The reasons for the course and results of the Livonian War are brief. Causes and results of the Livonian War (briefly)

Trying to reach the Baltic coast, Ivan IV fought the grueling Livonian War for 25 years.

Russia's state interests required the establishment of close ties with Western Europe, which were then most easily achieved through the seas, as well as ensuring the defense of Russia's western borders, where its enemy was the Livonian Order. If successful, the opportunity to acquire new economically developed lands opened up.

The reason for the war was the delay by the Livonian Order of 123 Western specialists invited to Russian service, as well as the failure of Livonia to pay tribute for the city of Dorpat (Yuryev) and the adjacent territory over the past 50 years.

The beginning of the Livonian War was accompanied by victories of Russian troops, who took Narva and Yuriev (Dorpat). A total of 20 cities were taken. Russian troops advanced towards Riga and Revel (Tallinn). In 1560, the Livonian Order was defeated, and its master W. Furstenberg was captured. This entailed the collapse of the Livonian Order (1561), whose lands came under the rule of Poland, Denmark and Sweden. The new Master of the Order, G. Ketler, received Courland and Semigallia as possession and recognized dependence on the Polish king. The last major success at the first stage of the war was the capture of Polotsk in 1563.

In 1565-1566, Lithuania was ready to give Russia all the lands it had conquered and conclude an honorable peace for Russia. This did not suit Ivan the Terrible: he wanted more.

The second stage (1561 – 1578) coincided with the oprichnina. Russia, opposed by Lithuania, Poland and Sweden, had to go on the defensive. In 1569, Lithuania and Poland united to form the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The new ruler of Lithuania and Poland, Stefan Batory, went on the offensive and recaptured Polotsk (in 1579), captured Velikiye Luki (in 1580), and besieged Pskov (in 1581). A truce was concluded as the war with Sweden began.

In the third stage, from 1578, Russia had to fight with the king of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth Stefan Batory, who besieged Pskov, and continue the war with Sweden. Pskov defended itself desperately, which allowed Ivan the Terrible to begin peace negotiations and in 1582 conclude a ten-year truce with Stefan Batory. Under the terms of the truce, Russia gave up everything it had conquered in Livonia and Lithuania. In 1583, peace was concluded with Sweden, which received the Russian cities of Narva, Yama, Koporye, Ivan-Gorod and others.

Russia was unable to break through to the Baltic Sea. This problem was solved by Peter I in the Northern War (1700–1721).

The failure of the Livonian War was ultimately a consequence of Russia's economic backwardness, which was unable to successfully withstand a long struggle against strong opponents. The ruin of the country during the oprichnina years only made matters worse.

Domestic policy of Ivan IV

Authorities and management bodies in Russia in the middleXVIV.

The war became protracted, and several European powers were drawn into it. The contradictions within the Russian boyars, who were interested in strengthening the southern Russian borders, intensified, and dissatisfaction with the continuation of the Livonian War grew. Figures from the tsar’s inner circle, A. Adashev and Sylvester, also showed hesitation, considering the war futile. Even earlier, in 1553, when Ivan IV became dangerously ill, many boyars refused to swear allegiance to his little son Dmitry. The death of his first and beloved wife Anastasia Romanova in 1560 was a shock for the tsar.

All this led to the cessation of the activities of the Elected Rada in 1560. Ivan IV took a course towards strengthening his personal power. In 1564, Prince Andrei Kurbsky, who had previously commanded the Russian troops, went over to the side of the Poles. Ivan IV, fighting the rebellions and betrayals of the boyar nobility, saw in them main reason failures of their policies. He firmly stood on the position of the need for strong autocratic power, the main obstacle to the establishment of which, in his opinion, was the boyar-princely opposition and boyar privileges. The question was what methods would be used to fight.

In these difficult circumstances for the country, Ivan IV introduced the oprichnina (1565–1572).

Federal Agency for Education

State educational institution

higher professional education

“Khakass State University named after N.F. Katanova"

Institute of History and Law

Department of Russian History


Livonian War: causes, course, results.

(Course work)


Performed:

1st year student, group Iz-071

Bazarova Rano Makhmudovna


Scientific adviser:

Ph.D., Art. teacher

Drozdov Alexey Ilyich


Abakan 2008


INTRODUCTION

1. CAUSES OF THE LIVONIAN WAR

2. PROGRESS AND RESULTS OF THE LIVONIAN WAR

2.1 First stage

2.2. Second phase

2.3 Third stage

2.4 Results of the war

CONCLUSION

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL LIST


INTRODUCTION


Relevance of the topic. The history of the Livonian War, despite the knowledge of the goals of the conflict, the nature of the actions of the warring parties, and the results of the clash, remains among the key problems Russian history. Evidence of this is the diversity of opinions of researchers who tried to determine the significance of this war among other foreign policy actions of Russia in the second half of the 16th century. One can rightfully discover problems in foreign policy similar to the reign of Ivan the Terrible modern Russia. Having thrown off the Horde yoke, the young state needed an urgent reorientation to the West and restoration of interrupted contacts. Soviet Union was also in long-term isolation from most of the Western world for many reasons, so the first priority of the new, democratic government was to actively search for partners and raise the international prestige of the country. It is the search for the right ways to establish contacts that determines the relevance of the topic under study in social reality.

Object of study. Russian foreign policy in the 16th century.

Subject of study. Livonian War causes, course, results.

Goal of the work. Describe the influence of the Livonian War of 1558 - 1583. on Russia's international position; as well as the domestic politics and economy of the country.

1. Determine the causes of the Livonian War of 1558 - 1583.

2. Identify the main stages in the course of military operations with the characteristics of each of them. Pay attention to the reasons for changes in the nature of war.

3. Summarize the results of the Livonian War, based on the terms of the peace treaty.

Chronological framework. It began in 1558 and ended in 1583.

Geographical framework. Baltic territory, western and northwestern regions of Russia.

Sources.

“The Capture of Polotsk by Ivan the Terrible” depicts the situation in Polotsk during its siege by Russian troops, the panic of the Lithuanian governors who were forced to surrender the city. The source provides interesting information about the superiority of Russian artillery and the defection of the Polotsk peasants to the side of the Russians. The chronicler shows the tsar as a zealous owner of his “fatherland” - Polotsk: after the capture of the city, Ivan the Terrible conducts a population census.

“Correspondence between Ivan the Terrible and Andrei Kurbsky” is polemical in nature. In it, Kurbsky accuses the tsar of striving for autocracy and mercilessly terrorizing talented commanders. The fugitive sees this as one of the reasons for military failures, in particular, the surrender of Polotsk. In his response letters, Grozny, despite the rude epithets addressed to the former governor, justifies his actions to him. In the first message, for example, Ivan IV justifies his territorial claims to the Livonian land as his “patrimony.”

The “Tale of the Coming of Stefan Batory to the City of Pskov” reflects one of the events of the Livonian War: the defense of Pskov. The author very picturesquely describes the “unquenchable fierce beast” of King Stephen, his inexorable “lawless” desire to take Pskov and, in contrast, the decision of all participants in the defense to stand “firmly.” The source shows in sufficient detail the location of the Lithuanian troops, the course of the first attack, firepower both sides.

Bright representative psychological-economic school, V. O. Klyuchevsky, saw the defining beginning of the turbulent history of the 16th century in the claim of princes to absolute power. Briefly, but clearly examining the foreign policy tasks of the Russian state, he noted that at the heart of the complex diplomatic relations that had begun with the countries of Western Europe was the “national idea” of further struggle for the unification of all ancient Russian lands.

In “Russian History in Descriptions of Its Main Figures” by N. I. Kostomarov, published over a period of fifteen years from 1873, the character of each figure is presented in accordance with the historical situation. He gave great importance subjective factor in history. He sees the cause of the conflict between Ivan the Terrible and Sigismund in personal hostility due to an unsuccessful matchmaking. According to Kostomarov, the choice of means to achieve the well-being of the human race was made by Ivan the Terrible unsuccessfully, and for this reason he does not fit the concept of a “great man.”

