All-Russian political public organization Unity Party. All-Russian Political Public Organization - Party “Unity”
"UNITY OF THE PARTY IS THE MAIN THING"
The dream of meeting Vladimir Ilyich came true in 1921 at the X Congress of our party, of which I was a delegate from the Krasnoyarsk organization.
With great excitement I crossed the threshold of the Round Hall, currently named after Ya. M. Sverdlov. The appearance of Vladimir Ilyich at the presidium table and his opening speech with a call for cohesion, for unity without the slightest trace of factionalism were met with unanimous applause from the delegates.
I sat near the presidium and throughout all the days of the congress I saw Vladimir Ilyich clearly and heard all his speeches.
While the congress was working, I saw how comrades kept coming up to Vladimir Ilyich and talking with him. So it was with me.
Listening to Vladimir Ilyich's reports, I was amazed at his exceptional ability to convey his thoughts in such a way that they deeply penetrated the soul of his listeners. Reports on any topic in his presentation became understandable even to those who were not completely familiar with the issue.
When giving presentations, Vladimir Ilyich did not read from a pre-written text. It was felt that his every word came from the depths of his heart, and therefore his listeners treated everything he said with great confidence.
Vladimir Ilyich valued the time not only of his own, but also of those who listened to him. He considered the rules of the congress obligatory for himself. Despite the complexity of the issues he raised in his reports on party unity and the replacement of appropriation with a tax in kind, Vladimir Ilyich strictly met the time established by the regulations.
I saw how Vladimir Ilyich, before each speech, took a small metal watch out of his pocket, put it on the palm of his left hand, and then attached it to his hand with a thin cord and, looking at it, finished on time, managing to say everything that was necessary.
After the congress’s decision to replace the surplus appropriation system with a tax in kind, Vladimir Ilyich drew attention to the fact that experienced people were needed to successfully implement the measures adopted by the congress, and asked the delegates to point out to him peasants who knew agriculture well and enjoyed authority among the population in order to attract them to work in bodies of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture.
During the break, I, together with another delegate from our organization, N.D. Leushin, rose to the podium and addressed Vladimir Ilyich. I told him the name of V. G. Yakovenko and began to talk about how popular and respected he was among the peasants of Kansk district, about great job, which was done by him when he led the partisan movement in Siberia, about his talented leadership of the masses.
Vladimir Ilyich listened to me carefully and then asked us several questions. We immediately realized that Vladimir Ilyich already knew about V. G. Yakovenko and, perhaps, even about the brochure he wrote about the shortcomings of surplus appropriation and improving relations with the peasantry. Vladimir Ilyich needed our answers in order to clarify the facts already known to him.
I was extremely amazed by this. It was difficult to understand how Vladimir Ilyich, doing enormous work as the head of the party and state, in conditions of terrible devastation, a tense state in the party in connection with the discussion about trade unions, with enormous difficulties in communicating with the localities, was so well informed not only about everything that happened in a vast country, in particular in Siberia, long time detached from the center, but also about individual workers.
Without writing anything about V. G. Yakovenko, Vladimir Ilyich, saying goodbye, said that everything we said would be taken into account by him.
We were soon convinced of Vladimir Ilyich’s excellent memory and the fact that his words do not diverge from his deeds. Before we had time to return from the congress to Krasnoyarsk, V. G. Yakovenko was summoned by Lenin to Moscow and sent to work in the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, and then appointed People's Commissar of Agriculture of the RSFSR.
Vladimir Ilyich, more than anyone, understood what important represents the unity of the party in the successful implementation of all the decisions of the congress, as well as in the future fate of the party, which factionalists threatened to split.
All of Vladimir Ilyich’s speeches on the issue of party unity made an unforgettable impression on me. All his efforts were aimed at first of all achieving complete unity at the congress.
On the initiative of Vladimir Ilyich, between the sessions of the congress, a meeting of the oldest members of the party - underground workers - was convened, at which he very sharply raised the question of the unity of the party and the blow that the discussion had dealt to the party.
Lenin, with all the strength of conviction and with his inherent logic, defended the correctness of his positions. He showed the danger of deviations that could destroy all the achievements of the working class acquired as a result of the Great October Revolution.
Vladimir Ilyich’s desire to bring the party out of disagreements, united and even more tempered for a decisive struggle for the creation of a communist society, achieved positive results.
The decisions of the Tenth Congress of the RCP (b) on party unity and the inadmissibility of factions were the main principle of building the Leninist party. They armed the party in the fight against various opportunist movements and groups.
About Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. Memories. 1900-1922. M., 1963. S. 592-594
Notes:
SHER ILYA MIKHAILOVICH (1885-1965) - party member since 1903. Active participant in the armed uprising in Odessa in 1905. After February Revolution 1917 and until 1921 he was in leading party work in Krasnoyarsk. Delegate to the X Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). In 1922-1925 - at party, Soviet and trade union work in Odessa. From 1926 to 1930 he dealt with issues of public utilities in Moscow. In 1930-1935 - executive secretary of the All-Union Society of Old Bolsheviks. Since 1953 - personal pensioner.
The most fundamental difference of the new legal system were completely special, unknown to the previous state history, relationship between the party and government organization , according to which all activities and institutions of the state were determined by the goals and ideological and political tasks of the dominant party.
The dictatorship of the NSDAP was ensured legislative establishment of one-party rule. During the period of consolidation of Nazi power, in 1933, the KPD, SPD, German People's Party, Bavarian People's Party, Catholic Center Party, as well as all their sports, youth and women's organizations were legally prohibited and dissolved. The parties' property was confiscated. In July 1933, the Steel Helmet merged with the NSDAP. Decrees on the “protection of the German people and state” (February 1933) limited the freedoms of assembly and the press in case of their anti-government orientation, and also generally abolished Art. 114-118, 123-124, 153 Weimar Constitution. The decree of July 14, 1933 prohibited the formation of new parties.
The third of the fundamental acts of the new way of life was the Law on Ensuring the Unity of the Party and the State on December 1, 1933. According to the law, the NSDAP was declared “the bearer of state thought and inextricably linked with the state.” The party assumed special tasks in relation to the people, the Fuhrer and the state, in the name of which special rights and obligations were imposed on its members, and their own special jurisdiction was established for them. At the 1935 congress, the state functions of the NSDAP were given the form special tasks to reorganize the state, eliminate the dissatisfied from the state apparatus, educate the people in the spirit of the NSDAP and its ideas. These principles became a state program, and subsequently fundamental decisions on issues of economic development, foreign policy, and government reform were made at party congresses.
