Nation states. Nation and state. National state National state

Shortly after the “Orange Revolution” of 2004, American political scientist Alfred Stepan published an article in which he analyzed the possibilities of national politics in Ukraine (Stepan A. Ukraine: Improbable demoсratic “nation-state” but possible democratic “state-nation”? // Post-Soviet Affairs. - Columbia, 2005. - No. 4. pp. 279–308). The author has not previously worked specifically on Ukraine, but is a recognized expert in the analysis of authoritarian regimes and models of their democratization.

Considering the political situation in Ukraine, Alfred Stepan resorts to contrasting two models. One of them is well known to us - the “nation-state”. Stepan has been developing an alternative “state-nation” model in recent years using material from Belgium, India and Spain with his long-term co-author Juan Linz and a new collaborator, political scientist from India Yogundra Yadav.

The purpose of politics in a nation-state is to establish a single, powerful identity for the community as members of the nation and citizens of the state. To achieve this, the state is pursuing a homogenizing assimilatory policy in the field of education, culture and language. In the realm of electoral politics, autonomist parties are not treated as coalition partners, and separatist parties are either outlawed or marginalized. Examples of such a model are Portugal, France, Sweden, Japan. Such a policy is facilitated if only one group is mobilized in a state as a cultural community with political representation, which sees itself as the only nation in the state.

When there are two or more such mobilized groups, as was the case in Spain after the death of Franco, in Canada at the creation of the federation in 1867, in Belgium by the mid-twentieth century, or in India at independence, democratic leaders must choose between excluding nationalist cultures and their arrangement in the state. All of the listed countries ultimately chose a model that should be more accurately described not as a “nation-state,” but as a “nation-state.” They decided to recognize more than one cultural, even national, identity and provide institutional support for them. Within the framework of one state, multiple, complementary identities were formed. For this purpose, asymmetrical federations were created, the practices of consociational democracy were introduced, and more than one state language was allowed.

Autonomist parties were allowed to create a government in some regions, and sometimes even join the coalition that formed the government in the center. The goal of such a model is to create loyalty among the different “nations” of a state towards it on an institutional and political basis, although the polity does not coincide with differing cultural demos.

Newly independent countries may choose an assertive and energetic but peaceful and democratic strategy of nation-state building if the polis and cultural demos are nearly identical, the political elite is united in adopting such a policy, and the international situation is at least not hostile to the implementation of such a strategy. . The situation of Ukraine at the time of its independence did not correspond to any of these conditions.

Alfred Stepan emphasizes the fundamental geopolitical difference between Ukraine and those countries that he and his co-authors previously considered within the framework of the “nation-state” model, that is, India, Belgium, Canada and Spain. None of these states had a neighbor who would pose a real irredentist threat, while Ukraine does have such a potential threat from Russia. Let us note the accuracy of this assessment: Stepan speaks in 2005 about the potential irredentist threat, admitting that at that time this topic was not seriously considered either by Russia or by Russian citizens of Ukraine.

Comparing the “nation-state” and “nation-state” models, Alfred Stepan builds the following series of oppositions:

• adherence to one “cultural civilizational tradition” versus adherence to more than one such tradition, but with the condition that adherence to different traditions does not block the possibility of identification with a common state;
• assimilationist cultural policies against recognizing and supporting more than one cultural identity;
• a unitary state or a mononational federation versus a federal system, often asymmetrical, reflecting cultural heterogeneity.

In other works, Stepan also notes that the “nation-state” model is more typical of a presidential model, while the “nation-state” model is more typical of a parliamentary republic.

The general theoretical principle formulated by Stepan is that the aggressive pursuit of a “nation-state” policy in the presence of more than one “mobilized national group” is dangerous for social stability and the prospects for democratic development. He admits that the “nation-state” model would imply, in relation to Ukraine, in particular, giving the Russian language the status of a second official language. Countries such as Belgium, India, Spain and Switzerland have more than one official language. Stepan notes that Ukraine has a better chance of creating a democratic political community if it does not pursue an aggressive strategy of establishing a “nation-state” model.

However, he goes on to make a reservation, which is the main thesis of his article: there may be situations where the line towards the “nation-state”, carried out quite gently, can also facilitate the creation of multiple and complementary identities that are so important for “nation-states” and for democracy in multinational societies. According to Stepan, Ukraine can serve as an example of such a situation.

Stepan gives the following arguments in favor of his thesis. In Ukraine, the preferred language is not necessarily a marker of identity. There are twice as many people who identify themselves as Ukrainians as those who use only the Ukrainian language when communicating. According to one study, up to 98% of those who consider themselves Ukrainians, regardless of what language they speak, would like their children to speak Ukrainian fluently. Among those who identify themselves as Russians, the percentage of those who want their children to speak Ukrainian fluently is also very high - 91% in Kyiv and 96% in Lviv.

Based on the fact that the vast majority of Russophones want their children to be fluent in Ukrainian, the state can, with sufficient flexibility, pursue a policy of imposing Ukrainian in the spirit of the “nation-state” model, without causing tension in relations with Russian-speaking citizens. Stepan also points out that in 2000, only 5% of respondents in Donetsk and 1% of respondents in Lvov believed that it would be better to divide Ukraine into two or more states. Russia, as a potential center of irredentist gravity, waged a bloody war in the Caucasus, which significantly reduced its attractiveness.

UKRAINIAN POLITICS – CHANGE OF MODEL

Three years have passed since Stepan’s article was published. Let's try to assess how the situation in Ukraine developed and how much his forecasts came true.

The period 2005–2007 was quite turbulent politically. During this time, both regular (2006) and extraordinary (2007) elections to the Verkhovna Rada were held. Their results demonstrated that the electoral base of all political forces without exception remains strictly tied to one or another macro-region.

The government of Yulia Tymoshenko, created after the presidential elections, was dismissed six months later. It, like the cabinet of Yuri Yekhanurov that replaced it, did not include politicians who would be perceived by the east and south of the country as their representatives. In the government of Viktor Yanukovych, formed after the 2006 parliamentary elections, there were no representatives of the western regions of Ukraine. The talk that arose about a possible coalition of the Party of Regions (PR) with part of the presidential “Our Ukraine” did not lead to anything.

The Yanukovych cabinet, like the Tymoshenko government before it, gradually became involved in an acute conflict with President Viktor Yushchenko, which led to the unconstitutional dissolution of parliament and early elections in 2007. During this conflict, the Constitutional Court was virtually destroyed, and it finally lost the opportunity to claim independence. All conflicting parties have repeatedly used “pocket” courts of various levels, continuing to undermine the prestige of the judiciary.

The country entered 2008 with the new government of Yulia Tymoshenko, which was not slow to once again enter into conflict with the weakened president. All leading political forces are unanimous that a revision of the Constitution is necessary, but each has its own vision of both the revision mechanism and the new constitutional model of power. In 2009 (if not earlier), the country will face new presidential elections. It cannot be ruled out that early parliamentary elections will take place again before this happens.