The monograph by V.D. Korolyuk, the only one for the Soviet period, is entirely devoted to the Livonian War. It accurately highlights the fundamentally different visions of Ivan the Terrible and the Elected Rada of the foreign policy tasks facing Russia at that time. The author describes in detail the international situation that was favorable for the Russian state before the start of the war; the course of military operations itself is poorly covered.

According to A.A. Zimin and A.L. Khoroshkevich, the war acted as a continuation of domestic policy by other means for both warring parties. The outcome of the conflict for Russia was predetermined for a number of objective reasons: the complete ruin of the country, the oprichnina terror that destroyed the best military personnel, the presence of fronts in both the West and the East. The monograph emphasizes the idea of ​​the national liberation struggle of the Baltic peoples against the Livonian feudal lords.

R. G. Skrynnikov in his “Russian History” paid very little attention to the Livonian War, believing that Ivan the Terrible did not need to resort to military action to gain access to the Baltic. The Livonian War is covered in overview; much more attention is paid to the internal politics of the Russian state.

Among the kaleidoscope of views on the history of the Livonian War, two main directions can be distinguished, based on the advisability of choosing the country’s foreign policy course in specific historical conditions. Representatives of the first believe that among many foreign policy tasks, resolving the Baltic issue was a priority. These include historians of the Soviet school: V. D. Korolyuk, A. A. Zimin and A. L. Khoroshkevich. Characteristic of them is the use of a socio-economic approach to history. Another group of researchers considers the choice in favor of war with Livonia to be erroneous. This was first noted by the 19th century historian N.I. Kostomarov. R. G. Skrynnikov, professor at St. Petersburg University, in his new book “Russian History of the 9th – 17th centuries” believes that the Russian government could have peacefully established itself on the Baltic coast, but failed to cope with the task and brought to the fore the military seizure of the harbors of Livonia. The pre-revolutionary historian E.F. Shmurlo took an intermediate position, considering the “Crimea” and “Livonia” programs to be equally urgent. The choice of one of them at the time described, in his opinion, was influenced by secondary factors.

1. CAUSES OF THE LIVONIAN WAR


The main directions of Russian foreign policy centralized state emerged in the second half of the 15th century, under Grand Duke Ivan III. They boiled down, firstly, to the struggle on the eastern and southern borders with the Tatar khanates that arose on the ruins of the Golden Horde; secondly, to the struggle with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Poland associated with it by the bonds of the union for the Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian lands captured by Lithuanian and partly Polish feudal lords; thirdly, to the struggle on the northwestern borders with the aggression of the Swedish feudal lords and the Livonian Order, who sought to isolate Russian state from the natural and convenient access it needs to the Baltic Sea.

For centuries, the struggle on the southern and eastern outskirts was a common and constant thing. After the collapse of the Golden Horde, the Tatar khans continued to raid the southern borders of Russia. And only in the first half of the 16th century, a long war between the Great Horde and the Crimea absorbed the forces of the Tatar world. Moscow's protege has established itself in Kazan. The alliance between Russia and Crimea lasted for several decades, until the Crimeans destroyed the remnants of the Great Horde. The Ottoman Turks, having subjugated the Crimean Khanate, became a new military force that the Russian state faced in this region. After the Crimean Khan attacked Moscow in 1521, the Kazan people broke vassal relations with Russia. The struggle for Kazan began. Only the third campaign of Ivan IV was successful: Kazan and Astrakhan were taken. Thus, by the mid-50s of the 16th century, a zone of its political influence had formed to the east and south of the Russian state. In her person a strength grew that could resist the Crimea and the Ottoman Sultan. The Nogai horde actually submitted to Moscow, and its influence in the North Caucasus increased. Following the Nogai Murzas, the Siberian Khan Ediger recognized the power of the tsar. The Crimean Khan was the most active force holding back Russia's advance to the south and east.

The foreign policy question that has arisen seems natural: should we continue the onslaught on the Tatar world, should we finish the struggle, the roots of which go back to the distant past? Is the attempt to conquer Crimea timely? Two different programs collided in Russian foreign policy. The formation of these particular programs was determined by international circumstances and the political forces inside the country. The elected Rada considered a decisive fight against Crimea timely and necessary. But she did not take into account the difficulties of implementing this plan. Vast expanses of the “wild field” separated what was then Russia from Crimea. Moscow did not yet have any strongholds along this path. The situation spoke more in favor of defense than offensive. In addition to military difficulties, there were also great political difficulties. Entering into conflict with Crimea and Turkey, Russia could count on an alliance with Persia and the German Empire. The latter was under constant threat of Turkish invasion and lost a significant part of Hungary. But in this moment much more important was the position of Poland and Lithuania, who saw Ottoman Empire a serious counterweight to Russia. The joint struggle of Russia, Poland and Lithuania against Turkish aggression was associated with serious territorial concessions in favor of the latter. Russia could not abandon one of the main directions in foreign policy: reunification with the Ukrainian and Belarusian lands. The program of struggle for the Baltic states seemed more realistic. Ivan the Terrible disagreed with his parliament, deciding to go to war against the Livonian Order and try to advance to the Baltic Sea. In principle, both programs suffered from the same flaw - impracticability at the moment, but at the same time both were equally urgent and timely. However, before the start of hostilities in the western direction, Ivan IV stabilized the situation on the lands of the Kazan and Astrakhan khanates, suppressing the rebellion of the Kazan Murzas in 1558 and thereby forcing the Astrakhan ones to submit.

Even during the existence of the Novgorod Republic, Sweden began to penetrate the region from the west. The first serious skirmish concerns XII century. At the same time, the German knights began to implement their political doctrine - the “March to the East”, a crusade against the Slavic and Baltic peoples with the aim of converting them to Catholicism. In 1201 Riga was founded as a stronghold. In 1202, the Order of the Sword Bearers was founded specifically for actions in the Baltic states, which conquered Yuryev in 1224. Having suffered a series of defeats from Russian forces and the Baltic tribes, the Swordsmen and Teutons formed the Livonian Order. The intensified advance of the knights was stopped during 1240 - 1242. In general, peace with the order in 1242 did not protect against hostilities with the crusaders and Swedes in the future. Knights leaning for help Roman Catholic Church, at the end of the 13th century, captured a significant part of the Baltic lands.

Sweden, having its interests in the Baltic states, was able to intervene in Livonian affairs. The Russian-Swedish war lasted from 1554 to 1557. Attempts by Gustav I Vasa to involve Denmark, Lithuania, Poland and the Livonian Order in the war against Russia did not yield results, although initially it was the order that pushed the Swedish king to fight the Russian state. Sweden lost the war. After the defeat, the Swedish king was forced to pursue an extremely cautious policy towards his eastern neighbor. True, the sons of Gustav Vasa did not share their father’s wait-and-see attitude. Crown Prince Eric hoped to establish complete Swedish dominance in Northern Europe. It was obvious that after the death of Gustav, Sweden would again take an active part in Livonian affairs. To some extent, Sweden's hands were tied by the aggravation of Swedish-Danish relations.

The territorial dispute with Lithuania had a long history. Before the death of Prince Gediminas (1316 - 1341), Russian regions accounted for more than two-thirds of the entire territory of the Lithuanian state. Over the next hundred years, under Olgerd and Vytautas, the Chernigov-Seversk region (the cities of Chernigov, Novgorod - Seversk, Bryansk), the Kiev region, Podolia (the northern part of the lands between the Bug and the Dniester), Volyn, Smolensk region.