The NSDAP party apparatus became direct structure of the state organization. Based on the previous organizational links, by 1935 a branched structure of NSDAP party organizations had developed, covering the country at all levels: 33 regions - Gau were divided into 827 districts, 21 thousand districts and over 260 thousand party cells (since 1938 there were already regions 38, cells – over 800 thousand). The main link was the regional one, which almost everywhere coincided with military districts and administrative divisions. The local leader (stattholder) was almost always also the Führer-Gauleiter of the regional party organization. On the annexed lands such a coincidence was absolute. All state matters (except the court, finance and postal services) were subject to the jurisdiction of the Gauleiters. In 1943-1944. party and administrative areas also became economic areas, and the regulation of prices, labor, etc. were subordinated to the same authorities. The Gauleiters reported directly to the Fuhrer, and, according to the organizational charter of the NSDAP, “were fully responsible to the Fuhrer for the area whose management he has been entrusted with it.”
NSDAP established direct party control over all state institutions. In July 1934, Hitler for the first time legalized the participation of his party deputy “in resolving issues related to the preparation of bills in all administrative authorities of the empire.” The opinions of the Deputy Fuehrer as Reich Minister were mandatory for the consideration of all proposals. In 1941, these powers were delegated to a new deputy, M. Bormann, and institutionalized in the special rights of the Party Chancellery of the Fuhrer, which simultaneously became both the national and party supreme governing body. According to Hitler's order (January 1937), any appointments to government positions made without the consent of party organizations at the appropriate level were considered invalid. The task of “political leadership of the state,” declared by the NSDAP Charter, was transformed into direct administrative supervision. And this corresponded to the official attitude: “It is not the state that gives us orders,” Hitler said at the party congress in 1935, “but we give orders to the state.”
The NSDAP was declared the political core of all public institutions of the country. According to the law of July 3, 1934, a Reichstag deputy lost his mandate if he left the party or was expelled from it; the chairman of the faction appointed a new “deputy” from general list. A special law in 1935 proclaimed the unity of the NSDAP and the youth organization "Hitler Youth", which was considered as part of the party; youth between the ages of 10 and 18 were required to join the Hitler Youth under threat criminal liability parents, the activities of all other than official party, youth, women's, sports, etc. unions were prohibited. This policy was also aimed at making the party more widespread, at uniting into it a significant part of the country's population and, in any case, the state apparatus. In January 1933, the NSDAP had 0.8 million members, in May - already 1.6 million, at the beginning of 1945 - 6 million. The share of NSDAP members in the state apparatus reached 70%, including technical employees. Separate state institutions purely party ones were created immediately. This was the Department for Work Among Germans Abroad (1931). The Volkssturm militia, created in September 1944, was subordinate only to the party leadership.
www.bibliotekar.ru
Law on the unity of the party and the state
The resolution “On Party Unity” became one of the most important decisions of the Tenth Congress of the RCP(b), which became a landmark in the history of the Communist Party and the country. The “discussion about trade unions” among the communists unfolded during the crisis of their power in 1920-1921. Having agreed to economic concessions (NEP), the leadership of the RCP(b) sought to maintain a monopoly on power. At the insistence of V. Lenin, it was decided to ban factions and groups in the RCP (b). This decision contributed to the suppression of intra-party opposition in the 1920s.
Victory over the white movement in civil war made the definition of a peacetime socio-political system relevant. For some communists, victory over the “whites” meant the possibility of carrying out democratic changes in the direction of the “withering away of the state”, for which the party advocated in 1917.
At the same time, the policy of “war communism” became obsolete. Now that there was no threat of a “white” restoration, the peasants saw no reason to supply the cities with food for free. At the end of 1920, food supplies to the cities began to decline, and the threat of famine arose again. The communists confiscated grain by force, and the peasants began to more actively support the insurgency against the communists. Among the workers there was also growing dissatisfaction with the policies of the Bolsheviks, who brought the country's cities to a state of starvation. But the leaders of the RCP(b) were not going to abandon the accelerated movement towards communism, hoping to restore and modernize industrial potential in the conditions of direct non-market product exchange, a system of rations and surplus appropriation. The leaders of the RCP(b) believed that the tasks of building communism required the working class. The main organization of workers was the trade unions, and therefore it was the trade unions that were at the center of debate in the Bolshevik Party after the Civil War.
Under these conditions, internal disagreements intensified within the Bolshevik Party over the ways of further development of the country, which went down in history as the “discussion about trade unions.”
The discussion began in November 1920 with L. Trotsky proposing to “shake up” the trade union leadership, and then make trade union structures government bodies. For these new tasks, different trade unionists are needed who know how to command the working class. This caused protests from trade union leaders led by M. Tomsky. Trotsky's dictatorial approach displeased V. Lenin, who considered his approach too rude. Trotsky criticized the inefficiency and bureaucratization of trade unions. On November 9, 1920, the plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) rejected Trotsky’s theses and created a commission to prepare measures for the democratization of trade unions, headed by G. Zinoviev, who was guided by the instructions of V. Lenin, who supported the moderate resolution of J. Rudzutak, adopted on the eve of the V All-Russian Conference of Trade Unions .
If Trotsky and his supporters (Kh. Rakovsky, N. Krestinsky and others) advocated strengthening dictatorial mechanisms and turning trade unions into a lever for controlling workers, then the workers' opposition, led by A. Shlyapnikov and A. Kollontai, proposed transferring power to congresses of producers ( in fact - to trade unions), abandoning the dictates of the Council of People's Commissars, the Central Committee and punitive bodies. The idea of transferring significant power to trade unions and councils was also put forward by the group of “Democratic Socialism” (“decists”), led by T. Sapronov, A. Bubnov, V. Osinsky. They believed that the country's socio-political system should be decisively democratized on the basis of collegiality and strengthening the role of councils. However, there were sharp contradictions between the Decists and the workers' opposition. The fact is that the Decists defended the positions of regional party groups, against which workers’ oppositionists fought locally, advocating the transfer of party posts from the bureaucracy to the workers.
