D. V. Vedeneev. The role of the Soviet special services in the defeat of Nazism (based on materials from the reconnaissance and sabotage activities of the NKVD-NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR) Reconnaissance, sabotage and operational combat activities behind the front line (“behind the front activities”) from the first days

VChK-OGPU-KVD-NKGB-MGB-MVD-KGB

Directory

INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY FOUNDATION

RUSSIA. XX CENTURY DOCUMENTS

UNDER THE GENERAL EDITION OF ACADEMICIAN A.N.YAKOVLEV

EDITORIAL COUNCIL:

A.N. Yakovlev (chairman), E.T. Gaidar, A.A. Dmitriev, V.P. Kozlov, V.A. Martynov, S.V. Mironenko, V.P. Naumov, C. Palm, R.G. Pihoya (Deputy Chairman), E.M. Primakov, A.N. Sakharov, G.N. Sevostyanov, S.A. Filatov, Chubaryan A.O.

VChK-OGPU-KVD-NKGB-MGB-MVD-KGB

Directory

COMPILERS: A.I. Kokurin, N.V. Petrov

SCIENTIFIC EDITOR R.G. Pihoya

MOSCOW 1997

UDC 351.746(47x97)(09)

BBK 67.401.212(2)Y2 L82

The following took part in the preparation of the directory: the State Archive of the Russian Federation, the Scientific Information and Educational Center "Memorial".

L82 LUBYANKA.

Cheka - OGPU - NKVD - NKGB - MGB - MVD - KGB

Directory.

Compilation, introduction and notes by A.I. Kokurina, N.V. Petrova. Scientific editor R.G. Pihoya.

M.: Publishing house MFD, 1997 - 352 p. ("Russia. XX century. Documents.").

15YOU 5-89511-004-5

The reference book is dedicated to the history of the Central Office of the Internal Affairs and State Security Bodies of the USSR in 1917–1960. For the first time, information is provided on the structure of the Cheka - OGPU - NKVD - NKGB - MGB - MVD - KGB, the most important orders that determined the activities of these departments, as well as biographical information about the People's Commissars (Ministers) of Internal Affairs of the USSR and their deputies.

BBK 67.401.212(2)Y2

5YOU 5-89511-004-5

© A.I. Kokurin, N.V. Petrov © International Foundation for Democracy, 1997

INTRODUCTION

Until now, the structure of the Central Apparatus of the Soviet internal affairs and state security bodies has not been described in detail. The information about her was completely secret.

However, without this data it is impossible to explore many aspects of Russian history in the 20th century. The Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of June 23, 1992 “On the removal of restrictive stamps from legislative and other acts that served as the basis for mass repressions and attacks on human rights” ordered the declassification of laws, by-laws and departmental directives relating, among other things, to "... organizations and the activities of the repressive apparatus", which were the NKVD - KGB. This is how the opportunity to prepare this directory arose.

Of course, fragmentary data on state security structures can be gleaned from numerous publications in recent years devoted to the history of punitive agencies and repression. But the fragmentation of the sources used and a considerable share of subjectivist interpretations created many contradictions and discrepancies regarding the structure and functions of certain units of the NKVD; to confusion about what the numbered departments of the Main Directorate of State Security (GUGB) were doing; to references to units that did not exist for a particular period of time; to errors in the names of the heads of these departments.

The compilers of the directory did not set themselves the task of providing detailed coverage of the activities of certain divisions of state security agencies. Only the names of the relevant departments are indicated. In those cases where this name is too arbitrary and does not indicate the scope of activity of the unit, brief explanations are given of what this or that department or department did. At the same time, one significant remark should be made: the conventional names given in the reference book should not be understood literally, as indications that state security bodies were responsible for the state of affairs in certain economic areas. Thus, the Water Transport Department of the GUGB did not organize water transportation, but coordinated the activities of all operatives at water transport facilities: on ships, in ports, at piers, in shipping company departments. The tasks of the security officers in water transport included conducting “undercover investigations”, arrests and investigations into the cases of employees in this industry. In the language of the security officers, this meant “operational service” in this area.

The same can be said about the departments of heavy and defense industry and the like in the GUGB and the State Economic University. In 1938–1941 the work of these units consisted of monitoring the state of affairs in the relevant sectors of the national economy using secret methods (agent apparatus), identifying “anti-Soviet” and “counter-revolutionary” elements, their further “development”, arrest and investigation. The work of state security in these areas was built on a sectoral basis.

On Monday, Kommersant, citing sources in law enforcement agencies, reported on an upcoming reform, which involves the creation of the MGB on the basis of the FSB, FSO and SVR. At the same time, the MGB, as the publication argued, may be able to take on the most high-profile cases or exercise control over investigations carried out by other intelligence agencies. According to the plan of the developers of the reform, the publication claims, the creation of the MGB would allow for more efficient management of law enforcement agencies and would help fight corruption in these departments.

Later, the press secretary of the Russian President Dmitry Peskov did not confirm information about the creation of the MGB on the basis of the FSB, FSO and SVR. “No, I can’t,” answered the Kremlin representative when asked by journalists to confirm the data provided. Federal News Agency offers its readers a brief excursion into the history of the issue.

Cheka

Soviet intelligence services began with the famous Cheka- The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, the “Chrekayka”, which is why security officers are still sometimes called security officers.

The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counter-Revolution and Sabotage under the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR was created in December 1917 as an organ of the “dictatorship of the proletariat” to combat counter-revolution. The Cheka was headed by one of his closest associates Lenin - Felix Dzerzhinsky.

After the end of the Civil War, the abolition of so-called “war communism” and the transition to the “new economic policy” ( NEP), the Cheka was reorganized into the GPU (State Political Administration), and then - after the formation of the USSR - all republican GPUs became part of the OGPU (United State Political Administration).

