The structure of the Wehrmacht armored forces in 1941. The organization of German tank forces

Organization of tank forces
Third Reich

The highest operational formation of the Wehrmacht tank forces at the beginning of World War II was tank group, consisting of seven to eight tank and motorized divisions and a large number of attached parts. On the eve of the invasion of the Soviet Union, four tank groups were deployed on its borders.

Division was the main tactical formation. The division had a full-time staff. The division was also the smallest formation that combined all branches of the military. The tank division had a tank, two motorized infantry (from 1942 - panzergrenadier) and artillery regiments. The motorized infantry division consisted of 2 motorized infantry and artillery regiments. The infantry division consisted of three infantry regiments. The divisions also included support units. The light infantry divisions that existed before the war were reorganized into tank divisions after the war with Poland.

Tank division in September 1939 it consisted of tank and motorized brigades, an artillery regiment, motorcycle rifle, reconnaissance and engineer battalions, an anti-tank battalion, a communications battalion and logistics services. It had 11.7 thousand people, 328 tanks, 130 guns and mortars. Each tank division included 1-2 two-battalion rifle regiments as motorized infantry (in 1942 they were renamed panzergrenadier regiments). For example, 1st Panzer Division during the attack on Poland in September 1939, in addition to the tank brigade, it had the 1st rifle brigade, which included the 1st rifle regiment and the 2nd motorcycle battalion. The rifle regiment consisted of 2 motorized rifle battalions, each of which included a motorcycle company, two rifle companies, a heavy engineer company, a battery of support guns and an anti-tank platoon. The motorcycle battalion consisted of three motorcycle companies, one machine gun company and a heavy support company. To ensure mobility, the motorized infantry used trucks and a large number of motorcycles.

In the spring of 1941, in preparation for the invasion of the USSR, the tank forces were reorganized. It was decided to double the number of tank divisions. There was only one tank regiment left in the tank divisions, consisting of two battalions. The light tank company had 17 Pz Kpfw III tanks and a platoon of light tanks. There were 10 Pz Kpfw IV tanks in a medium tank company. The total number of tanks in the tank division was 160 vehicles. The 1941 model division also had four motorized infantry battalions and a motorcycle battalion.

In 1942, the number of tanks in a tank division across the state increased to 200. However, constant combat losses and tank breakdowns led to the fact that only some divisions approached the regular number. Most divisions did not have even half their regular strength. In 1942, a battalion of Pz Kpfw IV tanks consisted of four tank companies of 22 medium Pz Kpfw IV tanks each, plus eight tanks in the regiment's headquarters company. The ratio of tank units and motorized infantry units has changed significantly. The infantry component of tank divisions was increasingly increasing. In June 1942, the rifle (Schutzen) regiments of the tank divisions were renamed Panzergrenadier regiments.

The 1943 model tank division included two panzergrenadier regiments. Panzergrenadier battalions consisted instead of five of four companies: three rifle and one heavy engineer company.

By the summer of 1943, tank divisions were required to have one two-battalion tank regiment. In reality, the tank regiments of the tank divisions included one or two Pz Kpfw IV battalions. Sometimes one battalion was armed with tanks Pz Kpfw V "Panther" .

Typical staffing of a tank regiment in 1943:

Regimental headquarters company - 8 Pz Kpfw IV tanks.

1st Tank Battalion:

Headquarters - 8 Pz Kpfw IV tanks
1st Tank Company - 17 Pz Kpfw IV tanks (3 platoons of 5 tanks each)
2nd Tank Company - 17 Pz Kpfw IV tanks (3 platoons of 5 tanks each)
3rd Tank Company - 22 Pz tanks Kpfw III(4 platoons of 5 tanks each)

2nd Tank Battalion:

Headquarters - 8 tanks Pz Kpfw IV and Pz Kpfw III
4th Tank Company - 17 Pz Kpfw IV tanks (3 platoons of 5 tanks each)
5th Tank Company - 22 Pz Kpfw III tanks (4 platoons of 5 tanks each)
6th Tank Company - 22 Pz Kpfw III tanks (4 platoons of 5 tanks each)

Most often, the actual number of tanks in units differed from the standard one.

In May 1943. The new Pz Kpfw V Panther "Panther" tanks were received by the 51st and 52nd separate tank battalions, then they were armed with the 23rd and 26th separate tank regiments and the tank regiments of the SS divisions "Das Reich" and " Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler ».

