In what year did the Afghan war begin? Entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan
In 1979, the USSR sent its troops into Afghanistan. Many people wonder why the leadership of the Soviet Union did this? The main reason is to stop the development of civil war in neighboring Afghanistan and support supporters of socialism. But did anyone push the USSR into armed conflict?
Let us recall that in 1979, the leadership of the USSR, in order to stop the development of civil war in neighboring Afghanistan, sent a limited contingent of troops there. This caused a violent reaction in the West: in particular, as a sign of protest, the United States and some other countries announced a boycott of the Moscow Olympics, which took place in 1980. The Soviet side lost about 15,000 soldiers in this war.
One of the US leaders of that time tells us the truth. It says that the USSR was lured to Afghanistan by the Americans.
The CIA appeared in Afghanistan before the Russians
Archived 1998 interview with President Carter adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski
about how the US provoked Soviet Union for intervention in Afghanistan. 
Nouvelle Observer (French weekly magazine): Former director CIA Robert Gates writes in his memoirs that American intelligence agencies began helping the Mujahideen in Afghanistan six months before the entry of Soviet troops there. At that time you were an adviser to US President Carter on national security, You were in the know. Do you confirm what Gates said?
Brzezinski: Yes. According to the official version, the CIA began supporting the Mujahideen in 1980, that is, after the entry of the Soviet Army into Afghanistan on December 24, 1979. But in reality (this was kept secret until today) everything was different: in fact, President Carter signed the first directive on providing secret assistance to opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul on July 3, 1979. And on the same day I wrote him a memo in which I explained that, in my opinion, this assistance would entail military intervention by the Soviets.
Despite this risk, you were a supporter of this secret operation. But maybe you wanted this war for the Soviets and were looking for ways to provoke it?
Brzezinski:
We did not force the Russians to intervene, but we deliberately increased the likelihood that they would do so.
When the Soviets justified their actions by saying they intended to fight covert US involvement in Afghanistan, no one believed them. However, there was truth in their words... Do you have any regrets today?
Regret what? That secret operation was a brilliant idea. She let the Russians be lured into an Afghan trap, and you want me to be sorry? When the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter, essentially: "We now have the opportunity to provide the USSR with its own Vietnam War" In fact, Moscow had to fight an unbearable war for almost ten years, a conflict that led to demoralization and ultimately the collapse of the Soviet Empire.
Do you regret that you promoted Islamic fundamentalism, armed and advised future terrorists?
What is more important for world history? Taliban or the fall of the Soviet Empire? A few excited Islamists or the liberation of central Europe and the end of the Cold War?
- “Somewhat excited”? But it has been said repeatedly: Islamic fundamentalism today poses a global threat...
Nonsense! It would be necessary, as they say, for the West to have a common policy towards Islamism. This is stupid: there is no global Islamism. Let's look at Islam rationally and without demagogy or emotion. This world religion with 1.5 billion followers. But what do fundamentalist pro-Western Saudi Arabia, moderate Morocco, militaristic Pakistan, Egypt or secularism have in common? Central Asia? Nothing more than what unites Christian countries.
The United States supplied the Afghan Mujahideen with advanced weapons - Stinger MANPADS
US arms supplies to Afghanistan
Afghanistan, 1980s. Mujahid with Stinger The USSR command promised the title of Hero of the Soviet Union to anyone who captured the Stinger MANPADS complex (Second Generation Man-portable Anti-Aircraft Missile Systems) in good condition. During the years of the Afghan War, Soviet special forces managed to obtain 8 serviceable Stinger MANPADS, but none of them became a Hero.
The Pentagon and the US CIA, arming Afghan rebels with Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, pursued a number of goals, one of which was the ability to test new MANPADS in real combat conditions. By supplying modern MANPADS to the Afghan rebels, the Americans “tried on” them for supplies Soviet weapons to Vietnam, where the United States lost hundreds of helicopters and planes shot down by Soviet missiles. But the Soviet Union provided legal assistance to the government of a sovereign country fighting the aggressor, and American politicians armed anti-government armed groups of the Mujahideen (“international terrorists” - according to the current American classification). 
Despite the strictest secrecy, the first reports of funds mass media about the supply of several hundred Stinger MANPADS to the Afghan opposition appeared in the summer of 1986. American anti-aircraft systems were delivered from the USA by sea to the Pakistani port of Karachi, and then transported by road Armed Forces Pakistan to Mujahideen training camps. The US CIA supplied missiles and trained Afghan rebels in the vicinity of the Pakistani city of Rualpindi. After preparing the calculations at the training center, they, together with the MANPADS, were sent to Afghanistan in pack caravans and vehicles.
Afghan war- military conflict on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). A limited contingent of Soviet troops took part in this conflict. The conflict took place between the Afghan government forces and the armed forces of the Afghan Mujahideen, which were supported by NATO, and primarily the United States, which actively armed the enemies of the Afghan regime.
Background to the Afghan War
The war itself, which lasted from 1979 to 1989, is defined in historiography by the presence of a limited contingent of the USSR Armed Forces on the territory of Afghanistan. But the beginning of the entire conflict must be considered 1973, when King Zahir Shah was overthrown in Afghanistan. Power passed to the regime of Muhammad Daoud, and in 1978 the Saur (April) Revolution took place, and the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), which proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, became the new government. Afghanistan began to build socialism, but all construction took place in an extremely unstable internal situation.
The leader of the PDPA was Nur Mohammad Taraki. His reforms were extremely unpopular in a country where traditionally the majority were rural residents. Any dissent was brutally suppressed. During his reign, he arrested thousands of people, some of whom were executed.
The main opponents of the socialist government were radical Islamists, who declared a holy war (jihad) against it. Mujahideen detachments were organized, which later became the main opposing force - the Soviet army fought against it.
The majority of Afghanistan's population was illiterate, and it was easy for Islamist agitators to turn the population against the new government.
