North Korea's nuclear weapons. Background

In light of recent events regarding nuclear program North Korea is once again coming to the forefront of international politics. Belligerent statements from official Pyongyang, which follow one after another almost every day, only add fuel to the fire. On March 30, North Korea announced that its relations with South Korea had “entered a military phase,” and all problems would now be resolved “as in war time" If we take into account these formulations, North Korea has actually declared war on its southern neighbor. At the same time, both sides of the more than 60-year-old conflict have not officially signed a peace treaty.

At the same time, the Republic of Korea is not inclined to overdramatize the situation. The DPRK's statements in Seoul are regarded as a continuation of the policy of verbal blackmail. Ministry of Defence South Korea confirmed the fact that the troops of the northern neighbor did not notice any signs of preparation for an attack and unusual movements troops. At the same time, a few days ago, the head of the DPRK tourism organization, who visited China, assured worried Chinese tour operators that “there will be no war,” urging them to send “as many tourists as possible” to the Juche Country. It is worth noting that five-day excursions to the DPRK with visits to the cities of Pyongyang, Kaesong, Wonsan, as well as the Kumgangsan Mountains cost almost $1,000. In a country that is experiencing an acute shortage of foreign currency, tourism plays a very important role important.

North Korea nuclear program

North Korea is one of the first countries in the Asia-Pacific region to begin secret work to master military nuclear technology. This is largely explained by the situation that developed on the Korean Peninsula after the end of World War II and which resulted in a full-scale Korean War of 1950-1953 between North and South. The United States and its allies, as well as the PRC and the USSR, were drawn into this military campaign. Maintaining tension in this region This was greatly facilitated by the deployment of American troops and an arsenal of American sea- and air-based tactical nuclear weapons on South Korean territory. In due time at the management North Korea there were serious concerns that during a possible military conflict on the peninsula these weapons could be used.

The first ruler of the DPRK, Kim Il Sung, attached great importance great importance nuclear missile research. He was one of the first leaders of third world countries to appreciate the potential capabilities of new weapons and despite a large number of difficulties began to achieve possession of it. The first clear lesson was taught to him by the United States when they launched nuclear strikes on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These full-scale tests of the new weapon made a stunning impression on him. And clearly demonstrated to the future North Korean leader, What nuclear weapon- this is not a “paper tiger” and its use for military purposes can be decisive in achieving victory over the enemy. Kim Il Sung learned his second lesson during Korean War, when the US military-political leadership was seriously considering the possibility of inflicting nuclear strikes on North Korea. It is worth noting that the leader of the DPRK turned out to be a diligent student and the creation of his own nuclear weapons became one of the main programs of the DPRK for many decades.

The active beginning of work on the nuclear program can be considered the founding of a research center in Yongbyon in 1964, where, along with research in the field nuclear power Military applied research soon began. This center was founded with the direct support of the USSR. Already in 1965, the first research reactor IRT-2000, with a capacity of 2 MW, was put into operation here. Since 1985, construction began on another nuclear reactor, this time its capacity was supposed to be 50 MW. Construction of a 200 MW reactor was also launched in the Tongcheon area. According to experts, these reactors have a dual purpose.

The nuclear program in the DPRK is directly managed by the Ministry of Atomic Industry, which is part of the State Administrative Council (Cabinet of Ministers). Today, when the design of the simplest nuclear charges is no longer a secret, the most critical element of military nuclear programs is obtaining required quantity fissile substances - plutonium or highly enriched uranium. For its nuclear program, North Korea has chosen plutonium as its primary fissile material. That is why the greatest practical value is information about how much weapons-grade plutonium North Korea currently has.

At the same time, the high secrecy and closeness of North Korean society make it impossible to give an unambiguous answer to this question. Therefore, here we can only rely on information from the special services that was transmitted to the media and the results of approximate calculations. So, for example, to determine the approximate volume of plutonium produced in reactors, experts often use the following simple relationship: during the day, an operating reactor is able to produce 1 gram of plutonium for every megawatt of its power. Based on this, the reactor in Yongbyon with a capacity of 5 MW is able to produce 5 g. plutonium per day or up to 1.8 kg. per year, and a 50-megawatt reactor is already up to 20 kg. plutonium per year, which is enough to produce 4-5 nuclear weapons.

