Difficulties of the standard model. Hierarchy is a structure of subordination of individuals whose interaction occurs through teams

Questions for the exam for students of groups 151-z, 152-z FVZO

1. The essence of social relations.
2. Coercion and solidarity as the main mechanisms (principles) of organizing social relations.
3. Typology of social relations.
4. The essence of society
5. State. Power.
6. Main types of economic activity, economic relations and areas of the economy.
7. Economic (production, economic) relations as a subject of study of economic theory.
8. Main features of the neoclassical approach.
9. Institutions like fundamental element economic relations.
10. " Economic man" in neoclassical theory and its complete rationality.
11. Opportunistic behavior and its main forms.
12. Functions of institutions (coordination and distribution).
13. Formal and informal rules. Interaction of formal and informal rules.
14. Institutional environment and institutional agreements. Hierarchy of rules.
15. Contracts and their types.
16. The essence of property rights, their significance in economic theory.
17. Continental and Anglo-Saxon traditions of determining the essence of property rights. Splitting of property rights.
18. Classifications of property rights (S. Pejovic and A. Honore). Exclusive nature of property rights. Protection of property rights and its forms.
19. Specification of property rights: essence, meaning, forms of implementation (regulated - spontaneous, formal - informal).
20. Costs of specification and protection of property rights.
21. Free access to resources mode. The effect of resource overuse, the “tragedy of the common” model.
22. Erosion of property rights: essence, causes, consequences.
23. Transactions: essence and types.
24. The concept of transaction costs. Their difference from transformation costs.
25. Types of transaction costs according to K. Dalman.
26. Reasons for the costs of searching for information and identifying alternatives and tools for reducing them (specialized markets, specialized agencies, signals).
27. Reasons for measurement costs. Researchable, experienced and trust benefits. Ways to reduce measurement costs.
28. Reasons for the costs of negotiating and concluding contracts. Ways to save them.
29. Reasons for the costs of specification and protection of property rights. Ways to save them.
30. Reasons for the costs of opportunistic behavior. Types of opportunistic behavior and ways to combat them.
31. Specific assets: essence and types (according to O. Williamson).
32. Classification of transactions by frequency of implementation, level of uncertainty and degree of specificity of assets.
33. Characteristics (properties) of transactions as determining factors of their management mechanisms (market, tripartite, bilateral and unified (intra-company)).
34. The essence of external effects and their types (positive and negative; consumer, technological, monetary and network; external and internal).
35. Traditional approach to solving the problem of externalities. Taxes and subsidies A. Pigou.
36. The essence of the approach to solving the problem of external effects by R. Coase.
37. “R. Coase’s theorem”: essence, conditions of implementation, significance for economic theory.
38. Basic coordination mechanisms: market, hierarchy, networks.
39. The essence of the market. Various approaches to defining the market (Cournot, Jevons, Mises, Hodgson, Furubotn).
40. The essence of the properties of symmetry and selectivity of market exchange. Non-market exchange.
41. The market as a means of reducing transaction costs.
42. Markets as a set of institutions that structure market exchange. Their types (open public market, craft shops, peddling, fairs, stock exchange, department stores, online trading).
43. The essence and types of hierarchies (firms, state, non-profit organizations).
44. The system of rules underlying the hierarchy: formal rules (constitutional, regulations); informal rules.
45. The system of rules underlying the hierarchy: formal rules (constitutional, regulatory acts); informal rules.
46. ​​The central agent of the hierarchy as a source of savings in transaction costs and his key powers.
47. Reasons for expanding the hierarchy. Features of vertical integration. The role of specific assets (O. Williamson's model).
48. Limits for expanding the hierarchy: 1) distortion and delay of information received and transmitted by the central agent; 2) increased costs to suppress the opportunistic behavior of agents.
49. Reasons for opportunistic behavior: 1) contradictions in the economic interests of the principal and agent; 2) the presence of information asymmetry.
50. Ways to combat opportunism in the form of shirking: 1) monitoring; 2) creation of a system of incentives.
51. Collective activity and the free rider problem. Methods for solving it (monitoring the contribution of each employee by the administrator, mutual monitoring, ranked payment system).
52. Types of firms, their institutional features, advantages and disadvantages: 1) private enterprise; 2) partnership; 3) a company managed by a labor collective (production cooperative); 4) non-profit organization (non-profit company); 5) state company; 6) regulated firm; 7) public corporation.
53. The essence of the state as a hierarchy.
54. Levels of agency relations in the state system.
55. Reasons for the asymmetric distribution of information in the state system.
56. Goals and motives of behavior of the bureaucracy.
57. Methods for increasing the efficiency of the bureaucracy.
58. What is a “network”?
59. The main features of an interorganizational network: 1) a common goal; 2) independent members; 3) voluntary connection; 4) the presence of several leaders; 5) integrated levels.
60. The main advantages of networks: creating additional value; cost savings.
61. The main disadvantages of the network: opportunistic behavior; complication of interaction (due to the heterogeneity of participants, ambiguity regarding membership, distribution of rights of participants), weak motivation, divergence of goals, uneven distribution of benefits.
62. The main criteria for the classification of intercompany networks: type of quasi-integration; degree of equality of relationships; group stability; barriers to entry; size of participating companies; tasks of cooperation.
63. The main types of interorganizational networks: 1) intercompany strategic alliances; 2) value chains (networks); 3) focal supply networks; 4) dynamic focal networks; 5) virtual organizations.
64. The essence of enterprise clusters as a form of interorganizational networks.
65. Violence as a mechanism for distributing social wealth. The need to control violence for the existence of society.
66. The emergence of spontaneous political order (anarchy) in pre-state societies and societies without central authority. Experience medieval Ireland and California during the Gold Rush.
67. The essence of the state. Legitimacy (public recognition) of violence, depersonification (depersonalization) of relations between the state and society.
68. Social contract theories. Vertical (Hobbes) and horizontal (Locke) social contracting.
69. Features of the conceptual approach of J. Buchanan
70. Characteristics of the social contract and efficiency economic development.
71. “Synthetic” theory of state by D. North.
72. The state and the emergence of the “principal-agent” problem.
73. What is bureaucracy.
74. Corruption. Types of corruption according to Shleifer and Vyshny (decentralized and centralized).
75. The need and problems of making the supreme power accountable to society.
76. Economic nature of the informal sector.
77. Costs of maintaining informal rules.
78. Main alternatives to formal government conflict resolution procedures ( social media, organized crime, corrupt government).
79. The influence of the informal sector on the economy.
80. The concept of property regime.
81. Free access mode: essence, reasons for its occurrence.
82. Reasons for the emergence of exclusive property rights and replacement of the free access regime.
83. Private property regime.
84. Communal property regime.
85. State property regime.

