Closed story. Kursk Bulge with German statistics

Situation and strengths of the parties

In the early spring of 1943, after the end of the winter-spring battles, a huge protrusion formed on the Soviet-German front line between the cities of Orel and Belgorod, directed to the west. This bend was unofficially called the Kursk Bulge. At the bend of the arc were located the troops of the Soviet Central and Voronezh fronts and German groups armies "Center" and "South".

Some representatives of the highest command circles in Germany proposed that the Wehrmacht switch to defensive actions, exhausting Soviet troops, restoring their own strength and strengthening the occupied territories. However, Hitler was categorically against it: he believed that the German army was still strong enough to inflict a major defeat on the Soviet Union and again seize the elusive strategic initiative. An objective analysis of the situation showed that the German army was no longer capable of attacking on all fronts at once. Therefore, it was decided to limit offensive actions to only one segment of the front. Quite logically, the German command chose the Kursk Bulge to strike. According to the plan, German troops were to strike in converging directions from Orel and Belgorod in the direction of Kursk. At successful outcome this ensured the encirclement and defeat of the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts of the Red Army. The final plans for the operation, codenamed "Citadel", were approved on May 10-11, 1943.

Unravel the plans of the German command regarding exactly where the Wehrmacht will advance in summer period 1943, was not difficult. The Kursk salient, extending many kilometers into the territory controlled by the Nazis, was a tempting and obvious target. Already on April 12, 1943, at a meeting at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the USSR, it was decided to move to a deliberate, planned and powerful defense in the Kursk region. The Red Army troops had to hold back the onslaught of Nazi troops, wear down the enemy, and then launch a counteroffensive and defeat the enemy. After this, it was planned to launch a general offensive in the western and southwestern directions.

In case the Germans decided not to attack in the Kursk Bulge area, a plan of offensive actions was also created with forces concentrated on this section of the front. However, the defensive plan remained a priority, and it was its implementation that the Red Army began in April 1943.

The defense on the Kursk Bulge was built thoroughly. In total, 8 defensive lines with a total depth of about 300 kilometers were created. Great attention was paid to mining the approaches to the defense line: according to various sources, the density of minefields was up to 1500-1700 anti-tank and anti-personnel mines per kilometer of front. Anti-tank artillery was not distributed evenly along the front, but was collected in so-called “anti-tank areas” - localized concentrations anti-tank guns, which covered several directions at once and partially overlapped each other’s sectors of fire. In this way, the maximum concentration of fire was achieved and shelling of one advancing enemy unit was ensured from several sides at once.

Before the start of the operation, the troops of the Central and Voronezh Fronts totaled about 1.2 million people, about 3.5 thousand tanks, 20,000 guns and mortars, as well as 2,800 aircraft. The Steppe Front, numbering about 580,000 people, 1.5 thousand tanks, 7.4 thousand guns and mortars, and about 700 aircraft, acted as a reserve.

On the German side, 50 divisions took part in the battle, numbering, according to various sources, from 780 to 900 thousand people, about 2,700 tanks and self-propelled guns, about 10,000 guns and approximately 2.5 thousand aircraft.

Thus, by the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Red Army had a numerical advantage. However, we should not forget that these troops were located on the defensive, and therefore, the German command had the opportunity to effectively concentrate forces and achieve the required concentration of troops in breakthrough areas. In addition, in 1943 the German army received sufficient large quantities new heavy tanks"Tiger" and medium "Panther", as well as heavy self-propelled units“Ferdinand”, of which there were only 89 in the army (out of 90 built) and which, however, in themselves posed a considerable threat, provided they were used competently in the right place.

The first stage of the battle. Defense

Both commands of the Voronezh and Central Fronts predicted the date of the German troops' transition to the offensive quite accurately: according to their data, the attack should have been expected in the period from July 3 to July 6. The day before the start of the battle, Soviet intelligence officers managed to capture “tongue,” who reported that the Germans would begin the assault on July 5.

The northern front of the Kursk Bulge was held by the Central Front of Army General K. Rokossovsky. Knowing the time of the start of the German offensive, at 2:30 a.m. the front commander gave the order to conduct a half-hour artillery counter-training. Then, at 4:30, the artillery strike was repeated. The effectiveness of this measure was quite controversial. According to reports from Soviet artillerymen, the Germans suffered significant damage. However, apparently, this was still not true. We know for sure about small losses in manpower and equipment, as well as about the disruption of enemy wire lines. In addition, the Germans now knew for sure that a surprise attack would not work - the Red Army was ready for defense.

At 5:00 am the German artillery preparation began. It had not yet ended when the first echelons of Nazi troops went on the offensive following the barrage of fire. German infantry, supported by tanks, launched an offensive along the entire defensive line of the 13th Soviet army. Main blow fell on the village of Olkhovatka. The most powerful attack was experienced by the right flank of the army near the village of Maloarkhangelskoye.

The battle lasted approximately two and a half hours, and the attack was repulsed. After this, the Germans shifted their pressure to the left flank of the army. The strength of their onslaught is evidenced by the fact that by the end of July 5, the troops of the 15th and 81st Soviet divisions were partially surrounded. However, the Nazis had not yet succeeded in breaking through the front. In just the first day of the battle, German troops advanced 6-8 kilometers.

On July 6, Soviet troops attempted a counterattack with the forces of two tank, three rifle divisions and a rifle corps with the support of two regiments guards mortars and two regiments of self-propelled guns. The impact front was 34 kilometers. At first, the Red Army managed to push the Germans back 1-2 kilometers, but then the Soviet tanks came under heavy fire German tanks and self-propelled guns and, after 40 vehicles were lost, were forced to stop. By the end of the day, the corps went on the defensive. The counterattack attempted on July 6 did not have serious success. The front managed to be “pushed back” by only 1-2 kilometers.

After the failure of the attack on Olkhovatka, the Germans shifted their efforts in the direction of the Ponyri station. This station was of serious strategic importance, covering the Orel-Kursk railway. Ponyri were well protected by minefields, artillery and tanks buried in the ground.

On July 6, Ponyri was attacked by about 170 German tanks and self-propelled guns, including 40 Tigers of the 505th heavy tank battalion. The Germans managed to break through the first line of defense and advance to the second. Three attacks that followed before the end of the day were repulsed by the second line. The next day, after persistent attacks, German troops managed to get even closer to the station. By 15:00 on July 7, the enemy captured the “1 May” state farm and came close to the station. The day of July 7, 1943 became a crisis for the defense of Ponyri, although the Nazis still failed to capture the station.

At the Ponyri station, German troops used the Ferdinand self-propelled guns, which turned out to be a serious problem for the Soviet troops. Soviet guns were practically unable to penetrate the 200 mm frontal armor of these vehicles. Therefore, the Ferdinanda suffered the greatest losses from mines and air raids. The last day when the Germans stormed the Ponyri station was July 12.

From July 5 to July 12, heavy fighting took place in the 70th Army's zone of action. Here the Nazis launched an attack with tanks and infantry, with German air superiority in the air. On July 8, German troops managed to break through the defense, occupying several settlements. The breakthrough was localized only by introducing reserves. By July 11, Soviet troops received reinforcements as well as air support. The dive bomber strikes caused quite significant damage to German units. On July 15, after the Germans had already been completely driven back, in the field between the villages of Samodurovka, Kutyrki and Tyoploye, military correspondents filmed damaged German equipment. After the war, this chronicle began to be mistakenly called “footage from near Prokhorovka,” although not a single “Ferdinand” was near Prokhorovka, and the Germans failed to evacuate two damaged self-propelled guns of this type from near Tyoply.

In the zone of action of the Voronezh Front (commander - General of the Army Vatutin), combat operations began in the afternoon of July 4 with attacks by German units on the positions of the front's military outposts and lasted until late at night.

On July 5, the main phase of the battle began. On the southern front of the Kursk Bulge, the battles were much more intense and were accompanied by more serious losses of Soviet troops than on the northern one. The reason for this was the terrain, which was more suitable for the use of tanks, and a number of organizational miscalculations at the level of the Soviet front-line command.

The main blow of the German troops was delivered along the Belgorod-Oboyan highway. This section of the front was held by the 6th Guards Army. The first attack took place at 6 a.m. on July 5 in the direction of the village of Cherkasskoe. Two attacks followed, supported by tanks and aircraft. Both were repulsed, after which the Germans shifted the direction of the attack towards the village of Butovo. In the battles near Cherkassy, ​​the enemy almost managed to achieve a breakthrough, but at the cost of heavy losses, Soviet troops prevented it, often losing up to 50-70% of the units' personnel.