By state 1944. the German tank division had a two-battalion tank regiment. The first battalion was armed with Pz Kpfw V "Panther" tanks, the second - with Pz Kpfw IV tanks. The battalion consisted of four companies of 17 tanks each. There were 8 tanks at the headquarters. In total, the Panther tank battalion was supposed to have 76 tanks. The battalion also included a sapper platoon, an air defense platoon, armed since the summer of 1944 with 37-mm Möbelwagen anti-aircraft self-propelled guns or 20-mm four-barreled Virbelwind self-propelled guns, and a technical company equipped with ARVs and vehicles. In fact, the Wehrmacht tank battalions had an average of 51-54 Panthers, and the SS troops had up to 64 Panthers. In fact, the Pz Kpfw V "Panther" tanks did not enter service with all Wehrmacht tank divisions. In 1944, in some tank regiments, both battalions were armed only with Pz Kpfw IV tanks.

At the beginning of 1944, the regular strength of tank companies was 17 tanks, in the summer - already 14, and in November 1944 - 10 tanks in each company.

Throughout the war, there was a trend towards a reduction in the number of tanks in a tank division. In 1939, the statewide tank division had 328 tanks, in 1941 - 160-221, in 1944 - 170, and in the spring of 1945 - only from 40 to 54 (including the Jagdpanzer). Reduction in the number of tanks in 1939-1941. was associated with an increase in the number of divisions, since industry could not fully provide them with military equipment. Further reductions were due to changes in the nature of the armed struggle on the Eastern Front. Seeking to restore combat capabilities divisions, the German command included more than 40 self-propelled guns in each of them, and one of the two battalions of the tank regiment was rearmed with Pz Kpfw V "Panther" tanks. In connection with the transition of the Nazi army to strategic defense, from the autumn of 1943 until the end of the war there was a decrease in the number of personnel, military equipment and weapons in the tank divisions.

Typical composition of a Wehrmacht tank division

Strengths and means	1941 - 1942	1943 1944 1945
Personnel (in thousands)		16,9	14,7	11,4
Tanks	160-221
self-propelled guns
Armored vehicles
Guns and mortars
Armored personnel carriers
Motorcycles
Cars	} 2915	2147	2084	2171
Tractors

The decrease in the number of tanks in tank divisions was partially compensated by increasing the firepower of motorized infantry (panzergrenadier) regiments, despite the fact that their size decreased. For example, in 1939, four rifle and one motorcycle battalions that were part of a tank division were armed with 110 light and 56 heavy machine guns, 36 50-mm and 24 80-mm mortars, eight light infantry guns and twelve 37-mm PaK36 anti-tank guns . In 1944, a tank division in service with four panzergrenadier battalions should have had 364 light and 49 heavy machine guns; there were no light mortars, but instead there were twenty-eight 80-mm and sixteen 120-mm heavy mortars, twelve heavy infantry guns, twelve 75 mm infantry guns and 40 20 mm anti-aircraft guns. Anti-tank guns were assigned to the divisions' anti-tank battalions, each of which had forty-three 75 mm PaK40 guns.

The advantage of the Wehrmacht and SS tank divisions was their ability to break into battle groups(Kampfgruppe), capable of acting independently. At the end of 1941 and beginning of 1942. one tank battalion of 40-60 tanks, one motorized infantry battalion with Sd.Kfz 251 armored personnel carriers and one artillery battalion were united into groups within divisions. Beginning in 1943, the best units of the division were united into battle groups to carry out attacks and counterattacks with the participation of the best technology. These groups included best tanks, armored personnel carriers of the division and Vespe self-propelled guns. When the war began to turn against the Germans, such groups proved especially useful, serving as "fire brigades" that carried out quick and powerful counterattacks, holding back the enemy advance. Therefore, even when acting on the defensive, these battle groups of tank forces continued to remain faithful to the pre-war Guderian's concepts about combined mobile formations, which included artillery, motorized infantry and tanks. In the last months of the war the concept of battle groups was improved, and after this reorganization the importance of panzergrenadiers in the armored divisions of the Third Reich increased even more.