1. Coordinating function of institutions. Coordination mechanism as a means of regulating the processes of concluding and executing contracts.

2. Basic coordination mechanisms: market, hierarchy, networks.

3. Additional coordination mechanisms: hybrid method, direct coordination, bazaar.

4. The essence of the market. Various approaches to defining the market (Cournot, Jevons, Mises, Hodgson, Furubotn).

5. The essence of the properties of symmetry and selectivity of market exchange. Non-market exchange.

6. The market as a means of reducing transaction costs.

7. Markets as a set of institutions that structure market exchange. Their types (open public market, craft shops, peddling, fairs, stock exchange, department stores, online trading).

8. Institutional analysis of an open public market and a craft shop.

9. Institutional analysis of peddling trade, fairs and exchanges.

10. Institutional analysis of department stores and online trading.

Main literature:

1. Institutional economics. New institutional economics. M.: INFRA-M, 2011. Ch. 6.

2. Furubotn E.G., Richter R. Institutions and economic theory: Achievements of the new institutional economic theory. SPb.: Publishing house. House St. Petersburg. State Univ., 2005. Ch. 7.

Additional literature:

1. Hodgson J. Economic theory and institutions. M.: Delo, 2003.

Topic 12. Hierarchies

1. The essence and types (firms, state, non-profit organizations) of hierarchies.

2. The system of rules underlying the hierarchy:

formal rules (constitutional, normative acts):

informal rules.

3. The reason for the emergence of firms is to minimize production and transaction costs.

4. The central agent of the hierarchy as a source of savings in transaction costs and his key powers.

5. Distribution of powers of the central agent in firms and organizations. Ownership and management.

6. Teams as a mechanism for coordination in a hierarchy.

7. Formation and role of corporate culture in the process of functioning of the hierarchy.

8. Reasons for expanding the hierarchy. Features of vertical integration. The role of specific assets (O. Williamson's model).

9. Limits of hierarchy expansion:

Distortion and delay of information received and transmitted by the central agent;

Increased costs of suppressing opportunistic behavior of agents.

10. Reasons for opportunistic behavior:

Contradictions between the economic interests of the principal and the agent;

Presence of information asymmetry.

11. Ways to combat opportunism in the form of shirking: 1) monitoring; 2) creation of a system of incentives.

12. Collective activity and the free rider problem. Methods for solving it (monitoring the contribution of each employee by the administrator, mutual monitoring, ranked payment system).

13. Types of firms, their institutional features, advantages and disadvantages:

Private enterprise;

Partnership;

A company managed by a workforce (production cooperative);

Non-profit organization (non-profit company);

State firm;

Regulated firm;

Public Corporation;

14. The essence of the state as a hierarchy.

15. Levels of agency relations in the state system.

16. Reasons for the asymmetric distribution of information in the state system.

17. Goals and motives of behavior of the bureaucracy.

18. Methods for increasing the efficiency of the bureaucracy.

Main literature:

1. Institutional economics. New institutional economics. M.: INFRA-M, 2011. Ch. 7.

2. Williamson O.I. Economic institutions of capitalism. Firms, markets, “relational” contracting. St. Petersburg: Lenizdat, 1996.