Over the past decades, work has been carried out in the DPRK to create an extensive nuclear infrastructure, which includes not only scientific research, but also manufacturing enterprises. Currently, the general public knows the location of the main nuclear facilities of the DPRK.

Location of North Korean nuclear infrastructure facilities

Yongbyon
It is actually the main center for the design and production of nuclear weapons. Research Center atomic energy, which includes: Institute of Nuclear Electronics, Institute of Nuclear Physics, Institute of Radiation Chemistry, Institute of Isotopes, Radiochemical Laboratory, Critical Assembly with a power of 0.1 MW, as well as 3 reactors: a reactor with a power of 5 MW, a reactor with a thermal power of 8 MW and a 50 MW reactor. The center also includes a plant nuclear fuel, an isotope processing facility and explosives testing site.

Nuclear facilities in Yongbyon

Suncheon, Ungi, Hungnam
Operating uranium mines.

Kusong
Uranium processing plant, producing UO2 - uranium dioxide.

Nannam
Nuclear Energy Research Center.

Pakcheon
An operating uranium mine and enrichment plant, and a nuclear energy research center. Presumably in this center Nuclear weapons are being developed.

Pyeongsan
Uranium dioxide production, uranium ore mining and processing enterprise.

Pyeongsong
Atomic Energy Research Center and Pyeongsong University of Science.

Pyongyang
College of Nuclear Physics consisting of University of Technology them. Kim Chheka and the College of Nuclear Physics at Kim Il Sung University.

Hamhung
University chemical industry, trains specialists in the field of nuclear materials processing.

An analysis of North Korea's nuclear infrastructure indicates a wide range of work in this area. At the same time, they cover all aspects of this rather complex scientific and technical problem. Noteworthy is the fact that large research centers have been created in the DPRK, which are able to conduct not only theoretical, but also practical research in this area. At the same time, the weakest link appears to be those available to the DPRK production capacity to obtain weapons-grade plutonium. This disadvantage is the main limiting factor for North Korea in the accumulation of its military nuclear arsenal.

North Korea acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in December 1985, but already in March 1993 announced its desire to withdraw from it. However, the withdrawal dragged on for 10 years, during which the DPRK, to call a spade a spade, blackmailed the world community with this issue, using it as a trump card in its international politics. On January 11, 2003, the DPRK formally released itself from all obligations under the NPT.

On February 10, 2005, North Korea for the first time officially recognized the existence of nuclear weapons of its own production. This was reported by the country's Foreign Ministry, which noted that North Korea's nuclear weapons are a “nuclear deterrent force” and are “entirely defensive” in nature. On October 9, 2006, the DPRK conducted its first underground test nuclear device. According to Russian experts, the power of the underground explosion was 10-15 kt.

Under pressure from the international community, North Korea suspended its nuclear program for 3 years, but eventually resumed it again on April 14, 2009. At the request of North Korea, IAEA inspectors left the country. On May 25, 2009, North Korea conducted its second nuclear test. According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, the power of the tested nuclear charge ranged from 10 to 20 kt. Also in May 2010, North Korea announced success in nuclear fusion, which could increase the power of its nuclear weapons hundreds of times.

At the end of 2012, the South Korean Ministry of Defense released " White paper”, which included the opinions of experts from both South Korea and the United States on the expansion of North Korea’s nuclear program. Having analyzed images from space, experts stated that the DPRK has other uranium enrichment enterprises, except large center in Yongbyon. This book also contained information that North Korea has approximately 40 kg. weapons-grade plutonium, which was obtained by quadruple processing of spent fuel rods.

The third nuclear test of the DPRK, which was carried out on February 12, 2013, contributed to another round of aggravation of international tension on the Korean Peninsula. Russian intelligence services estimated the power of the detonated nuclear device at 5 kilotons. After the third nuclear tests, the DPRK's rhetoric became more aggressive and led to another escalation of the conflict between the two Koreas, so far only in the form of verbal attacks and threats.

Information sources:
-http://ria.ru/spravka/20130330/930107861-print.html
-http://www.rg.ru/2013/03/30/kndr-site.html
-http://world.lib.ru/k/kim_o_i/ab.shtml

Kim Jong-un, unlike his relatives and predecessors, is not blackmailing the world with nuclear developments, but is creating a real missile nuclear arsenal.

Explosion for the holiday

On September 9, 2017, North Korea celebrated the 69th anniversary of the founding of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with another nuclear weapons test.