In March 1945, a typical tank division had a mixed tank regiment, which consisted of a tank battalion and a battalion of panzergrenadiers in armored personnel carriers. The tank division also included two panzergrenadier regiments on trucks (two battalions each), a mixed anti-tank battalion (75-mm RAK anti-tank guns and Jagdpanzer tank destroyers) and an artillery regiment (a division of Wespe and Hummel self-propelled guns ", two motorized divisions). Thus, there was a significant increase in the proportion of panzergrenadiers in the tank division. Now the division included five panzergrenadier (motorized infantry) battalions and one tank. Tank division model 1945 the state had only 54 tanks, including the Jagdpanzer tank destroyers, which were part of the anti-tank battalions. Most divisions had much fewer tanks.

Personnel motorized (motorized infantry) divisions usually transported by trucks and motorcycles. Having greater mobility and therefore being able to keep up with the armored divisions leading the advance, motorized infantry divisions were organized like regular infantry divisions. The motorized infantry division consisted in 1939 of three motorized and one artillery regiment, reconnaissance and engineer battalions, a communications battalion and an anti-tank fighter division. Composition and armament of the motorized infantry division in 1939: total number of personnel - 16,445 people. (of which 492 are officers), 2,616 trucks (of which 989 are for transporting personnel), 1,944 motorcycles (621 with sidecars), 30 armored personnel carriers (all in the reconnaissance battalion), 156 guns (24 light infantry, 72 PaK anti-tank guns 36, twelve 20 mm anti-tank guns, 36 light and 12 heavy field howitzers) and 138 mortars (84 light and 54 medium). In order to increase the mobility of the motorized division, in 1940 one motorized regiment was excluded from its composition, which led to a decrease in the number of personnel and military equipment. There were no tanks in the motorized division.

By the beginning of the Polish campaign, Germany had 4 motorized infantry divisions: 2nd, 13th, 20th and 29th. In the winter of 1939-40. The motorized infantry regiment "Greater Germany" was formed. Motorized infantry divisions performed well in Poland and France, so their further expansion followed in the fall of 1940. The 3rd, 10th, 14th, 18th, 25th, 36th and 60th infantry divisions became motorized. From the units of the 16th Infantry Division that were not suitable for the formation of the 16th Panzer Division, the 16th Motorized Infantry Division was formed. The 2nd Motorized Infantry Division was reorganized as the 12th Panzer Division by 10 January 1941. The "Gross Germany" regiment was deployed into a division (two more regiments were added) by March 12, 1942. The fighting on the Soviet-German front showed that the striking power of motorized divisions was not high, and large losses in equipment, weapons and especially vehicles were serious reduced their mobility.

In the summer of 1942, tank battalions were added to the motorized divisions. This significantly increased the combat power of the divisions. The tank battalions of some motorized infantry divisions were armed with Pz Kpfw III and Pz Kpfw IV tanks. However, most tank battalions of motorized (panzergrenadier) divisions were armed with assault guns, especially at the end of the war. In the fall of 1943, a division of self-propelled guns was included in the motorized divisions.

In October 1942, the motorized infantry regiments, known as "rifle" (Schutzen), were renamed grenadier regiments, and in March 1943, they became known as Panzergrenadier regiments.

After the major defeat of the Germans at Stalingrad at the end of 1942 - beginning of 1943, they were reorganized into Panzergrenadier 3rd, 29th and 60th motorized infantry divisions. In March 1943, in France, the 3rd Panzergrenadier Division was formed from the remnants of the 3rd Motorized Infantry Division. On March 1 in France, the 29th Infantry Division was formed from parts of the 345th Infantry Division. On June 23 of the same year it was reorganized into the 29th Panzergrenadier Division. On June 23, 1943, all Wehrmacht motorized infantry divisions began to be called panzergrenadier divisions, with the exception of the 14th and 36th divisions, from which the equipment was withdrawn and they became ordinary infantry divisions. In July 1943, the 60th Division was re-established as the Panzergrenadier Division "Feldherrnhalle". In total, during the war years, the Wehrmacht formed 15 army panzergrenadier divisions.

Statewide as of September 24, 1943 panzergrenadier division included two panzergrenadier regiments of three battalions (an increase compared to motorized divisions), one battalion of tanks (usually armed with assault guns), an anti-tank battalion (rarely self-propelled), a reconnaissance battalion, an artillery regiment, anti-aircraft division, engineer battalion, communications battalion and various auxiliary units. Composition and armament of the Panzergrenadier division in 1943: the strength of the division was 15,418 people, including 415 officers. The division's firepower consisted of 46 medium and 24 heavy mortars, 14 light and 44 heavy infantry guns, 21 75 mm anti-tank guns, 24 flamethrowers used by sappers, 42 20 mm and 4 88 mm anti-aircraft guns, 18 armored vehicles (usually equipped 20-mm guns) of a reconnaissance battalion, 43 self-propelled Jagdpanzers and 45 tanks or assault guns. Given the losses that German armored divisions had suffered by mid-1943, fully equipped panzergrenadier divisions often had the same number of tanks as battle-worn armored divisions.