During July 7-8, the Germans managed, while suffering losses, to advance another 6-8 kilometers, but then the attack on Oboyan stopped. The enemy was looking for weakness Soviet defense and seemed to have found it. This place was the direction to the still unknown Prokhorovka station.

The Battle of Prokhorovka, considered one of the largest tank battles in history, began on July 11, 1943. On the German side, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps and the 3rd Wehrmacht Panzer Corps took part in it - a total of about 450 tanks and self-propelled guns. The 5th Guards Tank Army under Lieutenant General P. Rotmistrov and the 5th Guards Army under Lieutenant General A. Zhadov fought against them. There were about 800 Soviet tanks in the Battle of Prokhorovka.

The battle at Prokhorovka can be called the most discussed and controversial episode of the Battle of Kursk. The scope of this article does not allow us to analyze it in detail, so we will limit ourselves to only reporting approximate loss figures. The Germans irretrievably lost about 80 tanks and self-propelled guns, the Soviet troops lost about 270 vehicles.

Second phase. Offensive

On July 12, 1943, Operation Kutuzov, also known as the Oryol offensive operation, began on the northern front of the Kursk Bulge with the participation of troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts. On July 15, troops of the Central Front joined it.

On the German side, a group of troops consisting of 37 divisions was involved in the battles. According to modern estimates, the number of German tanks and self-propelled guns that took part in the battles near Orel was about 560 vehicles. Soviet troops had a serious numerical advantage over the enemy: in the main directions, the Red Army outnumbered German troops by six times in the number of infantry, five times in the number of artillery and 2.5-3 times in tanks.

German infantry divisions defended themselves on well-fortified terrain, equipped with wire fences, minefields, machine gun nests and armored caps. Enemy sappers built anti-tank obstacles along the river banks. It should be noted, however, that work on the German defensive lines had not yet been completed when the counteroffensive began.

On July 12 at 5:10 a.m., Soviet troops began artillery preparation and attacked air strike on the enemy. Half an hour later the assault began. By the evening of the first day, the Red Army, waging heavy fighting, advanced to a distance of 7.5 to 15 kilometers, breaking through the main defensive line of German formations in three places. Offensive battles continued until July 14. During this time, the advance of Soviet troops was up to 25 kilometers. However, by July 14, the Germans managed to regroup their troops, as a result of which the Red Army offensive was stopped for some time. The Central Front offensive, which began on July 15, developed slowly from the very beginning.

Despite the stubborn resistance of the enemy, by July 25 the Red Army managed to force the Germans to begin withdrawing troops from the Oryol bridgehead. In early August, battles began for the city of Oryol. By August 6, the city was completely liberated from the Nazis. After this, the Oryol operation entered its final phase. On August 12, fighting began for the city of Karachev, which lasted until August 15 and ended with the defeat of the group of German troops defending this settlement. By August 17-18, Soviet troops reached the Hagen defensive line, built by the Germans east of Bryansk.

The official date for the start of the offensive on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge is considered to be August 3. However, the Germans began a gradual withdrawal of troops from their positions as early as July 16, and from July 17, units of the Red Army began pursuing the enemy, which by July 22 turned into a general offensive, which stopped at approximately the same positions that Soviet troops occupied at the start of the Battle of Kursk . The command demanded the immediate continuation of hostilities, but due to the exhaustion and fatigue of the units, the date was postponed by 8 days.

By August 3, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts had 50 rifle divisions, about 2,400 tanks and self-propelled guns, and more than 12,000 guns. At 8 o'clock in the morning, after artillery preparation, Soviet troops began their offensive. On the first day of the operation, the advance of units of the Voronezh Front ranged from 12 to 26 km. The troops of the Steppe Front advanced only 7-8 kilometers during the day.

On August 4-5, battles took place to eliminate the enemy group in Belgorod and liberate the city from German troops. By evening, Belgorod was taken by units of the 69th Army and the 1st Mechanized Corps.

By August 10, Soviet troops cut the Kharkov-Poltava railway. There were about 10 kilometers left to the outskirts of Kharkov. On August 11, the Germans struck in the Bogodukhov area, significantly weakening the pace of the offensive of both fronts of the Red Army. Fierce fighting continued until August 14.

The steppe front reached the near approaches to Kharkov on August 11. On the first day, the attacking units were not successful. Fighting on the outskirts of the city continued until July 17. Both sides suffered heavy losses. In both Soviet and German units, it was not uncommon to have companies numbering 40-50 people, or even less.

The Germans launched their last counterattack at Akhtyrka. Here they even managed to make a local breakthrough, but this did not change the situation globally. On August 23, a massive assault on Kharkov began; This day is considered the date of the liberation of the city and the end of the Battle of Kursk. In fact, the fighting in the city stopped completely only on August 30, when the remnants of German resistance were suppressed.

The Battle of Kursk (also known as the Battle of Kursk) is the largest and most key battle during the Great Patriotic War and the entire Second World War. It was attended by 2 million people, 6 thousand tanks and 4 thousand aircraft.

The Battle of Kursk lasted 49 days and consisted of three operations:

• Kursk strategic defensive (July 5 - 23);
• Orlovskaya (July 12 - August 18);
• Belgorodsko-Kharkovskaya (August 3 – 23).

The Soviets involved:

• 1.3 million people + 0.6 million in reserve;
• 3444 tanks + 1.5 thousand in reserve;
• 19,100 guns and mortars + 7.4 thousand in reserve;
• 2172 aircraft + 0.5 thousand in reserve.

Fought on the side of the Third Reich:

• 900 thousand people;
• 2,758 tanks and self-propelled guns (of which 218 are under repair);
• 10 thousand guns;
• 2050 aircraft.

Source: toboom.name

This battle claimed many lives. But a lot of military equipment “sailed” to the next world. In honor of the 73rd anniversary of the start of the Battle of Kursk, we remember which tanks fought back then.

T-34-76

Another modification of the T-34. Armor:

• forehead - 45 mm;
• side - 40 mm.

Gun - 76 mm. The T-34-76 was the most popular tank that took part in the Battle of Kursk (70% of all tanks).

Source: lurkmore.to

Light tank, also known as “firefly” (slang from WoT). Armor - 35-15 mm, gun - 45 mm. The number on the battlefield is 20-25%.

Source: warfiles.ru

A heavy vehicle with a 76mm barrel, named after the Russian revolutionary and Soviet military leader Klim Voroshilov.

Source: mirtankov.su

KV-1S

He is also “Kvass”. High-speed modification of the KV-1. “Fast” implies reducing armor in order to increase the maneuverability of the tank. This doesn't make it any easier for the crew.

Source: wiki.warthunder.ru

SU-152

Heavy self-propelled artillery unit, built on the basis of the KV-1S, armed with a 152 mm howitzer. In the Kursk Bulge there were 2 regiments, that is, 24 pieces.

Source: worldoftanks.ru

SU-122

Medium-heavy self-propelled gun with a 122-mm pipe. 7 regiments, that is, 84 pieces, were thrown into the “execution near Kursk”.

Source: vspomniv.ru

Churchill

Lend-Lease Churchills also fought on the side of the Soviets - no more than a couple of dozen. The armor of the animals is 102-76 mm, the gun is 57 mm.

Source: tanki-v-boju.ru

Ground armored vehicles of the Third Reich

Full name: Panzerkampfwagen III. Among the people - PzKpfw III, Panzer III, Pz III. Medium tank, with a 37 mm cannon. Armor - 30-20 mm. Nothing special.

4.7.2018 1870 Views

Commanders!

This summer marks the 75th anniversary of the Battle of Kursk, one of the most important episodes of World War II. In the summer of 1943, one of the most grandiose events took place near Prokhorovka. tank battles.

To properly celebrate this date, the developers have prepared a large-scale 50-day gaming event. And we already have the first details that we will tell you about!

Where, what and how

From July 5 9:00 (MSK) to August 24 9:00 (MSK) Daily combat missions will appear in the game - a new task every day. For each completed task you will receive a reward. The value of the rewards will increase as the event progresses, and at the end a truly excellent trophy will await you.

The more tasks you complete, the more prizes you will receive.

Three most important awards

Premium tank V T-34 shielded in a unique style. A limited series of such vehicles was produced in 1943, shortly before the start of the Battle of Kursk.

Special styles dedicated to the Battle of Kursk, which can be applied to any vehicle in your Hangar.

Both award styles are historical. This means they will be displayed to all players.

A medal that can be received for participating in a game event.

Choose your path tanker!

Certain vehicles from the Soviet Union took part in the Battle of Kursk. So those who play on historical vehicles will have a significant advantage.