Beginning of the war
Immediately after coming to power, the government was faced with the outbreak of armed uprisings organized by Islamists. The Afghan leadership was unable to cope with the situation and turned to Moscow for help.
The issue of assistance to Afghanistan was considered in the Kremlin on March 19, 1979. Leonid Brezhnev and other members of the Politburo opposed armed intervention. But over time, the situation at the borders of the USSR worsened, and opinion changed radically.
On December 12, 1979, a resolution was adopted by the CPSU Central Committee on the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. Formally, the reason was repeated requests from the Afghan leadership, but in fact these actions were supposed to prevent threats of foreign military intervention.
It must be remembered that, in addition to tense relations with the Mujahideen, there was no unity in the government itself. The internal party struggle, which reached its climax in September 1979, became particularly irreconcilable. It was then that the leader of the PDPA, Nur Mohammad Taraki, was arrested and killed by Hafizullah Amin. Amin took Taraki's place and, while continuing to fight against the Islamists, intensified repression within the ruling party.
According to Soviet intelligence, Amin tried to come to an agreement with Pakistan and China, which our experts considered unacceptable. On December 27, 1979, a detachment of Soviet special forces captured the presidential palace, Amin and his sons were killed. Babrak Karmal became the new leader of the country.
Progress of the war
As a result, our soldiers found themselves drawn into the outbreak of a civil war and became its active participants.
The entire war can be divided into several stages:
1st stage: December 1979 - February 1980. Introduction of the 40th Soviet Army of General Boris Gromov into Afghanistan, placement in garrisons, organization of security of strategic objects and locations.
2nd stage: March 1980 - April 1985. Conducting active large-scale combat operations. Reorganization and strengthening of the armed forces of the DRA.
3rd stage: May 1985 - December 1986. Reduction of active hostilities and transition to supporting the actions of Afghan government troops. Assistance was provided by aviation and sapper units. Organization of counteraction to the delivery of weapons and ammunition from abroad. Six regiments were withdrawn to their homeland.
4th stage: January 1987 - February 1989. Assisting the Afghan leadership in pursuing a policy of national reconciliation. Continued support for military operations carried out by government forces. Preparations for the withdrawal of Soviet troops.
In April 1988, an agreement was signed in Switzerland between Afghanistan and Pakistan to resolve the situation around the DRA. The Soviet Union pledged to withdraw its troops within nine months, and the United States and Pakistan were to stop supporting the mujahideen. In April 1988, in accordance with the agreement, Soviet troops were completely withdrawn from Afghanistan.
Losses in the Afghan War
At the moment, it is known that the losses of the Soviet army amounted to 14 thousand 427 people, the KGB - 576 people, the Ministry of Internal Affairs - 28 people (dead and missing). There were 53 thousand people wounded and shell-shocked during the fighting.
The exact data on Afghans killed in the war is unknown. According to various sources, these losses could range from 1 to 2 million people. From 850 thousand to one and a half million people became refugees and settled mainly in Pakistan and Iran.
After the end of the war
The Mujahideen did not take part in the Geneva negotiations and did not support these decisions. As a result, after the withdrawal of Soviet troops fighting did not stop, but even intensified.
The new leader of Afghanistan, Najibullah, could barely hold back the onslaught of the Mujahideen without Soviet help. There was a split in his government, many of his associates joined the ranks of the opposition. In March 1992, General Dostum and his Uzbek militia abandoned Najibullah. In April, the Mujahideen captured Kabul. Najibullah long time hid in the UN mission building, but was captured by the Taliban and hanged.
The United States of America provided great assistance in supporting the counter-revolution in Afghanistan. They were the initiators and organizers of many international protests against the Soviet Union.
Back in 1980, an Islamic conference was organized, at which 34 foreign ministers demanded the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. From the USA General Assembly The UN adopted a resolution protesting Soviet intervention. American President D. Carter advocated a boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics.
The United States and the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf organized unprecedented assistance to Afghan militants. With their money, Mujahideen were trained in Pakistan and China. Actively participated in operations against Soviet CIA forces.
Throughout the entire period of hostilities, the United States supplied the Mujahideen with a variety of modern weapons (recoilless rifles, Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, and others).
On December 25, 1979, the introduction of a limited contingent of Soviet troops into the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan began.
This undeclared war, which lasted 9 years, 1 month and 19 days, remains an unknown war to this day, despite numerous published books of memoirs of participants, very detailed descriptions of the events of the war, veteran websites, etc. If you compare how much is known about the three-year Patriotic War the war of 1812 and the four-year Great Patriotic War, then we can say that we know almost nothing about the Afghan war. The image of a ten-year “march across the river” in the minds of people, filmmakers and journalists is not cleared up at all, and, 33 years later, the same cliches about a “senseless bloody war”, about “mountains of corpses” and “rivers of blood”, about numerous, veterans who went crazy from these “rivers of blood” and then became drunkards or became bandits.
Some young people, seeing the abbreviation OKSVA, think that this stupid tattoo artist made a mistake in the word “Moscow”. I was 16 years old when this strange war began, and a year later I graduated from school and either entered college or entered the army. And my comrades and I really didn’t want to end up in this same OKSV in Afghanistan, from where the first zinc coffins had already begun to arrive! Although some crazy people rushed there themselves...
And that's how it all began...
The decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan was made on December 12, 1979 at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and formalized by a secret resolution of the CPSU Central Committee. The official purpose of the entry was to prevent the threat of foreign military intervention. As a formal basis, the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee used repeated requests from the Afghan leadership for the deployment of Soviet troops.
This conflict involved the armed forces of the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) on the one hand and the armed opposition (Mujahideen, or dushmans) on the other. The struggle was for complete political control over the territory of Afghanistan. During the conflict, the dushmans were supported by military specialists from the United States, a number of European NATO member countries, as well as Pakistani intelligence services.