The “workers' opposition” considered it necessary to accelerate the “withering away” of the state proclaimed by the Bolsheviks. Therefore, their opponents accused these oppositionists of an anarcho-syndicalist “deviation” from the general party line. But the position of the party as a whole was still the subject of debate.
N. Bukharin proposed a compromise, “buffer” position between the proposals of Trotsky, the “workers’ opposition” and the “decists”. Bukharin drew attention to the fact that all factions of the party advocated the inclusion of workers' organizations in the structure of the state, which after this could in fact become a workers' state. Management of enterprises in these conditions had to pass into the hands of democratized trade union organizations, essentially self-governing work collectives. But for this it is necessary to restore democracy in the trade unions (and therefore in the “unionized” state). Trotsky agreed with Bukharin’s arguments and admitted that workers, through re-elections, could “shake up” the trade union leadership, clearing it of bureaucratic cadres. Thus, the leading theoreticians of the party were ready to propose the creation of a new socio-political system based on democracy from bottom to top, from enterprises to the state as a whole. But this democracy was supposed to concern only the working class, and so far bypassed the “petty bourgeoisie,” that is, the peasantry.
Lenin and Zinoviev opposed these views. They believed that such changes could destroy the administrative apparatus, which is especially dangerous in the context of the growing socio-political crisis in the country. Lenin believed that power could not be trusted to the masses of workers closely associated with the peasantry, which Lenin considered to be the petty bourgeoisie. The construction of a powerful industry, planned by the communists, was to be controlled from a single center by the party and government bureaucracy, and not by workers' collectives. Therefore, Lenin insisted that the existing system of power must be preserved, trade unions must exist separately from the state, but be completely subordinate to the party, factions in the party must be banned, and party unity must be restored. At the same time, Lenin was ready to make concessions to the peasantry, which had almost stopped supplying food.
The X Congress of the RCP(b), which was held in Moscow on March 8-16, 1921, was supposed to resolve the contradictions in the party.
While the Bolsheviks were arguing, the peasant war intensified. Uprisings broke out in Ukraine, the Tambov region, and Siberia. The rebels put forward demands for an end to surplus appropriation, freedom of trade, and the elimination of the Bolshevik dictatorship. The culmination of this phase of the revolution was the labor unrest in Petrograd and the Kronstadt uprising of sailors from February 28 to March 18, 1921, which took place under democratic Soviet slogans. These slogans were partly close to the ideas discussed in the RCP(b). But the Kronstadters encroached on the Bolshevik monopoly on power. Lenin considered these events the greatest internal political crisis Soviet Russia. The Kronstadt uprising was brutally suppressed. A group of delegates, including active oppositionists, was sent to fight the Kronstadt uprising. However, both this and the numerous peasant uprisings of this time showed that it was no longer possible to maintain “war communism”.
In conditions of an acute social crisis, which again brought the Bolshevik dictatorship to the brink of collapse, Lenin considered the ongoing discussion harmful, and even Bukharin’s “buffer” attempts condemned them as adding “buffer kerosene to the fire” of the conflict. Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Stalin, as well as trade union leaders Tomsky and Rudzutak and others formed the “Group of 10”, which considered it necessary to abandon risky experiments with trade unions, retaining their previous functions. According to Lenin, trade unions should be a “school of communism,” that is, an organization within which workers can gradually acquire management skills. Also, trade unions were supposed to organize workers under the control of the party (to be its “drive belt” to the workers), which was generally consistent with Trotsky’s idea, although in a much more moderate form.
However, politically, the issue of trade unions for Lenin and his closest supporters faded into second place compared to the problem of party unity. In conditions when it became the only power in the country and experienced various social influences, uprisings occurred and external threats grew, Lenin came to the conclusion that the party must be a tightly controlled organization. Disagreements in the party can be tactical, momentary, businesslike, but not related to different strategies for the movement towards communism. The creation of “parties within a party” - factions with their own discipline and separate structures - is unacceptable.
In the original draft of the resolution, Lenin directly indicated those manifestations of factionalism that now had to be condemned: “Such signs of factionalism were evident, for example, at one of the party conferences in Moscow (in November 1920) and Kharkov, both from the group of the so-called “workers’ opposition.” , and partly also on the part of the group of so-called “democratic centralism.” Factionalism is harmful “even with all the desire of representatives of individual groups to protect party unity.” Now “It is necessary that every party organization strictly monitors the prevention of any factional actions.” When editing the resolution, these provisions were excluded from the text so as not to stigmatize subjectively even comrades, who, moreover, suffered in a separate resolution about the anarcho-syndicalist deviation in the party.
Working on a resolution on party unity, Lenin sought to intercept the main ideas of the opposition - the fight against bureaucracy, self-government of workers, the growth of the role of workers in the party and state.
Lenin also considered it necessary that “every practical proposal in the clearest possible form should be sent immediately, without any red tape, for discussion and decision by the leading, local and central, bodies of the party. Anyone who makes criticism must, in addition, in terms of the form of criticism, take into account the position of the party among the enemies surrounding it, and in terms of the content of criticism, through his direct participation in Soviet and party work, he must experience in practice the correction of the mistakes of the party or its individual members.”
Paragraph 7 of the resolution, which envisaged specific repression for factional activities, was not published in 1921, when the restoration of party unity was publicly demonstrated. However, the factional struggle in the RCP(b) did not stop. In 1922, a group of former supporters of the “worker opposition” led by A. Shlyapnikov, who was removed from the Central Committee, was convicted. After a discussion with the “left opposition”, paragraph 7 was published by decision of the XIII Party Conference in 1924.
After the adoption of the resolution “On Party Unity” in the RCP(b) there could only be one position on political issues. This position was proclaimed by the party leadership, after which members of the RCP (b) had to carry out their instructions without reasoning. The Bolsheviks were not accustomed to such arrangements, and discussions continued in the party throughout the 20s. But active participants in such discussions were accused by the party leadership of “factionalism” and were deprived of their posts, demoted in positions, and lost influence on the political course of the ruling party. Thus, the resolution "On Party Unity" was used by the majority of the Politburo to combat dissent and ultimately contributed to the establishment of Stalin's dictatorship in the party.