Until the dissolution of the Verkhovna Rada in the summer-autumn of 2007, the authorities mainly pursued a restrained policy in the spirit of the “nation-state” model, the chances of which Stepan regarded as very high for success. In the east and south of the country, cautious attempts have been made to introduce some solutions along the lines of the nation-state model. A number of regions and municipalities have granted official status to the Russian language. However, on the initiative of the presidential administration, these decisions were challenged in the courts and did not receive sanctions at the state level.

In the context of the political crisis of 2007, Ukrainization efforts in the cultural and linguistic spheres sharply intensified. In three years, all higher education will be translated into Ukrainian, and a law on mandatory dubbing of all rental copies of foreign films has come into force. The president’s statement about the information threat from Russian-language media should also be placed in this category, which promises a further reduction in Russian-language product on Ukrainian television screens.

The theme of the Holodomor as genocide of the Ukrainian people is significantly emphasized. This, at a minimum, creates discomfort for the Russian population of the country, because the discourse of the Holodomor as genocide is accompanied by arguments that the place of the Ukrainians exterminated by the famine was taken by immigrants from Russia. An extremely negative reaction everywhere, except Galicia, is caused by persistent efforts to glorify the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), its commander Roman Shukhevych and the leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) Stepan Bandera.

The unexpectedly sharp intensification of efforts at the end of 2007 for Ukraine to join NATO played a very provocative role both in the sphere of domestic politics and for relations with Russia. Moscow responded to this in the spring of 2008 by clearly promoting an irredentist theme in its policy towards Ukraine in general and Crimea in particular. So far, the matter is limited to the speeches of such figures who, by their status, cannot be considered “official” voices of the Russian political establishment (Yuri Luzhkov, Konstantin Zatulin). But statements of concern about the situation of Russians in Ukraine were also made in the Russian Foreign Ministry.

The threat of irredentism from potential, as Stepan characterized it in 2005, is becoming increasingly real. Until now, very reserved on this issue, Moscow, one might assume, would like to create controlled tension in Crimea in order to strengthen the already serious doubts of many NATO leaders about the advisability of admitting Ukraine to the alliance and even offering it a preparation program for membership. But irredentism is often like a genie, which is much easier to let out of the bottle than to put back in.

Unfortunately, the conflict between Russia and Georgia and the reaction of part of the Ukrainian leadership to it can lead to a sharp escalation of all the described contradictions and the further involvement of Moscow in internal Ukrainian politics.

PROSPECTS OF THE “RUSSIAN” PARTY

One of the most important issues in modern Ukrainian politics is the nature of identity, or more precisely, the identities of the population of the south and east of the country. The fact is that when we talk about a special Eastern Ukrainian identity, we believe that it unites both those people who consider themselves Ukrainians by blood, but speak Russian, and those citizens of the country who identify themselves as Russians (such as according to the 2001 census, more than 17%, or 8.3 million people).

It is unknown what will happen in the event of further intensification of Ukrainian politics in the spirit of the “nation-state”. It is very likely that a significant part of Russian-speaking Ukrainians will accept it with more or less enthusiasm.

But has not state policy already crossed the line beyond which the implementation of linguistic Ukrainization begins to play a mobilizing role for those more than eight million people who consider themselves Russian? For them, the question is not about changing the content of their Ukrainian identity, but about the loss of comfortable living conditions while maintaining their Russian identity.

According to surveys conducted at the beginning of 2005, only 17% of Russian citizens of Ukraine believed that the “orange revolution” brought them something good, while 58% of Ukrainians were against it. Without fear of being mistaken, we can assume that this position of the Russians was associated with fears of deteriorating relations with Russia and increased Ukrainization.

With many of these fears confirmed and Russia beginning to play the card of irredentism, it is difficult to predict how sentiment will change among Ukrainian citizens with a Russian identity. Several new factors support a possible rise in irredentist sentiment.

Serious problems in the Ukrainian economy are likely to grow in the foreseeable future. The country will have to endure another sharp increase in energy prices, a credit crisis, a rapid increase in inflation, and the negative consequences of the constant postponement of structural reforms, which, given the conditions of political instability and preparations for the next elections, will be postponed further. The economic situation in Ukraine in 2008 is reminiscent of the spring-summer of 1998 in Russia.

The ever-growing wage gap between Ukraine and Russia will soon begin to have a dangerous impact on the political situation for Ukraine. The main factor that alienated Ukrainian citizens with Russian identity from Russia, namely the war in Chechnya, has been eliminated. The term of service in the Russian army has now been reduced to one year.
In the spring of 2007, that is, on the eve of a new aggravation of the political crisis caused by the dissolution of the Verkhovna Rada and the associated new round of intensification of nationalizing policy, the Ukrainian Center named after. Razumkova conducted a very important sociological study. It makes it possible to assess what the sentiments were at that time not only of “Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine,” but also of more specific groups discussed above.

Sociologists have identified groups:

• “Russians”, that is, “citizens of Ukraine, Russians by nationality, for whom Russian is their native language and who consider themselves to be part of the Russian cultural tradition and use the Russian language in everyday communication”;
• “Ukrainians” - “citizens of Ukraine, Ukrainians by nationality, for whom Ukrainian is their native language, who consider themselves to be part of the Ukrainian cultural tradition and use the Ukrainian language in everyday communication”;
• “Russian-speaking Ukrainians” (that is, those who consider themselves Ukrainians by nationality); “bilingual Ukrainians” (of Ukrainian nationality and with Ukrainian as their native language);
• “bilingual Ukrainian-cultural Ukrainians” who declare Ukrainian nationality, Ukrainian as their native language, and belonging to the Ukrainian cultural tradition.

As the authors of the study rightly note, with this approach it becomes obvious that “Russian-speaking citizens” are not an imagined community in the sense in which Benedict Anderson used this definition, namely a group with a common identity. This imagined community exists only in the minds of researchers and commentators.

When asked whether respondents consider themselves patriots of Ukraine, the last three categories, that is, people with Ukrainian ethnic identity but who use Russian in everyday life, answered almost identically. Confident “yes” – from 37 to 42%, “rather yes” – from 41 to 45%, “probably no” – from 11 to 6%, confident “no” – 3% or less. 6–7% found it difficult to answer. The positive responses in this group in total (80% or more) are almost equal to the sum of the positive responses of “Ukrainians.”

Against this background, the responses of the “Russians” look completely different. A confident “yes” was given by 20.4%, “rather yes” by 29%, that is, less than half of the respondents considered themselves patriots. 14% of “Russians” openly declared that they did not consider themselves patriots of Ukraine, 27% gave the answer “probably not”, 9% declined to answer.

The differences in expectations for the development of the linguistic and cultural situation become even more pronounced. Only 4% of “Russians” agree that Ukrainian should be the only state language, 13% would be satisfied with the recognition of Russian as an official language in some regions, and 70% believe that Russian should be the second state language. Another 10% generally believe that Russian should be the only state language of the country. Almost a mirror situation in the “Ukrainians” group.

“Russian-speaking Ukrainians” are quite close to “Russians” on this issue: 49% of respondents in these groups support two state languages. However, among those “Russian-speaking Ukrainians” who speak Ukrainian, only a little more than 20% agree to grant Russian the status of a second state language.