Under Vasily III, Russia laid claim to the throne of the Principality of Lithuania after the death in 1506 of Alexander, whose widow was the Russian sovereign’s sister. In Lithuania, a struggle began between the Lithuanian-Russian and Lithuanian Catholic groups. After the latter's victory, Alexander's brother Sigismund ascended the Lithuanian throne. The latter saw in Vasily a personal enemy who laid claim to the Lithuanian throne. This exacerbated already strained Russian-Lithuanian relations. In such a situation, the Lithuanian Sejm in February 1507 decided to start a war with its eastern neighbor. The Lithuanian ambassadors in the form of an ultimatum raised the question of the return of lands transferred to Russia during recent wars with Lithuania. It was not possible to achieve positive results in the negotiation process, and military operations began in March 1507. In 1508, in the Principality of Lithuania itself, the uprising of Prince Mikhail Glinsky, another contender for the throne of Lithuania, began. The rebellion received active support in Moscow: Glinsky was accepted into Russian citizenship, in addition, he was given an army under the command of Vasily Shemyachich. Glinsky conducted military operations with varying success. One of the reasons for failure was fear of popular movement Ukrainians and Belarusians who wanted to reunite with Russia. Not having sufficient funds to successfully continue the war, Sigismund decided to begin peace negotiations. On October 8, 1508, the “eternal peace” was signed. According to it, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania for the first time officially recognized the transfer to Russia of the Seversky cities annexed to the Russian state during the wars of the late 15th – early 16th centuries. But despite some success, the government Vasily III did not consider the war of 1508 to be a solution to the issue of Western Russian lands and considered the “eternal peace” as a respite, preparing for the continuation of the struggle. The ruling circles of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were also not inclined to come to terms with the loss of the Seversky lands.

But in the specific conditions of the mid-16th century, a direct clash with Poland and Lithuania was not envisaged. The Russian state could not count on the help of reliable and strong allies. Moreover, the war with Poland and Lithuania would have to be waged in difficult conditions of hostile actions both from the Crimea and Turkey, and from Sweden and even the Livonian Order. Therefore, the Russian government did not consider this foreign policy option at the moment.

One of important factors What determined the tsar’s choice in favor of the fight for the Baltic states was the low military potential of the Livonian Order. The main military force in the country was the knightly Order of the Swordsmen. Over 50 castles scattered throughout the country were in the hands of the order authorities. Half of the city of Riga was subordinate to the supreme authority of the master. The Archbishop of Riga (the other part of Riga was subordinate to him) and the bishops of Dorpat, Revel, Ezel and Courland were completely independent. The knights of the order owned estates on fief rights. Large cities, such as Riga, Revel, Dorpat, Narva, etc., were virtually independent political force, although they were under the supreme authority of the master or bishops. Clashes constantly occurred between the Order and the spiritual princes. The Reformation spread rapidly in the cities, while chivalry remained largely Catholic. The only body of central legislative power was the Landtags, convened by the masters in the city of Wolmar. The meetings were attended by representatives of four classes: the Order, the clergy, the knighthood and the cities. The resolutions of the Landtags usually had no real significance in the absence of a unified executive power. Close ties have long existed between the local Baltic population and the Russian lands. Ruthlessly suppressed economically, politically and culturally, the Estonian and Latvian populations were ready to support the military actions of the Russian army in the hope of liberation from national oppression.

The Russian state itself by the end of the 50s. XVI century was a powerful military power in Europe. As a result of the reforms, Russia became significantly stronger and achieved a much higher degree of political centralization than ever before. Permanent infantry units were created - the Streltsy army. Russian artillery also achieved great success. Russia had not only large enterprises for the production of cannons, cannonballs and gunpowder, but also well-trained numerous personnel. In addition, the introduction of an important technical improvement - the carriage - made it possible to use artillery in field conditions. Russian military engineers have developed a new effective system engineering support for attacking fortresses.

In the 16th century, Russia became the largest trading power at the junction of Europe and Asia, whose craft was still suffocated by the lack of non-ferrous and precious metals. The only channel for the supply of metals is trade with the West through the intermediary of Livonian cities. The Livonian cities - Dorpat, Riga, Revel and Narva - were part of the Hansa, a trade association of German cities. Their main source of income was intermediary trade with Russia. For this reason, attempts by the English and Dutch merchants to establish direct trade relations with the Russian state were stubbornly suppressed by Livonia. Back at the end of the 15th century, Russia tried to influence trade policy Hanseatic League. In 1492, opposite Narva, the Russian Ivangorod was founded. A little later the Hanseatic court in Novgorod was closed. The economic growth of Ivangorod could not help but frighten the trade elite of the Livonian cities, which were losing huge profits. In response, Livonia was ready to organize an economic blockade, the supporters of which were also Sweden, Lithuania and Poland. In order to eliminate the organized economic blockade of Russia, a clause on freedom of communications with European countries through Swedish possessions was included in the peace treaty of 1557 with Sweden. Another channel of Russian-European trade passed through the cities of the Gulf of Finland, in particular Vyborg. The further growth of this trade was hampered by contradictions between Sweden and Russia on border issues.

Trade on the White Sea, although of great importance, could not solve the problems of Russian-Northern European contacts for many reasons: navigation on the White Sea is impossible for most of the year; the path there was difficult and long; contacts were one-sided with a complete monopoly of the British, etc. The development of the Russian economy, which needed constant and unimpeded trade relations with European countries, posed the task of gaining access to the Baltic.

The roots of the war for Livonia should be sought not only in the described economic situation of the Moscow state, they also lay in the distant past. Even under the first princes, Rus' was in close communication with many foreign countries. Russian merchants traded in the markets of Constantinople, and marriage alliances linked the princely family with European dynasties. In addition to overseas merchants, ambassadors of other states and missionaries often came to Kyiv. One of the consequences of the Tatar-Mongol yoke for Rus' was a forced reorientation of foreign policy to the East. The War for Livonia was the first serious attempt to bring Russian life back on track and restore the broken connection with the West.

International life posed the same dilemma for every European state: to ensure an independent, independent position in the sphere of international relations or to serve as a simple object of the interests of other powers. The future of the Moscow state largely depended on the outcome of the struggle for the Baltic states: whether it would join the family of European nations, having the opportunity to independently communicate with the states of Western Europe.

In addition to trade and international prestige, the territorial claims of the Russian Tsar played an important role among the causes of the war. In the first message of Ivan the Terrible, it is not without reason that he declares: “... The city of Vladimir, located in our patrimony, the Livonian land...”. Many Baltic lands have long belonged to the Novgorod land, as well as the banks of the Neva River and the Gulf of Finland, which were subsequently captured by the Livonian Order.

One should not discount such a factor as social. The program of the struggle for the Baltic states met the interests of the nobility and the upper classes of the townspeople. The nobility counted on local distributions of land in the Baltic states, as opposed to the boyar nobility, which was more satisfied with the option of annexing the southern lands. Due to the remoteness of the “wild field” and the impossibility of establishing a strong central government there, at least at first, landowners - boyars had the opportunity to occupy the position of almost independent sovereigns in the southern regions. Ivan the Terrible sought to weaken the influence of the titled Russian boyars, and, naturally, took into account primarily the interests of the noble and merchant classes.

Given the complex balance of power in Europe, it was extremely important to choose a favorable moment to begin military operations against Livonia. It came for Russia at the end of 1557 - beginning of 1558. The defeat of Sweden in the Russian-Swedish war temporarily neutralized this fairly strong enemy, which had the status of a naval power. Denmark at this moment was distracted by the deterioration of its relations with Sweden. Lithuania and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were not bound by serious complications of the international order, but were not ready for a military clash with Russia due to unresolved internal issues: social conflicts within each state and disagreements over the union. Proof of this is the fact that in 1556 the expiring truce between Lithuania and the Russian state was extended for six years. And finally, as a result of military operations against the Crimean Tatars, there was no need to fear for the southern borders for some time. The raids resumed only in 1564 during a period of complications on the Lithuanian front.

During this period, relations with Livonia were quite tense. In 1554, Alexei Adashev and clerk Viskovaty announced to the Livonian embassy their reluctance to extend the truce due to:

Failure of the Bishop of Dorpat to pay tribute from the possessions ceded to him by the Russian princes;

The oppression of Russian merchants in Livonia and the destruction of Russian settlements in the Baltic states.