First, several countries immediately recorded increased seismic activity in North Korea, which could mean a nuclear explosion.

Then the fact of nuclear testing was officially confirmed by Pyongyang. “The DPRK will continue to take measures to strengthen national nuclear forces in quantitative and qualitative terms to ensure the dignity and right to exist of the country in the face of the growing nuclear threat from the United States,” said a statement issued by the official North Korean news agency KCNA.

South Korea, the United States and Japan have initiated an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council, at which the issue of tightening sanctions against Pyongyang is expected to be raised.

The problem, however, is that sanctions on North Korea have virtually no effect. Moreover, there has been significant progress in North Korea's nuclear missile program.

How it all began

Even during the Korean War, the US command considered the possibility of launching nuclear strikes on the North. Although these plans were not realized, the North Korean leadership was interested in gaining access to technologies that would allow the creation of weapons of this type.

The USSR and China, acting as allies of the DPRK, were cool about these plans.

Nevertheless, in 1965, with the help of Soviet and Chinese specialists, a nuclear research center was founded in Yongbyon, where the Soviet nuclear reactor IRT-2000 was installed. Initially, it was assumed that the reactor would be used for work exclusively on peaceful programs.

In the 1970s, Pyongyang, with the support of China, began the first work on creating nuclear weapons.

In 1985, the Soviet Union obtained the DPRK to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In exchange for this, the USSR supplied a 5 MW gas-graphite research reactor to Korea. An agreement was also signed on the construction of a nuclear power plant in North Korea with four light water reactors of the VVER-440 type.

President Clinton's Failed War

Decay Soviet Union changed the situation in the world. The West and South Korea expected the imminent fall of the North Korean regime, while simultaneously conducting peace negotiations with it in hopes of liberalization political system and its dismantling according to the Eastern European version.

The United States, in exchange for abandoning its nuclear program, promised Pyongyang economic and technical assistance in the development of peaceful atoms. North Korea responded by agreeing to allow IAEA inspectors into its nuclear facilities.

Relations began to deteriorate sharply after IAEA inspectors suspected that a certain amount of plutonium was being hidden. Based on this, the IAEA requested a special inspection of two spent nuclear fuel storage facilities that had not been declared, but was refused, motivated by the fact that the facilities were in no way connected with the nuclear program and were of a military nature.

As a result, in March 1993, the DPRK announced its withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Negotiations with the United States made it possible to slow down this process, but on June 13, 1994, North Korea not only abandoned the agreement, but also withdrew from the IAEA.

During this period, as Newsweek magazine stated in 2006, the administration of US President Bill Clinton ordered a study of the issue of conducting military operation against North Korea. The military report stated that the operation would require expenditures of $100 billion, and the forces of South Korea and the United States would lose about a million people, with the losses of the US Army amounting to at least 100,000 people killed.

As a result, the United States returned to negotiation tactics.

Threats and promises

At the end of 1994, with the assistance of former US President Jimmy Carter, a “framework agreement” was reached, according to which North Korea pledged to abandon its nuclear weapons program in exchange for supplies of fuel oil and the creation of two new nuclear reactors in light water, which cannot be used for nuclear weapons work.

Stability was established for several years. Both sides, however, fulfilled their obligations only partially, but internal difficulties in the DPRK and the distraction of the United States to other problems ensured a stable situation.

A new escalation began in 2002, when President George W. Bush came to power in the United States.

In January 2002, in his speech, Bush included the DPRK in the so-called “axis of evil.” Coupled with the intention to create a global missile defense system, this caused serious concern in Pyongyang. The North Korean leadership did not want to share the fate of Iraq.

In 2003, negotiations began on the DPRK's nuclear program with the participation of the PRC, the USA, Russia, South Korea and Japan.

No real progress was achieved on them. The aggressive policy of the United States gave rise to the confidence in the DPRK that it was possible to ensure its own security only if it had its own atomic bomb.

North Korea did not particularly hide the fact that research papers on nuclear issues continue.

Bomb: birth

Exactly 12 years ago, on September 9, 2004, a South Korean reconnaissance satellite recorded a powerful explosion in a remote area of ​​the DPRK (Yangang Province), not far from the border with China. A crater visible from space remained at the site of the explosion, and a huge mushroom cloud with a diameter of about four kilometers grew above the scene.

On September 13, the DPRK authorities explained the appearance of a cloud similar to a nuclear mushroom as explosive work during the construction of the Samsu hydroelectric power station.