Elite panzergrenadier divisions Greater Germany" (Grossdeutschland) and " Feldherrnhalle"(Feldherrnhalle) had a different organization and had a much larger number of personnel, weapons and equipment. On the eve of the Battle of Kursk in June 1943, two tank battalions and an assault gun division of the Grossdeutschland division had 13 heavy Tiger tanks, 46 Panthers, 45 medium Pz Kpfw IV tanks and 35 StuGIII assault guns, a total of 139 vehicles . The two tank battalions of the Panzergrenadier Division "Feldherrnhalle" consisted of four tank companies (each with 22 tanks) instead of the usual three companies. After the division lost a large number of regular tank personnel, the number of tank companies was reduced to three. The Panzergrenadier battalions of the Feldherrnhalle division also consisted of four rather than three companies. After the defeat of the division in July 1944 in Belarus, in the fall, during its restoration, battalions were formed from three panzergrenadier companies.

In 1944, during another reorganization, the number of soldiers in the Panzergrenadier division was reduced by 680 people. In accordance with the German theory of “fewer soldiers, more weapons,” the firepower of all branches of the military was strengthened. Thus, the number of guns and mortars was increased from 201 to 274 units. The number of tank units remained the same, but the tanks were replaced by assault guns.

In March 1945, all panzergrenadier divisions became tank divisions, although by that time they had a very small number of tanks.

During the war, temporary formations were sometimes formed tank brigades. For example, to participate in Operation Citadel on the southern front Kursk Bulge The 10th Tank Brigade was formed. This brigade consisted of one tank and one motorized regiment, which had more tanks than any tank division.

In May 1942, the formation began heavy tank battalions (schwere Panzerabteilung, sPzAbt), which were supposed to be armed with the latest heavy tanks Pz Kpfw VI "Tiger". The heavy tank battalion was a separate unit and could operate either independently or as part of any formation. The battalion consisted of four companies, including two tank companies. Heavy tank companies from September 1942 to May 1943, in addition to the Tigers, had 10 medium tanks Pz Kpfw III Ausf N (2 platoons). Since the spring of 1943, in preparation for Operation Citadel, heavy tank battalions already consisted of five companies, including three tank companies. Together with the Pz Kpfw VI "Tiger" heavy tanks, they were armed with the Pz Kpfw III Ausf L, M and N medium tanks, which provided close support for the "Tigers".

In the spring of 1944, the heavy tank battalion consisted of three tank companies, each company had three tank platoons of 4 Pz Kpfw VI Tiger tanks. The company had 14 Tiger tanks (two command tanks). In total, the battalion had 45 heavy Tiger tanks (three were the battalion headquarters). The support company's tank platoon was armed with Pz Kpfw IV Ausf H medium tanks with anti-cumulative shields. The 502nd Battalion had a platoon of Hetzer tank destroyers - Jagdpanzer 38(t) Hetzer.

Since April 1944, heavy tank battalions began to be armed with new heavy tanks Pz Kpfw VI B ("Royal Tiger"). These tanks equipped the 1st company (12 units), the other two heavy tank companies were armed with Pz Kpfw VI Tiger I tanks.

After the defeat of the German troops near Moscow, they began to create tank reserve forces of the Wehrmacht High Command: the formation of a significant number of assault gun divisions began, and later separate battalions of heavy tanks (32-45 Pz Kpfw VI "Tiger" heavy tanks each), anti-tank fighter divisions (45 anti-tank self-propelled guns each), assault gun brigades (31-45 assault guns each) guns). With these measures, the Wehrmacht command tried to compensate for shortcomings in the organizational structure of tank and motorized divisions and the constant reduction in their combat strength.

The organization of the tank forces of the Third Reich allowed the Hitlerite command to massively use tank troops, carry out deep offensive operations, and, with the transition to defense, launch strong counterattacks. Throughout the war, the number of tank and motorized divisions of the Third Reich constantly increased. On June 22, 1941, there were 20 tank and 16 motorized divisions. In the period from December 1941 to May 1945, 26 tank, 17 motorized divisions, 16 tank and 12 motorized brigades were again formed.