December 25, 1979 at 15-00, the entry of Soviet troops into the DRA began in three directions: Kushka - Shindand - Kandahar, Termez - Kunduz - Kabul, Khorog - Fayzabad. The troops landed at the airfields of Kabul, Bagram, and Kandahar. On December 27, the KGB special forces “Zenith”, “Grom” and the “Muslim battalion” of the GRU special forces stormed the Taj Beg Palace. During the battle, Afghan President Amin was killed. On the night of December 28, the 108th Motorized Rifle Division entered Kabul, taking control of all the most important facilities in the capital.
The Soviet contingent included: the command of the 40th Army with support and service units, divisions - 4, separate brigades - 5, separate regiments - 4, combat aviation regiments - 4, helicopter regiments - 3, pipeline brigade - 1, material support brigade - 1. And also, units of the Airborne Forces of the USSR Ministry of Defense, units and divisions of the GRU General Staff, the Office of the Chief Military Advisor. In addition to formations and units of the Soviet Army, there were separate units of border troops, the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR in Afghanistan.
On December 29, Pravda publishes the “Address of the Government of Afghanistan”: “The Government of the DRA, taking into account the expanding interference and provocations of the external enemies of Afghanistan in order to protect the gains of the April Revolution, territorial integrity, national independence and maintaining peace and security, based on the Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighborliness of December 5, 1978, appealed to the USSR with an urgent request for urgent political, moral, economic assistance, including military assistance, with which the DRA government had previously repeatedly appealed to the government of the Soviet Union. The government of the Soviet Union satisfied the request of the Afghan side.”
Soviet troops in Afghanistan guarded roads and objects of Soviet-Afghan economic cooperation (gas fields, power plants, a nitrogen fertilizer plant in Mazar-i-Sharif, etc.). Ensured the functioning of airfields in major cities. Contributed to the strengthening of government bodies in 21 provincial centers. They carried convoys with military and national economic cargo for their own needs and in the interests of the DRA.
The presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and their combat activity conditionally divided into four stages.
1st stage: December 1979 - February 1980 Entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, placing them in garrisons, organizing the protection of deployment points and various objects.
2nd stage: March 1980 - April 1985 Conducting active combat operations, including large-scale ones, together with Afghan formations and units. Work to reorganize and strengthen the armed forces of the DRA.
3rd stage: May 1985 - December 1986 The transition from active combat operations primarily to supporting the actions of Afghan troops with Soviet aviation, artillery and engineer units. Special forces units fought to suppress the delivery of weapons and ammunition from abroad. The withdrawal of six Soviet regiments to their homeland took place.
4th stage: January 1987 - February 1989 Participation of Soviet troops in the Afghan leadership's policy of national reconciliation. Continued support for the combat activities of Afghan troops. Preparing Soviet troops for the return to their homeland and implementing their complete withdrawal.
On April 14, 1988, with the mediation of the UN in Switzerland, the foreign ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed the Geneva Agreements on a political settlement of the situation in the DRA. The Soviet Union pledged to withdraw its contingent within 9 months, starting on May 15; The United States and Pakistan, for their part, had to stop supporting the Mujahideen.
In accordance with the agreements, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan began on May 15, 1988.
February 15, 1989 Soviet troops were completely withdrawn from Afghanistan. The withdrawal of the troops of the 40th Army was led by the last commander of the limited contingent, Lieutenant General Boris Gromov.
Losses: According to updated data, in total in the war the Soviet Army lost 14 thousand 427 people, the KGB - 576 people, the Ministry of Internal Affairs - 28 people dead and missing. More than 53 thousand people were wounded, shell-shocked, injured. The exact number of Afghans killed in the war is unknown. Available estimates range from 1 to 2 million people.
Materials from the sites: http://soldatru.ru and http://ria.ru and photos from open Internet sources were used.
On December 25, 1979, at 15.00, in the Kabul direction, the TurkVO motorized rifle division stationed in Termez began crossing the pontoon bridge across the Amu Darya and marching to Kabul. At the same time, BTA planes with personnel and military equipment of the airborne division crossed the border, which landed at the Kabul airfield.
1. a brief description of forces that came to power in April 1978. Events preceding the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan.Nine years, one month and eighteen days... That’s how long the “Afghan war” lasted. The war that became the “swan song” of the Soviet Army and the Soviet Union.
A war that claimed 14,427 lives, through which a total of 620 thousand people passed, and which became one of the powerful preconditions for a radical change in the geopolitical situation in the world.
What events preceded the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan? Was it vital for our country or was it pure gamble?
Soviet troops were sent to Afghanistan after repeated requests from the leadership of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, which took the helm as a result of a coup d'etat unexpected for the USSR in April 1978. But even then the PDPA party did not represent a single whole, but consisted of two opposing factions - “Khalq” (“People”) and “Parcham” (“Banner”). The division into factions occurred almost immediately after the formation of the party in 1965. The Khalq faction adhered to the class principle of admission to the party, stood on radical left political positions, and set as its main task “the establishment of national democracy”, “resolving the land issue in favor of landless and land-poor peasants with the broad participation of the entire peasantry in this process.” The leader of the Khalq faction, Nur Muhammad Taraki, who later became the head of Afghanistan, considered the party “the vanguard of the working class,” not taking into account the fact that in Afghanistan the working class, if present, constituted a very insignificant part of Afghan society. In such conditions, the ideological work of the “Khalqists” was aimed primarily at the democratic intelligentsia and officers of the Afghan army. Ultimately, the Khalqists wanted to build a socialist society in Afghanistan.
Parcham, on the other hand, took a more moderate position and proposed accepting people into the party based not on class principles, but on a person’s desire to work. They considered themselves the most prepared revolutionaries, “Marxists-Leninists.” Their ultimate goal was the establishment of a democratic society in Afghanistan; For this, they intended to widely use the methods of parliamentary struggle, relying on the intelligentsia, civil servants, and the military, considering these layers to be the most real force with which they could achieve their goals.