ORIGINAL PROJECT
RESOLUTIONS OF THE XTH CONGRESS OF THE R.K.P. ABOUT THE UNITY OF THE PARTY.
1. The Congress draws the attention of all party members to the fact that the unity and cohesion of its ranks, ensuring complete trust between party members and truly united work, truly embodying the unity of will of the vanguard of the proletariat, is especially necessary at the present moment, when a number of circumstances intensify fluctuations in the environment petty bourgeois population of the country.
2. Meanwhile, even before the general party discussion about trade unions, some signs of factionalism were revealed in the party, i.e. the emergence of groups with special platforms and with the desire to isolate themselves to a certain extent and create their own group discipline.
It is necessary that all conscious workers clearly understand the harm and inadmissibility of any factionalism, which, even with all the desire of representatives of individual groups to preserve party unity, inevitably leads in practice to a weakening of united work and to intensified repeated attempts by enemies clinging to the government party to deepen its division and use it for counter-revolutionary purposes.
The use by the enemies of the proletariat of any deviations from the strictly adhered communist line showed itself most clearly in the example of the Kronstadt rebellion, when the bourgeois counter-revolution and the White Guards in all countries of the world immediately revealed their readiness to accept the slogans of even the Soviet system, just to overthrow the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia, when the Socialist Revolutionaries and In general, the bourgeois counter-revolution used slogans of uprising in Kronstadt, supposedly in the name of Soviet power, against the Soviet government of Russia. Such facts fully prove that the White Guards strive and know how to disguise themselves as communists and even “to the left” of them, just to weaken and overthrow the stronghold of the proletarian revolution in Russia. Menshevik leaflets in Petrograd on the eve of the Kronstadt rebellion also show how the Mensheviks used differences within the R.K.P. to actually push and support the Kronstadt rebels, Socialist Revolutionaries and White Guards, presenting themselves in words as opponents of the rebellions and supporters of Soviet power with only slight would be amendments.
3. Propaganda on this issue should consist, on the one hand, in a detailed explanation of the harm and danger of factionalism from the point of view of party unity and the implementation of the unity of will of the vanguard of the proletariat, as the main condition for the success of the dictatorship of the proletariat, on the other hand, in explaining the uniqueness of the latest tactics of the enemies Soviet power. These enemies, having become convinced of the hopelessness of a counter-revolution under an openly White flag, are now straining every effort to, professing differences within the RCP, advance the counter-revolution one way or another by transferring power to political groupings that are closest in appearance to recognizing Soviet power.
Propaganda must also clarify the experience of previous revolutions, when the counter-revolution supported the petty-bourgeois groups closest to the extreme revolutionary party in order to shake and overthrow the revolutionary dictatorship, thereby opening the way for the further complete victory of the counter-revolution, capitalists and landowners.
4. It is necessary that each party organization strictly ensure that absolutely necessary criticism of the party’s shortcomings, any analysis of the general line of the party or consideration of it practical experience, checking the implementation of its decisions and a method for correcting errors, etc. would be aimed not at discussing groups emerging on some “platform”, etc., but at discussing all members of the party. For this purpose, the congress orders the publication of the “Discussion Sheet” and special collections more regularly. Anyone who criticizes must take into account the position of the party among the enemies surrounding it, and must also, through his direct participation in Soviet and party work, strive to actually correct the mistakes of the party.
5. Instructing the Central Committee to carry out the complete destruction of all factionalism, the congress declares at the same time that on issues that attract the special attention of party members - about cleansing the party of non-proletarian and unreliable elements, about the fight against bureaucracy, about the development of democracy and independent activity of workers, etc. etc., any business proposals must be considered with the greatest attention and tested in practical work. All party members should know that on these issues the party does not carry out all necessary measures, encountering a whole series of various obstacles, and that, mercilessly rejecting unbusinesslike and factional criticism, the party will tirelessly continue, testing new methods, to fight by all means against bureaucracy, for the expansion of democracy, independent activity, for the disclosure, exposure and expulsion of those who adhere to the party, etc. d.
6. The Congress therefore orders the immediate dissolution of all groups formed on one platform or another, without exception, and instructs all organizations to strictly monitor the prevention of any factional actions. Failure to comply with this resolution of the congress should lead to unconditional and immediate exclusion from the party.
7. In order to implement strict discipline within the party and achieve the greatest unity while eliminating any factionalism, the congress gives the Central Committee the authority to apply in cases of violation of discipline or the revival, or admission of factionalism, all measures of party penalties, up to expulsion from the party, and in relation to members of the Central Committee, their transfer as a candidate and even, as a last resort, expulsion from the party. This measure can be applied only by resolution of 2/3 of the General Meeting of Central Committee members, candidates for the Central Committee and members of the Central Control Commission. (point 7 is not subject to publication)
© Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History
F.45, op.1, d.23, l.29-31.
Tenth Congress of the RCP(b). Verbatim report. March 1921. M., 1963.
Lenin V.I. PSS. T.43.
Pavlyuchenkov S.A. "Order of the Swordsmen" Party and power after the revolution. 1917-1929. M., 2008.
Pirani S. Russian revolution in retreat. M., 2013.
What caused the strengthening of internal party discipline after the defeat of the white movement?
How does the resolution see the difference between business discussion and factionalism?
What, according to the document, was the danger of the emergence of factions for the RCP(b) in the conditions of the early 20s? How does this relate to the uprising in Kronstadt?
What issues discussed during the internal party discussion of 1920-1921 did the resolution consider the most important?
What is common and different in the position of Lenin and other points of view during the discussion of 1920-1921?
