Patriotic War (briefly). Church of the Life-Giving Trinity on Vorobyovy Gory

The official cause of the war was the violation of the terms of the Tilsit Peace by Russia and France. Russia, despite the blockade of England, accepted its ships under neutral flags in its ports. France annexed the Duchy of Oldenburg to its possessions. Napoleon considered Emperor Alexander's demand for the withdrawal of troops from the Duchy of Warsaw and Prussia to be offensive. The War of 1812 was becoming inevitable.

Here is a brief summary of the Patriotic War of 1812. Napoleon, at the head of a huge 600,000-strong army, crossed the Neman on June 12, 1812. The Russian army, numbering only 240 thousand people, was forced to retreat deeper into the country. In the battle of Smolensk, Bonaparte failed to win a complete victory and defeat the united 1st and 2nd Russian armies.

In August, M.I. Kutuzov was appointed commander-in-chief. He not only had talent strategist, but also enjoyed respect among soldiers and officers. He decided to give a general battle to the French near the village of Borodino. The positions for the Russian troops were chosen most successfully. The left flank was protected by flushes (earthen fortifications), and the right flank by the Koloch River. The troops of N.N. Raevsky were located in the center. and artillery.

Both sides fought desperately. The fire of 400 guns was directed at the flashes, which were courageously guarded by the troops under the command of Bagration. As a result of 8 attacks, Napoleonic troops suffered huge losses. They managed to capture Raevsky's batteries (in the center) only at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, but not for long. The French attack was contained thanks to a bold raid by the lancers of the 1st Cavalry Corps. Despite all the difficulties of bringing the old guard, the elite troops, into battle, Napoleon never risked it. Late in the evening the battle ended. The losses were enormous. The French lost 58, and the Russians 44 thousand people. Paradoxically, both commanders declared victory in the battle.

The decision to leave Moscow was made by Kutuzov at the council in Fili on September 1. This was the only way to maintain a combat-ready army. On September 2, 1812, Napoleon entered Moscow. Waiting for a peace proposal, Napoleon stayed in the city until October 7. As a result of fires, most of Moscow was destroyed during this time. Peace with Alexander 1 was never concluded.

Kutuzov stopped 80 km away. from Moscow in the village of Tarutino. He covered Kaluga, which had large reserves of fodder and the arsenals of Tula. The Russian army, thanks to this maneuver, was able to replenish its reserves and, importantly, update its equipment. At the same time, French foraging detachments were subjected to partisan attacks. The detachments of Vasilisa Kozhina, Fyodor Potapov, and Gerasim Kurin launched effective strikes, depriving the French army of the opportunity to replenish food supplies. The special detachments of A.V. Davydov also acted in the same way. and Seslavina A.N.

After leaving Moscow, Napoleon's army failed to get through to Kaluga. The French were forced to retreat along the Smolensk road, without food. Early severe frosts worsened the situation. The final defeat of the Great Army took place in the battle of the Berezina River on November 14–16, 1812. Of the 600,000-strong army, only 30,000 hungry and frozen soldiers left Russia. The manifesto on the victorious end of the Patriotic War was issued by Alexander 1 on December 25 of the same year. The victory of 1812 was complete.

In 1813 and 1814, the Russian army marched, liberating European countries from Napoleon's rule. Russian troops acted in alliance with the armies of Sweden, Austria, and Prussia. As a result, in accordance with the Treaty of Paris on May 18, 1814, Napoleon lost his throne and France returned to its 1793 borders.

24.

Decembrist revolt of 1825

Revolutionary ideas appeared in Russia in the 1st quarter of the 19th century. The progressive society of that time was disillusioned with the reign of Alexander 1. However, the best people countries sought to end the backwardness of society in Russia.

During the period of liberation campaigns, having become familiar with Western political movements, the advanced Russian nobility realized that serfdom was the most important reason for the backwardness of the fatherland. The harsh reactionary policy in the field of education, Russia's participation in the suppression of European revolutionary events only strengthened confidence in the urgent need for change. Russian serfdom was perceived as an insult to the national dignity of everyone who considered himself an enlightened person. The ideas of Western national liberation movements, Russian journalism and educational literature had a serious influence on the formation of the views of future Decembrists. Thus, we can highlight the following most important reasons for the Decembrist uprising. This is the strengthening of serfdom, the difficult socio-economic situation in the country, the refusal of Alexander 1 to carry out liberal reforms, the influence of the works of Western thinkers.

The first political secret society was formed in St. Petersburg in February 1816. His goal was to adopt a constitution in the country and abolish serfdom. It included Pestel, Muravyov, S.I. Muravyov-Apostles. and M.I. (total 28 members).

Later, in 1818, a larger organization, the Union of Welfare, was created in Moscow, which numbered up to 200 members. It also had councils in other cities of Russia. The purpose of the secret society was the idea of ​​promoting the abolition of serfdom. The officers began preparing for a coup. But the “Union of Welfare”, having never achieved its goal, disintegrated due to internal disagreements.

“Northern Society”, created on the initiative of N.M. Muravyov. in St. Petersburg, there was a more liberal attitude. Nevertheless, for this society, the most important goals were the proclamation of civil liberties, the destruction of serfdom and autocracy.

The conspirators were preparing for an armed uprising. And the opportune moment for implementing the plans came in November 1825, after the death of Emperor Alexander. Despite the fact that not everything was ready, the conspirators decided to act, and the Decembrist uprising took place in 1825. It was planned to carry out a coup, seize the Senate and the monarch, on the day Nicholas 1 took the oath.

On December 14, in the morning on Senate Square there was the Moscow Life Guards Regiment, as well as the Life Guards Grenadier and Guards Marine Regiments. In total, about 3 thousand people gathered in the square.

But Nicholas 1 was warned that a Decembrist uprising was being prepared on Senate Square. He swore in the Senate in advance. After this, he was able to gather the remaining loyal troops and surround Senate Square. Negotiations were started. They did not bring any results. From the government side, Metropolitan Seraphim and Miloradovich M.A., the governor of St. Petersburg, took part in them. Miloradovich was wounded during the negotiations, which became fatal. After this, by order of Nicholas 1, artillery was used. The Decembrist uprising of 1825 failed. Later, on December 29, S.I. Muravyov-Apostol was able to raise the Chernigov regiment. This rebellion was also suppressed by government troops on January 2. The results of the Decembrist uprising turned out to be far from the plans of the conspirators.

Arrests of participants and organizers of the uprising took place throughout Russia. 579 people were charged in this case. 287 were found guilty. Five were sentenced to death. These were S.I. Muravyov-Apostol, K.F. Ryleev, P.G. Pestel, M.P. Bestuzhev-Ryumin, P. G. Kakhovsky. 120 people were exiled to hard labor or to settlement in Siberia.

The Decembrist uprising, a summary of which is outlined above, failed not only because of the inconsistency of the actions of the conspirators, the unpreparedness of society for such radical changes, and the lack of support from the broad masses. However, the historical significance of the Decembrist uprising is difficult to overestimate. For the first time, a fairly clear political program was put forward, and an armed uprising took place against the authorities. And, although Nicholas 1 called the conspirators only crazy rebels, the consequences of the Decembrist uprising turned out to be extremely significant for the further history of Russia. And the brutal reprisal against them aroused sympathy in wide sections of society and forced many progressive people of that era to awaken.

25. Abolition of serfdom in Russia

The prerequisites for the abolition of serfdom arose back in late XVIII century. All layers of society considered the serfdom an immoral phenomenon that disgraced Russia. In order to stand on a par with European countries free from slavery, the Russian government was faced with the issue of abolishing serfdom.

The main reasons for the abolition of serfdom:

Serfdom became a brake on the development of industry and trade, which hampered the growth of capital and placed Russia in the category of secondary states;

The decline of the landowner economy due to the extremely ineffective labor of the serfs, which was expressed in the obviously poor performance of the corvee;

The increase in peasant revolts indicated that the serf system was a “powder keg” under the state;

Defeat in Crimean War(1853-1856) demonstrated backwardness political system in the country.

Alexander I tried to take the first steps in resolving the issue of abolishing serfdom, but his committee did not figure out how to bring this reform to life. Emperor Alexander limited himself to the law of 1803 on free cultivators.

Nicholas I in 1842 adopted the law “On Obligated Peasants”, according to which the landowner had the right to free the peasants by giving them a land allotment, and the peasants were obliged to bear duties in favor of the landowner for the use of the land. However, this law did not take root; the landowners did not want to let the peasants go.

In 1857, official preparations began for the abolition of serfdom. Emperor Alexander II ordered the establishment of provincial committees, which were supposed to develop projects to improve the life of serfs. Based on these projects, the drafting commissions drew up a bill, which was transferred to the Main Committee for consideration and establishment.

On February 19, 1861, Emperor Alexander II signed a manifesto on the abolition of serfdom and approved the “Regulations on peasants emerging from serfdom.” Alexander remained in history with the name “Liberator”.

Although liberation from slavery gave peasants some personal and civil freedoms, such as the right to marry, go to court, trade, enter the civil service etc., but they were limited in freedom of movement, as well as economic rights. In addition, peasants remained the only class that bore conscription duties and could be subject to corporal punishment.

The land remained the property of the landowners, and the peasants were allocated a settled estate and a field allotment, for which they had to serve duties (in money or work), which were almost no different from serfs. According to the law, peasants had the right to buy out an allotment and an estate, then they received complete independence and became peasant owners. Until then, they were called “temporarily obligated.” The ransom amounted to the annual quitrent amount multiplied by 17!

To help the peasantry, the government organized a special “redemption operation.” After the establishment of the land allotment, the state paid the landowner 80% of the value of the allotment, and 20% was assigned to the peasant as a government debt, which he had to repay in installments over 49 years.

Peasants united into rural societies, and they, in turn, united into volosts. The use of field land was communal, and to make “redemption payments” the peasants were bound by a mutual guarantee.

Household people who did not plow the land were temporarily obliged for two years, and then could register with a rural or urban society.

The agreement between landowners and peasants was set out in the “statutory charter”. And to sort out emerging disagreements, the position of peace mediators was established. The general management of the reform was entrusted to the “provincial presence for peasant affairs.”

The peasant reform created the conditions for the transformation of labor into goods, and market relations began to develop, which is typical for a capitalist country. The consequence of the abolition of serfdom was the gradual formation of new social strata of the population - the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.

Changes in the social, economic and political life of Russia after the abolition of serfdom forced the government to undertake other important reforms, which contributed to the transformation of our country into a bourgeois monarchy.