• II T-60
• III T-70
• III M3 light
• V T-34
• V T-34 shielded
• V KV-1S
• V Churchill III
• V SU-85
• VII SU-152

Although the list of tasks remains unchanged throughout the event, the developers offer you, dear player, a choice of one of two paths - depending on the equipment you have.

• Northern direction- for those who have any equipment of level IV and higher, except historical. The tasks here will be more difficult.
• South direction- for those whose Hangar has suitable historical equipment from the list above. The tasks here will be easier.

When entering battle, the game will automatically select a direction depending on the vehicle - and so on for each combat mission.

And a couple more words about awards

• Rewards for tasks will be the same regardless of the direction you choose.
• After a task for one direction is completed, a similar task in another direction will become unavailable.
• And the most important thing: tasks can be “mixed”, performing one part of the tasks in the South direction, and the other part in the North direction.

In addition to daily rewards, you will receive one point for each completed task - and so on up to 50 points. The prize fund will be divided into seven stages, and each step forward will provide a reward many times better than the previous one.

5 points

• Commemorative medal for participation in the event.
• 1 day of premium account.
• 5 Large repair kits.
• 5 Large first aid kits.

10 points

• Reinforced aiming drives.
• 5 Automatic fire extinguishers.
• 5 Large repair kits.
• 5 Large first aid kits.

15 points

• Coated optics.
• 5 Automatic fire extinguishers.
• 5 Large repair kits.
• 5 Large first aid kits.

20 points

• Gun rammer large caliber.
• 5 Automatic fire extinguishers.
• 5 Large repair kits.
• 5 Large first aid kits.

30 points

• T-34 E tank with 100% crew and unique style.
• Slot in the Hangar.
• 5 Automatic fire extinguishers.
• 5 Large repair kits.
• 5 Large first aid kits.

40 points

• 7 days of premium account.
• 5 Automatic fire extinguishers.
• 5 Large repair kits.
• 5 Large first aid kits.

50 points

• A style that can be applied to any car.
• 5 Automatic fire extinguishers.
• 5 Large repair kits.
• 5 Large first aid kits.

Pay attention!

• You will receive a V T-34 shielded in a historical style for 30 completed tasks.
• You will receive a unique historical style that can be applied to any car for completing all tasks.

If you don’t particularly want to complete tasks to get a tank, you can purchase it in the Premium Store.

And a note at the end

Every day a new combat mission will await you, and you will try to complete them all - after all, your maximum reward depends on it.

It is very important to understand: if you do not complete a task, you will not be able to receive a reward for it later, in any way.

The Battle of Kursk, one of the most important and largest battles of World War II, ended on August 23, 1943. More than 2 million soldiers took part in the battle on both sides, as well as 4,000 aircraft and 6,000 tanks. The five most powerful models of armored vehicles from that battle will now be discussed.

The Soviet T-34 tank was quite good, but it was inferior in many respects to the German average T-IV tanks and "Panther". A frontal attack on a heavy "Tiger" for any single 34 was similar to suicide. However, the T-34s were superior to German tanks in speed and maneuverability on rough terrain. And most importantly, they were simpler and cheaper to produce, and therefore for 190 “Panthers” and 134 “Tigers” from the Wehrmacht there were about 2 thousand Soviet T-34s.

Armed with a 76-mm gun, the T-34 could not penetrate the frontal armor of the German “kittens”. Soviet tank crews recalled how shells bounced off German armor. Therefore, the crews had to enter from the flank or rear and shoot down the tracks. Tankers tried to set up ambushes to gain an advantage over heavier vehicles. The numerical superiority and experience of the Soviet crews made it possible in that battle to snatch victory from the hands of a much better armed enemy, albeit at a high price.

Su-152

At the time of the Battle of Kursk, Soviet Union there was a truly formidable and universal weapon against any, even the heaviest armored vehicles of the Wehrmacht - the SU-152 self-propelled artillery mount. The design of this weapon was so successful that the armored vehicle fighter went into production almost unchanged.

The self-propelled gun was armed with an incredibly powerful 152 mm ML-20S howitzer. Unfortunately, when the Battle of Kursk began, the Su-152 crews experienced a serious shortage of armor-piercing shells. However, this circumstance did not help the Wehrmacht much. After all, a 43-kilogram high-explosive fragmentation projectile, thrown from the 152nd gun, still destroyed the vast majority of enemy tanks.

The hits from such shells made huge holes in German tanks, tore off their turrets, and tore out pieces of the hull. The shots of the SU-152 hits are both frightening and terribly fascinating. Interestingly, the SU-152 was the only Soviet vehicle capable of stopping the super-heavy German Ferdinands with invulnerable 200 mm armor. Soviet soldiers nicknamed the lethal self-propelled gun "St. John's wort". There was only one problem. During the Battle of Kursk, only 24 such vehicles took part in the battle.

Pz. Kpfw.VI "Tiger"

It would be “impolite” not to remember the enemy’s formidable equipment, which, however, still did not help the Wehrmacht win. First of all, the Pz deserves mention. Kpfw.VI "Tiger", which was much feared on all allied fronts. Powerful armor made it invulnerable to 45 mm artillery fire. The 76 mm cannon could penetrate the side or stern only at pistol shot distance. The Tiger's gun fired up to 8 rounds per minute with a fairly experienced crew. It is noteworthy that the tank had a “soft suspension” and (unexpectedly!) was controlled using a steering wheel, rather than the levers familiar to most tankers. But the tank did not have a system for protecting and cleaning the rollers from snow and dirt, which played a cruel joke on this formidable vehicle during the war in the USSR.

Self-propelled gun "Ferdinand"

The already mentioned German self-propelled artillery mount “Ferdinand” is the same one whose frontal armor was not damaged by any shots (except for the SU-152 gun). It was a truly formidable weapon. The Pak 43/2 rifled gun of 88 mm caliber allowed the Germans to knock out any Soviet tanks at a distance of up to 3 km. Sound scary? Undoubtedly.

But the Ferdinand was incredibly heavy, which significantly reduced its combat capabilities. Also the self-propelled guns did not have additional weapons. Of course, with proper use, both disadvantages were leveled out. During Operation Citadel, the Wehrmacht irretrievably lost 39 of these self-propelled guns. Some of them were taken as trophies by the Red Army. By the way, “Ferdinand” was of great interest to specialists from the Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army.

Sturmpanzer IV

In conclusion, another interesting car. The German 150-mm howitzer StuH 43 L/12 was used both to support infantry and as a tank destroyer (in exceptional cases). The debut of this type of technology actually took place on the Kursk Bulge. Overall, the weapon performed quite mediocre. The armor protected the Sturmpanzer IV only from medium Soviet calibers. By the way, one of these howitzers is now on display in Kubinka, near Moscow.

Do you want more interesting military equipment? How about finding out more about one curious one and transporting him to another place.

Battle of Kursk
	Central Russia, Eastern Ukraine
	Victory of the Red Army
Commanders
Georgy Zhukov	Erich von Manstein
Nikolay Vatutin	Gunther Hans von Kluge
Ivan Konev	Walter Model
Konstantin Rokossovsky	Hermann Got
Strengths of the parties
By the beginning of the operation, 1.3 million people + 0.6 million in reserve, 3,444 tanks + 1.5 thousand in reserve, 19,100 guns and mortars + 7.4 thousand in reserve, 2,172 aircraft + 0.5 thousand in reserve reserve	According to Soviet data - approx. 900 thousand people, according to it. according to data - 780 thousand people. 2,758 tanks and self-propelled guns (of which 218 are under repair), approx. 10 thousand guns, approx. 2050 aircraft
Defensive phase: Participants: Central Front, Voronezh Front, Steppe Front (not all) Irrevocable - 70,330 Sanitary - 107,517 Operation Kutuzov: Participants: Western Front (left wing), Bryansk Front, Central Front Irrevocable - 112,529 Sanitary - 317,361 Operation "Rumyantsev": Participants: Voronezh Front, Steppe Front Irrevocable - 71,611 Hospital - 183,955 General in the battle for the Kursk ledge: Irrevocable - 189,652 Hospital - 406,743 In the Battle of Kursk as a whole ~ 254,470 killed, captured, missing missing 608,833 wounded and sick 153 thousand small arms 6064 tanks and self-propelled guns 5245 guns and mortars 1626 combat aircraft	According to German sources, 103,600 were killed and missing on the entire Eastern Front. 433,933 wounded. According to Soviet sources, 500 thousand total losses in the Kursk salient. 1000 tanks according to German data, 1500 - according to Soviet data, less than 1696 aircraft

Battle of Kursk(July 5, 1943 – August 23, 1943, also known as Battle of Kursk) in terms of its scale, the forces and means involved, tension, results and military-political consequences, is one of the key battles of the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War. In Soviet and Russian historiography, it is customary to divide the battle into 3 parts: Kursk defensive operation (July 5-12); Oryol (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3-23) offensive. The German side called the offensive part of the battle “Operation Citadel.”