History of Germany
Unity of party and state
Four months after the Reichstag abdicated its democratic rights and responsibilities, the republic was seamlessly replaced by a one-party totalitarian state. The next step in strengthening the totalitarian system was the merging of the National Socialist workers' party Germany (NSDAP) with the state, which it turned, one might say, into its monopoly. On December 1, 1933, a special law “On ensuring the unity of the party and the state” was adopted, which stated that “the NSDAP is the bearer of German statehood and is inextricably linked with the state.” As a result, the state became a party state, and the party became a state one. The party leaders were also the leaders of the state. So,
A. Hitler in the party is the leader of the nation, and in the state he is the Reich Chancellor; G. Goering in the party is the Reichsführer of the SA (storm troops) and the SS, and in the state he is the Minister of Aviation, Minister-President of Prussia and the head of the four-year economic plan to prepare for war; G. Himmler in the party is the Reichsführer of the SS, in the state he is a member of the Imperial Defense Council, and later the Minister of the Interior; J. Goebbels is responsible for propaganda both within the party and in the state, being at the same time the curator of all German culture and the Gauleiter of Berlin. Other top party leaders also held ministerial posts or seats as members of the Imperial Defense Council: R. Hess, A. Rosenberg, I. Ribbentrop, V. Darre,
B. Ley, X. Frank, W. Frick.
By the end of 1933, all leading positions in the imperial, state and local authorities were occupied by party members. Candidates for these positions could only be nominated by local NSDAP organizations. Strict centralization practically eliminated all local self-government. No official could remain outside the ranks of the Nazi Party. The courts were also placed under strict control, and only holders of party cards were appointed members.
Thus, all state bodies came under the comprehensive control of the National Socialists. Moreover, no law could be passed in the Third Reich unless the party leadership first approved it. The approval of laws by the Reichstag was reduced to a simple formality, since its absolute majority were Nazis, and the parliament itself was indistinguishable from a party congress, when it unanimously voted for all laws already endorsed by the party chancellery.
At the Nuremberg Congress in 1935, Hitler frankly defined the place of the Nazi Party in Germany: “It is not the state that gives us orders, but we give orders to the state.” If the state received the political blessing of the party, then the party was under the legal protection of the state. Crimes against the party, undermining its prestige with critical statements or even political jokes, were punishable by imprisonment or sending to a concentration camp, and often the death penalty. The fusion of the party apparatus with state bodies was so close that it was practically impossible to distinguish where the party began and the state ended. Government agencies became thoroughly partisan and politicized, and party bodies turned into state-bureaucratic organizations.
The National Socialist Party has transformed from a traditional political party into a state-compulsory entity. In essence, party members were not subject to the laws of the state; in particular, they could not be subject to ordinary criminal or civil liability. A member of the NSDAP who committed a crime was first expelled from its ranks by the party court, and only then, as an ordinary citizen of Germany, was brought before an ordinary criminal court. But for the most part, party courts found that the party criminal was “motivated by truly National Socialist motives, and not by any base intentions.”
Telephone instructions from party leaders to judges to pronounce an appropriate sentence, characteristic of a totalitarian system, have also become common practice. And since all judges were required to be members of the National Socialist Party, such instructions became mandatory for them. The unity of the party and the state extended to ideology. Just as the party banner easily turned into the state flag, so the Nazi party ideology became the state one. Just as the party became a monopoly ruling, so its ideology turned out to be monopolistic. According to Hitler, if “National Socialism as an ideology does not want to destroy itself, it must be intolerant, that is, under all circumstances, defend and carry out the correctness of its views and directives.” Echoing the Fuhrer, Goebbels said that anyone who is not a National Socialist cannot be right.
Branch: Constitutional Law Jurisdiction: Germany Legislator: German Government
Provisions: Establishment of a party form of government and a special procedure for legal proceedings for party members.
Expired: 1945 Status: not valid
Law on ensuring the unity of the party and the state(German: Gesetz zur Sicherung der Einheit von Partei und Staat).
The Reich Government passed the following law, which is given below:
1).After the victory of the National Socialist revolution, the National Socialist German Workers' Party is the bearer of German state thought and is inextricably linked with the state.
2). It is a corporation under public law. Its charter is approved by the Fuhrer.
To ensure the closest cooperation between party and SA services and public institutions, the Deputy Fuhrer and the Chief of Staff of the SA become members of the Reich Government.
1). Members of the National Socialist German Workers' Party and the SA (including subordinate units) as the leading and driving force of the National Socialist state have increased obligations to the Fuhrer, the people and the state.
2). If these obligations are violated, they are brought before a special party court and the SA court.
3). The Fuehrer may extend these regulations to members of other organizations.
A violation is any act or omission which affects the composition, organization, activities or significance of the National Socialist German Workers' Party, and in particular any violation of discipline and order.
In addition to the usual punishments for service, arrest and imprisonment are also possible.
State bodies, within the limits of their competence, must provide official and legal assistance to the official bodies of the party and the SA, which are entrusted with the exercise of party jurisdiction and jurisdiction under the SA.
The law concerning the disciplinary power in relation to members of the SA and SS of April 28, 1933 (Law of State Laws I, p. 230) became invalid.
The Reich Chancellor, as Führer of the National Socialist German Workers' Party and as Supreme Führer of the SA, issues the orders necessary for the implementation and development of this law, in particular regarding the structure and means of administering justice within the Party and the SA. It determines the time of entry into force of regulations concerning these vessels.
1. Four months after the Reichstag abdicated its democratic rights and responsibilities, the republic was seamlessly replaced by a one-party totalitarian state. As a result, the state became a party state, and the party became a state one. Party leaders simultaneously became leaders of the state.
2. A member of the NSDAP (SA), in contrast to a citizen of the Reich, was subject to party documents defining the sum of the rights and obligations of a member of the NSDAP and the SA. These party documents established “increased responsibilities”, for violation of which a member of the NSDAP (SA) was responsible.
3. Members of the NSDAP (SA) were subject to a special procedure for legal proceedings.
According to the regulations regarding such jurisdiction (which, according to paragraph 8 of the Law on Ensuring Unity, were issued directly by the Fuehrer (Reich Chancellor)), “in order to initiate proceedings against a member of the Nazi Party, the consent of the relevant party court was necessary:
- In cases involving a claim of a private nature, for example in relation to clothing, family quarrels, minor bodily injuries, etc.
- For criminal offences, that is, for such crimes and violations that are prosecuted only at the request of the prosecutor's office, for example, in lawsuits for insult.
- When filing complaints, for example, regarding fraud, theft, etc.
- In civil proceedings, which party justice practically does not deal with, that is, on complaints whose purpose is to assert personal rights, for example, in cases of purchase, rental, rental or loan.