Tsar Alexander 2, son of Nicholas 1, was born on April 29, 1818. Since he was the heir to the throne, he received an excellent education and had deep, versatile knowledge. Suffice it to say that the education of the heir was carried out so different people like combat officer Merder and Zhukovsky. His father Nicholas 1 had a great influence on the personality and subsequent reign of Alexander 2.

Emperor Alexander 2 ascended the throne after the death of his father in 1855. It must be said that the young emperor already had quite serious management experience. He was entrusted with the duties of the sovereign during periods of absence from the capital of Nicholas 1. short biography This person, of course, cannot include all the most important dates and events, but it is simply necessary to mention that the internal policy of Alexander 2 brought with it serious changes in the life of the country.

MYTH ABOUT THE WAR OF 1812

Many myths have been created and are still being created about the War of 1812. The word myth, of course, should be understood simply as an outright lie and lie.
To strengthen this lie, not only textbooks and books written and published by lured and tame “historians” are used, but the media and even announcements in the subway are constantly used, as happens every September, when to my surprise I heard that Borodino is it turns out...victory of the Russian army! That's how! But more on that later.
Russian Army Headquarters

Before moving directly to the events of 1812, let’s consider what the headquarters of the Russian army was like and, if possible, compare it with the French headquarters.
The headquarters of the Russian army was represented almost entirely by foreigners:

Chief of Staff - General Leonty Leontyevich Bennigsen - in fact, neither Leonty Leontyevich, but Levin August Gottlieb Theophilus von Bennigsen, was born in Hanover - a German region, which at that time was under a protectorate English king, was a subject of the English king. However, since Napoleon occupied Hanover, it follows that the chief of staff was a legal subject of Napoleon.
Karl Fedorovich Toll - in fact, not Karl Fedorovich, but Karl Wilhelm von Toll - later stationed troops on the Borodino field.
The Russian army was commanded by Bagration, who was born in Georgia before joining Russia.
Mikhail Bogdanovich Barclay de Tolly - not Mikhail Bogdanovich, but Michael Andreas Barclay de Tolly, comes from German barons, and then by origin is a Scot.
Mikhail Kutuzov - comes from a Prussian family, and was also the owner of 6567 Russian slaves. Kutuzov preferred to undergo treatment, like all rich Russians, in Germany.
At Russian headquarters they spoke French - it was the main language. In addition to this, they spoke German and English, but not Russian. Only slave soldiers spoke Russian. More on why they are slaves a little later.

Military gallery of the Winter Palace

The famous military gallery of the Winter Palace gives us an excellent understanding of the headquarters of the Russian army. The Military Gallery of the Winter Palace contains a number of paintings by participants in the War of 1812. It’s curious, but most of the characters painted in these paintings were not painted from life, but long after their death, so paintings with Darth Vader and the Terminator could just as well be hanging there.
Another interesting point and irony is that these paintings were painted by the English artist George Dow, representing the only country that won on absolutely all counts during the war against Napoleon. And of course, we must pay attention to the fact that the palace itself was built not by a Russian architect, but, as usual, by an Italian architect - Bartolomeo Francesco Rastrelli.

http://pasteboard.co/1H3P2muNK.png

This is an amazing gallery of an amazing event - the Russians caused this war, lost all the battles of this war including: the battle of Smolensk, the general battle of Borodino, the battle of Maloyaroslavets, and were unable to defeat the retreating Napoleon at Berezina, when he had no artillery , no cavalry. The Russians suffered enormous human and material losses, while a huge number of human losses turned out to be the reason for the stupidity of both Kutuzov and Alexander, but nevertheless, these characters are in the Winter Palace as heroes!

Pedigree of the "Russian" Tsar - Alexander I

Let's look at his pedigree:
His father, Paul I, is the son of the German Catherine II, whose full name is Sophia Augusta Frederica of Anhalt-Zerbst.
Father of Paul I - Peter III - Peter Karl Ulrich Duke of Holstein-Gottorp.
Mother of Alexander I - Sophia Maria Dorothea Augusta Louise of Württemberg.
The wife of Alexander I is Louise Maria Augusta of Baden.

It is noteworthy that Alexander I did not speak Russian.
As we see, the king Russian Empire was as Russian as Napoleon.
By the way, many people don’t know, but Alexander I was not any Romanov. It was the Holstein-Gottorp dynasty of the House of Romanov, and not the Romanov dynasty i.e. Simply put, the Russian Empire was ruled by the Germans.
Thus, there was no difference between the non-Russian Napoleon and the non-Russian Alexander I. However, Alexander I, unlike Napoleon, is Orthodox, but apparently not very religious because... was a parricide.
Alexander, of course, did not kill himself; he “only” consented to the murder. The very murder of Alexander’s father, Paul I, was carried out with English money because England did not need peace between Alexander and Napoleon.

As a child, Alexander was brought up in an unhealthy psychological situation between his grandmother Catherine II and his father Paul I, who hated each other and, as contemporaries said, dreamed of killing each other. Thus, one can imagine how distorted the psyche of the “Russian” tsar was.

It should be added that Alexander I was embarrassed by his own people whom he ruled and dreamed of ruling the civilized French.

But here is one of the most curious and shameful facts about the so-called Romanovs, which Russian interpreters of history keep silent: in 1810 - 1811. Alexander I sold about 10 thousand state peasants into serfdom!
(“World of News.” 08/31/2012, p. 26; for more information about this “seasonal sale” and about the situation of the sovereign’s slaves, about how these Russian Orthodox people were sold off in order, so to speak, to buy new gloves, see: Druzhinin N. M. State peasants and the reform of P. D. Kiselev. M.-L., vol. 1, 1946).

Speaking about Alexander, one cannot fail to mention the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, who for 40 years made the foreign policy of that country - this is Karl Vasilyevich Nesselrode, who in fact is not Karl Vasilyevich, as Russian “historians” usually write, but Karl Robert von Nesselrode is a German , a man who did not know Russian and did not even learn it in 40 years!
In general, note how the authors of interpretations of Russian history try to deceive every foreigner in power in Russia into being Russian, or rather, not even to do so, but to present their leadership to the Russians as Russians like themselves.

However, even the names already indicate colonial rule by foreigners, as has always been the case among the Slavs: let us remember that at first they were ruled by the Khazars, Avars and Normans, then by the Tatars, then by the Germans. This is extremely interesting.
As for the Russian people (and in fact, in addition to the Russian people, the Russian Empire included, as now, almost two hundred other peoples), these people shed blood for this leadership and for nothing more.

What was the Russian army and the population of the Russian Empire like?

Even in the 19th century, Russia was an extremely backward agrarian country, with a slave-feudal system. 98.5% of the Russian population were slaves, who are called “serfs” in historiography.
The Russian army, considering soldiers and not officers, consisted not of free people, but of the very slaves that the slave-owners were supposed to supply to the army. This scheme was called recruiting. It consisted in the fact that the serf slave was torn out from the “family” and sent to serve. The word “family” is put in quotation marks because... The family of a serf slave was very conditional - at any moment the master could sell his family to different parts of the country. Also, the master could at any time use the wife or daughters (even minors) of a serf slave for his bed games. Well, if the master had a certain kind of sexual promiscuity, then he could use not only the daughters of a serf slave, but also his sons.
Service in the Russian army lasted 25 years, the Russian soldier received nothing for it. It was a duty. Naturally, if he did not die during these 25 years, then he had nowhere to return and he could no longer start a family. So, the best option for a Russian soldier it was to die during service.
Unlike the French army, the Russian army was not accompanied by brothels, and Russian soldiers were not paid money. For example, Napoleon paid French soldiers in gold Napoleons.
Thus, a Russian serf slave, forcibly taken into the Russian army, could not realize his sexual desires, and naturally, as happens in similar cases in the modern Russian army or in Russian prisons, pederasty between soldiers was widely developed in the Russian army.

Human differences in France and Russia

To understand the cause of fear and aggression European countries to France of those years, it is necessary to quote a passage from the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of the French Republic, written by Napoleon:

Now let's compare this declaration in France with the fact that in Russia 98.5% of the Russian population were serfs.
It is noteworthy that this phrase from the declaration also shatters all the stories about the supposed partisan movement of peasants against Napoleon. Let’s imagine a situation: a “commissar” responsible for propaganda work comes to a Russian slave and declares something like: “the adversary Napoleon has prepared a terrible attack for you, he says that all people - and you, slaves, and your landowners and even "your king - are born free and equal in rights! Do you really want to be free and equal in rights with the landowners and the king? No?! That's it! Let us defend together, with arms in hand, your right to be slaves!"
And the peasants, in response, throw their hats up and shout: “Hurray, let’s defend our slavery! Let’s defeat the scoundrel Napoleon, who declared that everyone is born free and equal.”
Are you, reader, ready to believe in such a reaction from the peasants?

Causes of the War of 1812

Russia and France had no objective reasons for the war of 1805, 1807, 1812. Geographically, Russia did not have common borders with France, so there were no territorial disputes. Economically, there was no competition either, because France of the 19th century is a capitalist country with a developing industry, while Russia is an extremely backward agricultural country with a feudal-slave system, unable to produce anything for export except natural resources (timber), wheat and hemp. France's only real rival in economics was Britain.

Russian professional (and therefore paid) interpreters (!) of Russian history explain that the reason why Alexander was preparing for war with Napoleon was allegedly that due to joining the trade blockade, Russia was losing huge money, which allegedly ruined the economy, as was a necessary reason for preparations for war.
This is a lie! And the fact that this is a lie is proven statistically!

1) Alexander joined the blog only at the end of 1808, when the financial crisis was already extremely noticeable.
2) After Britain joined the trade blockade, British goods immediately began to arrive in Russia under a neutral flag, which completely neutralized Russia’s accession to the blockade. The situation is similar to how, after Moscow’s trade sanctions against the Russian Federation in 2015, bananas began to come from Belarus, as did sea fish.
3) In 1808, the first peaceful year after the conclusion of the Peace of Tilsit, according to the decree of Alexander I, military expenditures increased from 63.4 million rubles in 1807 to 118.5 million rubles. - i.e. the difference is twofold! And naturally, as a result of such military spending, a financial crisis occurred.
1) In a report to Alexander I, Chancellor Rumyantsev writes that financial problems do not come from joining the blockade, but from spending on the army, and this is statistically verified: losses from the blockade were 3.6 million rubles. and spending on the army has been increased by more than 50 million rubles - the difference is obvious!

Thus, it is clearly seen from the statistics that the cause of the war was not trade sanctions.