NKVD

In the early 1930s, the OGPU was reorganized into the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR ( NKVD). The NKVD of the USSR was created in 1934 as the central agency for combating crime, maintaining public order and ensuring state security.

The mass repressions of the 1930s are associated with the activities of the NKVD. Many repressed people - both those who were shot, those sentenced to prison, or those who ended up in the Gulag - were convicted out of court by special troikas of the NKVD. In addition, the NKVD troops carried out deportations based on nationality. Many NKVD employees, including those from the top leadership of this body, themselves became victims of repression.

During Great Patriotic War Border and internal troops of the NKVD were used to protect the territory and search for deserters, and also directly participated in hostilities. After death Stalin hundreds of thousands of illegally repressed people were rehabilitated.

MGB

For the first time, the People's Commissariat (Ministry) of State Security of the USSR was formed shortly before the Great Patriotic War - on February 3, 1941 - by dividing the NKVD of the USSR into two people's commissariats: the NKGB of the USSR and the NKVD of the USSR. However, at the beginning of the war, these departments were again merged into a single body - the NKVD of the USSR.

In 1946, people's commissariats at all levels were transformed into ministries of the same name - this is how the NKVD of the USSR turned into the MGB of the USSR.

In May 1946, the head of Smersh became the Minister of State Security. Victor Abakumov. Under Abakumov, the transfer of the functions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the MGB began. In 1947-1952, internal troops, police, border troops and other units were transferred from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the MGB.

However, Avakumov did not see the reorganization of his brainchild - on July 12, 1951, he was arrested and accused of treason, and after Stalin’s death he was shot.

On the day of Stalin’s death, March 5, 1953, at a joint meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, a decision was made to unite the MGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs into a single Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR under the leadership of Lavrentiy Beria, who, however, did not stay in this post for long and was also shot.

Subsequently, in the spring of 1954, state security bodies were removed from the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and the State Security Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR (KGB) was formed.

KGB

The CCCP State Security Committee existed from 1954 to 1991. Its main functions were foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, protection of the state border and party and state leaders, organizing and ensuring government communications, as well as the fight against nationalism, dissent, crime and anti-Soviet activities.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the state security organs underwent several reorganizations, of which the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation was organized for a short period of time.

FSB

And in December 1993, the President of Russia Boris Yeltsin signed a decree on the abolition of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation and the creation of the Federal Counterintelligence Service of the Russian Federation (FSK Russia), which was then transformed into the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation ( FSB of Russia).

The FSB, along with the SVR, FSVNG, FSO, GFS, FSTEC and the Special Objects Service under the President, belongs to the special services. The FSB has the right to conduct preliminary investigations and inquiries, operational search and intelligence activities. The director of the FSB since 2008 is Alexander Bortnikov, who reports directly to the President of the Russian Federation.

National composition of personnel of the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD-MGB USSR bodies in 1 year.

(Brief historical background)

Leningrad
October 1998

1.2 Introductory remarks
2. Leading personnel of the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD and NKGB of the USSR in the years
2.1 Personnel of the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD in the years
2.2 Changes in the personnel of the OGPU and the NKVD when he was deputy chairman of the OGPU and People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
2.3 Changes in the personnel of the NKVD of the USSR when he was People's Commissar
3. Main conclusions
Used materials

1.1 Political significance of the issue

After the upcoming inevitable restoration of democracy in the form of Soviets in Russia, the question will arise of carefully correcting the mistakes of the Soviet government in the period when the RSDLP-VKP(b)-CPSU were the only ruling Party in the USSR, in the years, i.e., until the moment of treacherous surrender political positions of the CPSU by Yev and his like-minded people.

Among the mistakes in the field of the national question, one should note the weak, lenient and ineffective control of the Party Central Committee over the proportional representation of the peoples of the USSR. In the governing bodies of the country, there is a well-known exclusion of representatives of the indigenous nation - Russian people - from active participation in the work of governing bodies and the filling of these bodies, especially in their highest echelons, with national minorities in a proportion many times greater than their actual weight in the population of Russia and the USSR . This is a violation of a clear provision: Russia should be governed by Russians, who make up the majority of its population. The remaining allied nations should have legal representation in the governing bodies of Russia, approximately proportional to their share in the numerical composition of the population of Russia.

A different approach is when some national clan is concentrated in the leadership of Russia, which, through mutual support, gradually expands its influence and takes root in some important government body, pushing aside the indigenous nationality. This leads to:

This creates an alienation of the broad masses of the people from the Party, which is allegedly introducing alien governance (which actually took place in the history of the country in connection with claims to the role of “the second leader of the October Revolution”);

There is a danger that, having concentrated in power, such a national wedge will gradually move away from defending the interests of Russia and will begin to use the authority of the Russian people to defend their own national interests;

A breeding ground is being created for hostile agitation inside and outside the country (at the international level) with the main thesis: “Russia is ruled by a non-Russian Government,” as in fact it was in the years. and later;

The unity of the country's leadership is being violated, since the presence of “disproportionate national layers” in the governing bodies does not contribute to their unity and concentration on solving the most difficult problems of building a socialist society, and introduces elements of national competition into the atmosphere of governance.

Thus, in general, this practice of disproportionate representation of nations in the leadership of a multinational socialist power does not contribute to the creation of sincere trust of the broad masses in Soviet power and violates the monolithic unity of the Party and the people.

Of course, the principle of internationalism fully allows any worthy communist of non-indigenous nationality to apply for and occupy any post in the Party and State.

