Why were they afraid of Soviet helicopters in the Afghan war? Helicopters for support: revelations from a private contract helicopter pilot in Afghanistan - bmpd

Friendly resource "Periscope.2"(periscope2.ru) published a translation of the article " Chopper Support Missions" from the November 2012 issue of the magazine " Combat & Survival", which is a summary of the stories of Neil Ellis, a famous private contract pilot flying in Afghanistan on a Russian-made Mi-8MTV helicopter.

“In the first six months of flying the Mi-8 in Afghanistan, I had more close calls with death than in the previous 36 years of my work as a helicopter pilot anywhere else.”

Mi-8MTV-1 helicopter (Colombian registration NK-3882, serial number 96018) of the Vertical de Aviacion airline registered in Colombia. Currently, this airline operates 30 Mi-8MTV series helicopters in Afghanistan in the interests of ISAF forces. The photo was taken at the American forward base FOB Salerno in Khost, Afghanistan. 11/16/2009 (c) Michael Ramsey / airliners.net

The war-torn land of Afghanistan is not the only hostile environment in the country. Afghan airspace is also full of threats, and the Taliban's anti-aircraft missiles and machine guns are not even the most dangerous of them. An even greater danger is sometimes the risk of collision with the numerous planes and helicopters that flood the skies here.

According to Neall Ellis, or Nellis as his friends call him, he has only had one engine failure so far in a flight over southern Afghanistan. “It happened very close to the Pakistani border and if not for luck, everything could have ended sadly. The terrain we were flying over was quite inhospitable. There are just depressions and gorges everywhere, there is very little flat surface on which to sit if something happens. Besides, you have no idea which areas are dangerous and which are not. Without reconnaissance, blindly, no one walks there. We received the first warning of impending trouble as soon as we crossed the mountain ridge at an altitude of about 10,000 feet (3,050 m). As one might expect, the cliffs here are almost vertical. Quickly assessing my options, I realized that there was nothing here that even remotely resembled a landing site. Actually, it is no coincidence that I fly over the most rugged terrain. In my experience, rebels prefer to operate in more settled areas, where movement is less like dangerous mountain tourism. Fortunately, the MTV (Mi-8MTV) is a very powerful helicopter, and I was once again convinced that its flight characteristics when flying on one engine are phenomenal. Therefore, even with all the cargo on board, we were able to stabilize the car at an altitude of 8,000 feet (approx. 2,440 m), while maintaining sufficient distance between us and the mountains around us. And because we feared that the area was under tight Taliban control, we had to pull all the way to a military base in the interior, where we eventually landed. Later, when inspecting the car, we found out that the cause of the malfunction was detached parts in the fuel supply regulator. Over time, they shredded, becoming essentially metal filings, clogged the fuel filter and caused a lack of fuel flow to the engine. If this had happened to both engines at the same time, we would have collapsed. By the time we realized what was happening, the power of the faulty engine had dropped to the point where it was no longer useful. And since we were unsure of the cause of the malfunction, we decided to turn it off and fly with one that was working. This avoided further damage to the faulty engine. We landed in Asadabad and from there we radioed for a new fuel regulator. Once it arrived and was installed by our flight mechanic, we were able to fly back to Kabul.”

It is curious that, according to Nellis, the Russians specifically developed a modification of the Mi-8MTV with TV3-117VM engines for operations in Afghanistan. It can be argued that this is still the best helicopter in the world in its class for operations in high mountain areas. Indeed, no Western helicopter in this weight category can operate as effectively.

The war in Afghanistan is unlike any other that the West has waged over the past hundred and fifty years. This is a clash of cultures and ideologies that defies description. No matter how you look at it, what is happening now in Afghanistan is very different from the scenarios of the wars in Vietnam, Korea, World War II and more than a hundred guerrilla wars in Asia, Africa, South and Central America and the Western Pacific. As one wit has said, parts of this country are leaping rapidly into the fourteenth century.

The young Winston Churchill once said that Afghanistan is a land that practically attracts conflict. If you once get entangled in a conflict here, he warned, it will be devilishly difficult to get out. This is exactly the situation the country remains in in the new millennium.

Nellis is a veteran of a dozen wars, including conflicts in Rhodesia, the former South West Africa (Namibia), Angola, Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone, as well as the Balkans, where he flew for Muslim fighters fighting the Serbs. Today he flies supply missions with Russian-built helicopters in Afghanistan. He admits that working in this complex and hopelessly fragmented land is different from anything he has experienced. And while he admits that not all work in Afghanistan is hard combat, he says there have been moments here when he would rather work somewhere else.

Based at Kabul International Airport in the suburbs of the Afghan capital former colonel The South African Air Force is associated with a large private military company operating in the region. At one point, more than 50 pilots from different countries worked for this company in Afghanistan.

Every day of the year, more than 100 civilian helicopters take to the skies of Afghanistan to transport supplies to remote outposts, muster sites, construction sites and military camps throughout Central Asia. Most of the cars are Russian (in some cases, ex-Soviet) Mi-8. Recently, American-purchased S-61, Bell 214 and Sikorsky S-92, and French Puma have been added. All of these vehicles are involved in supply missions in one form or another. Civilian helicopters fly during the day, while Army helicopters and State Department Air Wing helicopters equipped for night flights fly at night.

The fact that the Taliban also targets civilian vehicles is beyond doubt. It took time for the enemy to realize the important role private companies play in this war. Especially now, when sabotage against the Coalition vehicle convoy system has become more frequent. Therefore, the Taliban have now begun to take more concerted action against unarmed civilian vehicles.

There are quite a lot of cases of downed helicopters. Abu Dhabi Aviation lost a Bell 212 in the south of the country, a Vertical Aviation helicopter shot down in 2010. To counter this threat, civilian helicopters now fly above the range of small arms fire, reducing the risk of being shot down.

But, as a representative of one of the large operators operating from Kabul says: “Transportation to remote areas is also required every day. The Taliban have concentrated on firing at helicopters as they approach these bases. “Almost every week there are incidents where helicopters come under fire and cause holes,” he says, adding that in some cases helicopter landing sites come under mortar fire. According to him, the Taliban managed to largely neutralize road transport links, which made helicopters indispensable in this war. “This means that NATO forces and other organizations are forced to rely on helicopter companies for personnel replacement, food and ammunition operations,” he adds. “An effective counter tactic is to try to shoot down supply helicopters. If successful, it will stifle our operations in the country. "

To date, according to the interlocutor, there has been no evidence of the use of portable anti-aircraft missile systems Taliban militants. “However, we expect that this situation will change in the near future, since NATO forces cannot control all the MANPADS located on Libyan territory.” He says there is confidence among airmen in Afghanistan that these missiles will sooner or later fall into the hands of Taliban militants. “If this happens, we will be forced to change our flight profile - we will fly at low altitudes and as quickly as possible and the risk of being shot at from small arms from the ground will increase.”

According to him, pilots from Eastern Bloc countries often neglect tactical considerations. “In addition to flying slowly, they always follow standard flight profiles, which often leads to their helicopters being ambushed. As a result, most of the helicopters attacked are piloted by them.”

Crews working in Afghanistan are unlikely to get rich quickly. Pilot salaries range from $600 to $1,400 per day. American pilots are paid better than Eastern European ones, but some companies turn a blind eye to the number of flight hours, so in many companies that employ Eastern European pilots, their flight time exceeds 250 hours per month. So instead of the usual salary of $10,000 plus a hundred dollar extra pay for every flight hour over the 70 hour standard, they make a cool $30,000 a month for the month.

The standard work period for pilots is eight weeks, followed by four weeks off, although some companies use a six-by-six schedule. Airmen from Eastern Europe work for an average of three months, after which they do not return unless they are hired out. According to one senior pilot from a western country who has been working in Afghanistan for three years, helicopter owners and pilot bosses treat pilots from eastern European countries very harshly. “The problem is that these pilots are completely submissive and servile, their culture allows it. This also affects the way they fly, which is often dangerous."

Not surprisingly, pilots from Eastern European countries often cause problems. The truth is that many of them not only speak English poorly, but barely understand the language at all. Most of them are Russian or Ukrainian and are trained only to respond to standard phrases from air traffic control system operators and nothing more.

Often pilots are instructed to change course or delay for a while due to militant activity on the ground. In addition, the local airport may be busy. This can create misunderstandings between foreign pilots and air traffic control operators on the ground. There have been several occasions where such chaos has resulted that the number of possible collisions between helicopters has been greater than anyone could have imagined. Fortunately, helicopters are not that fast, and pilots usually have enough time to get out of a dangerous path.

When flying near densely populated areas of Kabul, problems often arise due to radio jamming equipment used by NATO troops to prevent radios and cellphones from detonating improvised explosive devices, Nellis said. As a result, you hear a piercing, ear-piercing noise in your headphones, something similar to the work of a heavy metal rock band. Sometimes the interference is so strong that it is impossible to hear instructions from the control tower and this leads to serious risks in the air. This happens especially often around the international airport and diplomatic areas.

There were times, Nellis says, “when we couldn’t follow the dispatcher’s instructions, even worse, when we saw with our own eyes that he was wrong. If we were on a collision course in poor visibility, we likely would not have had enough time to dodge.”

Original publication: Chopper Support Missions - Combat & Survival, November 2012

Translation by Sergei Denisentsev

Helicopters were destined to occupy a special place in the Afghan war. Due to their versatility, they were used to solve a wide range of tasks, and often became the only means of ensuring and supporting the diverse activities of troops. Without exaggeration, we can say that the helicopters bore the brunt of the war, going through it from the first to the last days. Moreover, their work began even before the appearance of Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

Among military equipment in March 1979, in addition to the already existing 8 Mi-8s, another 8 “eights” were delivered to the DRA. At the Bagram base they placed a transport squadron of Soviet An-12s, a communications center and an airborne battalion to guard them (to camouflage the paratroopers they dressed them in aircraft technician overalls). In the summer, they were joined by a squadron of eights, Lieutenant Colonel A. Belov, who arrived from Bukhara. Its task was “court” transportation and communications; it was ordered to refrain from participating in hostilities.

Back in mid-December, helicopter pilots from the Turkestan and Central Asian districts were put on alert with an order to relocate to border sites in Kalai-Mura, Kokaydy and Sandykachi. To conceal the operation, a rumor was started about an upcoming landing in Iran in order to support the anti-Shah revolution; the crews were even given maps of this country. The legend was maintained until December 25, when helicopter units began transferring soldiers and equipment to concentration areas near the border with Afghanistan and landing troops to capture key positions and airfields on its territory. On December 27, during the capture of Amin’s palace, it was planned to use the Mi-8 to transport an assault group to the roof of the building, but due to the risk of a night landing, this plan was abandoned and the capture was carried out by special forces with the support of armored vehicles (On the morning of that day, Amin, who had no more than ten years to live hours, he said with jubilation to his entourage: “Everything is going great, Soviet units are already on their way here!”...).

By the beginning of 1980, the 34th Mixed Air Corps, assigned to the group in Afghanistan, had 110 helicopters, of which 85% were Mi-8s - they were destined to become the “workhorse” of that war. The appearance of such an armada at Afghan airfields caused real panic among the forward commands - the placement and, especially, refueling of many helicopters was a serious problem for the poor local supply service. On January 2, 1980, a large helicopter landing force took control of Kandahar, the second largest city in the country. The same method ensured the rapid deployment of garrisons in remote places, on important roads and junctions, which made it possible to control entire areas. The opposition, which had managed to gain a foothold in the provinces, often resisted. Thus, in the border region of Kunduz, the rebels managed to cut the road to the northern regions. To restore traffic, on February 12, with the help of Mi-8, an airborne company was landed near the village of Kojagar, which captured the only bridge in these places. From this operation, helicopter pilots brought the first dead - the assault cost the lives of seven paratroopers.

The most important task of helicopters in the first military winter was to supply units stationed in the DRA. Snowy weather made the few roads impassable, and helicopters became almost the only means of delivering everything from food and ammunition to winter clothing, firewood and books for the garrison libraries, providing at least a tolerable existence for the hastily deployed troops, then numbering 81,800 people. A significant proportion of the cargo consisted of construction materials - boards, reinforcement and cement, which were used for the construction of checkpoints and outposts on roads and passes. The cargo compartment was packed to the brim so that the vehicle could rise, and a helicopter with knotty logs sticking out did not raise any eyebrows. The provincial center of Faizabad, completely cut off from the center by continuous snow debris, was saved by helicopters from starvation. Mi-8Ts of the Moscow border detachment were actively operating in areas bordering the USSR * [ * – The border detachment was stationed in the village of Moskovsky, Tajik SSR ], who controlled the Pamir region. With their help, they equipped and supplied the front line of border security, which consisted of a chain of outposts and observation posts located on the Afghan side to prevent enemy attacks.