And long before the events of 1812, the day after the conclusion of the Peace of Tilsit, Alexander writes a letter to his mother that “this is a temporary respite” and begins to create an invasion army.

The main real causes of the War of 1812 can be identified as follows:

1) Fear that ideas about equality will spread to Russia. In order not to be unfounded, you can compare a quote from the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of the French Republic, written by Napoleon:

"people are born and remain free and equal in rights, social differences can only be based on the common benefit"

And by the fact that Russia was a slave-owning country, where there could be no talk of any equality!
1) Another reason was the national inferiority complex of Tsar Alexander I, who realized what a defective country he lived in, and he so wanted to hang out and be equal to all these kings ruling in civilized countries, for which he obviously went out of his way to be first among the general discontent of the old royal Europe, who were most frightened by the ideas of equal rights of the French. Therefore, Alexander’s actions very closely resemble the actions of Soviet and post-Soviet figures, such as Gorbachev, Yeltsin, etc. who did anything to be accepted in the Western Club, praised and considered equal.
Alexander I, of course, was a king, like many other European monarchs of that time, but unlike them, Alexander was the king of an extremely backward slave-owning and impoverished country, which had a huge but uninhabited size, where civilization itself was absent even where there was life. He was the king of a country where all the rich people lived abroad most of the year and often did not even know Russian. He was the king of a country where all the nobility spoke exclusively French.

Russian interventions of 1805-1807 and preparation for the war of 1812

Starting from the very first days of the French Revolution, other countries began to prepare for intervention because... the air of freedom was too dangerous for European monarchies. The interventions lasted continuously from 1791 to 1815.
Russia showed direct aggression 3 times: this was Suvorov’s campaign in Italy in 1799, while Napoleon was busy in Egypt, as well as two aggressions as part of anti-Napoleonic coalitions in 1805 and 1807. Russia began preparations for the fourth aggression immediately after the conclusion of the Peace of Tilsit, and the immediate concentration of troops already in 1810, with the intention of moving towards France in the near future.

Since 1805, the war against Napoleon was sponsored by Britain by buying Russian soldiers, or rather paying the Russian Tsar for this participation. The prices were not so hot, so for every 100 thousand soldiers the British paid the Russian Tsar 1 million 250 thousand pounds. Although this is not so much money, for a country that can only sell timber and hemp, it was significant money, especially since the life of the population was worth nothing, and Alexander could do a great job with this money.

The Russian intervention began in 1805, when Alexander I created an anti-French coalition and sent troops across half of Europe - through Austria to France. As a result of this campaign, all these troops were completely defeated at Austerlitz, where the famous Russian commander, Mikhail Kutuzov, commanded. In the future, Kutuzov will also be defeated at Borodino, but in Russian historiography, interpreters of Russian history will write him down as a brilliant commander.

In 1807, Alexander took part in a new war against France.
And on June 2, 1807, Alexander’s troops were defeated again, already near Friedland. However, even this time, Napoleon again did not pursue the defeated Russians! And he didn’t even cross the borders of Russia, although if he had suddenly planned a campaign against Russia, it would have been difficult to imagine a better moment: the country was without an army and its military leaders were completely demoralized. However, Napoleon pursued only peace with Russia. This explains not only the fact that he allowed the defeated units of the Russian army to leave, did not pursue them, did not cross the border with Russia, but moreover, for the sake of peace and good relations, he equipped almost 7,000 captured Russian soldiers at the expense of the French treasury and 130 generals and staff officers and on July 18, 1800 sent them free of charge and without any exchange back to Russia. Trying to secure peace, Napoleon did not demand indemnity in Tilsit from Russia, which was punished three times (twice by him personally) for aggression. Moreover, Russia also received the Bialystok region! All for the sake of peace.

A striking example of Russian aggression in the war against Napoleon is the convened militia in 1806 in the amount of as many as 612,000 people!
Think about this word - militia. It a priori means military corps made up of local residents to fight the occupier on their territory. But what kind of occupier was there for the Russians in Russia in 1806? Napoleon wasn't even close! So, this militia was created for intervention in France. Looking ahead, it should be noted that the militia were serfs who were recruited from the landowners according to orders. However, having recruited this militia, Alexander I deceived the landowners who allocated serf slaves and tonsured them as recruits. In the future, this act will be reflected in the quality of the militia of 1812, when the landowners, remembering how the tsar deceived them, will give only the crippled and sick to the militia.

The fight against Napoleon was carried out not only on the battlefield, but also in the field of faith and religion. So in 1806 Orthodox Alexander orders the Synod (church ministry) to declare anathema to the Catholic Napoleon. And the unbelieving Catholic Napoleon was declared anathema by the Russian Orthodox Church, and at the same time they declared him the Antichrist. Napoleon was probably surprised, as was the Roman Catholic Church.
The ridiculousness of this anathema was revealed in 1807 at the conclusion of the Peace of Tilsit. Realizing that when signing peace, Alexander would have to kiss Napoleon, the “Antichrist,” the Russian Orthodox Church lifted the anathema. True, it was announced later anyway.
Another ridiculousness of the conclusion of peace in 1807 was that Alexander presented Napoleon with the Order of St. Andrew the First-Called, which was the highest award of the Russian Empire.

Be that as it may, but already in 1810, three Russian armies were already standing on the western border, ready for a new intervention, and on October 27 and 29, 1811, a series of “highest orders” were signed to the corps commanders, which ordered them to prepare for an operation right on the river Vistula!

On October 5 (old style), 1811, the Russian-Prussian military convention against France was signed. However, at the last moment, the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia were afraid to openly fight Napoleon again and agreed only to secret agreements that in the event of war they would not seriously act against Russia.

Thus, Napoleon began to gather troops later than Alexander and with the goal of defeating the Russians before they united with Prussia and Austria.
Throughout the spring of 1812, Napoleon waited in Dresden for the Russian offensive, so he did not move. It was impossible to wait indefinitely, so Napoleon went on the offensive himself, but lost the advantageous time and started the war at a time when it was no longer being started - the crossing of troops began on June 24!

Indisputable evidence that Napoleon not only did not intend to cross the border, but, having reliable intelligence information, was preparing to defend against Alexander’s aggression (as was always the case in previous years): The most important part of Napoleon’s correspondence in 1810 - the first half of 1812. dedicated to ensuring the strengthening of fortifications in the Warsaw region (Handelsman M. Instrukcje i depeszerezydentów francuskich w Warszawie. T. 2, Warszawa, 1914, p. 46; Correspondance de Napoleon I.P., 1863, V. 23, p. 149 - 150). Napoleon constantly warned his marshals. “If the Russians do not start aggression, the most important thing will be to conveniently position the troops, provide them with food well and build bridgeheads on the Vistula,” May 16, 1812 to the chief of the main headquarters. “...If the Russians do not move forward, my desire will be to spend the whole of April here, limiting myself to active work on the construction of the bridge in Marienburg...” - March 30. “...While the enemy will begin offensive operations...” - June 10. “...If enemy troops press on you... retreat to Kovno to cover this city...” wrote Marshal L.A. Berthier to General S.L.D. Grandjean June 26.

And finally, the main, legal proof that Russia started the war:
Back on June 16 (i.e., eight days before Napoleon crossed the Neman!) the head of the French Foreign Ministry, the Duke de Bassano, certified a note on the cessation of diplomatic relations with Russia, officially notifying the European governments of this. On June 22, the French Ambassador J. A. Lauriston informed the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry about the following: “... my mission ended, since Prince A. B. Kurakin’s request to issue him passports meant a break, and His Imperial and Royal Majesty from now on considers himself in a state of war with Russia."
This means that Russia was the first to declare war on France.

Patriotic War

The war of 1812 was short - only 6 months: moreover, only 2.5 of them were on “original Russian” territory. Even rumors that there was a war going on somewhere did not reach the entire population! And given that the speed of news dissemination took a month or more, for many the war was still “going on” for a whole month or even more than one, after it ended. To compare how the post office worked in France: within a day, news was delivered to the most remote corners of the empire.

The beginning of the war, which Alexander I himself was preparing, began with the fact that he decided to abandon both his armies and Moscow and fled straight from the ball to St. Petersburg.

The Russian military headquarters accepted Bernadotte's idea, received from Sweden, about the need to retreat using the presence of a vast territory and its uninhabited nature. The Russian headquarters understood that they could not defeat Napoleon in an open battle. At the same time, they retreated very quickly, so much so that the French cavalry vanguard wrote reports that they were losing sight of the retreating Russian infantry!

The War of 1812 was declared a Patriotic War in Russian history. But was this war domestic?
No, this war was never domestic!
First of all, we see that none of the countries of the anti-Napoleonic coalition, through whose territory Napoleon walked more than once, declared these wars domestic! Such an announcement occurred only in Russia, and even then, several decades after the end of this war. The War of 1812 was declared patriotic only in 1837 on the orders of Nicholas I and, as will be shown below, its purpose was to conceal the uprising of serf slaves.
In general, before we talk about national patriotism in the context of this war, we must understand that the Russian Empire in 1812 was an empire that occupied about 200 nations and thus, the empire and national patriotism, in principle, do not combine. Indeed, what kind of national patriotism should, for example, Buryats or Chukchi or even Tatars feel in relation to the occupying country?
To clearly show how Russian interpreters of history bypass national question, it is enough to quote what they write approximately as follows: let’s judge the nature of the war only by the territory from Smolensk to Moscow. They (the interpreters of Russian history) are inconvenient for the Lithuanian corps in Napoleon’s army, which clearly shows how the Lithuanian people occupied by the Russians perceived the “patriotic war”, they are inconvenient for the Little Russian partisans who acted against the “Muscovites” (who were hated then just as now), they are inconvenient for the Baltic collaborators (although there were many of them in the original Russian provinces), etc. They are not interested in the fact that recruitment was not even carried out in Georgia, which once again shows what kind of “patriotic war” this is for the occupied lands. Thus, the territory of Lithuania, Courland, “Little Russia”, former Polish lands in the area of ​​​​modern Belarus, vast Asian expanses and tribes, Georgia, Siberia and Far East(even news of the war reached them at least a month late), domestic “historian scientists” annexed and destroyed captured Finland from the Russian Empire in favor of their ambitious idea of ​​a “patriotic” war.