After the end of the battle, the strategic initiative in the war passed to the side of the Red Army, which until the end of the war carried out mainly offensive operations, while the Wehrmacht was on the defensive.

Preparing for battle

During the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent counter-offensive of the Wehrmacht in Eastern Ukraine, a protrusion with a depth of up to 150 and a width of up to 200 km, facing the west (the so-called “Kursk Bulge”) was formed in the center of the Soviet-German front. During April - June 1943, there was an operational pause at the front, during which the parties prepared for the summer campaign.

Plans and strengths of the parties

The German command decided to conduct a major strategic operation on the Kursk salient in the summer of 1943. It was planned to launch converging attacks from the areas of the cities of Orel (from the north) and Belgorod (from the south). The strike groups were supposed to unite in the Kursk area, encircling the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts of the Red Army. The operation received the code name “Citadel”. According to the information of the German general Friedrich Fangor (German. Friedrich Fangohr), at a meeting with Manstein on May 10-11, the plan was adjusted at the suggestion of General Hoth: the 2nd SS Panzer Corps turns from the Oboyan direction towards Prokhorovka, where terrain conditions allow for a global battle with the armored reserves of the Soviet troops.

To carry out the operation, the Germans concentrated a group of up to 50 divisions (of which 18 were tank and motorized), 2 tank brigades, 3 separate tank battalions and 8 divisions assault guns, with a total number, according to Soviet sources, about 900 thousand people. The leadership of the troops was carried out by Field Marshal General Günter Hans von Kluge (Army Group Center) and Field Marshal Erich von Manstein (Army Group South). Organizationally, the strike forces were part of the 2nd Panzer, 2nd and 9th armies (commander - Field Marshal Walter Model, Army Group Center, Orel region) and the 4th tank army, 24th Panzer Corps and Operational Group "Kempf" (commander - General Hermann Hoth, Army Group "South", Belgorod region). Air support for the German troops was provided by the forces of the 4th and 6th Air Fleets.

To carry out the operation, several elite SS tank divisions were deployed to the Kursk area:

• 1st Division Leibstandarte SS "Adolf Hitler"
• 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich"
• 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" (Totenkopf)

The troops received a certain amount of new equipment:

• 134 Pz.Kpfw.VI Tiger tanks (another 14 command tanks)
• 190 Pz.Kpfw.V “Panther” (11 more - evacuation (without guns) and command)
• 90 Sd.Kfz assault guns. 184 “Ferdinand” (45 each in sPzJgAbt 653 and sPzJgAbt 654)
• a total of 348 relatively new tanks and self-propelled guns (the Tiger was used several times in 1942 and early 1943).

At the same time, however, a significant number of frankly outdated tanks and self-propelled guns remained in the German units: 384 units (Pz.III, Pz.II, even Pz.I). Also during the Battle of Kursk, German Sd.Kfz.302 teletankettes were used for the first time.

The Soviet command decided to conduct a defensive battle, exhaust the enemy troops and defeat them, launching counterattacks on the attackers at a critical moment. For this purpose, a deeply layered defense was created on both sides of the Kursk salient. A total of 8 defensive lines were created. The average mining density in the direction of expected enemy attacks was 1,500 anti-tank and 1,700 anti-personnel mines for every kilometer of the front.

The troops of the Central Front (commander - General of the Army Konstantin Rokossovsky) defended the northern front of the Kursk ledge, and the troops of the Voronezh Front (commander - General of the Army Nikolai Vatutin) - the southern front. The troops occupying the ledge relied on the Steppe Front (commanded by Colonel General Ivan Konev). The coordination of the actions of the fronts was carried out by representatives of the Headquarters Marshals of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky.

In the assessment of the forces of the parties in the sources, there are strong discrepancies associated with different definitions of the scale of the battle by different historians, as well as differences in the methods of recording and classifying military equipment. When assessing the forces of the Red Army, the main discrepancy is related to the inclusion or exclusion from the calculations of the reserve - the Steppe Front (about 500 thousand personnel and 1,500 tanks). The following table contains some estimates:

Estimates of the forces of the parties before the Battle of Kursk according to various sources
Source	Personnel (thousands)		Tanks and (sometimes) self-propelled guns		Guns and (sometimes) mortars		Aircraft
						about 10000	2172 or 2900 (including Po-2 and long-range)
Krivosheev 2001
Glanz, House				2696 or 2928
Müller-Gill.				2540 or 2758
Zett., Frankson			5128 +2688 “reserve rates” total more than 8000

The role of intelligence

From the beginning of 1943, interceptions of secret communications from the High Command of the Nazi Army and secret directives from Hitler increasingly mentioned Operation Citadel. According to the memoirs of Anastas Mikoyan, back on March 27, Stalin informed him in general detail about the German plans. On April 12, 1943, the exact text of Directive No. 6 “On the plan for Operation Citadel” of the German High Command, translated from German, was placed on Stalin’s desk, endorsed by all Wehrmacht services, but not yet signed by Hitler, who signed it only three days later. This data was obtained by a scout working under the name "Werther". The real name of this man still remains unknown, but it is assumed that he was an employee of the Wehrmacht High Command, and the information he received came to Moscow through the Luzi agent Rudolf Rössler operating in Switzerland. There is an alternative assumption that Werther is Adolf Hitler's personal photographer.

However, it should be noted that back on April 8, 1943, G.K. Zhukov, relying on data from intelligence agencies of the Kursk fronts, very accurately predicted the strength and direction of German attacks on the Kursk Bulge:

Although the exact text of the “Citadel” lay on Stalin’s desk three days before Hitler signed it, already four days before that German plan became obvious to the highest Soviet military command, and the general details of the existence of such a plan were known to them at least eight days before.

Kursk defensive operation

The German offensive began on the morning of July 5, 1943. Since the Soviet command knew exactly the start time of the operation - 3 o'clock in the morning (the German army fought according to Berlin time - translated into Moscow time as 5 o'clock in the morning), at 22:30 and 2:20 Moscow time the forces of two fronts carried out counter-artillery preparation with an amount of ammunition 0.25 ammo. German reports noted significant damage to communication lines and minor losses in manpower. There was also an unsuccessful air raid by the 2nd and 17th Air Armies (more than 400 attack aircraft and fighters) on the enemy’s Kharkov and Belgorod air hubs.

Before the start of the ground operation, at 6 a.m. our time, the Germans also launched a bomb and artillery strike on the Soviet defensive lines. The tanks that went on the offensive immediately encountered serious resistance. The main blow on the northern front was delivered in the direction of Olkhovatka. Having failed to achieve success, the Germans moved their attack in the direction of Ponyri, but even here they were unable to break through the Soviet defense. The Wehrmacht was able to advance only 10-12 km, after which from July 10, having lost up to two-thirds of its tanks, the 9th German Army went on the defensive. On the southern front, the main German attacks were directed towards the areas of Korocha and Oboyan.

July 5, 1943 Day one. Defense of Cherkasy.

Operation Citadel - the general offensive of the German army on the Eastern Front in 1943 - was aimed at encircling the troops of the Central (K.K. Rokossovsky) and Voronezh (N.F. Vatutin) fronts in the area of ​​​​the city of Kursk through counter attacks from the north and south under the base of the Kursk salient, as well as the destruction of Soviet operational and strategic reserves east of the main direction of the main attack (including in the area of ​​Prokhorovka station). Main blow with southern directions were applied by the forces of the 4th Panzer Army (commander - Hermann Hoth, 48 Tank Tank and 2 Tank SS Tank) with the support of the Army Group "Kempf" (W. Kempf).

At the initial stage of the offensive, the 48th Panzer Corps (com: O. von Knobelsdorff, chief of staff: F. von Mellenthin, 527 tanks, 147 self-propelled guns), which was the most powerful formation of the 4th Panzer Army, consisting of: 3 and 11 tank divisions , mechanized (tank-grenadier) division "Greater Germany", 10th tank brigade and 911th division. assault gun division, with the support of 332 and 167 infantry divisions, had the task of breaking through the first, second and third lines of defense of units of the Voronezh Front from the Gertsovka - Butovo area in the direction of Cherkassk - Yakovlevo - Oboyan. At the same time, it was assumed that in the Yakovlevo area the 48th Tank Tank would link up with units of the 2nd SS Division (thus encircling the 52nd Guards Rifle Division and the 67th Guards Infantry Division), change units of the 2nd SS Division Tank Division, after which the SS division units were supposed to be used against the operational reserves of the Red Army Armies in the area of ​​the station. Prokhorovka, and 48 Tank Corps was supposed to continue operations in the main direction Oboyan - Kursk.