In World War II the main organizational forms German tank forces included tank and motorized divisions, tank corps, tank armies, as well as units and formations of the reserve of the main command. Their organizational structure During the war it was repeatedly changed. Despite the inclusion of self-propelled artillery, heavy tanks, an increase in the number of armored personnel carriers and other means of combat, formations and unification of Wehrmacht tank forces were repeatedly defeated by Soviet tank forces, and at the end of the war, by Allied tank forces.

Literature:

Combat actions of the Soviet Army in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, vol. 1. M., 1958.

"Military Historical Journal", 1974, No. 2.

Appendix 1. Number and armament of rifle (USSR) and infantry (Germany) divisions in 1941

Sources:

Steven J. Zaloga and Leland S. Ness Red Army Handbook 1939–1945.

Notes:

1. According to the state (KStN), the Wehrmacht infantry division was supposed to have (excluding the field reserve battalion of more than 800 people): 518 officers, 102 officials, 2573 non-commissioned officers and 13,667 soldiers, a total of 16,860 people. The division included: three infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, reconnaissance, anti-tank, engineer, field reserve battalions and a communications battalion. The division's armament: 20 light 75 mm and 6 heavy 150 mm infantry guns, 36 light 105 mm infantry howitzers, 12 150 mm field howitzers, as well as 9 flamethrowers and 3 light reconnaissance armored vehicles. In addition, the division had: 1,743 riding horses, 3,632 draft horses, 895 carts, 31 trailers, 500 bicycles, 530 motorcycles (190 of them with sidecars), 394 cars, 536 trucks (67 with trailers).

2. In the rifle division, according to the pre-war states, there were 17,166 people, 603 machine guns, 148 guns and mortars, 12 anti-aircraft guns, 54 anti-tank guns and 16 tanks.

3. In the rifle regiment of the reduced division there were 2949 people on staff (175–397–2377). Armament: heavy machine guns - 36, light machine guns - 54, large-caliber - 3, anti-aircraft - 6, 76 mm guns - 4, 122 mm howitzers - 8, 45 mm guns - 22 (18), 120 mm mortars - 18, 82 mm - 34 (54), 50 mm - 81.

Appendix 2. Organization of Wehrmacht tank divisions, number and types of tanks at the beginning of the war

The Wehrmacht tank divisions included: a tank, two infantry (motorized) and artillery regiments, as well as a motorcycle, reconnaissance, anti-tank, engineer, field reserve battalion and a communications battalion. All units and units of the tank division were motorized.

At the same time, ten tank divisions (1, 2, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14 and 16th) had two-battalion tank regiments, the remaining nine divisions (3, 6, 7, 8, 12, 17, 18, 19 and 20th) - three-battalion composition. The tank regiment was armed with the following types of tanks: T-I, T-II, T-III, T-IV, captured Czech tanks T-35(t) and T-38(t), as well as command tanks based on T-I and T- III.

Tank regiment according to the staff from 02/01/1941 consisted of:

1. Regimental control (2 command tanks and 1 medium tank); platoon of communications and light tanks (5 T-I or T-II tanks), total tanks - 8.

2. Two or three tank battalions.

3. Tank repair company.

Composition of the tank battalion:

1. Battalion control (2 command tanks and 1 medium tank).

2. Headquarters company - platoons: communications, reconnaissance, engineer, anti-aircraft and a platoon of light tanks (5 T-I or T-II tanks).

3. Two companies of light tanks.

4. One company of medium tanks.

5. One light transport column.

Light tank company: command (2 medium tanks), one light tank platoon (5 T-I or T-II tanks) and three medium tank platoons of 5 vehicles each, for a total of 22 tanks in a tank company. As medium tanks in light tank companies , as well as in the regiment and battalion departments, T-III, T-35(t) and T-38(t) tanks were used.

Medium tank company: command (2 T-IV medium tanks), one light tank platoon (5 T-I or T-II tanks) and three medium tank platoons T-IV tanks 4 vehicles each, a total of 19 tanks in the company.

Thus, according to the staff, the battalion had 71 tanks, of which 2 were command tanks, 20 light, 35 medium and 14 T-IV.