But maybe the Russians themselves should have felt this national patriotism?
This is the picture statistics give us about the Russian population:
98.5% of the Russian population of Russia are serfs.
A serf slave is a person with whom the slave owner could do absolutely whatever he wanted. The slave owner could sell him and his family either together or separately. A slave owner could breed slaves by selling their offspring. The slave owner could have sex and rape the wife of a slave (if he had one) or the daughters of a slave (if he had them), regardless of their age (the example with Kutuzov will further show that the younger the age of the slaves, the better). A slave owner could maim, beat and, in principle, even kill a slave and he would have nothing to do with it! Moreover, by decree of Catherine II, slaves who complained about their masters were sent to hard labor and exile in Siberia.
So you can imagine the uncontrollable outrage that Russian slave owners committed. And such slaves were 98.5% of the entire Slavic population.
Therefore, we cannot talk about a patriotic war, because... Slaves have no fatherland! They are not even citizens of the country, they are just talking things, slaves.
Slaves absolutely do not care who their master is today. Yesterday it could have had one owner, today another, and tomorrow there will be a third, and all these owners could be from completely different regions of the country. Its owner is the one who bought it today!
The serf slave also could not understand where he was located geographically, because... In principle, he had never been further than the neighboring village and did not know what was next; in his understanding, the world ended beyond the borders of the neighboring village that he knew about. The serf slaves also had no education. To clearly see that the Russian peasants did not recognize themselves as “citizens” of the country, it is enough to give an example of how they answered the question “who are they?” the unfortunates answered that they were “such and such a master " or "from such and such a village, volost" ("Kutuzovsky", "Ryazansky" - but not Russian!)
In total, Slavic peasants (serfs and a small part - state) made up 98.5% of the Slavic population! Therefore, it is not surprising that when Napoleon entered Moscow, most of the districts declared their allegiance to Napoleon. Russian serf slaves - peasants just said “we are now Napoleon’s”!
And we must admit that they were right, because their owner simply changed!

Therefore, it is not surprising that during those 36 days that Napoleon was in Moscow, no peasants or the Russian army tried to knock Napoleon out of there. The motive of the Russian army is clear - they had already been defeated and they were afraid of a new battle, so they simply played for time in the hope of the winter, that Napoleon would have to leave himself, and the serf slaves did not attack because their master had simply changed.

Russian peasants in 1812 refused to defend “faith, tsar and fatherland” because they did not feel a connection between themselves and all this verbiage! And even the French were horrified by the inhumane situation of the Russians: General Zh.D. Kompan wrote that pigs in France live better and cleaner than serfs in Russia (Goldenkov M. Op. cit., p. 203). So telling tales about how serf slaves, living worse than French pigs, allegedly fought for their slavery against the French is simply typical disrespect and contempt for the Slavs.

The destruction of a landowner's estate (Painting by V.N. Kurdyumov):

http://pasteboard.co/gWDkKUKoz.png

With all this, we must not forget that Russian military leaders carried out the so-called “scorched earth” tactics, which consisted in burning peasant houses, their crops - everything that had been acquired through back-breaking labor. And this once again shows who the real enemy was for the Russian peasant - not the Frenchman, who carried the ideas of freedom and equality on bayonets and did not carry out the tactics of total destruction, but precisely the Russian soldiers who burned and robbed everything, as well as the landowners who for centuries mocked their slaves.

Against this background, propaganda statements that peasants, acting as partisans, killed the French, look absurd. Let's look at this photo, taken somewhat later than those events, but in which we can observe all the hopelessness of the life of Russian serf slaves:

http://pasteboard.co/gWDXAoFIf.png

Now let’s compare this hopelessness and the realities of slavery with those propaganda paintings and stories that began to be created at the behest of Nicholas I and later, for example, one of these paintings depicting a serf slave named Vasilisa, who allegedly fights the French and kills them:

://pasteboard.co/1H41Db9Fd.png

Try to compare paintings on this topic with paintings and photographs of Russian slaves in the Russian Empire to understand that this could not have happened in principle.
It should be noted that there could be no unity between the slaves and the oppressors (landowners and the tsar) and no patriotism among the slaves!

Changes in the political elite of the Russian Empire did not affect the serf slaves in any way - they did not care who their owner was, especially since they would benefit from Napoleon. Napoleon began to free the serfs.

But since this war was not domestic for the slaves, then maybe it was domestic for the soldiers?
No, I wasn't. Soldiers in the Russian army are slaves for whom their landowner prepared an even more bitter fate by sending them to the Russian army, where the best fate for them could only be death. And they did not come there voluntarily, even being serf slaves, they preferred to remain serf slaves than to become serf soldiers.

But since this war was not domestic for slaves and soldiers, then maybe it was domestic for the nobles? Let's figure out what the nobles lost from the arrival of Napoleon and how patriotic they were.
So they were nobles, spoke French, lived abroad most of the year, read French novels written in French, listened to French music, drank French wine and ate French food.
What is war on the part of the conqueror? is a loss of independence and way of life.
But what kind of lifestyle could the Russian nobles lose if they already lived in the image and likeness of the conquerors?!
And what way of life could serf slaves lose? - only your slavery and nothing more.
Their theoretical changes from Napoleon's rise to power would have been zero - they were already living like French.
However, Napoleon had no intention of conquering them and introducing his own rules; the whole purpose of his war was to destroy the threat from Russia and conclude peace, which he insisted on until the very last moment.

Speaking about the level of patriotism of the nobles, it is necessary to give a clear example that will perfectly demonstrate their level of noble patriotism:
After the war, the government allowed (but then quickly canceled this initiative) applications for compensation for war damage.
Here is a small list of what the nobles demanded compensation:

Count Golovin's claim - 229 thousand rubles.
Count Tolstov's claim - 200 thousand rubles.
Prince Trubitkov's claim is almost 200 thousand rubles.
But in the register of Prince Zaseikin, among other things, the following are listed: 4 jugs for cream, 2 pancakes, a cup for broth.
The daughter of foreman Artemonov demanded: new stockings and chemisettes.

The level of patriotism of the nobles is simply brilliant! - Replace the stockings and chemisettes, and don’t forget the jugs - we lost them because of this war!

However, the investigation showed that all this was stolen by peasants who hated their masters, and not by the French. Speaking of thieves-peasants: this once again shows what cared about the serf slaves during the offensive of the interventionists - they were concerned about the opportunity to steal, and not to partisans!

Let us return, however, to the course of the war. Many imagine it as the seizure of the entire territory of Russia by hordes. But in fact, this was a small campaign that mostly went along the territory of the so-called “Smolensk road”, which was not even a road. was even unpaved!
Thus, due to objective reasons (territory, lack of decent infrastructure), the War of 1812 was only of an extremely local nature!
Why has no one ever written about this? Perhaps because pseudo-patriotic ideologists did not consider the population of most of the country to be people? From Smolensk to Moscow - Russia, and then - foreign, temporarily occupied lands?

The most important point of the events of those times is that at the same time there was a massive peasant uprising! And this uprising was not against the French, as well-paid Russian artists show us and well-paid Russian interpreters of history tell us, it was an uprising against the landowners and the Tsar! The numbers alone speak volumes: out of 49 provinces of the Russian Empire, 32 provinces were engulfed in a peasant uprising! And only 16 provinces were in one way or another involved in a direct war with the French. However, this does not mean that battles took place in these 16 provinces. This only means that either there were some military units there, or some newspapers were distributed, these are just provinces where they somehow knew about the war. But the Russian Tsar at that time waged the real war not with Napoleon, but with the rebel slaves of 32 provinces! That is why, trying to hide the causes of the war and the course of the war and this slave uprising, the term about the supposedly “patriotic” war was invented!
One of the main subjects of correspondence between Russian nobles of that time was the fear that the peasants, among whom there was already a rumor that “Napoleon came to give us freedom,” would rise up in revolt. In parallel with this, there is a murmur from landowners who have lost their estates.

Battle of Borodino

Before talking about the Battle of Borodino, it is necessary to dispel one of the myths of Russian history about the so-called “countless hordes” of Napoleon.
After crossing the Neman River, the French entered territory that was recently occupied by Russia and was not Russian territory.
In the first echelon, Napoleon brought in 390-440 thousand people, but this does not mean that this number reached Moscow, it only means that they dispersed to garrisons and after Smolensk Napoleon had only about 160 thousand.
And already near Moscow, at Borodino, the number was as follows:
The French have about 130 thousand soldiers minus the 18862 guard, which did not participate in the battle. Thus, the number of French participating in the battle was approximately 111 thousand and 587 guns.
The Russians have about 157 thousand soldiers, including 30 thousand militias and Cossacks, as well as 640 guns.
As we can see, the numerical advantage was with the Russians, whose numbers outnumbered the French army by 30%, while we should not forget about another 251 thousand population of Moscow (not counting other cities), which can quickly provide human resources.
On the Borodino field itself, the Russians were in a fortified position, having redoubts, flushes, etc. and according to military rules, the attackers had to have at least 1/3 more people in the fortifications in order to successfully fight with those in the fortifications.
However, in a battle where the Russians had both a numerical and fortified advantage, the Russians were defeated. Kutuzov lost all the fortifications: Ranevsky’s battery, Bagration’s flashes, Utinsky Kurgan, Shevardinsky redoubts, etc. and the Russians retreated, surrendering Moscow without a fight (by the way, which had fortified walls and a fortress - the Kremlin) and fleeing to Tarutino.
It is noteworthy that when escaping from Moscow, the Russians abandoned many guns and more than 22,500 of their wounded soldiers - they were in such a hurry, but they found time to ruin all the fire hydrants and hoses in the city. After which, on the orders of Governor General Rostopchin, the city was set on fire. In the flames of the fire, almost all of the more than 22,500 wounded Russian soldiers abandoned by the Russians were burned alive. Kutuzov knew about the impending arson, but did not even try to save the wounded soldiers.

It is curious that after the defeat at Borodino, which Kutuzov literally slept through while it was going on, Kutuzov writes a denunciation accusing Barclay de Tolly of the defeat.
Kutuzov’s undoubted guilt lies in the subsequent huge non-combat losses (more than 100 thousand soldiers!), since he did not take care of provisions and winter clothing for the army, but constantly slept and had fun with a 14-year-old Cossack girl.
On September 20, Rostopchin wrote to Alexander I: “Prince Kutuzov is no more - no one sees him; he still lies and sleeps a lot. The soldier despises him and hates him. He does not dare to do anything; a young girl

A. Northen "Napoleon's Retreat from Moscow"

As you know, war usually begins when a lot of reasons and circumstances converge at one point, when mutual claims and grievances reach enormous proportions, and the voice of reason is drowned out.