To complete the assigned task, units of the 48th Tank Corps on the first day of the offensive (Day “X”) needed to break into the defenses of the 6th Guards. A (Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakov) at the junction of the 71st Guards Rifle Division (Colonel I.P. Sivakov) and 67th Guards Rifle Division (Colonel A.I. Baksov), capture the large village of Cherkasskoe and make a breakthrough with armored units in direction to the village of Yakovlevo. The offensive plan of the 48th Tank Corps determined that the village of Cherkasskoye was to be captured by 10:00 on July 5th. And already on July 6, units of the 48th Tank Army. were supposed to reach the city of Oboyan.

However, as a result of the actions of Soviet units and formations, the courage and fortitude they showed, as well as the preparation of defensive lines they carried out in advance, in this direction The Wehrmacht's plans were “substantially adjusted” - 48 Tk did not reach Oboyan.

The factors that determined the unacceptably slow pace of advance of the 48th Tank Corps on the first day of the offensive were the good engineering preparation of the area by Soviet units (from anti-tank ditches almost throughout the entire defense to radio-controlled minefields), the fire of divisional artillery, guards mortars and the actions of attack aircraft against those accumulated in front of engineering obstacles for enemy tanks, competent location of anti-tank strong points (No. 6 south of Korovin in the 71st Guards Rifle Division, No. 7 southwest of Cherkassky and No. 8 southeast of Cherkassky in the 67th Guards Rifle Division), rapid reorganization of the battle formations of the 196 Guards battalions .sp (Colonel V.I. Bazhanov) in the direction of the enemy’s main attack south of Cherkassy, ​​timely maneuver by the divisional (245 detachment, 1440 grapnel) and army (493 iptap, as well as 27 optabr colonel N.D. Chevola) anti-tank reserve, relatively successful counterattacks on the flank of the wedged units of 3 TD and 11 TD with the involvement of forces of 245 detachment troops (Lieutenant Colonel M.K. Akopov, 39 M3 tanks) and 1440 SUP (Lieutenant Colonel Shapshinsky, 8 SU-76 and 12 SU-122), and also not completely suppressed resistance of the remnants of the military outpost in the southern part of the village of Butovo (3 baht. 199th Guards Regiment, Captain V.L. Vakhidov) and in the area of ​​workers’ barracks southwest of the village. Korovino, which were the starting positions for the offensive of the 48th Tank Corps (the capture of these starting positions was planned to be carried out by specially allocated forces of the 11th Tank Division and 332nd Infantry Division by the end of the day on July 4, that is, on the day of “X-1”, but the resistance of the combat outpost was never completely suppressed by dawn on July 5th). All of the above factors influenced both the speed of concentration of units in their initial positions before the main attack, and their progress during the offensive itself.

Also, the pace of the corps' advance was affected by the German command's shortcomings in planning the operation and poorly developed interaction between tank and infantry units. In particular, the “Greater Germany” division (W. Heyerlein, 129 tanks (of which 15 Pz.VI tanks), 73 self-propelled guns) and the 10 armored brigade attached to it (K. Decker, 192 combat and 8 Pz.V command tanks) in the current conditions The battle turned out to be clumsy and unbalanced formations. As a result, throughout the first half of the day, the bulk of the tanks were crowded in narrow “corridors” in front of engineering barriers (it was especially difficult to overcome the swampy anti-tank ditch west of Cherkasy), and came under a combined attack Soviet aviation(2nd VA) and artillery - from PTOP No. 6 and No. 7, 138 Guards Ap (Lieutenant Colonel M. I. Kirdyanov) and two regiments of the 33rd detachment (Colonel Stein), suffered losses (especially among officers), and not was able to deploy in accordance with the offensive schedule on tank-accessible terrain at the Korovino-Cherkasskoye line for a further attack in the direction of the northern outskirts of Cherkassy. At the same time, infantry units that overcame anti-tank barriers in the first half of the day had to rely mainly on their own fire weapons. For example, the VG division, which was at the forefront of the attack, battle group At the time of the first attack, the 3rd Battalion of the Fusilier Regiment found itself without tank support at all and suffered significant losses. Possessing enormous armored forces, the VG division for a long time actually could not bring them into battle.

The resulting congestion on the advance routes also resulted in the untimely concentration of artillery units of the 48th Tank Corps in firing positions, which affected the results of artillery preparation before the start of the attack.

It should be noted that the commander of the 48th Tank Tank became hostage to a number of erroneous decisions of his superiors. Knobelsdorff's lack of an operational reserve had a particularly negative impact - all divisions of the corps were brought into battle almost simultaneously on the morning of July 5, 1943, after which they were drawn into active hostilities for a long time.

The development of the offensive of the 48th Tank Corps on the day of July 5 was greatly facilitated by: active actions of engineer-assault units, aviation support (more than 830 sorties) and overwhelming quantitative superiority in armored vehicles. It is also necessary to note the proactive actions of units of the 11th TD (I. Mikl) and 911th department. division of assault guns (overcoming a strip of engineering obstacles and reaching the eastern outskirts of Cherkassy with a mechanized group of infantry and sappers with the support of assault guns).

An important factor in the success of German tank units was the qualitative leap in the combat characteristics of German armored vehicles that occurred by the summer of 1943. Already during the first day of the defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge, the insufficient power of anti-tank weapons in service with the Soviet units was revealed when fighting both the new German tanks Pz.V and Pz.VI, and modernized tanks of older brands (about half of the Soviet anti-tank tanks were armed with 45 mm guns, the power of 76 mm Soviet field and American tanks s guns made it possible to effectively destroy modern or modernized enemy tanks at distances two to three times shorter than the effective firing range of the latter; heavy tank and self-propelled units at that time were practically absent not only in the combined arms 6 Guards. And, but also in M.E. Katukov’s 1st Tank Army, which occupied the second line of defense behind it).

Only after the bulk of the tanks had overcome the anti-tank barriers south of Cherkassy in the afternoon, repelling a number of counterattacks by Soviet units, the units of the VG division and 11th Panzer Division were able to cling to the southeastern and southwestern outskirts of the village, after which the fighting moved into the street phase. At about 21:00, Divisional Commander A.I. Baksov gave the order to withdraw units of the 196th Guards Regiment to new positions to the north and northeast of Cherkassy, ​​as well as to the center of the village. When units of the 196th Guards Regiment retreated, minefields were laid. At about 21:20, a battle group of grenadiers from the VG division, with the support of the Panthers of the 10th Tank Brigade, broke into the village of Yarki (north of Cherkassy). A little later, the 3rd Wehrmacht TD managed to capture the village of Krasny Pochinok (north of Korovino). Thus, the result of the day for the 48th Tank Tank of the Wehrmacht was a wedge into the first line of defense of the 6th Guards. And at 6 km, which can actually be considered a failure, especially against the backdrop of the results achieved by the evening of July 5 by the troops of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (operating to the east parallel to the 48th Tank Corps), which was less saturated with armored vehicles, which managed to break through the first line of defense of the 6th Guards. A.

Organized resistance in the village of Cherkasskoe was suppressed around midnight on July 5. However, German units were able to establish complete control over the village only by the morning of July 6, that is, when, according to the offensive plan, the corps was already supposed to approach Oboyan.

Thus, the 71st Guards SD and 67th Guards SD, without having large tank formations (at their disposal were only 39 American M3 tanks of various modifications and 20 self-propelled guns from the 245th detachment and 1440 glanders) were held in the area of ​​​​the villages of Korovino and Cherkasskoye for about a day five enemy divisions (three of them tank). In the battle of July 5, 1943 in the Cherkassy region, the soldiers and commanders of the 196th and 199th Guards particularly distinguished themselves. rifle regiments of the 67th Guards. divisions. Competent and truly heroic actions of the soldiers and commanders of the 71st Guards SD and 67th Guards SD allowed the command of the 6th Guards. And in a timely manner, pull up army reserves to the place where units of the 48th Tank Corps are wedged at the junction of the 71st Guards SD and 67th Guards SD and prevent a general collapse of the defense of the Soviet troops in this area in the subsequent days of the defensive operation.

As a result of the hostilities described above, the village of Cherkasskoe virtually ceased to exist (according to post-war eyewitness accounts, it was a “lunar landscape”).

The heroic defense of the village of Cherkasskoe on July 5, 1943 - one of the most successful moments of the Battle of Kursk for the Soviet troops - unfortunately, is one of the undeservedly forgotten episodes of the Great Patriotic War.

July 6, 1943 Day two. First counterattacks.

