Five of the most powerful tanks and self-propelled guns in the Battle of Kursk. Tank battles

"Kursk Bulge": T-34 tank against "Tigers" and "Panthers"

And then the hour struck. On July 5, 1943, Operation Citadel began (the code name for the long-awaited offensive of the German Wehrmacht on the so-called Kursk salient). It did not come as a surprise to the Soviet command. We are well prepared to meet the enemy. The Battle of Kursk remained in history as a battle hitherto unprecedented in the number of tank masses. The German command of this operation hoped to wrest the initiative from the hands of the Red Army. It threw about 900 thousand of its soldiers, up to 2,770 tanks and assault guns into battle. On our side, 1,336 thousand soldiers, 3,444 tanks and self-propelled guns were waiting for them. This battle was truly a battle new technology, since on both sides new models of aviation, artillery, and armored weapons were used. It was then that the T-34s first met in battle with German medium tanks Pz. V "Panther". On the southern front of the Kursk ledge, as part of the German Army Group "South", the 10th German brigade, numbering 204 "Panthers", was advancing. There were 133 Tigers in one SS tank and four motorized divisions. On the northern front of the bulge in Army Group Center, the 21st Panzer Brigade had 45 Tigers.

German tanks before the attack

They were strengthened by 90 self-propelled units"Elephant", known among us as "Ferdinand". In both groups there were 533 assault guns. The assault guns in the German army were entirely armored vehicles, essentially turretless tanks based on the Pz. Ill (later also based on Pz. IV). Their 75mm gun is the same as on the PZ tank. IV of the early modifications, which had a limited horizontal aiming angle, was installed in the front deck of the cabin. Their task is to support the infantry directly in its combat formations. This was a very valuable idea, especially since assault guns remained artillery weapons, i.e. they were controlled by artillerymen. In 1942 they received a long-barreled 75 mm tank gun and were increasingly used as an anti-tank and, frankly, very effective weapon. In the last years of the war, it was they who bore the brunt of the fight against tanks, although they retained their name and organization. In terms of the number of vehicles produced (including those based on the PZ. IV) - more than 10.5 thousand - they surpassed the most popular German tank - the PZ. IV. On our side, about 70% of the tanks were T-34s. The rest are heavy KV-1, KB-1С, light T-70, a number of tanks received under Lend-Lease from the Allies (Shermans, Churchills) and new self-propelled artillery installations SU-76, SU-122, SU-152, which recently began to enter service. Exactly two last dropped share to distinguish themselves in the fight against new German heavy tanks. It was then that they received the honorary nickname “St. John’s worts” from our soldiers. However, there were very few of them: for example, by the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, there were only 24 SU-152s in two heavy self-propelled artillery regiments.

On July 12, 1943, the greatest tank battle of World War II broke out near the village of Prokhorovka. Up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns from both sides took part in it. By the end of the day, the German tank group, consisting of best divisions Wehrmacht: “Great Germany”, “Adolf Hitler”, “Reich”, “Totenkopf” were defeated and retreated. 400 cars were left to burn out on the field. The enemy did not advance on the southern front anymore. The Battle of Kursk (Kursk defensive: July 5-23. Oryol offensive: July 12 - August 18, Belgorod-Kharkov offensive: August 2-23, operations) lasted 50 days. In addition to heavy casualties, the enemy lost about 1,500 tanks and assault guns. He failed to turn the tide of the war in his favor. But our losses, in particular in armored vehicles, were great. They amounted to more than 6 thousand tanks and control systems. The new German tanks turned out to be tough nuts to crack in battle, and therefore the Panther deserves at least short story About Me.

Of course, you can talk about “childhood illnesses,” imperfections, and weak points of the new car, but that’s not the point. Defects always remain for some time and are eliminated during mass production. Let us remember that the same situation was at first with our thirty-four. We have already said that to develop a new medium tank based on the T-34 model, it was entrusted to two companies: Daimler-Benz (DB) and MAN. In May 1942 they presented their projects. "DB" even offered a tank that looked like a T-34 and had the same layout: that is, the engine compartment and drive wheel were rear-mounted, the turret was moved forward. The company even offered to install a diesel engine. The only thing different from the T-34 was the chassis - it consisted of 8 rollers (per side) large diameter, arranged in a checkerboard pattern with leaf springs as a suspension element. MAN proposed a traditional German layout, i.e. the engine is at the rear, the transmission is at the front of the hull, and the turret is between them. The chassis has the same 8 large rollers in a checkerboard pattern, but with a torsion bar suspension, and a double one at that. The DB project promised a cheaper vehicle, easier to manufacture and maintain, but with the turret located at the front, it was not possible to install a new long-barreled Rheinmetall gun in it. And the first requirement for the new tank was the installation of powerful weapons - a gun with a large initial speed armor-piercing projectile. And, indeed, the special long-barreled tank gun KwK42L/70 was a masterpiece of artillery production. The hull armor was designed in imitation of the T-34. The tower had a floor that rotated with it. After firing, before opening the bolt of a semi-automatic gun, the barrel was blown through with compressed air. The cartridge case fell into a specially closed case, where the powder gases were sucked out of it.

In this way, gas contamination of the fighting compartment was eliminated. The Panther was equipped with a double-flow transmission and rotation mechanism. Hydraulic drives made it easier to control the tank. The staggered arrangement of the rollers ensured even distribution of weight on the tracks. There are many rollers, and half of them are double. On the Kursk Bulge, “Panthers” of the Pz modification went into battle. VD with a combat weight of 43 tons. Since August 1943, tanks of the Pz modification were produced. VA with an improved commander's cupola, reinforced chassis and increased turret armor to 110 mm. From March 1944 until the end of the war, a modification of the Pz. VG. On it, the thickness of the upper side armor was increased to 50 mm, and there was no driver's inspection hatch in the front plate. Thanks to a powerful gun and excellent optical instruments (sight, observation devices), the Panther could successfully fight enemy tanks at a distance of 1500-2000 m. It was the best tank of Hitler's Wehrmacht and a formidable opponent on the battlefield. It is often written that the production of the Panther was supposedly very labor-intensive. However, verified data says that in terms of man-hours spent on the production of one Panther machine, it corresponded to twice as much light tank Pz. IV. In total, about 6,000 Panthers were produced. Heavy tank Pz. VIH - "Tiger" with a combat weight of 57 tons had 100 mm frontal armor and was armed with an 88 mm cannon with a barrel length of 56 calibers. It was inferior in maneuverability to the Panther, but in battle it was an even more formidable opponent.

At the end of August, People's Commissar of Tank Building V. A. Malyshev and Head of GBTU Marshal arrived at Tank Plant No. 112 armored forces Y. N. Fedorenko and responsible employees of the People's Commissariat of Armaments. At a meeting with plant managers, Malyshev said that victory in the Battle of Kursk came at a high price. Enemy tanks fired at ours from a distance of 1500

m., our 76-mm tank guns could hit “Tigers” and “Panthers” at a distance of 500-600 m. “Figuratively speaking,” said the People’s Commissar, “the enemy has arms one and a half kilometers away, and we are only half a kilometer away. We need to immediately install a more powerful gun in the T-34."

Around the same time, a similar task regarding heavy KV tanks was assigned to the ChKZ designers.

The development of tank guns with a caliber above 76 mm, as we have already said, began in 1940. In 1942-1943. The teams of V. G. Grabin and F. F. Petrov worked on this.

Since June 1943, Petrov presented his D-5 gun, and Grabin S-53, the leading designers of which were T. I. Sergeev and G. I. Shabarov. In addition, guns of the same caliber were presented for joint testing: S-50 by V. D. Meshaninov, A. M. Volgevsky and V. A. Tyurin and LB-1 by A. I. Savin. The S-53 gun was selected, but it failed the final tests. The S-53 gun used design solutions for the F-30 gun designed before the war for the future KV-3 heavy tank. The D-5 cannon has proven its advantages over the S-53. But its installation in the tank also required major modifications. In the meantime, it was decided to install it under the brand name D-5S in the new self-propelled unit SU-85, the production of which began at UZTM in August 1943. At plant No. 183 they developed a new turret with a widened shoulder strap with a diameter of 1600 mm instead of the previous 1420. According to the first version of work were led by designers under the leadership of V.V. Krylov, on the second - led by A.A. Moloshtanov and M.A. Na6utovsky. Moloshtanov's group was offered a new 85-mm S-53 cannon. However, its installation would require major changes in the design of the turret and even the hull. This was considered inappropriate.

In the summer of 1943, the T-34 with a new gun installed in the standard turret was tested at the Gorokhovets training ground near Gorky. The results were unsatisfactory. Two men in the turret could not successfully operate the gun. Ammunition load has been significantly reduced. In order to speed up the process of linking the gun, on the initiative of V. A. Malyshev, Nabutovsky’s group was sent to the TsAKB in October 1943. Nabutovsky came to Malyshev, and he ordered to organize a branch of the Morozov Design Bureau at the artillery plant at which the Grabin TsAKB worked. The joint work with Grabin did not last long. It turned out that the S-53 gun would require a larger turret and a wider shoulder strap. Then Nabutovsky went to F.F. Petrov. Together they came to the conclusion that his gun needed the same turret modification as Grabin's gun. At a meeting that took place soon, with the participation of the People's Commissar of Armaments D.F. Ustinov, V.G. Grabin, F.F. Petrov, it was decided to conduct comparative tests of both guns. Based on the test results, both artillery design bureaus created a new ZIS-S-53 gun, in which the shortcomings of the “ancestral” systems were eliminated. The gun was tested and showed excellent results (note that the work on creating a new gun took only one month). But the turret was not prepared for this gun. Krylov's group at plant No. 112 designed a cast turret with a 1600 mm shoulder strap for the S-53 cannon. However, the reservation group, led by A. Okunev, established that in new tower The gun's vertical aiming angle is limited. It was necessary to either change the design of the turret or take a different gun.

Grabin, an ambitious and impatient man, decided to “pull his nose” at the tankers, getting ahead of them. To do this, he ensured that Plant No. 112 allocated him one of the serial T-34 tanks, on which they remade the front part of the turret and somehow shoved a new gun into it. Without hesitation, Grabin handed over his project to D.F. Ustinov and V.A. Malyshev for approval, according to which plant No. 112 was to begin producing prototypes of the modernized tank. However, many specialists from the Scientific Tank Committee (STC) and the People's Commissariat of Armaments legitimately doubted the merits of the “Grabin project.” Malyshev urgently ordered Nabutovsky and his group to fly to plant No. 112 and look into this matter. And so Nabutovsky, at a special meeting in the presence of D. F. Ustinov, Ya. N. Fedorenko and V. G. Grabin, subjected the latter’s idea to devastating criticism. “Of course,” he notes, “it would be very tempting to place a new cannon in the tank without significant alterations. This solution is simple, but absolutely unacceptable for the reason that with such an installation of the cannon, its fastening will turn out to be weak, and a large unbalanced moment will arise. In addition, "This creates crowding in the fighting compartment and will significantly complicate the work of the crew. Moreover, if shells hit the frontal armor, the gun will fall out." Nabutovsky even stated that by accepting this project, we would let the army down. Grabin broke the silence that followed. “I’m not a tanker,” he said, “and I can’t take everything into account. And to implement your project it will take a lot of time, reducing production.” Ustinov asked how long it would take to submit the design bureau project of plant No. 183 for approval at this meeting. Nabutovsky asked for a week, the director of plant No. 112, K. E. Rubinchik, kindly provided him with his entire design bureau. Ustinov scheduled the next meeting in three days. A. A. Moloshtanov arrived to help and after three days of round-the-clock work, the technical documentation was ready.

In December, the Sormovichi sent two tanks with new turrets to the Moscow artillery plant, where ZIS-S-53 guns were installed in them. And after successful tests on December 15, the State Defense Committee adopted the modernized T-34-85 tank. However, further tests revealed a number of flaws in the design of the gun.

And time did not wait. The Red Army command was planning grandiose offensive operations for the next year, and new, better armed tanks were to play an important role in them.

And at the artillery plant No. 92 in Gorky, a meeting is held again, in which D. F. Ustinov, V. A. Malyshev, V. L. Vannikov, Ya. N. Fedorenko, F. F. Petrov, V. G. Grabin participate etc. For now, we decided to install the D-5T cannon on the tanks (up to 500 units of tanks with this gun were produced in late 1943 - early 1944) and at the same time modify the ZIS-S-53 cannon. So, finally, the new ZIS-S-53 gun was brought to perfection.

Factory No. 112 began producing the first tanks with an 85-mm cannon before the end of the year. In January 1944, Moloshtanov and Nabutovsky arrived at plant No. 183 with all the documentation. In March 1944, serial production of the T-34-85 began there. Then plant No. 174 began to assemble them (in 1944, the “thirty-four” were produced by these three plants, since STZ did not return to tank production after the liberation of Stalingrad, UZTM produced only SU based on the T-34, and ChKZ completely concentrated its efforts on production of heavy tanks IS-2 and SU based on them - ISU-152 and ISU-122). There were some differences between factories: some machines used stamped or cast rollers with developed fins, but with rubber (the “strain” with rubber decreased thanks to supplies from the USA). The towers differed somewhat in shape, number and placement of armored fan caps on their roofs, handrails, etc.

Tanks with the D-5T gun differed from vehicles with the ZIS-S-53 gun primarily in the gun mantlet: the former had one already. Instead of the TSh-15 sight (telescopic, articulated), the T-34 with the D-5T gun had a TSh-16 sight. Tanks with the ZIS-S-53 gun had an electric turret rotation drive controlled by both the tank commander and the gunner.

Having received a new 85-mm cannon, the T-34 could successfully fight the new German tanks. In addition to high-explosive fragmentation and armor-piercing, a sub-caliber projectile was also developed for it. But, as Yu. E. Maksarev noted: “In the future, the T-34 could no longer directly, in a duel, hit new German tanks.” This primarily caused the appearance of our SU-100 and ISU-122. And the thirty-fours were helped in battle by maneuverability and speed, in which they retained superiority. Despite the fact that compared to the first model, the weight of the T-34-85 has increased by almost 6 tons, its characteristics have remained virtually unchanged.

In 1944, several hundred OT-34-85 flamethrower tanks were produced based on the T-34-85. Instead of a machine gun, a piston flamethrower ATO-42 (automatic tank flamethrower model 1942) was placed in the frontal part of the hull. It was an improved version of the ATO-41 flamethrower, which was equipped with flamethrower tanks based on the T-34-76, KV-1 (KV-8) and KB-1S (KV-8S). The difference between the new flamethrower and the previous one is in the design of individual components and more compressed air cylinders. The flamethrowing range with a mixture of 60% fuel oil and 40% kerosene increased to 70 m, and with a special fire mixture - to 100-130 m. The rate of fire also increased - 24-30 fire rounds per minute. The capacity of fire mixture tanks has increased to 200 liters. Maintaining the main armament of an 85-mm cannon on a flamethrower tank was no small achievement, because... this was not possible on most flamethrower tanks of those times, both ours and foreign ones. The OT-34-85 was outwardly indistinguishable from linear tanks, which is very important, since in order to use a flamethrower it had to come close to the target and not be “recognized” by the enemy.

Production of the T-34 tank ceased in 1946 (see tank production data by year below). The production of SU-100 self-propelled guns based on the T-34 continued only until 1948.

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Military equipment in the "Battle of Kursk". Wehrmacht tanks

“War of the machines” is how some historians define the Battle of Kursk in 1943.
Indeed, in the operation code-named “Citadel,” Hitler, according to German generals, was counting heavily on new armored vehicles. By the beginning of the operation, the Wehrmacht was supposed to receive new T5-Panther tanks. It is precisely because of the inability to provide troops with these modern cars in time, the date of the German offensive was postponed by two months. German industry managed to produce 240 Panthers by the start of Operation Citadel. However, after these new tanks entered the battle, the unreliability of this miracle technology became clear. Many "Panthers" (More than 70 units) broke down. Still completely “raw”, heavy German tanks not brought to perfection were unable to fully demonstrate their superiority over Soviet military armored vehicles in the “Battle of Kursk”. Nevertheless, the “Panthers” were indeed superior to our tanks in all respects, and the famous T-34-76 did not “stand up” against the “Panthers” and “Tigers”. Our T-34s could only have an advantage in defensive positions, and when attacking the enemy they suffered heavy losses. During the battles, our troops received captured “Panthers” abandoned by their crew or with minor damage, after eliminating which these tanks were handed over to the best Soviet tankers and the “Panthers” fought on our side.

The frontal armor of this tank was impossible to penetrate from the T-34, the shell only left a dent, the crew did not suffer from this in any way, only a 152-mm high-explosive shell from the SU-152 self-propelled gun stopped this “beast”. The Panther's side armor was more vulnerable. The unsuccessful “debut” of the German T-5 at the Kursk Bulge revealed the technical shortcomings of these machines, which the Germans eliminated in subsequent modifications. Despite the fact that it was never possible to completely get rid of all the shortcomings, the Panther tank is considered the best German tank of the Second World War.
Another “debutant” of Kursk battles - self-propelled guns“Ferdinand”, aka, after modernization, “Elephant” (Elephant translated from German). The massive use of Ferdinands by the Germans began on July 9 in the area of ​​the Ponyri station. These heavy self-propelled guns (the frontal armor of 2 sheets was 200 mm) invulnerable to fire from standard anti-tank weapons, they were assigned the role of an armored ram, which was supposed to penetrate the well-prepared in-depth Soviet defense.

Thrown forward, instead of the disabled Panthers, many of these monsterswere blown up by mines and landmines. The Germans tried to evacuate the Ferdinands that had lost their speed, but they failed because they did not have enough appropriate evacuation equipment to tow heavy self-propelled guns. The very well designed Ferdinand cannon easily hit any type of Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns. The exception, perhaps, was the IS-2 heavy tanks, and even then only at long distances and at certain heading angles.
Perhaps the most legendary tank the Germans had was the Tiger. This is so recognized as the best tank of World War II. They were first used in August 1942 near Leningrad, and mass use began again in Operation Citadel and continued until the end of the war. As we see, it was for the “Battle of Kursk” that the Germans prepared all their newest equipment. In terms of cost of production, the Tiger was the most expensive tank of World War II. A total of 1,354 units were produced. For the first time in tank building, the Germans used a “chessboard” arrangement of road wheels, thereby ensuring good smoothness and, accordingly, better shooting accuracy on the move. It was also convenient to control the heavy vehicle - an ordinary car steering wheel, and powerful weapons, strong armor and high-quality optics allowed it to dominate the battlefields until mid-1944, when we had the heavy IS-2.

The Tiger crew during a break between battles on the Kursk Bulge. On the tank's turret there is a trace left by a shell that hit it, but did not penetrate the armor. -

The powerful "Tiger" proved its high fighting qualities near Kursk. For example, the 1st SS Panzer Regiment destroyed 90 Soviet tanks within 3 hours of one day.

Tiger tanks of the 2nd SS Motorized Division "Reich" near Kursk, summer 1943 -

It cannot be said that the “Tiger” was completely invulnerable, the Soviet A-19 (122mm) cannons and the ML-20 (152mm) howitzer easily penetrated its armor, but their low mobility and high vulnerability from the same “Tigers” did not allow them to fight effectively with these tanks. Therefore, our tankers had to maneuver, enter from the side, shoot at the tracks, gas tanks, engine compartment and other vulnerable areas"Tiger". Soviet heavy tanks of the KV family also could not resist the Tiger, and only the IS-2, which was put into service at the very end of 1943 and had the same weight category, became an equivalent analogue. The German military industry was ahead of not only the Soviet, but also the industry of the allies, American and British; there, too, there were practically no tanks capable of resisting the Tiger. That is why there were such large losses of our troops and equipment in the Battle of Kursk. More than 6,000 Soviet tanks alone were destroyed, versus 1,500 German ones. As for the Tigers, the victory ratio is even higher, about 1:8, that is, in order to destroy one Tiger, the Red Army paid with its eight tanks. No tank in the world has managed to achieve such a result. Soviet propaganda tales about hundreds of Tigers destroyed during the Battle of Kursk have nothing to do withreality. The greatest danger to the Germans was posed by Soviet aviation, in particular IL-2 attack aircraft, which pelted tank columns with cumulative bombs, and only thanks to the weather and low clouds these losses were not so high.

The PzKpfw IV tank (Panzerkampfwagen IV) is the most popular German tank of the entire Second World War. A total of 8,686 of them were produced. Produced until 1945. Tanks of this particular design made up the majority of German tank units in the Battle of Kursk.

A reliable, perfected tank, it had no equal in the line of medium tanks, until the appearance of the famous T-34-76. It was modernized many times, its armament and armor protection were strengthened. After installing a 75mm long-barreled gun on it, it could easily penetrate the armor of the T-34-76
PzKpfw III is a German medium tank, produced from 1938 to 1943. In Soviet documents it was referred to as Type-3 or T-3. These combat vehicles were used by the Wehrmacht from the first day of World War II until their complete destruction in battle.

Many captured T-3s were used with great success by our troops; there were even entire battalions consisting entirely of tanks of this type. The Germans supplied a large number of these vehicles to their allies. By the time of the invasion of the USSR, this tank was the main weapon of the Wehrmacht and easily dealt with the obsolete Soviet T-26s, which then formed the basis of the tank forces. The tank, like the PzKpfw IV (T-4), was modernized many times, but after the Battle of Kursk, all reserves for further modernization of this model were exhausted and its production was stopped.

On August 23, 1943, the Battle of Kursk ended, one of the main battles of the Great Patriotic War. About two million people, six thousand tanks and four thousand aircraft took part in it on both sides. the site selected the five most powerful armored vehicles that were involved in this battle.

Quantity equals quality

By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the T-34 tank was inferior to the German medium tanks - T-IV and Panther. And the attack on the heavy Tiger was akin to suicide. But the T-34 had an advantage in numbers - a little more than two thousand units. For comparison, the Germans were able to field just over 190 Panthers and 134 Tigers.

T-34−76 tanks support the infantry attack on the Kursk Bulge. Photo: waralbum.ru

The T-34 was armed with a 76-mm cannon, whose shell did not penetrate the frontal armor of the German "cats". Gunner-radio operator from the 32nd Tank Brigade of the 29th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army S.B. Bass said: “I remember they fired at the Tiger, and the shells bounced off until someone knocked down its track first, and then rammed the shell into the side. But the tank did not catch fire, and the tankers began to jump out through the hatch. We shot them with a machine gun."

Soviet tank crews near the T-34 tank listen to the accordion playing while resting before the battles on the Kursk Bulge.

— When encountering German heavy tanks, the crews tried to act from ambushes in order to hit the German tank in the side or stern: “It was not possible to take German vehicles head-on. But the T-34, from the first days when these tanks began to be supplied en masse to the troops, had one important advantage - maneuverability. While the Tiger crew was reloading and aiming at the target, the crew had at most a couple of minutes to jump out, flank the German and shoot. To say that the commander and loader, in addition to knowledge, also had circus skills is to say nothing,” recalled Ivan Kostin, driver-mechanic of the T-34 tank.

Maneuverability, experience and numerical superiority helped Soviet tankers achieve victory, although the price was very high.

"St. John's wort"

By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Soviet army had a universal and terrible tool against any German armored vehicles of that period - the Su-152 self-propelled gun. Its design turned out to be so successful that it entered the series of self-propelled guns almost unchanged compared to the prototype. True, there were few such cars - only 24.

Self-propelled gun SU-152 of the commander of the 1541st heavy self-propelled artillery regiment of the reserve of the Supreme High Command of the Guard, Major Alexei Sankovsky.

The self-propelled gun was armed with a powerful 152-mm howitzer ML-20s. By the way, at the beginning of the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the SU-152’s ammunition load did not contain armor-piercing shells, but this fact did not particularly bother the Soviet self-propelled gunners. To destroy a German medium tank, it was enough to be hit by a 43 kg high-explosive fragmentation projectile.

The turret of a German Panther after being hit by a 152 mm shell. Photo: istorya.pro

The photographs of 152-mm ammunition hits on German armored vehicles are impressive: broken armored hulls, turrets torn off by a huge shell and torn out pieces of the hull - the crews of the tanks and self-propelled guns on which the Soviet self-propelled gun operated had almost no chance of survival.

Completion of assembly of the SU-152 self-propelled gun. Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant, 1943

The SU-152 was the only Soviet combat vehicle capable of successfully resisting the German Ferdinand self-propelled gun with its invulnerable 200 mm frontal armor.

Therefore, during the battle on the Kursk Bulge, two separate heavy self-propelled artillery regiments (OTSAP), numbering 24 Su-152s, were transferred to the most tank-dangerous direction.

In total, during the Oryol-Kursk operation they managed to destroy seven Ferdinands and ten Tigers. Among the troops, the SU-152 was nicknamed “St. John’s Wort” for its high efficiency against German cats.

Pz. Kpfw.VI "Tiger"

The German "Tiger" was equipped with excellent optics and a powerful gun - the 88-mm KwK 36 L/56 with a rate of fire of 8 rounds per minute. Its powerful armor made it invulnerable to anti-tank artillery fire: 45-mm cannons could not reach it even at point-blank range, and 76-mm cannons penetrated the side and stern at pistol range.

German heavy tank Pz.Kpfw.VI "Tiger" from the 505th heavy tank battalion (s.Pz.Abt. 505), captured by Soviet troops in the Orel-Kursk direction. The vehicle of the commander of the 3rd company.

But most of all, the tank impressed the driver - the car was controlled using a steering wheel and was equipped with a mechanical robotic gearbox with a pre-selected gear (like the modern Tiptronic). Eight forward and four reverse speeds.

Soviet machine gunners run past a burning German Pz.Kpfw.VI Tiger tank.

“Soft suspension” - individual torsion bar, staggered arrangement of rollers in four rows, eight on board - made it possible to fire on the move. True, in Russia in winter, snow and mud accumulated between the rollers and in the morning tightly bound the tank.

Self-propelled gun "Ferdinand"

Powerful weapon: 88mm Pak rifled gun. 43/2 with a barrel length of 71 calibers - allowed the German self-propelled gun to hit any Soviet tanks at a range of over three kilometers. The frontal armor of the self-propelled gun was 200 mm. At that time, not a single Soviet weapon could penetrate it.

Soviet soldiers and commanders inspect German self-propelled guns"Ferdinand", knocked out on the Oryol sector of the front.

The crew of the self-propelled guns consisted of six people. The Ferdinand's combat qualities were negatively affected by its heavy weight (65 tons) and the lack of defensive weapons (machine gun), although with proper use these two factors could be neutralized.

Soviet tank crews near a captured German self-propelled gun. German heavy assault gun "Ferdinand" of the 653rd battalion (division), captured in good condition along with its crew by soldiers of the Soviet 129th Oryol Rifle Division.

Against the well-protected Ferdinands, the shells of Soviet tank guns turned out to be practically useless: out of 21 vehicles examined by specialists from the GBTU KA (Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army), only one, with tail number 602, had a hole in the left side. The shell hit the self-propelled gun in the area of ​​the gas tank, and the Ferdinand burned out.

Tank destroyers "Ferdinand", shot down on July 15-16, 1943 in the area of ​​Ponyri station. On the left is staff vehicle No. II-03. She was burned with bottles of kerosene mixture after being hit by a shell that damaged the chassis.

In total, during Operation Citadel, 39 self-propelled guns of this type were irretrievably lost.

Sturmpanzer IV

Armed with a 150 mm StuH 43 L/12 howitzer, this self-propelled gun was built on the chassis Panzer tank IV. Its main purpose was to support infantry with fire, especially in urban areas. The howitzer's ammunition load of 38 separate-loading rounds was placed along the sides and at the stern of the wheelhouse.

The assault gun Sturmpanzer IV “Brummbär” of the 216th assault tank battalion (Sturmpanzer-Abteilung 216) of the Wehrmacht, knocked out in the area of ​​the Ponyri railway station.

The armor of the self-propelled gun was designed to protect against medium-caliber guns. The forehead of the hull was covered with a 50-, 80- or 100-mm plate, depending on the modification, and the deckhouse was 100 mm thick. The sides were protected much less - about 50 mm.

The debut of these combat vehicles actually took place at the Kursk Bulge, where they were used not only as infantry support weapons, but also in some cases as tank destroyers.

Sturmpanzer IV operated near Kursk as part of the 216th battalion of assault tanks, one of these vehicles - number 38 - is now on display in a museum in Kubinka near Moscow.

How the Battle of Kursk began

The Battle of Kursk, the 80th anniversary of which is celebrated this year, has gone down in history as one of the bloodiest tank battles of the Second World War. The authors of this publication do not intend to talk about the widely known events and circumstances of this brutal battle between Soviet and German troops which took place from July 5 to August 23, 1943. Too much research and memoirs have been written about it, including by those who participated in it Soviet marshals- Zhukov, Vasilevsky, Rokossovsky, Konev, Bagramyan and Rotmistrov. For some reason, they described its events in different ways, sometimes even contradicting each other.

In our opinion, this happened because there is one mysterious moment in the history of the Battle of Kursk. Although the Germans were preparing for an offensive there, and the Soviet troops for a “deliberate” defense, debates about whether to attack or defend on this main sector of the front had been going on since April 1943 in both the German and Soviet High Command. The Wehrmacht generals offered Hitler two options: a realistic one - continuing active defense on the Kursk-Oryol ledge and an optimistic one - striking the ledge from two directions. The second option is a plan for an offensive operation, codenamed by the Germans "Citadel", was supported by Hitler, but postponed for another two months, ostensibly in order to create a guaranteed superiority in forces by replenishing the troops the latest technology- tanks, anti-tank guns and aircraft capable of destroying armored vehicles. There were two points of view among the Soviet command. Marshal Zhukov in his book he describes it this way:

“Army General N.F. Vatutin looked at the developing situation somewhat differently. Without denying defensive measures, he proposed to the Supreme Commander to deliver a pre-emptive strike to the enemy against his Belgorod-Kharkov grouping. In this he was fully supported by member of the Military Council N.S. Khrushchev. Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky, A.I. Antonov and other General Staff employees did not share this proposal of the Military Council of the Voronezh Front. I completely agreed with the opinion of the General Staff, which I reported to I.V. Stalin. However, the Supreme Commander himself still hesitated whether to meet the enemy with the defense of our troops or to launch a preemptive strike. J.V. Stalin feared that our defense might not withstand the attack of German troops, as happened more than once in 1941 and 1942. At the same time, he was not sure that our troops were able to defeat the enemy with their offensive actions.

After repeated discussions around mid-May 1943, I.V. Stalin finally firmly decided to meet the German offensive with fire from all types of deeply layered defense, powerful air strikes and counterattacks from operational and strategic reserves. Then, having exhausted and bled the enemy, finish him off with a powerful counter-offensive in the Belgorod-Kharkov and Oryol directions, and then carry out deep offensive operations in all the most important directions.”

That is, Stalin supported the General Staff’s version with one addition: he himself sets the start time of the German offensive, which was carried out by delivering a “preemptive” artillery strike on the German troops on the night of July 4-5.

Another one follows from Zhukov’s book incredible fact- at first, being at the Rokossovsky command post (northern face of the Kursk Bulge), he gave the command to deliver this strike and only after the start of the Soviet artillery barrage at 2 hours 20 minutes, he reported this to Stalin. That is, everything was done so that the Soviet counter-preparation at 2.20 began allegedly not on the direct orders of Stalin, but on the forced command of Zhukov (the German defector warned that the offensive would begin in the morning). At 4.30 the German artillery barrage began, and at 5.30 the German offensive began simultaneously on the northern and southern fronts of the Kursk ledge, and Zhukov immediately left for the southern one at the Vatutina command post (as it turned out, the Germans delivered the main blow there). It is noteworthy that Soviet propaganda strongly emphasized that the direction of the main attack and the date set by Hitler for the start of the offensive near Kursk was known to Stalin from the very beginning. The following sources have been cited at various times: Soviet intelligence officer Nikolay Kuznetsov-Paul Siebert, who allegedly received it from the Reich Commissioner of Ukraine Erich Koch; The Cambridge Five, who obtained this information using an encryption machine "Enigma"; and even "Luci"- a hitherto unknown employee of the Wehrmacht High Command, who transmitted it through the Rado group in Switzerland. Stalin was literally bombarded with information about the most secret plan Hitler, even Stalin allegedly read Directive No. 6 on the offensive on April 12 - that is, even before Hitler signed it on April 15. And since it stated: “The best formations must be used in the direction of the main attacks, best armies, the best commanders, the best equipment must be delivered to key points", then the response of the Soviet Supreme Commander-in-Chief was adequate - powerful defensive fortifications were built on the southern front, the approaches were mined, and additional formations were transferred there. Soviet troops were preparing for a long defense, but on July 5 the first blow was delivered by Soviet artillery on the northern front of the Kursk Bulge. Zhukov explained this in his memoirs by saying that, knowing exactly the appointed hour of the German offensive, the Soviet artillery struck 15 minutes before it, albeit “over the squares,” but significantly reducing the effect of the German artillery preparation for the offensive that began 2 hours later. The only surprising thing is that immediately after this the Germans delivered the main blow at the opposite end of the Kursk Bulge - on the southern front. That is, the Soviet “counterpreparation” had almost zero effect, although it consumed a significant supply of ammunition and gave the Germans the opportunity to detect the location of Soviet batteries.

Why was this done?

Who prepared the best equipment for the Battle of Kursk

The Germans assembled 2,000 tanks for the Battle of Kursk (according to German data, and 2,772 according to Soviet data). In addition to their main tanks T- III(armor 30-20 mm, gun 37 mm) and T- IV(armor 80-30 mm, gun 57 mm) they were going to use the latest armored vehicles in the Battle of Kursk: tanks T- VI"Tiger" with armor up to 100 mm and guns of a previously unused 88 mm caliber; T-V "Panther" with 85 mm armor and 75 mm gun; self-propelled guns "Ferdinand" with unprecedented 200 mm frontal armor and an 88 mm cannon with an extended barrel, as well as captured Soviet T-34, HF And .

They also prepared to accurately destroy armored vehicles with the help of aviation artillery, installing on aircraft "Henschel-129", "Focke-Wulf-190" And "Junkers-87" anti-aircraft 37-mm and even 50-mm cannons and developing a technique for vertical diving of fighters Me- 109 on tanks and self-propelled guns, ending with targeted bombing.

Soviet troops, according to Zhukov, had 3,600 tanks (according to German data -5,000). In service Soviet troops at that time there were: medium tank T-34-76(frontal armor: 45, side: 40 mm, gun: 76 mm), which was the most massive tank that participated in the Battle of Kursk (70% of all tanks); light tank T-70(armor 35-15 mm, gun 45 mm) - (20 -25%) and a small number (5%) of heavy tanks KV-1 C And KV-1 (armor 75-40 mm, gun 76 mm). Self-propelled artillery units also took part: 2 regiments (24 units) SU-152 "St. John's wort"(armor 75-60 mm, gun 152 mm); 7 regiments (84 units) SU-122(45-40 mm armor, 122 mm gun) and several dozen heavy English tanks received under Lend-Lease "Churchill"(armor 102-76, gun 57 mm).

Comparing combat capabilities these tank armadas, the clear advantage of the Germans becomes obvious - their heavy armored vehicles were capable of penetrating the frontal armor of any Soviet tank with targeted fire from a range of 2 km. While only a part of the Soviet tanks could do this, only by approaching them at a distance of 400-200 m. And the 45-mm cannon (which made up half of all Soviet anti-tank artillery) could not penetrate it at all.

Then the question arises - why, even inferior to the Germans in the quality of armored vehicles, Stalin was actually the first to start the Battle of Kursk? What was he counting on and why did he need it?

Why did Stalin start the Battle of Kursk first?

In our opinion, the reason was quite specific - the landing of Allied troops in Sicily, which began on July 8, 1943, just 3 days after the start of the Battle of Kursk. "Stalin's Correspondence with Churchill and Roosevelt" directly indicates this. Churchill's letter to Stalin No. 167 dated June 27, 1943 (i.e. just a week before the start of the Battle of Kursk) states:

“The enemy's uncertainty as to where the blow will be struck and what his strength will be, in the opinion of my reliable advisers, has already led to the postponement of Hitler's third offensive against Russia, for which great preparations seemed to be underway six weeks ago. It may even turn out that your country will not suffer a major attack this summer. If this were so, it would decisively confirm what you once called the “military expediency” of our Mediterranean strategy. However, in these matters we must wait for events to unfold.”

If we “translate” this letter from diplomatic-political, we get the following - according to Churchill’s advisers: 1) Hitler does not know where the operations of the anti-Hitler coalition will begin, so he does not dare to be the first to strike on the Eastern Front. 2) The planned strike on the Eastern Front, the decision on which was made six weeks ago - April 15, 1943 (i.e., Hitler’s Directive No. 6), was canceled by him, which means that there will be no summer offensive of German troops on the Eastern Front and the Germans They can transfer some of the troops to Italy. 3) It is necessary to begin the Mediterranean operation "Husky" ("Eskimo"), i.e. landing in Sicily. 4) The Allies want to do this by “waiting for events to unfold,” i.e. They will begin landing only after the resumption of active battles on the Soviet-German front.

It was probably this letter from Churchill that prompted Stalin to launch a preemptive strike against German groups on the Kursk Bulge, which forced them to immediately launch an offensive. Soviet post-war propaganda constantly asserted that Stalin knew exactly about the attack prepared by the Germans on the Kursk Bulge, and was “ahead” of him by exactly 15 minutes.

In January 1945, a situation would arise where Churchill would again be forced to write to Stalin on December 24, 1944 (a week after the start of the unexpected German counter-offensive in the Ardennes) in message No. 376, “that Eisenhower cannot solve his problem without knowing what your plans are.” and that "we ( with President Roosevelt, - note. authors) are now convinced that the answer will be reassuring.” This response was the start of the East Prussian strategic offensive operation with the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian Fronts going on the offensive almost a month earlier than planned, as a result of which the Germans in the west went on the defensive, removing and transferring the tank army to the east.

It follows that, in the interestsSecond Front in Europe Stalinrepeatedlypaid with the lives of Soviet soldiers.

GKO meeting with weapons designers

On the first day of the Battle of Kursk, July 5, 1943, an unprecedented, almost two-hour meeting of the State Defense Committee and military equipment designers took place in Stalin’s office. It can be called absolutely incredible for a number of reasons. Firstly, because on that day there was clearly no time for the prospects for the development of military equipment. Secondly, because the biggest tank battles of the Second World War were coming up, and the main designers of tanks and aircraft did not participate in the meeting. Thirdly, contrary to custom, the people's commissars of defense industries were not invited.

The meeting began 5 minutes after the end of an hour and a half meeting of the State Defense Committee, headed by Stalin, with the leadership of the General Staff and the commanders of the military branches. From the first meeting, only the following were invited to a meeting with the designers: Air Force Commander, Air Force Marshal Novikov (with Air Force Chief Engineer Lieutenant General Repin, Chief of NIPAV Air Force Major General Gurevich and commander of the NIPAV Air Force test pilot squad, Major Zvonarev), - Head of the GAU, Colonel General of Artillery Yakovlev (with the head of Artkom, Lieutenant General of Artillery Khokhlov). The chairman of the technical council of the People's Commissariat of Armaments was also invited Satele. That is, only the leaders responsible for the creation and testing of artillery and missile weapons ground forces and aviation. It is worth noting that this meeting is so misunderstood by historians and researchers that even in the unique fundamental publication “At a reception with Stalin. Notebooks-journals recording persons received by I.V. Stalin”, two participants in the meeting - Khokhlov and Zvonarev - were identified erroneously, and two more participants - Rashkov and Charnko - were not identified at all.

Weapon designers were invited to the meeting:

1. Glukharev- head and chief designer of OKB-16, which developed aircraft guns. (Rescued and brought to serial production the world's first automatic 37-mm aircraft gun "11-P-OKB-16", created by the former chief - chief designer of OKB-16 Taubin and his co-author Baburin, arrested on May 16, 1941 "for developing an enemy guns" and dead).

2.Shpitalny- head and chief designer of OKB-15, which developed aircraft cannons, co-participant in the development of the TNSh-20 automatic cannon (Nudelman-Shpitalny tank) for the T-60 and T-70 tanks.

3.Grabin- head and chief designer of the TsAKB, which develops anti-tank and tank guns, creator of the 57-mm ZiS-2, 76-mm ZiS-Z and a number of other guns.

4.Charnko- head and chief designer of OKBL-46 (later KB-10 - NII-88), developing special airborne recoilless air guns "ChK" (Charnko-Komaritsky). Continuer of the work of the designer-inventor Kurchevsky - the creator of the world's first recoilless rifles, arrested in 1937 and executed in 1938 (?)

5.Kostikov- Head and Chief Designer of the State. Institute of Jet Technology (formerly RNII) - in which the Katyusha and missiles (PC) for it and for aircraft were developed (their true creators were the director and chief engineer of the RNII Kleymenov And Langemak were arrested in 1937 and executed in 1938)

6.Nudelman- leading designer of OKB-16, representing it at serial plant No. 74, which produces aircraft guns "11-P-OKB-16", accomplice in the development of the TNSh-20 gun of the T-60 and T-70 tanks (later from 1943 to 1986, chief and chief designer of OKB-16).

7.Rashkov- leading designer of OKB-16, creator of the RES PTR (Rashkov-Ermolaev-Slutsky) and the RShR gun (Rashkov, Shentsov and Rozanov).

Noteworthy was the absence at the meeting of small arms designers Fedorov, Degtyarev, Tokarev, Shpagin and others, tank designers Kotin, Morozov, heavy artillery designers Petrov, Ivanov and aircraft designers Yakovlev, Ilyushin, Lavochkin and others.

This suggests that only the creators of artillery, tank and aviation weapons, since the question was about only one thing - what and how to destroy German tanks, because the Germans used the latest armored vehicles and aircraft in the Battle of Kursk.

So why did Stalin gather his designers on this day? To hear about everything that Soviet industry managed to do to fight tanks and what has already been delivered to the troops? But the heads of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff reported this at the previous meeting. In order to set development tasks the latest weapons? The moment is inappropriate, because we urgently need to decide what to do now in the battle that began that day. Most likely, the leader wanted to receive from the designers themselves accurate data about the weapons available to the troops capable of hitting German heavy tanks, to provide them with new intelligence data about German weapons and to hear recommendations on the most effective methods the use of their developments against powerful armor (including the use of tungsten cores in anti-tank shells, etc.). As well as the use of new tactical techniques that ensure the disabling of German heavy armored vehicles for their subsequent destruction by all other long-known methods, including grenades and even bottles with Molotov cocktails. Because it turned out that the Soviet medium tank T-34-76 with a 76-mm cannon, and even more so the T-60 with a 20-mm automatic cannon, were unable to penetrate the frontal armor of German heavy armored vehicles.

It is noteworthy that it was on this day that GKO Resolution No. 3692 of July 5, 1943 “On the release of V.M. Molotov” was adopted. from monitoring the production of tanks and assigning these responsibilities to L.P. Beria.” (Molotov was appointed to this position by GKO resolution No. 1250 of February 6, 1942).

This testifies to Stalin’s assessment of the difficult situation in the tank forces and the tank industry on the day the biggest battle of the Second World War with the use of tanks began (all the more striking is that the title of Hero Socialist Labor was awarded to Molotov precisely “for special services to the Soviet state in the development of the tank industry during the Great Patriotic War” on September 30, 1943 - immediately after the end of the Battle of Kursk).

Perhaps at this meeting it was Grabin who proposed to conduct targeted fire with 45-mm, as well as the latest 57-mm anti-tank guns, on the tracked tracks of German heavy tanks, finishing off stopped heavy tanks with explosives and Molotov cocktails. And also place 76-mm anti-tank guns not evenly along the front of the advance of German tanks, but in groups at intervals that ensure their penetration of side armor rather than frontal armor. In connection with the significant increase in the thickness of the armor of tank hatches of German heavy armored vehicles, Kostikov could recall that concrete-piercing and armor-piercing bombs with a rocket accelerator, created at the RNII back in 1940 to break into pillboxes of the Mannerheim Line, can penetrate them. He also reported that the Katyusha had already been installed on Lendlease Studebakers and the T-60 tank chassis and that 320 mm caliber PCs were available. Glukharev reported that the 37 mm 11-P-OKB-16 air cannons installed on the Yak-9T fighter (motor version) and the Il-2 attack aircraft (wing version) began military tests, participating in combat operations on the Kursk Bulge . At that time it was an automatic air cannon of the large caliber in the world (the Germans will use 37 and 50 mm cannons in the Battle of Kursk, but these will not be air guns, but anti-aircraft guns). Rashkov could talk about his new PTR "RES" of an unprecedented 20-mm caliber and its armor-piercing 20-mm armor-piercing projectile with a tungsten core (432 PTRs, most likely of this caliber, took part in battles on the Central Front alone). Charnko reported on the development of the 37-mm recoilless airborne gun "ChK", it is possible that Stalin was going to use the airborne forces in the Battle of Kursk (it was not without reason that on June 4, 1943, GKO decree No. 3505ss was adopted "On the additional formation of 13 guards airborne brigades "). However, the Cheka either did not make it in time for the Battle of Kursk, or was not informed about its participation in it, because it was put into service only in 1944.

Charnko's participation in this meeting also indicates that in a difficult moment Stalin remembered the work of his predecessor - the outstanding designer and inventor Kurchevsky, creator of the world's first recoilless rifles, who was repressed in 1937 (obviously, it was then that the leader spoke about his tragic fate : “They threw the baby out with the bathwater”). Or maybe Stalin gathered his designers for this reason, to apologize for the arrests and destruction in 1937-1941. the creators of the most advanced weapons in the world and explain to them the current situation in the war, when victory can only be achieved with the help of the most advanced technology. Is this why it was on June 19, 1943 that the State Defense Committee issued Resolution No. 3612 “On amnesty with expungement of criminal record of specialists E.A. Berkalov, E.P. Ikonnikova, S.I. Lodkin, A.F. Smirnov, G.N. Rafalovich.” , Tsirulnikova M.Yu.” All of them were artillery designers.

WhywasOthe USSR's advantage in heavy tank building was lost

Wondering why nothing was said anywhere about the participation of the heaviest Soviet KV-2 tanks in the Battle of Kursk, we began to look for photos of them on the Internet and discovered a huge number of them. But the most striking thing is that there is not a single photograph of a tank with a star, with the inscription “For the Motherland!”, or with a Soviet crew. All the photos are captured - the KV tanks on them are either knocked out or abandoned, many have German inscriptions and signs, most have smiling German soldiers and officers, photographed in memory of the supposedly “defeated” Soviet giants. And on some there are already German crew in black tank uniforms.

There is an explanation for all this: the KV-2 was a secret tank in the USSR; it (like the KV-1 and T-34) never even took part in pre-war parades on Red Square. He couldn't even be photographed. And he was supposed to be only in guarded and sealed premises. However, in one of the photographs we found a familiar face - the man in the coat and hat (second from the right) is none other than the Soviet weapons designer Shpitalny. Behind him is a police officer (obviously accompanying and guarding the Soviet tank), and next to him is a man with a hat pulled over his ears, vaguely reminiscent of the chief designer of the KV-2 military engineer of the 1st rank J. Kotina.

The crane hook next to the tank in this photo shows that it has just been unloaded from a railway platform. Combination of dress uniform (dagger) of German officers, designer hat B. Shpitalny and the working appearance of a Soviet tankman in a tank work uniform (on the far right is a leather jacket, belted with a command belt with a sword belt and a tank helmet with windproof goggles on top) show that this is a completely official meeting of representatives of the USSR and Germany. The duration is probably November-December (first snowfall!). The KV-2 version with a lowered turret appeared in November 1940, this is the version pictured. Moreover, it was in November 1940 that the designers Shpitalny and Taubin came to Berlin.

This means, most likely, this was November-December 1940. They came, first of all, in connection with the armament of the cannon and machine guns they developed for the Messerschmitt fighter. But it is quite possible that they also participated in the work on the KV-2, because at this time both were developing heavy machine gun 12.7 mm. (There is another option for dating this photo: perhaps this is the second half of April 1940 and a sample of the tank - the hero of the breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line - was brought to show the Fuhrer during the preparation for the breakthrough of the Maginot Line. But more on that below).

In another photograph of the same tank, taken there at the same time, we found a man extremely similar to the designer Taubin.

He is wearing a leather coat and boots (this is his typical clothing) carefully examining the tank. Smiling behind him German officer with a flashlight in his hand and a man in a coat and hat with a roll of drawing or a measuring ruler in his hand (possibly the head of ABTU Korobkov?). It looks like this is the first acquaintance with the amazing Russian tank. This is confirmed by the sight of a German tankman standing on a tank with his hand on his side. In his other hand there is some kind of part, the purpose of which is obviously explained by a Russian designer or tanker who happened to be behind the scenes.

And here is the third, clearly a pre-war photograph that we found, in which a brand new KV-2 is being transported to Germany - this is evidenced by the spare engine for it, standing together with the tank on the platform, and the combination of a German in uniform and a man in a Russian cap sitting on tank.

Another photo of the KV-2 tank on the street of Berlin. But this is not a display of the equipment of a defeated enemy, but rather a triumphal march of an ally’s tank with crowds of people, police protection and filming. Perhaps this tank really arrived at the Fuhrer’s “bride” on his birthday?

And how to understand all this!? But what about the shock of the Germans from the KV-2, which they saw on the Eastern Front at the beginning of the war? This will be a shock for ordinary soldiers, but for those who were admitted, the shock could only be in 1940, when they received from the Russian allies their “holy of holies” - the world’s largest tank with impenetrable Ural armor. Was it not from this moment that the Germans began the feverish development of heavy tanks, which were prepared for the Maginot Line and went into battle in the Battle of Kursk. Perhaps that is why so many technical solutions"Tigers", "Panthers" and "Ferdinands" are borrowed from the KV tanks?

The question involuntarily arises: who allowed this to happen in 1940? Maybe the same generals who, according to a number of modern “historians,” were arrested for this immediately after the start of the war and executed in October 1941-February 1942?

The completion of the development of the concept of the Tiger tank dates back to 1937, when it was main task there was an impending breach of the Maginot Line fortifications. The Porsche company has made the most progress in this regard, having managed to carry out the main work on the heavy tank together with Soviet specialists back in the 20s and early 30s. on the territory of the USSR. After Hitler came to power in 1933, she exported jointly produced samples to Germany under the guise of the chassis of the so-called “heavy tractors.” In the USSR, the KV-1 and KV-2 on six rollers were created on this chassis. But Porsche’s tank turned out to be heavier due to its heavier gun, and therefore it was necessary to increase the number of rollers to 8, installed in two rows. It was called the “tiger” by F. Porsche on April 20, 1940, demonstrated to the Fuhrer at his headquarters in Rastenburg as a birthday gift. At the same time, the Henschel company demonstrated its version of the “tiger”. It is possible that the Soviet version on this chassis, the KV-2, the photo of which was shown above, was also fitted there. Hitler chose the Henschel version for the “tiger” as the simplest. And he decided to use the chassis proposed by F. Porsche for the Tiger to create the Ferdinand assault gun on it. But what’s interesting is that by this time 90 chassis for the Porsche “tiger” had already been manufactured. Of course, the Germans were in a hurry (there were only a few weeks left before the attack on France), but where did Porsche get such opportunities?

So, most likely, these chassis, unified for the KV and for the Porsche 90 “tiger” (where the main thing was armor, the like of which the Germans never had) were made through cooperation in the USSR. That is, all 90 “Ferdinands” (“Elephants”) that participated in the Battle of Kursk were on Soviet chassis (the Germans only increased the thickness of their frontal armor by adding another 100 mm plate).

We decided to see what the pre-war Soviet-German agreements said about tanks. It turned out that in the “Program of Special Orders and Purchases in Germany” drawn up in October 1939, in Section XII “Vehicle Property” it is stated: “Clause 1. The latest samples of medium and heavy tanks with full equipment and weapons - 2.” This means that the Germans were supposed to supply the USSR with two medium and two heavy new tanks (letter from the People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov to the Central Committee to Stalin and to the Council of People's Commissars to Molotov, ref. No. 3438 ss dated October 20, 1939). Judging by the fact that in the same document in the section "Aviation" lists 30 aircraft that were successfully received by the USSR in April 1940. It can be assumed that the indicated 4 tanks were also received at the same time. Perhaps one of them was the one that came from nowhere in early 1943 (allegedly captured near Leningrad) by the “Tiger” (or, more precisely, the ancestor of the serial “Tiger”), which was fired at before the Battle of Kursk from all types of Soviet anti-tank weapons, testing their ability to penetrate his armor. But if the Germans, according to the agreement of 1939, supplied us with 2 heavy and 2 medium tanks, then we should have supplied them with similar tanks, at least to ensure parity. And they did. Discovered photos of the KV-2 confirm this - as an exchange, Stalin gave Hitler the latest and top-secret Soviet heavy breakthrough tanks, the likes of which would appear in Germany only two and a half years later - for the Battle of Kursk. How can we understand this?

Cooperation, parity, Stalin’s secret plan for entering the war andreality

One of the authors of this publication wrote and published the book “ Great mystery Great Patriotic War. A new hypothesis for the start of the war." In it, he argued that the reason for the disaster of the Red Army in 1941 was that on June 22 the war that Hitler and Stalin had been preparing their countries for many years began - against the British Empire. The catastrophe of the Red Army in the first days of the war confirms this hypothesis - after all, German troops concentrated near the borders of the USSR for almost a whole year, and for some reason this did not cause any concern to Stalin. For, according to his agreement with Hitler, they were preparing for the Great Transport Operation - the transfer of Soviet troops through Poland and Germany to the English Channel, and German troops through the USSR to Iraq (naturally, the ammunition had to move in separate trains). Churchill, having learned about this from his intelligence, ordered the kidnapping of Hess and through him agreed with Hitler, using the situation, to jointly strike the USSR on June 22, 1941, with England taking upon itself the bombing of Soviet naval bases. On this day, British planes were the first to simulate raids, but did not cause any harm to the Soviet Navy, and then the Germans launched attacks on Soviet border airfields.

Joint preparations between Germany and the USSR for war against England have been going on since the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922. At first it was military-technical and military-economic cooperation; then after the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 - cooperation, distribution of work and reduction of duplication, as well as ensuring parity; starting from 1940 - the unification of military equipment, ammunition and organizational forms of command and control of troops of both countries. The relationship was almost allied. This is also evidenced by the fact that in 1939-41. Not delegations, but commissions were sent to the neighboring country to check the status of implementation of various agreements (the last German aviation commission was in the USSR in April 1941, and the Soviet one in Germany in May 1941). According to the authors of this publication, observing the actions of Hitler, who, step by step, starting with the introduction of conscription in 1935 and the creation of the Wehrmacht, returned the territories of Germany taken away under the Treaty of Versailles, Stalin created his own plan for the USSR’s entry into World War II.

The first stage is the return to the USSR of all territories taken away under the Treaty of Versailles Tsarist Russia. The second stage is the participation of the USSR in the war in Europe on the side of either Germany or England. (Remember that in August 1939, a joint military delegation from England and France was the first to arrive in Moscow; why they didn’t reach an agreement with them still needs to be sorted out).

So it seems that the Soviet weapons preparing for war were also divided by Stalin into two categories: “weapons of the First Stage of the war” - conventional and weapons of the “Second Stage” - the latest. Among other things, this would also disorient the future enemy - in the “Second Stage” the USSR suddenly found itself with a weapon that no one expected, which would gain a clear advantage. Judging by the close cooperation with the military-industrial complex of Germany, Stalin was planning to fight rather against England (or pretended to), and therefore received samples of German weapons, documentation and equipment from entire factories. It is quite possible that those two years, which the leader always told his comrades, were not enough for him, should have been spent launching the production of “Second Stage” weapons and providing them to the Red Army. At the same time, Stalin was preparing the “Great Transport Operation” - the transfer of part of the Red Army to the English Channel coast, but where and with whom he was going to strike, once there, is still a big question. And if he was preparing to surprise the British with the quality of his weapons, then Hitler with their quantity. That's why best weapon developed and... not adopted, but transferred to factories that were equipped for its production, developed technology, and purchased materials for its production. Sometimes they even rebuilt factories or just laid communications and laid the foundations for their future construction. That is why, during the war years, evacuated and new military factories began operating so quickly. And in this - positive side Stalin's secret plan for “two stages of war”, even his personal merit. Because this in many ways became a trap for Hitler after the “Great Turning Point in the War.”

And before the war, some designers, military engineers, generals and people's commissariats knew nothing about the leader's secret plans and quite rightly believed that the Red Army should already have the best weapons today in order to repel an attack by any enemy at any moment. They did their best to ensure the immediate adoption of their brainchild - they wrote letters, called and “spoke incorrectly” at serious meetings, thereby dooming themselves to repression, and in some cases even to execution. This is the true main reason for many arrests, which were explained by the “marshals conspiracy” of 1937, attributed to Tukhachevsky, and the “aviators conspiracy” of 1941 with executions in Barbash, Saratov and Tambov. At the same time, “unreliable” people who actively participated in key aspects of the entire period of Soviet-German military-technical cooperation, often receiving instructions directly from the country’s top leadership, including Stalin personally, were eliminated.

As a result of this, at the beginning of a surprise attack by Germany, the Red Army and the entire country fell into the trap of the “First Stage” of a two-stage war, first of all, the leader himself. For a significant part of the finished weapons and ammunition that were stored near the border for transportation was captured by the Germans in the first days of the war. Due to the lack of ammunition and the ban on firing on the first day of the war, most of the heavy military equipment was abandoned and captured by the enemy. Many types of military equipment were discontinued the day before because... They were produced through cooperation in German factories. It was this period from July 1941 to April 1942 that was popularly called “One rifle for three.”

Therefore, simultaneously with the evacuation of factories to the East, the launch of the “Second Stage” weapons developed before the war began. According to the resolutions of the State Defense Committee, it is clear how this happened: by resolutions No. 1 and No. 2 of July 1, the production of T-34 and KV tanks was organized, then during July - radio explosion control devices (!), flamethrowers, radars (“radio finders”), "Katyusha" (M-13), etc. And the leader held back the 37 mm Taubin-Baburin air guns - although they successfully passed flight and firing tests in April 1942, for some reason their serial production began only on December 30, 1942 (GKO Resolution No. 2674). And for the first time, aircraft with these guns were brought into battle only on the Kursk Bulge in July 1943, where Yak-9T fighters and Il-2 attack aircraft with 37-mm 11-P-OKB-16 cannons, along with the latest artillery and tank systems, destroyed German tanks, breaking through the armor of even Tigers, Panthers and Ferdinands.

The Battle of Kursk, after which the Germans on the German-Soviet front were just retreating, lasted 50 days over a vast area. However, its main battle and symbol was the bloodiest tank battle near Prokhorovka. Unlike other parts of the Battle of Kursk, this place is flat, where you can see far all around. Therefore, it is strange that there was no photo of the panorama of the battle site with the tanks and guns that died there.

We think that this is not accidental, because it would have become clear that most of these tanks were Soviet. And not only because more Soviets actually died here (after all, they could penetrate the armor of the German “animals” only by approaching them), but also because many of them had German crosses and emblems on them, i.e. .To. A significant part of the German tanks in the Battle of Kursk were Soviet-made tanks, captured in the first days of the war or transferred to Germany before the start of the war by secret order. It was not for nothing that the Nazis took Kharkov twice, because there at KhPZ - the birthplace of the T-34 tank - they organized massive repairs of captured tanks, and on June 22, 1941 there were 1000 of them, including 832 in the western districts. It is no coincidence that one of the main characters During the battle of Prokhorovka, the commander of the 2nd Guards Tank Army, Lieutenant General Rotmistrov, wrote to Zhukov: “the T-5 Panther tank, which, in fact, is a complete copy of our T-34 tank, but in quality is much higher than the T-tank 34 and, in particular, in terms of the quality of weapons." Again, complete similarity, this is another secret of this battle!

Excavations are prohibited on the Prokhorovsky field, because it is literally stuffed with steel and human bones. However, historical “excavations” are necessary, because only they allow us to understand the inextricable connection between Hitler and Stalin, who, like the “Nanai boys” from the famous pop number, fought “with themselves,” and their people paid for it with enormous blood shed on the fields of brutal battles and had no idea about true reasons what's happening. There was only one difference - our country was attacked and our people knew that THEY FIGHTED FOR THE HOMELAND.

Alexander Osokin

Alexander Kornyakov

We continue the topic of the Kursk Bulge, but first I wanted to say a few words. Now I have moved on to the material about the losses of equipment in our and German units. Ours were significantly higher, especially in the Battle of Prokhorov. The reasons for the losses suffered by the 5th Guards Tank Army of Rotmistrov, was dealt with by a special commission created by Stalin's decision, chaired by Malenkov. In the commission's report in August 1943, the military actions of Soviet troops on July 12 near Prokhorovka were called an example of an unsuccessful operation. And this is a fact that is not at all victorious. In this regard, I would like to provide you with several documents that will help you understand the reason for what happened. I especially want you to pay attention to Rotmistrov’s report to Zhukov dated August 20, 1943. Although it sins in places against the truth, it still deserves attention.

This is only a small part of what explains our losses in that battle...

"Why was the Battle of Prokhorovsk won by the Germans, despite the numerical superiority of Soviet forces? The answer is given by combat documents, links to full texts which are given at the end of the article.

29th Tank Corps :

“The attack began without artillery bombardment of the occupied line by pr-kom and without air cover.

This made it possible for the pr-ku to open concentrated fire on the battle formations of the corps and bomb tanks and motorized infantry with impunity, which led to large losses and a decrease in the tempo of the attack, and this in turn made it possible for the pr-ku to conduct more effective artillery and tank fire from the spot . The terrain for the offensive was not favorable due to its ruggedness; the presence of hollows impassable for tanks to the northwest and southeast of the PROKHOROVKA-BELENIKHINO road forced the tanks to press against the road and open their flanks, without being able to cover them.

Individual units that took the lead, even approaching the storage facility. KOMSOMOLETS, having suffered heavy losses from artillery fire and tank fire from ambushes, retreated to the line occupied by the fire forces.

There was no air cover for the advancing tanks until 13.00. From 13.00 cover was provided by groups of fighters from 2 to 10 aircraft.

With the tanks coming out to the front line of the defense from the forest in the north. STORZHEVOYE and eastern. env. STORDOZHEVOYE pr. opened hurricane fire from ambushes of Tiger tanks, self-propelled guns and anti-tank guns. The infantry was cut off from the tanks and forced to lie down.

Having broken through into the depths of the defense, the tanks suffered heavy losses.

Parts of the project with support large quantity aviation and tanks launched a counterattack and parts of the brigade were forced to retreat.

During an attack on the front edge of the pr-ka self-propelled guns, operating in the first echelon of tank battle formations and even breaking out ahead of the tanks, they suffered losses from anti-tank fire (eleven self-propelled guns were put out of action)."

18th Tank Corps :

“Enemy artillery fired intensely at the corps’ battle formations.
The corps, lacking adequate support from fighter aircraft and suffering heavy losses from artillery fire and intense air bombardment (by 12:00, enemy aircraft had carried out up to 1,500 sorties), slowly moved forward.

The terrain in the corps' zone of action is crossed by three deep ravines running from the left bank of the river. PSEL to railway BELENIKHINO - PROKHOROVKA, why the 181st, 170th tank brigades advancing in the first echelon were forced to operate on the left flank of the corps line near a strong enemy stronghold. OCTOBER. The 170th Tank Brigade, operating on the left flank, had lost up to 60% of its combat equipment by 12.00.

By the end of the day, the enemy launched a frontal attack of tanks from the area of ​​KOZLOVKA, GREZNOE with a simultaneous attempt to bypass the battle formations of the corps units from the direction of KOZLOVKA, POLEZHAEV, using their Tiger tanks and self-propelled guns, intensively bombarding the battle formations from the air.

Carrying out the assigned task, 18th Tank Corps encountered a well-organized, strong enemy anti-tank defense with pre-buried tanks and assault guns at the line of heights 217.9, 241.6.

In order to avoid unnecessary losses in personnel and equipment, by my order No. 68, parts of the corps went on the defensive at the achieved lines.""

"The car is on fire"

Battlefield on the Kursk Bulge. In the foreground on the right is a damaged Soviet T-34

T-34 shot down in the Belgorod area and a tanker killed

T-34 and T-70, shot down during the battle on the Kursk Bulge. 07.1943

Destroyed T-34s during the battle for the Oktyabrsky state farm

Burnt T-34 “For Soviet Ukraine” in the Belgorod area. Kursk Bulge. 1943

MZ "Li", 193rd separate tank regiment. Central Front, Kursk Bulge, July 1943.

MZ "Li" - "Alexander Nevsky", 193rd separate tank regiment. Kursk Bulge

Destroyed Soviet light tank T-60

Destroyed T-70 and BA-64 from the 29th Tank Corps

OWL SECRET
Instance No. 1
TO THE FIRST DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF DEFENSE OF THE USSR UNION - MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION
Comrade Zhukov

In tank battles and battles from July 12 to August 20, 1943, the 5th Guards Tank Army encountered exclusively new types of enemy tanks. Most of the tanks on the battlefield were T-V (Panther), a significant number of T-VI (Tiger) tanks, as well as modernized T-III tanks and T-IV.

Having commanded tank units from the first days of the Patriotic War, I am forced to report to you that our tanks today have lost their superiority over enemy tanks in armor and weapons.

The armament, armor and fire targeting of German tanks became much higher, and only the exceptional courage of our tankers and the greater saturation of tank units with artillery did not give the enemy the opportunity to fully exploit the advantages of their tanks. The presence of powerful weapons, strong armor and good sighting devices on German tanks puts our tanks at a clear disadvantage. The efficiency of using our tanks is greatly reduced and their breakdown increases.

The battles I conducted in the summer of 1943 convince me that even now we can successfully conduct a maneuverable tank battle on our own, taking advantage of the excellent maneuverability of our T-34 tank.

When the Germans go over to the defensive with their tank units, at least temporarily, they thereby deprive us of our maneuver advantages and, on the contrary, begin to fully use sighting range their tank guns, while at the same time being almost completely out of reach of our targeted tank fire.

Thus, in a collision with German tank units that have gone over to the defensive, we, as a general rule, suffer huge losses in tanks and are not successful.

The Germans, having opposed our T-34 and KV tanks with their T-V (Panther) and T-VI (Tiger) tanks, no longer experience the former fear of tanks on the battlefields.

T-70 tanks simply cannot be allowed into tank battles, since they are more than easily destroyed by fire from German tanks.

We have to admit with bitterness that our tank technology, with the exception of the introduction into service of the SU-122 and SU-152 self-propelled guns, did not produce anything new during the war years, and the shortcomings that occurred on the tanks of the first production, such as: the imperfection of the transmission group (main clutch, gearbox and side clutches), extremely slow and uneven rotation of the turret, extremely poor visibility and cramped crew accommodation have not been completely eliminated to this day.

If our aviation during the years of the Patriotic War, according to its tactical and technical data, has been steadily moving forward, producing more and more advanced aircraft, then unfortunately the same cannot be said about our tanks.

Now the T-34 and KV tanks have lost the first place that they rightfully had among the tanks of the warring countries in the first days of the war.

Back in December 1941, I captured a secret instruction from the German command, which was written on the basis of field tests of our KV and T-34 tanks conducted by the Germans.

As a result of these tests, the instructions read approximately the following: drive German tanks tank battle with Russian KV and T-34 tanks they cannot and must avoid tank combat. When meeting with Russian tanks, it was recommended to take cover with artillery and transfer the actions of tank units to another section of the front.

And, indeed, if we recall our tank battles in 1941 and 1942, then it can be argued that the Germans usually did not engage us in battle without the help of other branches of the military, and if they did, it was with a multiple superiority in the number of their tanks, which it was not difficult for them to achieve in 1941 and 1942.

Based on our T-34 tank - best tank in the world at the beginning of the war, the Germans in 1943 managed to produce an even more improved T-V "Panther" tank, which is essentially a copy of our T-34 tank, in terms of its qualities it is significantly higher than the T-34 tank and features on the quality of weapons.

To characterize and compare our and German tanks, I provide the following table:

Tank brand and control system	Nose armor in mm.	Turret front and stern	Board	Stern	Roof, bottom	Gun caliber in mm.	Col. shells.	Speed ​​max.
T-34	45	95-75	45	40	20-15	76	100	55,0
T-V	90-75	90-45	40	40	15	75x)
KV-1S	75-69	82	60	60	30-30	76	102	43,0
T-V1	100	82-100	82	82	28-28	88	86	44,0
SU-152	70	70-60	60	60	30-30	152	20	43,0
Ferdinand	200		160	85		88		20,0

x) The barrel of a 75 mm gun is 1.5 times longer than the barrel of our 76 mm gun and the projectile has a significantly higher initial velocity.

I, as an ardent patriot of the tank forces, ask you, Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union, to break the conservatism and arrogance of our tank designers and production workers and raise the issue of mass release already by the winter of 1943, new tanks were superior in their combat qualities and design to the currently existing types of German tanks.

In addition, I ask you to dramatically improve the equipment of tank units with evacuation means.

The enemy, as a rule, evacuates all his damaged tanks, and our tankers are often deprived of this opportunity, as a result of which we lose a lot in terms of tank recovery time. At the same time, in those cases when the tank battlefield remains with the enemy for some period, our repairmen find shapeless piles of metal instead of their damaged tanks, since this year the enemy, leaving the battlefield, blows up all our damaged tanks.

TROOPER COMMANDER
5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY
GUARDS LIEUTENANT GENERAL
TANK FORCES -
(ROMISTROV) Signature.

Active Army.
=========================
RCHDNI, f. 71, op. 25, building 9027с, l. 1-5

Something I would definitely like to add:

"One of the reasons for the staggering losses of the 5th Guards TA is also the fact that approximately a third of its tanks were light T-70. Frontal hull armor - 45 mm, turret armor - 35 mm. Armament - 45 mm 20K cannon, model 1938, armor penetration 45 mm at a distance of 100 m (one hundred meters!). Crew - two people. These tanks had nothing to catch at all on the field near Prokhorovka (although, of course, they could damage a German tank of the Pz-4 class and older, driving up point-blank and working in “woodpecker” mode... if you persuade the German tankers to look in the other direction; well, or an armored personnel carrier, if you’re lucky enough to find one, drive it into the field with a pitchfork). There is nothing to catch in the framework of an oncoming tank battle, of course - if they were lucky enough to break through the defenses, then they could quite successfully support their infantry, which is, in fact, what they were created for.

One should also not discount the general lack of training of the personnel of the 5th TA, which received reinforcements literally on the eve of the Kursk operation. Moreover, both ordinary tank crews and junior/middle-level commanders are untrained. Even in this suicidal attack, it was possible to achieve better results by observing proper formation - which, alas, was not observed - everyone rushed into the attack in a heap. Including self-propelled guns, which have no place at all in attacking formations.

Well, and most importantly - monstrous ineffective work of repair and evacuation teams. This was generally very bad until 1944, but in this case the 5th TA simply failed on a massive scale. I don’t know how many were on the BREM staff by that time (and whether they were even in its combat formations in those days - they might have forgotten in the rear), but they couldn’t cope with the job. Khrushchev (then a member of the Military Council of the Voronezh Front), in a report on July 24, 1943 to Stalin about the tank battle near Prokhorovka, writes: “when the enemy retreats, specially created teams evacuate their damaged tanks and other materiel, and everything that cannot be taken out, including ours tanks and our material part, burns and blows up. As a result of this, the damaged material part captured by us in most cases cannot be repaired, but can be used as scrap metal, which we will try to evacuate from the battlefield in the near future" (RGASPI, f. 83, op.1, d.27, l.2)

………………….

And a little more to add. Regarding the general situation with command and control of troops.

The point is also that German reconnaissance aircraft discovered in advance the approach to Prokhorovka of the 5th Guards TA and 5th Guards A formations, and it was possible to establish that on July 12, near Prokhorovka, Soviet troops would go on the offensive, so the Germans especially strengthened the anti-tank missile defense on the left flank of the division." Adolf Hitler" 2nd SS Panzer Corps. They, in turn, were going to, after repelling the advance of the Soviet troops, go on a counteroffensive and encircle the Soviet troops in the Prokhorovka area, so the Germans concentrated their tank units on the flanks of the 2nd SS Tank Tank, and not in the center. This led to the fact that on July 12, the 18th and 29th Tank Tank had to attack the most powerful German anti-tank tanks head-on, which is why they suffered such heavy losses. In addition, German tank crews repelled the attacks of Soviet tanks with fire from the spot.

In my opinion, the best that Rotmistrov could have done in such a situation was to try to insist on canceling the counterattack on July 12 near Prokhorovka, but no traces were found that he even tried to do this. Here the difference in approaches is especially clearly evident when comparing the actions of the two commanders of tank armies - Rotmistrov and Katukov (for those who are bad with geography, let me clarify - Katukov’s 1st Tank Army occupied positions west of Prokhorovka at the Belaya-Oboyan line).

The first disagreements between Katukov and Vatutin arose on July 6. The front commander gives the order to launch a counterattack with the 1st Tank Army together with the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Corps in the direction of Tomarovka. Katukov sharply replies that, given the qualitative superiority of German tanks, this is disastrous for the army and will cause unjustified losses. The best way combat is maneuverable defense using tank ambushes, allowing you to shoot enemy tanks from short distances. Vatutin does not cancel the decision. Further events occur as follows (I quote from the memoirs of M.E. Katukov):

“Reluctantly, I gave the order to launch a counterattack. ... Already the first reports from the battlefield near Yakovlevo showed that we were doing the wrong thing at all. As one would expect, the brigades suffered serious losses. With pain in my heart, I saw NP, how thirty-fours burn and smoke.

It was necessary, at any cost, to achieve the cancellation of the counterattack. I hurried to the command post, hoping to urgently contact General Vatutin and once again report to him my thoughts. But he had barely crossed the threshold of the hut when the communications chief reported in a particularly significant tone:

From Headquarters... Comrade Stalin. Not without some excitement I picked up the phone.

Hello, Katukov! - a well-known voice rang out. - Report the situation!

I told the Commander-in-Chief what I saw on the battlefield with my own eyes.

“In my opinion,” I said, “we were too hasty with the counterattack.” The enemy has large unspent reserves, including tank reserves.

What are you offering?

For now, it is advisable to use tanks to fire from a spot, burying them in the ground or placing them in ambushes. Then we could bring enemy vehicles to a distance of three to four hundred meters and destroy them with targeted fire.

Stalin was silent for some time.

“Okay,” he said, “you won’t launch a counterattack.” Vatutin will call you about this."

As a result, the counterattack was canceled, the tanks of all units ended up in the trenches, and July 6 became the darkest day for the 4th German Tank Army. During the day of fighting, 244 German tanks were destroyed (48 tanks lost 134 tanks and 2 SS tanks - 110). Our losses amounted to 56 tanks (mostly in their formations, so there were no problems with their evacuation - I again emphasize the difference between a knocked out tank and a destroyed one). Thus, Katukov’s tactics fully justified themselves.

However, the command of the Voronezh Front did not draw any conclusions and on July 8 gave new order to carry out a counterattack, only 1 tank (due to the stubbornness of its commander) is tasked not to attack, but to hold positions. The counterattack is carried out by 2 Tank Corps, 2 Guards Tank Corps, 5 Tank Corps and separate tank brigades and regiments. The result of the battle: the loss of three Soviet corps - 215 tanks irretrievably, the loss of German troops - 125 tanks, of which 17 were irretrievable. Now, on the contrary, the day of July 8 becomes the darkest day for the Soviet tank forces, in terms of its losses it is comparable to the losses in the Battle of Prokhorov.

Of course, there is no particular hope that Rotmistrov would be able to push through his decision, but it was at least worth a try!

It should be noted that limiting the battles near Prokhorovka only on July 12 and only to the attack of the 5th Guards TA is unlawful. After July 12, the main efforts of the 2nd SS Tank Tank and 3rd Tank Tank were aimed at encircling the divisions of the 69th Army, southwest of Prokhorovka, and although the command of the Voronezh Front managed to withdraw the personnel of the 69th Army from the resulting pocket in time, however, most of the weapons and they had to give up technology. That is, the German command managed to achieve very significant tactical success, weakening the 5 Guards A and 5 Guards TA and for some time depriving the 69 A of combat effectiveness. After July 12, on the German side there were actually attempts to encircle and inflict maximum damage on the Soviet troops (in order to calmly begin withdraw your forces to the previous front line). After which the Germans, under the cover of strong rearguards, quite calmly withdrew their troops to the lines they occupied until July 5, evacuating the damaged equipment and subsequently restoring it.

At the same time, the decision of the command of the Voronezh Front from July 16 to switch to a stubborn defense on the occupied lines becomes completely incomprehensible, when the Germans are not only not going to attack, but, on the contrary, are gradually withdrawing their forces (in particular, the “Totenkopf” division actually began withdrawing on July 13 ). And when it was established that the Germans were not advancing, but were retreating, it was already too late. That is, it was already too late to quickly catch the Germans’ tail and peck them in the back of the head.

It seems that the command of the Voronezh Front had little idea of ​​what was happening at the front in the period from July 5 to 18, which manifested itself in a too slow reaction to the rapidly changing situation at the front. The texts of orders for advancement, attack or redeployment are replete with inaccuracies and uncertainties; they lack information about the opposing enemy, its composition and intentions, and there is no at least approximate information about the outline of the front line. A significant part of the orders in the Soviet troops during Battle of Kursk was given “over the heads” of lower-ranking commanders, and the latter were not informed about this, wondering why and why the units subordinate to them were performing some incomprehensible actions.

So it is not surprising that the chaos in the units was sometimes indescribable:

So on July 8, the Soviet 99th Tank Brigade of the 2nd Tank Corps attacked the Soviet 285th Infantry Regiment of the 183rd Infantry Division. Despite the attempts of the commanders of the units of the 285th regiment to stop the tankers, they continued to crush the soldiers and fire guns at the 1st battalion of the said regiment (result: 25 people were killed and 37 wounded).

On July 12, the Soviet 53rd Guards Separate Tank Regiment of the 5th Guards TA (sent as part of the combined detachment of Major General K.G. Trufanov to help the 69th Army) without accurate information about the location of its own and the Germans and without sending forward reconnaissance (into battle without reconnaissance - this is close and understandable to us), the tankers of the regiment immediately opened fire on the battle formations of the Soviet 92nd Infantry Division and the tanks of the Soviet 96th Tank Brigade of the 69th Army, defending against the Germans in the area of ​​​​the village of Aleksandrovka (24 km southeast of Prokhorovka station). Having fought through their own, the regiment came across advancing German tanks, after which it turned around and, crushing and dragging along separate groups of its own infantry, began to retreat. Following to the front line behind the same regiment (53 Guards Tank Troops) and just arriving in time to the scene of events anti-tank artillery, mistaking the tanks of the 96th brigade for Germans pursuing the 53rd Guards Separate Tank Regiment, turned around and did not open fire on its infantry and tanks only thanks to a happy accident.

Well, and so on... In the order of the commander of the 69th Army, all this was described as “these outrages.” Well, that's putting it mildly.

So we can summarize that the Germans won the Battle of Prokhorovka, but this victory was a special case against a generally negative background for Germany. The German positions at Prokhorovka were good if a further offensive was planned (which Manstein insisted on), but not for defense. But it was impossible to advance further for reasons not directly related to what was happening near Prokhorovka. Far from Prokhorovka, on July 11, 1943, reconnaissance in force began from the Soviet Western and Bryansk fronts (mistaken by the German command of the OKH ground forces for an offensive), and on July 12, these fronts actually went on the offensive. On July 13, the German command became aware of the impending offensive of the Soviet Southern Front in the Donbass, that is, practically on the southern flank of Army Group South (this offensive followed on July 17). In addition, the situation in Sicily became more complicated for the Germans, where the Americans and British landed on July 10. Tanks were also needed there.

On July 13, a meeting was held with the Fuhrer, to which Field Marshal General Erich von Manstein was also summoned. Adolf Hitler ordered the end of Operation Citadel in connection with the activation of Soviet troops in various sectors of the Eastern Front and the sending of part of the forces from it to form new German formations in Italy and the Balkans. The order was accepted for execution despite the objections of Manstein, who believed that Soviet troops on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge were on the verge of defeat. Manstein was not directly ordered to withdraw his troops, but was forbidden to use his only reserve, the 24th Tank Corps. Without the deployment of this corps, a further offensive would lose perspective, and therefore there was no point in holding the captured positions. (soon 24 Tank Corps was already repelling the advance of the Soviet Southwestern Front in the middle reaches of the Seversky Donets River). The 2nd SS Tank Tank was intended for transfer to Italy, but it was temporarily returned for joint operations with the 3rd Tank Tank with the aim of eliminating the breakthrough of the troops of the Soviet Southern Front on the Mius River, 60 km north of the city of Taganrog, in the defense zone of the German 6th Army.

The merit of the Soviet troops is that they slowed down the pace of the German offensive on Kursk, which, combined with the general military-political situation and a combination of circumstances that were not in favor of Germany everywhere in July 1943, made Operation Citadel unfeasible, but to speak purely military victory of the Soviet Army in the Battle of Kursk is wishful thinking. "