In the two-battalion tank regiment, there were 150 tanks in the state, of which 6 were command tanks, 45 light, 71 medium and 28 T-IV.

The 3-battalion tank regiment has 221 tanks, of which 8 are command tanks, 65 are light, 106 are medium and 42 are T-IV.

Motorized infantry regiment consisted of two infantry battalions. At the same time, in the 1st TD there were two battalions with armored personnel carriers, in the 10th TD there was one such battalion, in the 14th, 16th and 19th TD there were no units with armored personnel carriers, in the rest there was one company per armored personnel carrier.

Artillery Regiment consisted of two light artillery divisions (each with 3 batteries of 4 105-mm light field howitzers), one heavy (two batteries of 4 150-mm heavy field howitzers and one battery of 4 100-mm cannons each) and a control battery.

Anti-tank battalion consisted of three anti-tank companies (each - 8 37-mm, 3 50-mm anti-tank guns) and an anti-aircraft company (8 20-mm anti-aircraft guns and 2 20-mm quad mounts).

Appendix 3. Number and armament of tank divisions of the USSR and Germany in 1941

Sources:

* TsAMO RF. F. 3046. Op. 1. D 7.

** htlp://niehorster.orbat.com/011_germany/41_organ_army/41_org_army.htm.

*** Russian archive: Great Patriotic War: Orders people's commissar Defense of the USSR June 22, 1941 - 1942 T. 13(2–2). M.: TERRA.

Notes:

1. A separate tank division, according to the staff approved on July 6, 1941, had two tank, motorized rifle, artillery regiments and support units. In total, the tank division had 215 tanks, of which 20 KV, 42 T-34 and 153 T-26 and BT. In total, 12 such divisions were formed in July - August (101 - 112th).

2. The tank brigade (staff 010/78 dated August 23, 1941) included: headquarters (armored vehicle platoon, communications platoon, engineer platoon, chemical protection platoon, transport platoon), reconnaissance company (heavy armored vehicle platoon, light armored vehicle platoon, motorcycle platoon ), a three-battalion tank regiment, a motorized rifle battalion (three companies), a tank destroyer company, a mortar battery, an anti-tank battery, a transport company, an air defense division (two 37-mm batteries, a machine-gun platoon). The tank regiment consisted of a battalion of heavy and medium tanks (KV - 7, T-34 or T-50 - 22) and two battalions of light tanks: T-40 or T-60 - 64, in total - 93. In September, the number of light tanks in The regiment was reduced to 38, with a total of 67 tanks in the brigade.

3. According to NKO order No. 0063 dated August 12, 1941, 3 brigades were to be formed in August, 15 in September, and 30 in October.

4. In the tank brigade, according to state No. 010/87, from September 13, the tank regiment consisted of two battalions and had 61 tanks (7 KV, 22 T-34, 32 T-26, BT, T-40). The 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, 25th and some other brigades were formed in this state.

5. The motorized rifle division, according to the reduced staff approved on July 6, 1941, consisted of two motorized rifle, one tank and one artillery regiments and support units. The tank regiment (three tank and motorized rifle battalions) had 93 tanks - 7 KV, 22 T-34, 64 T-26 and BT. Some motorized rifle divisions pre-war formations were also transferred to the new state. In August - September, some reduced-strength tank divisions were also reorganized into motorized rifle divisions. Four motorized rifle divisions took part in the battle of Moscow: the 1st (later the 1st Guards) and the 82nd (instead of a regiment, there was a tank battalion) of the pre-war formation, the 101st and 107th, reformed from reduced tank divisions.

Appendix 4. Irreversible losses of the Wehrmacht in armored vehicles and anti-tank guns on the Eastern Front in 1941

Source:

Boog/Forster/Hoffmann/Klink/Muller, Oer Angriff auf die Sowjetunion. S.1156 (http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/files/Sten/ Avtotankovie_i_ Bronetankovie_Voiska_(1941–1945). rar).

Notes:

2. According to the famous Wehrmacht armored vehicle specialist I. Kurtukov, the losses of flamethrower tanks are counted among T-IIs. However, the table does not take into account German losses in command tanks (67), captured Czech T-35(t) tanks and T-III tanks with a 37 mm cannon.