Additional literature:

1. Shastitko A.E. New institutional economics. - 4th edition, revised. and additional - M.: Faculty of Economics of Moscow State University, TEIS, 2009. Ch. 14, 16.

2. Kapelyushnikov R.I. Economic theory of property rights. M.: IMEMO, 1990.

3. North D. Institutions, institutional changes and the functioning of the economy. M.: Foundation for Economic Books "Beginnings", 1997. Preface, chap. 2-7.

4. Eggertsson T. Economic behavior and institutions. M.: Delo, 2001.

Dracheva E.L., Libman A.M.

At the end of the 20th - beginning of the 21st centuries. The world economy is entering a qualitatively new stage of its development. Globalization processes determine the growth of interconnections and interdependence of national economic systems. The emergence in leading countries of a “new economy” based on information technology and computer networks is considered by many authors as a prerequisite for the transition to a fundamentally different paradigm of economic development. In this regard, qualitative changes are taking place in the management system of large companies, which are forced to adapt to constantly changing conditions and increased competition. All this has already led to a new “wave of mergers” of companies, the scale of which is difficult to overestimate. The number of so-called “hostile takeovers” is increasing, when a merger occurs against the will of the management of the target corporation.

However, integrated corporate structures are of particular interest in modern conditions - special group corporate associations characterized by their own patterns of development. Our previous publications have already provided an indicative list of terms used to refer to integrated corporate structures. This article mainly uses the concepts of “metacorporation” and “integrated corporate structure”. Metacorporations must be distinguished from corporations proper. The term "corporation", traditionally used in Russia, today is very ambiguous and is used in several meanings. Some authors focus on the legal aspect of the term “corporation” (it is important to note that the concept of “corporation” is actively used in common law countries, as well as in some others). Other researchers consider primarily the economic side of the concept of “corporation”. An approximate classification of the main definitions of this term is given in table. 1. All this necessitates the introduction of a new term to characterize metacorporate associations.

Table 1
Basic approaches to defining the concept of "corporation"

Various authors also provide a number of alternative definitions of metacorporations. One of the most complete is the concept of three criteria for an integrated corporate structure, put forward by J. Pappe, according to which a meta-corporation is an association of several economic agents (legal entities, as well as organizations that are not legal entities), satisfying the following requirements: 1) at least part economic agents is commercial organizations acting for the purpose of making a profit; 2) there are stable relationships between agents, more stringent than market ones; this means that in some essential respects the entire association acts as a single whole; 3) there is a strategic decision-making center, which can be either a legal entity or a group individuals- owners and senior managers; this center is called the central element.

Based on Pappe's criteria, one can enter the first, economic and legal definition Meta-corporations are an association of several legal entities, at least some of which are commercial organizations, in most cases not having the status of a legal entity itself. Thus, in Russian legislation, the only type of enterprise association that has the status of a legal entity, in accordance with the Civil Code of the Russian Federation (Civil Code of the Russian Federation), is unions (associations), which, however, are always non-profit organizations. In accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation "On the creation of financial and industrial groups in the Russian Federation" dated December 5, 1993 No. 2096, financial and industrial groups (FIGs) - an association of enterprises that meets the Pappe criteria - received the status of a legal entity, but this Decree was adopted even before the entry into force of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, which provided an exhaustive list of organizational and legal forms of legal entities; Subsequently, the Federal Law “On Financial and Industrial Groups” of November 30, 1995 No. 190-FZ deprived FIGs of the status of a legal entity. Various abroad legal forms meta-corporations (concerns in Germany, holding groups in the USA and Great Britain, keiretsu in Japan, chaebols in South Korea, industrial and financial groups in Ukraine, economic groups in Belarus, financial and industrial groups in other CIS republics, etc.), as a rule, do not have the status of legal entities. And, for example, in the legislation of Ukraine, associations, concerns, corporations and consortia are considered as legal entities(cm.: ).

It is possible to give another economic definition metacorporations. According to the contract theory of the firm, both the market and the firm are alternative systems transactions; Moreover, if in the market the main coordination mechanism is price, then the company uses a command system. The firm (hierarchy) and the market (polyarchy) are extreme manifestations in a kind of continuum, which also contains many intermediate forms that combine both price and command management mechanisms. It is these intermediate (hybrid) forms that are metacorporations. Of course, the economic and economic-legal definitions of a metacorporation coincide only in general. Thus, there are a number of corporations that have the status of a legal entity, and at the same time use the principle of decentralization, internal entrepreneurship, internal markets and the autonomy of individual divisions (horizontal corporations, circular corporations, companies with a divisional structure), which are not metacorporations from the point of view of economic legal definition, but are classified as such from the point of view of economic definition. On the contrary, holdings, formally consisting of a number of legal entities, are often such strictly centralized associations that individual enterprises within them have much less independence than divisions of a horizontal corporation. In this case, from the point of view of economic definition, they are hierarchies and not metacorporations, but from an economic and legal point of view, a holding is one of the most striking examples of a metacorporation.