After the deployment of troops, part of the helicopter group was recalled back. On some of the remaining "eights", hiding their identity, Afghan identification marks were applied over the somehow painted over red stars. They were included in the “native squadron”, for which flight and technical personnel from Tajiks, who looked and spoke like Afghans, were specially collected from all over the Soviet Union. But the squadron did not become a “purebred”: it was not possible to recruit the required number of Tajiks, moreover, not all of them had the proper class, and six “white” pilots still had to be left behind. The command of the “national formation” was taken by an experienced pilot, Major V.I. Sidorov. True, the disguise was fairly disrupted by Russian speech with specific turns of phrase audible a mile away, and the hastily applied Afghan stars and ears of corn were far from the original.

In the spring, the rebels began to take active action. Plans for a quick withdrawal of troops had to be postponed until the “stabilization of the political situation in the country”, which they decided to implement through a series of operations to defeat the opposition. The first of these, in early March, were raids along roads in Khairabad near Kabul and Kunar province, during which the blockade of surrounded villages was lifted and roadside areas were cleared. This was already a real war, replacing episodic skirmishes and skirmishes. A limited number of roads, gorges and passes, and areas with the threat of talus and rockfalls made the movement of troops extremely difficult. Fire support from artillery and tanks often turned out to be completely impossible - they simply could not be pulled up to the right places. The nature of the hostilities again required the build-up of the helicopter group.

In the spring of 1980, helicopter units again began to be drawn into the DRA, placing them in garrisons and distributing areas of responsibility: Mi-8s from Bagram and Kabul worked in the center of the country and the Charikar Valley (up to the Salang Pass and Miterlama in the east). The 280th Helicopter Regiment, based in Kandahar, controlled the southern belt - the highway and the surrounding areas. A squadron from Shindand was in charge of the western provinces and covering the border with Iran. In the northern provinces, Mi-8s of the 181st airborne regiment operated from Faizabad and Kunduz, which lay along the Kabul-USSR border highway and were well supplied. If necessary - conducting operations, transporting and supplying troops - a maneuver was carried out by the helicopter group using other airfields, where asphalt strips, bulk “patch” of crushed stone or hastily laid metal flooring served as bases. Such bases were Ghazni, located among the mountain valleys, commercial Herat, and Farah and Lashkargah, blown by the hot “Afghan” (immediately renamed by the aviators to Loshkarevka). For efficiency, it was often necessary to work in small groups of 1-2 units from field sites, where even refueling was a problem. To solve this problem, they set up field storage facilities from voluminous rubber “skins” with kerosene laid on the ground, or sent a “cow” - Mi-8 or Mi-6 with fuel - to help. In August 1980, tanker helicopters supported a major landing in Maymen in the north-west of the country, supplying two helicopter regiments with fuel.

For closer cooperation, helicopter squadrons were assigned to each of the three (5th, 108th and 201st) motorized rifle divisions and the 103rd airborne divisions, and helicopter detachments reinforced the 66th and 70th separate motorized rifle brigades. Helicopter units stationed in the DRA usually consisted of one to four squadrons. Often they, formed on the basis of several regiments and equipped locally with individual vehicles and pilots from different districts, were a “hodgepodge”. The average level of crew training, satisfactory for peacetime, in Afghanistan turned out to be completely insufficient: many pilots did not have permission to independently choose a landing site, could not keep their aircraft in service, fell behind and got lost, even when flying in a group. Navigators often lacked training in flights over terrain devoid of clear landmarks and familiar radio beacons. There were cases when, upon returning, pilots got confused in the map, indicating the landing site. Some strange things also happened: in the air, all three crew members - the commander, the navigator and the flight engineer - disagreed about where the helicopter was flying. There was also a lack of skills in using weapons, since during the combat training of helicopter transport pilots in the USSR, very modest attention was paid to this. Most of them had only a few test shootings to their credit, not to mention knowledge of the intricacies of tactics. I still had to learn how to fight.

Another reason for the problems was the numerous instructions and regulations that regulated the flights. Restrictions designed for the good purpose of ensuring safety constrained pilots in combat, or even turned out to be completely impossible to implement. The limits of roll of up to 30 and dive of no more than 15° established for the Mi-8T could lead to the death of the helicopter in mountain gorges. Aerobatics extended over time allowed the enemy to hide, change position or return fire, and a “safe” pancake turn exposed the side of the vehicle to fire.

I had to learn literally on the fly, learning from the experience of great pilots. One of the most famous pilots who opened the Afghan campaign was Major Vladimir Kharitonov, who served as deputy commander of the 280th flight training regiment. He took out young pilots, revealing the capabilities of the machine and demonstrating excellent piloting techniques, including in modes that the creators of the Mi-8 themselves had hardly imagined. All members of its crews could replace each other, any of the pilots had to be able to troubleshoot problems themselves, and even the technicians received the necessary helicopter piloting skills.

A remarkable pilot was the commander of the 181st airborne regiment Vyacheslav Gainutdinov, who became a Hero of the Soviet Union in April 1980. He received an award for saving a reconnaissance group trapped in a village, managing to take off and find it in a dust storm. Landing under fire right in the village, he covered the group’s retreat, firing back and spinning on one wheel while the scouts made their way to the helicopter through the narrow streets. Major Gainutdinov died four months after the award, on Aviation Day - he was burned in a helicopter shot down on takeoff in Kunduz.

The best teacher was everyday work: the crews performed 5-6 missions a day, spending up to 8 hours in the air. Maneuvers with high overloads, which were strictly prohibited at home, came into practice: turns with a bank of up to 90°, “fighter” combat turns, slides with negative overloads (theoretically unacceptable for a helicopter!) and steep dives, during which the cabin became dark from the earth filling the entire review. Many pilots subsequently said that Afghanistan really taught them to fly, but “over there” they preferred not to talk about their achievements in aerobatics - the prohibitions remained prohibitions. Kharitonov was repeatedly called “on the carpet”, subjected to penalties and threatened with removal from flying work, quietly, however, encouraging “the culprit of our victories.” In connection with the need that arose, the Design Bureau carried out work to expand the range of permissible flight modes of the Mi-8, and together with LII, to increase the maximum take-off weight by changing the piloting technique and performing a take-off run.

“Steep aerobatics” was necessary, but also risky: energetic maneuvers with supercritical angles of attack led to stall flutter of the main rotor and shaking, so piloting at extreme conditions required the pilot special attention. On April 9, 1980, in Kandahar, Captain Kharin in a Mi-8T with troops on board made a sharp turn immediately after takeoff, lacking altitude and speed, and lost control (this was his first combat mission on the G8). Everyone in the crashed helicopter died except the navigator, who fortunately did not have time to fasten his seat belt and was thrown through the blister upon impact. Developing piloting techniques in extreme conditions cost the lives of the most experienced LII testers V.E. Turovts and N.A. Bessonov, who crashed in Zhukovsky on February 8, 1982 while simulating the landing of a crippled Mi-8 - with the engines turned off at extreme pitch and descent angles.

During flights among monotonous mountains and gorges, landmarks could serve as noticeable trees, characteristic rocks or buildings that were not marked on any maps and were passed on by the pilots to each other “on record.” The maps themselves were often old and inaccurate, and in Bagram, the notes of the academician breeder N.I. Vavilov about his journey through Afghanistan, which contained sketches of the terrain, heights of passes and descriptions of landscapes with many signs, were found in the garrison library as an unexpected help. The flights “according to Vavilov” were appreciated; the book, which became a bestseller, was passed from hand to hand and was even specially ordered from the Union. Due to the significant distance between airfields and the nature of flight missions, the helicopters were equipped with a pair of additional tanks of 915 liters each, which provided the Mi-8T with a flight range of up to 930 km. The voluminous “barrels” occupied a good half of the cargo compartment, but the pilots were reluctant to part with even one of them, fearing an emergency landing due to fuel exhaustion in inhospitable places. Due to their versatility and due to the shortage of Mi-24s, from the first months of the war the G8s began to be used for strike operations, for example, fire support for the troops they had landed. The squadrons also had several special strike-transport Mi-8TV (“heavy weapons”), protected by armor and equipped with an A-12.7 heavy machine gun, six 32-round UB-32-57 units and four 9M17P Scorpion-P anti-tank missiles " However, these clearly overweight vehicles were not popular due to their reduced flight characteristics, especially noticeable in the thin mountain air. The pilots preferred the regular Mi-8T to the clumsy "iron", which could also carry quite powerful weapons - bombs and missiles of the S-5 type in 16-charge UB-16-57UMVP units on four hardpoints.

The battles and the first losses quickly replaced the previous parting words about the “high and honorable mission of providing international assistance,” which was replaced by the simple logic of war: “Shoot first!”

In June 1980, while conducting reconnaissance in the vicinity of Ghazni, the Mi-8T pair of Surnin and Solovyov discovered firing points on a mountain ridge, which they decided to fire in the second approach. The vehicles were met with heavy return fire. The wingman’s G8 came out of the attack with a trail of smoke: the bullets set fire to the equipment in the cargo compartment, nothing was visible behind the dense smoke, and the flight engineer tried to determine by touch whether the tanks were on fire, threatening to explode. The presenter's shabby old car shone in the sun as if polished - oil was flowing all over the side from a broken radiator.

To enhance the firepower of the G8s, they began to take on board armed AKM and RPK shooters from among the soldiers, unoccupied pilots and airfield crew technicians. To cover the helicopter at the exit from the attack, one of them was often planted at the back near the hatch in the cargo door. Infantry 30-mm rapid-fire automatic grenade launchers AGS-17 “Plamya” were installed in the entrance doorway. The tripod with the grenade launcher was secured with guy ropes so that the AGS, which twitches when firing, would not fly out of the cabin. “Flame” turned out to be a very effective tool in the fight against manpower at distances of up to 800 m: a dense fan of fragments even mowed down grass within a radius of 6-7 m from the explosion site. The ammunition in the drum was 29 280-g fragmentation grenades. Fire was fired sideways along the flight, covering the target with a clearly visible chain of explosions, or from a turn, tightly placing grenades in the center of the circle. On June 11, 1980, south of Ghazni, a group of armed horsemen was spotted from a G8 patrol. Trying to hide from pursuit, they rushed to a nearby grove. Cutting off the road, the helicopter turned around and flight technician Mikhail Kel covered them with one burst. A dozen grenades were enough for the entire group to remain among the splintered palm trees. Kandahar helicopter pilots practiced a group AGS strike, approaching the target from the front, simultaneously turning sideways and firing a coordinated broadside salvo. The disadvantage of the weapon was the complete absence of any sighting devices - the standard sight was not suitable for shooting on the move, and there was no time to develop a special sight. The accuracy of shooting from the air depended solely on the skill and keen eye of the flight engineer.

In a duel situation, the small arms on board did not give an advantage, and when meeting with the DShK, they were noticeably inferior to it in range and fire power. S-5 missiles have become an indispensable weapon, allowing them to hit a variety of targets. 57-mm rockets were used in many variants, differing mainly in the design of the warhead; High-explosive fragmentation S-5M and S-5MO were especially common (S-5M produced 70-75 fragments weighing 0.5-1 g, and another 20 steel rings were strung on the S-5MO body, scattering along the cuts), S- 5KOs had a cumulative effect, knocking out sharp fragments of stone that hit no worse than fragments. The significant dispersion of NARs suggested their use against area targets, but they were also widely used against point targets: a salvo bombarded the target with a hail of missiles, one or two of which gave a direct hit to a machine-gun nest or shelter. Typically, the number of NARs in a salvo was 8, 16 or 32. The prescribed effective firing range was 1600-1800 m, but many “masters of missile combat”, for greater accuracy, tried to plant missiles point-blank directly into windows and embrasures and hardly knock out an enemy holed up in a crevice not from a vertical dive.

The disadvantages of the S-5 included their low lethality, especially against hardened targets. The high-explosive effect of the NAR, containing only 200 g of explosives, was weak, often S-5 got stuck in the clay of walls and ducts. Light fragments retained destructive power only a few meters away, at the end they could not penetrate the thick cotton robes of the “targets” and the reports noted “the high survivability of targets when struck by fragmentation ammunition.”