By the end of the first day of the offensive, the 4th TA had penetrated the defenses of the 6th Guards. And to a depth of 5-6 km in the offensive sector of 48 TK (in the area of ​​​​the village of Cherkasskoe) and at 12-13 km in the section of 2 TK SS (in the Bykovka - Kozmo-Demyanovka area). At the same time, the divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (Obergruppenführer P. Hausser) managed to break through the entire depth of the first line of defense of the Soviet troops, pushing back units of the 52nd Guards SD (Colonel I.M. Nekrasov), and approached the 5-6 km front directly to the second line of defense occupied by the 51st Guards Rifle Division (Major General N. T. Tavartkeladze), entering into battle with its advanced units.

However, the right neighbor of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps - AG "Kempf" (W. Kempf) - did not complete the task of the day on July 5, encountering stubborn resistance from units of the 7th Guards. And, thereby exposing the right flank of the 4th Tank Army that had advanced forward. As a result, Hausser was forced from July 6 to July 8 to use a third of the forces of his corps, namely the Death's Head TD, to cover his right flank against the 375th Infantry Division (Colonel P. D. Govorunenko), whose units performed brilliantly in the battles of July 5 .

On July 6, the tasks of the day for units of the 2nd SS Tank Tank (334 tanks) were determined: for the Death's Head TD (Brigadeführer G. Priss, 114 tanks) - the defeat of the 375th Infantry Division and the expansion of the breakthrough corridor in the direction of the river. Linden Donets, for the Leibstandarte TD (brigadeführer T. Wisch, 99 tanks, 23 self-propelled guns) and “Das Reich” (brigadeführer W. Kruger, 121 tanks, 21 self-propelled guns) - the fastest breakthrough of the second line of defense near the village. Yakovlevo and access to the line of the bend of the Psel river - the village. Grouse.

At about 9:00 on July 6, 1943, after powerful artillery preparation (carried out by artillery regiments of the Leibstandarte, Das Reich divisions and 55 MP six-barreled mortars) with the direct support of the 8th Air Corps (about 150 aircraft in the offensive zone), the divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps moved into offensive, delivering the main blow in the area occupied by the 154th and 156th Guards Regiment Regiment. At the same time, the Germans managed to identify control and communications points of the 51st Guards SD regiments and carry out a fire raid on them, which led to the disorganization of communications and control of its troops. In fact, the battalions of the 51st Guards SD repelled enemy attacks without communication with higher command, since the work of liaison officers was not effective due to the high dynamics of the battle.

The initial success of the attack by the Leibstandarte and Das Reich divisions was ensured due to the numerical advantage in the breakthrough area (two German divisions against two guards rifle regiments), as well as due to good interaction between the division regiments, artillery and aviation - the advanced units of the divisions, the main ramming force of which were the 13th and 8th heavy companies of the "Tigers" (7 and 11 Pz.VI, respectively), with the support of assault gun divisions (23 and 21 StuG) advanced to the Soviet positions even before the end of the artillery and air strike, finding themselves at the moment of its end several hundred meters from the trenches.

By 13:00, the battalions at the junction of the 154th and 156th Guards Regiment Regiments were driven from their positions and began a disorderly retreat in the direction of the villages of Yakovlevo and Luchki; The left-flank 158th Guards Regiment, having folded its right flank, generally continued to hold the line of defense. The withdrawal of units of the 154th and 156th Guards Regiment was carried out mixed with enemy tanks and motorized infantry and was associated with heavy losses (in particular, in the 156th Guards Regiment, out of 1,685 people, about 200 people remained in service on July 7, that is, the regiment was actually destroyed) . There was practically no general leadership of the withdrawing battalions; the actions of these units were determined only by the initiative of junior commanders, not all of whom were ready for this. Some units of the 154th and 156th Guards Regiments reached the locations of neighboring divisions. The situation was partly saved by the actions of the artillery of the 51st Guards Rifle Division and the 5th Guards Division from the reserve. Stalingrad Tank Corps - howitzer batteries of the 122nd Guards Ap (Major M. N. Uglovsky) and artillery units of the 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (Colonel A. M. Shchekal) fought heavy battles in the depths of the defense of the 51st Guards. divisions, slowing down the pace of the advance of the combat groups TD "Leibstandarte" and "Das Reich", in order to enable the retreating infantry to gain a foothold on new lines. At the same time, the artillerymen managed to retain most of their heavy weapons. A short but fierce battle broke out for the village of Luchki, in the area of ​​which the 464th Guards Artillery Division and the 460th Guards Division managed to deploy. mortar battalion 6th Guards MSBR 5th Guards. Stk (at the same time, due to insufficient provision of vehicles, the motorized infantry of this brigade was still on the march 15 km from the battlefield).

At 14:20, the armored group of the Das Reich division as a whole captured the village of Luchki, and the artillery units of the 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade began to retreat north to the Kalinin farm. After this, right up to the third (rear) defensive line of the Voronezh Front in front of the battle group of the TD "Das Reich" there were virtually no units of the 6th Guards. army capable of holding back its advance: the main forces of the army's anti-tank artillery (namely the 14th, 27th and 28th brigade) were located to the west - on the Oboyanskoye Highway and in the offensive zone of the 48th Tank Corps, which, based on the results of the battles on July 5, was assessed by the army command as the direction of the main strike by the Germans (which was not entirely correct - the strikes of both German tank corps of the 4th TA were considered by the German command as equivalent). To repel the attack of the Das Reich TD artillery of the 6th Guards. And by this point there was simply nothing left.

The offensive of the Leibstandarte TD in the Oboyan direction in the first half of the day on July 6 developed less successfully than that of Das Reich, which was due to the greater saturation of its offensive sector with Soviet artillery (the regiments of Major Kosachev’s 28th regiments were active), timely attacks by the 1st Guards. Tank Brigade (Colonel V.M. Gorelov) and 49th Tank Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel A.F. Burda) from the 3rd Mechanized Corps of the 1st TA M.E. Katukov, as well as the presence in its offensive zone of the well-fortified village of Yakovlevo, in street battles in in which the main forces of the division, including its tank regiment, got bogged down for some time.

Thus, by 14:00 on July 6, the troops of the 2nd SS Tank Tank had basically completed the first part of the general offensive plan - the left flank of the 6th Guards. A was crushed, and a little later with the capture of. Yakovlevo, on the part of the 2nd SS Tank Tank, conditions were prepared for their replacement by units of the 48th Tank Tank. The advanced units of the 2nd SS Tank Tank were ready to begin fulfilling one of the general goals of Operation Citadel - the destruction of the Red Army reserves in the area of ​​the station. Prokhorovka. However, Hermann Hoth (commander of the 4th TA) was unable to fully implement the offensive plan on July 6, due to the slow advance of the troops of the 48th Tank Corps (O. von Knobelsdorff), which encountered the skillful defense of Katukov’s army, which entered the battle in the afternoon. Although Knobelsdorff's corps managed to encircle some regiments of the 67th and 52nd Guards SD of the 6th Guards in the afternoon. And in the area between the Vorskla and Vorsklitsa rivers (with a total strength of about a rifle division), however, having encountered the tough defense of the 3 Mk brigades (Major General S. M. Krivoshein) on the second line of defense, the corps divisions were unable to capture bridgeheads on the northern bank of the Pena River, discard the Soviet mechanized corps and go to the village. Yakovlevo for the subsequent change of units of 2nd SS Tank. Moreover, on the left flank of the corps, the battle group of the tank regiment 3 TD (F. Westhoven), which had gaped at the entrance to the village of Zavidovka, was shot by tank crews and artillerymen of the 22 Tank Brigade (Colonel N. G. Venenichev), which was part of the 6 Tank Tank Brigade (Major General A D. Getman) 1 TA.

However, the success achieved by the Leibstandarte divisions, and especially Das Reich, forced the command of the Voronezh Front, in conditions of incomplete clarity of the situation, to take hasty retaliatory measures to plug the breakthrough that had formed in the second line of defense of the front. After the report of the commander of the 6th Guards. And Chistyakova about the state of affairs on the left flank of the army, Vatutin with his order transfers the 5th Guards. Stalingrad Tank (Major General A. G. Kravchenko, 213 tanks, of which 106 are T-34 and 21 are Mk.IV “Churchill”) and 2 Guards. Tatsinsky Tank Corps (Colonel A.S. Burdeyny, 166 combat-ready tanks, of which 90 are T-34 and 17 are Mk.IV Churchill) subordinate to the commander of the 6th Guards. And he approves of his proposal to launch counterattacks on the German tanks that broke through the positions of the 51st Guards SD with the forces of the 5th Guards. Stk and under the base of the entire advancing wedge 2 tk SS forces of 2 guards. Ttk (directly through the battle formations of the 375th Infantry Division). In particular, on the afternoon of July 6, I.M. Chistyakov assigned the commander of the 5th Guards. CT to Major General A. G. Kravchenko the task of withdrawing from the defensive area he occupied (in which the corps was already ready to meet the enemy using the tactics of ambushes and anti-tank strong points) the main part of the corps (two of three brigades and a heavy breakthrough tank regiment), and a counterattack by these forces on the flank of the Leibstandarte TD. Having received the order, the commander and headquarters of the 5th Guards. Stk, already knowing about the capture of the village. Luchki tanks of the Das Reich division, and more correctly assessing the situation, tried to challenge the execution of this order. However, under the threat of arrest and execution, they were forced to begin implementing it. The attack by the corps brigades was launched at 15:10.