When asked which cultural tradition will prevail in Ukraine in the future, only 6% of “Russians” are ready to accept the undivided dominance of Ukrainian culture, 50% believe that different traditions will prevail in different regions, and 24% believe that the Russian tradition will prevail. In groups where they speak Ukrainian, those who agree with the dominance of the Ukrainian cultural tradition invariably prevail, although only among “Ukrainians” do such citizens constitute an absolute majority (59%).

It is interesting that when asked what definition of the Ukrainian nation people consider preferable, in all groups the most popular answer is “a civil nation, including all citizens of Ukraine” (“Russians” and “Russian-speaking Ukrainians” - 43 and 42%, the rest - according to 35%). However, the sum of the remaining answers, which differently emphasize the ethnic character of the nation, in all groups of “Ukrainians” is greater than the percentage of answers emphasizing the civic principle.

Overall, these data confirm that “Russian-speaking Ukrainians” would like equal status for the Russian language and culture, but are willing to accept nation-state policies, while “Russians” strongly reject such policies. It is logical to assume that over the past year the level of discomfort among them has increased and the potential for political mobilization in an irredentist spirit has increased.

Let us also note the obvious disappointment in the policies of the Party of Regions among those voters who attach paramount importance to the issue of the status of the Russian language and culture. The PR has not demonstrated persistence in implementing its slogans in this area and, largely for this reason, is gradually losing the support of the electorate. A niche is emerging for a new political force that can position itself as a “Russian party.” “Russians” make up 17% of the population, and the party could count on creating a faction in the Verkhovna Rada, even if the entry barrier is higher than the current 3%.

POTENTIAL FOR INSTABILITY

So, after three years since the publication of Stepan’s article, it can be stated that as a result of the intensification of policies in the spirit of the “nation-state”, as well as Russia’s steps to use the irredentist theme in relations with Ukraine, the risks have increased. Chronologically, it was Kiev’s acceleration of politics in the spirit of the “nation-state” that preceded the activation of the irredentist factor in Russian politics, created certain conditions for it and partly provoked this activation (which should not be understood as an indulgence for Russia).

The main destabilizing impulses come from the country's president, Viktor Yushchenko. All the steps listed above were initiated by the head of state and those small parties on which he still relies. It is Yushchenko who is the main character in carrying out the memory policy described above. He is even trying to pass through parliament a version of the law on the Holodomor that would provide for criminal liability for denying the characterization of the Holodomor as genocide, and is initiating a discussion of this topic in international organizations - the UN, the Council of Europe, the OSCE. It was Yushchenko who came up with the initiative to appeal to NATO to provide Ukraine with a Membership Action Plan (MAP) in the alliance, and he persistently tried to push for such a decision on the eve of the Bucharest summit of the alliance both within the country and in the international arena. After the August war in Georgia, the topic of the external (Russian) threat may become decisive in Ukrainian politics.

Lacking a majority in parliament, Viktor Yushchenko rules through decrees, many of which contradict the Constitution. Having lost popularity and desperately trying to maintain power, the president is the author of all destabilizing steps in the institutional sphere. Their list over the last year alone includes the unconstitutional dissolution of parliament, an attempt to push through their own version of the new Constitution (dramatically expanding the powers of the president) through a referendum bypassing the Verkhovna Rada, discrediting the Constitutional Court, which still does not work at full strength, constant interference in the sphere of government prerogatives .

The two largest political forces in Ukraine – the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (Yulya Tymoshenko Bloc) and the PR – seem to demonstrate an understanding of the mechanisms described by Stepan and his colleagues in the “nation-state” model. Both advocate a parliamentary (or parliamentary-presidential) republic. PR is against speeding up relations with NATO. BYuT does not demonstrate activity in this issue, and also does not emphasize the themes of the Holodomor and the UPA in its rhetoric. PR opposes the rehabilitation of the UPA and the politicization of the Holodomor topic. Neither BYuT nor PR have so far been characterized by rhetoric in the spirit of a “nation-state.” The PR supports a significant expansion of the powers of the regions, in times of crisis even putting forward a demand for federalization, which the forces of the “orange” camp consider nothing less than separatist. However, there is every reason to assume that for the PR the idea of ​​federation is not of fundamental, but of situational importance.

All this indicates the real possibility of a significant reformatting of the Ukrainian political scene, which would make it possible to slow down the dangerous trends of 2007. However, in conditions of acute political confrontation and deep mutual distrust of various forces towards each other, the chances of a further deepening of the crisis are much greater. The international situation also contributes to this.

An important destabilizing factor is that, due to the nature of the career of Yushchenko’s main rival and BYuT leader Yulia Tymoshenko, no one will undertake to guarantee her compliance with democratic methods of politics if she gains full power. These fears were further confirmed in March 2008, when BYuT achieved the removal of the mayor of Kyiv, Leonid Chernovetsky, in flagrant violation of democratic procedures. BYuT generally actively undermines the positions of mayors of large cities if they are not among its supporters.

Meanwhile, Stepan notes that in conditions where the federalization of Ukraine is difficult due to the irredentist factor, the country could use the experience of the Scandinavian countries, where the lack of federation is partly compensated by the very broad powers of municipalities. However, the new elections held in Kyiv inflicted a painful defeat on BYuT and ended with the re-election of Chernovetsky.

The democratic nature of PR also raises reasonable doubts. Strictly speaking, not a single significant political force in Ukraine provides reliable guarantees of commitment to democracy.

In the struggle over the mechanism for adopting a new Constitution and establishing the principles that should be embedded in it, all social forces are guided primarily by immediate political interests. It is important that in debates about the desired form of government, the topic of federation is not discussed at all, and when justifying the preference for a parliamentary republic over a presidential republic, the “nation-state” motive is not heard either by the BYuT or by the PR.

Thus, we see how in the three years that have passed since the publication of Alfred Stepan’s article, many of his predictions and warnings have come true. Two important additions can be made to his analysis.

Firstly, he did not sufficiently take into account the identification heterogeneity of the population in the east and south of the country (although Stepan, more than many researchers, paid attention to the differences in the position of “Russian-speaking Ukrainians” and “Russians”).

Secondly, maintaining proper moderation in the Ukrainization policy turned out to be a very difficult task. Describing a possible successful strategy for Ukraine, Stepan proposes a moderate policy in the spirit of the “nation-state”, since building a “nation-state” is impossible, and the choice of a “nation-state” model is complicated by foreign policy circumstances. A similar political structure worked successfully under a relatively centralized system during the times of Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma, but it turned out to be quite fragile. The weakening presidential power under Yushchenko sacrificed this moderate course in the context of an intensified struggle for power.

If the political mobilization of Russian citizens in Ukraine results in the creation of a “Russian” party, then Kyiv will face a difficult problem. Satisfying demands to improve the status of the Russian language and implement other measures in the spirit of the “nation-state” model will complicate the so far successful process of “soft” Ukrainization of “Russian-speaking Ukrainians.” The continuation of the Ukrainization policy in the spirit of the “nation-state” will lead to a further increase in the level of discomfort for more than eight million “Russians” and create new opportunities for strengthening irredentism.