Neither South Korean nor American experts confirmed that it was indeed a nuclear explosion.

Western experts believed that the DPRK did not have the resources to create a full-fledged atomic bomb. necessary resources and technology, and we are talking about potential, not immediate danger.

On September 28, 2004, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK stated at the session General Assembly UN that North Korea has already turned into a nuclear weapon enriched uranium obtained from 8,000 reprocessed fuel rods from its nuclear reactor. He stressed that the DPRK had no other choice in creating a nuclear deterrent force in conditions when the United States declared its goal to destroy the DPRK and threatened preventive nuclear strikes.

On February 10, 2005, the DPRK Foreign Ministry for the first time officially announced the creation in the country atomic weapons. The world treated this statement as another bluff by Pyongyang.

A year and a half later, on October 9, 2006, the DPRK announced for the first time that it had successfully tested a nuclear charge, and its preparation had been publicly announced before. The low power of the charge (0.5 kilotons) raised doubts that it was a nuclear device and not ordinary TNT.

North Korean acceleration

On May 25, 2009, North Korea conducted another nuclear test. The power of the underground nuclear explosion, according to Russian military estimates, ranged from 10 to 20 kilotons.

Four years later, on February 12, 2013, North Korea conducted another atomic bomb test.

Despite the adoption of new sanctions against the DPRK, the opinion remained that Pyongyang is far from creating powerful devices that can be used as real weapons.

On December 10, 2015, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un announced that his country had a hydrogen bomb, which meant a new step in the creation of nuclear weapons. On January 6, 2016, another test explosion was carried out, which the DPRK declared to be a test of a hydrogen bomb.

South Korean sources call the current test the most powerful in the entire nuclear program of the DPRK. It is also noteworthy that the interval between tests was the shortest in all years, which indicates that Pyongyang has made serious progress in improving technology.

And most importantly, North Korea stated that this test was carried out as part of the development nuclear warheads, which can be placed on ballistic missiles.

If this is indeed the case, then official Pyongyang has come close to creating real military nuclear weapons, which will radically change the situation in the region.

The rockets are flying further and further

Media reports about the situation in the DPRK, often from South Korean sources, give the wrong impression of North Korea. Despite the poverty of the population and other problems, this country is not backward. There are quite enough specialists in advanced industries, including nuclear and missile technologies.

People talk about the tests of North Korean missiles with a chuckle - they exploded again, missed the target again, fell again.

Military experts monitoring the situation claim that North Korean specialists are for last years made a powerful technological breakthrough.

By 2016, the DPRK had created a mobile single-stage liquid-propellant ballistic missile, the Hwasong-10, with a firing range of about three thousand kilometers.

In the summer of this year, the Pukkyukson-1 rocket was successfully tested. This solid propellant missile is designed to arm submarines. Its successful launch was carried out precisely from a submarine of the DPRK Navy.

This does not at all fit with the idea of ​​North Korea as a country with rusty old Soviet aircraft and Chinese tanks.

Experts point out that the number of tests in the DPRK has been growing rapidly in recent years, and the technology is becoming more and more complex.

Within a few years, North Korea is capable of creating a missile with a flight range of up to 5,000 km, and then a full-fledged intercontinental ballistic missile. Moreover, it will be equipped with a real nuclear warhead.

What to do with North Korea?

There is almost no doubt that sanctions against North Korea will be tightened. But previous experience shows that this does not affect Pyongyang in any way.

Moreover, Comrade Kim Jong-un, unlike his relatives and predecessors, is not blackmailing the world with nuclear developments, but is creating a real nuclear missile arsenal.

Moreover, he is not stopped even by the outright irritation of his main ally, Beijing, which is not interested in escalating the situation in the region.

The question arises: what can be done with North Korea? Even those who have an extremely negative perception of Comrade Kim’s regime are convinced that it will not be possible to shake up the situation from within. Neither friends nor enemies can convince Pyongyang to “behave well.”

A military operation against North Korea today will cost the United States much more than in the early 1990s, when the Clinton administration made similar plans. In addition, neither Russia nor China will allow a war on their borders, which has every prospect of turning into the Third World War.

In theory, Pyongyang could be satisfied with guarantees that would ensure the preservation of the regime and the absence of attempts to dismantle it.

That's just recent history teaches that the only such guarantee in modern world is the “nuclear club” that North Korea is working to create.