When attacking structures and shelters, bombs were more practical, usually fragmentation "weaving" AO-50-100M, high-explosive fragmentation OFAB-100-120, OFAB-100M and OFAB-250-270. A “weaving” explosion produced up to 2,500 large fragments with a continuous damage radius of 35-40 m. Usually a helicopter bomber carried a couple of bombs, less often – four. The combined weapon version of two UB-16-57UMVP units and two bombs had greater versatility and was used to attack protected objects: having suppressed resistance with a missile salvo, the helicopter could destroy the target with bombs. To carry out a bomb attack, weapons could be distributed among the vehicles in the group. For launching missiles, the Mi-8T was equipped with a PKV collimator sight, and for bombing with an OPB-1r optical sight, but the pilots preferred shooting and dropping bombs “by eye,” which was more practical in the mountains, using horizontal lines marked on the windshield that corresponded to the usual dive angles and drawn according to your height and eye level.

There were cases of using completely unexpected weapons with the Mi-8T: having used up the ammunition, the enemy was bombarded with hand grenades, and Colonel A. Burkov, after a dozen unsuccessful attempts to bomb a narrow bridge across a gorge, he blew it up by placing bags of explosives and a ignited fuse from a helicopter. Local craftsmen tried to adapt the GSh-23 cannon removed from the fighter and even the 73-mm 2A28 gun from the BMP-1 to the “eights”, but they did not dare to test it in the air, fearing that the strong recoil would destroy the helicopter.

Improving tactics, helicopter pilots began to use a closed circle (“spinner”), which is effective when attacking in a group, usually as part of a flight, approaching the target from a dive and covering each other when exiting. The safe interval between the vehicles was 1000-1500 m, but for continuity of fire impact it was compressed, and the next helicopter opened fire as soon as the one in front turned to the side. Less often they practiced striking from a flat circle, taking the target into the ring and firing from the sides; in this case, only small arms could be used, and bullets ricocheting from stones could hit the helicopter opposite. Some targets, such as a chain of firing points, were attacked by the front of helicopters, turning into a “comb”, usually with a bearing ledge, guided by the leader. In narrow gorges and intermountains they attacked in single file - one after another, with minimal gaps.

They worked mainly from low altitudes, where the helicopter had great capabilities, and the main enemy was machine guns and the English 7.62-mm rifles of the Lee-Enfield system (the so-called “Boers”), beloved by the Mujahideen, a large number of which ended up in Afghanistan in 20 -30 years At first, enemy gunners, having no experience in repelling air attacks, did not take lead when firing at a fast-moving target, and the hits fell mainly on the tail section. Compared to densely packed fighters, where even one bullet often disables a system or unit, the “empty” helicopter endured the hits of many bullets that pierced right through it without serious failures. Mi-8s returned from battle with up to three simultaneously damaged blades (there were 5-6 holes in the blades themselves), with tanks shot through, torn spars and frames, broken pipelines and control wiring. Once, an Mi-8 accompanying a convoy of troops was damaged by fragments of an anti-tank mine that exploded under the armored personnel carrier over which it was flying.

The crews received protective helmets and body armor, but there were few people willing to wear them. A two-kilogram helmet did not allow you to turn your head, and in a heavy body armor you could “cook in your own juice” in no time. To protect against bullets, they were hung behind the seat, on the side on a blister, or placed under the feet. It was already difficult for the pilots and technicians: in the summer, the skin heated up to +80...+90°C, and there was absolute heat in the cockpit (reporting documents stated: “In the heat, when performing work in the cockpit and, especially, in the tail booms of helicopters, it is generally impossible be"). To escape the heat, crews often flew in uniforms that were far from standard - shorts and Panama hats. Nothing could save him from the dust that penetrated everywhere, climbed into his nose, his eyes and stuck to his body - in a year a person inhaled so much of it that it would be enough for two bricks.

The greatest load fell on the last one in the crew - the flight technician. In addition to the usual work of preparing the helicopter, he was responsible for equipping with ammunition, refueling, and was involved in loading. In flight, he monitored the operation of the systems, assisted the pilot and navigator, fired from a machine gun and automatic self-propelled gun, controlled the shooting of paratroopers and their landing, not being able, as the pilots joked, except to give birth. When landing on field sites, where it was possible to run into a stone, a pothole, break the chassis or roll over, the flight engineer was the first to jump out and, pointing out a level place, helped the commander to sit down (his waving of his arms, squatting and bouncing in a cloud of sand in front of the helicopter vividly resembled shamanic dance). On board and in the parking lot, flight technicians spent 12-17 hours a day, having, according to military doctors, “3-4 times the limits of permissible fatigue standards.” In order for the “technicians” to maintain combat effectiveness, their duties were partially delegated to other specialists.

To avoid burns and sunstroke, when performing heavy work (suspension of 250 kg bombs was not considered such!), they tried to water the helicopters in the parking lot with water, if only it was at hand. Daily combat missions made it necessary to abandon days of preliminary training, performing it after flights, “in between”, and reducing maintenance to a minimum necessary work. If there was not enough time, the vehicles were allowed to go on missions with some of the equipment not working, failures of individual systems and unpatched holes, from which a draft walked through the cabin (“as long as the propeller turned and the machine guns fired”). The tough G8 withstood unimaginable operating conditions: there were helicopters with dozens of holes and rotor blades that had not been balanced (although this caused shaking, it was still possible to fly). In the spring of 1980, two Kandahar Mi-8Ts touched each other in the air with their propellers. Having landed in the desert, the damaged sections of the blades were trimmed by eye with a chisel, and the helicopters were able to return to base.

At the usual summer +40°C for Afghanistan, even at flat airfields, the available power of the TV2-117A engines dropped by a third, and in the highlands the theater of operations did not produce even half the power. Accordingly, the payload had to be reduced, the rate of climb dropped almost threefold, and maneuverability decreased. With the “passport” load of the Mi-8 up to 4000 kg, in most cases 9-10 paratroopers were the limit. In the summer of 1980, a Soviet squadron went to the rescue of an Afghan battalion stuck in the mountains near Kandahar. In pitch darkness, the pilots managed to find the Afghans and take them out of the plateau at an altitude of 2200 m. Having filled the cabins with 14-16 people, they barely took off and made it home on the verge of burnout of the turbines and fire.

It was especially difficult when starting the engines, which had difficulty grasping the hot air. It was the helicopter pilots who invented the “evaporative” method - from a tank that was standing ready through the top hatch into the air intakes, they splashed out water with a ladle or mug, which cooled the air at the inlet (once in the 280th Air Force, scouts picked up in the desert first of all drank all the water on board and, in order to take off, , the flight engineer had to sacrifice “NZ” - a supply of homemade mash.)

In the summer, the lubricant in the components melted and oxidized, and the batteries began to boil due to overheating. Several times, hurricane-force winds twisted the propeller blades at their hinges, and the helicopters themselves sometimes had to be tied to tanks to prevent them from being blown away. The dust from the salt marshes that was constantly hanging in the air got into the hinges, hydraulic and oil systems, leading to wear and corrosion of steel parts, normal conditions considered to be stainless. For every ton of fuel in the tankers' tanks there was up to half a kilogram of dust and sand, some of which somehow ended up in the tanks, clogging the filters and threatening the engine's spontaneous withdrawal from mode, or even stopping. The compressors were the first to wear out dust. Due to erosion, the profile of the blades changed, leading to undesigned flow and even surge. TV2-117A did not produce even half of the assigned resource, and when they were rebuilt, it was discovered that the miniature blades of the last stages were “eaten” almost to nothing. Dust protection devices (RODs) installed on the Mi-24 were not used on the Mi-8T. Turning on the ROM took up to 6% of the already missing power. Pulling out another hundred “horses,” technicians often re-adjusted the gas temperature limiter behind the turbine, raising it from the permitted 880°C to 920°C, reasonably believing that the engine would still not reach the set resource.

Since June 1980, the Mi-8T began to be modified, increasing its armament and security. The cockpit was covered with external 5-mm armored screens and internal armor plates behind the pilots' seats, on the sides and below in front of the instrument panels (these sheets could be folded to improve visibility). The total mass of the armor gave a weight gain of 180 kg, but it turned out to be quite effective: it stopped 70% of incoming bullets, including large-caliber ones. In the nose, instead of the frontal glazing section, they installed a movable PKT tank machine gun - a powerful weapon chambered for a cartridge reinforced compared to the handbrake. Two more machine guns were mounted on top of the suspension trusses. The choice of an army model was justified: it had to work in its “native environment” - dust and dirt, with insufficient cooling. The truss machine guns were aimed so that their tracks converged 800 m in front of the helicopter. They had 400 rounds of ammunition alternating between conventional, armor-piercing incendiary and tracer bullets. The bow PKT had 500 rounds of ammunition. Another PKT with a pair of cartridge boxes was placed in the tail hatch. The PKT differed from the infantry model in its more massive barrel, which made it possible to conduct prolonged fire without overheating.

In 1980, the first Mi-8MTs appeared in the 40th Army Air Force, equipped with more powerful TVZ-117MT engines and standard ROMs. The power-to-weight ratio increased by almost one and a half times provided them with superiority in speed, ceiling, rate of climb and maneuverability. The new helicopter did not even want to land unloaded, hanging freely near the ground at low throttle, and flew normally on one engine (on the Mi-8T, an engine failure forced them to immediately look for a place to land). To the pilots who tried the Emteshka, the regular G8 seemed to lack power. With the same engines and similar firepower as the Mi-24, the Mi-8MT was a ton lighter and noticeably more “volatile.” The increased carrying capacity made it possible to carry up to 6 pylons with weapons, including bombs up to 500 kg and more powerful UB-32-57 units, which made it possible to effectively use it during attack. Gradually, the entire fleet of G8s began to be updated with new helicopters.

In the summer of 1980, arrivals at Kabul airport were greeted by the slogan “Peace to the world!” and the local joke “There is no war here, but our struggle for peace will soon leave no stone unturned.” Fighting at this time was already taking place throughout Afghanistan. KHAD Help * [ * – KHAD – Service State Information, Afghan state security ] in the densely populated Charikar Valley near Kabul said: “People’s power is focal in nature and extends, as a rule, to a building or fortress.” Could it have been otherwise in a country where they tried to forcefully impose a “bright future” on a people with long-standing customs and traditions; there was no longer any need to think about the blood and fury of the fighting. The enemy was in sight, and all that was left was to shoot and shoot. They no longer counted cartridges: 10-12 zinc cartridges were taken on board the G8 in addition to the standard ammunition, and after another heated battle, hundreds of spent cartridges rattled underfoot, covering the floor of the cabin. They had to be raked out with a broom and buckets, poured into heaps around the sites and filling the local ditches to the top.

When providing fire support, close contact with ground units acquired particular importance. In this, helicopter pilots had an undoubted advantage over IA and IBA: if necessary, they could take on board an aircraft controller who knew the terrain or sit down in the battle formations of troops to clarify the situation and coordinate actions. Colonel B.V. Gromov, then commander of the 5th Motorized Rifle Division, had at his disposal a soldier-artist who depicted in color a panorama of the area along which the helicopter pilots were assigned places of work and targets. From a low altitude, signal flares and smoke bombs were clearly visible, the chain of which marked the front of the unit. An attack by helicopters provided much greater efficiency and accuracy than attacks by high-speed aircraft, which were often unable to notice these signals from a height (there were cases when an aircraft controller, desperate to show the target to aircraft dangerously circling overhead, diverted them to the side, giving a rock in the distance as a reference point).

Working together with the IA and IBA, the helicopters could “illuminate” the target with machine-gun tracks or operate using a system called “smoke-fire”: they struck the NAR, and the planes dropped bombs on the rising cloud of dust and smoke. Having overcome the well-known arrogance towards the rotary-wing “Carlson” aircraft, the pilots of “real” aviation did not miss the opportunity to “fly up” on the Mi-8 as gunners, feel the flight close to the ground and closely meet the enemy. And the helicopter pilots saw him literally in person, and the words of the song from their rich folklore were not an exaggeration:

“...I see you through the sight reticle,

Through the haze of a salvo of rockets,

I see you still whole -

A rifle, a turban and a beshmet.”