It should be noted that at that time (late 1960s-early 1970s) the Soviet Union was not interested in radically changing the government structure of Afghanistan. At that time, Kabul had a strong central government, personified by King Zahir Shah. Afghanistan has been a traditionally friendly state for our country. Soviet specialists took an active part in building the Afghan economy and in training their own Afghan personnel. Under the leadership of specialists from the USSR, the famous Salang tunnel was built in 1964, which made it possible to connect Kabul with the northern provinces of the country by the shortest route. Under the strong rule of the king, all the numerous tribes of Afghanistan lived peacefully and did not conflict with each other.
In July 1973, an anti-monarchist coup took place in Afghanistan, led by Zahir Shah’s cousin, Mohammad Daoud, who personified the moderate nationalist “third force” that stood between traditional Islamic forces and the PDPA.
Already in August 1973, armed protests by supporters of the Islamic-monarchical system of Afghanistan began in the Panjshir Gorge, organized, as it was announced, by Pakistani military and political circles. From then on, the protests of Daoud's opponents began to expand.
In April 1978, the country experienced coup d'etat, the cause of which was the contradictions between the leadership of Afghanistan and the PDPA, which was laying claim to power. On April 25, by order of M. Daoud, the top leaders of the PDPA Central Committee were arrested, including Nur Muhammad Taraki and Babrak Karmal. The reason for the arrest was the accusation of the leaders of the PDPA of violating the Constitution, which prohibited the activities of any political parties. And already at 9 am on April 27, mass demonstrations began, led by the remaining leaders of the PDPA, including Hafizullah Amin. Already at 17.30 the arrested PDPA leaders were released from prison. During the storming of M. Daoud's palace by rebel military personnel, he and members of his family were killed. On April 30, Afghanistan was proclaimed a Democratic Republic, and on May 1, a new government consisting of 20 ministers was appointed.
This development of events was actually a surprise for the Soviet leadership. which turned out to be unprepared for such rapid developments. And the PDPA itself, tormented by internal contradictions, was in no way suitable for the role of the leading and guiding force of Afghan society, which, being under the strong influence of Islamic religious and secular authorities, was not inclined to immediately begin to destroy the established traditional foundations. Moreover, having come to power, the new leadership of Afghanistan, led by the Khalqist Taraki, immediately began a radical restructuring of all spheres of Afghan society. For example, surplus land was confiscated from large landowners, and a land ownership limit was set at 6 hectares. Poor peasants were freed from debt bondage. 296 thousand families were allocated land due to the seizure of land from wealthy landowners. However, landless peasants cautiously and cautiously accepted such “gifts” from the new government, because traditional principles were strong in Afghan society, according to which the poor could not lay claim to the riches of the rich, “for it is so pleasing to the Almighty (“inshallah”).”
Another major miscalculation of the new government was the proclamation of the “Saur uprising” (“Saur” - “April” on one of official languages Afghanistan) “a proletarian revolution, part of the world proletarian revolution.” And this in a country where there were only about 100 thousand low-skilled workers for a population of 16 million. Most likely, statements about the proletarian nature of the revolution were made counting on the full assistance of the USSR. Considering the generally positive response of the population to the overthrow of Daoud as approval of its rise to power, the PDPA began drastic socio-economic reforms that directly affected the interests of a fairly wide segment of Afghan society. The new authorities began to behave arrogantly towards farmers, completely ignoring the traditions and foundations that had developed in a virtually closed cell - the Afghan village. Thus, they provoked a massive influx of the Afghan peasantry into the ranks of the political and armed opposition, the first units of which began operations during the reign of Daoud. In addition, the sharply anti-religious policy of the new authorities (for example, on the first day of the new government, more than 20 mullahs were shot in Kabul alone) did not contribute to mutual understanding between atheist communists and the deeply religious Afghan people. All this led to a sharp intensification of anti-government protests in July-September 1978. This is due to a sharp increase in funding for intra-Afghan anti-government Islamic groups from such international Islamist groups as the Muslim Brotherhood.
By the beginning of the summer of 1979, the military-political situation in Afghanistan had sharply worsened. Almost the entire eastern province of Paktia was controlled by opposition forces, and Afghan rebels kept breaking out in the garrisons. regular army. In the current situation, the Afghan leadership was unable on its own, without a combat-ready army and without the support of the people, to stop the large-scale onslaught from outside of large armed groups financed from abroad.
Beginning in the spring of 1979, the Afghan leadership repeatedly appealed to the USSR to send a limited military contingent to Afghanistan to help repel the external and internal “counter-revolution”. There are 14 such requests. Here are some of the requests:
“June 16th. Send Soviet crews in tanks and infantry fighting vehicles to the DRA to protect the government and Bagram and Shindand airfields.”
But the Soviet leadership refused every time.
However, the opinion of the Soviet leadership changed dramatically in September 1979, when one of the leaders of the PDPA, Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin, removed President Nur Muhammad Taraki. The internal party struggle, which had died down, flared up with renewed vigor, which threatened instability on the southern borders of the USSR. In addition, in foreign policy Amin leaned more and more towards the West and the USA. And the internal political situation in Afghanistan sharply worsened due to the fact that Amin began brutal political repression against the “Parchamists.” It was necessary to take control of the situation in Afghanistan. After a comprehensive study of the situation around Afghanistan, the top Soviet leadership decided to eliminate Amin, install a more predictable leader and send troops to provide moral support to the Afghan people. The political decision to send troops was made on December 12, 1979 in the cabinet Secretary General Central Committee of the CPSU L.I. Brezhnev. However, according to the leadership of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, the introduction of troops into Afghanistan would lead to an intensification of the rebellious movement, which, first of all, would be directed against Soviet troops (which subsequently happened). But no one listened to the opinion of the military.