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On testing an intercontinental ballistic missile with a thermonuclear warhead

On Sunday night, the Chinese Seismological Center recorded two earthquakes of magnitude 6.3 and 4.6, which experts interpreted as an underground explosion. The conclusions of experts from the Middle Kingdom were subsequently confirmed by South Korean and Japanese experts.

At the same time, the Korean Central News Agency reported that the DPRK had created hydrogen bomb, which can be installed in the head of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).

It was indicated that the power of the bomb could vary from ten to hundreds of kilotons, and all its components were produced in the country. In this situation, the key question is: is North Korea really capable of placing a hydrogen bomb on an ICBM capable of reaching the United States?

North Korea's missiles could reach the US

The West is powerless in the face of North Korea, China can help

As a result, North Korea has intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons at its disposal, but is unlikely to be able to launch a missile with such a serious filling. Nevertheless, such a prospect is a matter of time, and it may take North Korean scientists five to ten years to refine the technology.

However, it remains unclear how Western countries will be able to influence the DPRK. Probably, main role China will have to take responsibility for resolving the situation.

the site studied expert opinions about how much nuclear missiles and who they might threaten.

The world's attention is focused on the confrontation between the DPRK and the United States. North Korea plans to test another ballistic missile; however, the launch apparently failed, but the main evidence of this remains only the silence of the North Korean media about the important event dedicated to the 105th anniversary of the birth of Kim Il Sung.

The US President continues to demonstrate that he intends to act decisively on the international stage: following the bombing of Syria on suspicion of being used by government forces chemical weapons he gave the order to send warships to the shores of North Korea. Pyongyang responded by saying that if they suspect the United States of being ready to attack, they reserve the right to a preemptive strike.

In January 2003, North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Agreement, which it joined in 1985. Shortly before this, the country's authorities admitted that, in violation of agreements with the United States, they continued the uncontrolled use of nuclear technologies.

One of the organizations that regularly monitors news about the DPRK nuclear program (and analyzes satellite surveillance data, among other things) is the American Institute of Science and Technology international security. In the summer of 2016, its experts assessed the amount of material for nuclear weapons at Pyongyang's disposal as sufficient to create

from 13 to 21 nuclear warheads.

Institute experts believe that over the past two years, North Korea's nuclear arsenal has increased by four to six warhead equivalents - and decreased by one since the country conducted another underground nuclear weapons test in early 2016.

The main question is whether Pyongyang has means of delivering nuclear warheads, and if so, what kind. It is the test of a ballistic missile medium range, which supposedly failed and is now hushed up by the North Korean state media, became the reason for the aggravation of relations between the United States and the DPRK.

Earlier, sources in the DPRK reported to the South Korean press that the missile that Pyongyang planned to test the other day has a range of up to 10 thousand kilometers.

Dennis Wilder, a former adviser to US President George W. Bush, assures in a commentary to the Daily Express that, according to intelligence data, North Korea could test and acquire ballistic missiles capable of delivering a nuclear warhead to US territory within the next four years. Another expert - Professor Siegfried S. Hacker from Stanford University - in

Research in the field of nuclear energy in North Korea began in 1956, when an agreement on cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy was signed between the DPRK and the USSR. In 1964, also with the assistance of the USSR, a research center was founded in Yenben, and a little later a 5-megawatt nuclear reactor was put into operation. Around the same time, according to a number of experts, the DPRK began work on the use of nuclear energy for military purposes.

Over the next few decades, an extensive nuclear infrastructure was formed in the DPRK, including, in particular, the College of Nuclear Physics at the University. Kim Il Sung and the College of Nuclear Physics as part of the University of Technology. Kim Chheka in Pyongyang, Atomic Energy Research Center, Pakcheon Uranium Mine and Processing Plant, Atomic Energy Research Center and Pyeongsong University of Science. Also, a number of uranium mines were opened and put into operation on the territory of the DPRK.

At the same time, in 1985, the DPRK signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in 1991 - with the Republic of Korea - an agreement on the creation of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean Peninsula, and in 1992 - with the IAEA - an agreement on access to nuclear facilities of agency employees. According to the results of the ensuing inspection, the DPRK was indeed working on the production of weapons-grade plutonium necessary for the production of warheads. In the same year - 1992 - the country's leadership refused to allow the IAEA to conduct inspections at spent nuclear fuel storage sites, and the next year they even made a statement about their intention to withdraw from the NPT.