Two questions come to the fore.

First– how and when will the crisis of power be overcome and what configuration of political forces will emerge at the exit from the crisis? There is no doubt that the “nation-state” policy will continue, but it is unclear whether the new power coalition will continue to intensify it or try to return to the previous moderate course. So far, the chances of a quick end to the political crisis in Ukraine look very modest.

Second– will it be possible by the time the crisis is over to return to the previous policy, or has the disruption of 2007–2008 already launched processes that will force the strategy described by Stepan to be written off as a missed opportunity? Today no one can confidently answer these questions.

NATION-STATE OR CIVILIZATION-STATE?

1.Lyrical preface

When I find myself on a business trip in Moscow, I always try to buy as many different newspapers and magazines of the patriotic opposition as possible. I would like to be aware of new ideas and trends in that direction of socio-political thought, to which I myself belong, and in the province in which I live, there is nothing from the huge range of patriotic press, except, of course, “Soviet Russia” and “Pravda” , impossible to get. Last time, about a year ago, when I was in the “first throne”, I noticed a tent with newspapers in a subway passage and hurried there. “Do you have anything patriotic?” - I asked, and the saleswoman eagerly immediately handed me the newspaper “I am Russian.” For some reason, my clearly non-Russian, but rather Asian, appearance did not bother her... For the sake of curiosity, I took, along with “Tomorrow” and “Russian Special Forces”, which I highly respect, also “I am Russian”. I started reading and immediately came across an article directed against Eurasianism and imperial ambitions. The author went on about how supposedly the Russians don’t need these “blacks”, maintaining national regions, holding large territories, a big game in international politics require strength, which the Russian nation already has little of, independence should be granted to the Volga region, the Caucasus, Siberia should be separated and Far East and build a small, racially pure Republic of Rus'...

And then suddenly I remembered the speech of one major Turkic nationalist, which I heard in my native Ufa during a scientific conference devoted to the problems of interethnic communication (as in other national regions, we have small-town nationalists, as a rule, humanities professors). He began his report with the words: “I really love genuine Russian nationalists and wish them the speedy implementation of their aspirations...”. These words shocked the audience, because the speaker was a well-known Russophobe, an outspoken supporter of the separation of Bashkiria from Russia and the solution of the “Russian question” in the republic by deporting all Russians and Russian-speaking people to central Russia (in accordance with the slogan popular then and now among the few Bashkir separatists: “Russians - to Ryazan, Tatars - to Kazan!”). Noticing general bewilderment, the nationalist professor explained that the real Russian nationalists for him are not those who advocate the revival of the Soviet Union, within which the Russians did not even have their own state, but those who advocate the creation of a small, mononational " Republic of Rus'" within the boundaries of several central regions - Moscow, Vladimir, Tula, etc. Here the goals of the Bashkir, Tatar, Chuvash and other nationalists coincide with the goals of the Russian nationalists - the professor completed his thought - since each nation will engage in its own national construction, the Russians will not interfere in the affairs of the Bashkirs, and the Bashkirs - in the affairs of the Russians ... "

When I read this issue of the newspaper “I am Russian” that fell into my hands, I could not get rid of the impression that it was all written by that same Turkic nationalist, only for some reason hiding behind a Slavic pseudonym... The argumentation, at least, completely coincided... And Then I thought that the dialecticians were right: opposites converge and that supporters of the revival of the Russian Superpower, of which I belong, are not on the same path as any nationalists of the Eurasian space.

It was then that the idea for this article was born.

2. Hidden prerequisites for “fighters against foreigners”

Among modern Russian patriots, both “right” and “left,” today there are extremely widespread maxims about the dominance of “foreigners” in Russia, by which we mean, first of all, representatives of the Muslim peoples of the former USSR and the Russian Federation itself. At the same time, we are talking not only and not so much about “ethnic crime,” that is, about criminal crimes and offenses committed by immigrants from the republics of the former USSR and immigrants from the Russian Caucasus living in the center of Russia, primarily in Moscow. To combat this, as with any other crime, the well-coordinated work of law enforcement agencies and the appropriate legislative framework is sufficient, and the “fighters against foreigners” transfer the problem to the political plane. As a rule, they argue that Russia is a mono-national Russian state, since about 80% of the population in it are ethnic Russians, that this should be the percentage of Russians both in the authorities of the Russian Federation and in the media, that, finally, foreigners are “ “guest workers” are taking away jobs from Russian people, so we need to mercilessly fight against illegal migrants, and this requires closing borders, tightening customs control, creating privileged conditions for the national proletariat, etc.

Moreover, maxims of this kind can often be found not only on Black Hundred monarchist Internet sites, but also in the organ of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, the newspaper Pravda. One has to be surprised that these statements come from people who call themselves patriots of the Russian Empire and the USSR. After all, it is not difficult to notice that their conclusions have two basic premises that cannot be combined with the ideas of restoring the Greater Russian Space, neither within the borders of the Russian Empire, nor within the borders of the USSR, and even with the ideas of the integrity of the current post-Soviet Russian Federation.

The first premise is that the peoples of the post-imperial, post-Soviet space, as well as the Russian Federation, do not constitute one single civilization. Russians, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Tatars, Kabardians, etc. from this point of view, this is not a family of peoples objectively connected by a common historical destiny and many other factors, but competitors in an interstate, international struggle. It is significant that when our “patriots” talk about the dominance of Caucasians in Moscow, they draw comparisons with the Turkish problem in Germany or the Arab problem in England. Thus, they imply as something natural and self-evident that, say, an Azerbaijani and a Russian are as far from each other as a German and a Turk. The fact that the grandfathers of these Azerbaijanis and Russians sat in the same trench at Stalingrad, and their great-great-grandfathers took Paris together, while the Germans and Turks never had any stable intercultural ties at all, is not taken into account at all. In fact, 1991 is taken as the starting point and the existence of post-Soviet “independent states” is perceived not as a pathology that must be corrected, but as a norm that only needs to be formalized through treaties on borders and immigration laws. In fact, in this case, those “Russian patriots” who consider the “Azerbaijani question” in Russia to be an analogue of the “Turkish question” in Germany, paradoxically, take the same position as nationalists from the former republics of the USSR, who also believe that the Great Russia in all its forms - from the Muscovite Kingdom to the USSR was an unnatural construct, a union of alien national entities, held only by the repressive power of the state, and that it is normal and positive that Russia defends its Russian interests, Azerbaijan its Azerbaijani, Latvia its Latvian, Ukraine its Ukrainian without propaganda archaisms about “friendship of peoples”.