The establishment of peaceful relations between Russia and Sweden contributed to a temporary settlement of Russian-Livonian relations. After Russia lifted the ban on the export of wax and lard, Livonia was presented with the terms of a new truce:

Unimpeded transportation of weapons to Russia;

Guarantee of payment of tribute by the Bishop of Dorpat;

Restoration of all Russian churches in Livonian cities;

Refusal to enter into an alliance with Sweden, the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania;

Providing conditions for free trade.

Livonia did not intend to fulfill its obligations under the truce concluded for fifteen years.

Thus, the choice was made in favor of resolving the Baltic issue. This was facilitated by a number of reasons: economic, territorial, social and ideological. Russia, being in a favorable international situation, had high military potential and was ready for a military conflict with Livonia for possession of the Baltic states.

2. PROGRESS AND RESULTS OF THE LIVONIAN WAR

2.1 First stage of the war


The course of the Livonian War can be divided into three stages, each of which differs slightly in the composition of the participants, duration and nature of the actions. The reason for the outbreak of hostilities in the Baltic states was the fact that the Bishop of Dorpat did not pay the “Yuryev tribute” from the possessions ceded to him by the Russian princes. In addition to the oppression of Russian people in the Baltic states, the Livonian authorities violated another point of the agreement with Russia - in September 1554 they entered into an alliance with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, directed against Moscow. The Russian government sent Master Furstenberg a letter declaring war. However, hostilities did not begin then - Ivan IV hoped to achieve his goals through diplomatic means until June 1558.

The main goal of the first campaign of the Russian army in Livonia, which took place in the winter of 1558, was the desire to achieve a voluntary concession of Narva from the Order. Military operations began in January 1558. Moscow horse armies led by Kasimov’s “Tsar” Shah Ali and Prince. M.V. Glinsky entered the land of the Order. During the winter campaign, Russian and Tatar troops, numbering 40 thousand soldiers, reached the Baltic coast, ravaging the surroundings of many Livonian cities and castles. During this campaign, Russian military leaders twice, on the direct orders of the tsar, sent letters to the master to resume peace negotiations. The Livonian authorities made concessions: they began collecting tribute, agreed with the Russian side on a temporary cessation of hostilities and sent their representatives to Moscow, who, during difficult negotiations, were forced to agree to the transfer of Narva to Russia.

But the established truce was soon violated by supporters of the military party of the Order. In March 1558 Narva Vogt E. von Schlennenberg ordered the shelling of the Russian fortress of Ivangorod, provoking a new invasion of Moscow troops into Livonia.

During the second campaign to the Baltic states in May-July 1558. The Russians captured more than 20 fortresses, including the most important - Narva, Neuschloss, Neuhaus, Kiripe and Dorpat. During the summer campaign of 1558. The troops of the Moscow Tsar came close to Revel and Riga, ravaging their surroundings.

The decisive battle of the winter campaign of 1558/1559. happened near the city of Tiersen, where on January 17, 1559. met a large Livonian detachment of the Riga domprost F. Felkerzam and the Russian Advanced Regiment led by the governor, Prince. V.S. Silver. In a stubborn battle, the Germans were defeated.

In March 1559 The Russian government, considering its position quite strong, through the mediation of the Danes, agreed to conclude a six-month truce with Master W. Furstenberg - from May to November 1559.

Having received in 1559 an extremely necessary respite, the order authorities, led by G. Ketler, became on September 17, 1559. new master, secured the support of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Sweden. Ketler in October 1559 broke the truce with Moscow. The new master managed to defeat the detachment of governor Z.I. with an unexpected attack near Dorpat. Ochina-Pleshcheeva. Nevertheless, the head of the Yuryevsky (Derpt) garrison, Voivode Katyrev-Rostovsky, managed to take measures to defend the city. For ten days, the Livonians unsuccessfully stormed Yuriev and, not deciding on a winter siege, were forced to retreat. The siege of Lais in November 1559 was equally unsuccessful. Ketler, having lost 400 soldiers in the battles for the fortress, retreated to Wenden.

The result of the new large offensive of the Russian troops was the capture of one of the strongest fortresses of Livonia - Fellin - on August 30, 1560. A few months earlier, Russian troops led by governors Prince I.F. Mstislavsky and Prince P.I. Shuisky occupied Marienburg.

Thus, the first stage of the Livonian War lasted from 1558 to 1561. It was conceived as a punitive demonstration campaign given the obvious military superiority of the Russian army. Livonia stubbornly resisted, counting on the help of Sweden, Lithuania and Poland. Hostile relations between these states allowed Russia, for the time being, to conduct successful military operations in the Baltic states.


2.2 Second stage of the war


Despite the defeat of the Order, the government of Ivan the Terrible faced a difficult choice: either to cede the Baltic states in response to the ultimatum statement of Poland and Lithuania (1560), or to prepare for war against the anti-Russian coalition (Sweden, Denmark, the Polish-Lithuanian state and the Holy Roman Empire) . Ivan the Terrible attempted to avoid conflict through a dynastic marriage with a relative of the Polish king. The matchmaking turned out to be unsuccessful, as Sigismund demanded territorial concessions as a condition of marriage.

The successes of Russian weapons accelerated the beginning of the collapse of the “Cavalier Teutonic Order in Livonia.” In June 1561, the cities of Northern Estonia, including Revel, swore allegiance to the Swedish king Eric XIV. The Livonian state ceased to exist, transferring its cities, castles and lands under the joint authority of Lithuania and Poland. Master Ketler became a vassal of the Polish king and Grand Duke of Lithuania Sigismund II Augustus. In December, Lithuanian troops were sent to Livonia and occupied more than ten cities. The Moscow side initially managed to reach an agreement with the Kingdom of Sweden (on August 20, 1561, a truce was concluded in Novgorod with representatives of the Swedish king Eric XIV for 20 years).

In March 1562, immediately after the end of the truce with Lithuania, Moscow governors ravaged the outskirts of Lithuanian Orsha, Mogilev and Vitebsk. In Livonia, troops of I.F. Mstislavsky and P.I. Shuisky captured the cities of Tarvast (Taurus) and Verpel (Polchev).

In the spring of 1562 Lithuanian troops carried out retaliatory raids on Smolensk places and Pskov volosts, after which battles unfolded along the entire line of the Russian-Lithuanian border. Summer - autumn 1562 Lithuanian troops continued to attack border fortresses in Russia (Nevel) and on the territory of Livonia (Tarvast).

In December 1562 Ivan IV himself set out on a campaign against Lithuania with an army of 80,000. Russian regiments in January 1563 moved to Polotsk, which had an advantageous strategic position at the junction of the Russian, Lithuanian and Livonian borders. The siege of Polotsk began on January 31, 1563. Thanks to the actions of Russian artillery, the well-fortified city was taken on February 15. An attempt to make peace with Lithuania (with the condition of consolidating the achieved successes) failed.

Soon after the victory at Polotsk, the Russian army began to suffer defeats. The Lithuanians, alarmed by the loss of the city, sent all available forces to the Moscow border under the command of Hetman Nikolai Radziwill.

Battle on the river Ulle January 26, 1564 turned into a heavy defeat for the Russian army due to the betrayal of the prince. A.M. Kurbsky, a Lithuanian intelligence agent who transmitted information about the movements of Russian regiments.

1564 brought not only the flight of Kurbsky to Lithuania, but also another defeat from the Lithuanians - near Orsha. The war became protracted. In the autumn of 1564 The government of Ivan the Terrible, not having the strength to fight several states at once, concluded a seven-year peace with Sweden at the cost of recognizing Swedish power over Revel, Pernov (Pärnu) and other cities of Northern Estonia.

In the autumn of 1564 The Lithuanian army, which included Kurbsky, launched a successful counter-offensive. In agreement with Sigismund II, the Crimean Khan Devlet-Girey also approached Ryazan, whose raid led the king into panic.