Background

After 1807, Napoleon marched victoriously across Europe and beyond, and only Great Britain did not want to submit to him: it seized French colonies in America and India and dominated the sea, interfering with French trade. The only thing Napoleon could do in such a situation was to declare a continental blockade of Great Britain (after the Battle of Trafalgar on October 21, 1805, Napoleon lost the opportunity to fight England at sea, where she became almost the only ruler). He decided to disrupt England's trade by closing all European ports to it, dealing a crushing blow to Britain's trade and economy. But the effectiveness of the continental blockade depended on other European states and their compliance with sanctions. Napoleon persistently demanded that Alexander I more consistently implement the continental blockade, but for Russia, Great Britain was the main trading partner, and she did not want to break off trade relations with her.

P. Delaroche "Napoleon Bonaparte"

In 1810, Russia introduced free trade with neutral countries, which allowed it to trade with Great Britain through intermediaries, and also adopted a protective tariff that increased customs rates mainly on imported French goods. Napoleon was outraged by Russian policies. But he also had a personal reason for the war with Russia: in order to confirm the legitimacy of his coronation, he wanted to marry a representative of one of the monarchies, but Alexander I twice rejected his proposals: the first time for a marriage with his sister Grand Duchess Catherine, and then with Grand Duchess Anna. Napoleon married the daughter of the Austrian Emperor Franz I, but declared in 1811: “ In five years I will be the ruler of the whole world. There is only Russia left - I will crush it...." At the same time, Napoleon continued to violate the Truce of Tilsit by occupying Prussia. Alexander demanded that French troops be withdrawn from there. In a word, the military machine began to spin: Napoleon concluded a military treaty with the Austrian Empire, which pledged to provide France with an army of 30 thousand for the war with Russia, then followed by an agreement with Prussia, which provided another 20 thousand soldiers for Napoleon’s army, and the French emperor himself intensively studied the military and economic situation of Russia, preparing for war with it. But Russian intelligence was not asleep either: M.I. Kutuzov successfully concludes a peace treaty with Turkey (ending the 5-year war for Moldova), thereby liberating the Danube Army under the command of Admiral Chichagov; in addition, information about the state of the Grand French Army and its movements was regularly intercepted at the Russian embassy in Paris.

Thus, both sides prepared for war. The size of the French army was, according to various sources, from 400 to 500 thousand soldiers, of which only half were French, the remaining soldiers were 16 nationalities, mainly Germans and Poles. Napoleon's army was well armed and financially secure. Its only weakness was precisely the diversity of its national composition.

The size of the Russian army: the 1st Army of Barclay de Tolly and the 2nd Army of Bagration were 153 thousand soldiers + the 3rd Army of Tormasov 45 thousand + the Danube Army of Admiral Chichagov 55 thousand + the Finnish corps of Steingel 19 thousand + a separate corps of Essen nearby Riga 18 thousand + 20-25 thousand Cossacks = approximately 315 thousand. Technically, Russia did not lag behind France. But embezzlement flourished in the Russian army. England provided Russia with material and financial support.

Barclay de Tolly. Lithograph by A. Munster

Starting the war, Napoleon did not plan to send his troops deep into Russia; his plans were to create a complete continental blockade of England, then include Belarus, Ukraine and Lithuania in Poland and create a Polish state as a counterbalance to the Russian Empire, in order to then conclude a military alliance with Russia and move together towards India. Truly Napoleonic plans! Napoleon hoped to end the battle with Russia in the border areas with his victory, so the retreat of Russian troops into the interior of the country took him by surprise.

Alexander I foresaw this circumstance (disastrous for the French army to advance in depth): “ If Emperor Napoleon starts a war against me, then it is possible and even probable that he will beat us if we accept the battle, but this will not yet give him peace. ... We have an immense space behind us, and we will maintain a well-organized army. ... If the lot of arms decides the case against me, then I would rather retreat to Kamchatka than cede my provinces and sign treaties in my capital that are only a respite. The Frenchman is brave, but long hardships and bad climate tire and discourage him. Our climate and our winter will fight for us“, he wrote to the French Ambassador to Russia A. Caulaincourt.

Beginning of the war

The first skirmish with the French (a company of sappers) occurred on June 23, 1812, when they crossed to the Russian coast. And at 6 o’clock in the morning on June 24, 1812, the vanguard of the French troops entered Kovno. In the evening of the same day, Alexander I was informed about Napoleon's invasion. Thus began the Patriotic War of 1812.

Napoleon's army attacked simultaneously in the northern, central and southern directions. For the northern direction, the main task was to capture St. Petersburg (after first occupying Riga). But as a result of the battles near Klyastitsy and on August 17 near Polotsk (a battle between the 1st Russian Infantry Corps under the command of General Wittgenstein and the French corps of Marshal Oudinot and General Saint-Cyr). This battle did not have serious consequences. Over the next two months, the parties did not conduct active hostilities, accumulating forces. Wittgenstein's task was prevent the French from advancing towards St. Petersburg, Saint-Cyr blocked the Russian corps.

The main battles took place in the Moscow direction.

The 1st Western Russian Army was stretched from Baltic Sea to Belarus (Lida). It was headed by Barclay de Tolly, chief of staff - General A.P. Ermolov. Russian army was threatened with destruction in parts, because Napoleonic army advanced rapidly. 2nd Western Army, led by P.I. Bagration, was located near Grodno. Bagration's attempt to connect with Barclay de Tolly's 1st Army was unsuccessful, and he retreated to the south. But the Cossacks of Ataman Platov supported Bagration’s army at Grodno. On July 8, Marshal Davout took Minsk, but Bagration, bypassing Minsk to the south, moved to Bobruisk. According to the plan, two Russian armies were to unite in Vitebsk in order to block the French road to Smolensk. A battle took place near Saltanovka, as a result of which Raevsky delayed Davout’s advance to Smolensk, but the path to Vitebsk was closed.

N. Samokish "The feat of Raevsky's soldiers near Saltanovka"

On July 23, Barclay de Tolly's 1st Army arrived in Vitebsk with the goal of waiting for the 2nd Army. Barclay de Tolly sent Osterman-Tolstoy's 4th Corps to meet the French, which fought near Vitebsk, near Ostrovno. However, the armies still could not reunite, and then Barclay de Tolly retreated from Vitebsk to Smolensk, where both Russian armies united on August 3. On August 13, Napoleon also set out for Smolensk, having rested in Vitebsk.

The 3rd Russian Southern Army was commanded by General Tormasov. The French General Rainier stretched his corps along a line of 179 km: Brest-Kobrin-Pinsk, Tormasov took advantage of the irrational location of the French army and defeated it near Kobrin, but, uniting with the corps of General Schwarzenberg, Rainier attacked Tormasov, and he was forced to retreat to Lutsk.

To Moscow!

Napoleon is credited with the phrase: “ If I take Kyiv, I will take Russia by the feet; if I take possession of St. Petersburg, I will take her by the head; Having occupied Moscow, I will strike her in the heart" Whether Napoleon spoke these words or not is now impossible to establish for sure. But one thing is clear: the main forces of Napoleonic army were aimed at capturing Moscow. On August 16, Napoleon was already at Smolensk with an army of 180 thousand and on the same day he began his assault. Barclay de Tolly did not consider it possible to fight here and retreated with his army from the burning city. The French Marshal Ney was pursuing the retreating Russian army, and the Russians decided to give him battle. On August 19, a bloody battle took place at Valutina Mountain, as a result of which Ney suffered heavy losses and was detained. The battle for Smolensk is the beginning of the people's, Patriotic, war: the population began to leave their homes and burn settlements along the route of the French army. Here Napoleon seriously doubted his brilliant victory and asked General P.A., who was captured in the battle of Valutina Gora. Tuchkova to write a letter to his brother so that he would bring to the attention of Alexander I Napoleon’s desire to make peace. He did not receive a response from Alexander I. Meanwhile, relations between Bagration and Barclay de Tolly after Smolensk became increasingly tense and irreconcilable: each saw his own path to victory over Napoleon. On August 17, the Extraordinary Committee approved Infantry General Kutuzov as the single commander-in-chief, and on August 29, in Tsarevo-Zaimishche, he already received the army. Meanwhile, the French had already entered Vyazma...

V. Kelerman "Moscow militias on the Old Smolensk Road"

M.I. Kutuzov, by that time already a famous military leader and diplomat, who served under Catherine II, Paul I, participated in the Russian-Turkish wars, in the Russian-Polish war, fell into disgrace with Alexander I in 1802, was removed from office and lived in his Goroshki estate in the Zhitomir region. But when Russia joined the coalition to fight Napoleon, he was appointed commander-in-chief of one of the armies and showed himself to be an experienced commander. But after the Austerlitz defeat, which Kutuzov opposed and which Alexander I insisted on, although he did not blame Kutuzov for the defeat, and even awarded him the Order of St. Vladimir, 1st degree, he did not forgive him for the defeat.

At the beginning of the Patriotic War of 1812, Kutuzov was appointed head of the St. Petersburg and then the Moscow militia, but the unsuccessful course of the war showed that an experienced commander of the entire Russian army was needed who enjoyed the trust of society. Alexander I was forced to appoint Kutuzov as commander-in-chief of the Russian army and militia.

Kutuzov initially continued Barclay de Tolly's strategy - retreat. The words are attributed to him: « We will not defeat Napoleon. We will deceive him».

At the same time, Kutuzov understood the need for a general battle: firstly, this was required by public opinion, which was concerned about the constant retreat of the Russian army; secondly, further retreat would mean the voluntary surrender of Moscow.

On September 3, the Russian army stood near the village of Borodino. Here Kutuzov decided to give a big battle, but in order to distract the French to gain time to prepare fortifications, he ordered General Gorchakov to fight near the village of Shevardino, where there was a fortified redoubt (a closed-type fortification, with a rampart and a ditch, intended for all-round defense). All day on September 5 there was a battle for the Shevardinsky redoubt.

After 12 hours of bloody battle, the French pressed the left flank and center of the Russian positions, but were unable to develop the offensive. The Russian army suffered heavy losses (40-45 thousand killed and wounded), the French - 30-34 thousand. There were almost no prisoners on either side. On September 8, Kutuzov ordered a retreat to Mozhaisk with the confidence that only in this way could the army be saved.

On September 13, a meeting was held in the village of Fili on further plan actions. Most of the generals spoke in favor of a new battle. Kutuzov interrupted the meeting and ordered a retreat through Moscow along the Ryazan road. By the evening of September 14, Napoleon entered empty Moscow. On that same day, a fire began in Moscow, engulfing almost the entire Zemlyanoy City and White City, as well as the outskirts of the city, destroying three-quarters of the buildings.