The second premise of reasoning in the spirit of “Russia for Russians” is that if in any territory the majority is made up of representatives of any people, then they have the right to create a mono-national state there in the manner of Western national republics. In other words, the essence of the second premise is that the Western institution of the nation-state is applicable not only in the West itself, but everywhere - from South America and Africa to Russia and India. In fact, this recognizes that the nation-state is that notorious “universal value,” a cultural product of Western civilization that has not local, but universal value. The only difference between liberal-Westerners and such “patriots” is that liberals (let’s call them conscious Westerners) consider the institutions of parliamentary democracy, a capitalist market economy, and an atomized civil society to be the main universal values ​​of the West, and relegate the Western model of the “nation-state” to second place. the plan, and sometimes is completely discarded, they consider it outdated in the “age of globalization”, the creation of a “single universal home”, naturally, under the leadership of the “most democratic democracy” of the USA. In turn, some of our “patriots” (let’s call them unconscious Westerners), on the contrary, recognize democracy and the market as secondary values, and sometimes even completely deny their universal, “universal” status, arguing that they are rather associated with geopolitical, psychological and the historical characteristics of the West itself, but the Western idea of ​​the “nation state” is readily adopted.

The falsity of the first premise was proven long ago by both domestic (N. Danilevsky, P. Savitsky, N. Trubetskoy) and Western (O. Spengler, A. Toynbee) cultural scientists. There are a number of scientific arguments - from geopolitical to the argument of “common historical destiny”, proving that the majority of the peoples that were part of the Russian Empire and the USSR constitute a single civilization and its dismemberment is unnatural and only leads to grave suffering for these peoples. We are not going to retell these fairly well-known proofs; let us rather turn to the second premise, which receives incomparably less attention.

3. The destructiveness of the “nation-state” model for Russia

This issue is discussed in more detail by the English historian and cultural philosopher A. J. Toynbee. In his work “The World and the West,” Toynbee noted: “... there is a classic example of the harm that an institution can bring, torn out of its usual social environment and forcefully transferred to another world. Over the past century and a half...we, the Western political institution of "nation states", have broken through the borders of our original homeland, Western Europe, and paved the way, strewn with thorns of persecution, massacre and deprivation(my italics - R.V.) to Eastern Europe, Southeast Asia and India... The turmoil and devastation caused in these regions by the establishment of the borrowed Western institution of “nation states” is much larger and deeper than the harm caused by the same institution in Great Britain or France".

Toynbee also explains the reasons for the explosiveness of the “nation-state” model everywhere except Western Europe, where this model appeared: “In Western Europe, it (the institution of the nation-state - R.V.) does not cause much harm... in Western Europe it corresponds to the natural distribution languages ​​and political boundaries. In Western Europe, people speaking the same language, in most cases, live in compact communities on the same compact territory, where fairly clear linguistic boundaries separate one community from another; and where linguistic boundaries form something like a patchwork quilt, this linguistic map conveniently corresponds to the political one, so that “nation states” also appeared as a natural product of the social environment... It is worth looking at the linguistic map of the whole world and we will see that the European field.. - there is something special and exceptional. Over a much larger area, stretching southeast from Danzig and Trieste to Calcutta and Singapore, the language map is not a patchwork quilt, but rather an iridescent silk blanket. In Eastern Europe, Southeast Asia, India and Malaya, people speaking different languages ​​are not as clearly separated as in Western Europe, they are mixed geographically, as if alternating houses on the same street in the same cities and villages...” .

So, it turns out that the inapplicability of the nation-state for Russia is not even a consequence of the specifics of the Russian-Eurasian civilization, which was and is noted by soil patriots. This is a common place for all civilizations of the world, excluding, of course, the European one. All over the world, in addition to Western Europe, the organic institution is not a nation-state, but a civilization-state - a large multinational state, united not on the principle of ethnic kinship, but on the principle of a common religion or ideology, complementarity of cultures, a similar geopolitical position, and finally, a common historical fate. Such civilizational states were the Byzantine Empire, the Arab Caliphate, the Russian Empire, in modern times the USSR, and Yugoslavia. State-civilizations should be distinguished from the Western colonial empires of modern times - British, French, etc., which were completely artificial formations and relied only on military force and brutal terror towards the conquered population (naturally, the British and Indians or the French and Algerians were united neither by a common religion nor by a common historical destiny). Strictly speaking, Western empires of the colonial type were not empires in the full sense of the word - they were the same “nation states” with the addition of foreign territories that were in no way culturally connected with the metropolis.

An attempt to transfer the nation-state model to any non-European territories after the fall of colonial systems led and leads, as a rule, to a violation of this established picture of a patchwork ethnic quilt, to interethnic conflicts, wars, oppression and genocide on a national basis. A. Toynbee compared the Western idea of ​​nationalism, that is, the desire of each nation to form its own national state, with diseases from which Europeans had immunity, but the aborigines of non-European civilizations did not, which is why contact between them ended in the death of entire non-European tribes. Toynbee, who wrote the aforementioned work in the middle of the last century, cited as an example of the destructive consequences of the expansion of the nation-state model outside Europe the Kurdish conflict on the territory of the Turkish Republic and the conflict between Muslims and Hindus in India, which led to its split into two ethnically Indian states - Indian union and Pakistan.

At that time, the traditional model of interethnic relations was still preserved to one degree or another in Russia-USSR, Yugoslavia and China. The events of the 80s - 2000s in Russia-USSR once again confirmed that Toynbee was right. When the Soviet Union collapsed and newly-minted nation-states began to emerge on its territory, this became especially acute. The nationalists who came to power strove for the desired monoethnicity, taking the West as a model. They declared their states “Georgian”, “Ukrainian”, “Moldavian”, etc. But the very nature of organic civilization is that this civilization is built on the principle of unity. This means that every smallest element of such a civilization carries within itself all the diversity of this civilization. Thus, the former Georgian USSR, the Moldavian USSR are also multinational, like the Soviet Union as a whole, the attempt to create “Georgia for Georgians” gave rise to the problem of Adjarian and Abkhaz separatism, the attempt to construct Moldova for the Moldovans - the separation of Russian and Ukrainian-speaking Transnistria from it. If the dreams of extreme Russian nationalists come true and the “Russia for Russians” project is implemented, this will cause an explosion of separatism in the national regions of Russia. The result will be the collapse of even the current, reduced Russia, to the great joy of nationalists from among the Russian “small peoples”. However, they should not be deluded either; this law also applies to the national regions themselves. Let's say - God forbid! - the wildest dream of some local national radicals, for example Tatar ones, will come true, and an independent Tatar state will arise. Carrying out the policy “Tatary for the Tatars” will lead to intra-Tatar separatism: after all, there are entire regions where Russians, Bashkirs, Chuvashs, etc. live compactly along with the Tatars, and often with a numerical preponderance over them. So the day after the declaration of independence, yesterday’s nationalists, who loved to talk about the right of nations to self-determination, will switch to the rhetoric of their recent enemies and talk about territorial integrity, about harmful separatism...