In 1568, the enemy of Ivan IV, Johan III, sat on the Swedish throne. In addition, the rude actions of Russian diplomats contributed to the further deterioration of relations with Sweden. In 1569 Under the Union of Lublin, Lithuania and Poland merged into a single state - the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In 1570, the Russian Tsar accepted the peace terms of the Polish king in order to be able to oust the Swedes from the Baltic states by force of arms. A vassal kingdom was created on the lands of Livonia occupied by Moscow, the ruler of which was the Danish prince Magnus of Holstein. The siege of Swedish Revel by Russian-Livonian troops for almost 30 weeks ended a complete failure. In 1572, a struggle began in Europe for the Polish throne, which had become empty after the death of Sigismund. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was on the verge of civil war and foreign invasion. Russia hastened to turn the course of the war in its favor. In 1577, a victorious campaign of the Russian army to the Baltic States took place, as a result of which Russia controlled the entire coast of the Gulf of Finland, excluding Riga and Revel.

At the second stage, the war became protracted. The fight was waged on several fronts with varying success. The situation was complicated by unsuccessful diplomatic actions and the incompetence of the military command. Failures in foreign policy led to a sharp change in domestic political course. The many years of war led to an economic crisis. The military successes achieved by 1577 could not subsequently be consolidated.


2.3 Third stage of the war


A decisive turning point in the course of hostilities was associated with the emergence at the head of the Polish-Lithuanian state of the experienced military leader Stefan Batory, whose candidacy for the Polish throne was nominated and supported by Turkey and Crimea. He deliberately did not interfere with the advance of Russian troops, delaying peace negotiations with Moscow. His first concern was solving internal problems: suppressing the rebellious gentry and restoring the combat effectiveness of the army.

In 1578 The counter-offensive of Polish and Swedish troops began. The stubborn struggle for Verdun Castle ended on October 21, 1578. heavy defeat of the Russian infantry. Russia lost one city after another. Duke Magnus went over to Batory's side. The difficult situation forced the Russian Tsar to seek peace with Batory in order to gather forces and strike in the summer of 1579. a decisive blow to the Swedes.

But Batory did not want peace on Russian terms and was preparing to continue the war with Russia. In this he was fully supported by his allies: the Swedish king Johan III, the Saxon Elector Augustus and the Brandenburg Elector Johann Georg.

Batory determined the direction of the main attack not on devastated Livonia, where there were still many Russian troops, but on Russian territory in the region of Polotsk, a key point on the Dvina.

Alarmed by the invasion of the Polish army into the Moscow state, Ivan the Terrible tried to strengthen the garrison of Polotsk and its combat capabilities. However, these actions are clearly too late. The siege of Polotsk by the Poles lasted three weeks. The defenders of the city put up fierce resistance, but, suffering huge losses and losing faith in the help of Russian troops, they surrendered to Batory on September 1.

After the capture of Polotsk, the Lithuanian army invaded the Smolensk and Seversk lands. After this success, Batory returned to the capital of Lithuania - Vilna, from where he sent a message to Ivan the Terrible reporting victories and demanding the concession of Livonia and recognition of the rights of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to Courland.

Preparing to resume hostilities next year, Stefan Batory again intended to advance not in Livonia, but in the northeastern direction. This time he was going to take possession of the Velikiye Luki fortress, which covered the Novgorod lands from the south. And again, Batory’s plans turned out to be unsolved by the Moscow command. Russian regiments found themselves stretched along the entire front line from the Livonian city of Kokenhausen to Smolensk. This error had the most Negative consequences.

At the end of August 1580 The army of the Polish king (48-50 thousand people, of which 21 thousand were infantry) crossed the Russian border. The royal army that set out on the campaign had first-class artillery, which included 30 siege cannons.

The siege of Velikiye Luki began on August 26, 1580. Alarmed by the enemy’s successes, Ivan the Terrible offered him peace, agreeing to very significant territorial concessions, most notably the transfer of 24 cities to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in Livonia. The tsar also expressed his readiness to renounce claims to Polotsk and the Polotsk land. However, Batory considered Moscow's proposals insufficient, demanding all of Livonia. Apparently, even then, plans were being developed in his circle to conquer the Seversk land, Smolensk, Veliky Novgorod and Pskov. The interrupted siege of the city continued, and on September 5, the defenders of the dilapidated fortress agreed to surrender.

Soon after this victory, the Poles captured the fortresses of Narva (September 29), Ozerishche (October 12) and Zavolochye (October 23).

In the battle of Toropets, the army of the prince was defeated. V.D. Khilkov, and this deprived the southern borders of Novgorod of protection.

Polish-Lithuanian detachments continued military operations in this area even in winter. The Swedes, having taken the Padis fortress with great difficulty, put an end to the Russian presence in Western Estonia.

The main target of Batory's third strike was Pskov. June 20, 1581 The Polish army set out on a campaign. This time the king was unable to hide his preparations and the direction of the main attack. The Russian governors managed to get ahead of the enemy and deliver a warning strike in the area of ​​Dubrovna, Orsha, Shklov and Mogilev. This attack not only slowed down the advance of the Polish army, but also weakened its strength. Thanks to the temporary stop of the Polish offensive, the Russian command was able to transfer additional military contingents from Livonian castles to Pskov and strengthen fortifications. Polish-Lithuanian troops in the fall and winter of 1581. stormed the city 31 times. All attacks were repulsed. Batory abandoned the winter siege and on December 1, 1581. left the camp. The moment has come for negotiations. The Russian Tsar understood that the war was lost, and for the Poles, further presence on Russian territory was fraught with heavy losses.

The third stage is largely Russia's defensive actions. Many factors played a role in this: the military talent of Stefan Batory, the inept actions of Russian diplomats and commanders, and a significant decline in Russia's military potential. Over the course of 5 years, Ivan the Terrible repeatedly offered peace to his opponents on terms unfavorable for Russia.

2.4 Results


Russia needed peace. In the Baltic states, the Swedes went on the offensive, the Crimeans resumed raids on the southern borders. The Pope acted as a mediator in peace negotiations Gregory XIII, who dreamed of expanding the influence of the papal curia in Eastern Europe. Negotiations began in mid-December 1581 in the small village of Yam Zapolsky. The congresses of ambassadors ended on January 5, 1582 with the conclusion of a ten-year truce. The Polish commissars agreed to cede to the Moscow state Velikiye Luki, Zavolochye, Nevel, Kholm, Rzhev Pustaya and the Pskov suburbs of Ostrov, Krasny, Voronech, Velyu, which had previously been captured by their army. It was specifically stipulated that the Russian fortresses that were besieged at that time by the troops of the Polish king were subject to return if they were captured by the enemy: Vrev, Vladimerets, Dubkov, Vyshgorod, Vyborets, Izborsk, Opochka, Gdov, Kobylye fortification and Sebezh. The foresight of the Russian ambassadors turned out to be useful: according to this point, the Poles returned the captured city of Sebezh. For its part, the Moscow state agreed to the transfer to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of all cities and castles in Livonia occupied by Russian troops, of which there were 41. Yam - the Polish truce did not apply to Sweden.

Thus, Stefan Batory secured most of the Baltic states for his kingdom. He also managed to achieve recognition of his rights to the Polotsk land, to the cities of Velizh, Usvyat, Ozerische, and Sokol. In June 1582, the terms of the Yam-Zapolsky truce were confirmed at negotiations in Moscow, which were conducted by Polish ambassadors Janusz Zbarazhsky, Nikolai Tavlosh and clerk Mikhail Garaburda. The parties agreed that the end date of the truce concluded in Yama Zapolsky should be considered St. Peter and Paul (29 June) 1592

On February 4, 1582, a month after the conclusion of the Yam-Zapolsky Truce, the last Polish troops left Pskov.