Appendix 5. Comparative tactical and technical characteristics of tanks of the USSR and Germany and their weapons in 1941

Notes:

* crawler/wheeled;

** welded tower;

*** cast tower.

1. Solyankin A.G., Pavlov M.V., Pavlov I.V., Zheltov I.G. Domestic armored vehicles. 1905–1941. M.: Eksprint, 2002 and the same: 1941–1945. M.: Eksprint, 2005.

2. Chamberlain P., Doyle H. Encyclopedia of German Tanks of World War Two. London: Arms & Armour, 2000.

3. Jentz T.L. Panzertruppen. The Complete Guide to the Creation & Combat Employment of German's Tank Force. 1933–1942. Atglen, RA: Shiffer Publishing, Ltd., 1996.

Notes:

* with/without walkie-talkie;

** beyond effective fire;

The table was compiled by Kavalerchik B.K. using the following sources:

1. Svirin M. Artillery weapons Soviet tanks. 1940–1945. M.: Eksprint, 1999.

2. Shirokorad A.B. Encyclopedia domestic artillery. Minsk: Harvest, 2000.

3. Chamberlain P., Doyle H. Encyclopedia of Germany's Tanks of World War Two. London: Arms & Armour, 2000.

4. Jentz T.L., Doyle H.L. Germany's Panzers in World War II. From Pz.kpfw.I to Tiger II. Atglen, RA: Shiffer Publishing, Ltd., 2001.

5. Kliment S.K., Francev V. Czechoslovak Armored Fighting Vehicles. 1918–1948. Atglen, R. A. Shiffer Publishing, Ltd., 1997.

Comments:

It should be taken into account that some of the stated data in the tables did not always coincide with the real ones. Thus, the power reserve of Soviet tanks equipped with a V-2 diesel engine (BT-7M, T-34, KV-1 and KV-2) in practice was significantly less. This also applies to the table values ​​of armor penetration: the quality of the armor and the quality of the shells sometimes did not correspond to the reference samples during testing. For example, a large batch of Soviet 45-mm armor-piercing shells before the war were fired with deviations from heat treatment technology. They were overheated and became fragile because of this. When they hit the cemented armor of German tanks, which had a surface layer of high hardness, these shells split and did not penetrate it. Special modifications to the projectiles were required so that they would again acquire the appropriate penetrating ability.

The armor penetration of the 152 mm gun of the KV-2 tank was only slightly superior to the 76 mm gun of the KV-1 tank. This is explained by the fact that the KV-2 was tasked with fighting the enemy’s field fortifications, manpower and artillery, and not with his tanks, so they did not make a special armor-piercing projectile for it. If necessary, they were to use a naval semi-armor-piercing projectile to combat tanks.

It is a widely known fact that G.K. Zhukov at the very beginning of the Great Patriotic War ordered the use of concrete-piercing shells from 09–30 to fire at German tanks from 152-mm guns of KV-2 tanks. Thus, he only demonstrated his incompetence in this area. The special charge for the concrete-piercing projectile was not tested, and when firing a standard charge, the tank's turret jammed and its support bearing failed. Therefore, firing concrete-piercing shells was strictly prohibited. Conventional high-explosive or even high-explosive fragmentation shells from this weapon could be successfully used against tanks. A 152-mm projectile weighing almost half a centner hitting any German tank of that time resulted in its guaranteed destruction. The effectiveness of long-range fire largely depended, in addition to crew training, on the quality of the sights. The Germans had much better optics. In real conditions in 1941, Soviet tanks opened fire, as a rule, at a distance not exceeding 800 m.

Appendix 6. Availability of tanks in the tank divisions of the 3rd Panzer Group in September 1941

Source:

Thomas L. Jentz “Panzertruppen. The Complete Guide to the Creation & Combat Employment of Germany's Tank Force. 1933–1942", Shiffer Military History, Atglen, RA (total number calculated by the author).

** in some publications the number of tanks in the 3rd TG-r (512) is calculated without taking into account the replenishment received and the repair fund.

Appendix 7. Resolution of the State Defense Committee “On the voluntary mobilization of workers of Moscow and the Moscow region in the people’s militia division”

In accordance with the will expressed by the workers, and proposals of Soviet, party, trade union and Komsomol organizations of the city of Moscow and the Moscow region, the State Defense Committee DECIDES:

I. Mobilize 200 thousand people in the people's militia divisions in the city of Moscow and 70 thousand people in the Moscow region.