The consent of the party court was not required:
With all these four types of legal proceedings, the first task of the party judge... should be to prevent the process. Small things should not be blown into the process. Often a warning or a simple instruction is enough to draw the attention of a party member to his party duties.”
The representative of the general civil authorities had the right, in the event of a violation of criminal law by a member of the Nazi Party, to “initiate a case in the competent party court against the party member so that he would be punished (on the party line) or, if he turns out to be completely incorrigible, expelled from the party. In this case, the party court checks whether the behavior of the party member in the specific case indicated by the government representative requires punishment or not. If such an incident comes to the attention of the party court or party member, then the party court or party member asks the government representative to file an application with the court (obviously meaning the party court). If he refuses to initiate a case in court, then a complaint is filed to a higher authority. In all cases, the Supreme Court makes the final decision.” In general, 5 types of legal proceedings were provided for party courts:
The range of organizations to which this Law and, accordingly, the party court applied was subsequently significantly expanded:
On the basis of the law on ensuring the unity of the party and the state of December 1, 1933 (List of State Laws I p. 1016), I prescribe:
§ 1 (1) The registered (e.V.) German Workers' Union and the registered (e.V.) German Hitler Youth are to be deleted from the list of unions. The assets of these unions, without liquidation, became the assets of NSDAP as a public law corporation.
(2) Land registers and other public registers are subject to correction free of charge upon request.
(3) Until the publication of the statutes of the NSDAP (§ 1 paragraph 2 of the Law on Ensuring the Unity of the Party and the State of December 1, 1933), the still valid registered German statutes apply to the NSDAP as an organ of public law.
HJ (including Jungvolk, Union of German Girls and Girls),
are divisions of the National Socialist German Workers' Party.
Registered (e.V.) National Socialist Association of German Doctors,
registered (e.V.) National Socialist German Lawyers,
registered (e.v.) National Socialist organization for the relief of war victims,
The registered (e.v.) Reichsunion of German Employees, the National Socialist Association of German Technicians (including the National Socialist Association "Strength through Joy") are formations affiliated to the National Socialist German Workers' Party.
(1) Units of the National Socialist German Workers' Party do not have their own legal entity, nor your property.
(2) NSDAP, with its divisions as a public law corporation in respect of property rights, forms a single entity within the framework of the general organization. In relation to property rights, obligations and rights are therefore exclusively shared by a single body.
(3) The NSDAP Reich Treasurer is the Fuehrer's general representative for all NSDAP property matters. General powers include the right to give authority in general or in specific cases.
(1) Affiliated formations may have their own legal entity.
(2) Affiliated formations are subject to financial supervision by the NSDAP State Treasurer.
(3) The financial supervision of the NSDAP State Treasurer does not affect other rights of supervision determined by law.
All agencies shall assist the NSDAP State Treasurer and his designees in the performance of their duties and comply with the expectations of the NSDAP State Treasurer placed upon them by this order.
(1) The first execution order of March 23, 1934 (“Völkischer Beobachter”, Munich Edition No. 86 of March 27, 1934 and Berlin Edition No. 87 of March 28, 1934) to the Law on Ensuring the Unity of Party and State of December 1, 1933 year is cancelled.
(2) Likewise, all orders and regulations still in force that oppose this order for the implementation of the law on ensuring the unity of the party and the state of December 1, 1933 are canceled.
(1) The instructions for the implementation and addition of § 2 and § 3 of this order are issued by the Deputy Fuhrer. Otherwise, instructions for the implementation of this order are issued by the NSDAP Imperial Treasurer.
(2) Instructions for implementation and addition should be published in the sheet of state laws.
This order comes into force the next day after publication.
Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler
Deputy Fuhrer R. Hess Reich Minister without Portfolio
Resolution “On Party Unity”, 1921
Speech by Lenin V.I. at the 10th Congress of the RCP(b)
One of the mandatory principles of the Marxist Communist Party is its unity. Organization, cohesion and discipline are what ensure unity.
Party unity includes:
Unity of the Program, charter, ideological unity + unity of tactics and strategy of struggle.
Democratic centralism, which presupposes clear discipline, unconditional subordination of the minority to the majority, and binding decisions of the highest bodies of the party on the lower ones.
Organizational unity in implementing party decisions.
Unity depends on the unity and consciousness of the working class, its ability to lead until the victory of socialism and communism.
The need to fight petty-bourgeois ideologies that are aimed at organizational disunity in the party and in the ranks of the working class.
After the October Revolution, various factions began to appear in the party: “right deviation”, “left communists”, “workers’ opposition” (leaders A.G. Shlyapnikov and A.M. Kollontai), the “democratic centralism” group, etc. The emergence of factions could lead to a split. Therefore, the 10th Congress adopted V.I. Lenin’s proposal. resolution "On the unity of the party."
When the document is accepted
Purpose of adoption:
The struggle for the unity of the party, preventing it from splitting into factions.
Basic provisions
Unity and cohesion in the ranks of the party is necessary, especially when fluctuations in the petty-bourgeois environment are intensifying.
All factions and groups in the party must be dissolved. ( Factionalism- this is the creation of factions, that is, closed groups within the party with their own program and their own group discipline).
The Central Committee received the right to impose any penalties, including expulsion from the party.
Preventing factional protests. It is necessary to consider disagreements openly at party meetings, and not in secret circles, so as not to create the basis for the formation of factions. For this purpose it is necessary to publish discussion sheet, that is, a party publication designed to make factional bodies redundant.
Cleansing the party of unreliable, non-proletarian elements.
The development of democracy and initiative of the working class, its business proposals must be considered and applied in practical work.
Results of the adoption of the resolution “On Party Unity”
Subordination of the minority to the majority, the minority now lost the opportunity to defend its views.
Cleansing the ranks of the party from its unreliable members.
Formation of centralism in management.
The resolution, adopted as temporary, became the basis of party policy until the dissolution of the CPSU November 6, 1991, justified the repressions carried out during the Stalinist period. “He who is not with us is against us”- this slogan was the basis of totalitarianism in the USSR.
CONSTANT expansion and deepening of ties with the masses is the most important pattern of the activities of the Leninist party. The objective necessity of this activity is caused by the fact that, as Marxism-Leninism teaches and life confirms, neither the masses without the party, nor the party without the masses can successfully carry out their historical mission to overthrow the power of the exploiters and build a communist society.