A. Smirnov "Fire of Moscow"

There is still no single version about the causes of the fire in Moscow. There are several of them: organized arson by residents when leaving the city, deliberate arson by Russian spies, uncontrolled actions of the French, an accidental fire, the spread of which was facilitated by the general chaos in the abandoned city. Kutuzov directly pointed out that the French burned Moscow. Since the fire had several sources, it is possible that all versions are true.

More than half of the residential buildings, more than 8 thousand retail outlets, 122 churches out of the existing 329 were burned in the fire; Up to 2 thousand wounded Russian soldiers left in Moscow died. The university, theaters, and libraries were destroyed, and the manuscript “The Tale of Igor’s Campaign” and the Trinity Chronicle were burned in the Musin-Pushkin palace. Not the entire population of Moscow left the city, only more than 50 thousand people (out of 270 thousand).

In Moscow, Napoleon, on the one hand, builds a plan for a campaign against St. Petersburg, on the other hand, he makes attempts to make peace with Alexander I, but at the same time remains with his demands (a continental blockade of England, the rejection of Lithuania and the creation of a military alliance with Russia). He makes three offers of truce, but receives no response from Alexander to any of them.

Militia

I. Arkhipov "Militia of 1812"

On July 18, 1812, Alexander I issued a Manifesto and an appeal to the residents of the “Most Throne Capital of our Moscow” with a call to join the militia (temporary armed formations to help the active army to repel the invasion of Napoleonic army). Zemstvo militias were limited to 16 provinces directly adjacent to the theater of operations:

District I - Moscow, Tver, Yaroslavl, Vladimir, Ryazan, Tula, Kaluga, Smolensk provinces - was intended to protect Moscow.

District II - St. Petersburg and Novgorod provinces - provided “protection” of the capital.

III district (Volga region) - Kazan, Nizhny Novgorod, Penza, Kostroma, Simbirsk and Vyatka provinces - reserve of the first two militia districts.

The rest of the provinces should remain “inactive” until “there is a need to use them for sacrifices and services equal to the Fatherland.”

Drawing of the banner of the St. Petersburg militia

Chiefs of militias of the Patriotic War of 1812

Militia of districts and provinces of RussiaChiefs
1st (Moscow)
militia district
Moscow military governor general, infantry general F.V. Rostopchin (Rastopchin)
MoscowLieutenant General I.I. Morkov (Markov)
TverskayaLieutenant General Ya.I. Tyrtov
YaroslavskayaMajor General Ya.I. Dedyulin
VladimirskayaLieutenant General B.A. Golitsyn
RyazanMajor General L.D. Izmailov
TulaCivil Governor, Privy Councilor N.I. Bogdanov
from 16.11. 1812 – Major General I.I. Miller
KaluzhskayaLieutenant General V.F. Shepelev
SmolenskayaLieutenant General N.P. Lebedev
II (St. Petersburg)
militia district
General of Infantry M.I. Kutuzov (Golenishchev-Kutuzov),
from 27.8. to 09.22.1812 Lieutenant General P.I. Meller-Zakomelsky,
then - Senator A.A. Bibikov
St. PetersburgGeneral of Infantry
M.I. Kutuzov (Golenishchev-Kutuzov),
from August 8, 1812, Lieutenant General P.I. Meller-Zakomelsky
NovgorodskayaGene. from infantry N.S. Svechin,
from Sep. 1812 Lieutenant General P.I. performed part-time duties. Meller-Zakomelsky, Zherebtsov A.A.
III (Volga region)
militia district
Lieutenant General P.A. Tolstoy
KazanskayaMajor General D.A. Bulygin
Nizhny NovgorodValid Chamberlain, Prince G.A. Georgian
PenzaMajor General N.F. Kishensky
KostromskayaLieutenant General P.G. Bordakov
SimbirskayaValid State Councilor D.V. Tenishev
Vyatskaya

The collection of militias was entrusted to the apparatus state power, nobility and church. The military trained warriors, a gathering was announced Money for the militia. Each landowner had to present a certain number of equipped and armed warriors from his serfs within a specified time frame. Unauthorized joining of the serfs' militia was considered a crime. Selection for the detachment was made by the landowner or peasant communities by lot.

I. Luchaninov "Blessing of the Militia"

There were not enough firearms for the militia; they were primarily allocated for the formation of reserve units regular army. Therefore, after the end of the gathering, all the militias, except for the St. Petersburg one, were armed mainly with edged weapons - pikes, spears and axes. Military training of the militias took place according to a shortened recruit training program by officers and lower ranks from the army and Cossack units. In addition to zemstvo (peasant) militias, the formation of Cossack militias began. Some wealthy landowners assembled entire regiments from their serfs or formed them at their own expense.

In some cities and villages adjacent to the Smolensk, Moscow, Kaluga, Tula, Tver, Pskov, Chernigov, Tambov, and Oryol provinces, “cordons” or “guard militias” were formed for self-defense and maintaining internal order.

The convening of the militia allowed the government of Alexander I to mobilize large human and material resources for the war in a short time. After completion of formation, the entire militia was under the unified command of Field Marshal M.I. Kutuzov and the supreme leadership of Emperor Alexander I.

S. Gersimov "Kutuzov - Chief of the Militia"

During the period that the Great French Army was in Moscow, the Tver, Yaroslavl, Vladimir, Tula, Ryazan and Kaluga militias defended the borders of their provinces from enemy foragers and marauders and, together with army partisans, blocked the enemy in Moscow, and when the French retreated, they were pursued by the militias of Moscow, Smolensk, Tver, Yaroslavl, Tula, Kaluga, St. Petersburg and Novgorod zemstvo provincial troops, Don, Little Russian and Bashkir Cossack regiments, as well as individual battalions, squadrons and detachments. The militia could not be used as an independent fighting force, because they had a weak military training and weapons. But they fought against enemy foragers, looters, deserters, and also performed police functions to maintain internal order. They destroyed and captured 10-12 thousand enemy soldiers and officers.

After the end of hostilities on Russian territory, all provincial militias, except Vladimir, Tver and Smolensk, participated in the foreign campaigns of the Russian army in 1813-1814. In the spring of 1813, the Moscow and Smolensk troops were disbanded, and by the end of 1814, all other zemstvo troops were disbanded.

Guerrilla warfare

J. Doe "D.V. Davydov"

After the Moscow fire began, guerrilla warfare and passive resistance intensified. The peasants refused to supply the French with food and fodder, went into the forests, burned unharvested grain in the fields so that the enemy would not get anything. Flying partisan detachments were created to operate in the rear and on the enemy’s communication lines in order to impede his supplies and destroy his small detachments. The most famous commanders of the flying detachments were Denis Davydov, Alexander Seslavin, Alexander Figner. Army partisan detachments received full support from the spontaneous peasant partisan movement. It was the violence and looting by the French that sparked the guerrilla war. The partisans made up the first ring of encirclement around Moscow, occupied by the French, and the second ring was made up of militias.

Battle at Tarutino

Kutuzov, retreating, took the army south to the village of Tarutino, closer to Kaluga. Being on the old Kaluga road, Kutuzov's army covered Tula, Kaluga, Bryansk and the grain-producing southern provinces, and threatened the enemy rear between Moscow and Smolensk. He waited, knowing that Napoleon’s army would not last long in Moscow without provisions, and winter was approaching... On October 18, near Tarutino, he gave battle to the French barrier under the command of Murat - and Murat’s retreat marked the fact that the initiative in the war had passed to the Russians.

Beginning of the End

Napoleon was forced to think about wintering his army. Where? “I’m going to look for another position from where it will be more profitable to launch a new campaign, the action of which will be directed towards St. Petersburg or Kyiv" And at this time Kutuzov put under surveillance all possible escape routes for the Napoleonic army from Moscow. Kutuzov's foresight was manifested in the fact that with his Tarutino maneuver he anticipated the movement of French troops to Smolensk through Kaluga.

On October 19, the French army (consisting of 110 thousand) began to leave Moscow along the Old Kaluga Road. Napoleon planned to get to the nearest large food base in Smolensk through an area not devastated by the war - through Kaluga, but Kutuzov blocked his way. Then Napoleon turned near the village of Troitsky onto the New Kaluga Road (modern Kiev Highway) to bypass Tarutino. However, Kutuzov transferred the army to Maloyaroslavets and cut off the French retreat along the New Kaluga Road.

12 June 1812 - the beginning of the Patriotic War of 1812. War was declared in advance, but the time and place of the strike were not reported. Having crossed the Neman, Napoleon invades Russian territory. But the Russian army avoids a general battle and retreats with rearguard battles. The main blow fell on Bagration's army. The 1st and 2nd armies planned to unite first in the Vitebsk area, but it was not possible. At first, Alexander I was the commander-in-chief, and then Mikhail Bogdanovich Barclay de Tolly became the commander-in-chief. The partisan movement begins.

4 – 6 August 1812 - Battle of Smolensk. It was bloody - 120 thousand Russians against 200 thousand French. Neverovsky's detachment prevented the French from bypassing Smolensk. The corps of Dokhturov and Raevsky held back the onslaught of the French for 2 days, covering the withdrawal of the main forces of the army. Smolensk was abandoned

8 August 1812 - appointment of Kutuzov as commander-in-chief of the Russian army. Alexander did this despite personal hostility, taking into account Kutuzov's combat experience, talent and enormous popularity in the Russian army. On August 17, Kutuzov arrived in active army. The retreat to Moscow continues, as the army needs to be put in order and prepared for a general battle.

24 August 1812 - the battles for the Shevardinsky redoubt made it possible to prepare fortifications.

26 August 1812 - Battle of Borodino. It became the main battle of the War of 1812. The position on the Borodino field was not chosen by chance:

Two roads leading to Moscow were covered - the new and old Smolensk.

The rugged nature of the terrain made it possible to place artillery at the heights, to hide part of the troops, and made it difficult for the French to maneuver. The right flank is covered by the Kolocha River.

Each side set as its goal to defeat the enemy.

The battle was characterized by extreme tenacity and bitterness. Napoleon tried to break through the Russian fortifications in the center, on the left flank. Raevsky's battery, located on Kurgan Heights, changed hands several times. As darkness fell, the battle ended and the French withdrew their troops to their original positions. The battle ended in a draw, as neither side achieved its goals. Napoleon lost 50 thousand people, but did not bring the old guard into battle. The Russians lost 40 thousand. Kutuzov gives the order to retreat.

Meaning of the battle:

Napoleon's army received a strong blow and suffered significant losses.

Kutuzov's army survived.

An example of Russian heroism.