Patrolling (“looking through”) the surroundings and border areas, helicopters searched for armed detachments and stopped the path of caravans with weapons. In the Registan and Khash deserts stretching beyond Farah and Kandahar, the search was facilitated by trails and plumes of dust clearly visible from the air, which stayed behind a passing caravan or car for hours. They drove travelers along them, disembarked inspection groups, and even decided their fate on the spot. A person or group who had weapons and tried to break away from pursuit, run away or hide was clearly recognized as an enemy. During the inspection, special flair and caution were required: a machine gun could instantly appear in the hands of a peaceful merchant, and the caravan men would sometimes rush to attack. In the summer of 1980, the commander of the Mi-8T G. Pozharishchensky from the 280th airborne regiment, who landed in Registan, was killed in this way. The Kharitonov-trained flight engineer A. Medvedev managed to bring the car with the wounded navigator and gunner home. Not long before this, in a skirmish with a gang, commander Sidorov had his hair cut by a bullet, his navigator was wounded in the neck, and the flight engineer had to shoot back from the advancing Mujahideen from the PKK while the retreating group loaded the dead and wounded on board.

For surprise, the “viewing” and approach to the target were carried out at extremely low altitudes, at the level of the treetops (although the instructions prohibited flights below 50 m, later lowering the “bar” to 25 m). In August 1980, the Mi-8T returned to Kandahar without the front strut, which was demolished in a low-level flight. He had to sit on the placed boxes. The car was repaired, and it continued to fly, retaining as a souvenir an impressive dent in the floor of the cabin.

The main work of the G8s remained the transportation and landing of troops, which occupied, respectively, 18% and 12% of the total number of sorties. army aviation(AA), increasing to 40-45% during operations that are generally impossible without landing from helicopters and air supply. When clearing the Foriab province bordering the USSR in January 1982, 40 Soviet Mi-8Ts and MTs, 12 Mi-24s, 8 Mi-6s and 12 Afghan Mi-8Ts were deployed, landing 1,200 fighters, losing two G8s. During the 2nd Panjshir operation in May-June 1982, the decisive role was played by the tactical landings of 20 Soviet and Afghan battalions with a total of 4,200 people, carried out by 104 of our helicopters and part of the Afghan vehicles. The main task was to capture commanding heights in order to cut off the enemy's escape routes, for which helicopters had to operate at altitudes of up to 3,500 m. Supporting the landing, in addition to bombs and missiles, the helicopters fired 415,226 rounds of ammunition over the three weeks of the operation.

Traces of an encounter with a Mi-8MT Stinger from the 50th Osap. Bagram, November 1986. The rocket passed right at the side of the aircraft and exploded above the propeller hub, shattering the gearbox, blades and oil system pipes with fragments. The helicopter was restored within a day

The most difficult flights were carried out to provide high-mountain outposts and reconnaissance posts that controlled passes and roads. To throw food, fuel, ammunition and plain water The Mi-8 was made extremely light by removing armor, suspension trusses, some equipment, seats in the cargo compartment, and sometimes even weapons and cargo hatch doors. A “naked” helicopter could gain an extra couple of hundred meters of altitude, but there was often nowhere to land, and the car had to be kept suspended, stuck against a rock ledge with one wheel, while the cargo was thrown out of the cabin and people were received. Sometimes, having climbed into a high-mountain area with acceleration, the helicopter could no longer take off normally from there. In this case, a stall technique was developed, in which the helicopter slid down, gained sufficient speed in the fall and went into a horizontal flight. Once Captain Kabdulin managed to pick up 30 people blocked at the top in this way at once, explaining later that he would climb to this platform again he simply couldn't.

“Turntushki” enjoyed well-deserved love and respect: in addition to delivering everything necessary and fire support, they took out the wounded and those suffering from heatstroke (“solar workers”), and rescued units cut off from their own. For many who found themselves in a hopeless situation, the roar of helicopters meant salvation. Among them was the chief of logistics of the 40th Army, Colonel V.A. Vasin, the armored personnel carrier with which was knocked out in the green area near Charikar.

The increase in aviation losses forced the tactics of search and rescue teams (SRS) to improve. At first, a pair of Mi-8s with weapons, a first aid kit and a rescue team on board, whose task was to support the downed crew and help them get out, were on duty at the airfield and rose when called.

The fate of grounded pilots was often decided in minutes, and a couple of PSS began to be assigned to the main group. She walked at the rear in the battle formation so that she could see all the other cars. Air duty at the target was carried out at a safe echelon, circling 300-500 m higher than the others. If necessary, the nearest helicopter landed to the rescue, while the others covered it with fire, standing in a circle.

From the first day, in units of the 40th Army, there was an order that not a single soldier - wounded, shell-shocked or killed - should remain on the battlefield. In April 1981, five people disappeared during fighting in the Anardara gorge near Farah. When the helicopter pilots found them, only one remained alive, but the bodies of the dead had to be recaptured by landing troops and knocking the enemy out of the area. In June 1985, helicopter pilots of the 280th Airborne Regiment, searching for a fighter pilot shot down near Kandahar, found him dead: the spooks, who were descending by parachute, were shot in the air. The Mi-8 flight technician, who opened the door, was killed on the spot by a sniper lurking in an ambush, who knew that the “shuravi” would certainly fly in to pick up theirs. A helicopter was also shot down from the ZGU, from which the commander and navigator barely had time to jump out.

The helicopter pilots themselves annually lost 30-35 vehicles (almost an entire regiment), many of which took the crew with them. There was little left of the burnt helicopter: a burnt spot noticeable from afar, a tail boom and wheels that flew off during the impact, engines tangled with pieces of wires in a puddle of duralumin, and the skeleton of the cabin covered with greasy soot. The majority of damage to the Mi-8 was received during landing, landing and picking up people in areas under fire (up to 50%), and during transport (up to 15%). To avoid defeat during landing, the “maple leaf” technique was invented: the helicopter descended, wobbling along the course and roll. The flight direction was maintained, but from the ground it was difficult to understand the true position of the vehicle and the maneuver being performed.

Gaining experience, the enemy shooters tried to knock out the crew with targeted fire: 44% of all losses in helicopter aviation were due to the death of the pilot from small arms. By 1982, the number of hits in the cockpit reached 74% of the total, with 42% of the bullets from the front coming from the unprotected glazing of the Mi-8. The "Drill" with a target range of up to 2600 m was no less dangerous than an automatic weapon. In March 1982, Art. Lieutenant Minin from the 339th regiment, who was taking the wounded from Gardez, was hit in the face by a Bur bullet. He died in the air, the entire cabin was covered in blood, but the navigator managed to take control and take the helicopter away. Captain Alexandrov, who was walking as a wingman, was immediately wounded in the arm, and he turned over on landing. Everyone on board remained safe, and the “tagged” pilot, returning to duty, received a sniper’s bullet in the same place on his first flight! Major Kharitonov was saved in flight by the artificial horizon, in which a bullet lodged, heading straight for the head.

Against helicopters taking off and landing, the Mujahideen used hand grenade launchers, which they were real masters in handling. A cumulative RPG grenade tore out up to 1.5 square meters of the side, caused a fuel leak and a fire, and could tear off the tail boom or destroy the propeller. Captain Ivanov was waylaid by a grenade launcher on takeoff in Asadabad. The spirit, dirty and shaggy, rose from the nearby stones and slammed a grenade into the side at point-blank range. As soon as the G8 took off from the ground, it collapsed in flames, machine guns immediately hit it, but the pilots managed to jump out and, hiding behind the creeping smoke, took cover behind the armor of an infantry fighting vehicle that arrived in time. RPGs could also fire barrages, while the grenades self-destructed, scattering fragments around (apparently, such cases gave rise to rumors about the use of MANPADS at the beginning of the war, because the flash of a grenade exploding in the air was very similar to a rocket exploding).

One of the Mi-8s became a victim of a Shilka stolen from an Afghan unit. On July 22, 1980, while conducting reconnaissance near Marble Mountain near Kandahar, the helicopter was hit in the fuselage, cutting the vehicle in half, and fell to the ground. The follower, who was following, could not help in any way - everyone in the car engulfed in fire was burned.

With the saturation of air defense with large-caliber anti-aircraft machine guns and anti-aircraft guns with an effective inclined firing range of up to 1500 m, helicopter flight levels had to be raised. The number of hits from small arms, including those with a caliber of up to 14.5 mm, at altitudes above 1200 m dropped to 3-5% of the total, and after 2000 m it could not be taken into account. The appearance of MANPADS qualitatively changed the nature of the use of helicopters; in fact, a war for air supremacy began. “Red Eye - dangerous areas” were marked on flight maps back in 1980, and in May 1982, the first Dushman Strela were captured in Panjshir. However, the new weapons had not yet been properly mastered; the trophies taken, for example, turned out to have completely damp batteries. The first launches were recorded in 1983, then their number began to grow alarmingly; by the end of 1984, 62 cases of missile use were noted, in 1985 - 141 launches, in 1986 - already 847, hitting 23 vehicles. In 1987, according to the operations department of the headquarters of the 40th Army, the enemy had 341 MANPADS, and in the camps in Pakistan and Iran, where anti-aircraft gunners were trained, the specialty of a missile shooter became one of the most popular. A hit by a missile with a powerful warhead, which slashed the helicopter with a dense stream of fragments and a high-explosive strike, most often led to a catastrophic outcome - a fire, explosion and the death of the pilots. Experts who studied the resistance of helicopter systems and components to MANPADS came to a quotable conclusion: “A direct hit by missiles on a helicopter leads to its death, so the specific nature of combat damage to aircraft in this case is not of practical interest.” With the advent of more advanced Stingers, the air defense reach zone covered altitudes of up to 3,500 m, and gunners could wait for aircraft everywhere: they even reported launches from the center of Kabul, from the roofs of houses and cars.

The first improvements to improve protection against MANPADS were carried out already in the summer of 1980. They included the installation of screen-exhaust devices (ESD) and ASO-2B passive jammers with IR traps. EVA, mixing hot exhaust gases with outside air, reduced the thermal background of engines by 2-3 times. The ACO blocks, each containing 32 LO-56 squibs, were suspended on steel belts under the tail boom. Later, on the Mi-8MT they began to be mounted in packs of three on the sides of the fuselage, so that the traps would burn out in the thermal wake of the engines. The shooting was set automatically in series of 4-16 pieces. However, these systems did not provide a radical solution: the efficiency of low-power traps with a burning time of 5-8 s was only 10-15%, and the design of the electronic device was not entirely successful. They directed the exhaust gases upward so that they were washed away by the flow from the propeller, but experiments carried out at TsAGI, during which a helicopter with an electronic device was filmed from different angles with thermal imaging equipment, revealed an unexpected effect - the presence of clearly identifiable bursts of infrared radiation as the blades passed, attractive to the seeker rockets. To achieve a satisfactory result, it was necessary to change three types of electronic devices.

Since 1982, the SOEP-V1A optical-electronic jamming station (product L-166 or “Linden”) appeared on helicopters, which was mounted on the top of the fuselage. Using a heating element (a powerful xenon lamp or a nichrome spiral) and a system of rotating lenses, Lipa created a pulsed stream of continuously moving IR rays around the helicopter, which caused the missile tracking system to swing and guidance to be disrupted. The station turned out to be extremely effective: when tested, it thwarted an attack with a probability close to 1, although it had “dead zones” at the bottom and did not fully provide protection from the Stingers. Practical helicopter pilots have also found everyday use for the truly universal system, using its powerful “stove” to fry potatoes and boil kettles. The total effectiveness of all three helicopter active and passive protection systems in combat conditions reached 70-85% (it was estimated by the number of disrupted launches to their total number).

At the same time, the EVU added 68 kg of mass, another 50 kg was given by the ASO and 25 kg by the Linden, which was quite a lot for the car, which had become heavier after all the modifications. As they accumulated (the total mass of modifications reached 500 kg), they began to have a negative effect. To preserve flight quality, units began to lighten helicopters by removing the pylon PKT, and often the bulky “mugs” of the ECU, which greatly increased the resistance (this was especially felt on the less powerful Mi-8T, the “ceiling” of which in hovering mode was half a meter from the ground!) . The tail PKT, indispensable for protection against fire from behind, was left. Another simple and effective measure was the installation of rear-view mirrors, which allowed pilots to monitor the rear hemisphere. As a result, the Mi-8’s vulnerability when exiting an attack was almost half that of the Mi-24, which did not have such protection.