With the Communist Party at its head, the working people of our country made the Great October Socialist Revolution, created real socialism, defended its gains from worst enemy humanity - Hitler's fascism.
For the first time in world history, the peoples of the USSR, under the leadership of the Leninist Party, built a developed socialist society and are successfully implementing the program of communist construction.
The CPSU is not an alien force, divorced from the masses, as anti-communists claim. She is flesh of flesh, blood of the blood of her people. The enemies of socialism are most afraid of the steadily strengthening unity of the party and the people, which has been and remains the unshakable foundation of our system, the source of its strength and indestructibility.
PARTY OF THE WORKING CLASS, PARTY OF THE PEOPLE
It is known that Lenin's party arose as the vanguard of the proletariat. But the proletariat is an integral part of the entire mass of working people, its natural representative and hegemon. Therefore, by expressing the class interests of the proletariat, the party thereby expresses the fundamental interests of all the exploited, all working people.
V.I. Lenin saw an indispensable condition for success in the revolutionary struggle in contacting, “getting closer, and to a certain extent merging with the broadest mass of working people.”
The degree of unity of the working masses around the Communist Party at each stage of the development of our society largely reflects the growth of the party ranks and their social composition.
Only about 24 thousand Bolshevik revolutionaries came out of hiding to lead the working people in an assault on capitalism. During the Great October Revolution, the party already numbered 350 thousand people in its ranks. Today there are 18 million people in the ranks of the CPSU. The proportion of communists in society is steadily growing. Thus, in 1939 they made up 2.2% of the country’s adult population; in 1950 - 5.9, in 1960 - 6.8, and in 1982 - 11%.
With the construction of developed socialism in our country, the CPSU, while remaining by its nature a party of the working class, at the same time turned into the vanguard of everything Soviet people. Today the CPSU consists of 43.7% workers, 12.6% peasants, 43.7% employees. These figures indicate that the social composition of the party reflects the social composition of society, and this is one of the most important foundations of their unshakable unity.
THE HIGHEST GOAL IS THE GOOD OF THE PEOPLE
The unity of the Communist Party and the people has deep objective foundations. This is, first of all, the unity of socialist ownership of the means of production, the undivided dominance in our country of mature forms of socialist production relations. This is the social community of the Soviet people, the absence in the USSR of classes hostile or indifferent to socialism. This is the ideological and international cohesion of Soviet society.
The unity of the party and the people is served by the wise, scientifically based policy of the CPSU, expressing the interests Soviet people, their aspirations. The Party has always cared and is caring about ensuring the growth of the well-being of the working people, creating material conditions for the further flourishing of their spiritual, cultural life, and social activity.
The path traveled by our country under the leadership of the Communist Party during the years of Soviet power is an entire era. History does not know such a rapid rise from a state of backwardness and ruin to the power of a modern great power. Over 60 years, the volume of industrial production has increased 528 times, the commissioning of fixed assets - 598 times.
The interests and aspirations of the Soviet people are also served by the peace-loving foreign policy CPSU. Carrying out the Peace Program developed by the Party, Soviet Union persistently seeks to curb the arms race, put forward more than 100 proposals aimed at defusing international tension.
TOGETHER WITH THE PEOPLE, AT THE LEADER OF THE MASSES
The unity of the party and the people is not something given once and forever, frozen. This unity must be constantly strengthened and developed.
Following Lenin's behests, the party, with all its specific organizational, ideological and educational work among the masses, strengthens ties with the people in every possible way. A special role in this belongs to the primary party organizations, of which there are more than 420 thousand in our country. They are the strongholds through which the party addresses every collective, every worker.
The fact that the number of workers and collective farmers employed directly in production is constantly increasing in the leading party bodies - from primary party organizations to the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics - also helps to strengthen the ties between the party and the people. They are now over 40%.
An important condition for strengthening the unity of the party and the people is the democratic nature of the party leadership in our country. The work of party bodies is noted by wide publicity. The party submits all its undertakings and plans to the general judgment of the Soviet people, carefully taking into account everything valuable that they offer.
Strengthening the unity of the Party and the people is inseparable from the development of socialist democracy. It is noteworthy that the number of ordinary workers in the Councils of People's Deputies is growing. Among the deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of the tenth convocation, workers make up 34.8%, collective farmers - 16.3%. More than 50% of the deputies of the Supreme Soviets of the union republics are workers and collective farmers, and over 68% of the local Soviets.
Public organizations are a reliable support for the Party among the masses. This was convincingly demonstrated by the XVII Congress of Trade Unions, the XIX Congress of the Komsomol, and elections to local Councils of People's Deputies that took place last year.
“When we say: “The people are united in the party!” - noted in the report at the ceremonial meeting dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR, Secretary General The Central Committee of the CPSU Yu. V. Andropov is a statement of the immutable fact that the goals and objectives set for itself by the party accurately express the aspirations and needs of all Soviet people. And our many millions of people implement the party’s policy through their deeds.”