On June 11, 1993, a joint statement by the DPRK and the United States was published. The document, in particular, indicated that the DPRK was suspending its withdrawal from the NPT, and the United States was creating the International Consortium for Energy Development on the Korean Peninsula (KEDO) to replace North Korean gas-graphite reactors with light water ones (which significantly reduce the possibility of using the plutonium produced in them for military purposes).

On September 1-3, 1993, negotiations took place in the DPRK with the IAEA delegation on the “bias” of the latter’s inspections.

On March 1, 1994, a group of IAEA experts arrived in the DPRK to verify the nuclear facilities agency control equipment.

On May 15, 1994, the DPRK issued a statement that it had begun replacing graphite rods in the Yongbyon reactor.

On October 21, 1994, a framework agreement between the DPRK and the United States was published to resolve the nuclear issue and normalize bilateral relations. The document, in particular, obligated the United States to take measures to build a nuclear power plant in the DPRK using two light water nuclear reactors with a total capacity of 2 million kW, and also, even before the completion of the first reactor by 2003, to ensure supplies to the DPRK liquid fuel in the amount of 500 thousand tons per year. A commitment was received from the DPRK to freeze and dismantle the existing gas-graphite reactor. In addition, according to the document, it guaranteed the preservation of the DPRK as a party to the NPT.

On November 1, 1994, the DPRK announced the suspension of the construction of reactors with graphite moderators with a capacity of 50 thousand kW and 200 thousand kW.

In March 1995, the International Consortium for Energy Development on the Korean Peninsula (KEDO) was officially approved.

On August 31, 1998, the DPRK test-launched a three-stage ballistic missile that flew over Japanese territory and then fell into the Pacific Ocean.

In 1999, the DPRK agreed to establish a moratorium on such launches until 2003.

In 2001, the US administration added North Korea to the list of countries suspected of violating the ban on research in the field of biological weapons.

On January 29, 2002, US President George W. Bush, in his message to Congress, described the DPRK countries as part of the “axis of evil” along with Iraq and Iran. The North Korean leadership responded by declaring that such a statement was tantamount to a declaration of war.

In March 2002, in New York, the DPRK's permanent representative to the UN held two meetings with the US special representative for the Korean peace negotiations, Jack Pritchard. In particular, a message was made to the latter that the issue of resuming negotiations between the two countries was “considered in a favorable light.”

On August 7, 2002, in the DPRK, KEDO began construction of the foundation for one of the light water reactors. However, construction work financed by the Republic of Korea and Japan was limited to the construction of the reinforced concrete frame of the reactor (which was facilitated to a certain extent by changes in US policy towards the DPRK after the change of presidents).

In October 2002, North Korea notified the United States that it no longer intended to adhere to the agreement on resolving the nuclear issue. In addition, North Korea acknowledged the long-term secret implementation of the program in violation of the mentioned agreement.

On October 3-5, 2002, US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly visited the DPRK, during which evidence was presented of North Korea's continuation of its own nuclear program. The DPRK recognized the resumption of development due to failure to fulfill US obligations to build light water reactors.

On October 17, 2002, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il made a statement about allowing IAEA inspectors to inspect the country's nuclear facilities.

On October 21, 2002, US Secretary of State Colin Powell made a statement that the agreement on the re-equipment of the DPRK's nuclear program had become invalid due to violations of the terms of the document by this country.

On October 21-25, 2002, the DPRK issued a statement about its own right to create nuclear weapons, but at the same time declared its readiness to curtail its nuclear programs in exchange for assistance and a “non-aggression” pact with the United States.

On December 13, 2002, the DPRK announced the resumption of its nuclear program and its intention to return to the construction of a nuclear reactor. The North Korean leadership emphasized the forced nature of such a step due to the cessation of fuel oil supplies from the United States.

On December 25, 2002, North Korea began removing seals from one of its fuel rod manufacturing plants.

On January 6, 2003, the IAEA issued an ultimatum to the DPRK to curtail its nuclear program.

On January 7, 2003, the United States announced its consent to negotiate with the DPRK, but only on the condition that North Korea fulfills its international obligations.

On March 12, 2003, the IAEA submitted materials on the DPRK's violation of obligations to cease work on the creation of nuclear weapons for consideration by the UN Security Council.