So, the imposition of a monoethnic state in Russia - Eurasia - “Russian Russia”, “Tatar Tataria”, “Bashkir Bashkiria”, “Estonian Estonia” leads only to blood, suffering and genocide, to a war of all against all, ultimately to the weakening of our peoples and to the danger of their mutual destruction. The “threads” of our ethnic groups are so closely woven that those who want to unravel them and weave a new, “one-color” fabric will be forced to destroy the social peace throughout society right down to the level of villages, neighborhoods and even individual families (since in Russia and generally in the territory of the former USSR there is many multinational families). We can already see all this in the example of the Baty republics, which throughout their “independence” have been on the brink of civil war, since hundreds of thousands of representatives of the “non-titular” Russian-speaking population are deprived of basic political rights. Usually the leaders of these states are accused of some kind of unprecedented extremism, when in fact they are implementing the trivial Western model of the “nation state”. References to the fact that “Baltic nationalists” ignore the “humane” policy of the West towards national minorities can hardly serve as a serious argument. First of all, the Russian population of the Baltic states, which falls into the category of “non-citizens”, is not a national minority at all; its numbers are comparable, and in some places almost exceed the size of the “titular ethnic group” (as far as we know, in the Baltics there are entire cities where “Russian-speaking” more than Estonians or Latvians). Further, all measures of Western states to eliminate conflicts between “foreigners”, for example, Arabs, and Europeans, for example, the French, are, by and large, aimed at naturalizing people from other countries, their dissolution into European ethnic groups. This means that in a generation the descendants of current Arabs living in France will speak French and consider French culture their native one. Not a single program of tolerance towards national minorities assumes that there will always be Arabs living near Paris who do not consider themselves French and identify themselves with another state.

So, the conflict between the Baltic authorities and the Russian population is a clash of two points of view on the issue of interethnic communication; The Russian population here professes an imperial paradigm: on the same territory, within the same state, representatives of different ethnic groups can coexist, and none of these ethnic groups seeks to absorb the other. The Baltic leadership professes the paradigm of Western “liberal nationalism”: each state is a form of existence of only one nation, all others must be prepared for future assimilation among the “titular nation”. Naturally, there can be no compromise between these two positions, so the conflict between the Baltic nationalists and “Russian-speaking non-citizens” will be long and will not lead to anything other than extreme exhaustion and defeat of one of the parties.

Of course, our geopolitical opponents are not going to calmly look at the intra-Eurasian squabble, they will take advantage - and are already taking advantage! - a situation for the realization of their interests, which are diametrically opposed to the interests of our Eurasian states and peoples. There is only one way out - to abandon the obviously harmful and unnecessary adventure of planting national states of the European type in Eurasia, which is fundamentally different from Europe in key parameters - from history to geography, and to return to a state-civilization that is organic for Eurasia, a multinational superpower. This will also be a rejection of the last Westernizing stereotype that has penetrated the patriotic worldview - the stereotype of the “universal human character” of the Western nation-state. The form of this superpower, its ideology, all this is another question that needs to begin to be resolved now.

4. “Russian question” and the new Eurasian empire

This could be the end of our study, if not for one last argument of the “fighters against foreigners” from among Russian nationalists. They rightly point out that the Russian people are now in a catastrophic state, the demographic crisis is such that Russians are losing a million people a year, national morality is collapsing, mentality is being supplanted by Western-style mass culture, the alcohol and drug epidemic is spreading...

“Why do we need a Eurasian empire if it will soon be dominated by Asians and Caucasians? Why do we need Moscow, the capital of a superpower, if it is populated by Azerbaijanis?” - such nationalists ask with sarcasm. The conclusion they draw from this is simple: instead of “straining” the strength of the nation through imperial construction, they need to abandon imperial ambitions, create their own small state, the “Republic of Rus'” within the borders of the central regions of present-day Russia and gradually overcome the crisis (to this openly calls, for example, Ivanov-Sukharevsky).

We will not talk about the fact that in fact the demographic crisis and all the other side “charms” of colonial capitalism also hit other peoples of the former Soviet superpower. The extensive growth of post-Soviet Asians against the backdrop of the extinction of Russians is a myth (although the rate of degeneration of post-Soviet Asia is indeed slower, but this is due to the fact that it is more imbued with a traditional spirit; modernization there began much later than among Russians, not in the 18th century, and after 1917). We will limit ourselves only to proving the assertion that the restoration of the empire is the only salvation for all the peoples of the former Soviet Union, including and above all for the Russian people.

In fact, what is the reason for the current ethnic catastrophe of Russians? I think we won’t be mistaken if we answer that with the defeat in the Cold War and with the sad realities of colonial capitalism. Fifteen to twenty years ago the demographic situation was much more favorable. The corrupting effect of Western mass cult, the systematic destruction of the economy and the entire life structure of our civilization by the pro-Western leadership of Russia - these are the true reasons for the “Russian tragedy.” Now let’s ask ourselves the question: “will the West leave alone the dream of nationalists - a small “mono-ethnic Russia” that has abandoned imperial ambitions? In no case! On the contrary, he will take advantage of her even greater weakness and loneliness and set a course for finishing her off. Only the revival of imperial greatness, the imperial military-nuclear shield, and imperial geopolitical power can cool down the Western architects of the final “solution to the Russian question,” save the Russians and all the other brotherly peoples of the Empire, and give impetus to a new cultural and demographic upsurge! This is our deep conviction, stemming from the awareness of the fact that the West has never been merciful towards weakened former enemies; the West understands only the language of force, the language of imperial and strong-willed, and not conformist diplomacy. So, the Turanophobic, anti-imperial argument of Russian nationalists is reminiscent of curses against the medicine that can only save one from the disease... How can one not recall the words of Lev Gumilyov: “If Russia is destined to be reborn, it will only be through Eurasianism”! That is, we will add, through overcoming nationalist temptations and creating a new state-civilization from Brest to Vladivostok.

One of the most important principles of the organization of modern statehood, which arose as a result of the collapse of traditional social ties and a sharp increase in population mobility in the process of development of commodity-capitalist relations. The nation state as a political and legal reality arises from the need to clarify the traditional status of state subjects, to whom, unlike foreigners, more stringent criteria of political loyalty are now applied, as well as civil rights and obligations defined by law. One of the most important functions of the national state was the regulation of population migration. The principle of the nation-state is determined primarily by the system of international relations and is not the sole implementation of the desire of national movements to create their own statehood. This is the meaning of international recognition of new states or, on the contrary, non-recognition of separatism and rebellious territories; This also explains the harsh policies of rich countries towards poor migrants.

The real subject of a nation state can be two kinds of nations: ethnic and civil origin. The first type of nation is created by ethnicity, which provides such objective criteria of nationality as common origin, common language, common religion, common historical memory, common cultural identity. Accordingly, a nation state with a single ethnic basis seeks to identify its political boundaries with ethnocultural ones. National states of this kind are typical, for example, of Central and Eastern Europe (Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland, etc.). The nation of civil origin has as its starting point a non-ethnic (and in this sense cosmopolitan) ideology (mythology). This role can be played by: the idea of ​​popular sovereignty, “human rights”, the communist worldview, etc. In any case, a nation of civil origin focuses on the non-natural aspects of the national community, although it also presupposes the presence of such natural unifying moments as a common (state) language, common cultural and historical traditions, etc. Classic states formed on the basis of nations of civil origin were France and the United States. In the 20th century, such a type of nation of civil origin as “socialist nations” arose, many of which were composed of several ethnic communities (USSR, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, etc.). Although the population of many nation-states of civil origin is multi-ethnic, this in itself does not mean that it is less cohesive than the population of nation-states of mono-ethnic origin. However, as historical experience shows (especially the collapse of “socialist nations”), the politics of large ethnic groups creates a potential or actual threat to the existence of civil nations.