Metacorporations today operate in a wide variety of industries and sectors of the economy, at all levels of the economic system - from regional to transnational. At the same time, they are characterized by two important trends: 1) transnationalization, i.e. the desire, through foreign direct investment (FDI), to expand the scope of its activities on a global scale, creating subsidiaries and branches abroad; 2) integration of industrial and credit and financial institutions within the meta-corporation, i.e. participation of banks and non-bank financial institutions in meta-corporations.

In modern economic theory, there are a number of alternative theories of metacorporations. All the theories under consideration are based on the concept of “the need for metacorporations,” considered, however, in different ways: 1) as the presence of objective economic laws leading to the emergence of banking metacorporations; 2) the feasibility of creating banking meta-corporations, the benefits of such actions for all participants. The second concept of necessity contains an element of subjectivity, but at the same time focuses on the will of each economic subject. Based on the second concept of necessity, specific models of the effectiveness of integrated corporate structures are formed. Today, economic-mathematical, econometric and statistical models are increasingly being used, and simulation models using personal computer. In existing theoretical approaches, the concepts under consideration are often not separated.

Theoretical approaches to the analysis of a metacorporation can also be divided in terms of priority objects of analysis: 1) attention can be directed to the role and place of the corporation in the economic system, abstracting from the relations within the metacorporation (in this case, a metacorporation in economics is interpreted as a kind of “material point” in physics ); 2) it may be based on the study of the internal aspects of the metacorporation’s activities. Today, a number of theoretical concepts of metacorporations from the point of view of their internal nature have developed in world and domestic science.

1. Many authors proceed from the analysis of metacorporations as specific forms of merger of individual companies. From this point of view, the synergetic theory of mergers is considered basic. There are alternative theories of mergers - agency theory of free cash flows and hubris theory - but they are less supported by theoretical research, although they focus on the most important factor functioning of any corporation in general and in particular of any metacorporation, namely: the factor of differentiation of the interests of various groups taking part in the management of the metacorporation. At the same time, this approach does not explain the reasons for the formation of metacorporations, and not just mergers of companies, reducing them exclusively to legal restrictions.

2. In this regard, the interpretation of metacorporations as alternative forms of expansion to mergers arises. It is this that underlies the above economic definition. Thus, one theory explains the formation of metacorporations by a compromise of the interests of insiders and outsiders in the management of companies, who find themselves dependent on the central element, seeking to take advantage of all the benefits of integration, but maintain a certain autonomy. This approach is most fully considered in the internalization model and institutional theories. A metacorporation is a system of coordination of economic agents in the process of resource distribution. From this point of view, a metacorporation, in which there are always (to one degree or another) “centers of power and authority,” and the market, which in its classical incarnation should be a system of perfect competition, are alternative ways of organizing the interaction of economic entities. The initial theoretical basis for the analysis becomes the contract theory of the firm by R. Coase and the model of O. Williamson, who, analyzing the limits of expansion of the hierarchy in relation to the market, reduces them, in essence, to Gossen’s second law (equality of the marginal costs of hierarchy and polyarchy). Thus, a metacorporation, in essence, is a specific internal market, isolated from the outside world. An integrated corporate structure is viewed not so much as a separate company, but as a system of interaction between business entities. Similar approaches were used in the analysis of metacorporations by V. Mikryukov and S. Avdasheva. Thus, the first author believes it is necessary to highlight a special theoretical direction devoted to the analysis of interaction between business entities and using mathematical modeling methodologies. S. Avdasheva actively uses neoclassical and institutional approaches to the analysis of integration in her research; She also pays great attention to hybrid forms of organization, that is, metacorporations. It is no coincidence that as the main forms of organization of metacorporations, it considers, in addition to financial-industrial groups (FIGs) and holdings, groups of producers connected by systems of non-cash payments, tolling contracts, non-payments, and barter. A similar principle is applied in a number of other works - while metacorporations are considered as forms of business cooperation and joint planning of activities, which include long-term contractual relationships, the provision of financial and commercial services on a long-term basis, leasing and franchising, participation in capital (including .h. holding), financial and industrial groups, business unions and temporary associations of companies. Within the framework of institutional theories, metacorporations can be considered as systems of relations between principals and agents, organized according to the principle of competition of agents, participation of agents in profit, or coalition of agents. This approach is associated with the concept of a corporation in common law countries, where there is no structure of bodies of a legal entity, and the directors of the corporation are considered as its agents. However, a similar approach can also be used when analyzing corporate combinations. The same can be said about many provisions of the theory of economics of organizations (see).