2. Deployment of troops. The tasks initially faced by OKSV.
On December 25, 1979, at 15.00, in the Kabul direction, the TurkVO motorized rifle division stationed in Termez began crossing the pontoon bridge across the Amu Darya and marching to Kabul. At the same time, BTA planes with personnel and military equipment of the airborne division crossed the border, which landed at the Kabul airfield (From the certificate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR “On the issue of the circumstances of the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan”).
On December 27, 1979, the USSR KGB special unit “A” (the famous “Alpha”), led by Colonel Boyarinov, who died during this assault, began an operation to storm the palace of H. Amin, as a result of which the latter was liquidated. At this time, Soviet units were already crossing the border. On December 28, 1979, the situation in Kabul was completely controlled by Soviet troops. On this day, Babrak Karmal addressed the Afghan people on the radio, who “on the armor” of Soviet tanks returned in triumph from an “honorable exile” from Czechoslovakia, where he was ambassador. Now he, a member of the Parcham faction, has become the new ruler of Afghanistan.
Before January 1, 1980, about 50 thousand military personnel were introduced into Afghanistan, namely: two airborne and two motorized rifle divisions, support units). One motorized rifle division, numbering 12 thousand people, entered Afghanistan in the direction of Kushka, Kandahar, while the main forces were in the direction of Termez, the Salang pass to Bagram and Kabul.
In January 1980, two more motorized rifle divisions were sent to Afghanistan. The total number of troops was 80 thousand people. The first commander of the 40th Army, which formed the backbone of the Limited Contingent of the Soviet Forces, was Colonel General Yuri Tukharinov.
By mid-January 1980, the introduction of the main forces of the 40th Army into Afghanistan was largely completed. Three divisions (2 motorized rifle divisions, 1 airborne division), an air assault brigade, and two separate regiments were concentrated on the territory of Afghanistan. Subsequently, the combat composition of the OKSV was clarified, and some units were reorganized in order to strengthen them. Finally, the OKSV included:
4 divisions (motorized rifle - 3, airborne - 1),
5 separate brigades (motorized rifle - 2, air assault - 1, special forces - 1)
4 separate regiments (motorized rifle - 2, parachute - 1, artillery - 1)
4 combat aviation regiments
3 helicopter regiments.
1 pipeline crew
1 logistics brigade.
Be that as it may, for peacetime such a transfer of troops, unprecedented in its scale, was generally successful, without serious complications.
The initial combat missions facing the Soviet troops were: protecting the main transport routes (Kushka-Herat-Shindand-Kandahar; Termez-Kabul; Kabul-Jalalabad; Kunduz-Fayzabad); protection of economic infrastructure facilities in Afghanistan, ensuring safe passage of convoys with national economic cargo. But the situation has made significant adjustments to these tasks...
ENTRY OF SOVIET TROOPS INTO AFGHANISTAN
Let us now turn to the events associated with the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan.
On December 12, 1979, Resolution No. 176/125 of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee was adopted. It was called: “To the situation in “A”, which meant - to the situation in Afghanistan.
Here is the text of the Resolution:
"1. Approve the considerations and measures (i.e., sending troops into Afghanistan) outlined by vol. Andropov Yu. V., Ustinov D. F., Gromyko A. A.
Allow them to make adjustments of a non-fundamental nature during the implementation of these activities.
Issues requiring a decision by the Central Committee should be submitted to the Politburo in a timely manner. The implementation of all these activities is entrusted to comrade. Andropova Yu. V., Ustinova D. T., Gromyko A. A.
2. Instruct t.t. Andropov Yu.V., Ustinova D.T., Gromyko A.A. inform the Politburo of the Central Committee about the progress of the planned activities.
Secretary of the Central Committee L.I. Brezhnev.”
It became especially clear to our leadership that the deployment of troops was necessary with the coming to power in Afghanistan of X. Amin, when he began to commit atrocities against his own people, as well as to show treachery in foreign policy, which affected the interests of the state security of the USSR. Our leaders were actually forced to send in troops.
What motivated them? Obviously, firstly, by the fact that it was necessary to prevent Amin’s repressions from rampant. It was an open extermination of the people; thousands of innocent people were executed every day. At the same time, not only Tajiks, Uzbeks, Khazarians, Tatars, but also Pashtuns were shot. Extreme measures were taken in response to any denunciation or suspicion. The Soviet Union could not support such power. But the Soviet Union could not break off relations with Afghanistan due to this.
Secondly, it was necessary to exclude Amin’s appeal to the Americans with a request to send in their troops (since the USSR refuses). And this could have happened. Taking advantage of the current situation in Afghanistan and using Amin’s appeal, the United States could install its own monitoring and measuring equipment along the Soviet-Afghan border, capable of taking all parameters from prototypes of our missile, aircraft and other weapons, the testing of which was carried out at state testing sites in Central Asia. Thus, the CIA would have the same data as our design bureaus. Moreover, missiles would be deployed on the territory of Afghanistan (from a complex of missiles of shorter and medium range, but strategic nuclear forces), aimed at the USSR, which, of course, would put our country in a very difficult situation.
When the Soviet leadership finally decided to send our troops into Afghanistan, then under these conditions the General Staff proposed an alternative: send troops, but serve as garrisons in large populated areas and do not get involved in the fighting that took place on the territory of Afghanistan. The General Staff hoped that the very presence of our troops would stabilize the situation and the opposition would stop hostilities against government troops. The proposal was accepted. And the very entry and stay of our troops on the territory of Afghanistan was initially planned for only a few months.
But the situation developed completely differently than we expected. With the introduction of our troops, the provocations intensified. Although, in principle, the people of Afghanistan welcomed the entry of our troops. The entire population in cities and villages poured into the streets. Smiles, flowers, exclamations: “Shuravi!” (Soviet) - everything spoke of kindness and friendship.
The most vile provocative step on the part of the dushmans was the brutal murder, with torture, of our officer-advisers in the artillery regiment of the 20th Infantry Division in the north of the country. The Soviet command, together with the military and political leadership of Afghanistan, was forced to take tough preventive measures. And the provocateurs were just waiting for that. And in turn, they carried out a series of bloody actions in many areas. And then military clashes spread throughout the country and began to grow like a snowball. Even then, a system of coordinated actions and centralized control of opposition forces was visible.
Therefore, the grouping of our troops from forty to fifty thousand, which were introduced initially (in 1979–1980), by 1985 began to number more than one hundred thousand. This, of course, included builders, repairmen, logistics workers, doctors, and other support services.
One hundred thousand - is it a lot or a little? At that time, taking into account the socio-political situation in Afghanistan itself and around it, this was exactly as much as was required to protect not only the most important objects of the country, but also oneself from attacks by rebel gangs and partially take measures to cover the state border with Pakistan and Iran ( interception of caravans, gangs, etc.). There were no other goals and no other tasks were set.
Later, some politicians and diplomats (and even military men) wrote that history condemned the Soviet Union for this step of sending troops into Afghanistan. I don't agree with this. It was not history that condemned, but a well-prepared and convincingly presented US propaganda campaign that forced the vast majority of countries in the world to condemn the Soviet Union. And the leadership of our country, carried away by the dilemma “to introduce - not to introduce,” did not care at all about this side of the matter, that is, about explaining not only the Soviet and Afghan people, but also the world, their goals and intentions. After all, we went to Afghanistan not with war, but with peace! Why did we have to hide it? On the contrary, even before the introduction it was necessary to widely communicate this to the peoples of the world. Alas! We wanted to stop the military clashes that were already there and stabilize the situation, but outwardly it turned out that we seemed to have brought war. They allowed the Americans, by their step, to mobilize the opposition as much as possible to fight both government troops and our units.
It is appropriate to return to the events in Vietnam. The whole world knew the Soviet-Vietnamese relations that took place before the US aggression. But then the United States attacked Vietnam. Undoubtedly, we, like other countries of the world, condemned this act. But we did not make these events dependent on relations between the USSR and the USA. And Carter suddenly poses the question categorically: the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan is unacceptable for the United States, and this is a precondition for our further negotiations on the issue of reduction nuclear weapons (?!).
This “amazing” position becomes even stranger if we remember at least one more fact from the Vietnamese set: the United States is bombing Hanoi, and Nixon flies to Moscow on an official visit, the leadership of the USSR does not cancel his reception. Really strange.
And in general one wonders why White House so mad? Is aggression against Vietnam permissible for the United States? Is it also possible to commit aggression against Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, Libya, Grenada, Panama?! But the Soviet Union, at the request of the leadership of Afghanistan, is not allowed to send its troops into this country, even if there are contractual relations?
This is the policy of double standards.
Take 1989. After the withdrawal of our troops from Afghanistan, the United States instantly lost interest in the Afghan problem, although, if you believe the pompous statements of American politicians, starting with presidents, the United States seemed to be in favor of peace on the soil of Afghanistan and for providing assistance to the long-suffering people of this country. So where is it all? Instead, the Americans set the Taliban against the people of Afghanistan, supporting them in every possible way with finances and weapons.
I return to the events of 1979. In order to ensure the entry of our troops into Afghanistan, our military command decided: to transfer in advance small operational groups with communications equipment to Kabul and other cities where it was planned to introduce formations of the Ground Forces or land units of airborne troops. These were mainly units special purpose. In particular, to ensure our actions, a task force led by Lieutenant General N. N. Guskov was sent to the airfields of Bagram (70 km north of Kabul) and Kabul. Subsequently, he took over an entire airborne division and a separate parachute regiment. It should be of interest to the reader that to transport one airborne division, about four hundred transport aircraft of the IL-76 and AN-12 type (and partly Antey) are required.
The entire deployment of troops on the spot, in the Turkestan Military District, was directly led from the Ministry of Defense by S. L. Sokolov with his headquarters (task group), which was located in Termez. He acted jointly and through the commander of the district troops, Colonel General Yu. P. Maksimov. But although the General Staff was in Moscow, it “kept its finger on the pulse.” Not only did he “feed” on data from Sokolov’s task force and the district headquarters. In addition, the General Staff had direct closed radio communication with each formation (division, brigade) that marched into Afghanistan, and with each of our operational groups that had already been abandoned and settled in Afghanistan.
The composition of our troops being introduced was determined by the corresponding directive signed on December 24, 1979 by the Minister of Defense and the Chief of General Staff. Specific tasks were also defined here, which generally boiled down to the fact that our troops, in accordance with the request of the Afghan side, are being introduced into the territory of the DRA in order to provide assistance to the Afghan people and prohibit the aggression of neighboring states. And further it was indicated which routes to take to march (cross the border) and in which settlements to become garrisons.
Our troops consisted of the 40th Army (two motorized rifle divisions, a separate motorized rifle regiment, an air assault brigade and an anti-aircraft missile brigade), the 103rd Airborne Division and a separate airborne parachute regiment.
Subsequently, both the 103rd division and a separate airborne regiment, like the rest of the Soviet military units located in Afghanistan, were introduced into the 40th Army (initially these units were under operational subordination).
In addition, a reserve consisting of three motorized rifle divisions and one airborne division was created on the territory of the Turkestan and Central Asian military districts. This reserve served political purposes more than purely military ones. Initially, we did not intend to “draw” anything from it to strengthen the group in Afghanistan. But later life made adjustments, and we had to introduce one additional motorized rifle division (201st med) and station it in the Kunduz area. Initially, the 108th med was planned here, but we were forced to place it further south, mainly in the Bagram area. It was also necessary to take several regiments from other reserve divisions and, bringing them to the level of a separate motorized rifle brigade or a separate motorized rifle regiment, bring them in and place them in separate garrisons. So we subsequently had garrisons in Jalalabad, Ghazni, Gardez, and Kandahar. Moreover, the subsequent situation forced us to introduce two special forces brigades: one of them strengthened the Jalalabad garrison (one battalion of this brigade was stationed in Asadabad, Kunar province), and the second brigade was stationed in Lashkar Gah (one of its battalions was in Kandahar).
The introduced aviation was actually based at all airfields in Afghanistan, with the exception of Herat, Khost, Farah, Mazar-i-Sharif and Faizabad, where helicopter squadrons were periodically based. But its main forces were in Bagram, Kabul, Kandahar and Shindand.
So, on December 25, 1979, at 18.00 local time (15.00 Moscow), at the urgent request of the leadership of Afghanistan and taking into account the situation around this country, the leaders of our state gave the command and Soviet troops began their entry into the territory of Afghanistan. All supporting measures were previously carried out, including a floating bridge was built on the Amu Darya River.
On state border, i.e. in both directions where troops were introduced (Termez, Hairatan, Kabul - from 12/25/79 and Kushka, Herat, Shindand - from 12/27/79), the Afghan people met Soviet soldiers with soul and heart, sincerely, warmly and friendly, with flowers and smiles. I have already mentioned this, but it bears repeating. All this is the absolute truth. It is also true that where our units became garrisons, good relations with the local residents were immediately established.
In general, both Moscow and Kabul were then motivated by noble goals: Moscow sincerely wanted to help its neighbor in stabilizing the situation and did not intend to conduct hostilities (let alone occupy the country), Kabul outwardly wanted to preserve the power of the people. Undoubtedly, the warring parties in Afghanistan pushed Washington and its satellites to hostilities. Therefore, in addition to propaganda measures, huge finances and material resources were thrown here (the United States spared nothing for the war against the Soviet Union with the wrong hands). At the same time, Islamabad was turned into main base, where the opposition could support its forces at the expense of refugees, train combat troops and control military operations from here. Islamabad undoubtedly hoped to bring Afghanistan under its control in the future. Other countries also warmed their hands on this grief, selling their weapons to the opposition.
In the area of politics, the United States tried to make maximum dividends from the entry of Soviet troops. The US President even sent a message to L. Brezhnev (naturally, it was prepared by Brzezinski) with negative assessments of this step by the Soviet leadership and made it clear that all this would entail dire consequences.
In this regard, the country's leadership is preparing a response letter from L. Brezhnev to Carter's message. Already on December 29, 1979, Leonid Ilyich signed it and sent it to the President of the United States.
Here is its summary:
“Dear Mr. President! In response to your message, I consider it necessary to say the following. We cannot agree with your assessment of what is happening now in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Through your ambassador in Moscow, we have already, in confidence, given the American side and you personally... an explanation of what is really happening there, as well as the reasons that prompted us to respond positively to the request of the Afghan government for the deployment of limited Soviet military contingents.
The attempt made in your message to cast doubt on the very fact of the request of the Afghan government to send our troops to this country looks strange. I am forced to note that it is not someone’s perception or non-perception of this fact, agreement or disagreement with it that determines the actual state of affairs. And it consists of the following.
The Afghan government has repeatedly approached us with this request for almost two years. By the way, one of these requests was sent to us on December 25th. d. We, the Soviet Union, know this, and the Afghan side, which sent us such requests, knows this equally.
I want to emphasize once again that the sending of limited Soviet contingents to Afghanistan serves one purpose - to provide assistance and assistance in repelling acts external aggression, which has been taking place for a long time and has now taken on even wider proportions...
...I must further clearly tell you that the Soviet military contingent did not take any military actions against the Afghan side and we, of course, do not intend to take them (and the Afghan side did not take measures of resistance, on the contrary, the Soviet troops were greeted as friends).
You reproach us in your message that we did not consult with the US government on Afghan affairs before sending our military contingents to Afghanistan. May I ask you - did you consult with us before you started massive concentration? naval forces in the waters adjacent to Iran and in the Persian Gulf region, and in many other cases about which you should at least inform us?
In connection with the content and spirit of your message, I consider it necessary to clarify once again that the request of the Afghan government and the satisfaction of this request by the Soviet Union is exclusively a matter for the USSR and Afghanistan, which themselves regulate their relations by their own consent and, of course, cannot allow any outside interference in these relationships. They, like any UN member state, have the right not only to individual, but also collective self-defense, which is provided for in Article 51 of the UN Charter, which the USSR and the USA themselves formulated. And this was approved by all UN member states.
Of course, there is no basis for your assertion that our actions in Afghanistan pose a threat to peace.
In light of all this, the immoderation of the tone of some of the wording of your message is striking. What is this for? Wouldn't it be better to assess the situation more calmly, keeping in mind the highest interests of the world and, not least of all, the relationship between our two powers?
As for your “advice,” we have already informed you, and here I repeat again, that as soon as the reasons that caused Afghanistan’s request to the Soviet Union disappear, we intend to completely withdraw Soviet military contingents from the territory of Afghanistan.
And here is our advice to you: the American side could make its contribution to stopping armed incursions from outside into the territory of Afghanistan.
I do not believe that the work to create more stable and productive relations between the USSR and the USA may be in vain, unless, of course, the American side itself wants this. We don't want this. I think that this would not be beneficial for the United States of America itself. We are convinced that the way relations develop between the USSR and the USA is a mutual matter. We believe that they should not be subject to fluctuations under the influence of any incidental factors or events.
Despite differences in a number of issues of world and European politics, of which we are all clearly aware, the Soviet Union is a supporter of conducting business in the spirit of those agreements and documents that were adopted by our countries in the interests of peace, equal cooperation and international security.
A. Brezhnev."
As the reader can undoubtedly see, Brezhnev’s letter, although in the spirit of modern diplomacy, but written sharply and with dignity. The letter, like a mirror, truly reflected our relations with the United States at that time and at the same time showed that a conversation could only be on equal terms and not otherwise. As for the “advice” that Carter gave to Brezhnev, the Soviet Union can give it to the United States with no less success and even more effectively.
At the same time, in order to mitigate the foreign policy situation that had developed around the USSR in connection with the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, telegrams were sent through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to all Soviet ambassadors. They recommended immediately visiting the head of government and, referring to the instructions of the Soviet government, revealing the essence of our policy on this problem. In particular, it was said that in the context of interference in internal Afghan affairs, including the use of armed force by gangs from the territory of Pakistan and taking into account the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborhood and Cooperation concluded in 1978, the Afghan leadership turned to the Soviet Union for assistance and assistance in the fight against external aggression. Therefore, we were obliged to respond positively to this appeal.
“At the same time,” the telegram says, “the Soviet Union proceeds from the relevant provisions of the UN Charter, in particular Article 51, which provides for the right of states to individual and collective self-defense in order to repel aggression and restore peace... The Soviet Union again emphasizes that, as before , his only desire is to see Afghanistan as an independent sovereign state fulfilling international obligations, including under the UN Charter.”
Meanwhile, with the help of the United States and Pakistan, the Afghan opposition was well organized militarily already in the spring of 1978 (immediately after the April Revolution in Afghanistan). And by the time the Soviet troops entered it had a clear political structure- “Alliance of Seven”, a military organization, excellent provision of weapons, military equipment, ammunition, other property and supplies, a high level of training system for its gangs on the territory of Pakistan and guaranteed control of forces and means. Moreover, the further, the more the opposition received US support: in 1984, a turning point came - the American Congress approved the supply of cutting-edge equipment. In January 1985, the Mujahideen received effective remedy combat air targets "Oerlikon" of Swiss production and anti-aircraft missile Blowpipe made in Great Britain. And in March 1985 it was decided to supply upper class American-made Stinger portable air defense system.
The United States also provided financial support to the Mujahideen: in the Western press, for example, it was reported that in 1987 alone, the US Congress allocated $660 million for the Mujahideen, and in 1988 they received weapons worth $100 million literally every month. In total, for the period from 1980 to 1988 general assistance to the Afghan Mujahideen amounted to about $8.5 billion (the main donors are the USA and Saudi Arabia, partly Pakistan). In addition, the Mujahideen underwent special training at training bases in Pakistan under the guidance of American instructors - I will say more about this later.
As for our troops, in principle, they were all highly trained - they had excellent command of equipment and weapons, and acted skillfully on the battlefield. Undoubtedly, we did not have such wild cases as in the war in Chechnya, where recruits were sent who had never fired at all.
But adaptation was necessary for both soldiers and officers. Before being sent to Afghanistan, they should have at least simply been in a natural and climatic environment similar to this country: under the rays of the hot sun, in conditions of poor drinking conditions, and learned to act skillfully if they wanted to stay alive and win while carrying out a combat mission.
And absolutely rightly, the decision was made to urgently develop two training grounds of the Turkestan Military District in the Termez region: one was built on flat terrain. All personnel who underwent preliminary training were also based here. The second of the prefabricated structures in the mountainous rocky area. Units came here for several days to conduct training in difficult terrain conditions (including live-fire operations).
We initially prepared for three months, then we increased the preparation to four and five months. And finally we settled on six months.
Thus, a recruit called up to the Armed Forces, having completed a young soldier course in his unit and then ending up in the TurkVO, with a destination in the 40th Army, adapted and studied in the conditions in which he would serve in Afghanistan. Naturally, all this had a sharply positive impact on the general situation and especially on preserving the lives of personnel and reducing our losses.
In the soldier's training, the main emphasis was on getting him used to difficult natural and climatic conditions. He would be as resilient as possible in the most difficult extreme situations, would have the necessary skill to act quickly and confidently, would be able to instantly react to the situation, would have high physical, fire and tactical training, would have an unbending morale and fighting spirit, would be able to instantly navigate and act successfully alone, as part of a platoon and company squad.
The training of an officer (from lieutenant to captain), in addition to all this, was aimed at developing the ability to firmly manage his unit in the most difficult and even hopeless conditions, the ability to organize interaction within the unit, with neighbors, as well as with assigned and supporting forces and means (tankers, artillerymen , aviators, sappers, etc.). The officer was obliged by personal example and active actions to maintain a high level of vigilance, constant combat readiness and the ability of the subordinate unit to engage in hostilities immediately if a command was issued to do so or if a real threat suddenly emanated from somewhere for the unit. The officer is obliged to do everything to win in any battle and prevent losses. But if a unit soldier is wounded, his comrades must immediately provide first aid medical care. The officer was personally responsible for the removal and evacuation of the wounded and bodies of the dead, no matter the cost.
About how to solve all these problems. Relevant classes were conducted on mock-ups. IN training centers there were various instructions, instructions, advice, etc. But the main thing was the officers who taught all this science here. In 1981, and even more so later, among the teaching officers there were mainly those who had personally gone through the crucible of the war in Afghanistan and knew the value of a pound.
Naturally, the entire burden of carrying out tasks fell on the soldier, the commanders of squads, platoons and companies. It was not easy for the battalion commander either, and often even worse than for the soldier, because in addition to everything listed for the soldier and the lieutenant-captain, he was obliged to organize logistical and medical support for the battalion units. Battalions, as a rule, operated in an independent direction. It was he, the battalion commander, who first of all had to control both artillery fire on the battlefield and bombing operations of aviation, and run or crawl from company to company in order to personally see on the spot what the situation was and what needed to be done.
And all this had to be instilled in soldiers and officers within six months. I flew from Afghanistan to Termez several times, visited these training centers and became convinced that the studies were, in principle, organized correctly.
It is important to note that weapons and Combat vehicles at the training centers they used exactly those that were in service with the 40th Army.
Thus, the training system for soldiers and officers at the TurkVO training grounds has become well established over time. Before joining the units and units of the 40th Army, which is fighting in Afghanistan, they acquired the necessary skills in training.
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