September 1, 1812 - Council in Fili, where the decision was made to leave Moscow in order to preserve the army. Having left Moscow along the Ryazan road, the army crossed country roads to the Kaluga road and set up camp near the village of Tarutino, preparing for new battles.

September 2, 1812 - Napoleon's troops occupy Moscow. Moscow greets with a grandiose fire - it lasted 6 days, ¾ of the city burned down, priceless monuments, books. There are different versions of the fire - the French are to blame, patriots, probably a joint decision of Kutuzov and Moscow Governor General Rostopchin. 3 times Napoleon suggested that Alexander the First begin negotiations. The situation for the French army is rapidly deteriorating - there is no food, no housing, the partisans are causing great damage (peasant detachments of Chetvertakov, Gerasim Kurin, Vasilisa Kozhina and under the leadership of officers Denis Davydov, Figner are operating), the army is decomposing, and winter is ahead.

October 6, 1812 - Napoleon's troops leave Moscow. The reason is that the city, like a besieged fortress, becomes a trap. Napoleon is trying to break into the southern provinces.

October 12, 1812 – battles for Maloyaroslavets. The city changed hands 8 times. Result - Napoleon is forced to return to the old Smolensk road, and the retreat begins. The initiative completely passes to the Russian army. The Russian army pursues Napoleon on a parallel course, all the time threatening to get ahead and cut off the route of retreat.

November 14 -16, 1812 - heavy French losses when crossing the Berezina River - 30 thousand, but retained the generals, the old guard. Soon he secretly leaves the army and leaves for Paris.

December 25, 1812 - manifesto about the end of the Patriotic War. Only the pitiful remnants of the great army crossed the border. The Patriotic War ended with the complete defeat of the enemy.

Reasons for victory:

The fair nature of the war, defended the Fatherland.

The role of Kutuzov and other commanders.

Partisan movement.

Heroism of soldiers and officers.

National assistance - creation of a people's militia, fundraising.

Geographical and natural factors (vast spaces and cold winters).

Results of the Patriotic War. Historical meaning victory.

1 . Russia defended its independence and territorial integrity. She won the war.

2 . Huge damage:

Thousands of people died.

Great damage to the western provinces.

Many cities were damaged - old historical and cultural centers(Moscow, Smolensk, etc.).

3 . The war united the nation, as they defended their homeland and their independence.

4 . The war strengthened the friendship of the peoples of the country, the Slavs in the first place.

5 . The war elevated Moscow as the spiritual center of Russia. The official capital of St. Petersburg found itself on the sidelines of events.

6 . The heroism of the Russian people inspired cultural figures to create patriotic works about this war. The war had a strong influence on the development of culture and social thought.

1813 -1815 - foreign campaign of the Russian army. Kutuzov's troops crossed the Neman and entered European territory. Other states are joining the fight against France, and a new anti-French coalition is being created (Russia, Prussia, Austria, Sweden, England). In 1813, Kutuzov died.

1813, October 16 -19 - Battle of Leipzig. In the "Battle of the Nations" Napoleon is defeated. Allied troops enter Paris. Napoleon abdicates power and exiles to the island of Elba, but flees and returns to power for 100 days.

1815 Battle of Waterloo. The final defeat of Napoleon. He is exiled to St. Helena Island in the Atlantic Ocean. Russia played decisive role in the defeat of Napoleonic France. The Russian army was the core of the Allied military forces.

Historical significance of the foreign campaign:

Europe is liberated from Napoleonic tyranny.

Reactionary monarchical regimes are being installed.

1814 – 1815 – The Vienna Congress of the Victorious Powers determined the principles post-war structure Europe. Russia received the territory of the Duchy of Warsaw. To protect the relations established at the Vienna Congress and to fight the revolutionary movement, the Holy Alliance (Russia, Prussia, Austria) was created.

Thus, foreign policy Russia at the beginning of the 19th century was active. The main direction is western. Victory in the war with France strengthened the country's international authority.

Decembrist movement.

The first revolutionaries to create a fairly powerful secret organization and openly oppose the autocracy were the Decembrists. These were young nobles, officers - Alexander Muravyov, Sergey Trubetskoy, Nikita Muravyov, Matvey and Sergey Muravyov - Apostles, Ivan Kushkin, Pavel Pestel, Evgeny Obolensky, Ivan Pushchin, Kakhovsky, Lunin and others. Based on the name of the month in which they openly opposed the tsar, they began to be called Decembrists.

Reasons for the speech of the Decembrists:

1 . - growth of national self-awareness in connection with the War of 1812. Many of the Decembrists took part in the war, knew the way of life and order in Europe, and had the opportunity to compare. They saw the destructiveness of serfdom and the fact that the people who fought against the Napoleonic invasion received nothing to make their lives easier.

2 . - strengthening of the reaction in the country - attack on the achievements of education - defeat of the Kazan and St. Petersburg universities, deterioration of the situation of the peasantry - again the landowners could exile the peasants to Siberia, the creation of military settlements, refusal of reforms.

3. – the influence of revolutionary ideology – the ideas of French thinkers (Locke, Montesquieu, Diderot) and Russian enlighteners (Novikov, Radishchev).

4. – revolutionary processes in Europe – a wave of revolutionary uprisings, bourgeois revolutions.

Decembrists- these are supporters of a military coup with the aim of carrying out bourgeois reforms in Russia only by the forces of the army without the participation of the people.

Since the Decembrists were military men, they hoped to use the military forces at their disposal for the coup. Formation begins secret societies, uniting the most radically thinking representatives of the nobility.

Secret organizations of the Decembrists:

1. "Union of Salvation" 1816 - 1818, created in St. Petersburg, included about 30 people. The charter “Statute” was adopted, a new name was given, “Society of True and Faithful Sons of the Fatherland.” The main goal is the introduction of a constitution and civil liberties, the abolition of serfdom. Specific activity is preparing public opinion for the upcoming reforms. The organization was created on the basis of the Semenovsky regiment. They published translations of the works of French enlighteners. The question of regicide arose. They proposed presenting their demands at the time of the change of monarch on the throne.

2. “Union of Welfare”, 1818 – 1821, included about 200 people. The Green Book program set the task of convincing public opinion of the need for reforms within 15–20 years. The ultimate goals - a political and social revolution - were not declared, since the program was intended for wide dissemination. They sought to attract public attention to the situation of serfs and military villagers in order to eliminate arbitrariness. Members of the organization, by their example, sought to promote the ideas of educating the people - they created schools on estates and actively participated in the activities of legal scientific, educational and literary societies.

The union was led by the root council in St. Petersburg, there were branches in Moscow, Tulchin, Poltava, Tambov, Kyiv, Chisinau, and the Nizhny Novgorod province.

In January 1821, the Union of Welfare was dissolved because:

Possibility of screening out unreliable people.

Disagreements regarding future activities.

The uprising in the Semenovsky regiment, where most of the Decembrists served, led to the deportation of officers to different garrisons. The regiment was disbanded and recruited again.

3. " Southern Society», 1821 – 1825, founded in Ukraine, in the city of Tulchin. Led by Pavel Pestel. Entered S. Muravyov - Apostol, M. Besstuzhev - Ryumin. In 1825, the Society of United Slavs, created in 1823, joined it. The program was called “Russian Truth”.

4 . "Northern Society" 1821 – 1825, founded in St. Petersburg. The society's program - "Constitution" was compiled by N. Muravyov. included S. Trubetskoy, E. Obolensky, K. Ryleev, Pyotr Kakhovsky.

Program documents of the Decembrists:

General: liquidate estates, introduce civil liberties - freedom of speech, press, assembly, religion, liquidate military settlements and recruitment, introduce universal military service.

Both programs opened up ways for the further development of Russia.

The greatest activity of the Decembrist societies occurred in 1824 - 1825: preparations were made for an armed uprising, hard work was underway to harmonize political programs. A military coup was planned for the summer of 1826. But the uprising happened earlier. On November 19, 1825, Alexander I dies in Taganrog. The troops and population swore allegiance to Emperor Constantine, but he abdicated the throne back in 1823, but this was kept secret. On December 14, 1825, the re-oath was set for his brother Nikolai. The Decembrists decided to take advantage of this situation. The final plan for the uprising was adopted on December 13 at Ryleev’s apartment - to withdraw troops to Senate Square in order to prevent the oath of office of the Senate and the State Council, to publish the “Manifesto to the Russian People”, to proclaim the abolition of serfdom, the code of the press, conscience, and the introduction of universal military service. The government is declared deposed and power is transferred to a provisional government until the convened Great Council makes a decision on the form of government in Russia. Royal family should be arrested, the Winter Palace and the Peter and Paul Fortress captured with the help of troops. Trubetskoy was appointed dictator of the uprising.

December 14, 1825 At 11:00 a.m., officers brought their loyal units to Senate Square in St. Petersburg:

Moscow Label – guards regiment(Bestuzhev - Ryumin and D. Shchepin - Rostovsky)

Grenadier Regiment (Panov)

Guards Fleet Crew (Bestuzhev)

Only 3 thousand soldiers, 30 officers, no artillery. The king had 12 thousand people, cavalry, 36 guns.

From the very beginning the uprising did not go according to plan:

Trubetskoy did not appear on the square; another leader, Obolensky, was elected on the spot.

The Senate and State Council had already sworn allegiance to the Tsar early in the morning.

Yakubovich, who was supposed to command the guards naval crew and the Izmailovsky regiment, refused to seize the Winter Palace and arrest the royal family, because he was afraid of regicide.

The rebels in the square were inactive, but the king was active. They are trying to persuade the rebels to disperse (Kakhovsky kills Miloradovich, the governor of St. Petersburg), and at this time the loyal units are gathering. Two cavalry attacks were repulsed, and a decision was made to use artillery. By 6 o'clock in the evening the uprising was defeated (1271 people died, of which 900 were curious people in the square). Arrests and searches began.

December 25, 1825 - uprising of 5 companies of the Chernigov regiment (970 soldiers and 8 officers, led by Muravyov - Apostol). Defeated by tsarist troops near the village of Ustinovka.

Causes of defeat:

1. disruption of the original plan of the uprising.

2. numerical superiority of the royal troops

3. wait-and-see tactics

4. fear of addressing the people

The investigative commission worked in St. Petersburg from December 17, 1825 to June 17, 1826. At the same time, commissions worked in Bila Tserkva, Minsk, Bialystok, and Warsaw. The investigation was led by the tsar, 579 officers were involved, 280 of them were found guilty. The trial proceeded without the presence of the Decembrists.