March 13, 2003 official representative The DPRK Foreign Ministry, Lee Kwang Hook, made a statement that Pyongyang is “able to deal a crushing blow to American interests around the world,” and also has ballistic missiles, “capable of hitting enemy targets at any distance.”

On April 5, 2003, US President George W. Bush made a promise to seek a solution to the complex of problems associated with the DPRK nuclear program through peaceful and diplomatic means. At the same time, North Korea issued a warning that it does not intend to recognize the legality of any UN Security Council resolutions adopted in connection with Pyongyang's nuclear program.

On April 12, 2003, North Korea announced its agreement to negotiate with the United States in a multilateral format if Washington abandons its hostile approach.

On April 18, 2003, the DPRK announced that the country was “successfully carrying out work on its nuclear program at the final stage, up to the reprocessing of 8 thousand used reactor rods.”

On May 12, 2003, the DPRK unilaterally withdrew from the agreement on the creation of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean Peninsula (concluded in 1992 with the Republic of Korea).

In June 2003, the United States sought a complete cessation of work within the framework of the KEDO on the construction of a light water reactor, citing the DPRK’s refusal to sign a protocol on compensation in case of incidents at a future nuclear power plant.

On July 9, 2003, the state intelligence agency of the Republic of Korea presented in the country's parliament data on the DPRK conducting about 70 tests of "devices for nuclear explosions"at a test site located 40 km northwest of Yongbyon. In addition, according to the agency, the DPRK has completed the processing of 8 thousand used rods from a nuclear reactor in Yongbyon (and, thus, Pyongyang received weapons-grade plutonium for the production of warheads ).

July 14, 2003 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and foreign trade Yun Yong-gwan of the Republic of Korea stated that South Korea does not have reliable evidence that North Korea has completed the reprocessing of used nuclear reactor rods in Yongbyon.

On September 3, 2003, the DPRK parliament adopted a resolution stating that the country has no choice but to “actively build up nuclear deterrence forces to protect against possible nuclear attacks from the United States.” In addition, the resolution noted that, given Washington’s “extremely hostile attitude,” North Korea “sees no point in continuing the six-party talks until the United States reconsiders its position.”

On September 23, 2003, the DPRK rejected the resolution of the 47th General Conference of the IAEA to dismantle its nuclear programs and refused to return to fulfilling its obligations under the NPT.

On October 2, 2003, the DPRK announced the successful completion of the processing of 8 thousand used nuclear reactor rods and the use of weapons-grade plutonium extracted from them to strengthen its own “nuclear deterrent forces.” According to some experts, the resulting plutonium is enough to make 4-6 warheads.

On October 20, 2003, during the APEC summit in Bangkok, US President George W. Bush put forward a proposal to the DPRK to renounce its nuclear program in exchange for the provision of security guarantees by the United States and other states, but rejected the possibility of signing a treaty with North Korea. non-aggression."

On February 13, 2004, US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, based on the confession of Pakistani scientist Abdul Khan about the transfer of nuclear technology to the DPRK, made a statement that “the DPRK’s nuclear program has existed longer and is more developed than the United States believed.”

On May 22, 2004, the American newspaper The New York Times published an article according to which in 2001 the DPRK sold uranium used in weapons to Libya (and the IAEA, in turn, has evidence that this uranium was supplied from DPRK).

On June 7, 2004, the DPRK announced its intention to build up its own “nuclear deterrent forces,” the reason for which was an underground experiment using subcritical mass of plutonium conducted by the United States on May 25, 2004 at a test site in Nevada.

June 30, 2004 general secretary The ruling Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, Shinzo Abe, at a meeting with US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, stated that Japan is ready to compensate the DPRK for the missing part energy resources in exchange for concrete steps to freeze the nuclear program within the framework of general plan providing North Korea with humanitarian aid.

On July 24, 2004, the DPRK media published materials characterizing the US proposal to curtail the country’s nuclear program in exchange for economic assistance"fictitious". “The US proposals are not worthy of further consideration,” the DPRK leadership says.

On February 10, 2005, the DPRK announced its withdrawal from six-party negotiations (with the participation of Russia, the United States, the Republic of Korea, China and Japan) to resolve the crisis surrounding its nuclear program, and for the first time recognized the presence of its own nuclear weapons. According to the DPRK Foreign Ministry, nuclear weapons The countries are "fully defensive" and will remain a "nuclear deterrent."