The Mi-8 fuel tanks were lined on the outside with porous rubber, which plugged holes, and filled from the inside with polyurethane foam, which stopped the flames and extinguished the explosion. These measures virtually eliminated fires and tank explosions even when hit by large-caliber bullets. We separated the tail rotor control cables so that they would not be interrupted by one hit (as has happened more than once before), protected the lines of the oil and hydraulic systems with screens, and at the same time made many operational improvements: the ever-flowing hydraulic valves were replaced with durable hoses in a metal braid, the service life of the blades was increased due to reinforcement the frontal shroud, which protected them from clouds of sand and flying stones, sealed the hinges and protected them from dust. The characteristics of the Mi-8MT were improved by installing TVZ-117V engines with increased altitude. Since 1982, the Mi-8MT began to use B-8V20 missile pods with more powerful 80-mm rocket launchers, UPK-23-250 cannon containers and GUV universal helicopter nacelles, equipped with high-speed machine guns and grenade launchers.

The growing number of losses prompted helicopter pilots to use various techniques - from anti-aircraft maneuvers and work from low altitudes, which left the enemy a minimum of time to prepare and aim (the Red Eye and Stinger seekers could lock on a target at altitudes no lower than 30 m), to leaving practical ceiling, out of reach of air defense fire. The Mujahideen, in turn, improving their defense, introduced early warning posts, dispersed anti-aircraft positions for firing from different directions and tiers in the mountains, echeloned them around base areas with increasing density towards the center. During the next attack on Panjshir in the spring and summer of 1984, in one day, June 16 (remembered as the “helicopter pilot’s day”), 5 vehicles did not return to base. In April 1986, while trying to land troops on a bridgehead near the Javara base that had not been cleared of air defense, the Afghans lost five helicopters. The major operations “Desert” in July 1985, accompanied by the landing of 7,000 people in the mountains, and “Dam” in the fall of the same year, during which the Kunar Gorge was blocked for 170 km by a landing force of more than 12,000 soldiers, did not go without losses. In the November operation near Kandahar, helicopters performed 508 sorties over two weeks, landing and providing paratroopers at 19 sites. During these days, three Mi-8MTs were shot down, one of which killed the commander of the 280th regiment, Filyushin. In the mountains, where anti-aircraft fire was especially dangerous, and visibility and maneuver were difficult, losses increased by 1.3-1.5 times compared to operations on the plains. In total, in 1985, combat losses of the Mi-8 were distributed as follows: 27% were from small arms, 40% from DShK fire, 27% from PGIs, and 6% from MANPADS. During that year, the average number of sorties per Mi-8 was 426, and the maximum was 906 with 963 flight hours.

"Eights" were widely used as headquarters vehicles for air control and command and control. Mistakes also occurred: in April 1982, the already mentioned operation was carried out to destroy a drug trafficking hub in Rabati Jali in the extreme southwest of the country, near the border with Iran and Pakistan. After the bomb attack at dawn, it was planned to complete the job with a landing party, led by the deputy commander of the 40th Army Air Force, Colonel Aprelkov. To make it easier for helicopters to reach the target, the Su-17 designated it with a SAB alignment. While the group was being pulled up to the landing area, the SABs were blown away by the wind, the helicopters landed the paratroopers on Iranian soil and, not noticing the mistake, went back. They reached the designated area only after five hours. Aprelkov’s failure cost him his position, and the base, which was extremely valuable to the Mujahideen, and was being restored every now and then, had to be destroyed more than once, gathering all the aviation in the area for the next “crusade.”

Among the few “unloading” tasks was work as repeaters. Ensuring stable radio communication between the command post and the vehicles and ground units that had gone on missions, the helicopter climbed to the maximum altitude and circled over the airfield on autopilot. A full refueling lasted for 4.5 hours, and the most prudent pilots, replacing each other, had time to sleep on the provided mattress.

Without helicopters, the work of special forces - the most combat-ready, trained and well-armed units, true war professionals - would be impossible. Eight special forces battalions covering the border areas and the “southern belt” were consolidated into two brigades with headquarters in Jalalabad and Lashkar Gah. Each of them was assigned a separate helicopter squadron - the 205th and 239th helicopter squadrons. Using reconnaissance data, radio interception and KhAD, special forces learned in advance about the exit of gangs, the time and route of movement of caravans, and helicopters ensured secrecy and surprise of advance to the designated area.

On September 17, 1984, an ambush, planted in the right place at the right time, met and destroyed a pair of jeeps making their way through Registan. Among the few surviving Mujahideen was the French journalist Jacques Abouchard, for whose sake this hunt was started (they suspected that he was a military adviser and intelligence officer). In the fall of 1985, Kandahar special forces managed to intercept and completely exterminate the gang of one of the most famous commanders in these places, Mullah Malang. The search and strike operations of helicopters with special forces inspection teams on board turned out to be very effective, making it possible to cover areas within a radius of 100-120 km from the base. Having landed the group, a pair of Mi-8s covered them from the air and cut off the escape routes for the fleeing caravaners. It is generally accepted that on January 5, 1987, the first Stinger was captured, familiarity with the device of which was necessary to develop countermeasures. They had been looking for MANPADS for a long time, and a reward was assigned for the trophy ahead of time - the Hero's Star. According to a reconnaissance report, a pair of Mi-8MTs with the duty group of Major E. Sergeev, accompanied by two Mi-24s, flew out to search. Near the village of Shahjoy they found a column of five motorcyclists. Trying to leave, they managed to launch two Stingers, but missed. Having destroyed 16 Mujahideen with return fire, the paratroopers captured one surviving “caravan driver” and an equipped MANPADS.

However, three months earlier, near Kandahar, Major Belov’s special forces reconnaissance group had already delivered three Stingers, but the scout never received the promised reward, having been “seen drinking alcohol and being harsh with his superiors.”

By 1987, the strengthening of air defense forced the almost complete abandonment of the use of helicopters for fire support of troops. The leadership of the TurkVO Air Force and the 40th Army diverted bombing attacks to aircraft, and helicopters covered them and, at best, completed the raid, “cleaning up” the area after the strike. Increasingly, helicopters were used for work at night. For safety, such flights were carried out with intervals between vehicles increased to 800-1000 m, without turning on the BANO and using only dim combat lights. Strike operations at night were usually carried out by mixed groups of a pair of Mi-8s, engaged in illuminating the SAB terrain from an altitude of 2500-3000 m, and Mi-24 assault flights.

The policy of national reconciliation and the ceasefire declared on January 15, 1987 did not produce the desired results, and the war continued. But the helicopter pilots had a new job - transporting refugees and Mujahideen who wished to return to peaceful life, who were transported away from the combat areas, to their homes. In the parking lots, motley bandit-looking people appeared, wearing galoshes on their bare feet, beards and machine guns. During the flight, their weapons were taken away, locking them away from harm's way in the cockpit.

With the general strategy to curtail active military operations, the number of airborne assaults was also reduced. The last major landings were carried out during Operation Magistral in November 1987 to unblock the road to besieged Khost. During it, the heights along the road were captured, and a Soviet battalion and a brigade of Afghan commandos were landed near the city, moving towards the advancing troops.

By the beginning of the withdrawal of Soviet troops on May 15, 1988, the 40th Army Air Force had 331 helicopters. The primary task of their crews was to protect cities and airfields from increasingly frequent mortar and rocket attacks. On Jalalabad and Bagram, mines and bullets rained down almost regularly from the nearby greenery, and on moonlit nights one often had to sneak in even to the toilet. Continuous helicopter patrols, along with minefields, proved to be the most effective defense measure. The working day at air bases began at 4-5 a.m. with the takeoff of the duty flight of helicopters, which combed the perimeter in search of enemy shooters. Before darkness fell, helicopters circled around the airfield, covering the takeoff and landing of aircraft. At night, SABs were hung on them. The hunt for the enemy, who was approaching the very camps, was carried out with the help of night vision devices - IR goggles PNV-57E. Having discovered a “warm target” whose intentions were beyond doubt, they illuminated it with a “chandelier” and immediately opened fire to kill. At the same time, the helicopter remained invisible, and the blinded enemy had nowhere to escape.

While covering the air bases that became the last bridgeheads, helicopter pilots could not always protect themselves: on a black day in December 1988, one shell hit the roof of a club where the pilots had gathered around the TV, killing 11 people at once.

At 9.45 am on February 15, an armored personnel carrier with army commander Boris Gromov, bringing up the rear of the departing columns, crossed the bridge on the state border. And only after receiving a report about the exit of the “first”, the Mi-8s removed five cover groups and were the very last to leave Afghanistan.

The scorched sky of Afghanistan. Combat aviation in the Afghan War Markovsky Viktor Yurievich

Mi-24 combat helicopters

Mi-24 combat helicopters

The initial plans for the deployment of Soviet units when entering Afghanistan only provided for the placement of garrisons in cities, the protection of roads and enterprises, and did not involve large-scale military operations. Obviously, this is why a small number of Mi-24s were sent to the DRA: by the beginning of 1980, there were only 6 of them in the OKSV. In the helicopter units, the “twenty-four” played the role of leaders, being used mainly for reconnaissance and covering landings on occupied airfields. So, in the early morning of January 1, 1980, before the flight to Kandahar of a large group of Mi-6 and Mi-8 with paratroopers on the only Mi-24A separate helicopter regiment in the 280th separate helicopter regiment (OVP), regiment commander Vladimir Bukharin was the first to follow the route, paving the way for the rest . On the same day, helicopters transferred from Ashgabat stormed firing points near the border pass. An unusually cold and snowy winter froze the actions of the opposition. Thus, in Kandahar, during the entire January, dushmans only once fired at a helicopter approaching the airfield, and their only combat mission was the destruction of a tank stolen from an Afghan unit. Bukharin himself flew out to search for him on a Mi-24A, accompanied by a MiG-17 advisor to the commander of the local fighter regiment P.P. Ivantsova. He discovered the tank in a narrow mountain pass under an overhanging cornice. Not really counting on a direct hit, Bukharin used a FAB-250 bomb to bring down a stone canopy on the Mujahideen’s prey. That flight had to be coordinated with Kabul for almost a day, but already at the end of January permission was received to independently use weapons.

Mi-24 at Kandahar airfield in the first war winter

The focal nature of the fighting and the tactics of the Mujahideen, who used ambushes and raids, required a quick reaction and an accurate response. In the mountains, where the enemy tried to use the commanding heights (whoever is higher is stronger!), aviation assistance became paramount. The war promised to be a helicopter war, and the Mi-24 had a strong say in it.

Already in the last days of February, military transport aviation began the hasty transfer of two more Mi-24D squadrons. Two helicopters were driven into Antey with the blades, stabilizer and wing removed, “settling” them on deflated shock absorbers. The Mi-24s transferred to the border aviation unit were also deployed at border sites in the Pamir region and Turkmenistan for work in the north of the DRA. Each garrison was required to be equipped with a helipad; landing spots even had remote outposts and checkpoints. This solution, adopted from the Americans with their Vietnam experience, simplified supplies and communications, not least allowing for evacuation in a pinch. Based in field operations, helicopter pilots could receive missions and target designations first-hand, and the rapid jump to the point of impact made it timely and effective. The successful actions of helicopter pilots were facilitated by the mixed composition of regiments and individual squadrons.

The close interaction of “bees” (as the Mi-8 was nicknamed) and combat “crocodiles” ensured sufficient forces for a wide range of tasks. The 40th Army managed to successfully resolve the very difficult issue for the Soviet Armed Forces of including aviation units in combined arms formations. A recent attempt to implement a similar structure at home, bringing helicopter units into Army Aviation (AA) and transferring it to the command of military districts for better interaction from the beginning of 1980, did not have much success. In Afghanistan, the aviation commander had his own voice in the leadership of the army; assignments in the interests of ground forces units passed through his headquarters, which gave specific orders to the aviators.

