, Orlov in 1833, as ambassador extraordinary in Constantinople, concluded the Unkiyar-Isklessi Treaty. The brother of the Decembrist M.F. Orlov, he was among those

who suppressed the uprising, and, as it appears in his formal list, “for excellent actions against the rebels” received the dignity of count. In 1831, he took part in the suppression of the cholera riot in St. Petersburg and the uprising in military settlements. Having no family property, Orlov acquired and received large land holdings for his faithful service to the monarch, so that in the early 50s he became one of the largest land owners: he and his wife had 171,370 dessiatines. land and all sorts of lands in several provinces. Orlov was a serf owner in the precise sense of the word, both in social status and in his views. He was deeply alien to everything new, progressive, he belonged entirely to the past. Orlov never dealt with the peasant question, did not know and did not recognize it.

Almost the entire composition of the Committee matched him: the Chairman of the Department of Laws of the State Council, Mr. D. N. Bludov, book. P. P. Gagarin, bar. M. A. Korf, adjutant general Ya. I. Rostovtsev and K. V. Chevkin, chief of gendarmes and head of the III department of the book. V. A. Dolgorukov, Minister of the Imperial Court gr. V. F. Adlerberg, Minister of Internal Affairs S. S. Lanskoy, Minister of Finance P. F. Brock (in March he was replaced by A. M. Knyazhevich). Subsequently, the following were added to the Committee: April 22, 1857 M. N. Muravyov, newly appointed Minister of State Property, July 31, 1857 led. book Konstantin Nikolaevich, January 17, 1858 Minister of Justice gr. V. N. Panin. The management of the affairs of the Secret Committee was entrusted to Secretary of State V.P. Butkov, and “to help him” was appointed acting. Deputy State Secretary of the State Council S. M. Zhukovsky. The members of the Secret Committee belonged to the highest strata of the bureaucracy, many were representatives of the aristocracy and large landowners. The absolute majority were opponents of the liberation of the peasants.

Some of the members of the Secret Committee deserve special attention for the role they played during the preparation of the reform.

Adjutant General Ya. I. Rostovtsev was the closest confidant to Alexander II in the government environment, thanks to which he acquired special influence on policy on the peasant issue. Already on February 22, 1855, Alexander II appointed Rostovtsev as head of the General Staff for military educational institutions, and in March of the same year as a member of the State Council and present on the Committee of Ministers. Their friendship had developed over the previous twenty years (despite the 15-year age difference). Rostovtsev came from the nobility of the St. Petersburg province and belonged to the military bureaucracy; he had no land ownership. In his youth, Rostovtsev was close to the leaders of the Northern Society of Decembrists, but joined a secret revolutionary organization

refused. On the eve of the uprising, he informed Nicholas I about the upcoming performance (without hiding it from his friends), and on December 14 he participated in the suppression of the uprising, was wounded and “for diligence and accuracy in the performance of his duties” received a promotion and an order. The return of the Decembrists from Siberia at the end of 1856, on the eve of the establishment of the Secret Committee, stirred up the past, which had already been pushed into the shadows, both for Rostovtsev himself and his family, and for his contemporaries. As the peasant question develops and is defined in socio-political life and studies it, Rostovtsev will radically change his views; the past, in particular, will push him towards a modern liberal program and towards a rapprochement with liberal statesmen. But this will happen outside the activities of the Secret Committee, in the second half of 1858 and in 1859.

S. S. Lanskoy became a member of the Secret Committee as the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, specially concerned with the peasant issue. He was already of advanced years (born in 1785) and had extensive experience in administrative service. In 1830-1834. Lanskoy was a civil governor, first in Kostroma, then in Vladimir, after that he was present in the Senate, from 1850 he was a member of the State Council, the following year he was granted full privy councilor status. S.S. Lanskoy came from the nobility, was educated at home, and had a family estate of 150 dessiatines. in the Tver province, some acquired land with serfs and a house in St. Petersburg. He did not belong to the titled nobility (he received the title of count in 1861 after his resignation). In his youth, Lanskoy was a member of the Union of Welfare, but withdrew from secret societies long before the uprising and was not involved in the investigation. Unlike most of his colleagues on the Secret Committee, he was a supporter of the abolition of serfdom, gravitated toward liberalism, but, without a clear program, he was very dependent on his closest assistants. However, having determined his position, he became firm and adamant. Ultimately, his role in preparing the reform was determined by the choice of N. A. Milyutin (instead of A. I. Levshin) to the position of his comrade and complete trust in him.

The Minister of State Property, General of the Infantry, M. N. Muravyov, was a reactionary man, although in the past he was also a member of the Union of Welfare. In contrast to his brother, Decembrist A.N. Muravyov, who served as military governor of Nizhny Novgorod in 1855-1861. contributed in every possible way to the liberation of the peasants and supported the policy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, M. N. Muravyov is an active opponent of peasant reform and a defender of the inviolability of noble land ownership (he and his wife had

about 600 souls of peasants in the St. Petersburg and Smolensk provinces).

Among the influential serf owners of the Secret Committee were Prince. P. P. Gagarin, book. V. A. Dolgorukov and gr. V. N. Panin. All three belonged to the highest noble aristocracy and were large landowners. Gagarin had more than 2,000 peasant souls in the Nizhny Novgorod province (almost all on the family estate), Dolgorukov had 1,800 souls, and together with his wife about 6,800 (also on the family estate) in the Smolensk and Tver provinces; Panin had (together with his parents) more than 12,500 peasant souls in his family's possession in nine provinces of the central regions of Russia. All three achieved high positions in the bureaucratic world under Nicholas I. From 1818, Gagarin served in various departments of the Senate, in 1843 he received the rank of actual Privy Councilor and from 1844 he became a member of the State Council. At the time of the establishment of the Secret Committee, he was an experienced, wise administrator of 68 years. He kept a diary in which he reflected the activities of the Committee. Dolgorukov in 1852-1856. was Minister of War and turned out to be mediocre and helpless in the difficult circumstances of the Crimean War. In June 1856, he became chief of gendarmes and head of the III department, replacing Orlov, who had been promoted. Gagarin and Dolgorukov were members of the Investigative Commission in the Petrashevites case in 1849. Panin was appointed manager of the Ministry of Justice back in 1839 and approved as minister in 1841, remaining in this post until February 1860, when, after the death of Rostovtsev, he became chairman of the Editorial Commissions. Panin appeared in the Secret Committee later than others, after the publication of the first rescripts.

Of the remaining members of the Secret Committee, gr. D. N. Bludov and bar. M. A. Korf.

D. N. Bludov (count since 1842) replaced A. F. Orlov as chairman of the Committee (he was one year older than Orlov). He had (together with his wife) ancestral land property of about 2,500 dessiatines. in different provinces. The nephew of G.R. Derzhavin, Bludov was an educated man close to literary circles; in his youth he was one of the founders and an active member of the Arzamas literary circle. In 1855 he became president of the Academy of Sciences (and remained in this post until his death, until 1864). Better than other members of the Committee, Bludsv knew the legislation of the Russian monarchy and the peasant issue. He was the clerk of the first Secret Committee of 1826, the Minister of the Interior in 1832-1838, and from 1840 he was the chief manager of the II department of his own e.i. V. office (codification). Under his leadership, two

editions of the Code of Laws (1842 and 1857). Bludov, more than other members of the Committee, with the exception of M.A. Korf, knew about the program of the Decembrists, about their demands and aspirations; he compiled a “report” to the Investigative Commission on their case.

M. A. Korf graduated from the Tsarskoye Selo Lyceum in 1817, together with A. S. Pushkin and some future Decembrists. He was not involved in the Decembrist movement and, unlike many of his friends of these years, began his career early and safely. In 1848, on the instructions of Nicholas I and the heir to the throne (the future Alexander II), he wrote the book “The Accession to the Throne of Emperor Nicholas I,” in which he gave the official version of the history of the Decembrist movement. Publishing in 1857 (for the first time in a widely censored press) materials about the uprising on Senate Square, he viewed the events from the point of view of the highest authorities. In his views and beliefs, Korf was alien to his former Tsarskoye Selo friends. He did not seek business contacts or internal spiritual connections with the Decembrists who returned from exile. But from a letter from I. I. Pushchin from St. Petersburg to E. P. Obolensky in Kaluga dated January 8, 1857, we learn that Korf was among the lyceum friends who visited Pushchin in the house on the Moika. Korf was burdened by his appointment to the Secret Committee and, citing ignorance of the peasant question both in theory and in practice (he had no serfs), sought to resign from its membership, and finally received the consent of Alexander II to this at the beginning of 1858.

The activities of other members of the Secret Committee were not particularly noteworthy. Gr. V. F. Adlerberg, in his views and service experience, belonged to the old Nikolaev bureaucracy. He was the closest friend of Nicholas I throughout his reign, at the end of his reign he became a minister, and at the beginning he was seconded to the Investigative Commission on the Decembrist case. Adlerberg came from the nobility of the Estland province and had no land ownership (his wife had about 1,500 serfs). K.V. Chevkin also had personal “merits” to Nicholas I: on December 14, 1825, he “was near the Tsar and personally received orders from him,” and then received the order. He reached the highest positions in the civil service under Alexander II. Chevkin came from the nobility; in fact, he had no land ownership. He did not belong to the rabid serf owners and gradually moved to the position of supporters of the reform.

The Secret Committee was staffed by members of the State Council; its meetings usually took place in the State Council hall, sometimes in the Tsar's Winter Palace. This reflected the established tradition of organizing the former Sec-

military committees. What was unusual about the last Secret Committee was that 10 of its 14 members were in one way or another connected in their past activities with the history of the liberation movement: seven participated in the suppression of the Decembrist uprising, subsequently over the Decembrists and Petrashevites, two themselves took part in their youth in the Union of Welfare, one studied the history of Decembrism. This experience of the past did not pass without a trace and influenced the perception of the Committee members of the socio-political situation of the late 50s. Their speeches and behavior showed fear of the possibility of struggle or discontent among the peasantry and nobility.

The secrecy of the Committee's existence was strictly maintained. In Orlov’s “most humble” report dated January 9, 1857, it was recognized that it was necessary “to take such measures regarding the Committee’s paperwork that would make it possible to keep the purpose and intentions of the government, even the very establishment of the Committee, in strict secrecy.” Orlov’s prudent caution extended far: when requesting papers from the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Secret Committee, it was indicated that the State Chancellery needed them for a report to Alexander II, “without mentioning the establishment of the Committee and without saying that this information was needed for the report to the Committee.” Cases that became archival - materials of the Secret Committees of Nicholas I, legislation already adopted and implemented - inventories, decrees of 1803 on free cultivators and 1842 on obliged peasants, were sent from the Ministry to Butkov only “secretly”, and some even “very secretly” ".

Contemporaries are unanimous in their assessment of the last Secret Committee. D. A. Obolensky wrote in his memoirs: “In St. Petersburg, the Secret Committee on the Peasant Question, composed of the highest state dignitaries, completely incapable and unprepared to draw up any project for the liberation of the peasants... was engaged in pouring from empty to empty... Question was raised, all of Russia found out about it, and although the committee was secret, nevertheless, its inconsistency was not a secret to anyone.” A.I. Levshin gave the following description of the Secret Committee: “In general, the composition of the Committee was very unsuccessful and therefore it is no wonder that for the first half of the year it only looked at the beast (i.e., the peasant question - L. 3.) indicated to it, and walked near it, not knowing which side to approach it from. In the intervals, the president (A.F. Orlov. - p/7. 3.) was engaged in mortgaging his or his wife’s estates into the guardianship council, which aroused general fear; all over Russia they talked about it and rushed to imitate him,” etc. F.P. Elenev concluded his opinion about the Committee as follows: “The Emperor is very

knew well the direction of thoughts of the members he appointed and nevertheless allowed a decisive advantage on the side of the opponents of liberation, as if he himself did not trust his thoughts and was looking for objections to it.”

None of the members of the Secret Committee had any serious knowledge of the peasant question. At one of the first meetings, Korf and Rostovtsev, “in sincere self-awareness,” declared that they were “least capable” of important responsibilities, that “the structure and needs of rural life... are known to them only superficially from what they read or heard from others.” With no less sincerity, “the chairman of the committee explained against this that all members of the committee are in almost the same position..., but this cannot prevent them from expressing their opinion in general state terms.” D. A. Obolensky also wrote about the unpreparedness of the Committee members to resolve the peasant issue. Here is his impression of a conversation with V.A. Dolgorukov, recorded on January 16, 1857. At breakfast with the leader. book Ekaterina Mikhailovna Obolensky advised Dolgorukov to read the note on the peasant issue by Yu. F. Samarin. Obolensky became convinced that Dolgorukov “understands absolutely nothing about this matter and that he wants to at least grab some top positions in order to be able to say something in the Committee, although he himself is not a partisan of liberation.” Dolgorukov asked Obolensky to compile a summary of the notes of Yu. F. Samarin and M. P. Posen, which was done. In response to Obolensky’s recommendation to seriously study the peasant question, Dolgorukov said that he had no time to study it, since “there’s a ball there today, lunch tomorrow, and so on.” At the end of the recording of this conversation, Obolensky laments “the insignificance of these statesmen.”

The first meeting of the Secret Committee took place on January 3, 1857 in the Winter Palace in the office of Alexander II, who opened it. The Tsar expressed his “absolute will” that all the work of the Committee be kept in “strict secrecy” and stated that, in his opinion, “serfdom has almost become obsolete.” At the beginning of the meeting, the report of the Minister of Internal Affairs dated December 20, 1856 was read, at the end of the same meeting - the project of M. P. Posen, which attracted the “special attention” of Alexander II, presented to him on December 18, 1856 (the same Posen's note, which the Ministry of the Interior gave a negative opinion in its note of December 23, also presented to Alexander II).

In the first six months of its existence, the Secret Committee, although it used the term “liberation of the peasants,”

based its recommendations solely on existing legislation and did not even develop a specific action plan. It was intended to begin a “detailed revision” of two decrees: on obligated peasants and on free cultivators. The possibility of discussing the issue of introducing in all landowner estates inventories similar to those recently introduced in the Vitebsk and Mogilev provinces (i.e., not the southwestern ones, where allotments and duties were strictly regulated, and the land was assigned for “eternal” use) was not excluded.

Despite strict adherence to already established practice both in substance and in methods of work, the journals of the meetings, written in clerical language, still convey a sense of the unusual political situation in which the work of this last Secret Committee took place. At the very first meeting, in response to the question proposed by Alexander II: “Should we now begin to take any measures to free the serfs?” - “the meeting unanimously recognized that at present the minds of both landowners and the serfs who belong to them, especially peasants, are in some kind of expectation... Of course, such expectation and the very excitement of the minds is not new... But nevertheless one cannot help but admit “that even if it is not stronger now than it was at another time, it still exists and with further development it can have consequences that are more or less harmful, even dangerous.”

At the second meeting, on January 17, “some of the members, taking into account the present ferment of minds, which may indeed already be intensifying ... would consider it not only useful, but even necessary to give some publicity to the proceedings of the Committee, and with a frank presentation of the plans of the government to calm the minds and peasants and landowners." They proposed publishing a “highest” personal decree on this to the Senate. His draft, written by Rostovtsev, is brief. The very first lines betray the government’s fear for the “state of mind”: “For some time now, various rumors have begun to spread among the people that some changes have been made in the condition of the landowner peasants. These rumors are spread by unkind people in order to deceive the peasants and disturb the landowners.”

The chief of the gendarmes, Dolgorukov, admitted that “there is fermentation of minds regarding freedom in the serf class; but it is exaggerated and supported more by the fear of the landowners themselves.” He suggested that instead of publishing a decree, “firmly support the existing order of social order.” Two years later, in his next “all-submissive” report for 1858, Dolgorukov would convince the tsar of the need to accept and declare at the end of 1859 “in the main features of the

hope that the government will resolve the peasant issue,” since “there is a limit to patience while waiting.”

Seven members of the Secret Committee (out of 10 present) - Orlov, Lanskoy, Korf, Chevkin, Rostovtsev, Brock, Adlerberg - did not share Dolgorukov’s opinion. They argued that a decree should be published. The alarmed members of the Secret Committee, borrowing the principle of openness from the arsenal of modern trends alien to them, tried to calm the “ferment of minds,” prevent the brewing of discontent and crisis, and strengthen their class positions. It was self-deception. When they resort to glasnost (in November the Secret Committee will speak out in favor of publishing a rescript to Nazimov), this will widen the still barely noticeable cracks in the mechanism of the absolute monarchy. And the first metamorphosis will take place with the Secret Committee itself. It will turn into the Main, i.e. vowel, and then others will follow.

It is interesting that representatives of the bureaucracy, such different in their views as Orlov and his like-minded people, on the one hand, and Milyutin, on the other (in a note of 1856), distinguished among the landowners those who adhere to the old order and those who strive to transformations. Only Orlov focuses on the reactionary masses and considers the transformative plans of the “enlightened” landowners a utopia, and Milyutin urges us to rely on precisely this enlightened (liberal) part of the landowners. The attempt to use monarchical elements in the ideology of the peasantry and protect the landowners from the hatred of the peasants with the “royal word” is also interesting. Although the members of the Secret Committee did not know the peasant question, this did not prevent them from taking a clear class position.

The seven members believed so much in the success of their plan that they saw the “highest” decree to the governing Senate not only sent out in “the largest number of copies” to all governors, all provincial and district leaders, but also posted “in a frame under glass” in the offices of the patrimonial administrations , in parish churches, in the offices of bailiffs, in rural departments of the state property department. “We note,” it was stated in parentheses, “that from this department rumors are often disseminated among the landowner peasants about their conversion to the state.” How can we not recall the two-pronged reform plan of P. D. Kiselev, how can we not state the complete validity of these rumors. The words of seven members of the Secret Committee were aimed at Kiselev’s department, which at the time of his power he dreamed of turning into the “Ministry of Reforms”, but due to circumstances he could not.

The harmonious unity of the seven members, who seemed close to success, was disrupted by Gagarin. He made a remark that somehow immediately devalued the long and sensitive arguments of the seven members:

“It is hardly convenient at the present time to express so positively the views of the government in relation to only these two laws, which have had almost no effect since the time of their publication and hitherto.” He proposed postponing the publication of the decree until the “main principles” of the reform were determined. Three months later, he himself would define these “beginnings” as the landless liberation of the peasants.

Alexander II did not sign the decree. When the third meeting of the Secret Committee finally took place on February 28, it was decided to elect a commission from among itself to develop a specific plan of activity. This “Preparatory Commission” was established with four members: Gagarin, Korf, Rostovtsev, Butkov. She had to consider existing legislation on the peasant question (decrees on free cultivators and obliged peasants), as well as various notes and projects on the abolition of serfdom. Having familiarized itself with this material, the commission was unable for almost two months to determine “the basis for the work ahead of the Committee” and come to a common decision. The commission members submitted their own separate notes. There are three of them: Rostovtsev on April 20, Gagarin on May 5 and Korf on April 16.

Rostovtsev approved the proposals of Posen's note, which was read out at the first meeting of the Secret Committee, and before that was rejected by the Minister of the Interior. This fact deserves attention. Until the summer of 1858, Rostovtsev would be under the strong influence of Posen. And in the history of preparations for the peasant reform, a moment will come when the views and ideas of Posen, carried out by Rostovtsev, will be of decisive importance in drawing up the most important government decrees on peasant affairs and on issues of local government. Rostovtsev's note was essentially no different from the decisions of the Secret Committees of the reign of Nicholas I, which postponed the abolition of serfdom for an indefinite period. Gagarin in his note launched a program for the landless emancipation of peasants, preserving in the hands of landowners not only all land property, but also patrimonial power. These conditions of the reform, in Gagarin’s view, were to ensure the dominance of large landowners in agricultural production and leave in the state “the governmental order that currently exists in it.” P. A. Zayonchkovsky rightly noted that Gagarin’s project “was fully consistent with the laws of 1816-1819, which abolished serfdom in the Baltic provinces.” M.A. Korf proposed to entrust the nobility with developing the conditions for the reform, without limiting its initiative with any precise guidelines.

These notes from the members of the “Preparatory Commission” and the journal of its last meeting were presented to the Secret Committee. But the Committee continued its delaying tactics, taking its time to determine its position. Only S.S. Lanskoy submitted his written review on June 13, 1857.

The Minister of Internal Affairs recognized the “question of land” as paramount and expressed his disagreement with Gagarin’s proposal to “grant landowners the right to liberate entire villages of peasants without conditions or land.” The minister supported Korf’s idea to transfer the discussion of the peasant issue to the nobility, but stipulated the participation of the nobility in the preparation of the reform as an indispensable condition for adhering to the “main principles” that the government would develop and give to him. These “main principles” were supposed to contain the answer to the main questions: will all the land remain in the possession of the landowner? If tenure remains, what is the nature of the peasants' use (i.e., can the landowner remove peasants from the land they are using)? Will the landowners be rewarded for the personality of the peasant and for the land if the law obliges them to allocate land to the peasants? Having thus raised the land issue, the minister began to prepare “his decisive opinion” about it - another note.

While the Ministry was working on a new note, the members of the Secret Committee went on vacation, and Alexander II went to Kissingen. Driving through Vilna, he met with Governor-General Nazimov, who informed him that the nobility of the northwestern provinces was “inclined to meet the wishes of the sovereign with a proposal to free their peasants from serfdom.” For Alexander II, this news was very important and valuable: the implementation of Nazimov’s calculations would give the authorities a reason to refer to the initiative of the nobility in their actions to prepare the reform.

Upon arrival in Kissingen, Alexander II met and for the first time after his accession “saw eye to eye,” as P. Semenov writes, with the leader. book Elena Pavlovna. Their conversations concerned the peasant issue. At the request of Alexander II, Orlov sent him from St. Petersburg his report dated June 21 and the material of the “Preparatory Commission” with Lansky’s review. At the same time, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prince. A. M. Gorchakov gave Alexander II a note on the abolition of serfdom. A. Haxthausen, researcher of agrarian relations in Prussia and Russia.

Haxthausen wrote about the need to immediately begin preparing the reform and transfer it to the nobility. The argument for the urgency of this matter is interesting. The author of the note expressed thoughts about the relationship and mutual influence of the socio-political development of Russia and Europe, about preventing possible revolutions.

dionic shocks by timely reform. “We live,” wrote Haxthausen, “in an era when thoughts and opinions do not wait, as before, for years and centuries for their full development and dissemination. Distributed by printing, steam and electricity, they travel like lightning across Europe from one end to the other, and there is no people, no country that could protect itself from their influence. I say this to remind you that in Russia you cannot stop halfway, that it is impossible to leave the most important issues of national existence to their own development, that the government is obliged to be the first to take a thoughtful and active part in them, so that events, ahead of it, do not seize the reins and snatch from him making concessions that would lead to his downfall.” Against the last phrase, Alexander II wrote in the margin: “Completely fair, and this is my main concern.” The idea of ​​N. Milyutin, which was expressed by him even earlier in a note about Karlovka, completely coincides with this idea of ​​Haxthauzen, did not find such support from Alexander II.

Having received a report with the commission’s materials and Lansky’s review, Alexander II handed them over to Kiselev, whom he met in Kissingen, for review. On July 9 (21), Kiselev presented Alexander II with a note with the following conclusion: “I believe that it should not and is impossible to grant complete freedom to 22 million serfs of both sexes. It should not be because this huge mass is not prepared for legal complete freedom. It is impossible because farmers without land would become extremely dependent on the landowners and would be their complete slaves or form a proletariat, unprofitable for themselves and dangerous for the state.” It would be wrong to imagine Kiselev, who back in the 30s and 40s tried to solve the peasant question, as an opponent of the abolition of serfdom, as is sometimes done in literature, on the basis of the above words taken literally. Obviously, Kiselev was frightened by the prospect of the landless emancipation of the peasants - the only clear constructive proposal presented by the “Preparatory Commission”. Kiselyov did not see any real financial possibilities for the purchase of peasant plots. That is why he spoke out against the immediate liberation of the peasants. Kiselev proposed to begin revising the legislation on peasants, considering two conditions immutable: to leave the peasants for a time “strong on the earth” and to protect their personal rights and their lands and property with laws, which essentially coincided with his plan for a general inventory of the landowner village of 1839.

3 L. G. Zakharova

The resolution of Alexander II on Orlov’s report on June 21 demanded that the Secret Committee take immediate and specific

decisions on the peasant case, “without postponing it under various pretexts.” “Haxthausen guessed,” he wrote, “my main fear, that the matter would not start by itself from below.”

It was at this time that, in order to revive the almost frozen activities of the Secret Committee, a leader was introduced into its composition. book Konstantin Nikolaevich. Soon^ another appointment took place, characterizing the mood of Alexander II, his attitude towards liberal figures. K. D. Kavelin, completely unexpectedly for himself and for many of his friends and enemies, was appointed teacher to the heir to the throne. book Nikolai Alexandrovich. Kavelin had conversations with the Empress, who wished to get acquainted with his views and plans personally, in addition, he visited the Empress’s maid of honor A.F. Tyutcheva and the chief of gendarmes Dolgorukov and talked with them about various subjects, including the peasant question.

Not without reason, seeing a political meaning in his sudden and honorable appointment, Kavelin came to the following conclusions: “Obviously, the sovereign urgently demands emancipation, and those around him see that there is nothing to be done... Increasing private uprisings of peasants, which A.F. told me about Tyutchev and Prince Dolgorukov himself give weight to our opinion and discredit the camarilla. It is necessary to see with what noticeable dissatisfaction Prince Dolgorukov descends before me from the heights of the chief commander of the gendarmerie and a great man in general. This cannot be for nothing.” It turns out that Kavelin understood that the role of the liberals and their influence on the preparation of the reform depended, in addition to their own strength, on the degree of pressure from the “lower classes” and were ultimately determined by this factor.

Kavelin’s diary has preserved for us very important evidence of interest at the top in the newly published issues of Kolokol and in Herzen’s publications in general. So, having come to a conversation with the empress, Kavelin found her reading the 2nd sheet of “The Bell”. And on the same day, August 15 (27), another entry is even more surprising, about a conversation with the chief of gendarmes: Dolgorukov “complained about high-ranking persons that they were secretly smuggling Iskander’s publications into Russia and distributing that Iskander’s works were dangerous because there is a lot of truth in them. In conclusion, he warned me to be careful when bringing Iskander’s creations into Russia, so as not to get caught, and after bringing them in, so as not to distribute them.”

In Kavelin's conversations with the Empress, Tyutcheva and Dolgorukov, they discussed, in particular, the project for the liberation of peasants on the estate. book Elena Pavlovna - Karlovka. On her instructions, Kavelin continued this work and saw her, and this activity of his was known at the top, and the empress was favorable.

in relation to intentions led. book Elena Pavlovna. Thus, the solution to the peasant question proposed in N.A. Milyutin’s note in October 1856 did not remain shelved, although it was not accepted by Alexander II. It was being improved. At the same time, the program of the liberal bureaucracy, which had not yet become official, was also determined.

The official program of the Ministry of Internal Affairs also developed and was clarified in the next note of the minister dated July 26, 1857, drawn up in response to the results of the work of the “Preparatory Commission”. As Levshin wrote, this was “the first clear outline of the system according to which the minister and I thought we would move forward.”

As in previous notes from the end of 1856, the importance of the Baltic Sea experience of the liberation of peasants was confirmed as a model for the upcoming reform. But in addition to previous statements, in a note on July 26, 1857, Levshin revealed his understanding of the essence of the Baltic experience. At this time, he was guided by the legislation of recent years, which approved the basis for the use of field land by peasants, and not by the initial laws of 1816-1819, which carried out the completely landless emancipation of peasants. Levshin explains in his memoirs that he was looking for “a middle point between the landless and fully-landed state of the peasant.” It seemed to him that he had found this “middle point” in the purchase by the peasants of the estate and in the allotment of field land for their use, on grounds similar (but not identical) to those recently adopted in the Baltic provinces for peasant plots - Bauernland. “During the transition period,” he explained the question of the peasants’ use of field land, “I believed that the conditions of relations between landowners and peasants should be protected by government control or regulations; at the end of this period, I did not find any danger in voluntary transactions.” Perhaps, in order to develop government control measures for the transition period of conditional use of land by peasants, Levshin studied the inventories.

The “system” proposed by Levshin and Lansky for resolving the peasant question ultimately meant the dispossession of the absolute majority of the peasantry. Levshin's arguments about the middle position between landless and full-land emancipation of peasants poorly concealed the main goal - the preservation of all land ownership by the landowners, the view of the landowner's economy as the only basis of agricultural production. This is revealed in the solution of the land issue in all its aspects: about the estate, about the use of field land, about redemption. The only thing Levshin really wanted to avoid was the immediate complete landization of everything

peasantry, as Gagarin proposed. The amount of estate land in the black earth provinces, where the land is of great value, could be reduced, and in the northern provinces, where the land is infertile, on the contrary, it was increased. The maximum period for the redemption of the estate was set at 10 to 15 years. The ransom of the peasants' personalities was rejected. But the cost of the estate, buildings and land, especially for the non-black earth zone, actually included the ransom of the individual in order to compensate, as Levshin openly admitted, the loss by the landowner of the free labor of the serfs.

Field land was left to peasants for conditional use in exchange for payment in money or labor. The note does not say anywhere about “eternal” or “permanent” use or its inalienability from the peasants; on the contrary, the inalienability of this land from the landowners was asserted. Levshin’s judgments about the size of the field allotment are categorical. He did not allow the pre-reform allotment to remain in the use of the peasants. In Levshin’s memoirs, this idea is emphasized: “I believe that the widespread retention of the liberated peasants’ full current allotment of land is not only unnecessary, but even harmful.” And then the truly class essence of his position is involuntarily revealed: “If the peasants retain a full allotment of land, they will not have the need to work for the landowners, and these latter (at least for the first time) will be left without hands.” The purchase of this reduced field land after the expiration of an indefinite period of transition was not intended to be a mandatory measure, but rather a voluntary agreement between landowners and peasants, and therefore could not actually become the general outcome of the reform.

Levshin concluded his note dated July 26, 1857 with the already well-established idea of ​​gradual transformation. First of all, the reform was supposed to be carried out in the Vilna, Grodno and Kovno provinces, and then spread it to the east. However, the principle of gradualism should not apply to the preparation of the reform. The drawing up of local projects was to be carried out everywhere and at the same time, since “rumors about the government’s intentions are spreading everywhere”, “everyone remains bewildered and together in an anxious spirit.” In 1858, the Main Committee will be guided by these principles of the gradual introduction of reform, with the simultaneity and ubiquity of its preparation.

Levshin believed that the “system” he developed and outlined in this note for solving the peasant question has no analogy with the experience of agrarian legislation and agrarian development of European countries: “We can gradually arrange things, without resorting to either new theories or examples of foreign states, where is the final resolution of this issue?

partly carried out by violence and unforeseen political upheavals. In our country, on the contrary, in the three Baltic provinces, the liberation of the landowner peasants was carried out quietly, consistently over the course of half a century, with the assistance of both the government and the nobility. At the beginning, mistakes were made, inconvenient measures were taken, but they were corrected, legal provisions were changed, and finally, in the past 1856, the third and final regulation on peasants was issued for the Estonian province. The same will soon be made public for the Livonia province.” Levshin jumped to conclusions. He wrote about a law adopted, but not yet tested by life - the Regulations of 1856 for Estland. Less than a year later, in the spring and summer of 1858, the implementation of this Regulation would cause widespread unrest among the Estonian peasants. And the main argument for the attractiveness of the Estonian (and in general the Baltic See) model will disappear, weakening the position of the defenders of the “Best See experience”.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs published publications about the Baltic Sea legislation in its departmental journal throughout the year. In the “Journal of the Ministry of Internal Affairs” in No. 10 and 12 for 1857, a large article by P. Schultz “Extract from the regulations on peasants of the Baltic provinces” was published (in 1858 it was published as a separate publication in St. Petersburg). Even earlier, in Nos. 3 and 6, “Essays on the History of Estonian Peasants” were published, in which the Regulations of 1856 were explained in detail. Artemyev’s diary contains information about the distribution by the Ministry, by order of Levshin, to the leaders of the nobility of different provinces of the Regulations on the Livonian and Estonian peasants. Along with his interest in the Baltic Sea legislation, Artemyev noted the attention of the Ministry, and Levshin in particular, to inventories, especially those from the north-west. In May 1857, the files on the inventories were transferred to Artemyev, who, on instructions from Levshin, compiled a note on the inventories, mainly in the western, Belarusian provinces, for submission to the State Council. Having completed this task, Artemyev wrote in his diary on June 12 (24) that, in Levshin’s opinion, the matter of inventories “should be in connection with the question of the structure of serfs in general in Russia.”

Artemyev’s diary shows the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ awareness of the attitude of advanced social thought to the upcoming transformations. During the period when the Ministry was drawing up a note for the Secret Committee, Artemyev wrote in his diary on June 26 (July 8): “I learned that many papers relating to inventories were connected with files specially kept by Levshin himself about the organization of landowner peasants in general. It would be very interesting to reconsider all these cases, especially since even Herzen’s pamphlets are taken into account in them.

By the way, this man also launched a new semi-periodical publication “The Bell” - ringing for the freedom of peasants, printing, government, etc... They claim that Lanskoy, with the permission of the sovereign, signed up to receive this “Bell”. One of the subsequent entries confirms this information. Moreover, the minister forces articles from Kolokol and Polar Star, which write about him and his department, to be read aloud to himself. Thus, into the musty atmosphere of routine and secrecy in which peasant affairs were located in the Ministry, a fresh stream of life penetrated, modern social ideas penetrated. However, the power still lies with the Secret Committee. The Ministry's note of July 26, extremely cautious, preserving the right of landowners to all land property, but still proposing a concrete approach to reform, was not discussed in the Secret Committee. Forced to a decision by the demands of Alexander II, the Secret Committee adopted its plan for “reform”, or rather delaying the reform.

The decision of the Secret Committee was made in two meetings on August 14 and 17 and recorded in the journal on August 18, 1857. The Committee recognized the general emancipation of serfs as impossible, since this “could shake the peace and order in the state.” Three periods of transformation were outlined. The first, “preparatory”, provided for “measures to soften or facilitate the serf class.” The second, the “transitional period,” consisted of taking mandatory measures to liberate the peasants, who were supposed to “gradually acquire the personal rights of people of the free class, remaining more or less strong on the land.” The timing of the onset and end of this period remained unclear. Moreover, the third period loomed even more unattainably distant - the “final” period, when the peasants “will be placed in their relations with the landowners as completely free people.” Alexander II not only signed this journal, but even “sincerely” thanked the members of the Committee “for their first work.” However, the Secret Committee's plan turned out to be stillborn. When the preparation of the rescript to Nazimov begins in three months, the basis will be not the journal of the Secret Committee of August 18, but the note of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

For the subsequent development of peasant reform, the opinion of P. D. Kiselev, expressed in connection with the request of the leader, is of great interest. book Konstantin Nikolaevich to give comments on the journal of the Secret Committee dated August 18. Here is what Kiselev wrote in September 1857: “I have always believed and now believe that peasant land should remain (with the landowner’s remuneration) in the full inalienable property of the peasants... Dismissal of the land in my understanding is a condition

necessary not only economically, but also politically. In France, the owners of land, of whom there are 7 million, constitute a class of people who are deceased and devoted to the government as the protector of their property; they give the advantage to the proletariat and do not allow it to spread its perverse plans.” Turning to the conditions of reform in Russia, he wrote: “In no state has the liberation or redemption of corvee been made under such conditions.” From the following lines it is clear that Kiselev did not mean an immediate ransom, but a gradual one, “over a more or less close time.” So, Kiselev considered it possible to combine two tasks in the reform - the creation of a class of peasant owners (similar to France) and the preservation of noble land ownership - and at the same time counted on the peaceful development of post-reform Russia. We will meet these thoughts later in the notes of the members of the Editorial Commissions. Such a task contained an element of utopia, which was generally characteristic of socio-political thought in Russia in the second half of the 50s of the 19th century.

15:24 — REGNUM

Alexander II calls on the Moscow nobles to begin liberating the peasantry. 1857. Engraving from the early 1880s.

1857 On January 15 (January 3, O.S.), the Secret Committee on Peasant Affairs was established to prepare reforms for the emancipation of peasants.

Samples of peasant plows

“From that day (March 30, 1856), when Alexander II declared: “Better from above than from below,” preparations for the abolition of serfdom began on the initiative of the tsar. But this initiative cannot be credited personally to Alexander II. By itself he was even more conservative than his father, Nicholas I. Even those penny concessions on the peasant issue that Nicholas allowed, Alexander considered unnecessary.

As a person, Alexander II was, of course, more attractive than his father - smarter, more educated, softer and more restrained in character (the influence of his teacher V.A. Zhukovsky affected him). Outwardly, in appearance and bearing, he was the spitting image of his father; he was mentally and morally more like his uncle, Alexander I, than like his father. However, Alexander Nikolaevich also combined - not as flashily as Nikolai Pavlovich - the vices of a tyrant and a retrograde, and he also relied excessively on Nikolai’s former campaigners, about whom F.I. Tyutchev said in 1856 that they “remind him of the hair and nails that continue to grow on the body of the dead for some time after their burial in the grave.”

In contrast to the strong, albeit limited, truly gendarmerie nature of Nicholas, Alexander was by nature not so much weak as changeable. In this way he also reminded him of his uncle. In his youth, for example, he either meekly endured his father whipping him on the cheeks with a hot hand (that’s why, according to evil tongues, Alexander’s cheeks sagged from a young age), then suddenly he dared to despise his father’s will and stand his ground. Over the years, Alexander II retained this instability of nature - both in personal and in state life, “he always walked now to the right, now to the left, constantly changing his direction.” He hesitated for a long time before taking the initiative to abolish serfdom. Most importantly, this initiative of his was forced, imposed on the tsar by force of circumstances - a force that had been growing steadily for a long time, in the form of economic and social disasters, spontaneous protest of the peasant masses, pressure from liberals and revolutionaries.

Preparations for the abolition of serfdom in Russia began with the establishment of the next Secret Committee on Peasant Affairs on January 3, 1857, as was done from time to time under Nicholas I. The committee included 11 nobles: the former chief of gendarmes A.F. Orlov, the real chief of gendarmes V.A. Dolgorukov, future "Hangman" M.N. Muravyov, former member of the court over the Petrashevites and future chairman of the court over the Ishutinites P.P. Gagarin and others, almost without exception, are reactionaries, serf owners. Orlov even boasted that “he would rather let his hand be cut off than sign the liberation of the peasants with the land.” He was appointed (isn’t that why?) chairman of the committee.

This was the committee for preparing the liberation of the peasants. Its members did not hide their readiness to bury the peasant question in conversations “about the peasant question,” as was the case in similar committees under Nicholas I. However, the growing revolutionary situation and especially the rise of the peasant movement forced the committee, after 6.5 months of abstract debate, to concretely begin business. On July 26, 1857, member of the committee, Minister of Internal Affairs S.S. Lanskoy presented an official draft of the reform and proposed creating noble committees in each province with the right to make their own amendments to the draft. This proposal meant that tsarism, showing maximum sensitivity to the interests of the landowners, carried out the reform in such a way that the initiative for its implementation would come from the nobility with minimal damage to the nobles. Lanskoy himself advertised his serfdom convictions, stating in print that the Emperor instructed him to “inviolably protect the rights granted to the nobility by his crowned ancestors.” On November 20, the tsar legitimized Lansky’s proposal in a rescript addressed to the Baltic Governor-General V.I. Nazimova. The rescript to Nazimov was sent to all governors for information and published. It set out the reform principles formulated by Lansky /187/ that were to guide the provincial committees, namely:

1) landowners retain in their hands all the land and patrimonial (i.e. police) power over the peasants;

2) peasants receive only legal personal freedom, and even then after the so-called transition period (up to 12 years), as well as an estate for ransom, without land."

Quoted from: Troitsky N.A. Russia in the 19th century: A course of lectures. - M.: Higher School, 1997

History in faces

From a letter from Alexander II to Grand Duchess Elena Pavlovna, 1856:

I am waiting for well-meaning owners of populated estates to express themselves to what extent they believe it is possible to improve the lot of their peasants

Quoted from: Tatishchev S.S. Emperor Alexander II: His life and reign. M.: Eksmo, 2009

The world at this time

Suppression of the Indian Rebellion by the British. V.Vereshchagin. 1884

“On the evening of Sunday 10 May 1857, local mercenary sepoys of the 20th and 11th Bengal Native Infantry and the 3rd Light Horse Regiment mutinied at the strategic military base at Meerut, refusing to obey their British officers and opening fire on them. They captured, robbed and burned the bungalows of Europeans, exterminating their inhabitants in cold blood, leaving no one alive, not even women and children.The roar of rifle fire and the deafening sounds of war bugles drowned out the terrible cries of pain and desperate pleas for mercy.

The rebels disappeared into the darkness of the night, taking hostages. Less than a day later, early on the morning of May 11, the sepoys crossed the bridges over the Yamuna River and headed to the Red Fort in Delhi. Armed with rifles, pistols, knives, daggers and swords, the rebels crushed the resistance of the garrison stationed in the fort, killing many British. The uprising was led by Padishah Bahadur Shah Zafar II, an elderly ruler of the Mughal dynasty. The local capital of the empire, Delhi, fell. The sepoys won their first victory.

Before the colonial administration had time to realize the full scale of the disaster, riots broke out in Northern and Central India. This was the beginning of terrible events that lasted many days and months. It became clear to the British authorities that something more than just a sepoy mutiny was happening - British imperialism was being challenged.

The reason for the rebellion was the notorious problem with the means of care for the Enfield cap guns that had just entered service. The lubricant of the rifle and the impregnation of the cardboard cartridges contained animal fats, and the top of the cartridge (with the bullet) had to be bitten when loading the gun (gunpowder was poured from the cardboard sleeve into the barrel, the sleeve itself was used as a wad, and the bullet was hammered into the top with a ramrod). The sepoys, who included both Hindus and Muslims, were frightened by the prospect of desecration through such contact with the remains of animals - cows and pigs. The reason, as you know, is in religious taboos: a pig is considered an unclean animal by Muslims, and a cow for Hindus is a sacred animal, and eating its meat is a great sin.

The army leadership insisted on using both a new model of gun and cartridges lubricated with forbidden fats, not paying attention to the growing discontent of the sepoys. When the authorities realized the mistake, it was already too late: the sepoys interpreted the innovation as a deliberate insult to their religious feelings, and although the command carefully ensured that the sepoy units were recruited on a mixed religious basis in order to eliminate the possibility of collusion among them, the effect was exactly the opposite. Sepoys - both Hindus and Muslims - forgot their differences and united in defense of "dharma and the Koran" (...)

The rebellion was suppressed with exceptional cruelty. And no matter how the British tried to characterize it as just a “revolt of the sepoys, and nothing more,” the facts told a different story. One of the representatives of the British administration in Delhi, T. Metcalfe, noted with regret that “the British live on a volcano, ready at any moment to explode in an outbreak of merciless violence. All the Udhs rebelled against us with arms in their hands, not only regular troops, but also thousand people from the army of the ex-king. The zamindars and their servants, 250 forts, equipped to the teeth with artillery, act against us. They opposed the rule of the Company (East India) with the supreme power of their own kings and almost unanimously came out in their support. Even those who served in the army the mercenaries became our opponents, and everyone, to the last man, joined the rebels"(...)

The mutiny of 1857 shook the very foundations of imperial rule in India, affecting most of the other colonies. The British could no longer imagine colonization as a win-win situation for both the colonizer and the colonized. Desperate to maintain India as a colony, the British Crown dissolved the East India Company, handing over the administration of India directly to the British government. Administrative and military reforms have passed. The Queen's proclamation promised to "respect the feelings of devotion that Indians feel for the lands they inherited from their ancestors" and "to take due account of the historical practices, customs and traditions of India in lawmaking and law enforcement."

And for India itself, 1857 was a turning point - the Indians could not have more clearly outlined their desire for independence, although there was still almost a century left before gaining independence."

Quoted in: Kumar M. Sepoys v. Empire. Around the World, No. 8, 2007