5 people were executed on July 13, 1826, hanged in the Peter and Paul Fortress - Ryleev, Pestel, Kakhovsky, Muravyov - Apostol, Bestuzhev - Ryumin.

88 people were sentenced to hard labor.

19 people were exiled to Siberia.

15 people were demoted to soldiers.

120 people were punished by personal order of Nicholas I without trial.

The rest were sent to the active army in the Caucasus.

Soldiers and sailors were tried separately.

The significance of the Decembrist movement:

2. their demands reflected the urgent needs of transformation in Russia.

3. great importance for the development of advanced social thought (ideology, tactics, experience of struggle)

4. their performance influenced domestic policy king


Related information.


The outbreak of the Patriotic War of 1812 was caused by Napoleon's desire for world domination. In Europe, only Russia and England maintained their independence. Despite the Treaty of Tilsit, Russia continued to oppose the expansion of Napoleonic aggression. Napoleon was especially irritated by her systematic violation of the continental blockade. Since 1810, both sides, realizing the inevitability of a new clash, were preparing for war. Napoleon flooded the Duchy of Warsaw with his troops and created military warehouses there. The threat of invasion looms over Russia's borders. In turn, the Russian government increased the number of troops in the western provinces.

Napoleon became the aggressor

He began military operations and invaded Russian territory. In this regard, for the Russian people the war became a liberation and Patriotic war, since not only the regular army, but also the broad masses of the people took part in it.

Balance of power

In preparation for the war against Russia, Napoleon gathered a significant army - up to 678 thousand soldiers. These were perfectly armed and trained troops, seasoned in previous wars. They were led by a galaxy of brilliant marshals and generals - L. Davout, L. Berthier, M. Ney, I. Murat and others. They were commanded by the most famous commander of that time - Napoleon Bonaparte. The weak point of his army was its motley National composition. The aggressive plans of the French emperor were deeply alien to the German and Spanish, Polish and Portuguese, Austrian and Italian soldiers.

Active preparations for the war that Russia had been waging since 1810 brought results. She managed to create modern armed forces for that time, powerful artillery, which, as it turned out during the war, was superior to the French. The troops were led by talented military leaders - M. I. Kutuzov, M. B. Barclay de Tolly, P. I. Bagration, A. P. Ermolov, N. N. Raevsky, M. A. Miloradovich and others. They were distinguished by extensive military experience and personal courage. The advantage of the Russian army was determined by the patriotic enthusiasm of all segments of the population, large human resources, food and fodder reserves.

However, on initial stage During the war, the French army outnumbered the Russian one. The first echelon of troops that entered Russia numbered 450 thousand people, while the Russians on the western border were about 210 thousand people, divided into three armies. The 1st - under the command of M.B. Barclay de Tolly - covered the St. Petersburg direction, the 2nd - led by P.I. Bagration - defended the center of Russia, the 3rd - under General A.P. Tormasov - was located in the southern direction .

Plans of the parties

Napoleon planned to seize a significant part of Russian territory up to Moscow and sign with Alexander new agreement to subjugate Russia. Napoleon's strategic plan was based on his military experience acquired during the wars in Europe. He intended to prevent the dispersed Russian forces from uniting and deciding the outcome of the war in one or more border battles.

Even on the eve of the war, the Russian emperor and his entourage decided not to make any compromises with Napoleon. At successful outcome clashes, they were going to transfer hostilities to the territory of Western Europe. In case of defeat, Alexander was ready to retreat to Siberia (all the way to Kamchatka, according to him) to continue the fight from there. Russia had several strategic military plans. One of them was developed by the Prussian General Fuhl. It provided for the concentration of most of the Russian army in a fortified camp near the city of Drissa on the Western Dvina. According to Fuhl, this gave an advantage in the first border battle. The project remained unrealized, since the position on Drissa was unfavorable and the fortifications were weak. In addition, the balance of forces forced the Russian command to initially choose a strategy of active defense. As the course of the war showed, this was the most correct decision.

Stages of the war

The history of the Patriotic War of 1812 is divided into two stages. First: from June 12 to mid-October - the retreat of the Russian army with rearguard battles in order to lure the enemy deep into Russian territory and disrupt his strategic plan. Second: from mid-October to December 25 - a counter-offensive of the Russian army with the goal of completely expelling the enemy from Russia.

Beginning of the war

On the morning of June 12, 1812, French troops crossed the Neman and invaded Russia by forced march.

The 1st and 2nd Russian armies retreated, avoiding a general battle. They fought stubborn rearguard battles with individual units of the French, exhausting and weakening the enemy, inflicting significant losses on him.

Two main tasks faced the Russian troops - to eliminate disunity (not allow themselves to be defeated one by one) and to establish unity of command in the army. The first task was solved on July 22, when the 1st and 2nd armies united near Smolensk. Thus, Napoleon's original plan was thwarted. On August 8, Alexander appointed M.I. Kutuzov Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army. This meant solving the second problem. M.I. Kutuzov took command of the combined Russian forces on August 17. He did not change his retreat tactics. However, the army and the whole country expected a decisive battle from him. Therefore, he gave the order to look for a position for a general battle. She was found near the village of Borodino, 124 km from Moscow.

battle of Borodino

M.I. Kutuzov chose defensive tactics and deployed his troops in accordance with this. The left flank was defended by the army of P.I. Bagration, covered by artificial earthen fortifications - flushes. In the center there was an earthen mound where the artillery and troops of General N.N. Raevsky were located. The army of M.B. Barclay de Tolly was on the right flank.

Napoleon adhered to offensive tactics. He intended to break through the defenses of the Russian army on the flanks, encircle it and completely defeat it.

The balance of forces was almost equal: the French had 130 thousand people with 587 guns, the Russians had 110 thousand regular forces, about 40 thousand militias and Cossacks with 640 guns.

Early in the morning of August 26, the French launched an offensive on the left flank. The fight for flushes lasted until 12 noon. Both sides suffered huge losses. General P.I. Bagration was seriously wounded. (He died from his wounds a few days later.) Taking the flushes did not bring any particular advantages to the French, since they were unable to break through the left flank. The Russians retreated in an organized manner and took up a position near the Semenovsky ravine.

At the same time, the situation in the center became more complicated, where Napoleon sent main blow. To help the troops of General N.N. Raevsky, M.I. Kutuzov ordered the Cossacks of M.I. Platov and the cavalry corps of F.P. Uvarov to carry out a raid behind French lines. The sabotage, which was not very successful in itself, forced Napoleon to interrupt the assault on the battery for almost 2 hours. This allowed M.I. Kutuzov to bring fresh forces to the center. The battery of N.N. Raevsky changed hands several times and was captured by the French only at 16:00.

The capture of Russian fortifications did not mean Napoleon's victory. On the contrary, the offensive impulse of the French army dried up. She needed fresh forces, but Napoleon did not dare to use his last reserve - the imperial guard. The battle, which lasted more than 12 hours, gradually subsided. The losses on both sides were enormous. Borodino was a moral and political victory for the Russians: the combat potential of the Russian army was preserved, while Napoleonic's was significantly weakened. Far from France, in the vast Russian expanses, it was difficult to restore it.

From Moscow to Maloyaroslavets

After Borodino, Russian troops began to retreat to Moscow. Napoleon followed, but did not strive for a new battle. On September 1, a military council of the Russian command took place in the village of Fili. M.I. Kutuzov, contrary to the general opinion of the generals, decided to leave Moscow. The French army entered it on September 2, 1812.

M.I. Kutuzov, withdrawing troops from Moscow, carried out an original plan - the Tarutino march-maneuver. Retreating from Moscow along the Ryazan road, the army turned sharply to the south and in the Krasnaya Pakhra area reached the old Kaluga road. This maneuver, firstly, prevented the French from seizing the Kaluga and Tula provinces, where ammunition and food were collected. Secondly, M.I. Kutuzov managed to break away from Napoleon’s army. He set up a camp in Tarutino, where the Russian troops rested and were replenished with fresh regular units, militia, weapons and food supplies.

The occupation of Moscow did not benefit Napoleon. Abandoned by the inhabitants (an unprecedented case in history), it burned in the fire. There was no food or other supplies in it. The French army was completely demoralized and turned into a bunch of robbers and marauders. Its decomposition was so strong that Napoleon had only two options - either immediately make peace or begin a retreat. But all the peace proposals of the French emperor were unconditionally rejected by M. I. Kutuzov and Alexander I.

On October 7, the French left Moscow. Napoleon still hoped to defeat the Russians or at least break into the unravaged southern regions, since the issue of providing the army with food and fodder was very acute. He moved his troops to Kaluga. On October 12, another bloody battle took place near the town of Maloyaroslavets. Once again, neither side achieved a decisive victory. However, the French were stopped and forced to retreat along the Smolensk road they had destroyed.

Expulsion of Napoleon from Russia

The retreat of the French army looked like a disorderly flight. It was accelerated by the unfolding partisan movement and the offensive actions of the Russians.

The patriotic upsurge began literally immediately after Napoleon entered Russia. Robbery and looting French. The Russian soldiers provoked resistance from local residents. But this was not the main thing - the Russian people could not put up with the presence of invaders on their native land. Names go down in history ordinary people(G. M. Kurin, E. V. Chetvertakov, V. Kozhina), who organized partisan detachments. “Flying detachments” of regular army soldiers led by career officers (A.S. Figner, D.V. Davydov, A.N. Seslavin, etc.) were also sent to the French rear.

At the final stage of the war, M.I. Kutuzov chose the tactics of parallel pursuit. He took care of every Russian soldier and understood that the enemy’s forces were melting every day. The final defeat of Napoleon was planned near the city of Borisov. For this purpose, troops were brought up from the south and north-west. Serious damage was inflicted on the French near the city of Krasny in early November, when more than half of the 50 thousand people of the retreating army were captured or died in battle. Fearing encirclement, Napoleon hastened to transport his troops across the Berezina River on November 14-17. The battle at the crossing completed the defeat of the French army. Napoleon abandoned her and secretly left for Paris. The order of M.I. Kutuzov on the army of December 21 and the Tsar's Manifesto of December 25, 1812 marked the end of the Patriotic War.

The meaning of war

The Patriotic War of 1812 is the greatest event in Russian history. During its course, heroism, courage, patriotism and selfless love of all layers of society and especially ordinary people for their Motherland were clearly demonstrated. However, the war caused significant damage to the Russian economy, which was estimated at 1 billion rubles. During the hostilities, about 300 thousand people died. Many western regions were devastated. All this had a huge impact on the further internal development of Russia.

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