As a result of the processes of modernization and globalization, the above distinction between nation-states is becoming more and more relative. On the one hand, none of the modern ethnonational states is completely monoethnic, and the existing or emerging ethnic minorities are in no hurry to assimilate into the dominant (titular) ethnicity (nation). On the other hand, no nation-state of civil origin has ever been a complete melting pot for the ethnic characteristics of its citizens. The latter, expressing full loyalty to the national state and developing a cultural identity consistent with it, at the same time can preserve important signs of their ethnic origin (language, traditions) - like, for example, “Russian Armenians” in the Russian Federation or “American Chinese” in the USA . Taking into account the growing convergence of different types of nation states, a number of common features can be identified:

National language as a means of official communication;

System of officially adopted national and state symbols (coat of arms, flag, etc.);

State monopoly on the legitimate use of violence and taxation;

Rational-bureaucratic administration and legislation common to all;

A stable currency with national symbols;

Access to the labor market and social guarantees for “citizens” and corresponding restrictions for “non-citizens”;

If possible, a unified education system;

Development and promotion of national patriotic ideas and symbols.

priority of national interests in foreign policy.

TO consider this issue, we should apparently proceed from the fact that the state as a political institution is called upon to maintain the internal and external stability of the community on the basis of which it arose and developed. In this regard, it is important to clarify the concept of a nation state, since different interpretations of this concept can also determine different directions of state ethnopolitics.

In the textbook “Ethnology”, authored by G.T. Tavadov, a fairly common, albeit deeply erroneous, definition of a national state is given: “A national state is a state formed by an ethnos (nation) on the basis of an ethnic territory and embodying the political independence and independence of the people.” In this case, the author essentially equates the “ethnos” (ethnic community) with the nation, and therefore it turns out that there are “national” states and there are those that cannot be considered national. Meanwhile, all modern states are national, because they are built on the basis of the nation’s sovereign right to self-determination, and it is civil, not ethnic communities, that have such a right. And a nation-state is a territorial community, all members of which, regardless of their ethnicity, recognize their community, are in solidarity with it and obey the institutionalized norms of this community.

In addition to the postulate that there is a national state, for the purposes of ethnopolitical analysis it is necessary to determine another important position: what is the ethnic component in state building, i.e. what is a mono-ethnic state and what is a multi-ethnic state.

In world practice, a state in which 95% of the population or more are representatives of one ethnic tradition is considered to be monoethnic. But there are very few such states in the world (Iceland, Norway, Portugal, Albania, Armenia, Malta, Jamaica, Yemen, Hungary); in the vast majority of countries, the population contains several or even many ethnic groups. The heterogeneity of the ethnic composition of the population, combined with religious and racial differences, confronts state institutions with the task of integrating a multi-ethnic society, developing a national ideology and values ​​that cement the foundations of the state.

Each state solves this problem in its own way. The United States has long been dominated by the idea of ​​a “melting pot.” Researchers and politicians imagined American society as such a cauldron, in which heterogeneous ethnic and racial components formed an alloy called the American nation.

By and large, Soviet ideologists had a similar idea, according to whom, in the USSR, from numerous socialist nations, through “flourishing and rapprochement,” a “new historical community of people” called the “Soviet people” emerged. This people was declared a typologically new community for the reason that it was characterized by internationalism and all this was called “multinationality.” In world science, law and politics, “multinational (or transnational) corporations are known, “multinational armed forces” are known, and “multinational” has always meant transstate entities or connections. In fact, when translated into common language, it was about multi-ethnicity. It is no coincidence that in Soviet and post-Soviet times the concepts of “national” and “multinational” were translated from Russian as “ethnic” or “multi-ethnic”. Thus, the concept “national” was given exclusively ethnic content. A quote from Tavadov’s textbook is a clear confirmation of this. In fact, the Soviet people were not a new, but an old historical community, known since the time of M.V. Lomonosov, N.M. Karamzin and A.S. Pushkin as “the Russian people” or “Russians”. In the 18th century even the Russian language was called the Russian language.

In contrast to the American and Soviet models, which define the complex integrity of the population according to the state (the American nation and the Soviet multinational people), there are models of the nation state in which the main role in the formation of the nation is given to the ethnic group. Thus, in modern Latvia, the assistant to the prime minister for national security officially declares that “the Russian community does not fit into the concept of the national Latvian state.” An attempt by the dominant ethnic group to declare itself as a state nation and consolidate this thesis in ideology and in its legal status leads to the formation of a so-called ethnocratic state. Ethnocratic ideology is characteristic of African states, and it is used especially widely during the formation of states.

An ethnocratic state should be understood as a state in which an ethnic group, dominant numerically or politically, enjoys power and privileges in relation to others, it identifies exclusively with the state, denying minorities the right to membership in the nation or to independent “nation building”. In this case, the dominant ethnic group positions itself, through state ideology and state institutions (directly or indirectly), as the only “true,” “real,” “real” nation and demands that representatives of other ethnic groups be culturally equal to it. This state model is sometimes called constitutional nationalism. It aims to cement the ethnic majority and reject or isolate unwanted ethnic or racial minorities (prominent examples of this are the apartheid regime in South Africa, as well as the constitutional foundations of the post-Soviet state).

The regime of constitutional nationalism can be relatively soft and extremely harsh. In the latter case, it completely denies the rights of certain groups of the population. Thus, in the Central African state of Burundi, the Tutsi ethnic group has occupied a dominant position for many centuries, which was made their privileged ally by German colonists before the First World War (Tutsis were overseers on banana and tea plantations), and then they were used for the same purposes by the Belgians, beginning in 1972 repressive actions against the Hutus with the aim of reducing the number of the latter, and, if possible, their complete physical destruction. As a result, hundreds of thousands of people were killed. Moreover, the conditions for the conflict began to mature long before it began, because the practice of separating communities began at school: Hutu and Tutsi children were separated: some sat in one corner of the classroom, others in the other. Before the outbreak of active confrontation, marriages between Hutus and Tutsis were not a rare occurrence. The first massacre was stopped as a result of protests from the world community; but the ethnocratic idea turned out to be stronger than the voice of the world community, and in 1988, clashes between Hutus and Tutsis resumed.

But the largest ethnic civil war of the late 20th century, associated with the confrontation between the Hutus and Tutsis, took place in neighboring Rwanda in 1994. About one million people died then. This confrontation serves as a clear example of African political tribalism. By the time the Rwandan authorities provoked the massacre of the Tutsi, the latter’s position had already been significantly weakened.

At the end of the 1950s. During the decolonization process, the Hutus began to actively demand the transfer of power to the majority (the Hutus made up 85% of the country's population). In 1959, the first clashes between communities occurred. In 1962, presidential elections in Rwanda were held for the first time, as a result of which the Hutus took leading political positions in the country. Large-scale oppression of the Tutsi began, which provoked them to fight to regain their lost positions. This struggle resulted in a series of attacks on government institutions and subsequent massacres of Tutsis. On the territory of Uganda, refugees from Rwanda formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front, which fought for the reform of public administration in Rwanda and the division of political power between the main ethnic communities. In 1990, the RPF launched a major offensive and approached the capital, Kigali. In turn, the central government declared all Tutsis living in Rwanda to be collaborators of the RPF, and Hutu who sympathized with the struggle for Tutsi rights - traitors. The attack on the capital with the help of France was repulsed, but a large-scale guerrilla war unfolded in the country. In the summer of 1993, representatives of the warring parties in Tanzania reached an agreement on ceasefire and the beginning of the process of democratic change in Rwanda However, the country's President Habyarimana was in no hurry to implement the agreements and STARTED to form a people's militia in the country whose number reached 30 thousand people. They were armed mainly with machetes, which they then used to kill Tutsis.

UN peacekeeping forces stationed in the country informed the organization's leadership about the impending ethnic cleansing, but Canadian General Romeo Dallaire was ordered not to intervene in the situation. On April 6, 1994, the plane carrying the presidents of Burundi and Rwanda was shot down by a missile (according to one version, it was launched by radical Hutus). The death of President Habyarimana signaled the beginning of the extermination of the Tutsi. At the same time, all the Hutu politicians and journalists who called for dialogue were the first to be killed. The Hutu armed forces, together with the army, systematically exterminated the Tutsis wherever they were found. In the first two weeks, 250 thousand people were killed. The country's radio stations played the role of coordinators of ethnic cleansing, calling for pogroms and providing information about Tutsi locations. It was reported on air that the Tutsi lands would be given to those Hutus who would destroy them.

UN peacekeepers did not interfere with what was happening during the entire period of the pogroms, and a significant part of them, on the instructions of their governments, left the country. One of the most dramatic episodes of this conflict is associated with the departure of the Belgian peacekeepers. In one of the schools in Kigali, which they guarded, two thousand Tutsis who had escaped during the pogroms were hiding. After the Belgians received orders to abandon the school building, the abandoned people were killed by the Rwandan military. In the outback, people were killed even in church buildings where they came to seek refuge. These events became the backdrop against which the events of Gilles Courtemanche’s novel “A Sunday Afternoon by the Pool in Kigali” and its screen version unfold. Then the confrontation between the Hutu and Tutsi spread to the territory of the Congo, where a huge number of refugees representing both ethnic groups moved.

An example of an “inverted ethnocracy” is Sri Lanka. Historically, it was inhabited by Sinhalese who practiced Buddhism. With the arrival of the British and the creation of vast tea plantations, significant groups of Hindu Tamils ​​began to move to the island from the Hindustan Peninsula, who settled mainly in the north of the island and worked on tea plantations. Although the Sinhalese were numerically superior, the British favored the Tamils, who therefore occupied the most prestigious positions in the colonial administration and bureaucracy. After independence in 1947, the Tamils ​​were gradually displaced from key positions in the state apparatus by the Sinhalese. Then the Sinhalese began to settle in territories that had previously been perceived exclusively as Tamil, other measures were taken to strengthen the position of the Sinhalese, and finally the Sinhalese language was declared the only state language of the country, and Buddhism the constitutional religion. The Tamils ​​felt disadvantaged and a protest movement grew among them, which escalated into the 1980s. into a guerrilla war under the slogan of creating an independent Tamil state in northern Sri Lanka. As a result of enormous efforts, government troops managed to break the main centers of Tamil resistance, but the conflict has not yet been completely overcome. The Tamils ​​complain about pogroms and infringements of their rights, the Sinhalese see open separatism in the Tamil protest movement and nothing more.

In recent years, the concept of the nation state has come under double pressure: on the one hand, it is weakening under the pressure of transnational institutions, the system of international law and globalization processes; on the other hand, the state, as a form of social organization of society, experiences the pressure of ethnopolitical movements and is forced to confront the challenges of politicized ethnicity. Moreover, these challenges arise where the processes of intrastate integration, the development of democratic institutions and civil society, it would seem, have gone so far that they exclude the possibility of the emergence of ethnopolitical movements and the actualization of the ideas of ethnic nationalism.

However, in modern Europe, where efforts were made to develop national minorities and where the principles of the inviolability of state borders after the Second World War were repeatedly confirmed by state leaders and interstate agreements, at the end of the 20th century, the third wave of nationalism arose in the past century. It is often associated with the third geopolitical redistribution of the world, which was a consequence of the end of the Cold War, caused by the confrontation between two social systems. To some extent this is true, but ethnopolitical movements in Europe became actualized before the collapse and liquidation of the socialist Eastern Bloc. For example, Ulster “exploded” in 1969, when no one in the world could have imagined that the Soviet Union would collapse. The October crisis of 1970 in Quebec, where prominent politicians were killed by Quebec separatists, shocked Canada. In continental Europe, the most problematic character by the 1960s. acquired the ethnopolitical problems of Belgium. For more than a century, this country developed under the complete dominance in political and cultural life of one ethnic group - the Walloons. French was the only official language of the country. The French-speaking provinces were the most developed economically, and the basis of the financial bourgeoisie and the Brussels bureaucracy were Francophones. It is no coincidence that the Flemings supported Germany during the First World War, hoping for the latter's help in creating an independent state.

A television “prank” organized by Belgium's French-language state channel in December 2006, which announced that Flanders had announced its secession from the Kingdom of Belgium, was taken seriously by a huge number of the country's citizens, indicating the fragility of relations between the communities.

Among the crisis regions of Europe in the second half of the 20th century were not only Ulster and Belgium, but also the Basque Country and Catalonia in Spain, Val d'Aosta and South Tyrol, Lombardy in Italy, Corsica and Brittany in France. Today it is on the verge of collapse not even Belgium, but Great Britain, because Scottish nationalism is strengthening and supporters of an independent Scotland are close to becoming the politically dominant force in the Scottish Parliament, and the referendum on independence itself may take place in the coming years. Separatist movements are now popular in many European countries. All of them have an "ethnic" justification, their inspirers proceed from the opposition of their ethnic groups to the rest of the population. By its nature, ethnicity is concentrated mainly in the sphere of culture and does not imply the presence of a political program or concept. But under certain conditions it can perform a political function.

A special type of state, characteristic of the modern world, in which the government has power over a certain territory, the majority of the population are citizens who feel themselves to be part of a single nation. Nation states originated in Europe, but in the modern world they are spread globally.

Excellent definition

Incomplete definition ↓

Nation state

nation-state), public territory an education that has the status of a state with appropriately defined borders (self-determination), and the people living in it are united in self-identification based on common culture, history, race, religion and language and consider themselves a nation. N.g. forms a single and sovereign political community, the authorities of which are formed by the majority of us. recognized as legitimate (legitimacy). Almost all states, in order to cultivate a sense of nationalism. participation use, although not always successfully, symbols, rituals, shrines, the education system, the media and weapons. strength. N.g. are a subject of international law on the basis of mutual recognition and membership in international. org-tions, for example. UN. However, after the collapse of the columns, the plural border system. state-in were carried out artificially, without taking into account ethnicity. and religions, characteristics that led to the inevitable division of us. on base and minorities. In such formations the likelihood of conflicts is very high.

Excellent definition

Incomplete definition ↓