Coming from a Russified Polish noble family, in particular, he did not contribute to the concentration of people of Polish nationality in the Cheka. In addition to the revolutionary known from underground times, who was the first deputy and became successor after his death, only a few security officers of Polish origin are known, for example, the OGPU authorized security officer in Transcaucasia, security officer Redens, who was married to his wife’s sister. Under the leadership of this security officer, a young man began his work in the OGPU, who managed to survive his less insidious boss from the Caucasus and himself settled into his position.

The fact that the founder of the Cheka-OGPU did not tend to concentrate his fellow tribesmen in the apparatus of his department serves as another positive characteristic of his political activity.

At that time, the Cheka cadres were formed from revolutionary sailors, Red Guards, Bolsheviks with underground experience, mostly Great Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, with a noticeable layer of Latvians. The question of the concentration of persons of any one non-indigenous nationality in the Cheka-OGPU did not arise, and the national composition of the bodies approximately corresponded to the composition of the population of Russia and the USSR.

However, there were some mistakes. In 1919, under historically unclear circumstances, he authorized the admission, immediately to a leadership position, of one of his deputies, a distant relative, the husband of Yakov (Yankel) Mikhailovich Sverdlov’s niece. Most likely, he personally worked hard to get his relative appointed to a prominent post in the Cheka-OGPU.

Since he later played a negative role in the work of the OGPU of the USSR and, in particular, contributed in every possible way to filling the apparatus of the OGPU with his fellow tribesmen (his nationality was a “Polish Jew” - as he wrote in his own handwriting in his questionnaires), it is necessary to dwell in more detail on this person, which cannot be done , without simultaneously covering the history of the Sverdlov family.

Nizhny Novgorod private Jewish engraver Mikhail Sverdlov (father of Yakov Mikhailovich Sverdlov) from the end of the 19th century served the needs of revolutionary organizations in his workshop (engraving seals, cliches, etc.). In connection with this, he was under the supervision of the Nizhny Novgorod gendarmerie department. In the first years of the 20th century, he accepted the young son of a Nizhny Novgorod pharmacist, Genrikh Genrikhovich Yagoda, as an engraver's apprentice. In some sources, Yagoda's true name and surname are defined as Hershel Gershelevich Yehuda (translated from Hebrew as Judas).

The history of the relationship between the student and the master is dramatic: before the revolution, the student robbed his master twice, hid from him in other cities, where he tried to open “his own business.” In both cases, the Sverdlov family did not contact the police, given their connections with revolutionary circles and fearing exposure and reprisals.

In both cases, he returned to the master in shame, asked for forgiveness and again worked in the Sverdlovs’ engraving workshop. After the second theft and the second reconciliation with Sverdlov, the elder, the young engraver, to strengthen the family union, married the granddaughter of Mikhail Sverdlov (she is also the niece of Yakov Sverdlov) Ida Averbakh. After this, the friction in the family ended, and in 1918 Yakov Mikhailovich Sverdlov hired his relative into the Cheka, although at that time the engraver did not have any revolutionary merits of his own, nor did he have experience in operational security work. He considered himself a member of the Sverdlov family. Moreover, he considered himself a member of the family on the very flimsy basis that Mikhail Sverdlov’s other son, Zavel (who was given the name Zinovy ​​when he converted to Orthodoxy) was (after a break with his father, Mikhail Sverdlov, on religious grounds) adopted (by Gorky) and from then on was known in the family as Zinovy ​​​​Peshkov (he was his successor at Orthodox baptism).

This artificial “kinship” made him part of the family in the 30s, where he, as a relative, spent a lot of time. This led to the accusation of poisoning his son Maxim Peshkov.

The rather confusing circumstances presented here are presented in the source (3), the author of which B. Bazhanov was closely acquainted with the younger generation of the Sverdlov family in the 20s. From this it is clear that, wanting to “please a loved one,” he slipped in a personnel who was very dubious in terms of his moral qualities, and for some reason Dzerzhinsky himself contributed to this typically “thieves” employment operation, which did not and could not have any special merits to the RCP (b) ) and could hardly qualify for the post of second deputy chairman of the Cheka due to his business and political qualities.

As you know, those repressed in the “Bukharin trial” have now been rehabilitated - all with the exception of those who have many crimes on their conscience. The moral character of this “chekist” is well characterized by his actions. Having entered into power and authority in the early 30s, he anticipated the famous “Beria syndrome” - the hunt for women. In 1932/33, already as the head of the NKVD, he became interested in the wife of the diplomatic courier Selivanov, Nina Selivanova. The diplomatic courier himself was immediately captured, accused of spying for Germany and shot. A little later, he “set his sights” on an employee - the wife of Maxim’s son. And then Maxim Peshkov - this healthy young man, an athlete - suddenly dies to the great grief of his father - .

Before this, the boss died in 1933, clearing the way for him to the top.

Considering that at that time he opened a special laboratory within the OGPU-NKVD for the development of poisonous drugs, it can be assumed that these deaths, which he personally needed, were not accidental. The remaining accusations of “poisoning” Kuibyshev, Gorky and others were most likely attributed to the initiators of the “Bukharin trial”, because there is no personal interest in the death of Gorky, Kuibyshev and others.

As follows from here, through petition and an amazing oversight, a man who had no political merit to the Party before the Revolution, a principled cynic, a thief, a murderer and an adulterer, got into the responsible work of the head of all the special services of the USSR.

The principle “A security officer must always have a cool head and a warm heart, devoted to the cause of the Party” was violated in this case.

2.2 Changes in the personnel of the OGPU and NKVD during their tenure
Deputy Chairman of the OGPU and People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR

Already in the first period of his activity in the field of the USSR intelligence services, as their deputy head, he contributed in every possible way to filling these services with people of the same nationality as himself. He encouraged clanism and fraternity, and appointed members of his family (for example, his son, the above-mentioned Nadezhda Peshkova) to the organs.

He appointed an Odessa security officer as the first assistant to the Secret Operations Directorate of the OGPU, which he personally supervised.

The most important foreign department in the OGPU (foreign intelligence) was successively headed (at the suggestion) by the Jewish security officers Trilisser, Artuzov, Slutsky and Shpigelglass (the organizer of the murder (of Bronstein) in Mexico), Passov and Dekanozov.

A Jewish specialist (and part-time poisoner), Colonel Mairanovsky, was appointed to the post of head of a specially established “chemical laboratory of the OGPU” (composition of lethal poisons and long-term toxic compounds), who directly testified at the criminal trial in his case (1954): “ Whatever court verdicts they pointed out to me who should be confiscated, I confiscated them, that is, I poisoned them with drugs developed by the laboratory.” Hesselberg was appointed head of the OGPU photographic laboratory, and Berenzon was appointed chief accountant of the department. After the “transfer of cases,” the last to be arrested was Chekist Colonel Shvartsman from the investigative unit of the NKVD. This officer was accused of creating a terrorist Zionist organization directly in the general apparatus of the NKVD (Moscow). This was back in the 1930s, when the state of Israel did not yet exist, but the Zionist movement was already developing and was well organized.

Having been “interrogated,” Colonel Shvartsman immediately named thirty (!) names of Jewish security officers who allegedly belonged to his organization.

Thus, the question of whether the organization was part of the NKVD remains open (the investigator could have invented this organization), but the fact that 30 Jewish security officers “worked” in the central apparatus of the NKVD is beyond doubt.

Personally supervising the work of the Main Directorate of State Security of the OGPU-NKVD, he appointed a well-known person (Sorenzon) as his first deputy in this important area. - this is the same investigator who, with one stroke of the pen, single-handedly “sentenced” a Russian poet to execution (1921) and who stubbornly imposed his “friendship” on another great poet - . In general, knowing who he was dealing with, he respectfully called this “friend of Russian poetry” “Agranych.” By the way, Yagodovsky’s employee of the Cheka-OGPU was also the well-known “patron” - Osip Brik, who, using his connections in the OGPU, prevented the issuance of a passport to Mayakovsky for his next trip to Paris, which upset the poet’s plans to marry a Russian emigrant - Tatyana Yakovleva, the daughter of the Tsar engineer Colonel Yakovlev, who left for France back in 1908. According to some writers, this tragedy (Tatyana, without waiting for Mayakovsky, married Prince Radziwill) was the reason for the poet’s suicide.

Back in 1924, he became a member of the Special Meeting of the OGPU, which had the rights of the highest court, passing sentences without the right of appeal.

How persistently the People's Commissar was committed to the idea of ​​saturating the cadres of the USSR special services with his fellow tribesmen is well shown by the historical episode of the second recruitment into the OGPU cadres for a responsible position of the famous Socialist Revolutionary Ya. Blumkin.

Until 1918, Ya. Blumkin worked in the Cheka from the Left Socialist Revolutionary Party, allied at that time with the RCP (b). By virtue of his position, he was entrusted with supervision of the activities of the German embassy. Carrying out an illegal order from the head of the Left Socialist Revolutionary Party, Maria Spiridonova, Blumkin, using his official access to the Embassy, ​​organized a terrorist act - the murder of the German ambassador to the RSFSR, Count Mirbach, in order to provoke Germany into military action against a still weakened Russia, contrary to the Brest-Litovsk Peace. Following the same signal, the Left Social Revolutionaries launched an armed rebellion in Moscow and Yaroslavl, in particular, they managed to arrest. Thus, Ya. Blumkin was the instigator and executor of the largest political provocation against Soviet power, which put the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Executive Committee in a critical situation. Thanks to political art, the rebellion of the left Socialist Revolutionaries was suppressed, but during its suppression (especially in Yaroslavl) a lot of blood was shed, which modern Israeli ideologists “very much regret for reasons of humanity,” apparently forgetting who exactly started the matter and shed blood in Moscow foreign diplomat.

For this counter-revolutionary attack, Ya. Blumkin was declared outlawed by the Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR (on proposal).

For a couple of years, this Socialist Revolutionary terrorist hid from justice in the Socialist Revolutionary underground. Then, seeing no other way out, he “confessed to the OGPU” (the Cheka had already been reorganized), handed over to the OGPU all the materials known to him about the activities of the already underground Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party (i.e., in other words, he sold his accomplices) and .... asked to go back to work in the OGPU of the RSFSR. His petition was warmly supported. As a result, Ya. Blyumkin was “forgiven” and again began to “serve” Soviet power, first in Georgia, where, according to the conclusion of the OGPU itself, he “showed excessive cruelty,” then in Mongolia, where again due to “abuse of executions” he was recalled to Moscow, a little later the OGPU Collegium sent Blumkin as a resident to the Middle East.

However, betrayal eats into a person’s character; Blumkin had to betray and in 1929 he betrayed the leadership of the OGPU, establishing an illegal relationship with Trotsky, who was exiled. Only after this was he forced to sanction the punishment of the traitor - Ya. Blumkin was shot.

The second appointment of the left Socialist-Revolutionary Ya. Blumkin to a responsible job in the OGPU and his entire future career rests entirely on his conscience. This episode illustrates how clan loyalty to people of one's own nationality, regardless of their moral, political and business qualities, harms the cause.

Blyumkin’s admission to the OGPU cadres again had other consequences: Blyumkin, like Yagoda, dragged his fellow tribesmen into the OGPU to smaller positions. In 1924, in Odessa, the supply manager of a cavalry regiment, a cousin of Ya. Blyumkin, a certain Arkady Romanovich Maksimov (actually Isaac Birger), stole and was expelled from the party. Having taken root in the OGPU for the second time, Ya. Blumkin turned to the head of the Administrative Department of the OGPU, Flexner, with a request to give A. Birger a “good job.” The “Accept” resolution appears. The scoundrel was hired for “chekist work,” like Ya. Blumkin, reinstated in the CPSU (b), and began to demand “responsible assignments.” The order was immediately issued - secret surveillance of the work and life of the responsible technical secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (Bolsheviks) B. Bazhanov. In other words, instead of fighting counter-revolution, an OGPU employee was charged with indirect “monitoring” of the work of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. And who was charged with this observation?! To the former thief expelled from the Party, recommended to the OGPU apparatus by the former Socialist-Revolutionary, provocateur and terrorist Ya. Blumkin, his relative! The whole story of Ya. Blumkin and his henchman is described in detail in source (3).

This kind of semi-criminal recruitment of new “chekists” to responsible positions is typical during the reign of the OGPU and the NKVD.

This is a very dangerous staffing system. We have to give one more specific example. In the early 20s, he recommended to the personnel service of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks for the position of personal secretary-referent to “one of the members of the Politburo” two of his “countrymen”: a certain G. Kanner and a widely known one in the future. Both were submitted directly to the secretariat.

Then the matter developed according to the principle of a “chain reaction”: he immediately took on a certain Makhover and a certain Yuzhak as “assistant secretaries”. The latter turned out to be a Trotskyist: he regularly removed from the table data on the progress of voting against the opinion of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in the primary party organizations (on the issue of the Trotskyist-Zinoviev bloc) and transmitted them directly.

The second “secretary” G. Kanner takes on as his “assistant” a security officer, a certain Bombin (Shmul Zomberg), who, presumably, also “observed” the work of the Politburo.

Thus, clinging to each other and carefully maintaining their monopoly, the organs of the Cheka-GPU-NKVD and other “leading heights” were filled with more and more fellow tribesmen of the omnipotent. The trouble would have been less if we were talking about ideologically convinced Jews - communists - tested underground. However, the “personnel policy” was aimed at staffing the OGPU with people like Blumkin, Flexner, Mehlis, Birger, etc., if he were a Jew, the rest would follow.

The staff of the Foreign Department of the OGPU (external international intelligence) was staffed in approximately the same way.

“This service was considered a bread service.” Permanent stay abroad, the right to organize trade and industrial enterprises there with OGPU money (camouflage and material support for basic intelligence work), accelerated promotion, awards and, finally, high salaries (for example, a resident in Trepper received 350 US dollars a month in 1960, and when he sent his wife and children to the USSR, he began to receive 275 US dollars. At that time, this was a lot of money (6). The general (Lev Feldbin) received 300 US dollars before the betrayal) entailed This area of ​​fellow tribesmen is like flies to honey.

As one of our military observers writes; The defeat of foreign intelligence led to the fact that foreign intelligence was recruited almost from the street for operational work. “Recruits” who did not know the specifics of their business, the country of their illegal activity and its language were illegally sent abroad.

The well-deserved authority of external operations carried out by the Cheka and OGPU under (for example, Operation Trust and the arrest of the “leader” of the Socialist Revolutionary movement Savinkov), faded, the matter went from failure to failure, the first NKVD officers appeared - traitors (Ya. Blyumkin, A. Orlov (i.e. L. Feldbin) and others).

But its NKVD Collegium sharply strengthened the purely repressive functions of the OGPU. “Extrajudicial bodies” have emerged to pass sentences without the right of appeal. The network of “political detention centers” and concentration camps expanded, and “unauthorized methods” of investigation, in other words, the use of physical measures against prisoners, became widespread.

It is surprising to note that the most acute structure of mass repression - the Gulag - was also (in terms of leadership) staffed by Yagoda on a national basis.

He was the head of the Main Directorate of Camps and Settlements at that time. His deputy is .
He was the head of the White Sea camps.
He was the head of the White Sea-Baltic camp (canal construction).
The head of the Main Directorate of Prisons of the NKVD of the USSR was H. Apert.
The head of the camps on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR was then Balitsky.
The head of the camps in the Northern regions was Finkelstein.
The head of the camps in the Sverdlovsk region was Shklyar.
The head of the camps on the territory of the Kazakh SSR was Polin.
The head of the camps in Western Siberia was first Shabo, then Gogel.
The head of the camps in the Azov-Black Sea region was Friedberg.
The head of the camps in the Saratov region was Pilyar.
In the Stalingrad region, the camps were in charge of Raisky, in the Gorky region - Abrampolsky, in the North Caucasus - Fayvilovich, in Bashkiria - Zaligman, in the Far Eastern region - Deribas, in Belarus - Leplevsky.

In general, fellow tribesmen commanded and practically carried out repression in 95% of the Gulag camps. The main contingent of prisoners in these camps were Russian people, Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Caucasians. Among them and among their relatives, thoughts and conversations involuntarily arose that Jews, the heads of repressive institutions, were raging against the rest of the inhabitants of the USSR. This, naturally, fueled sentiments of anti-Semitism and for this reason alone was harmful to the national policy of the Party. However, it didn’t matter - he continued to stubbornly pump up the leading cadres of the NKVD with “his” people.

This is a clear historical example of how biased, unfair personnel policies can really quarrel the peoples of our multinational state.

An analysis of the deplorable results of the leading “Chekist” activities clearly showed the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) the need to urgently replace him with another comrade who would, in particular, be less susceptible to inflating the Jewish diaspora directly in the structures of the special services and, especially, in their leadership.

The OGPU also included “women’s units.” When sending OGPU and GRU residents and emissaries abroad on assignments, “for technical needs” it was necessary to send with them a secretary (or radio operator) of an OGPU employee - a woman, and a situation was encouraged in which “informal relations” arose between both emissaries. Upon returning from a business trip, the woman “assigned” to the resident in this way made a separate and secret report from her partner about his words, deeds and lifestyle abroad.

So, for example, the former Socialist-Revolutionary, already mentioned above, employee of the OGPU (resident in the Middle East) Ya. Blyumkin, returning to 1929. in the USSR from Baghdad, secretly went to the Princes' Islands (Turkey), where L. Trotsky was at that time, Blumkin took from Trotsky a secret letter to the Trotskyist Sobelson (i.e. Karl Radek) and propaganda materials for illegal distribution in the USSR. His assistant (aka his wife) Liza Blyumkina (in her second marriage, Liza Zarubina, state security captain), having learned about this in accordance with the OGPU charter, reported her husband’s behavior to the command. Blyumkin, upon arrival in the USSR, was arrested, tried and shot as a traitor.

When he handed over the position of the head of the Foreign Department of the Main Directorate of State Security (05/21/1935), he appointed him to this most important position, and made him the first deputy, and only the second deputy was Russian.

On November 26, 1935, he reached the highest point of his career: by the Decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, he was awarded the title of “Commissar General of State Security of the USSR.” At this time, he was already the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, and his adventures with Nina Selivanova and Nadezhda Peshkova, which ended in the deaths of the husbands of these women, date back to the same time of “dizziness from success.” To characterize him as a person, it can be noted that when Yezhov, who replaced him in his post, approached him with a “kind” question: was he interested in the future fate of Nina Selivanova (she was in prison at that time as the “wife of a German spy”), he answered : “Not interested at all.” The new (last in his career) title: “Commissar General of State Security of the USSR” corresponded to the title “Marshal of the Soviet Union”, and the corresponding uniform included a marshal’s star on the buttonhole of a tunic (tunic, overcoat).

One step below the General Commissar of the USSR State Security Service was the title “Commissar of the State Security Service of the 1st Rank,” which then corresponded to the then rank of “Commander of the 1st Rank” or the current title of “Army General.” It is interesting that of the 5 persons who, according to the proposal, were awarded this title, three were Jews: , and, the remaining two were Poles: and and not a single(!) Russian. (4)

By order of January 1, 2001, he organized in N.K.V. D. special “Central management of trade, industrial and household enterprises and public catering of NKVD contingents.” The NKVD was appointed head of this sweet and completely uncontrolled feeding trough.

01/04/1936 organized the “Engineering and Construction Department of the NKVD of the USSR” for the construction of buildings, housing, prisons and camps for his department. He was appointed head of the new department.

Finally, on January 28, 1936, a long-standing wish came true: Order No. 000 of the NKVD of the USSR announced the transfer of the most important body from the NKO of the USSR to the NKVD - the Office of the Commandant of the Moscow Kremlin. By the same order, upon nomination, a certain division commander (4) was appointed to the post of commandant of the Kremlin.

Now he could let any terrorist team into the Kremlin.

Some old security officers who served under believe that he had far-reaching plans to “take power” in the country and that for this purpose he even created a certain “elite unit” of 2,000 soldiers who underwent special military-sports training, however, the unlucky omnipotent the minister forgot that here he was playing against a much larger political grandmaster - .

In the midst of the troubles described above, the all-powerful People's Commissar and General Commissioner of State Security of the USSR on September 26, 1936 was unexpectedly relieved of his posts and rank with the appointment of People's Commissar of Communications of the USSR. The sunset has begun.

Further fate corresponded to the spirit of the times. On April 3, 1937, by Decree of the USSR, he was removed from the post of People's Commissar of Communications of the USSR, and on the same days he was arrested. On March 13, 1938 (this year was needed to participate as a defendant in the Bukharin trial), he was sentenced to death by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, but immediately submitted a request for pardon to the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the USSR.

In his request, the former General Commissioner of State Security of the USSR wrote heartfeltly: “My guilt before my Motherland is great. Not redeeming her in any way. It's hard to die. “I am on my knees before all the People and the Party and ask you to have mercy on me by saving my life.” The petition was rejected and G. G. Yagoda was shot on March 15, 1938 (4).

The time has come for a new People's Commissar of Internal Affairs and a new General Commissioner of State Security of the USSR - Nikolai Ivanovich Yezhov, this time a representative of the indigenous people.

2.3 Changes in the personnel of the NKVD of the USSR when he was People's Commissar

Recalling this time, the famous Soviet intelligence officer (later KGB general) Pavel Sudoplatov writes (5): “I remember the oral(!) instructions of Obruchnikov, Deputy Minister for Personnel, not to accept Jews for officer positions. I could not imagine that such an openly anti-Semitic order came directly from Stalin.” Of course, the husband of GB Lieutenant Colonel Emma Koganova took this order with resentment, but let us ask ourselves the question: how else could the Government of the USSR clear out the huge percentage of Jewish diaspora in the special services, which was cherished by the “Polish Jew” for many years? Apparently, common sense dictated: it was necessary to at least limit the influx of new Jewish recruits into the central apparatus of the NKVD of the USSR, which was already quite filled with Jewish security officers.

Implementing this new personnel policy, the People's Commissar of the USSR Internal Affairs began to gradually replace personnel with security officers from among the overwhelming majority of the People of the USSR.

The matter, apparently, proceeded with great difficulty and noticeable resistance from the “already recruited” personnel.

Nevertheless, things moved forward: on March 17, 1937, he was expelled from the Central Office of the NKVD to the Saratov region, but (10/16/36) and (09/29/36) were appointed as deputies. At the same time, 4 more security officers of Russian nationality (,) and a Pole were immediately appointed as deputies.

These first steps gave grounds for the celebration of the 20th anniversary of the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD of the USSR on December 20, 1937 to declare: “... Yezhov created in the NKVD a wonderful core of security officers, Soviet intelligence officers, expelling alien people who had penetrated the NKVD and slowed down its work. Yezhov achieved these successes thanks to the fact that he worked under the leadership of Stalin, learned and was able to apply the Stalinist style of work in the field of intelligence.”(4)

The purge of the NKVD apparatus was radical. From the central apparatus of the NKVD, which numbered (in the last year of work) 22,283 operational workers, operational workers were dismissed (from 01.10.36 to 01.01. operational workers, that is, 1/4 of the personnel (about 25%). Of this number, they were arrested “for counter-revolutionary activities in the authorities” about 1,700 officers, “for the collapse of work” - 373 officers and “for criminal offenses” - 35 officers.

Among the arrested leaders of the NKVD of the USSR were: former People's Commissar, head of the Engineering and Construction Department, head of the Special Department of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR, head of the Security (Government) Department of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR.

However, no matter how hard he tried to get rid of the “Jewish bias” in the personnel of his department, the process of equalizing the national composition of the central bodies of the NKVD was slow, with great resistance from external and internal (in relation to the NKVD) influential intercessors.

While in the Central Office of the NKVD they continued their activities:
- head of the Gulag (that is, the officer who directly supervised the repressions);
- Head of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR (his affairs are mentioned above);
- special commissioner at the NKVD Collegium;
- Commandant of the Moscow Kremlin;
- Head of the Foreign Department of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR;
- Head of the NKVD Secretariat;
- Head of the Special Department of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR;
- Head of the 3rd Department of the 3rd Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR;
- Head of the 3rd Directorate of the NKVD;
- Head of the 7th Department of the 3rd Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR;
- Head of the Central Trade Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR;
- Head of the 5th Department of the 1st Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR;
- Head of the 1st Department of the Main Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR;
Head of the 9th Department of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR;
- Head of the Resettlement Department of the NKVD of the USSR;
- (obviously, the brother of the previous one) - Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR;

- Head of the 2nd Department of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR;
responsible employee of the Gulag of the NKVD of the USSR;
Nikolaev - - Head of the Operations Department of the Main Directorate of State Security of the USSR;
- executive secretary of the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR (the body for sentencing in political cases consisting of 3 members of the OSO);
- Head of the Personnel Department of the NKVD of the USSR;
- operational secretary of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR.

This list applies only to the top leaders of the NKVD apparatus of the USSR; it includes only 23 security officers of Jewish nationality. In total, this top nomenclature of leaders included 50 positions, including the People's Commissar and his deputies.

Consequently, in the top leadership of the NKVD of the USSR until 1936-38. the Jewish stratum made up about 45%, the rest of the leaders were Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, etc. This shows that the NKVD did not completely cope with the task of correcting the “national imbalance” in the top leadership.

One of the reasons for the weakening of his activity is moral degradation: the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs drank continuously. Women in the NKVD apparatus were afraid to stay for evening work in the building on Lubyanka, because a drunken People's Commissar walked along the corridors and pestered female employees. Personal life circumstances are confused. He seduced the wife of a famous diplomat, Evgenia Solomonovna Gladun (Khayutina), whom he had known since 1929 in Odessa (where he worked). The diplomat was immediately captured and, in the best traditions, shot as a “Trotskyist terrorist.” Eventually married. However, he was unable to establish a normal family life, drank and was jealous of his second wife towards the writer Isaac Babel, with whom she had a relationship in Odessa. As a result, Isaac Babel also ended up in the Gulag and died there. To “strengthen the family,” a child (a girl) was taken into it from a children’s boarding school, however, the family was clearly heading for collapse, and the People’s Commissar appeared at the workplace every day in an incapacitated state.

This continued until the end of his career. At the moment of his political collapse (Yezhova) shot herself, and the child ended up back in a boarding school.

It should be noted that even according to official statistics as of 01/01/32, only in the Central Office of the NKVD Russians made up 65%, Jews - 7.4%, while among the top leadership (see above) the ratio was different: Russians and other nationalities - 55%, Jews - security officers - 45%.

This leads to the conclusion: 1937 was the year of the scope of the “Great Terror” in the USSR after the murder, therefore, Jewish security officers also made a very significant contribution to this wave of repression.

Therefore, the cries of the “democratic” press of our time about the “special suffering” of the Jews at this time are political demagoguery. A significant layer of Jewish security officers “fully” carried out the repressions of the 1920s and 1930s, without experiencing any hesitation. The victims of repression were mostly Russians, but Jews, Slavs, Caucasians and Muslims also suffered. To pose the question in such a way that Jews were not at all involved in the repressions of the 20s and 30s is historically incorrect.(4)

Further career developed in a descending line. On April 8, 1938, being the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, he was appointed, concurrently, the People's Commissar of Water Transport of the USSR. On November 23, 1938, he addressed the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and personally with a statement in which he asked the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to relieve him from the post of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

In the statement he wrote: “The most neglected area in the NKVD turned out to be personnel. ...For decades, foreign intelligence services managed to recruit not only the top of the Cheka, but also middle management, and often ordinary workers. I calmed down from the fact that I defeated the top and some of the most compromised middle-level workers. Many of the newly nominated ones, as it now turns out, are also spies and conspirators.”

By the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated January 1, 2001, N. I. Yezhov’s request was granted “in view of the motives stated by Yezhov, as well as taking into account his painful condition.” On November 25, 1938, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR relieved the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR from his post.

By another decree, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia (Bolsheviks) was appointed to this position on the same day.

In April 1939 he was arrested and in February 1940, by the verdict of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, he was shot along with a large group of his former subordinates.

From these times, a decisive change began in the personnel policy of the NKVD (later the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security of the USSR), in particular in the direction of correcting the imbalance in the national composition of the heads of the Special Services.

The general direction of policy in this area was to bring the quantitative composition of national personnel in the leadership of the Special Services in accordance with the proportions of the national composition of the population of the USSR.

Around the person following Yezhov, the People's Commissar (then the Minister) of Internal Affairs of the USSR, our propagandists of “true democracy” and their corrupt newspapers raised whole fountains of dirt. Meanwhile, he was a complex and contradictory personality, unfortunately, tainted by the further development of the “Yagoda-Yezhov-Clinton syndrome,” i.e., by the constant hunt for women.

As for his political activities, if we look at it objectively, he did a lot of useful things for the country.

It is enough to note his large role in organizing work on the rapid creation of atomic and hydrogen weapons, which allowed the USSR to quickly achieve parity with the United States in nuclear weapons.

Now the son has filed a petition for the rehabilitation of his father from charges in the Khrushchev trial of 1953. The chairman of Mr. Yeltsin's rehabilitation commission is now the famous renegade of the Communist Party, Yakovlev. And even this “fierce democrat” and fighter against Soviet power was forced to admit in the press that the accusations against (except for the moral and everyday ones noted above) were not supported by any evidence or evidence.

Without trying to give an analysis of all activities, we will note here what is directly related to the topic under consideration.

The fact is that in 1953 he clearly understood the importance of observing the principle of proportional representation of the nations of the USSR in the governing bodies of the union republics. On June 8, 1953, the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR addressed a letter to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee about the national composition of the personnel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Belarusian SSR, pointing out the weak promotion of local workers of Belarusian nationality to senior positions in the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus. Of the 22 heads of departments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus, he wrote, only 7 are ethnic Belarusians; out of 148 senior officials of regional departments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus, only 37 are Belarusians, out of 173 heads of regional departments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus, only 33 are Belarusians. Therefore, with the permission of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, Beria, by his order, released the Minister of Internal Affairs of Belarus and appointed a Belarusian Minister, obliging him “... to take measures to staff the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus with proven local personnel.” A similar order was given for the Lithuanian SSR. The major general was relieved of the post of Minister of Internal Affairs of Lithuania, and in his place Lithuanian Lieutenant Colonel Viljunas was appointed Minister of Internal Affairs. Beria issued the same orders to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Estonian SSR and the Latvian SSR. In Estonia, the Russian Minister of Internal Affairs, a Ukrainian colonel, gave way to an Estonian lieutenant colonel; in Latvia, the Minister of Internal Affairs, a Russian lieutenant general, gave way to a Latvian lieutenant colonel. (7) The same orders were prepared for the rest of the Union Republics of the USSR. No matter how you evaluate the personality, it is impossible not to note the usefulness of the mentioned measures of the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR for correcting distortions in personnel policy at the local level, which increased the real level of management of the affairs of national republics by the forces of their indigenous nations and emphasized the equality of all peoples within the USSR.

3. Main conclusions

From the facts and circumstances discussed above, the following conclusions should be drawn: In 1st year. The Jewish people were widely (disproportionately their numbers in the country's population) represented in the bodies of the Cheka, OGPU, and NKVD of the USSR.

“Great Terror” was implemented in the USSR with the active participation of Jewish security officers. There were frequent cases when a Jewish security officer used “illegal methods of investigation” against a Jewish prisoner. A classic example: the practical implementation of the murder of Leiba Davidovich Bronstein (Trotsky) by security officers Shpigelglass and Eitingon and their team. National and, especially, family concentration of “compatriots” and “insiders” in the highest echelons of power is a hidden form of violation of socialist democracy, since such national or family imbalances in personnel policy violate the natural rights of the broad masses to equal representation in bodies of people's power.

A person’s nationality objectively exists in society and therefore should be reflected in accounting documents (passports, questionnaires, personnel statistics). The exclusion of the “nationality” column in current passports of the Russian Federation objectively leads to hiding the concentration of persons of a particular nationality in the highest echelons of the country’s power. And concealing the imbalances in the national composition of government bodies is a violation of the democratic right of an indigenous nation to govern its state directly.

It should be self-critically admitted that there was strict daily control over the activities of the governing bodies of the Cheka, OGPU-NKVD by the Central Committee of the RCP (b) (then the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks) in the historical period under review. failed to implement. Conclusions on correcting errors were made after the errors were made. Outside the strict control of the Party was the selection of new personnel for the USSR Intelligence Services. The mistakes of the Cheka, OGPU, and NKVD bodies were widespread, affecting a large number of Party members and non-Party members, and therefore really influenced the attitude of the general public towards the work of the security agencies in a negative direction. In addition, the heads of the Special Services (,) were “forgiven” for the lawlessness they committed and even crimes against the personality of Soviet citizens (the Selivanov case, the Gladun case, the cases of the victims).

The above should be taken into account after the restoration of democracy in the form of Soviets in Russia and the USSR.

Used materials

“What do Jews believe...”

(2) - Pravda-5, 08/12/97, p. 3, V. Prussakov “Dangerous Guarantor”

(3) - B. Bazhanov “The Kremlin, 20s”, Ogonyok magazine, October 1989.

(4) - Y. Kozhurin, N. Petrov “From Yagoda to Beria”, Pravda-5, No. 17

(5) - P. Sudoplatov “Intelligence and the Kremlin”, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1993.

(6) - “Red Chapel”, “Foreign Literature” magazine, February 1990, Moscow.