Since the spring of 1980, the lean, spotted silhouettes of the Mi-24 began to appear more and more often in the Afghan sky, soon becoming a real symbol of this war. The attacks of the “twenty-fours,” which flew “closest, lowest and slowest of all,” were much more effective than the attacks of supersonic fighter and fighter-bomber aircraft, which instantly flew over the target and were nicknamed “whistles” without much respect. After the first skirmishes and losses, the helicopter pilots began performing missions in at least a pair, insuring each other in case of an emergency landing. The main tactical unit was a link (four vehicles) or eight, which provided the proper strike effectiveness in an area replete with natural shelters. When meeting with a snarling and well-armed enemy, the link allowed the implementation of most tactical techniques: an attack from a circle, borrowed from the attack aircraft of the Patriotic War, “in-line” processing of the target in a formation of a ledge with a sequential turn of the wingmen towards the target; a “daisy” raid, which included the dissolution of the group on the approach and alternating strikes from different sides with minimal “gaps”; anti-aircraft “scissors” with “swing” in height (course), when the upper pair covered the attacking lower one.

“Our cause is right!”

The crew of the Kunduz Mi-24V is fully equipped - ZSh-5B protective helmets with titanium spheres (the pilot on the left is not wearing one) and AKS-74U assault rifles with a couple of magazines. 181st airborne regiment, Kunduz

The main attack was aimed at surprise, continuity of fire and mutual cover. The density of the strike was brought to the limit: it happened that the missiles from the slave whistled at the sides of the leader, who did not have time to turn away from the combat course. The flexibility of tactics and its improvement were no less important - the pattern was immediately punished, even when flying again along the same route, one could stumble upon an ambush. Therefore, in order not to get caught in one burst and have time to react by dodging or suppressing a firing point, when moving towards a target or on patrol, the interval between vehicles was kept increased to 1200–1500 m.

In the training of Mi-24 crews, combat maneuvering occupied its rightful place, which made it possible to invent new techniques and maneuvers, largely going beyond the limits of what was envisaged. Well-trained pilots, in addition to the usual turns, combat and forced turns, practiced sneaking up and performing a jump-slide for an attack with an overload of up to “three”, exiting an attack with a steep pitch up to 50° and a sharp turn at the top point, where the machine fell into a roll beyond 90°, instantly finding yourself on the opposite course, facing the enemy for a second attack.

Mi-24V over Bagram airfield

The high speed characteristics of the Mi-24 were achieved at the cost of a load on the main rotor that was one and a half times greater than that of the G8. In everyday extreme conditions (heat, high altitude, increased dust) this significantly affected control. Moreover, habitual piloting skills often turned out to be harmful and could lead to an accident. During takeoff and landing with an overweight propeller, a sharp movement of the handle caused a drawdown, they tried to hold the car with “step-throttle”, the throttle response of the “weakened” engines was not enough, and the helicopter fell to the ground. At low speeds on a hill or near the ground, the Mi-24 began to behave unusually. The directional control turned out to be insufficient; the reactive torque of the main rotor pulled the car into a spontaneous left turn and could fall into a helicopter spin. During energetic maneuvers with overload at high speeds and angles of attack, due to the disruption of the flow from the blades, the Mi-24 lifted its nose, going into a “pick-up” - pitching up with disobedience to control, after which it abruptly failed. The matter more than once ended in a rough landing on the wingtips and blocks. It was possible to avoid being “caught” by strictly observing the restrictions, but in battle there was no need to fly “lower and quieter.” During the “pick-up” and during an energetic recovery from a dive, impacts of the blades on the tail boom occurred. So, in August 1980, after storming the T24 caravan, commander Igor Kozovoy and his deputy Alatortsev returned to Fayzabad with their tails cut by blades. This incident had tragic consequences: while going on a control flight after repairs, Major Kozovoy came under fire from the DShK, the tail rotor with a shot off blade went into disarray, the damaged tail boom collapsed, and the out-of-control vehicle collapsed, burying the entire crew. Hero of the Soviet Union Vyacheslav Gainutdinov, a squadron commander from the G8, who took the place of the operator in the car of his schoolmate, also died in it.

At the exit from a dive with an angle of 20° and at a speed of 250 km/h, the Mi-24’s drawdown reached 200 m. When piloting at low altitudes and extreme conditions, when the pilot’s error could no longer be corrected, the energy and correctness of the maneuver became of utmost importance (it was common joke that it is “as easy as walking on a tightrope”). For the squadron from Kunduz, science cost 6 Mi-24Ds, lost in the first year, mostly for non-combat reasons: crashed in the mountains due to fog and unexpected air currents, broken during landing on slopes and in gorges.

“Air hooligans” demonstrated prohibited maneuvers to someone who visited Afghanistan in April 1980 general designer Milevsky OKB M.P. Tishchenko. Having seen masterly aerobatics with a very steep pitch-up, dashing corkscrew spirals and even an impossible “barrel roll” (it was performed on the Mi-8 by Major V. Kharitonov), the amazed General could not restrain himself: “Now I myself don’t know how helicopters fly!” The impressions from the visit were immediate: already in the summer of 1980, modifications to the Mi-24 began, including re-adjustment of the engine fuel automatics by factory teams, designed to compensate for the drop in power in rarefied hot air, and the installation of dust protection devices (DPD). For a “special period” they raised the permissible temperature of the gases in front of the turbine, preferring the possibility of burnout to a lack of power. ROM “plugs” that screened out sand and dust at the engine inlet cleaned the air by 70–75%, reducing wear on the compressor blades by 2.5–3 times. The Mi-24s were equipped with them even before the G8s, although combat helicopters had less to operate from unprepared sites. The fact is that the TVZ-117 engines installed on the Mi-24D at low throttle on the ground had higher speeds, sucked in sand more energetically and needed protection first of all.

Since 1981, Mi-24Vs began to arrive in Afghanistan, equipped with new high-altitude TVZ-117V engines, which had 15–20% more power in hot highland conditions. During repairs, the Mi-24D was also equipped with these engines.

By the end of 1980, the helicopter group of the 40th Army was doubled, bringing it to 251 vehicles, which was four times the number of aircraft (the original proportion was 2:1). The main components of combat work were planned strikes and on-call missions during operations. Army aviation performed 33% of all “schedule work,” but its share of close air support was 75%. By this time, three types of operations of ground troops had taken shape: army, private and implementation, carried out respectively by division, brigade and battalion forces with mandatory support from helicopters. Mi-24, using a rich combat arsenal, acted as a powerful shock “fist” in them. With mixed missile and bomb armament, a complex bomb-assault strike (BSA) was practiced: from a distance of 1200–1500 m, the pilot launched a NAR, and on approach opened fire from a machine gun, giving the operator the opportunity to accurately drop bombs.

An accurate strike from low altitudes was delivered at high speed, setting the fuses on the bombs with an “assault” deceleration of up to 32 seconds in order to escape from their own fragments, although the wingmen did not always succeed in this. The problem of encountering fragments of one’s own bombs and NAR, as a consequence of close “contact” with the target, remained pressing further. So, in the summer of 1985, the Mi-24 of the 335th regiment returned to Ghazni, which had 18 fragments from the leader’s bombs. At the limit of the combat load, up to 10 hundred parts were suspended on the Mi-24, using multi-lock bomb racks MBD2-67u. The accuracy of their salvo release was low, but it made it possible to cover area targets such as Mujahideen camps.

Mi-24V over the Panjshir Gorge. Under the wing is a unit with a B8V20 NAR and an ATGM “Sturm” with a high-explosive warhead. 262nd OVE, autumn 1986

Opening the way for the landing, bombs pierced the thick walls of the duvals, burying enemy riflemen under the ruins. Another means of combating them was the UPK-23-250 suspended containers with GSh-23L cannons, the shells of which had a high initial velocity and pierced the clay of the walls, turning out to be much more effective than the S-5. Large-caliber bombs (the Mi-24 could carry up to four FAB-250s or two FAB-500s) were necessary in the fight against fortresses that had survived in many places since time immemorial and served as a haven for the Mujahideen. Made of stone or adobe with walls three meters thick, these structures covered the entrances to villages, forks in roads and hung like “swallow’s nests” from inaccessible cliffs, remaining invulnerable to S-5. In June 1980, the work of eight Mi-24Ds helped take the “mountain of thieves” Sangi Duzdan near Faizabad, famous for the fact that Alexander the Great himself could not cope with it at one time. The mountain, pitted with holes and caves, served as a refuge for local gangs for centuries and was turned into a large camp by the Mujahideen. Making a way for the attackers, the Grad worked non-stop on the mountain, and at night helicopters joined in, performing flight after flight. To take more bombs, one pilot remained in the cockpit. Everyone else pulled up and hung landmines.

In August 1980, volume-detonating aerial bombs were probably used in battles for the first time, used with the Mi-24D to eliminate an ambush in a stone bag in the Fayzabad gorge. Knowing about the low reliability of detonation of atomized explosives that emerged during testing, the slave pair immediately fired missiles into the oily cloud that enveloped the target as a backup. ODAB was dropped from a higher altitude than usual, and yet the shock wave caught up with the helicopters and shook them sensitively (as the pilots said, “only their teeth clanged”). Claims against ODAB remained until the end of the war; their effectiveness was affected by the altitude and speed of release, high altitude and air temperature (according to some data, from 15 to 50% of such bombs worked in front-line aviation). Their use from helicopters was sporadic, usually together with incendiary or high-explosive bombs. With a successful strike, the ODAB were a terrible weapon: at the bombing site, buildings were blown away into smoke, and the paratroopers found only burned corpses, blinded and deafened wounded.

Mi-24V supports landing operations near Kabul

For target designation, in addition to signal flares and machine-gun tracers (for deception, however, they were also used by the Mujahideen), they used artillery and tank guns, which launched a projectile towards the target. To help the aircraft controller, a sighting series of NARs was launched from a helicopter in the approximate direction, using the reference gaps of which he clarified the position of the target. With direct support, bombing was allowed to be carried out no closer than 1500 m from friendly forces, launching NAR - no closer than 500 m, and machine-gun fire - 300 m. In battle, the enemy was nearby, and the helicopter pilots had to knock out targets a couple of tens of meters from the infantry.

Before the planned strikes, the pilots studied the terrain using maps and photographic reconnaissance data. For on-site orientation, abandoning the impractical and inaccurate coordinate reference, we used a “snail” - a division of the kilometer map sections into small squares, about 600x600 m, numbered in a spiral. Having followed the “snail” path to the desired square, the pilot received the target’s position with an accuracy of ten meters and, using the indicated signs, found the object of attack. In places where they had to work almost constantly, they made do with a scrap of map in a knee tablet with the immediate attack area. The strike group could be given target designation by an Mi-8 with a gunner on board, usually from the Afghan counterintelligence KHAD, who would help them navigate the “anthill” of the green zone populated by a wide variety of people and find the desired house in the village. Intelligence came from prisoners, their own people in villages and gangs, or was simply bought (although more than once an informant who received money immediately went to the Mujahideen to earn extra money there by warning about the raid). The Mi-24s were accompanied on missions by a pair of PSS “eights”, which also carried out photo monitoring of the results, and when attacking an important and protected target, they carried out additional reconnaissance, assessing possible retaliatory actions. In March 1982, the forces of the 335th Airborne Regiment Squadron were to destroy the opposition leaders gathered in Asadabad for a meeting. In an exemplary organized operation, a flight of Mi-24s distracted the enemy by simulating an attack in another place, while another group blocked the block where they were to work. The Afghan gunner accurately pointed out the house, which the entire squadron attacked. Upon his return, the “ally” immediately fled, without waiting for a noisy scandal: the destroyed house belonged to the local authorities, long-time blood relatives of this Afghan, who took the opportunity to take revenge. Another time in Kandahar, a tragicomic incident occurred: the gunner pointed to a house below, which was immediately attacked on the move. The poor guy, who didn’t know Russian, just wanted to show off his own home...

The accuracy of hitting targets was affected by orographic (from the Greek “oros” - mountains) air disturbances, ground winds, various gusts and currents, which, due to different heating of sunny and shaded slopes, picked up bombs and NAR, blowing them away from the target. Experience told the pilots themselves to rely more on a keen eye and skill than on the ASP-17V automatic sight and VSB-24 ballistic shooting and bombing computer available on the Mi-24V. Sniper pilot Nikolai Malyshev revealed the secret of his success simply: “You have to hit, not aim!” In Jalalabad, operator Ivan Manenok was famous, he had a great feel for a helicopter and knew how, like no one else, to drop bombs “on the top” of fortresses and into machine-gun nests. During the assault on villages, he managed to maneuver the bombs flat right under the wall, achieving maximum high-explosive effect. Hiding from air strikes, the Mujahideen equipped shelters and firing points behind stone ridges. To knock them out, bombs were “rolled” there from the nose up; the same method was used to attack targets protected by air defense.