However, the Yam-Zapolsky and “Peter and Paul” peace agreements of 1582 did not end the Livonian War. The final blow to Russian plans to preserve part of the cities conquered in the Baltic states was dealt by the Swedish army under the command of Field Marshal P. Delagardie. In September 1581, his troops captured Narva and Ivangorod, the defense of which was led by governor A. Belsky, who surrendered the fortress to the enemy.

Having gained a foothold in Ivangorod, the Swedes soon went on the offensive again and soon occupied the border Yam (September 28, 1581) and Koporye (October 14) with their districts. On August 10, 1583, Russia concluded a truce with Sweden in Plus, according to which the Swedes retained the Russian cities and Northern Estonia they occupied.

The Livonian War, which lasted almost 25 years, ended. Russia suffered a heavy defeat, losing not only all its conquests in the Baltic states, but also part of its own territories with three important border fortress cities. On the coast of the Gulf of Finland, only the small fortress of Oreshek on the river remained behind the Moscow state. Neva and the narrow corridor along this water artery from r. Arrows to the river Sisters, with a total length of 31.5 km.

The three stages in the course of military operations are of a different nature: the first is a local war with a clear advantage of the Russians; at the second stage, the war has become protracted, an anti-Russian coalition is taking shape, battles are taking place on the border of the Russian state; the third stage is characterized primarily by Russia’s defensive actions on its territory; Russian soldiers demonstrate unprecedented heroism in the defense of cities. The main goal of the war - the solution of the Baltic issue - was not achieved.

CONCLUSION


Thus, based on the above material, the following conclusions can be drawn:

1. It is quite difficult to say whether the choice in favor of war with Livonia was timely and correct. The need to solve this problem for the Russian state seems clear. The importance of unhindered trade with the West dictated the need for the Livonian War in the first place. Russia under Ivan the Terrible considered itself the heir to the Rus of Novgorod, Kyiv, etc., and therefore had every right to lay claim to the lands occupied by the Livonian Order. At a certain period, completely isolated from Europe, having strengthened, Russia needed to restore interrupted political and cultural contacts with Western Europe. It seemed possible to restore them only by ensuring high international prestige. The most accessible route, unfortunately, was through war. The reasons that caused the Livonian War turned out to be relevant subsequently. All the successors of Ivan the Terrible tried to strengthen themselves on the Baltic coast and raise the international status of Russia, until Peter the Great managed to do this.

2. Livonian War 1558 – 1583 has three stages. From a punitive expedition it turned for Russia into a war on several fronts. Despite the initial defeat of the Livonian Order, it was not possible to consolidate the success. Strong Russia did not suit its neighbors, and former rivals in Europe joined forces against it (Lithuania and Poland, Sweden and the Crimean Khanate). Russia found itself isolated. The protracted hostilities led to the depletion of human and financial resources, which, in turn, did not contribute to further successes on the battlefield. It is impossible not to take into account the influence of many subjective factors on the course of the war: the leadership and political talent of Stefan Batory, cases of treason by prominent military leaders, the low level of commanders in general, diplomatic miscalculations, etc. At the third stage, the threat of capture loomed over Russia itself. The key point at this stage can be confidently considered the defense of Pskov. Only the heroism of its participants and the timely actions of the authorities to strengthen the defense saved the country from final defeat.

3. Ultimately, the historical task of obtaining free access to the Baltic Sea could not be solved. Russia was forced to make territorial concessions under the terms peace treaties with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Sweden. But despite the unsuccessful end of the war for Russia, some positive results can be identified: the Livonian Order was finally defeated, in addition, the Russian state managed to avoid irreparable land losses. It was the Livonian War of 1558 - 1583. for the first time loudly voiced one of the priority directions in Russian foreign policy for the next hundred and fifty years.

The consequences of the Livonian War affected many areas of Russian life. Years of tension in the economy led to an economic crisis. Heavy taxes led to the desolation of many lands: Novgorod, Volokolamsk district, etc. Failures in military operations, political dissent of the Rada, the betrayal of some boyars and numerous attempts to discredit them by the enemy, the need to mobilize society became the reasons for the introduction of the oprichnina. The foreign policy crisis, thus, directly affected the domestic policy of the state. The social upheavals of the 17th century have their roots in the era of Ivan the Terrible.

The defeat in the Livonian War seriously damaged the prestige of the Tsar and, in general, of Russia. In the peace treaty, Ivan IV is referred to only as the “Grand Duke”; he is no longer “the Tsar of Kazan and the Tsar of Astrakhan.” A completely new political situation developed in the area of ​​the Baltic coast, in particular, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was ousted from Livonia by the Swedes.

The Livonian War rightfully occupies a prominent place in the history of the Russian state.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL LIST

Sources


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Right there. – P. 140.

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By Russian troops (1577), the troops of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth returned Polotsk and unsuccessfully besieged Pskov. The Swedes took Narva and unsuccessfully besieged Oreshek.

The war ended with the signing of the Yam-Zapolsky (1582) and Plyussky (1583) truces. Russia lost all the conquests made as a result of the war, as well as lands on the border with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the coastal Baltic cities (Koporye, Yama, Ivangorod). The territory of the former Livonian Confederation was divided between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Sweden and Denmark.

In Russian historical science, since the 19th century, the idea of ​​war as Russia’s struggle for access to the Baltic Sea has been established. A number of modern scientists name other reasons for the conflict.

The Livonian War had a huge impact on events in Eastern Europe and the internal affairs of the states involved. As a result, the Livonian Order ended its existence, the war contributed to the formation of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and the Russian Empire led to economic decline.

The disunity and military weakness of Livonia (according to some estimates, the Order could field no more than 10 thousand soldiers in open battle), the weakening of the once powerful Hansa, the expansionist aspirations of the Polish-Lithuanian Union, Sweden, Denmark and Russia led to a situation in which the existence of the Livonian Confederation was threatened .

Proponents of another approach believe that Ivan IV did not plan to start a large-scale war in Livonia, and the military campaign of early 1558 was nothing more than a show of force in order to push the Livonians to pay the promised tribute, supported by the fact that the Russian army was originally planned to be used on Crimean direction. Thus, according to historian Alexander Filyushkin, on the Russian side, the war did not have the character of a “struggle for the sea,” and not a single Russian document contemporary with events contains information about the need to break through to the sea.

Also important is the fact that in 1557 the Livonian Confederation and the Polish-Lithuanian Union concluded the Pozvol Treaty, which grossly violated the Russian-Livonian treaties of 1554 and included an article on a defensive-offensive alliance directed against Moscow. In historiography, both contemporaries of those events (I. Renner) and later researchers have the opinion that it was that treaty that provoked Ivan IV into decisive military action in January 1558, in order to prevent time for the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to mobilize their forces to secure their Livonia.

However, a number of other historians believe that the Pozvolsky Treaty had little influence on the development of the situation in 1558 around Livonia. According to V. E. Popov and A. I. Filyushkin, the question of whether the Pozvolsky Treaty was case belli for Moscow is controversial, since it has not yet been substantiated by legislative material, and the military alliance against Moscow at that time was postponed for 12 years. According to E. Tiberg, Moscow at that time did not know at all about the existence of this agreement. V.V. Penskoy believes that in this matter it is not so important whether the fact of concluding the Pozvolsky Treaty case belli for Moscow, which, as the cause of the Livonian War, went in conjunction with others, such as the open intervention of Poland and Lithuania in Livonian affairs, the non-payment of the “Yuriev tribute” by the Livonians, the strengthening of the blockade of the Russian state, and so on, which inevitably led to war.

By the beginning of the war, the Livonian Order was further weakened by defeat in the conflict with the Archbishop of Riga and Sigismund II Augustus, who supported him. On the other hand, Russia gained strength after the annexation of the Kazan and Astrakhan khanates, Bashkiria, the Great Nogai Horde, the Cossacks and Kabarda.