3. One of the interesting approaches is the analysis of the movement and evolution of forms of capital as the economic basis for the functioning of banking metacorporations. In this regard, the concepts of financial capital are being developed (introduced by R. Hilferding and understood by him as banking capital, capital in monetary form, which actually turns into industrial capital (cited by), as well as the newest theory of financial-industrial capital (see) At the same time, such a concept fully allows us to analyze those metacorporations that include banks and industrial enterprises. This means that the economic and organizational form of functioning of financial-industrial capital is a financial-industrial group (this concept is discussed in more detail when analyzing the classification of banking meta-corporations), and in the political sphere, financial-industrial capital determines the emergence of a financial-industrial elite. It should be noted that within the framework of this theory, four main economic processes are identified that determine the formation of metacorporations: 1) concentration of capital, 2) centralization of capital, 3) concentration of production, 4) attracting savings of the population and funds of legal entities to finance the activities of metacorporations.

4. Finally, the newest approach is the theory of economic power, developed by both foreign (J.K. Galbraith, R. Muller (cited by) and domestic (A. Movsesyan (for example,)) scientists. Its advantage is the combination of the first and second concepts of necessity , taking into account the volitional component in the actions of economic entities... In general, today the problem of economic power is becoming one of the central ones in economic theory. Thus, V. Radaev believes that the theory of economic power can become basic in the development of Russian economic science (see), and in the opinion J.K. Galbraith, economic theory that does not analyze power relations is meaningless and devoid of any influence on real processes... Metacorporations concentrate various resources of economic power, actively using them. Moreover, within metacorporations, power relations include four components: 1) organizational management power in each of the companies that are part of the metacorporation; 2) the power of the central element over the other components of the metacorporation, 3) the power of the metacorporation in the market, i.e. market power, 4) the power of metacorporation in economic and social systems in general, its influence on political and social phenomena. In this case, a specific power space is created in which the central element of the metacorporation controls the main aspects of the activities of all economic agents. Following the scheme of the main elements of financial industrial groups proposed by I. Khrabrova (in principle applicable to other types of metacorporations), the power space of an integrated corporate structure can be represented in the form of three concentric spheres (zones): A - zone of circular and cross-holdings, in which all companies are closely are interconnected by cross participation in capital and systems of multi-directorates, combining hierarchical and etarchic property relations: B - zone of hierarchical holdings created under the control of individual “core” companies: C - zone, control over enterprises of which is based primarily on contracts and control over resources. The French classification is similar, according to which the “core group”, “group in the broad sense of the word” and “sphere of influence of the group” are distinguished. At the center of the power space is the central element of the metacorporation.

5. Today, combined concepts are used, combining a number of individual approaches. For example, the concept of “capital” is considered primarily in connection with the resources of economic power (monetary, economic, social, cultural, symbolic capital are distinguished, which in principle can be converted into each other). The chain “financial-industrial (financial) capital - financial-industrial groups - financial-industrial elite”, which is the subject of relations of economic power, is analyzed (see). The concept of “power capital” stands apart, considered as a force that generates power space. Also combined can be considered the approach of R.H. Hall, who, using the provisions of the theory of organization, especially emphasizes the concept of “interorganizational relations”, in the analysis of which the theory of economic power is actively used, and organizations themselves, following the example of Galbraith, are interpreted as “instruments of power” and even as "synonyms for power".

From the point of view of interaction of metacorporations with external environment, in the course of their activities they perform a number of functions: firstly, this general functions for the production of goods and provision of services performed by companies as part of a metacorporation; secondly, these are the specific functions of large business, both explicit (the function of optimally combining factors of production, the function of forming a social product and promoting the distribution of national income, the organization function, the innovation function, the function of effectively satisfying demand) and latent functions (foreign economic representation of the national economy , the exercise of real economic power in the country). In terms of their role in the country’s economy, metacorporations are complex phenomena, which is reflected in Fig. 1. At the same time, individual components of the role of metacorporations are realized by them only insofar as they include banks, industrial companies, etc. A major role in the study of integrated corporate structures from the point of view of this approach can be played by developments in the field of theory of industrial organization and sectoral economics (on A number of works in this area have been published in Russian). Finally, some authors associate the development of metacorporations with the desire of the world economy to “increase the level of planning” (in this case we are talking about using an objective approach to the concept of “necessity”).

Figure 1. The role of metacorporations in the national and global economy

The structure of the theory of metacorporations is presented in Table. 2.

table 2
Main aspects of the theory of metacorporations

At the same time, when analyzing metacorporations, from the point of view of the dialectical relationship between form and content, it is very important to consider not only their economic essence, but also their form, which is highly differentiated. What is interesting here is the concept generally accepted in German economics, according to which the form of any enterprise (or association of enterprises) - Unternehmensform - is considered from the point of view of two elements:

In reality, both of these components are closely interrelated - the management structure takes into account existing legislation, and legislation should clearly control possible management structures, however, providing sufficient independence in the choice of management systems. It is possible to consider the organization of any integrated corporate structure in a similar way. At the same time, the business structure of metacorporations is, in principle, organized in the same way as any other large company(linear-staff, divisional, matrix structures, etc. are distinguished). It should be noted that the constituent business structures and individual legal entities within a metacorporation do not have to coincide at all. On the contrary, in a number of cases, several subsidiaries may form one business unit, or vice versa.