Some Mi-24s were armed with large-caliber S-24 rockets with powerful high-explosive fragmentation warheads. This made it possible to hit targets from a distance of more than 2000 m without coming under anti-aircraft gunner fire. Colonel Gorshkov's helicopter pilots from the 50th Osap successfully carried out 50 S-24 launches. But they did not become a mass weapon on the Mi-24, being available only to the most experienced crews: when launching a powerful rocket, powder smoke covered almost the entire helicopter, threatening to cause a surge.

For protected point targets - dushman shelters, firing positions and structures, excellent results were achieved by the use of ATGMs, especially the new Sturmovs used on the Mi-24V with more reliable and accurate guidance. During the first year of the war, the number of ATGMs used was only 33, but with the advent of the Sturmov, their use became more frequent. Guided missiles on helicopters became a popular weapon, with the help of which they achieved reliable destruction of small targets, including vehicles in Dushman caravans. In operations where the targets - firing points and fortifications - were known in advance, the use of ATGMs was most effective. The operator could drive a 35-kg rocket into an embrasure or the mouth of a cave from 1.5–2 km; a special effect was achieved by 9M120 rockets with a volumetric detonating warhead, which blew away shelters from the inside. When launched at the vehicles of Dushman caravans, “Sturm-V” gave an accuracy of hitting moving targets of the order of 0.75-0.80 (the pilots in their reports even complained about “the small number of suitable objects”). In the Panjshir operation from May 17 to June 10, 1982, the use of ATGMs was massive: helicopter pilots fired 559 missiles at firing points and fortifications.

In close combat, from a distance of 800-1000 m, a powerful four-barreled YakB-12.7 machine gun was used, which produced a dense, accurate shower of fire, capable of turning around a blower half a meter thick. In August 1982, Lieutenant Colonel Alexandrov from the 280th Airborne Regiment, having met a caravan near Kandahar, cut the “commander’s” bus in half in one burst. However, for operation on a helicopter, the kinematics of a machine gun with a rotating barrel block and electric aiming drives turned out to be excessively complex. The installation suffered from dust, dirt, overheating, and the self-retracting system of the cartridge strip, which was supplied with many kinks, also failed. After 200-250 rounds, the YakB began to “spit”, it often jammed, and firing at least 500 rounds without failure was considered a great success. The short burst fire recommended by the developers was not always appropriate in the heat of battle. Therefore, the standard ammunition load of 1,470 rounds was cut threefold, also to save weight. The very concept of a “flying infantry fighting vehicle” did not justify itself: shooters were rarely taken to fire through the on-board blisters, the crews did not want to fight on a “bus with machine gunners,” preferring to maintain “volatility.” In addition, the landing gunners had to spend the entire flight in the most cramped conditions. The Mi-24 was still a bit heavy. Seats and armor in the cargo compartment were often removed, the combat load was limited to a couple of blocks or bombs, sufficient for most missions, and fuel was filled with no more than 2/3 of the tanks' volume. With all nodes fully loaded, only 16% of flights were carried out - on the “short leg” to the attack site.

A crashed Mi-24 near the road to Kabul

An independent “hunt,” officially called reconnaissance and strike actions (RAD) and boiling down mainly to the search and liquidation of caravans, was carried out by a pair or flight of Mi-24s (the less protected and armed Mi-8s were allocated less frequently for risky independent raids, but could support them ). In the area indicated by reconnaissance, the helicopters turned to a bearing at an angle of 15–20° and combed the area at an altitude of 1500–1700 m, maintaining a distance of 600–800 m, which gave good visibility and freedom of maneuver. The discovered caravan was stopped with warning fire and encircled until the inspection team arrived on the Mi-8. Hidden machine guns were increasingly seen under the car awnings, and convoys that aroused suspicion began to be shot on the move, leaving the landing force to collect trophies and destroy the surviving vehicles. The usual version of the Mi-24's armament for the thrusters included a couple of blocks, two ATGMs and 500–700 rounds of machine gun ammunition. In one raid in August 1985, a mixed group of a flight of Mi-24Vs and two Mi-8MTs managed to destroy five DShKs and two large-caliber PGIs and capture four machine guns and three PGIs intact as trophies.

At night, when the enemy, hidden in the darkness, began to feel freer, the search along paths and roads was carried out in pairs, for safety, diverging in height by 80-100 m. Having noticed headlights or camp fires and having received confirmation that there were no friendly people in the area, they immediately attacked . Everything was decided by the pace, which did not allow the enemy to disappear into the darkness. In the direction of the extinguished lights, from a distance of two to three kilometers, special lighting NAR S-5-O were launched, “fixing” the position of the target, then they hung SABs on parachutes, under which the helicopters dived to strike. Later, the combat approach began to be built above the “chandeliers,” remaining invisible from the ground. Working at night required excellent training, but had a great effect: in April 1986, at a signal from a reconnaissance post, a flight of Mi-24s flew to the village of Garkalai near Kandahar to intercept the caravan. After one of their runs, the Mujahideen, unable to withstand the horror of the night attack, scattered, leaving six vehicles with weapons to the armored groups that arrived without a fight. In December of the same year, “blinding” bombs based on FOTAB were tested near Bagram, the flashes of which within a radius of 30–50 m incapacitated the enemy for several hours, depriving them of vision.

Mi-24P accompanied by a convoy

The most important tasks of the helicopter pilots were landings, which had to be carried out near villages, roads and at junction points favored by the Mujahideen. The “Twenty-Fours” in these operations were assigned the role of a ram, clearing the way for the Mi-8 and Mi-6 with bombs and NAR. A group of transport workers, sometimes numbering up to 60 vehicles, was accompanied along the route by one or two pairs of Mi-24s, walking on the sides of the column at an altitude of 200-400 m and keeping the “wards” under supervision until landing. The landing was preceded by artillery and aircraft strikes, and immediately after them the targets were processed by one or two Mi-24 flights. With a minimum interval, without allowing the enemy to come to his senses, the landing force was delivered to the cleared area. It was covered by several more pairs of helicopters, which circled at an altitude of 1200–1800 m, knocking out the surviving firing points. The duty unit remaining at the airfield was in readiness and, if necessary, could replace the Mi-24s that had worked over the battlefield. To cover small landings, at least a flight of helicopters was allocated, one pair of which suppressed air defense, and the other patrolled higher, monitoring the situation. In November 1981, near Asadabad, a hidden machine gunner opened fire in pursuit of helicopters retreating after landing. The trailing Mi-24 immediately fired a salvo of S-5S filled with thousands of steel arrows at it from a turn. Sitting down to pick up the weapon, the crew got a rare opportunity to see the result of their work: the shooter’s body, turned into a pile of minced meat, clinging to the machine gun.

The formidable Mi-24 inspired due respect from the enemy. Major Anatoly Volkov from the 280th airborne regiment in May 1983 near Tulukan, having used up all the ammunition, continued to imitate attacks again and again, dispersing the dushmans with the sight of a rumbling predatory vehicle lying on top of them, and managed to save the landing company that was getting out of the green area. “Masters of psychic attacks” were nicknamed “proud falcon”, and helicopter pilots were henceforth ordered to leave 25% of their ammunition as a last resort.

Another important task for helicopter pilots since the summer of 1980 was escorting convoys, which occupied 15–17% of all sorties. The 40th Army required hundreds of tons of fuel, food and other cargo every day, the vehicles with which were subject to constant attacks. To protect the columns, they were accompanied by tanks and armored personnel carriers, rapid-firing ZU-23 anti-aircraft guns were mounted in the bodies of KamAZ trucks, capable of firing almost vertically along overhanging slopes, and numerous guard posts were set up along the roads.

However, air cover turned out to be much more effective. Several pairs of Mi-24s patrolled over the convoy in shifts. Following a “snake” at a speed of 150–170 km/h, the helicopter pilots scanned the terrain two to three kilometers to the sides (distances of possible enemy fire) and carried out reconnaissance ahead along the route five to eight kilometers. Having noticed the ambush, they tried to attack it from the flank, going along the road so as not to hit their own people. In order to continuously escort vehicles traveling at a speed of 15–20 km/h, there were landing areas along the routes for refueling and shift changes. The northern section from the border Termez to the Salang pass was covered by Mi-24s from Kunduz, for which sites were equipped in Hairatan, Mazar-i-Sharif, Tashkurgan and Puli-Khumri. Next, the columns were received by Bagram helicopter pilots, and crews from Jalalabad, Ghazni and other air bases were escorted into the interior of the country. And yet, thousands of cars were lost every year, and the driver’s profession was one of the most risky. In April 1983, on the approach to Kandahar, in the Dori River valley, 180 trucks and an accompanying tank battalion came under fire from multiple ambushes. On the road, surrounded by duvals and thickets infested with “spirits,” 20 tankers and six armored vehicles were soon burning. The approaching Mi-24s of the 280th regiment used 80-mm S-8 rocket launchers for the first time, the explosions of which on the ground were mistaken for cannon salvoes of extraordinary accuracy and power. The convoy was brought to its destination, to the joy of the helicopter pilots themselves - there was barely enough fuel left at the airfield for a couple of flights.

S-8 shells in 20-round B-8V20 units, which appeared simultaneously on the Su-25, received the highest rating. The warhead weighing 3.6 kg had an impressive high-explosive effect, and the “shirt” produced many three-gram fragments that hit the enemy within a radius of 10–12 m. New NARs began to replace the S-5, although they continued to be used until the end of the war, despite the complaints of the pilots , that they are only good for “tickling the heels of spirits” and when launched they “scatter like a tulip.” The S-5 salvo was still quite effective in open areas, the missiles themselves are simple and reliable, and equipping the units took little time and effort, which was the primary reason for five or six sorties per shift. Not the least reason was the need to exhaust the innumerable reserves of these missiles accumulated in warehouses.

With the acquisition of experience, the tactics of helicopter pilots also changed. Avoiding the midday heat, 3/4 of all flights were carried out in the morning. In order to catch the dushmans in the open, they tried to strike the first blow at sunrise, when devout Muslims were gathering for prayer. The group distributed the combat load and tasks: some NAR and RBK crews knocked out air defenses and manpower, others destroyed positions and buildings with high explosives. Some of the “hundredth” bombs were dropped with fuses into mines, so that their unexpected explosions, which continued to thunder for another day, would prevent the survivors from getting out and clearing the rubble (however, there were cases when the Mujahideen managed to defuse such bombs with the hands of those who had been at fault and dragged them onto the roads, using in turn as land mines). The last BSHU was applied in the evening, knowing that faith commands the dead to be buried before sunset.

Before being sent to the DRA, the helicopter pilots underwent training for 15–20 days at a mountain range near Chirchik and in the Kagan desert near Bukhara. Already in Afghanistan, successive pilots “tested” them in the main areas of work on the Mi-8. Subsequently, 12–15% of the flight time was devoted to training and consolidation of skills, with the main attention being paid to combat maneuvering and mastering unusual takeoff and landing methods. Vertical take-off in conditions where the helicopter “barely carried itself” was almost never used. They usually ascended from the runway like an airplane, with a 100-150-meter runway. According to the methodology developed by testers of the Flight Research Institute (LII), it was mastered even more radical way take-off run only on the front wheels. At the same time, the car, tilted forward by 10–12°, accelerated vigorously and took off from the ground twice as fast, and the launch weight could be increased by 1000–1500 kg. However, this method required refined piloting techniques. In November 1986, in Bagram, during an emergency flight, the pilot began the takeoff run straight from the parking lot and, striking the blades on the concrete, went on a mission with the tips bent upward. He did not dare to go back under the squeal of the mutilated propeller, he sat down in the field and waited there for the repair team.

Incident with the Mi-24P of Captain Nikolaev from the 262nd OVE.

During an emergency landing, the stricken helicopter rammed into a hangar.