The Russian kingdom began the war on January 17, 1558. The invasion of Russian troops in January-February 1558 into the Livonian lands was a reconnaissance raid. 40 thousand people took part in it under the command of Khan Shig-Aley (Shah-Ali), governor M.V. Glinsky and D.R. Zakharyin-Yuryev. They walked through the eastern part of Estonia and returned back by the beginning of March [ ] . The Russian side motivated this campaign solely by the desire to receive due tribute from Livonia. The Livonian Landtag decided to collect 60 thousand thalers for settlements with Moscow in order to end the war that had begun. However, by May only half of the declared amount had been collected. In addition, the Narva garrison fired at the Ivangorod fortress, thereby violating the armistice agreement.

This time a more powerful army moved to Livonia. The Livonian Confederation at that time could put no more than 10 thousand people in the field, not counting the fortress garrisons. Thus, its main military asset was the powerful stone walls of the fortresses, which by this time could no longer effectively withstand the power of heavy siege weapons.

Voivodes Alexey Basmanov and Danila Adashev arrived in Ivangorod. In April 1558, Russian troops besieged Narva. The fortress was defended by a garrison under the command of the knight Focht Schnellenberg. On May 11, a fire broke out in the city, accompanied by a storm (according to the Nikon Chronicle, the fire occurred due to the fact that drunken Livonians threw an Orthodox icon of the Mother of God into the fire). Taking advantage of the fact that the guards had left the city walls, the Russians rushed to storm.

“Very vile, terrible, hitherto unheard of, true new news, what atrocities the Muscovites commit with captive Christians from Livonia, men and women, virgins and children, and what harm they cause them daily in their country. Along the way, it is shown what the great danger and need of the Livonians lies. “Written from Livonia and printed for all Christians to warn and improve their sinful lives,” Georg Breslein, Nuremberg, "Flying Leaf", 1561

They broke through the gates and took possession of the lower city. Having captured the guns located there, the warriors turned them around and opened fire on the upper castle, preparing the stairs for the attack. However, by the evening the defenders of the castle themselves surrendered on the condition of free exit from the city.

The defense of the Neuhausen fortress was particularly tenacious. It was defended by several hundred warriors led by the knight von Padenorm, who repelled the onslaught of the governor Peter Shuisky for almost a month. On June 30, 1558, after the destruction of the fortress walls and towers by Russian artillery, the Germans retreated to the upper castle. Von Padenorm expressed a desire to hold the defense here too, but the surviving defenders of the fortress refused to continue their pointless resistance. As a sign of respect for their courage, Pyotr Shuisky allowed them to leave the fortress with honor.

In 1560, the Russians resumed hostilities and won a number of victories: Marienburg (now Aluksne in Latvia) was taken; German forces were defeated at Ermes, after which Fellin (now Viljandi in Estonia) was taken. The Livonian Confederation collapsed. During the capture of Fellin, the former Livonian landmaster of the Teutonic Order, Wilhelm von Furstenberg, was captured. In 1575, he sent his brother a letter from Yaroslavl, where the former landmaster had been granted land. He told a relative that he “has no reason to complain about his fate.” Sweden and Lithuania, who acquired the Livonian lands, demanded that Moscow remove troops from their territory. Ivan the Terrible refused, and Russia found itself in conflict with the coalition of Lithuania and Sweden.

In the autumn of 1561, the Union of Vilna was concluded on the formation of the Duchy of Courland and Semigallia on the territory of Livonia and the transfer of other lands to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

On November 26, 1561, the German Emperor Ferdinand I banned supplies to the Russians through the port of Narva. Eric XIV, King of Sweden, blockaded the port of Narva and sent Swedish privateers to intercept merchant ships sailing to Narva.

In 1562, there was a raid by Lithuanian troops on the Smolensk and Velizh regions. In the summer of the same year, the situation on the southern borders of the Russian kingdom worsened [com 4], which moved the timing of the Russian offensive in Livonia to the fall. In 1562, in the battle of Nevel, Prince Andrei Kurbsky failed to defeat the Lithuanian detachment that invaded the Pskov region. On August 7, a peace treaty was signed between Russia and Denmark, according to which the Tsar agreed with the Danish annexation of the island of Oesel.

The prophecy of the Russian saint, the wonderworker Peter Metropolitan, about the city of Moscow, that his hands would rise up against the shoulders of his enemies, was fulfilled: God poured out untold mercy on us unworthy, our patrimony, the city of Polotsk, was given to us into our hands

In response to the proposal of the German Emperor Ferdinand to conclude an alliance and join forces in the fight against the Turks, the Tsar declared that he was fighting in Livonia practically for his own interests, against the Lutherans [ ] . The Tsar knew what place the idea of ​​the Catholic Counter-Reformation occupied in Habsburg policy. By speaking out against “Luther’s teaching,” Ivan the Terrible touched a very sensitive chord in Habsburg politics.

After the capture of Polotsk, there was a decline in Russia's successes in the Livonian War. Already the Russians suffered a number of defeats (Battle of Chashniki). A boyar and a major military leader, who actually commanded the Russian troops in the West, Prince A. M. Kurbsky, went over to the side of Lithuania; he betrayed the king’s agents in the Baltic states to the king and participated in the Lithuanian raid on Velikiye Luki.

Tsar Ivan the Terrible responded to military failures and the reluctance of eminent boyars to fight against Lithuania with repressions against the boyars. In 1565, the oprichnina was introduced. In 1566, a Lithuanian embassy arrived in Moscow, proposing to divide Livonia on the basis of the situation existing at that time. The Zemsky Sobor, convened at this time, supported the intention of the government of Ivan the Terrible to fight in the Baltic states until the capture of Riga.

A difficult situation has developed in the north of Russia, where relations with Sweden have again deteriorated, and in the south (the campaign Turkish troops near Astrakhan in 1569 and the war with Crimea, during which the army of Devlet I Giray burned Moscow in 1571 and devastated the southern Russian lands). However, the onset of a long-term “kinglessness” in the Republic of Both Nations and the creation in Livonia of the vassal kingdom of Magnus, which at first had an attractive force in the eyes of the population of Livonia, again made it possible to tip the scales in favor of Russia. [ ]

In order to interrupt the growing trade turnover of Narva, which was under Russian control, Poland, followed by Sweden, launched active privateering activities in the Baltic Sea. In 1570, measures were taken to protect Russian trade on the Baltic Sea. Ivan the Terrible issued a “royal letter of marque” (patent of marque) to the Dane Carsten Rohde. Despite the short period of activity, Rode's actions were quite effective, reducing Swedish and Polish trade in the Baltic, forcing Sweden and Poland to equip special squadrons to capture Rode. [ ]

In 1575, the Sage fortress surrendered to the army of Magnus, and Pernov (now Pärnu in Estonia) surrendered to the Russians. After the campaign of 1576, Russia captured the entire coast except Riga and Revel.

However, the unfavorable international situation, the distribution of land in the Baltic states to Russian nobles, which alienated the local peasant population from Russia, and serious internal difficulties (economic ruin looming over the country) negatively influenced the further course of the war for Russia. [ ]

The Tsar's ambassador John Kobenzel testified about the complex relations between the Moscow state and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1575: [ ]

“Only the Poles are proud of their disrespect for him; but he also laughs at them, saying that he took more than two hundred miles of land from them, and they did not make a single courageous effort to return what was lost. He receives their ambassadors poorly. As if regretting me, the Poles predicted exactly the same reception for me and foreshadowed many troubles; meanwhile, this great Sovereign received me with such honors that if His Tsar Majesty had decided to send me to Rome or Spain, then even there I could not have expected a better reception.”

Poles on a dark night
Before the very Intercession,
With a hired squad
They sit in front of the fire.

Filled with courage
The Poles are twirling their mustaches,
They came in a band
To destroy Holy Rus'.

On January 23, 1577, a 50,000-strong Russian army again besieged Revel, but failed to take the fortress. In February 1578, Nuncio Vincent Laureo reported with alarm to Rome: “The Muscovite divided his army into two parts: one is expected near Riga, the other near Vitebsk.” By this time, all of Livonia along the Dvina, with the exception of only two cities - Revel and Riga, was in the hands of the Russians [ ] . At the end of the 70s, Ivan IV began building his military fleet in Vologda and tried to transfer it to the Baltic, but the plan was not implemented.

The king takes on a difficult task; the strength of the Muscovites is great, and, with the exception of my master, there is no more powerful Sovereign on earth

In 1578, a Russian army under the command of Prince Dmitry Khvorostinin took the city of Oberpalen, occupied by a strong Swedish garrison after the flight of King Magnus. In 1579, the royal messenger Wenceslaus Lopatinsky brought the king a letter from Batory declaring war. Already in August, the Polish army surrounded Polotsk. The garrison defended itself for three weeks, and its bravery was noted by Batory himself. In the end, the fortress surrendered (August 30), and the garrison was released. Stephen's secretary Bathory Heidenstein writes about the prisoners:

According to the institutions of their religion, they consider loyalty to the Sovereign to be as obligatory as loyalty to God; they extol with praise the firmness of those who kept their oath to their prince until their last breath, and say that their souls, having parted with their bodies, immediately move to heaven. [ ]

However, “many archers and other Moscow people” went over to Batory’s side and were settled by him in the Grodno region. Following this, Batory moved to Velikiye Luki and took them.

At the same time, direct peace negotiations were underway with Poland. Ivan the Terrible proposed giving Poland all of Livonia, with the exception of four cities. Batory did not agree to this and demanded all Livonian cities, in addition Sebezh, and payment of 400,000 Hungarian gold for military costs. This infuriated Grozny, and he responded with a sharp letter.

Polish and Lithuanian troops ravaged the Smolensk region, the Seversk land, the Ryazan region, the southwest of the Novgorod region, and plundered Russian lands right up to the upper reaches of the Volga. The Lithuanian voivode Philon Kmita from Orsha burned 2,000 villages in the western Russian lands and captured a huge [ ] . Lithuanian magnates Ostrozhsky and Vishnevetsky, with the help of light cavalry units, plundered

The events of the Livonian War are a classic example of Europe’s reluctance to let Russian state on the world political and economic arena. The confrontation between Russia and European states, which, by the way, continues to this day, did not begin suddenly. This confrontation goes back centuries and there are many reasons for it. Although the main one is competition. At first it was a spiritual competition - the struggle of the shepherds of the Christian church for the flock, and, incidentally, for the territorial possessions of this flock. So, the events of the Livonian War of the 16th century are echoes of the struggle waged between the Roman Catholic and Orthodox churches.

First Russian Tsar declared war on the Livonian Order in 1558. The official reason was the fact that 50 years ago the Livonians stopped paying tribute for the possession of the city of Dorpat, which they captured back in the 13th century. In addition, the Livonians did not want to allow specialists and craftsmen from German states to enter Muscovy. Military company began in 1558 and lasted until 1583 and was called the Livonian War in World History.

Three periods of the Livonian War

The events of the Livonian War have three periods, which occurred with varying success for Tsar Ivan the Terrible. The first period is 1558 - 1563. Russian troops carried out successful military operations, which in 1561 led to the defeat of the Livonian Order. Russian troops captured the cities of Narva and Dorpat. They came close to Riga and Tallinn. The last successful operation for the Russian troops was the capture of Polotsk - this happened in 1563. The Livonian War became protracted, which was facilitated by internal problems Moscow State.

The second period of the Livonian War lasts from 1563 to 1578. Denmark, Sweden, Poland and Lithuania united against the troops of the Russian Tsar. Each pursuing its own goal in the war with Muscovy, these northern European states pursued a common goal - not to allow the Russian state to join the number of European states that lay claim to a dominant position. The Moscow state should not have returned those European territories that belonged to it during Kievan Rus and were lost during internecine and feudal strife and wars of conquest. The situation in the Livonian War was complicated for the Russian troops by the economic weakness of the Moscow state, which during this period was experiencing a period of ruin. The ruin and bleeding of an already not very rich country occurred as a result of the oprichnina, which turned out to be an enemy no less bloodthirsty and cruel than the Livonian Order. A prominent Russian military leader, a member of the Chosen Council of Ivan the Terrible, his friend and associate, thrust the knife of betrayal into the back of his sovereign, as well as into the back of his country. Kurbsky in 1563 went over to the side of King Sigismund and participated in military operations against Russian troops. He knew many of the military plans of the Russian Tsar, which he did not fail to report to his former enemies. In addition, Lithuania and Poland united in 1569 into a single state - the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

The third period of the Lithuanian War takes place from 1579 to 1583. This is a period of defensive battles waged by the Russians against the combined forces of the enemy. As a result, the Moscow state lost Polotsk in 1579, and Velikiye Luki in 1581. In August 1581, the Polish king Stefan Batory began a siege of the city of Pskov, in which Kurbsky also participated. The truly heroic siege lasted almost six months, but the invading troops never entered the city. The Polish king and the Russian Tsar signed the Yampol Peace Treaty in January 1582. The Russian state lost not only the Baltic lands and many original Russian cities, but also did not gain access to the Baltic Sea. the main task The Livonian War was not resolved.

For him, war truly became part of his reign and, one might even say, a matter of life.

It cannot be said that Livonia was a strong state. The formation of the Livonian state dates back to the 13th century; by the 14th century it was considered weak and fragmented. The state was headed by the Order of the Knights of the Sword, although it did not have absolute power.

Throughout its existence, the Order prevented Russia from establishing diplomatic relations with other European countries.

Reasons for the start of the Livonian War

The reason for the start of the Livonian War was the non-payment of the Yuryev tribute, which, by the way, happened throughout the entire period after the conclusion of the treaty in 1503.

In 1557, the Livonian Order entered into a military agreement with the Polish king. In January of the following year, Ivan the Terrible moved his troops to Livonian territory. During 1558 and by the beginning of 1559, the Russian army had already passed through all of Livonia and was at the borders of East Prussia. Yuryev and Narva were also captured.

The Livonian Order needed to make peace to avoid complete defeat. A truce was concluded in 1559, but it lasted only six months. Military operations continued again, and the end of this company was the complete destruction of the Livonian Order. The main fortresses of the Order were captured: Fellin and Marienburg, and the master himself was captured.

However, after the defeat of the order, its lands began to belong to Poland, Sweden and Denmark, which, accordingly, sharply complicated the situation on the war map for Russia.

Sweden and Denmark were at war with each other, and therefore for Russia this meant a war in one direction - with the king of Poland, Sigismund II. At first, success in military operations accompanied the Russian army: in 1563, Ivan IV took Polotsk. But the victories stopped there, and the Russian troops began to suffer defeats.

Ivan IV saw the solution to this problem in the restoration of the Livonian Order under the auspices of Russia. It was also decided to conclude peace with Poland. However, this decision was not supported by the Zemsky Sobor, and the tsar had to continue the war.

The war dragged on, and in 1569 a new state was created called the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which included Lithuania and Poland. They still managed to make peace with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth for 3 years. At the same time, Ivan IV created a state on the territory of the Livonian Order and put Magnus, the brother of the Danish king, at the head.

In the speech of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth at this time he was elected new king- Stefan Batory. After this, the war continued. Sweden entered the war, and Batory besieged Russian fortresses. He took Velikiye Luki and Polotsk, and in August 1581 approached Pskov. Residents of Pskov took an oath that they would fight for Pskov until their death. After the 31st unsuccessful assault, the siege was lifted. And although Batory failed to capture Pskov, the Swedes occupied Narva at that time.

Results of the Livonian War

In 1582, peace was concluded with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth for 10 years. According to the agreement, Russia lost Livonia along with the Belarusian lands, although it received some border territories. A peace agreement was concluded with Sweden for a period of three years (the Truce of Plus). According to him, Russia lost Koporye, Ivangorod, Yam and adjacent territories. The main and most sad fact It turned out that Russia remained cut off from the sea.

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