Despite increased attention Despite the attention paid to the problems of the functioning of metacorporations by researchers, a unified classification of such associations has not yet emerged. This can be partly explained by the intertwining of numerous metacorporations with each other, the gaps between legislation and the economic essence of phenomena. At the same time, identifying the classification of metacorporations is the most important prerequisite for their research. There are two main approaches to the classification of integrated corporate structures. In accordance with the first, classification is carried out according to a number of criteria identified by the researcher. The second approach is to consider the complex forms of integrated corporate structures and compare them according to various indicators. In fact, the first approach defines a multidimensional continuum in which each coordinate axis corresponds to one or another classification of metacorporations. Within the framework of the second approach, those points (forms of metacorporations) that represent the most typical combinations of various characteristics encountered in practice are identified in this continuum. At the same time, the classification of already identified complex forms of metacorporations can be carried out using specific criteria. Note that in some cases, classifications of forms of metacorporations are applicable to the grouping of all metacorporations as a whole. Thus, many authors identify regional, interregional, federal and interstate financial and industrial groups (FIGs), but in accordance with the criterion of geographical distribution, a similar classification of any form of metacorporation can be distinguished.

The most frequently mentioned complex forms of metacorporations are cartels, syndicates, trusts, consortia, concerns, unions, business associations, corners, pools, franchises, holdings, virtual companies, strategic alliances, financial-industrial groups, complexes, transnational corporations and transnational banks (TNCs and TNBs) , industrial hubs, contract groups, companies with a divisional structure, business networks. Certain complex forms of metacorporations are inherent in individual states - financial coalitions (USA), suduns and keiretsu (Japan), chaebols ( South Korea) etc. Many of these concepts are ambiguous. Thus, the term “holding” is used in several meanings: 1) as a holding company that controls a number of dependent companies, 2) as a holding group that unites a holding company and subsidiaries. Some authors refer to holdings as complex types of metacorporations, while others refer to them as a variety of metacorporations from the point of view of the use of shareholder control in them. In some classifications, a holding (H-form) is generally considered as a type of business structure, along with line-staff, divisional, etc. , in others - as a legal form of metacorporations. Finally, a broad definition of a holding from the point of view of the theory of economic power (“a group of societies in which one society (the dominant one) has the ability to impose its will on others (subordinates)”) allows us to classify almost any centralized meta-corporation, for example, a franchise, into this group. Similarly, there are many different definitions of the concepts “transnational corporation”, “multinational corporation”, “global corporation”, “international company, etc.” .

Currently, a number of fundamentally new forms of metacorporations are emerging. Some of them are related to the development of internal entrepreneurship and the decentralization of companies (circular corporations, horizontal corporations), others are related to the development of Internet technologies (virtual production chains, quasi-holdings, project communities). Virtual companies are often included in the latter group, but in the literature there are several definitions of the latter: firstly, associations of companies connected exclusively by contractual relations and work on a specific project are considered as virtual companies; secondly, we are talking about communities of companies united using the latest information technologies. Several other newer types of metacorporations can be mentioned. Thus, the introduction of bank card systems led to the emergence of groups that include acquiring banks (beneficiaries) and the card issuing bank, which plays the role of a central element. Today, another form of meta-corporation is emerging on the Internet - “virtual universal banks,” that is, Internet companies that provide client connections with specialized banking institutions and provide the services themselves.

I would like to note one more feature of FIGs as a form of meta-corporation: in Russia, due to the legislatively established constitutional (legal-forming) procedure for registering FIGs, a gap has formed between formal (registered in accordance with the requirements of the law) FIGs and real (informal) FIGs. Often several formal financial and industrial groups are included in one informal one. All this leads to the duality of the concept of FIG in Russia: FIG in the broad sense of the word (an association of banks and industrial enterprises, divided into financial-industrial, industrial-financial, etc., depending on the dominance of one or another component) and FIG in the narrow sense words - specific legal forms in which enterprise associations are created. At the same time, the concept of an industrial-financial group, for example, takes on a completely different meaning - we are talking about legal structures of Ukrainian legislation similar to Russian financial and industrial groups.

The approach to classifying metacorporations in accordance with certain criteria is given in Table. 3.

Table 3
Classification of metacorporations

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It seems that the development of a comprehensive theory of metacorporations is one of the most important components in the development of economic theory and general theory of management. Literature

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1 Essence synergistic effect is that when several individual banks and enterprises merge, their total indicators will be greater than the sum of the same indicators for each member of the association. The principle of synergy is most fully expressed in the formula “2*2=5”.

2 This approach was also used by some Russian researchers. Thus, A.B. Feldman identifies: 1) economic mechanisms of integration (relationships between parent and subsidiary enterprises, relations between dominant and dependent enterprises, holding, franchising, cooperation, cartel, partly factoring, as well as “Resource Reception”) and 2) organizational- legal forms in which these mechanisms operate (holding, syndicate, consortium, association, concern, financial-industrial group).

3 This approach was incorporated into the project federal law“On Holdings”, adopted in the summer of 2000 by the State Duma of the Russian Federation, but rejected by the President.

4 Note that similar discrepancies in terminology exist in the economic science of foreign countries, for example, Germany.

5 Pappe Y.S. Oligarchs: Economic Chronicle 1992-2000. - M.: State University Higher School of Economics, 2000. - P.175

The book develops the ideas presented by the author in an article published in the Harvard Business Review and received the prestigious McKinsey Award for applied character and innovative thinking in business and management. John Kotter encourages organizations to create a combined management system that combines a time-tested, reliable and effective hierarchical organizational structure with a flexible and dynamic network structure, similar to that of a start-up company. According to the author, the combined management system provides large, mature companies with a key tool to meet the demands of a rapidly changing environment.

The book is intended for everyone who is ready to implement significant reform in their organization in order to achieve competitive victories in any industry - be it public administration or financial services.

The limits of a hierarchical structure

You find that you rely on the same people you can rely on to lead key initiatives over and over again.

You find that interaction between functional departments occurs with clearly unsatisfactory speed and efficiency. The same applies to information flowing into an organization “top-down” and “bottom-up”. Result: loss of speed, braking.

You find that corporate policies and procedures, even when they are reasonable and appropriate, become barriers to the timely implementation of strategic projects. The number of rules and procedures inevitably increases over time, they are introduced as a solution current problems in the areas of cost containment, quality assurance and compliance with legal requirements. But in a fast-paced world, redundant rules and procedures become bumps in the road, if not concrete blocks that stop traffic.

You find that focusing on quarterly results conflicts with the company's strategic development goals necessary to win in the competitive environment. It's easy to imagine which topic will generate the most interest in a meeting discussing a long-term innovation program and urgently putting out a fire in a factory. Multiply this discussion by 100 or 1000, and you can see why so many ideas for improving an organization's innovation capabilities end in disgrace.

Part of the problem is social: people are often reluctant to do anything without permission from above. Another part of it is simply related to human nature: People cling to their habits and are afraid of losing power and status.

The irony is that complacency is often a consequence of past success. People do not believe that there is an urgent need to change something, and they resist change. And with insufficient involvement in what is happening, without conviction in the goal, they may believe that changes are needed, but do not trust initiatives launched from above. Both complacency and lack of personal involvement in what is happening slow down progress.

This is often not visible from the office of a high-ranking boss. There is always a temptation to blame problems on specific people: middle managers who do not know how to manage, or MBA graduates who are not interested in anything other than their career. In reality, these problems are systemic in nature and are directly related to the restrictions that the hierarchical structure and typical management processes impose on the organization.

Dedicated functional units in the format of departments, or services, or blocks are an integral part of the hierarchical structure. They can be separated by thinner walls, managers can try to overcome the limitations/narrowness of their interests, but such divisions themselves cannot be abolished. The same goes for rules and procedures: you can reduce their number, but you cannot abandon them. The list goes on and on. You can reduce the number of levels in the management hierarchy, but you cannot eliminate levels entirely. You can require employees to pay attention to strategic goals, but you cannot eliminate quarterly budgeting and goal setting.

These factors are an integral part of the system and - as one might expect - ultimately hinder all efforts to accelerate change and implement strategies in a rapidly changing business environment.

Many managers understand all this, sometimes intuitively, and try to cope with problems of this kind with the help of all sorts of improvements. They create special structures For project work. They use work groups to create opportunities for functional teams to work together. They bring in strategic consultants or create strategic planning departments that can focus on long-term issues. Additionally they add strategic planning to annual operational planning. By overcoming complacency, reducing resistance, and increasing the personal commitment of everyday employees, wise leaders create an environment in which change is possible.

However, these improvements only work up to a certain limit. The existing hierarchical structures and management processes that form the operating environment of any organization are not “bad” or outdated. They just have their limits. What we need today is a powerful new building block to address the challenges created by the increasing complexity and rapid change of the world around us. A solution that I think works surprisingly well is to supplement the hierarchical structure with another structure - a network structure, more like solar system than on Egyptian pyramid. A structure that can give an organization flexibility and the ability to change quickly. The task of the new structure is not to overload, but to complement the hierarchical management system of a mature organization, freeing the latter for the work for which it is intended. This makes it easier for the enterprise to operate while accelerating strategic change. The question is not an “either/or”. I propose a model in which both structures act together. Combined control system.

New direction

Let me explain my idea. I'm not talking about improved collaborative ("interdepartmental") working groups, strategy committees, innovation boards, policies of giving people time to work on their own creative projects - either individually or collectively. These techniques, no matter how good they are, do not make a hierarchical management system adequate to the challenges facing modern business. What I propose, although based on familiar structures, practices and thinking, involves a radical change in the status quo.

Most new companies (startups) have a network structure - after all, it is important for them to be agile, fast and creative in order not to miss any of the opportunities that open up. Even in mature organizations, informal networks of change agents often operate outside the purview of the hierarchical structure, allowing innovation to be implemented more quickly.

What I describe here also echoes some of the most interesting management ideas of the past few decades: from Michael Porter's call for organizations to pay more frequent and explicit attention to strategy; through Clayton Christensen's findings that traditionally organized companies do not cope well with the radical technological innovations that accompany our current existence; and until the laureate's recent work Nobel Prize Daniel Kahneman, who describes the brain as two coordinated systems - one more emotional, the other more rational.

The processes taking place in the new network structure (network organization) are less like regular management, which prioritizes stability and efficiency, and more like inspiring leadership, which creates flexibility and dynamics. The set and sequence of processes in a network structure follows the logic of the 8 Step model of change that I first outlined 15 years ago in the book Leading the Change.

The network structure within the framework of our combined management system implements rapid changes in the organization according to the “8 steps” model and greatly enhances their effect. This result can be achieved by involving as many people as possible as active agents of change. This result can be achieved by creating a sense of what urgently needs to be implemented. Greater Opportunity. Launched to solve one or another individual strategic problem, the processes of change do not stop. They become agents of change, creating and continuously maintaining strategic flexibility and dynamics in the organization.

The direction that I will outline in this book - however, for some pioneers it is no longer news - solves problems that have bothered us for decades.

For a quarter of a century, people have been talking about the need to have more leaders because in these times of constant change and increasing competition, the top two or three leaders in an organization can no longer cope with all the tasks that require leadership skills. But few positions in a traditional company hierarchy provide the information and experience needed to become a leader. Leadership courses or textbooks obviously do not solve the problem at hand, because developing leadership beliefs and acquiring leadership skills occurs on the job, not in the classroom.

Over the past decade, we have been hearing the word “innovation” more and more often. How many organizations do you know where innovation has been introduced into the work of the financial department, logistics service, or IT department? We criticize managers for their lack of initiative or strategic vision, but we forget to look at the system in which they work. Complex hierarchies with well-tuned regular management processes are not designed to move creatively into the future. Innovation means taking risks and requires out-of-the-box thinking and studying problems from the points of view of different functional departments. The hierarchical structure is designed to minimize risks, regulate employee behavior and fix the boundaries between departments. This gap cannot be eliminated by evolutionary transformations.

For half a century, authors have been writing about unleashing human potential and genuine feelings and channeling the released energy to solve the most complex strategic problems. But has anyone other than startups been able to implement this? Most people today are within rigid hierarchical models that are optimal for performing routine operations, models that gently require employees to “keep their heads down,” follow commands, and do the same thing for many years.

People have been complaining for years about strategy consultants who are often powerless to develop and implement a strategy that allows an organization to respond to a changing competitive environment. A consultant's recommendations - analytical and soulless, designed for 2-5-10 years by a nimble outsider and implemented by a limited number of designated people within the organization - have little chance of success in a constantly changing and increasingly unpredictable world.

And most importantly: For at least 20 years, people have been researching and writing about the increasing speed of decision-making in business, the need for companies to move faster and be more flexible. The warnings are getting louder and louder. In a recent survey of managers and executives, over 90% of respondents noted that the importance of flexibility and speed has increased in business over the past five years. To the question “How do you plan to seek sources of competitive advantage over the next 15 years?” the majority of respondents answered: “Through a quick response to changes in environment" But who can really respond quickly and dynamically to change other than a few small high-tech firms? The situation will not improve much by refining conventional methods or adding various improvements to a single hierarchical system. It's like trying to improve an elephant so that it is both an elephant and a panther. Happy daring.

So what's ahead of us? In the next chapter, I will outline the contours of the combined management system: its hierarchical network structure, the basic principles underlying its effectiveness, the factors that accelerate change, and we will talk about the employees of the organization participating in the operation of the combined management system. In the third chapter, I'm going to tell you the story of a company. This story will show what risks exist in a world of rapid change, how much greater and more varied they are than some people think. In Chapter Four, we look at current practices in leadership and organizational structures and see where they fall short and why existing structures and models will not help us in the face of constant change. In Chapter 5, we'll look at how another company implemented a combined management system and the impact it had on the business. In chapters six, seven, and eight, we'll look at how firms can begin to create a combined management system.