This helicopter, despite serious damage, was restored. Bagram, April 1987

Landing on field sites, where it was easy to roll over in an impenetrable cloud of dust, hitting a pothole or on a stone, was carried out by balancing at a speed at which the cabin remained ahead of the dust cloud, and the mileage was minimal. It was possible to reduce it to a few meters, descending steeply with the engines close to takeoff, tightening the propeller close to the ground for a smooth touch, immediately pulling the handle and braking with the propeller and wheels. “Afghan wear” during such landings quickly erased tires and brake discs, which reached the thickness of paper (in the Union they lasted for at least a year). Engines suffered even more, mainly due to compressor blades worn away by sand, burnouts in turbines and combustion chambers. More than half of the TVZ-117 had to be removed ahead of schedule, of which 39% were rejected due to blade erosion and almost 15% due to surge, and when inspecting non-pulling engines, “chapped” turbines were discovered every now and then (in Bagram in the fall of 1986, in one of the turbines out of 51 the shoulder blades were missing 17). Black mucus from the dust that got into the tanks settled in the filters and fuel units, disrupting the start and putting the engine in the air on a “starvation ration” (a drop in power at the most inopportune moment earned the name “silent surge”). The AI-9V APUs often burned out, forcing them to overwork every conceivable deadline. The protective covering of the leading edges of the blades was eaten away by the sand, notifying this by the shaking and whistling of fragments. Frequent overloads during maneuvers from time to time forced to change the keel beams, which cracked along the power ribs.

In helicopter units (like attack aircraft) of the 40th Army, in order to avoid interruptions in work and unnecessary consumption of resources on transfers, only crews were replaced, and the vehicles were doomed to work in place for the entire period, at best, holding out until they were sent for repairs. Not everyone succeeded in this: from year to year, helicopter pilots lost 8-12% of their fleet to the DRA. The average Mi-24 flight time per year was 360,400 hours, and in “hot” places it was much higher. Thus, having received a pair of “zero” Mi-24s in August 1986, the 262nd squadron from Bagram completely exhausted their entire 1000-hour service life before the first repair within a year. In 1985, with an average flight time of 414 hours, which was ahead of the Mi-8, the maximum number of hours on one of the Bagram aircraft was 660. At the same time, the average flight duration of the Mi-24 was 30–50% higher than that of the “eights”, which often flew on short “ shuttle flights.

Mi-24P returns from a combat mission. Bagram, December 1988

Thanks to high reliability (and even more due to the overload of people who spent “from fifteen to fifteen” at the airfield), it was possible to put into practice the operation of helicopters “as needed,” with maintenance “when needed” instead of “when it’s supposed to.” Engines that had exhausted their service life were allowed to fly off for up to 50 hours, and many units even worked until failure. Showing remarkable ingenuity, technicians modified the Mi-24 on site and performed very complex repairs. Hopelessly clogged filters were blown out with compressed air, batteries that had boiled in the heat were cooled in flowing ditches, engines were started from the batteries of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, and “recycled materials” from downed vehicles were used to replace units (in the fall of 1982, left without engines, Kandahar technicians managed to assemble a completely working TVZ -117 out of three worn). With a general twofold increase in labor costs compared to allied statistics, the amount of work on equipping weapons was 24 times greater. Everyone who could, had to roll up bombs, fill blocks with rockets, uncork “zincs” with cartridges and turn the “meat grinder” machine for stuffing machine gun belts. At one time, stacks of ammunition were kept right next to the helicopters, but such “localism” fragmented the forces during equipment and was unsafe - the very first hit of a Dushman mine could destroy the entire parking lot. They began to prepare weapons ahead of time, at special sites, and immediately transport them to the vehicles returning from departure. In some places they introduced a “conveyor belt”, in which helicopters taxied to the place where the team was waiting for them with ammunition at the ready. Not relying too much on inconvenient winches and lifts with ever-flowing hydraulics, which were also inconvenient to roll under the wing on the Mi-24, heavy bombs were picked up with belts or an irreplaceable crowbar was used. Three or four of us took it on and, straining ourselves, hooked the bomb onto the lock, after which the gunsmith ran around the helicopters, adding the final touch - screwing in the fuses and inserting the pins.

Designed to increase firepower, helicopter nacelles (GUVs) in machine gun and grenade launcher versions did not take root, largely due to their inability to lift. The crews agreed to take the 450-kg GUV only under pain of punishment, reasonably pointing out that there was simply nowhere to spend 4,350 rounds of machine-gun GUV - there were no targets for such a shower of fire. In addition, equipping endless cartridge belts was an extremely labor-intensive and troublesome task, taking much more time than loading a standard machine gun and stuffing blocks. Interest in the GUV finally disappeared with the advent of the Mi-24P, equipped with a GSh-2-30K cannon, which, with the same caliber, had a salvo weight ten times greater than a grenade launcher and had twice as much weight. sighting range. Some Mi-24Ps carried a laser rangefinder, which increased shooting accuracy. The installation of the gun was not without problems: after 1500–2000 shots, strong recoil led to deformations and cracks of the frames and fuselage skin. The structure was reinforced with an outer duralumin plate and a pair of powerful corners, bringing the guarantee to 4000 shots.

The security of the Mi-24 was considered to be quite good. Steel armor four to five mm thick, covering the cockpit, drive box and engine oil tanks, gearbox and hydraulic tank, stopped more than 2/3 of the bullets that hit. In all cases, the armored glass of the cabins was never pierced at all, although the Mi-24 received the greatest number of hits from the front, during the attack, and the operator’s workplace received the most hits (once six bullet marks were counted in the windshield). Armored glass confidently withstood even hits from a heavy DShK bullet, capable of piercing the side of an armored personnel carrier. On Major E. Rybenko’s helicopter near Bagram, a burst of DShK tore apart the bottom of the fuselage and the under-cabin compartment, and a massive 50-gram bullet that entered the cockpit lodged in the armored seat shell. In Ghazni, the Stinger exploded at the tail rotor, weakening the blades, but the Mi-24 was able to land on their remains.

The most formidable enemy for a long time Large-caliber DShK and ZGU remained, with which in 1985, 42% and 25% of all lost Mi-24s were shot down, respectively. More often than others, the power plant, the hydraulic system, and especially the electrical network and controls, which were stretched throughout the helicopter, suffered, although their duplication in many cases made it possible to save the machine. When one engine was knocked out, the second one automatically reached increased power. Even with a shot through the gearbox and complete “oil starvation”, it was possible to drag on for another 15–20 minutes. In March 1987, captain Nikolaev's Mi-24P was hit in the tail by bullets that broke the steering chain, depriving the vehicle of directional control. The pilot nevertheless managed to reach Bagram and landed on the move. During the run, the helicopter was carried off the runway, in a cloud of dust it swept across the entire airfield, miraculously dodged a taxiing Su-17, jumped over the cars standing in the way and stopped, buried in an empty hangar. After replacing the blades, a twisted gun and a dented nose, the T24 returned to service.

On July 12, 1982, a pair of Mi-24V Volkova and Lantsev from the 280th regiment chased two jeeps on the approaches to the Dushman base near Kandahar. The desperately dodging Toyotas were shot down, but the helicopters themselves came under fire. The tracks of three DShKs converged on the slave. On board, pipelines and electrical wiring were broken, blades and swashplate were cut, and instruments in the cabin failed. After landing, the wounded flight engineer had to climb into the engine, which stubbornly refused to turn off due to the broken brake valve rod.

Mi-24P patrols the vicinity of the Bagram air base to protect against shelling and sabotage. January 1989

Among aviators, the majority of permanent losses were suffered by helicopter pilots, especially in the summer months, when people were exhausted by the heat and hard work, and the machines were inferior in performance. In another month, three or four crews did not return from flights. An impartial formulation came into use among military doctors: “injuries incompatible with life,” most of which occurred in emergency landings and fires of damaged vehicles. 30% of all deaths were caused by head and spinal injuries, 55% by extensive burns and 9% by injuries internal organs. The helicopter pilot has a difficult death. Everyone who happened to pick up dead comrades and saw charred skulls in the wreckage of a car covered in greasy soot knew about this. The statistics spoke about who suffered the most: from year to year in the Air Force of the 40th Army, the main share of losses fell on more experienced 1st class pilots, who flew more often on missions and died two to three times more often than pilots 2 1st and 3rd grades.

The analysis of losses confirmed: first of all, it is necessary to protect the crew, who can save even a damaged vehicle. An attempt to solve the problem head-on, following the example of the front ones, by installing side armored glass inside, turned out to be unsuccessful: the 35-kg frame with glass blocks worsened visibility and reduced the usable volume of the cabin, literally preventing people from turning their heads. The same fate awaited the special protective kit for a helicopter pilot proposed in 1980 - real steel armor with arm guards and leggings, immediately rejected for its bulkiness and excessive weight. The crews only occasionally used body armor (mostly in winter, as a kind of sweatshirt) and protective helmets ZSh-ZB, scolding them for their heaviness - during a maneuver, three kilograms simply turned their heads to the side (later more comfortable titanium ZSh-5B appeared). The previously popular light blue overalls began to be removed from the equipment: during a fire on board, the synthetic in their fabric melted and tightly burned to the skin. In return, in 1984, helicopter pilots were the first in the Air Force to receive camouflage suits, which gave them an extra chance during an emergency landing. In this case, in order to hold out until the search group arrived, they took a machine gun on the flight. The most prudent pilots fastened it with belts to their hips or hung it under their arms so as not to lose it during a parachute jump, and exchanged standard PM pistols for more reliable TTs, automatic APS or captured 20-round Berettas. The NAZ kit was sorted out, leaving a couple of chocolate bars and a flask of water from the entire ration; the vacated space was taken by cartridge “horns” and four RGD-5 grenades.

Fighting near the village of Kalagulai on the outskirts of Bagram. The battle is taking place right next to the aircraft stands; behind the buildings of the village on the left you can see a bomb explosion

Fires and explosions were the cause of death in up to 45% of all downed vehicles. The tanks, which accounted for 90% of the damage to the fuel system, began to be filled with polyurethane foam. This protection turned out to be very effective, negating the incidence of fire on board, although it cost 40 kg of weight gain, and also led to increased clogging of fuel filters with sponge crumbs (at first the filler was Belgian-made, then due to a refusal in supplies it was replaced with domestic , more brittle). The pilots insistently demanded that the Mi-24 be protected from fire from behind, where the helicopter had a vulnerable “dead zone” and was much inferior to the Mi-8 in this regard. At the exit from the attack, the Mi-24 received 46–48% of all hits versus 26–27% for the “eights” equipped with a stern machine gun. In 1985, the OKB carried out such a modification by installing a 12.7-mm NSVT “Utes” machine gun in place of the rear radio compartment, to which a tunnel led from the cabin, “cut” in the rear fuel tank. There was not really room for the shooter in the cramped compartment, and his legs in peculiar rubberized “pants” hung outward. Such an installation was inconvenient to use; moreover, when showing it to the Air Force leadership, one of the high-ranking officials, who wanted to personally try out the invention, got stuck tightly in a tight hole.

The Mi-24 continued to make do with the cover of the gunner-flight technician, who used the windows of the landing compartment.

To increase the firing sector, they introduced separate opening of only the upper doors of the doors, in which it was possible to operate the machine gun more freely (previously they swung open together with the lower ones, and the shooter had nothing to rely on). Usually they used a PK machine gun (or a tank PKT), respected for its range and accuracy, and sometimes a pair, so as not to waste time transferring weapons from side to side (in Kabul there was a case when a flight technician hit the trigger and shot his helicopter from the inside) . On other cars they also took with them the lighter and more convenient RPK handbrake. In the spring of 1986, the command, “in order to reduce unjustified losses,” decided to leave the flight technician on the ground, but this was opposed by the crews themselves, who agreed to fly together only at their own discretion, choosing to gain weight or leaving a third crew member to provide cover.

Another set of modifications to the Mi-24 was carried out to protect against MANPADS. EVAs appeared on the engine nozzles, which, due to high resistance and inconvenience in operation, did not take root immediately and became mandatory only in 1983, when the threat of MANPADS became noticeable. The ASO-2B IR decoy cassettes were initially installed under the tail boom, and since 1987 - in blocks of three on the fuselage behind the wing, “spreading” them to the sides to create a wide trail of false targets behind the helicopter. The defense complex was crowned with the SOEP-V1A Lipa active jamming station, which turned out to be very effective: from helicopters we observed more than once how a missile deceived by Lipa began to rush to the sides and exploded in the distance. “Linden” worked from takeoff to landing, and if it failed, the helicopter was positioned above another, hiding behind its working station. ASO were used not only when attacking a target, but also when flying over dangerous areas. A typical “ASO maneuver” consisted of a sharp turn when a launch was noticed, with a simultaneous salvo of IR cartridges (those who saw such “fireworks” from the ground for the first time were amazed at the “armored helicopter, from which tracers were ricocheting!”).