V. SHAPKO, Doctor of Historical Sciences
Party unity one of the fundamental principles of the revolutionary Marxist party, a necessary condition for the successful activity of which is organization, cohesion and discipline, based on the common task of the struggle for communism. Fundamentals of the EP: a) Marxist-Leninist worldview (the doctrine of class struggle, socialist revolution, dictatorship of the proletariat, construction of socialism and communism) as the general theoretical platform of the working class party; the commonality of goals, methods and forms of activity, principles of relationships with different classes and social groups etc. (ideological unity, including the unity of revolutionary strategy and tactics); b) provided for by democratic centralism (See Democratic centralism), firm internal party discipline, unconditional subordination of the minority to the majority, binding decisions of the highest party bodies for the lower ones, enshrined in the Party Charter and presupposing the active activity of communists in implementing party decisions (organizational unity). V.I. Lenin emphasized the inextricable connection between organizational and ideological E.P. Back in 1900, he wrote: “It is necessary to develop, firstly, a strong ideological unification... It is necessary, secondly, to develop an organization...” (Full. collected works, 5th ed., vol. 4, p. 357). The CPSU preserved and developed Lenin’s position on the E. p. “The inviolable law of life of the CPSU,” as stated in the Party Charter, “is ideological and organizational unity, the solidity of its ranks, the high conscious discipline of all communists” (1971, p. 5). E. p. depends on the degree of unity and consciousness of the proletariat as a class, the strength of its ties with the non-proletarian strata of the working people, on its ability to lead them to the socialist revolution, and after its victory - to lead socialist and communist construction. The heterogeneity of the working class, the influence of the petty-bourgeois environment, and the ideological pressure of imperialism create conditions for the emergence of opportunist, revisionist trends in the labor movement, and are reflected in the party in the form of anti-Marxist groups. The Communist Party constantly fights against the influence of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideologies, their tendency towards organizational disunity, i.e., violation of the EP. Defense of the EP means the fight against all varieties of revisionism and opportunism. Underestimation of theoretical or organizational issues entails a weakening of economic power, which can lead to its loss of ability to lead workers. Special meaning has the protection of the organizational united state, which is the consolidation of the ideological united state and without which the party as a union of like-minded people cannot exist. Lenin and the Bolsheviks waged a long and stubborn struggle against the opportunists for the EP. They defended and achieved (4th Congress of the RSDLP, 1906) the inclusion in the party charter of the first paragraph in Lenin’s formulation: “Anyone who accepts the party program and supports the party is recognized as a party member material means and a member of any party organization” (“CPSU in resolutions...”, 8th ed., vol. 1, 1970, p. 182). The struggle for the European Union in the pre-revolutionary period ended with the expulsion from the party of economists, liquidators, Mensheviks and other opportunists. After the October Revolution of 1917, the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois influence on the working class was reflected in the party in the form of various factional groups (“left communists”, the workers’ opposition, the group of “democratic centralism”, Trotskyists, the right deviation), which undermined the principle of the EP. All of them had in common the departure from Marxism-Leninism, first in matters of strategy and tactics, and then in the field of its organizational and theoretical foundations. Since the emergence of factions was fraught with a split in the party and led to its weakening leadership role, the 10th Congress of the RCP (6) (1921), based on Lenin’s report, adopted the resolution proposed by him “On the unity of the party,” instructing the Central Committee to carry out “... the complete destruction of all factionalism...” (ibid., vol. 2, 1970, p. 220). The principle of economic power finally won in the CPSU after the elimination of the remnants of the exploiting classes. The unity of the CPSU is ensured by: a unified socialist economic system in the USSR; complete coincidence of interests of the working class and the collective farm peasantry in all main directions of party policy; the continuous growth of the general culture of the people, the ever deeper assimilation by party members of Marxist-Leninist theory and its creative application in practical activities; development of internal party democracy and strengthening of conscious discipline in the ranks of the party. The unity of the CPSU is the key to successful communist construction. Strengthening the unity of the Communist Party on the basis of Marxism-Leninism has become one of the most important tasks of the Communist International and its sections from the first days of their existence. For this, in the early 20s. It was necessary, first of all, to overcome the remnants of social democracy in the communist parties. Twenty-one conditions for admission to the Comintern and a number of other documents of the international communist movement served to prevent the penetration of alien elements into the Communist Party that would undermine the Communist Party. At the same time, it was necessary to help young communists get rid of the mistakes described by V.I. Lenin as “the childhood disease of “leftism” in communism.” The most important condition strengthening the unity of the communist parties was to cleanse them of Trotskyists and those who became more active in the late 20s. right-wing opportunist elements. The strengthened unity of the communist parties became an important factor in the success of the united labor and popular fronts in the 30s, and during the 2nd World War - one of the conditions for the communist parties to fulfill their vanguard role in the Resistance Movement. In the post-war years, as a result of the numerical growth of communist parties, among the young members of which not all had sufficient theoretical training, the need emerged to continue the struggle to strengthen the unity of communist parties on a Marxist-Leninist basis. There was a revival of right-wing revisionist elements, which led to particularly dire consequences in 1956 in Hungary and in 1968 in Czechoslovakia. The fight against revisionists who are trying to push their anti-Marxist views into the communist party under the guise of “free discussion” remains one of the urgent tasks for the world communist movement. The Communist Party (for example, Austria, Italy, France) is systematically purging its ranks of opportunists. Component this struggle is an exposure of the splitting activities of the Maoist leadership of the Communist Party of China and its agents in various countries. Policy documents international meetings Communist and workers' parties of 1957, 1960 and 1969 indicate that the unity and cohesion of the international communist movement, of each communist party individually, is one of the prerequisites for the further success of the working class in the struggle for democracy and socialism. Historical experience shows that the communist party, having lost its unity and, as a result, left without firm leadership, turns into a fragmented mass, incapable of organized action. Under the pressure of counter-revolutionary forces, it may be defeated. The source of strength and the prerequisite for the success of the work of the Communist Party is strong political, organizational and ideological unity based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism. E. p. needs to be updated, deepened and strengthened in the course of solving all new issues. The principled struggle against all manifestations of opportunism, revisionism and factionalism is Ch. a means of preserving the European Union. Democratic centralism and collective party leadership create the conditions for strengthening the European Union. Lit.: Marx K. and Engels F., Manifesto of the Communist Party, Works, 2nd ed., vol. 4; Charter of the Union of Communists, ibid. (Appendices); Lenin V.I., Statement of the Iskra Editorial Board, Complete. collection cit., 5th ed., vol. 4; him, Where to start?, ibid., vol. 5; him, What to do?, ibid., vol. 6; him. One step forward, two steps back, ibid., vol. 9; him. The fight against the Social-Democratic cadets and party discipline, ibid., vol. 14; him. Report to the Fifth Congress of the RSDLP regarding the St. Petersburg split and the related establishment of the party congress, ibid., vol. 15; him. The childhood disease of “leftism” in communism, ibid., vol. 41; CPSU program. (Adopted at the XXII Congress of the CPSU), M., 1971; Charter of the CPSU, M., 1971. G. V. Antonov.
Big Soviet encyclopedia. - M.: Soviet Encyclopedia. 1969-1978 .
See what “Party Unity” is in other dictionaries:
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Books
- Complete works, V.I. Lenin, The twenty-second volume includes works written in July 1912 - February 1913. Most of the works of this period are devoted to the analysis of the growing revolutionary upsurge, explanation... Category:
