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State Emergency Committee 1991. The secrets of the State Emergency Committee over the years have acquired a large number of versions.

GKChP is an abbreviation for the name of the State Committee for the State of Emergency, created by several senior functionaries of the Communist Party of the USSR on August 19, 1991 to save the collapsing Soviet Union. The formal head of the committee was the Vice-President of the USSR, member of the Politburo, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Gennady Ivanovich Yanaev

Background

Economic restructuring

In 1982, the long-time head of the Soviet Union, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, L. I. Brezhnev, died. With his death, the period of relatively calm, stable, more or less prosperous life of the USSR ended, which began for the first time since the formation of the Country of Soviets. In 1985, the post of General Secretary and, therefore, the absolute ruler of the destinies of 250 million Soviet citizens was taken by M. S. Gorbachev. Aware of the complexities of the Soviet economy and its increasing lag behind Western countries, Gorbachev made an attempt to invigorate the socialist economic system by introducing market elements into it.
Alas, having said “A”, one must definitely continue, that is, one concession to the ideological enemy was followed by another, a third, and so on until complete capitulation

1985, April 23 - at the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, Gorbachev proclaimed a course to accelerate - improve the existing economic system
1985, May - Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee “On measures to overcome drunkenness and alcoholism”
1986, February 25-March 6 - XXVII Congress of the CPSU. It defined the task of “improving socialism”
1986, November 19 - The Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted the Law “On Individual Labor Activities”
1987, January - at the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the task of radical restructuring of economic management was put forward
1987, January 13 - Resolution of the Council of Ministers authorizing the creation of joint ventures
1987, February 5 - Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR “On the creation of cooperatives for the production of consumer goods”
1987, June 11 - Law “On the transfer of enterprises and organizations of industries National economy for full self-financing and self-financing"
1987, June 25 - The Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee considered the issue “On the party’s tasks for a radical restructuring of economic management.”
1987, June 30 - the law “On State Enterprise (Association)” was adopted, redistributing powers between ministries and enterprises in favor of the latter
1988, May 26 - Law “On Cooperation in the USSR”
1988, August 24 - the first cooperative bank in the USSR (“Soyuz Bank”) was registered in Chimkent (Kazakh SSR)

The measures taken did not bring results. In 1986, the budget deficit doubled compared to 1985
The resolution of the CPSU Central Committee “On measures to overcome drunkenness and alcoholism” led to more than 20 billion losses in budget revenues, the transition to the category of scarce products that were previously on free sale (juices, cereals, caramels, etc.), a sharp increase in moonshine and increase in mortality due to poisoning with counterfeit alcohol and surrogates. Due to low world energy prices, the flow of foreign currency into the budget has decreased. Large-scale accidents and disasters have become more frequent (1986, May - Chernobyl). In the fall of 1989, sugar coupons were introduced

“In a Murmansk store near the bazaar, for the first time after the war I saw food cards - coupons for sausage and butter (V. Konetsky, “No one will take away the path we have traveled,” 1987)

1990, June - resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR “On the concept of transition to a market economy”
1990, October - resolution “Main directions for stabilizing the national economy and transition to a market economy”
1990, December - the USSR government headed by N. Ryzhkov was dismissed. The Council of Ministers of the USSR was transformed into the Cabinet of Ministers of the USSR, headed by Prime Minister V. Pavlov
1991, January 23-25 - exchange of 50 and 100 ruble banknotes for new banknotes
1991, April 2 - double price increase for all products

However, in 1991 there was an 11% decline in production, a 20-30% budget deficit, and a huge external debt of $103.9 billion. Food, soap, matches, sugar, detergents were distributed on cards, but the cards were often not purchased. Republican and regional customs offices appeared

Restructuring Ideology

The introduction of elements of capitalism into the Soviet economic mechanism forced the authorities to change their policy in the field of ideology. After all, it was necessary to somehow explain to the people why the capitalist system, which had been criticized for 70 years, suddenly turned out to be in demand in their country, the most advanced and rich. The new policy was called glasnost

1986, February-March - at the 27th Congress of the CPSU Gorbachev said:
“The issue of expanding publicity is of fundamental importance to us. This is a political issue. Without glasnost there is no and cannot be democracy, political creativity of the masses, their participation in governance.”
1986, May - at the V Congress of the Union of Cinematographers of the USSR, its entire board was unexpectedly re-elected
1986, September 4 - order of Glavlit (the USSR censorship committee) to focus the attention of censors only on issues related to the protection of state and military secrets in the press
1986, September 25 - Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee to stop jamming of Voice of America and BBC broadcasts
1986, December - Academician Sakharov returned from exile to Gorky
1987, January 27 - Gorbachev at the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee:
“We should not have areas closed to criticism. The people need the whole truth... We need more light now, more than ever, so that the party and the people know everything, so that we don’t have dark corners where mold would grow again.”
1987, January - T. Abuladze’s anti-Stalin film “Repentance” was released on screens across the country.
1987, January - shown documentary"Is it easy to be young?" directed by Juris Podnieks
1987, February - 140 dissidents released from prison
1987 - unlimited subscriptions to newspapers and magazines allowed
1987, October 2 – release of the independent television program “Vzglyad”
1988, May 8 - the Democratic Union organization of dissidents and human rights activists was founded, positioning itself as an opposition party to the CPSU
1988, June 28-July 1 - at the XIX All-Union Party Conference of the CPSU, a decision was made on alternative elections of deputies of Councils at all levels
1988, November 30 - Jamming of all foreign radio stations is completely prohibited in the USSR
1987-1988 - publication of literary works banned in the USSR; articles about the past of the USSR were published in magazines and newspapers, refuting established myths (“New World”, “Moscow News”, “Arguments and Facts”, “Ogonyok”)
1989, March 26 - the first free elections to the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR
1989, May 25 - The First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR opened in Moscow, at which the country's problems were openly discussed for the first time, some actions of the authorities were criticized, and proposals and alternatives were put forward. The congress sessions were broadcast on live and listened to the whole country
1989, December 12-24 - at the Second Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, Boris Yeltsin, who headed the group of democrats, received a demand for the abolition of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution, which stated that “the CPSU is the leading and guiding force” in the state

Perestroika, acceleration, glasnost - the slogans of the policy pursued by M. S. Gorbachev

Collapse of the USSR

The Soviet Union was based on violence and fear, or discipline and respect for authority, as you like. As soon as the people discovered a certain lethargy and helplessness in the actions of the state, some freedom, actions of disobedience began. Somewhere there were strikes (in the spring of 1989 in the mines), somewhere anti-communist rallies (in August-September 1988 in Moscow). However, the biggest problems were caused to Moscow interethnic conflicts and activities national republics, whose leaders, sensing the weakness of the Center, decided to take all power in the territory under their control

1986, December 17-18 - anti-communist protests of Kazakh youth in Almaty
1988, November-December - aggravation of relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh
1989, June - pogrom of Meskhetian Turks in the Fergana Valley
1989, July 15-16 - bloody clashes between Georgians and Abkhazians in Sukhumi (16 dead).
1989, April 6 - anti-Soviet rally in Tbilisi, suppressed by the army
1990, January - unrest in Baku, suppressed by the Army
1990, June - conflict between the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in the city of Osh
1990, March 11 - declaration of independence of Lithuania
1990, May 4 - declaration of independence of Latvia
1990, May 8 - declaration of independence of Estonia
1990, June 12 - declaration of independence of the RSFSR
1990, September 2 - proclamation of the Transnistrian Republic
1991, January 8-9 - bloody clashes between the army and demonstrators in Vilnius
1991, March 31 - referendum on independence of Georgia
1991, April 19 - conflict between Ingush and Ossetians, one dead

On August 20, 1991, the former republics of the USSR, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and in the fall - Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine and Turkmenistan, were to sign a new treaty, terminating the union of 1922 and creating a new state entity - a confederation instead of a federation

State Emergency Committee. Briefly

In order to prevent the creation of a new state and save the old one - the Soviet Union, part of the party elite formed the State Committee for the State of Emergency. Gorbachev, who was vacationing in Crimea at that moment, was isolated from the events taking place

Composition of the Emergency Committee

*** Achalov - Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, Colonel General
*** Baklanov - First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Defense Council
*** Boldin - Chief of Staff of the President of the USSR
*** Varennikov - Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces
*** Generalov - head of security at the residence of the President of the USSR in Foros
*** Kryuchkov - Chairman of the KGB of the USSR
*** Lukyanov - Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
*** Pavlov - Prime Minister of the USSR
*** Plekhanov - Head of the Security Service of the KGB of the USSR
*** Pugo - Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR
*** Starodubtsev - Chairman of the Peasant Union of the USSR
*** Tizyakov - President of the Association of State Enterprises of the USSR
*** Shenin - member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee
*** Yazov - Minister of Defense of the USSR
*** Yanaev - Vice President of the USSR

1991, August 15 - the text of the new Union Treaty was published
1991, August 17 - Kryuchkov, Pavlov, Yazov, Baklanov, Shenin, Boldin at a meeting decide to introduce a state of emergency from August 19, demand that Gorbachev sign the relevant decrees or resign and transfer powers to Vice President Yanaev
1991, August 17 - the conspirators decided to send a delegation to Gorbachev demanding the introduction of a state of emergency and non-signing of the Treaty
1991, August 18 - Yanaev in the Kremlin met with members of the delegation who returned from Crimea after a meeting with Gorbachev
1991, August 18 - Yazov ordered preparations for the entry of troops into Moscow
1991, August 19 - Yanaev signed a decree on the formation of the State Committee for the State of Emergency

Resolution of the State Emergency Committee No. 1 introduced a ban
- rallies
- demonstrations
- strikes
- activities political parties, public organizations, mass movements
- issues of some central, Moscow city and regional socio-political publications
- allocation of 15 acres of land for gardening work to all city residents who wish to do so

1991, August 19 - parts of Tamansk entered Moscow motorized rifle division, Kantemirovskaya tank division, 106th (Tula) Airborne Division
1991, August 19 - people opposing the State Emergency Committee began to gather near the building of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, on Manezhnaya Square, in the evening Boris Yeltsin spoke to them, reading out the Decree “On the illegality of the actions of the State Emergency Committee”
1991, August 20 - the confrontation between Muscovites led by Yeltsin and the State Emergency Committee continued. There were rumors about preparations for a forceful dispersal of protesters, an assault on the White House, and TV suddenly showed a true story about what was happening near the White House
1991, August 21 - at 5 a.m. Yazov gave the order to withdraw troops from Moscow
1991, August 21 - at 17:00 a delegation of the State Emergency Committee arrived in Crimea. Gorbachev refused to accept her and demanded to restore contact with the outside world
1991, August 21 - At 9 o'clock in the evening, Vice President Yanaev signed a decree declaring the State Emergency Committee dissolved and all its decisions invalid
1991, August 21 - at 22 o'clock, the Prosecutor General of the RSFSR Stepankov issued a decree on the arrest of members of the State Emergency Committee ( more details about the August Putsch are written on Wikipedia)

Result of the State Emergency Committee

1991, August 24 - Ukraine declared state independence
1991, August 25 - Belarus
1991, August 27 - Moldova
1991, August 31 - Uzbekistan
1991, October 27 - Turkmenistan
1991, August 31 - Kyrgyzstan
1991, September 9 - Tajikistan
1991, September 21 - Armenia
1991, October 18 - Azerbaijan
1991, December 8 - in Viskuli near Brest (Belarus), the President of the RSFSR B. Yeltsin, the President of Ukraine L. Kravchuk and the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Belarus S. Shushkevich signed an Agreement on the collapse of the USSR and on the creation of the Commonwealth Independent States(CIS)

Perestroika, acceleration, glasnost, the State Emergency Committee - all these attempts to correct and restore the Soviet state machine were in vain, because it was inseparable and could only exist in the form in which it was

19.08.2015 23:55

August 19, 1991, 24 years ago, Soviet people From the morning television news I learned about the formation of the State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR (GKChP). It was announced that the country's President Mikhail Gorbachev was ill and Vice President Gennady Yanaev, Chairman of the State Emergency Committee, took over his duties.

Meanwhile, armored vehicles were entering Moscow. Columns of armored personnel carriers and tanks obediently stopped when the light turned red. Television announcers transmitted documents from the State Emergency Committee every hour, after which “Swan Lake” was shown on TV. It started to look like a farce.

Boris Yeltsin (by that time already the president of the RSFSR) gathered his comrades-in-arms to the White House to “repel the junta.” The members of the Soviet leadership themselves sat back, as if waiting for something. The press conference that members of the State Emergency Committee gave in the evening did not add any clarity. On the contrary, it caused chuckles about Yanaev’s shaking hands.

It was a very strange putsch.

On August 20, it became clear: the State Emergency Committee was losing to Yeltsin, who gathered a rally at the White House to repel the “putschists” and “defend” Gorbachev, who was illegally removed from power. On the night of the 21st, in a tunnel on the Garden Ring, three guys died under the tracks while trying to stop armored vehicles, and in the afternoon Gorbachev was rescued from Foros. This was followed by arrests by the Russian prosecutor's office of members of the State Emergency Committee and those leaders who actively supported it.

As a result, the following people ended up in the cells of the Matrosskaya Tishina detention center: Vice-President of the USSR G.I. Yanaev, Prime Minister V.S. Pavlov, Minister of Defense D.T. Yazov, Head of the KGB of the USSR V.A. Kryuchkov, Deputy Chairman of the Defense Council O.D. Baklanov, Chairman of the Association of State Enterprises of Industry, Transport and Communications A.I. Tizyakov, chairman of the Agro-Industrial Union and chairman of the collective farm V.A. Starodubtsev. And also their like-minded people: Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Politburo member O.S. Shenin, Chief of Staff of the President of the USSR V.I. Boldin, Deputy Minister of Defense, Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces General V.I. Varennikov, heads of KGB departments Yu.S. Plekhanov and V.V. Generals. A couple of days later they were joined by the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR A.I. Lukyanov, who was not a member of the committee and did not support it. Russian prosecutor Valentin Stepankov accused all of them of “treason to the Motherland.” There were only 4 months left before the liquidation of the USSR.

The coup lasted only three days, but became a point of no return for the vast country.

The empire, which in August 1991 was just cracking along the borders of the republics, in December of the same year irrevocably broke into several pieces.

But then, on August 21, the victory over the State Emergency Committee was greeted with jubilation. People believed that, even if not immediately, even if it was difficult, but in the foreseeable future we would live in a prosperous, civilized, democratic country. However, this did not happen.

Outside the country

After the end of World War II, the main directions of the struggle against the Russian people were determined, which were later embodied in official documents of the US government, and, above all, in the directives of the Council National Security USA and the laws of this country.

In a circular from US Secretary of State J.F. Dulles to American embassies and missions abroad on March 6, 1953, immediately after Stalin's death, emphasized:

Our main goal remains to sow doubts, confusion, and uncertainty regarding the new regime not only among the ruling circles and the masses in the USSR and satellite countries, but also among communist parties outside the Soviet Union.

And finally, the Captive Peoples Act, adopted by the NOA Congress in August 1959, openly raised the issue of dividing Russia into 22 states and inciting hatred against the Russian people. The same law determines the independence of the current Donbass, called Cossackia in the text, and thereby makes the current US policy in relation to the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics untenable.

Since 1947, under the pretext of fighting communism, the American government has allocated hundreds of millions of dollars annually to implement programs to combat Russia and the Russian people.

One of the main points of these programs was the training of “like-minded people, allies and assistants” in Russia.

Most detailed plan the destruction of the USSR was described in Directive 20/1 of the US National Security Council dated August 18, 1948:

Our main goals regarding Russia, in essence, boil down to just two:

a) Reduce the power and influence of Moscow to a minimum;

b) Carry out fundamental changes in the theory and practice of foreign policy,

which are adhered to by the government in power in Russia.

For the peace period, NSS Directive 20/1 provided for the capitulation of the USSR under external pressure. The consequences of such a policy were, of course, foreseen in the NSC Directive 20/1:

Our efforts to get Moscow to accept our concepts are tantamount to a statement: our goal is the overthrow of Soviet power. Starting from this point of view, we can say that these goals are unattainable without war, and, therefore, we thereby admit: our ultimate goal in relation to the Soviet Union is war and the overthrow of Soviet power by force.

It would be a mistake to follow this line of reasoning.

Firstly, we are not bound by a specific deadline to achieve our goals in peacetime. We do not have a strict alternation between periods of war and peace that would prompt us to declare: we must achieve our goals in peacetime by such and such a date or “we will have recourse to other means...”.

Secondly, we should rightly feel absolutely no guilt in seeking to eliminate concepts that are incompatible with international peace and stability and replace them with concepts of tolerance and international cooperation. It is not our place to ponder the internal consequences that the adoption of such concepts in another country might lead to, nor should we think that we bear any responsibility for these events... If the Soviet leaders consider that the growing importance of more enlightened concepts international relations is incompatible with maintaining their power in Russia, then this is their business, not ours. Our job is to work and ensure that internal events happen there... As a government, we are not responsible for internal conditions in Russia… .

The new US strategic doctrine regarding the USSR NS DD-75, prepared for US President R. Reagan by Harvard historian Richard Pipes, proposed intensifying hostile actions against Russia.

The directive clearly formulated, writes American political scientist Peter Schweitzer, that our next goal is no longer coexistence with the USSR, but a change in the Soviet system. The directive was based on the conviction that changing the Soviet system through external pressure was entirely within our power.

Another American doctrine - “Liberation” and the concept of “Information Warfare”, developed for the administration of President George W. Bush, openly proclaimed the main goal of the Western world “dismantling the USSR” and “dismemberment of Russia”, ordered American legal and illegal structures to monitor the state, initiate and manage anti-Russian sentiments and processes in the republics of Russia and establish a fund of billions of dollars. per year to assist the “resistance movement.”

In the seventies and eighties, the American program for training agents of influence in the USSR acquired a complete and purposeful character. It cannot be said that this program was not known to the Soviet leadership. The facts say that it was. But those people whom we today can with full responsibility call agents of influence deliberately turned a blind eye to it.

Inside the country

The KGB of the USSR prepared a special document on this matter, which was called “On the CIA’s plans to acquire agents of influence among Soviet citizens.”

According to KGB Chairman Kryuchkov, the competent authorities of the USSR knew about these plans:

Pay attention to the deadline - it speaks of a thoughtful, long-term policy, the core of which is genocide.

Today we can speak with complete certainty about the implementation of many plans developed by the world behind the scenes in relation to the USSR. In any case, by the beginning of the eighties, American intelligence had dozens of assistants and like-minded people in the highest echelons of power. The role of some of them is already quite clear, the results of their activities are obvious and data on their cooperation with foreign intelligence services cannot be refuted.

According to data reported by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Latvia, from 1985 to 1992, the West (primarily the USA) invested “in the process of democratization of the USSR (that is, in the destruction of Russia) 90 billion dollars. Services were purchased with this money the right people, agents of influence were trained and paid, special equipment, instructors, literature, etc. were sent.

Through the network of representative offices of the Crible Institute and similar institutions, hundreds of people who formed the personnel backbone of the destroyers of the USSR and the future Yeltsin regime, including: G. Popov, G. Starovoitova, M. Poltoranin, A. Murashov, S. Stankevich, underwent instructive training for agents of influence. , E. Gaidar, M. Bocharov, G. Yavlinsky, Yu. Boldyrev, V. Lukin, A. Chubais, A. Nuikin, A. Shabad, V. Boxer, many “shadow people” from Yeltsin’s entourage, in particular the head of his elected campaign in Yekaterinburg A. Urmanov, as well as I. Viryutin, M. Reznikov, N. Andrievskaya, A. Nazarov, prominent journalists and television workers. Thus, a “fifth column” was formed in the USSR, which existed as part of the Interregional Deputy Group and “Democratic Russia”.

It is reliably known that M. Gorbachev knew from the reports of the KGB of the USSR about the existence of special institutions for training agents of influence, and he also knew the lists of their “graduates”. However, he did nothing to stop the activities of the traitors.

Having received a dossier from the KGB leadership containing information about an extensive network of criminals against the state, Gorbachev prohibits the KGB from taking any measures to suppress criminal attacks. Moreover, he does his best to cover and shield the “godfather” of agents of influence in the USSR A.N. Yakovlev, despite the fact that the nature of the information about him coming from intelligence sources did not allow one to doubt the true background of his activities.

Here is what the former KGB chairman Kryuchkov reports about this:

In 1990, the State Security Committee through intelligence and counterintelligence received from several different (and assessed as reliable) sources extremely alarming information regarding A. N. Yakovlev. The meaning of the reports was that, according to Western intelligence services, Yakovlev occupies positions favorable to the West, reliably opposes the “conservative” forces in the Soviet Union, and that he can be firmly counted on in any situation. But, apparently, the West believed that Yakovlev could and should show more persistence and activity, and therefore one American representative was instructed to hold a corresponding conversation with Yakovlev, directly telling him that more was expected of him.

It is worth recalling that many of the “young reformers” went through Andropov’s “Lonjumeau School”, which was the International Institute of Applied Sciences. system analysis(MIPSA) in Vienna, where regular, quarterly seminars were held, to which our “trainees” came, accompanied by “curators” from the KGB and met there with Western “management specialists”, half of whom were Western intelligence officers. And Gorbachev himself became friends with Andropov back in the 1970s, which can explain a lot.

Andropov and Gorbachev, Stavropol region, 1973

Even after receiving this information, Gorbachev refuses to do anything. Such behavior of the first person in the state indicated that by that time he, too, was closely integrated into the system of connections of the world behind the scenes.

The first published news about M. Gorbachev’s membership of the free masons appeared on February 1, 1988 in the German small-circulation magazine “Mer Licht” (“More Light”). Similar information is published in the New York newspaper “New Russian word"(December 4, 1989), there are even photographs of US President Bush and Gorbachev making typical Masonic signs with their hands.

Meeting in Malta. In the photo: on the left is USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, second from left is General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev, second from right is US President George W. Bush. Photo: RIA Novosti

However, the most compelling evidence of Gorbachev's affiliation with Freemasonry is his close contacts with leading representatives of the world Masonic government and his membership in one of the main mondialist structures - the Trilateral Commission. The mediator between Gorbachev and the Trilateral Commission was the famous financial businessman, freemason and agent of the Israeli intelligence service Mossad, J. Soros, who in 1987 formed the so-called Soros-Soviet Union Foundation, from which the Soviet-American Cultural Initiative Foundation later grew, which had openly anti-Russian character.

AGENTS OF INFLUENCE

Soros funds were used to pay for the anti-Russian activities of politicians who played a tragic role in the fate of the USSR, and in particular Yu. Afanasyev. In 1990, he financed the stay in the United States of a group of developers of the “500 Days” program to destroy the Soviet economy, led by G. Yavlinsky, and later members of the “Gaidar team” (when they were not yet in the government).

Thus, by August 1991, the highest echelons of power in the USSR, as an analysis of relations with the West shows, for the most part had pro-Western sentiments and financial support for the implementation of the goals set by the masters of the West, which did not meet the interests of the country’s population.

Causes of the coup: judgments and opinions

The need to introduce a state of emergency due to the actual collapse of life support systems, a catastrophic shortage of energy resources and the refusal of agricultural enterprises and local authorities to ensure the implementation of the plan for the state supply of food to state reserves, judging by many reports, was repeatedly discussed in the circle of Gorbachev and the authorities subordinate to him. In Lukyanov’s interview with a group of deputies of the USSR Supreme Council, given by him on the second day of the coup, it is said that Gorbachev intended to introduce a state of emergency after the signing of the Union Treaty, on the basis of the “9+1” agreement.

However, the signing of the Union Treaty automatically removed the leaders of the State Emergency Committee from power and, in the opinion now former leaders basic sectors of the national economy, made it impossible to stabilize the economy and maintain life support systems in working order in view of the upcoming winter.

The signing of the Union Treaty would intensify the collapse of the unified financial system and the economic space of the USSR as a whole, and would eliminate the activities of defense enterprises with long technological chains.

Of the events that undoubtedly stimulated the attempt of the August putsch and the preservation of the USSR as a single power, recreated by the people after the war under the leadership of Joseph Stalin, the following should be noted:

Russia's nationalization of the oil and gas industry and the increase in domestic prices for oil and petroleum products promised by Yeltsin in Tyumen, which, according to Pavlov, would blow up the entire economy of the country.
The proposed introduction of national currencies in some republics.
Nationalization of the gold mining industry by Yakutia and Kazakhstan.
Failure to fulfill plans for state supplies of grain from the new harvest and the closure of economic spaces by grain-producing union republics.
A 50% reduction in defense orders and the impending paralysis of the defense industry, the social consequences of a thoughtless conversion of defense industries.
Avalanche-like commercialization of relations between managers of large enterprises and sub-sectors of the national economy, leading to the loss of planned components of their management.
The phenomenon of personal financial independence of heads of enterprises of organizations and the resulting loss of the last levers of managing them.
Yeltsin's decree on departition, eliminating the apparatus of the CPSU from the sphere of making any decisions on managing the economy and social life.
The need to introduce a state of emergency continues after the failure of the coup. It is likely that it will be introduced, but in different forms and with different leaders.
Creation of republican security systems, including paramilitary formations and national guards, the beginning of the transition of the republican KGB to the jurisdiction of the republics.

How Gorbachev orchestrated the 1991 August Putsch

During his reign, Gorbachev, step by step, drove a wedge into the state apparatus of power, destroying it to its very foundation. However, it was already clear to him that the plan was a success, and there was very little left before its final implementation.

Former member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Yuri Prokofiev, later recalled how, back in March 1991, Gorbachev gathered the country’s key leaders and discussed the current situation with them. The situation was difficult:

When the meeting was held with Yazov, a pressing question arose: Gorbachev can conduct business according to the “back and forth” principle, then stop. What to do in this case? Someone said that then Yanaev would have to take the leadership of the country into his own hands. He protested: he was neither physically nor intellectually ready to serve as president; this option was unacceptable.

Pugo and Yazov stated that they agreed to introduce a state of emergency only subject to a constitutional solution to the issue, that is, with the consent of the president and by decision of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Otherwise, they will not participate in introducing a state of emergency.

Gorbachev knew that the meetings were taking place. For example, when we visited Yazov, he was returning from Japan and called Kryuchkov from the plane. In a conversation with Gorbachev, he said that, fulfilling his instructions, we are now sitting and conferring. So Gorbachev was the initiator of the development of documents on the introduction of a state of emergency in the country, and, in essence, almost the entire composition of the State Emergency Committee was formed by him,

Prokofiev notes.

Marshal Dmitry Yazov himself emphasizes in one of his interviews:

In fact, there was no one to conclude an agreement with in August 1991, but “the process began,” and the state was collapsing literally before our eyes. That’s when the government, headed by Valentin Pavlov, assembled. It happened in one of the KGB secret buildings, near Kryuchkov. The State Emergency Committee was not a question at all at that time. We simply discussed the current situation in the country and decided: in order to fulfill the will of the people and preserve the Soviet Union, it is necessary to introduce a state of emergency. Now there is a lot of speculation on this matter. But the fact remains: leaving on August 3rd for vacation in Foros, Gorbachev gathered the government and strictly warned that it was necessary to monitor the situation and, if anything happened, introduce a state of emergency,

Yazov notes.

The final document was soon adopted. Based on the prepared materials, President Gorbachev issued a decree on the procedure for introducing a state of emergency in certain regions and sectors of the country's national economy. This decree was published in May and passed almost unnoticed.

The only thing I remember back then was that Gorbachev called and, chuckling, said: “I agreed on a decree with Yeltsin. He agreed and made only one amendment: the decree was introduced only for a year. And we don’t need more than one year”...

Yuri Prokofiev remembers.

On May 24, 1991, changes were adopted to the constitution of the RSFSR on the names of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (ASSR) - the word “autonomous” was removed from them and they began to be called as Soviet Socialist Republics (SSR) within the RSFSR, which contradicted Article 85 of the USSR Constitution.

And on July 3, 1991, changes were made to the Constitution of the RSFSR to change the status of the Autonomous Regions to the Soviet Socialist Republics within the RSFSR (except for the Jewish Autonomous Region), which also contradicted Article 87 of the USSR Constitution.

The political elite, shaken by the social depression that gripped the country, were preparing for the creation of a new Union of Soviet Sovereign Republics (USSR). However, this option did not suit Gorbachev’s curators - during the formation of a renewed USSR, it would be too easy to remove him from power and return the system to the previous order. Then western plan didn't work.

Gorbachev went all-in and organized another most cynical political provocation - the “August Putsch.” The fact that the beneficiary of the Putsch was the Secretary General himself, to today Almost all direct participants in those events confessed. The August Putsch was directed by Gorbachev.

Writer and historian Nikolai Starikov, in his publication “There Was No Putsch,” directly speaks about the other side of this bloody event, started at the instigation of Mikhail Gorbachev and his foreign counterparts:

It was a crude and cynical deception. There was betrayal. There was a cold-blooded desire for blood to be shed. A lot happened in those August days of 1991. But it was not the State Emergency Committee that did all this. Only there was no putsch. When the Emergency Committee began to carry out the actions agreed upon and assigned to them, Yeltsin declared them traitors and putschists. And after him, the whole world repeated it.

What about Gorbachev? But he simply didn’t pick up the phone in Foros. The stories about “blocking” Gorbachev at his dacha in Foros by “putschists” are complete nonsense. In the August days of 1991, one of the St. Petersburg journalists... reached the Secretary General's dacha using a regular telephone. Gorbachev betrayed his subordinates. He deceived them. And together with the “putschists” who were confused precisely for this reason, he betrayed and deceived his people,

Researcher notes.

Here is a comment from General Varennikov, one of the members of the State Emergency Committee:

There were young people on both sides of the barricades. They pushed her into provocation: to set up an ambush one and a half kilometers from the White House, on the Garden Ring. American and other film and television reporters were placed there in advance so that they would film an episode that no one knew about, neither the police nor, of course, the troops who were on patrol and were ambushed.

Crowds of people quickly formed on the streets of Moscow, incited by provocateurs. Clashes between people and armored vehicles, “highlighted” by television cameras of Western channels and flashes of foreign photographers, showed how well-orchestrated the August scenario was.

There was no Putsch not only in 1991. What happened in August 1991 repeated the events of the summer of 1917:

Then Kerensky (the head of Russia at that time) ordered his subordinate, the commander in chief, General Kornilov, to send troops into Petrograd and restore order. When Lavr Kornilov began to carry out his plans, Kerensky himself declared him a traitor and arrested him along with a group of senior officers. Accused of an attempt to seize power, which in fact never existed even in the thoughts of too honest Russian generals. After which Kerensky released the Bolsheviks from prison and distributed weapons to those who in two months would overthrow him, Kerensky, the “Provisional Government,” the researcher emphasizes. - The scenarios of August 1991 and 1917 are striking in their similarity. An order to restore order. They are declared traitors for this. Confusion of the military. Their defeat is inevitable - after all, they were not prepared to fight. They were only preparing to carry out orders. And then - the defeat of the country. Decay. Civil War.

And in 1991, we can say that at the “curfew” all the activities of the State Emergency Committee ended. It was already clear that the “putschists” gave their honor to the future “Tsar Boris”. It all ended on August 21 with a false curfew: the troops stood quietly, did not touch anyone, waiting for some orders from the “putschists.” It was as if they had scared themselves. This was their last day. As one would expect, the crowd got excited and attacked the troops themselves, who did not know what to do. The blood of the “defenders of democracy,” who were not attacked, was shed, after which the State Emergency Committee was doomed to become a “putsch.” Both for the brethren from television and for the crowd, the fifth day finally came - August 22, when the head of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, in which Gorbachev’s accomplices formed police units, were “demolished” special purpose- Riot police.

Someone gave the head of the riot police a “chick” - the last Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR - Boris Karlovich Pugo - his head was blown off. If you believe the official version, then he shot himself, although everyone on television was shown a pistol that was lying on the bedside table, where he allegedly put it himself after he shot himself.

According to the official version, Pugo shot his wife before shooting himself in the temple. At his request, the pistol was brought in the morning by his son Vadim, a KGB officer who had left for work before the tragedy. Economist Grigory Yavlinsky, who came to arrest the head of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs in the company of the Chairman of the KGB of the RSFSR Viktor Ivanenko, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the RSFSR Viktor Erin and Deputy Prosecutor General of the RSFSR Yevgeny Lisov, described what he saw.

According to the future Yabloko member:

Pugo's wife was wounded and bleeding. The face is marred with blood. It was impossible to figure it out knife wound or firearms. She was sitting on the floor on one side of the double bed, and on the other side of the bed lay Pugo in a workout suit. His head fell back on the pillow and he breathed. But appearance he had it like a dead man. The wife looked insane. All her movements were absolutely uncoordinated, her speech was incoherent. …I’m not a professional and didn’t think about the circumstances then. Before me lay a state criminal. And only after Ivanenko and I left, my memory highlighted two circumstances that I cannot explain.

First. The gun lay neatly on the nightstand behind Pugo's head. Even Yavlinsky, a purely civilian man, found it difficult to imagine how a man, having shot himself in the temple, could put it there. And then lie down on the bed and stretch out. If the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs first lay down on the bed and then shot, it would simply be impossible for him to reach the bedside table, put the gun on it and take the position in which he was found.

The investigation put forward the version that the wife was the last to shoot. She allegedly put the gun on the nightstand. But here's the strange thing: investigators found three spent cartridges!

It should be noted that the “putsch” scenario largely repeated the events of the summer of 1953, when the Minister of Internal Affairs Lavrentiy Pavlovich Beria was eliminated (we wrote a series of articles about this, and tanks were brought into Moscow, after which the country’s course was sharply changed.

The August crisis led to the destruction of governance institutions, the core of which were the CPSU and the KGB. As a result, Russia was struck by a deep crisis of governance, from which the country could not recover long years. Breaking off evolutionary political development, the August putsch contributed to increased polarization of political forces, which ultimately resulted in the bloody drama of October 1993.

According to Doctor of Historical Sciences Mikhail Geller, everything was completed back in August. Witnesses and participants in the events did not yet know that the history of the USSR had ended.

In September 1991, Gorbachev’s book “The Putsch” was published, hastily compiled by his American assistants. In it, the author states that:

The Soviet Union remains and will remain a great power, without which world problems cannot be solved.

According to Geller, the “Putsch” was nothing more than a well-executed performance staged before the whole world.

This is explained by the fact that the main roles in the “Putsch” were played by people, each of whom was carefully chosen and placed in their place by Gorbachev himself. These were his closest associates. The “August Putsch,” although Gorbachev presents it as a betrayal of loved ones, was of a different nature. Before last minute The “conspirators” convinced Gorbachev to head the Committee and begin to act decisively to restore order in the country,

Researcher notes.

According to Geller, on August 18, a delegation from the future “putschists” flew to Foros to ask the president to declare a state of emergency. After their arrest, the “putschists” claimed that Gorbachev knew about their intentions and left for Foros with parting words: do as you want.

This should probably be understood: if it succeeds, I will be with you; if it fails, you answer.

Marshal Dmitry Yazov speaks about this in his memoirs:

Its inconsistency was convincingly demonstrated by General Valentin Ivanovich Varennikov. During the trial, he directly asked Gorbachev: “When we left Foros on August 18, were you still president or not?” Gorbachev twisted and turned, but in the end he said: “Yes, I thought that I remained president.” - “So, that means we didn’t seize power from you?” "They didn't capture..."

And it is difficult to call a coup a situation that leaves in place the entire structure of state power, the entire cabinet of ministers, and the entire party hierarchy. Only the head of state was absent. But negotiations were constantly underway with Gorbachev, with him or his supporters, who remained in their offices next to the “conspirators.”

On February 1, 2006, in an interview with the Rossiya TV channel, Boris Yeltsin stated that Gorbachev’s participation in the State Emergency Committee was documented.

Purpose of the Emergency Committee

The main goal of the putschists was to prevent the liquidation of the USSR, which, in their opinion, should have begun on August 20 during the first stage of signing a new union treaty, turning the USSR into a confederation - Union Sovereign States. On August 20, the agreement was to be signed by representatives of the RSFSR and the Kazakh SSR, and the remaining future components of the commonwealth during five meetings, until October 22.

On the 20th, we did not allow the signing of a union treaty; we disrupted the signing of this union treaty.

G. I. Yanaev, interview with radio station “Echo of Moscow”

One of the first statements of the State Emergency Committee, disseminated by Soviet radio stations and central television, indicated the following goals, for the implementation of which a state of emergency was introduced in the country:

In order to overcome the deep and comprehensive crisis, political, interethnic and civil confrontation, chaos and anarchy that threaten the life and safety of citizens of the Soviet Union, sovereignty, territorial integrity, freedom and independence of our Fatherland; based on the results of the national referendum on the preservation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; guided by the vital interests of the peoples of our Motherland, all Soviet people.

In 2006, the former chairman of the USSR KGB, Vladimir Kryuchkov, stated that the State Emergency Committee did not aim to seize power:

We opposed the signing of a treaty that would destroy the Union. I feel like I was right. I regret that measures were not taken to strictly isolate the President of the USSR, questions were not raised before the Supreme Council about the abdication of the head of state from his post.

Opponents of the State Emergency Committee

The resistance to the State Emergency Committee was led by the political leadership of the Russian Federation (President B.N. Yeltsin, Vice-President A.V. Rutskoi, Chairman of the Government I.S. Silaev, Acting Chairman of the Supreme Council R.I. Khasbulatov).

In an address to Russian citizens on August 19, Boris Yeltsin, characterizing the actions of the State Emergency Committee as a coup d’etat, said:

We believe that such forceful methods are unacceptable. They discredit the USSR before the whole world, undermine our prestige in the world community, and return us to the era cold war and isolation of the Soviet Union. All this forces us to declare the so-called committee (GKChP) that came to power illegal. Accordingly, we declare all decisions and orders of this committee illegal.

Khasbulatov was on Yeltsin’s side, although 10 years later in an interview with Radio Liberty he said that, like the State Emergency Committee, he was dissatisfied with the draft of the new Union Treaty:

As for the content of the new Union Treaty, in addition to Afanasyev and someone else, I myself was terribly dissatisfied with this content. Yeltsin and I argued a lot - should we go to a meeting on August 20? And finally, I convinced Yeltsin by saying that if we didn’t even go there, if we didn’t form a delegation, it would be perceived as our desire to destroy the Union. There was, after all, a referendum in March on the unity of the Union. Sixty-three percent, I think, or 61 percent of the population were in favor of preserving the Union. I say: “You and I have no right...”. That’s why I say: “Let’s go, form a delegation, and then we will motivate our comments on the future Union Treaty.”

On the role of non-political communities in those Three Days

Independent research centers, civil associations, charities suddenly they closed into a network - what the Americans call the word network - and messages, help, and resources necessary to counter the tanks moved through this network.

This is what the director wrote on August 30, 1991 Information agency POSTFACTUM Gleb Pavlovsky:

Among these cells of civil society, I cannot help but note those closest to us: the editorial offices of the magazine “The 20th Century and the World” and the weekly magazine “Kommersant”, the Center for Political and Legal Research, the Memorial Society, the Institute for Humanitarian and Political Research and, of course, the publishing house “ Progress". At the same time, the true role and scope of the long-term programs of the Soviet-American Cultural Initiative Foundation (known to most as the Soros Foundation) was revealed, especially the Civil Society program - the groups it supported were active participants in the Three Days resistance. The days of confrontation united us in a common effort, the result of which - freedom - is more and more uncertain every day. Freedom as a state is like information: it is open, it is doubtful and dangerous. But this is the risk we actually wanted.

Western reaction

As a result of the anti-Russian coup d'etat in August-December 1991, the plans of the world behind the scenes were achieved. However, institutions for training and instructing agents of influence are not only not dismantled, but are also turning into an important part of the power structure of the Yeltsin regime, developing for him a kind of directive programs of activity and supplying him with advisers.

A legal one was opened in the USA community Center this structure called “Russian House”, which was headed by influence agent E. Lozansky, although, of course, all important decisions were made within the walls of the CIA and the leadership of the world behind the scenes.

Confident of final victory, Yeltsin no longer hid his direct connection with subversive anti-Russian organizations such as the American National Investment in Democracy, to whose leaders he sent a message, which, in particular, said:

We know and appreciate the fact that you contributed to this victory (fax dated August 23, 1991).

The world behind the scenes rejoiced, each of its representatives in their own way, but they all noted the key role of the CIA. US President Bush immediately after the August 1991 coup full knowledge things and how former director The CIA publicly stated that the rise to power of the Yeltsin regime:

Our victory is a victory for the CIA.

Then-CIA Director R. Gates held his own “victory parade” in front of BBC cameras in Moscow's Red Square, declaring:

Here, on Red Square, near the Kremlin and the Mausoleum, I perform my solo victory parade.

Quite naturally, a relationship between master and vassal is established between the CIA and representatives of the Yeltsin regime. For example, in October 1992, R. Gates met with Yeltsin in complete secrecy. Moreover, the latter is not even given the opportunity to use the services of his own translator, who is turned out the door, and the entire translation is carried out by the translator of the CIA director.

Maltese brothers

The world behind the scenes rewards Yeltsin with the title that almost every member of the world Masonic public organization bears - Knight Commander of the Order of Malta. He receives it on November 16, 1991. No longer embarrassed, Yeltsin poses for reporters in full garb of a knight commander.

In August 1992, Yeltsin signed Decree No. 827 “On the restoration of official relations with Order of Malta". The contents of this decree were kept completely secret for some time. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was ordered to sign a protocol on the restoration of official relations between Russian Federation and the Order of Malta.

Conclusion

Calling the State Emergency Committee a “putsch” or a “coup” is not entirely correct, since a break-up was not intended state system, but on the contrary, measures were proposed in defense of the system that exists. This was an “attempt” by a number of senior officials of the state to save the Union from collapse.

On Gorbachev’s part, this was actually a “top action”; the local communists did not receive any instructions about their actions. And this action was carried out to instill fear in society, disperse the CPSU and destroy the Union. The putschists found themselves in the role of “framed up”. They were arrested for the sake of order. But after a while they gave me amnesty.

Attempts by M.S. Gorbachev's plans to take control of the country again encountered resistance from the leaders of the republics. Through the efforts of the putschists, the central government was compromised. In Moscow, the President of the RSFSR B.N. felt like a master. Yeltsin.

The highest body of state power - the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR - on September 5, 1991 announced its self-dissolution and the transfer of power to the State Council composed of the leaders of the republics. M.S. Gorbachev, as the head of a single state, became superfluous.

On December 8, 1991, in Belovezhskaya Pushcha near Minsk, the leaders of Russia (B.N. Yeltsin), Ukraine (L.M. Kravchuk) and Belarus (S.S. Shushkevich) announced the denunciation of the Union Treaty of 1922, the end of the existence of the USSR and creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The great power ceased to exist. The location of Belaya Vezha was chosen as if not by chance, since it was here on July 3, 964 that the Great Forgotten Victory over the Khazar Kaganate was won.

Historical retreat

Svyatoslav not only crushed the Khazar Khaganate, the top of which adopted Judaism, but also tried to secure the conquered territories for himself. In place of Sarkel, the Russian settlement of Belaya Vezha appears, Tmutarakan comes under the rule of Kyiv, there is information that Russian troops were in Itil and Semender until the 990s. The Khazar Khaganate was the first state that Ancient Rus' had to face. The fate of not only the Eastern European tribes, but also many tribes and peoples of Europe and Asia depended on the outcome of the struggle between these two states.

As many researchers note, the crushing of Khazaria, whose leaders professed Judaism and supported it among the subject and surrounding peoples through the dissemination of the same biblical doctrine that was beneficial to their worldview (about it), meant crushing the shackles of the most severe oppression - spiritual, which could destroy the foundations of a bright , the original spiritual life of the Slavs and other peoples of Eastern Europe.

The Khazar kingdom disappeared like smoke immediately after the elimination of the main conditions for its existence: military superiority over its neighbors and the economic benefits that the possession of the most important trade routes between Asia and Europe brought. Since there were no other grounds for its existence, under the blows of the stronger Russian state it crumbled into its component parts, which later dissolved in the Polovtsian Sea,

The historian M.I. Artamonov concludes.

Therefore, it is especially symbolic that in Belaya Vezha, as if in retaliation for that Great Victory of 964, agreements shameful for our country were signed.

December 25, 1991 M.S. Gorbachev resigned as President of the USSR, which meant the end of “Perestroika”.

As a result of the collapse of the USSR - financial and economic scams of the 90s.

J. Soros was the perpetrator of almost all the largest financial and economic scams committed in Russia in the first half of the 90s.

It was he who stood behind Chubais, Gaidar, Burbulis and a number of other newly-minted Russian functionaries during the so-called privatization, as a result of which the overwhelming majority of the property belonging to the Russian people passed into the hands of international financial swindlers.

According to the Chairman of the State Property Committee V.P. Polevanov:

500 largest privatized enterprises in Russia with a real value of at least 200 billion dollars. were sold for next to nothing (about 7.2 billion US dollars) and ended up in the hands of foreign companies and their front structures.

In the mid-90s, the Soros Foundation carried out a number of operations to undermine Russian economy. According to the Wall Street Journal (1994.10.11.), American financial experts believe that the collapse of the ruble in Russia on the so-called Black Tuesday on October 11, 1994 was the result of the activities of a group of funds headed by Soros. Attention is drawn to the fact that by the beginning of the summer of 1994, the Soros Foundation acquired shares Russian enterprises in the amount of 10 million dollars. At the end of August - beginning of September, Soros, waiting for the stock price to rise, sold them. According to experts, he made a profit equivalent to $400 million from this operation. At the end of September, the Soros Foundation began purchasing dollars for rubles, which, according to American experts, caused fast growth exchange rate of the US dollar and the rapid fall of the ruble, the collapse of the financial system and the rapid ruin of many Russian enterprises.

“FAVORITES” OF THE WORLD BACKSTAGE

Opinions of event participants

In 2008, Mikhail Gorbachev commented on the situation in August 1991 as follows:

I regret now - I shouldn’t have left. Error, yes, I already said that. Just as it was a mistake that I did not send Yeltsin forever somewhere in the country to procure banana products. After known processes. When the plenum demanded - expulsion from the members of the Central Committee. Some of the party demanded to be expelled for what he had started.

Member of the State Emergency Committee, Marshal Dmitry Yazov in 2001 spoke about the impossibility of managing public opinion in 1991:

I would not call the events of 1991 a putsch for the reason that there was no putsch. There was a desire by a certain group of people, the leadership of a certain former Soviet Union, aimed at preserving the Soviet Union as a state by any means. There it was the main objective these people. None of them pursued any selfish goals, no one shared portfolios of power. One goal is to preserve the Soviet Union. .

conclusions

It should be noted that all participants in the events are from the same managerial “elite”, which had the abbreviation of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which many reveal as the Central Committee of the Capitulatory Party of Self-Liquidation of Socialism. Perhaps, if not they themselves, then their “puppeteers” simply agreed who would rule in the new conditions, and who, after a short stay in prison, should go to a well-deserved rest, having previously secured for themselves the aura of “sufferers for the people’s happiness”, and the “puppeteers” - the possibility of a legitimate return to the “socialist” policy scenario in the future.

After all, if after Yeltsin’s victory the lawyers substantiated the illegality of the State Emergency Committee, then, if necessary, another team of lawyers will no less strictly justify the fact of high treason by Gorbachev and his associates and, accordingly, the competence and legality of the State Emergency Committee, whose fault in this case will only be that they have not achieved success and such figures and scenarios are already being tried to promote.

And if you remember about conceptual power and the fact that any legislation is a line of defense on which one concept protects itself from the implementation in the same society of another concept that is fundamentally incompatible with it. In a conceptually undefined society, such as the USSR was in the last years of its existence, mutually exclusive concepts were expressed in the same legislation. That is why, on its basis, having been conceptually defined, it is possible to legally flawlessly substantiate an indictment against Gorbachev, and against the State Emergency Committee, and against Yeltsin and the team of reformers of the “Gaidar-Chernomyrdin” era.

The August “putsch” was one of those events that marked the end of the power of the CPSU and the collapse of the USSR and, according to the widespread opinion of liberals, gave impetus to democratic changes in Russia.

On the other hand, supporters of preserving the Soviet Union argue that the country began to be in chaos due to the inconsistent policies of the then government.

The August putsch was an attempt to remove Mikhail Gorbachev from the post of President of the USSR and change his course, undertaken by the self-proclaimed State Committee for a State of Emergency (GKChP) on August 19, 1991.

On August 17, a meeting of future members of the State Emergency Committee took place at the ABC facility, a closed guest residence of the KGB. It was decided to introduce a state of emergency from August 19, form the State Emergency Committee, demand Gorbachev to sign the relevant decrees or resign and transfer powers to Vice President Gennady Yanaev, Yeltsin to be detained at the Chkalovsky airfield upon arrival from Kazakhstan for a conversation with Defense Minister Yazov, further action depending on the results of the negotiations.

On August 18, representatives of the committee flew to Crimea to negotiate with Gorbachev, who was on vacation in Foros, to secure his consent to declare a state of emergency. Gorbachev refused to give them his consent.

At 16.32 at the presidential dacha, all types of communications were turned off, including the channel that ensured the management of strategic nuclear forces THE USSR.

At 04.00, the Sevastopol regiment of the USSR KGB troops blocked the presidential dacha in Foros.

From 06.00 All-Union Radio begins to broadcast messages about the introduction of a state of emergency in some regions of the USSR, a decree of the Vice-President of the USSR Yanaev on his assumption of duties as President of the USSR in connection with Gorbachev’s ill health, a statement by the Soviet leadership on the creation of the State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR, an appeal from the State Emergency Committee to the Soviet people.

22:00. Yeltsin signed a decree on the annulment of all decisions of the State Emergency Committee and on a number of reshuffles in the State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company.

01:30. The Tu-134 plane with Rutsky, Silaev and Gorbachev landed in Moscow at Vnukovo-2.

Most members of the State Emergency Committee were arrested.

Moscow declared mourning for the victims.

The winners' rally at the White House began at 12.00. In the middle of the day, Yeltsin, Silaev and Khasbulatov spoke at it. During the rally, demonstrators brought out a huge banner of the Russian tricolor; The President of the RSFSR announced that a decision had been made to make the white-azure-red banner the new state flag of Russia.

New state flag Russia (tricolor) was installed for the first time on the top point of the House of Soviets building.

On the night of August 23, by order of the Moscow City Council, amid a massive gathering of protesters, the monument to Felix Dzerzhinsky on Lubyanka Square was dismantled.

The material was prepared based on information from open sources

On August 19, 1991, at six o’clock in the morning Moscow time, a “Statement of the Soviet leadership” was broadcast on radio and television, which read: “Due to the impossibility for health reasons of Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev to fulfill the duties of the President of the USSR and the transfer, in accordance with Article 127.7 of the USSR Constitution, of the powers of the President of the Union SSR to Vice-President Gennady Ivanovich Yanaev", "in order to overcome the deep and comprehensive crisis, political, interethnic and civil confrontation, chaos and anarchy that threaten the life and safety of citizens of the Soviet Union, the sovereignty, territorial integrity, freedom and independence of our Fatherland" A state of emergency is introduced in certain areas of the USSR, and the State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR (GKChP USSR) is formed to govern the country. The State Emergency Committee was headed by: First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Defense Council O. Baklanov, Chairman of the KGB of the USSR V. Kryuchkov, Prime Minister of the USSR V. Pavlov, Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR B. Pugo, Chairman of the Peasant Union of the USSR V. Starodubtsev, President of the Association of State Enterprises and Facilities industry, construction, transport and communications of the USSR A. Tizyakov, Minister of Defense of the USSR D. Yazov, acting President of the USSR G. Yanaev.

Resolution No. 1 of the State Emergency Committee ordered the suspension of the activities of political parties and public organizations, and prohibited the holding of rallies and street marches. Resolution No. 2 prohibited the publication of all newspapers except the following: “Trud”, “Rabochaya Tribuna”, “Izvestia”, “Pravda”, “Krasnaya Zvezda”, “ Soviet Russia", "Moskovskaya Pravda", "Lenin's Banner", "Rural Life".

The resistance to the putschists was led by the President of the RSFSR Boris Yeltsin and the Russian leadership. Yeltsin's Decree was issued, where the creation of the State Emergency Committee is qualified as a coup d'etat, and its members as state criminals. At 1 p.m., the President of the RSFSR, standing on a tank, reads out an “Appeal to the Citizens of Russia,” in which he calls the actions of the State Emergency Committee illegal and calls on the citizens of the country to “give a worthy response to the putschists and demand that the country be returned to normal constitutional development.” The appeal was signed by: President of the RSFSR B. Yeltsin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR I. Silaev, Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR R. Khasbulatov. In the evening, a press conference of members of the State Emergency Committee was shown on television; the trembling hands of the acting President of the USSR G. Yanaev were visible.

On August 20, volunteer detachments of defenders (about 60 thousand people) gather around the House of Soviets of the RSFSR (White House) to defend the building from an assault by government troops. On the night of August 21, at about one in the morning, a column of airborne combat vehicles approached the barricade near the White House, about 20 vehicles broke through the first barricades on Novy Arbat. In the tunnel, blocked by eight infantry fighting vehicles, three defenders of the White House died - Dmitry Komar, Vladimir Usov and Ilya Krichevsky. On the morning of August 21, the withdrawal of troops from Moscow began.

At 11:30 a.m. on August 21, an emergency session of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR began. Speaking to the deputies, Boris Yeltsin said: “The putsch occurred precisely at a time when democracy began to grow and gain momentum.” He reiterated that “the coup is unconstitutional.” The session instructed the Prime Minister of the RSFSR I. Silaev and the Vice-President of the RSFSR A. Rutsky to go to the President of the USSR M. Gorbachev and free him from isolation. Almost at the same time, members of the State Emergency Committee also flew to Foros. On August 22, on a TU-134 plane of the Russian leadership, USSR President M. Gorbachev and his family returned to Moscow. The conspirators were arrested by order of the President of the USSR. Subsequently, on February 23, 1994, they were released from prison under an amnesty declared State Duma. On August 22, 1991, M. Gorbachev spoke on television. In particular, he said: “... the coup d'etat failed. The conspirators miscalculated. They underestimated the main thing - that the people have become different over these, albeit very difficult years. He breathed in the air of freedom, and no one can take that away from him.”

Wrote in August 19th, 2011

What happened to the participants in the events of August 1991?
Organizers, opponents of the coup - what do they think about the State Emergency Committee, what happened to them

August 19, 1991, 6 a.m. Radio stations and Central Television announce the introduction of a state of emergency in Russia and the transfer of power to the State Committee for the State of Emergency, GKChP. Troops have been sent to Moscow. President Gorbachev is blocked at his dacha in Crimea.

The most important clash for the history of Russia, which threatened to develop into a civil war, lasted ridiculously short: on August 22, members of the State Emergency Committee were arrested. There were three dead - not counting Pugo, a member of the State Emergency Committee, who committed suicide, who left a mysterious note about his “completely unexpected mistake.” What happened to the main characters of the coup? How do they comprehend, and some even justify, what happened?

The main characters of the August putsch

Mikhail Gorbachev, President of the USSR

Who was he in August 1991: President of the USSR.

What did you do after 1991: On December 25, 1991, he resigned. In 1996, he ran for president of the Russian Federation and received only 0.5% of the vote. Since 1992 - President of the Gorbachev Foundation.

Direct speech:“They say Gorbachev knew, but how could he not know... They didn’t call me from anywhere, they didn’t warn me: putsch, putsch, putsch... The most important thing was not to cause a big bleed... And we avoided it. There could be a civil war” - answer at a press conference on August 17, 2011.

“I was betting on a new Union Treaty. It was ready, we could sign it within a few days. We could re-found the USSR on a new foundation. I couldn’t help but think that I would have to return soon, I even ordered the plane to be prepared on which we were supposed to return to Moscow. It was Sunday, August 18th, when it all started. I spoke on the phone with Georgy Shakhnazarov, who was vacationing in Crimea, at the Yuzhny sanatorium. This was the last phone call before the phones went offline” - interview with the Italian newspaper La Repubblica.

Gennady Yanaev, Chairman of the State Emergency Committee

Who was he in August 1991: Vice-President of the USSR, Chairman of the State Emergency Committee.

What did you do after 1991: released under amnesty in 1994. After his release he worked in the Russian international academy tourism. Wrote the book “GKChP against Gorbachev. The last battle for the USSR." Died in September 2010.

Direct speech:“I absolutely never admitted that I carried out a coup d’etat, and I never will. In order to understand the logic of my actions, as well as the logic of the actions of my comrades, you need to know the situation in which the country found itself by August 1991. At that time we were talking about an almost total crisis; there was an open struggle for power in the country between supporters of the preservation of a unified state and socio-political system and its opponents” - from an interview with the Ekho Moskvy radio station.

Boris Yeltsin, President of the RSFSR

Who was he in August 1991: President of the RSFSR.

What did you do after 1991: until December 31, 1999 - President of Russia. Died on April 23, 2007.

Direct speech: “We decided to write an appeal to the citizens of Russia. The text was written by hand by Khasbulatov, and everyone who was nearby, Shakhrai, Burbulis, Silaev, Poltoranin, Yaroshenko, dictated and formulated it. The appeal was then reprinted. (...) Literally an hour after my daughters published our appeal to the people, people in Moscow and other cities read this document. It was broadcast by foreign agencies, professional and amateur computer networks, independent radio stations such as Ekho Moskvy, stock exchanges, and the correspondent network of many central publications.

It seems to me that the elderly GKAC members simply could not imagine the full scope and depth of this new information reality for them. Before them was a completely different country. Instead of a party-style quiet and imperceptible putsch, it suddenly turned out to be an absolutely public duel. (...) Frankly, there was little that made me happy at that moment. Everything seemed unsteady and unreliable. Now let's rush to The White house, and suddenly there is an ambush somewhere. And if we break through, there may also be a trap there. The familiar ground was disappearing from under our feet” - from the book “Notes of the President.”

Boris Pugo, Minister of Internal Affairs, member of the State Emergency Committee

Who was he in August 1991: Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, member of the Security Council, member of the State Emergency Committee.

Direct speech: “I made an absolutely unexpected mistake that was equivalent to a crime” - from the suicide note.

Alexander Rutskoy, Vice-President of the RSFSR

Who was he in August 1991: Vice President of the RSFSR, one of the main organizers of the defense of the White House. On August 21, together with Ivan Silaev, I flew to Foros to pick up Mikhail Gorbachev.

What did you do after 1991: Until September 1993 he was Vice President of the Russian Federation. In 1992, he headed the Security Council commission to combat corruption; in April 1993, he announced “11 suitcases of incriminating evidence” on government officials, including Yegor Gaidar, Gennady Burbulis and Anatoly Chubais. In 1993 he was one of the main characters October conflict with Boris Yeltsin, called for an assault on the Moscow City Hall and the Ostankino television center. He was arrested and released in February 1994 under an amnesty. From 1996 to 2000 - governor Kursk region. Now he is the chairman of the board of directors of a cement plant under construction in the Voronezh region.

Direct speech:“After it all calmed down, I came to Boris Nikolaevich myself and said: “Boris Nikolaevich, why are we sitting and waiting? Let me fly and bring Gorbachev?” - "How will you do it?" - “Well, that’s another question.” If they really wanted to destroy us, how could I first go from the building of the Supreme Council to the Kremlin, talk with Anatoly Ivanovich Lukyanov, and then two days later I got into the car and in my car, past the columns, past the troops, I drove to Vnukovo. Nobody stopped me from capturing Yanaev’s plane. And fly away on this plane. Yes, the command was given to put the tanks on the runway so that we wouldn’t land there, well, the brigade commander Marine Corps he didn’t do it, and we sat down calmly” - from an interview with the Ekho Moskvy radio station.

Dmitry Yazov, Minister of Defense, member of the State Emergency Committee

Who was he in August 1991: The Minister of Defense, a member of the State Emergency Committee, gave the order to send troops into Moscow.

What did you do after 1991: amnestied in February 1994, in 1998 he was appointed chief military adviser to the Main Directorate of International Military Cooperation of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. Since 2008 - leading analyst of the Service of Inspector General of the Ministry of Defense.

Direct speech: « And when the so-called State Emergency Committee began, Grachev called me and reported that Boris Yeltsin was asking him to send security to the White House. I answer: “Please send there a battalion of the 106th Airborne Division, which was coming from Tula.” The division was commanded by Lebed, although he was already Grachev’s deputy for combat as commander of the Airborne Forces. The battalion has arrived. But it was full of drunks. They got the military drunk. Lebed came to Yeltsin and reported that he had “arrived for security.” In general, it turned out that Yeltsin recruited them (Grachev and Lebed)” - from an interview with Nezavisimaya Gazeta.

Ruslan Khasbulatov, and. O. Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR

Who was he in August 1991: Acting Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR. On August 19, I was at a dacha in the village of Arkhangelskoye, next door to Yeltsin’s dacha. According to my own recollections, as soon as I saw Swan Lake on TV early in the morning, I ran to Yeltsin. He took part in drawing up the appeal “To the Citizens of Russia” and was in the White House with Yeltsin’s team.

What did you do after 1991: from 1991 to 1993 he was Chairman of the Supreme Council. In September-October 1993, in the conflict between the Supreme Council and Boris Yeltsin, he was one of Yeltsin’s main opponents; on October 4, he was arrested and placed in Lefortovo, released in February 1994. In the summer of 1994, he created the “peacekeeping mission of Professor Khasbulatov,” trying to mediate between Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev and Russian authorities, however, the negotiations were unsuccessful. Since 1994 - Head of the Department of World Economy at the Russian Academy. G. V. Plekhanov.

Direct speech:“The first night was the worst. We thought they were attacking the White House. We saw many signs that the army was about to attack the building. It was then that Yeltsin wanted to take refuge in the US Embassy. I noticed that he was getting ready to go down to the garage. “In half an hour they will start firing at us,” he said. Luckily, I convinced him to stay. We couldn’t abandon people, we would never be forgiven for this,” from an interview with the Spanish newspaper El Mundo.

Pavel Grachev, commander of the Airborne Forces, participated in the preparation of the putsch

Who was he in August 1991: commanding Airborne troops THE USSR. He participated in the development of plans for the State Emergency Committee, on August 19 he carried out Yazov’s order to send troops into Moscow, but then went over to Yeltsin’s side and, instead of storming the White House, sent tanks to defend it.

What did you do after 1991: from 1992 to 1996 - Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, in 1994-1995 he personally led the military operations in Chechnya. He was a suspect in the murder of Moskovsky Komsomolets journalist Dmitry Kholodov. From 1998 to 2007 - Advisor to the Federal State Unitary Enterprise Rosoboronexport. Now he is the head of a group of advisors to the general director of Omsk Radio Plant named after. Popova."

Direct speech: “Then I spoke out against the State Emergency Committee, in fact, I did not allow the capture of Boris Nikolayevich in the White House. At least that's what many thought. That’s probably why Yeltsin decided to thank me,” from an interview with the Trud newspaper.

Who was he in August 1991: Secretary of the State Council under the President of the RSFSR, right hand Boris Yeltsin, participated in the preparation and signing of the Belovezhskaya Accords.

What did you do after 1991: from 1991 to 1992 - first deputy chairman of the Russian government. From 1993 to 2000 - State Duma deputy, one of the founders of the Russia's Choice party. From 2000 to 2007 - vice-governor of the Novgorod region, from 2001 to 2007 - member of the Federation Council. Now - head of the department of political philosophy International University in Moscow.

Direct speech:“This is the political Chernobyl of the Soviet system, and these three days deprived us of our Motherland and country, and after that, let’s say, there was no CPSU, there was no Soviet leadership, there was no Soviet government, and each republic was forced to resolve issues of basic survival almost alone” - from an interview with the radio station “Echo of Moscow”.

Ivan Silaev, Prime Minister of the RSFSR

Who was he in August 1991: Prime Minister of the RSFSR, signed the appeal “To the Citizens of Russia”, together with Rutsky flew to Foros for Gorbachev on August 21.

What did you do after 1991: opposed the Belovezhskaya Accords, and on September 26, 1991 he was dismissed from the post of chairman of the Russian government. In 1991-1994 - Russian Ambassador to the EU in Brussels. From 2002 to 2006 - Chairman of the Russian Union of Mechanical Engineers.

Direct speech:“Today we can talk about complete uncertainty as to what will happen to the Russian leadership in the coming days. We accept any situation. We don't have tanks or other types of weapons. But we have trust Russian people, his support, and I have no doubt that it is the Russians who will say their word in defense of human rights, constitutional norms and rules relating to both the Union President and the President of Russia and all legally elected bodies.<…>We are ready for anything. Even if the worst happens - which is also possible - Russian citizens will say something about us kind word"- RIA interview on August 19, 1991.

Oleg Baklanov, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, member of the State Emergency Committee

Who was he in August 1991: Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee for Defense Issues, member of the State Emergency Committee.

What did you do after 1991: released under amnesty in 1994. Now he is the Chairman of the Board of Directors of OJSC Rosobschemash.

Direct speech:“The main motive for our trip [to Foros] is to postpone the action that Gorbachev prepared - the signing of a new union treaty. The signing of a union treaty would essentially lead to the collapse of the Soviet Union, because only six or seven republics could sign it at that time. (...) I was not personally familiar with it; I only learned its contents on the 16th or 17th from a newspaper publication. This issue needed to be discussed both in the Cabinet of Ministers and at the Supreme Council. Lukyanov did not approve of him either, there were questions. This is the task we faced in order to stop Gorbachev...” - from an interview with Radio Liberty.

Valentin Pavlov, Prime Minister, member of the State Emergency Committee

Who was he in August 1991: Prime Minister of the USSR, member of the State Emergency Committee.

What did you do after 1991: amnestied in 1994. In 1995 - president of Chasprombank, whose license was subsequently revoked. From 1996 to 1997 - financial advisor to the chairman of the board of Promstroybank. Died in 2003.

Direct speech:“In Russian reality, the complete destruction of the working control mechanism at an accelerated pace and to the ground, starting from the headquarters, from the brains, and then construction. Naturally, there can be only one payment for the next acceleration - paralysis of production and destruction of production potential. Not only was it predicted Russian leadership more than once, but also calculated, the last time in August 1991. The results of the assessment were known to all republics. It is no coincidence that practically none of them followed the Russian path, with the exception of individual forced steps” - from an interview with Kommersant-Vlast magazine.

Vasily Starodubtsev, agrarian, member of the State Emergency Committee

Who was he in August 1991: people's deputy, chairman of the Union of Agrarians of the RSFSR and the Peasant Union of the USSR, member of the State Emergency Committee.

What did you do after 1991: released from prison due to health reasons in 1992. From 1997 to 2005 - governor Tula region. Since 2007 - State Duma deputy from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation.

Direct speech: « Kryuchkov’s headquarters developed the actions of the State Committee to restore order, primarily in Moscow, of course, but throughout the country too. And then the day of the State Emergency Committee was announced, when the capital<...>Armored and other troops were brought in. But as a result of the betrayal of Grachev and, to some extent, Alpha, we were unable to restore order in Moscow” - from an interview with km.ru.

Alexander Tizyakov, member of the State Emergency Committee

Who was he in August 1991: President of the Association of State-Owned Enterprises and Associations of Industry, Construction, Transport and Communications of the USSR, member of the State Emergency Committee.

What did you do after 1991: amnestied in February 1994, after which he returned to Yekaterinburg, where he headed the branch of the Association of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs. He was the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the New Technologies company. He was listed as a co-owner of the companies CJSC Stator, ComInfoPlus, and Nauka93.

Direct speech: “There is an objective factor in the development of humanity, according to this factor we will all sooner or later come to socialism” - interview with regions.ru

Vladimir Kryuchkov, Chairman of the KGB, member of the State Emergency Committee

Who was he in August 1991: Chairman of the KGB of the USSR, member of the State Emergency Committee.

What did you do after 1991: released in 1992, amnestied in 1994. Wrote a memoir, “A Personal Affair.” He was a member of the board of directors of the information and analytical structure of ANTR Region (part of AFK Sistema). Died in 2007.

Direct speech: « It was obvious to everyone: if the agreement had been signed on August 20, there would have been no Soviet Union. We extended the life of our country by 4 months” - interview with the Izvestia newspaper.

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