Sufficient own artillery assets of the 5th Guards. The Stk did not have it, and the order did not leave time for coordinating the actions of the corps with its neighbors or aviation. Therefore, the attack of tank brigades was carried out without artillery preparation, without air support, on flat terrain and with practically open flanks. The blow fell directly on the forehead of the Das Reich TD, which regrouped, setting up tanks as an anti-tank barrier and, calling in aviation, inflicted a significant fire defeat on the brigades of the Stalingrad Corps, forcing them to stop the attack and go on the defensive. After this, having brought up anti-tank artillery and organized flank maneuvers, units of the Das Reich TD, between 17 and 19 hours, managed to reach the communications of the defending tank brigades in the area of ​​the Kalinin farm, which was defended by 1696 zenaps (Major Savchenko) and 464 Guards Artillery, which had withdrawn from the village of Luchki. .division and 460 Guards. mortar battalion 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade. By 19:00, units of the Das Reich TD actually managed to encircle most of the 5th Guards. Stk between the village. Luchki and the Kalinin farm, after which, building on the success, the command of the German division of part of the forces, acting in the direction of the station. Prokhorovka, tried to capture the Belenikhino crossing. However, thanks to the proactive actions of the commander and battalion commanders, the 20th Tank Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel P.F. Okhrimenko) remaining outside the encirclement of the 5th Guards. Stk, who managed to quickly create a tough defense around Belenikino from various corps units that were at hand, managed to stop the offensive of the Das Reich TD, and even forced the German units to return back to x. Kalinin. Being without contact with corps headquarters, on the night of July 7, surrounded units of the 5th Guards. The Stk organized a breakthrough, as a result of which part of the forces managed to escape from the encirclement and linked up with units of the 20th Tank Brigade. During July 6, 1943, units of the 5th Guards. Stk 119 tanks were irretrievably lost for combat reasons, another 9 tanks were lost for technical or unknown reasons, and 19 were sent for repairs. Not a single tank corps had such significant losses in one day during the entire defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge (the losses of the 5th Guards Stk on July 6 even exceeded the losses of 29 tanks during the attack on July 12 at the Oktyabrsky storage farm).

After being surrounded by 5th Guards. Stk, continuing the development of success in the northern direction, another detachment of the tank regiment TD "Das Reich", taking advantage of the confusion during the withdrawal of Soviet units, managed to reach the third (rear) line of the army defense, occupied by units 69A (Lieutenant General V.D. Kryuchenkin) , near the village of Teterevino, and for a short time wedged itself into the defense of the 285th infantry regiment of the 183rd infantry division, but due to the obvious insufficient strength, having lost several tanks, it was forced to retreat. The entry of German tanks to the third line of defense of the Voronezh Front on the second day of the offensive was regarded by the Soviet command as an emergency.

The offensive of the "Dead Head" TD did not receive significant development during July 6 due to the stubborn resistance of units of the 375th Infantry Division, as well as the counterattack of the 2nd Guards in its sector in the afternoon. Tatsin tank corps (Colonel A. S. Burdeyny, 166 tanks), which took place simultaneously with the counterattack of the 2nd Guards. Stk, and demanded the involvement of all the reserves of this SS division and even some units of the Das Reich TD. However, inflict losses on the Tatsin Corps even approximately comparable to the losses of the 5th Guards. The Germans did not succeed in the counterattack, even though during the counterattack the corps had to cross the Lipovy Donets River twice, and some of its units were surrounded for a short time. Losses of the 2nd Guards. The total number of tanks for July 6 was: 17 tanks burned out and 11 damaged, that is, the corps remained fully combat-ready.

Thus, during July 6, formations of the 4th TA were able to break through the second line of defense of the Voronezh Front on their right flank and inflicted significant losses on the troops of the 6th Guards. A (of the six rifle divisions, by the morning of July 7, only three remained combat-ready, and of the two tank corps transferred to it, one). As a result of the loss of control of units of the 51st Guards SD and 5th Guards. Stk, at the junction of 1 TA and 5 Guards. Stk formed an area not occupied by Soviet troops, which in the following days, at the cost of incredible efforts, Katukov had to plug with brigades of the 1st TA, using his experience of defensive battles near Orel in 1941.

However, all the successes of the 2nd SS Tank Tank, which led to the breakthrough of the second defensive line, again could not be translated into a powerful breakthrough deep into the Soviet defense to destroy the strategic reserves of the Red Army, since the troops of AG Kempf, having achieved some successes on July 6, nevertheless again failed complete the task of the day. AG Kempf was still unable to secure the right flank of the 4th Tank Army, which was threatened by the 2nd Guards. Ttk supported by the still combat-ready 375 sd. German losses in armored vehicles also had a significant impact on the further course of events. So, for example, in the tank regiment of the TD "Great Germany" 48 Tank Tank, after the first two days of the offensive, 53% of the tanks were considered uncombatable (Soviet troops disabled 59 out of 112 vehicles, including 12 "Tigers" out of 14 available), and in the 10th Tank Brigade to on the evening of July 6, only 40 combat Panthers (out of 192) were considered combat-ready. Therefore, on July 7, the 4th TA corps was given less ambitious tasks than on July 6—expanding the breakthrough corridor and securing the army’s flanks.

The commander of the 48th Panzer Corps, O. von Knobelsdorff, summed up the results of the day's battle on the evening of July 6:

Starting from July 6, 1943, not only the German command had to retreat from previously developed plans (which did this on July 5), but also the Soviet command, which clearly underestimated the strength of the German armored strike. Due to the loss of combat effectiveness and failure of the material part of most divisions of the 6th Guards. Ah, from the evening of July 6th general operational management troops holding the second and third lines of Soviet defense in the area of ​​​​the breakthrough of the German 4th TA, was actually transferred from the commander of the 6th Guards. A I. M. Chistyakov to the commander of the 1st TA M. E. Katukov. The main framework of the Soviet defense in the following days was created around the brigades and corps of the 1st Tank Army.

Battle of Prokhorovka

On July 12, the largest (or one of the largest) oncoming tank battles in history took place in the Prokhorovka area.

According to data from Soviet sources, on the German side, about 700 tanks and assault guns took part in the battle, according to V. Zamulin - the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which had 294 tanks (including 15 Tigers) and self-propelled guns.

On the Soviet side, the 5th Tank Army of P. Rotmistrov, numbering about 850 tanks, took part in the battle. After a massive airstrike, the battle on both sides entered its active phase and continued until the end of the day.

Here is one of the episodes that clearly shows what happened on July 12: the battle for the Oktyabrsky state farm and the heights. 252.2 resembled the sea surf - four tank brigades of the Red Army, three batteries of the SAP, two rifle regiments and one battalion of a motorized rifle brigade rolled in waves onto the defense of the SS grenadier regiment, but, having met fierce resistance, retreated. This went on for almost five hours until the guards drove the grenadiers out of the area, suffering colossal losses.

From the memoirs of a battle participant, Untersturmführer Gurs, commander of a motorized rifle platoon of the 2nd grp:

During the battle, many tank commanders (platoon and company) were out of action. High level of commander losses in the 32nd Tank Brigade: 41 tank commanders (36% of the total), tank platoon commander (61%), company commander (100%) and battalion commander (50%). The command level and the motorized rifle regiment of the brigade suffered very high losses; many company and platoon commanders were killed and seriously injured. Its commander, Captain I. I. Rudenko, was out of action (evacuated from the battlefield to the hospital).

A participant in the battle, deputy chief of staff of the 31st Tank Brigade, and later Hero of the Soviet Union, Grigory Penezhko, recalled the human condition in those terrible conditions:

... Heavy images remained in my memory... There was such a roar that the eardrums were pressed, blood flowed from the ears. The continuous roar of engines, the clanging of metal, the roar, the explosions of shells, the wild rattle of torn iron... From point-blank shots, turrets collapsed, guns twisted, armor burst, tanks exploded. Shots into the gas tanks instantly set the tanks on fire. The hatches opened and tank crews tried to get out. I saw a young lieutenant, half burned, hanging from his armor. Wounded, he could not get out of the hatch. And so he died. There was no one around to help him. We lost the sense of time; we felt neither thirst, nor heat, nor even blows in the cramped cabin of the tank. One thought, one desire - while you’re alive, beat the enemy. Our tankers, who got out of their wrecked vehicles, searched the field for enemy crews, who were also left without equipment, and beat them with pistols and grappled hand-to-hand. I remember the captain who, in some kind of frenzy, climbed onto the armor of a knocked out German “tiger” and hit the hatch with a machine gun in order to “smoke out” the Nazis from there. I remember how bravely the tank company commander Chertorizhsky acted. He knocked out an enemy Tiger, but was also hit. Jumping out of the car, the tankers put out the fire. And we went into battle again

By the end of July 12, the battle ended with unclear results, only to resume on the afternoon of July 13 and 14. After the battle, German troops were unable to advance any significantly, despite the fact that the losses of the Soviet tank army, caused by tactical errors of its command, were much greater. Having advanced 35 kilometers between July 5 and 12, Manstein’s troops were forced, after trampling on the achieved lines for three days in vain attempts to break into the Soviet defenses, to begin withdrawing troops from the captured “bridgehead.” During the battle, a turning point occurred. Soviet troops, which went on the offensive on July 23, pushed back the German armies in the south of the Kursk Bulge to their original positions.

Losses

According to Soviet data, about 400 German tanks, 300 vehicles, and over 3,500 soldiers and officers remained on the battlefield of the Battle of Prokhorovka. However, these numbers have been called into question. For example, according to G. A. Oleinikov’s calculations, more than 300 German tanks could not have taken part in the battle. According to research by A. Tomzov, citing data from the German Federal Military Archive, during the battles of July 12-13, the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler division irretrievably lost 2 Pz.IV tanks, 2 Pz.IV and 2 Pz.III tanks were sent for long-term repairs , in the short term - 15 Pz.IV and 1 Pz.III tanks. The total losses of tanks and assault guns of the 2nd SS Tank Tank on July 12 amounted to about 80 tanks and assault guns, including at least 40 units lost by the Totenkopf division.

At the same time, the Soviet 18th and 29th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army lost up to 70% of their tanks.

According to the memoirs of Wehrmacht Major General F.W. von Mellenthin, in the attack on Prokhorovka and, accordingly, in the morning battle with the Soviet TA, only the Reich and Leibstandarte divisions, reinforced by a battalion of self-propelled guns, took part - in total up to 240 vehicles, including including four "tigers". It was not expected to meet a serious enemy; according to the German command, Rotmistrov’s TA was drawn into battle against the “Death’s Head” division (in reality, one corps) and the oncoming attack of more than 800 (according to their estimates) tanks came as a complete surprise.

However, there is reason to believe that the Soviet command “overslept” the enemy and the TA attack with attached corps was not at all an attempt to stop the Germans, but was intended to go behind the rear of the SS tank corps, for which its “Totenkopf” division was mistaken.

The Germans were the first to notice the enemy and managed to change formation for battle; the Soviet tank crews had to do this under fire.

Results of the defensive phase of the battle

The central front, involved in the battle in the north of the arc, suffered losses of 33,897 people from July 5-11, 1943, of which 15,336 were irrevocable, its enemy, Model’s 9th Army, lost 20,720 people during the same period, which gives a loss ratio of 1.64:1. The Voronezh and Steppe fronts, which took part in the battle on the southern front of the arc, lost from July 5-23, 1943, according to modern official estimates (2002), 143,950 people, of which 54,996 were irrecoverable. Including the Voronezh Front alone - 73,892 total losses. However, the chief of staff of the Voronezh Front, Lieutenant General Ivanov, and the head of the operational department of the front headquarters, Major General Teteshkin, thought differently: they believed that the losses of their front were 100,932 people, of which 46,500 were irrevocable. If, contrary to Soviet documents from the war period, we consider the official numbers of the German command to be correct, then taking into account the German losses on the southern front of 29,102 people, the ratio of losses of the Soviet and German sides here is 4.95: 1.

According to Soviet data, in the Kursk defensive operation alone from July 5 to July 23, 1943, the Germans lost 70,000 killed, 3,095 tanks and self-propelled guns, 844 field guns, 1,392 aircraft and over 5,000 vehicles.

During the period from July 5 to July 12, 1943, the Central Front consumed 1,079 wagons of ammunition, and the Voronezh Front used 417 wagons, almost two and a half times less.

The reason that the losses of the Voronezh Front so sharply exceeded the losses of the Central Front is due to the smaller massing of forces and means in the direction German strike, which allowed the Germans to actually achieve an operational breakthrough on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge. Although the breakthrough was closed by the forces of the Steppe Front, it allowed the attackers to achieve favorable tactical conditions for their troops. It should be noted that only the absence of homogeneous independent tank formations did not give the German command the opportunity to concentrate its armored forces in the direction of the breakthrough and develop it in depth.

According to Ivan Bagramyan, the Sicilian operation did not in any way affect the Battle of Kursk, since the Germans were transferring forces from west to east, therefore “the defeat of the enemy in the Battle of Kursk facilitated the actions of the Anglo-American troops in Italy.”

Oryol offensive operation (Operation Kutuzov)

On July 12, the Western (commanded by Colonel-General Vasily Sokolovsky) and Bryansk (commanded by Colonel-General Markian Popov) fronts launched an offensive against the 2nd Tank and 9th armies of the Germans in the area of ​​​​the city of Orel. By the end of the day on July 13, Soviet troops broke through the enemy’s defenses. On July 26, the Germans left the Oryol bridgehead and began to retreat to the Hagen defensive line (east of Bryansk). On August 5 at 05-45, Soviet troops completely liberated Oryol. According to Soviet data, 90,000 Nazis were killed in the Oryol operation.

Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation (Operation Rumyantsev)

On the southern front, the counter-offensive by the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began on August 3. On August 5 at approximately 18-00 Belgorod was liberated, on August 7 - Bogodukhov. Developing the offensive, Soviet troops cut the Kharkov-Poltava railway on August 11, and captured Kharkov on August 23. The German counterattacks were unsuccessful.

On August 5, the first fireworks display of the entire war was given in Moscow - in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod.

Results of the Battle of Kursk

The victory at Kursk marked the transfer of strategic initiative to the Red Army. By the time the front stabilized, Soviet troops had reached their starting positions for the attack on the Dnieper.

After the end of the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the German command lost the opportunity to conduct strategic offensive operations. Local massive offensives, such as the Watch on the Rhine (1944) or the Balaton operation (1945), were also unsuccessful.

Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, who developed and carried out Operation Citadel, subsequently wrote:

According to Guderian,

Discrepancies in loss estimates

The casualties of both sides in the battle remain unclear. Thus, Soviet historians, including Academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences A. M. Samsonov, talk about more than 500 thousand killed, wounded and prisoners, 1,500 tanks and over 3,700 aircraft.

However, German archival data indicate that the Wehrmacht lost 537,533 people on the entire Eastern Front in July-August 1943. These figures include those killed, wounded, sick, and missing (the number of German prisoners in this operation was insignificant). In particular, based on 10 days of reports of their own losses, the Germans lost:

Total total losses of enemy troops taking part in the attack on the Kursk salient for the entire period 01-31.7.43: 83545 . Therefore, the Soviet figures for German losses of 500 thousand look somewhat exaggerated.

According to the German historian Rüdiger Overmans, in July and August 1943 the Germans lost 130 thousand 429 people killed. However, according to Soviet data, from July 5 to September 5, 1943, 420 thousand Nazis were exterminated (which is 3.2 times more than Overmans), and 38,600 were taken prisoner.

In addition, according to German documents, on the entire Eastern Front the Luftwaffe lost 1,696 aircraft in July-August 1943.

On the other hand, even Soviet commanders during the war did not consider Soviet military reports about German losses to be accurate. Thus, the chief of staff of the Central Front, Lieutenant General M.S. Malinin wrote to lower headquarters:

In works of art

• Liberation (film epic)

• "Battle for Kursk" (eng. BattleofKursk, German Die Deutsche Wochenshau) - video chronicle (1943)
• “Tanks! Battle of Kursk" Tanks!The Battle of Kursk) — documentary, produced by Cromwell Productions, 1999
• "War of the Generals. Kursk" (English) GeneralsatWar) - documentary film by Keith Barker, 2009
• “Kursk Bulge” is a documentary film directed by V. Artemenko.
• Composition Panzerkampf by Sabaton