The leadership of mobilization and formation will be entrusted to the commander of the Moscow Military District, Lieutenant General ARTEMYEV

To help the MVO command to carry out mobilization, create an emergency commission consisting of comrades. SOKOLOV - secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (b), YAKOVLEV - secretary of the MK VKP (b), PEGOV - secretary of the MK and MGK Komsomol, FILIPPOV - head of the food products department of the city trade department, ANUPRIENKO - brigade commander and PROSTOV - lieutenant colonel.

II. Mobilize Moscow workers, employees and students into the people's militia and form 25 divisions according to the regional principle.

The mobilized division receives a number and name of the district, for example: 1st Sokolniki District Division.

Districts of the Moscow region form separate divisions and units and merge them, at the direction of the Moscow Military District Headquarters, into the division of the city of Moscow.

III. To replenish the decline, in addition to the mobilized divisions, each district creates a reserve regiment, from which the decline is replenished.

IV. To lead the work of mobilizing workers in the people's militia division and providing them with material support, an emergency troika is created in each district, headed by the first secretary of the RK VKP(b), consisting of members of the district military commissar and the head of the district department of the NKVD.

The emergency troika carries out mobilization under the leadership of the Headquarters of the Moscow Military District with subsequent registration of mobilization through the district military registration and enlistment offices.

V. The formation of divisions is carried out through the mobilization of workers from 17 to 55 years old. Those liable for military service of the 1st category of conscription age who have mobilization orders in hand, as well as workers, employees of the People's Aviation Industry factories, the People's Commissariat of Armaments, the People's Commissariat of Ammunition, machine-tool factories and workers of some, at the discretion of the regional troika, enterprises carrying out particularly important defense orders are exempt from mobilization.

The rank and file, junior personnel, 50% of platoon commanders, up to 40% of company commanders, medical personnel and the entire political composition of the division formed by the district are made up of workers, employees and students of the district; the rest of the command staff is staffed by Red Army personnel.

VI. Combat training of units is carried out according to a special plan of the Headquarters of the Moscow Military District.

VII. Mobilization and barracks placement of militia units takes place on the basis of the housing stock of district councils (schools, clubs, other premises), except for premises intended for hospitals.

VIII. The supply of division units with vehicles, motorcycle and bicycle equipment, entrenching tools (shovels, axes), kettles, kettles for cooking food is carried out at the expense of the resources of Moscow, the Moscow region and the region, through the mobilization and production of these funds by the enterprises of the region.

The headquarters of the Moscow Military District provides the divisions with weapons, ammunition and clothing allowances.

Ammunition and weapons are supplied through military supply lines.

IX. During the entire time that a mobilized person is in the people's militia units, he retains support: for workers - in the amount of his average earnings, for employees - in the amount of the salary he receives, for students - in the amount of the scholarship he receives, for the families of collective farmers, an allowance is assigned in accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council USSR “On the procedure for assigning and paying benefits to the families of ordinary and junior commanding personnel in war time"from 26.VI.1941.

In the event of disability and death of a mobilized person, the mobilized person and his family have the right to receive a pension on the same basis as those conscripted into the Red Army.

Chairman of the State Defense Committee

I. STALIN.

Appendix 8. List and main combat composition of the Moscow militia divisions that were part of the active army at the beginning of Operation Typhoon

Source:

Documents from TsAMO RF.

Militia defending Moscow. M.: Moscow worker, 1978 (table compiled by the author).

Notes:

* Distribution of divisions among armies according to the order of the Supreme High Command Headquarters dated July 30, 1941. By the morning of August 4, 1941, the 32nd Army was supposed to occupy the line of Bogoroditskoye, Lysova, Podrezova, Panfilovo, Godunovka. Headquarters - Vyazma. 33rd - by the morning of August 5, 1941 - the line of Luzhki, Ratki, Dyuki, Ivanovka, Podlesnya. By the beginning of the operation, there were more than 133 thousand people in 12 divisions.

** The 2nd, 7th, 8th, 9th and 13th bottoms that were surrounded west of Vyazma were disbanded due to heavy losses. There are no independent funds for these divisions in TsAMO RF. In total, by October 17, slightly more than 13 thousand people (10%) had left the encirclement.

*** In October, on the basis of previously formed workers and destruction battalions, 4 more Moscow divisions of the people's militia were additionally created. On October 24, they were transformed accordingly: the 1st Moscow - into the 153rd Infantry Division, the 2nd - into the 129th Infantry Division, the 3rd - into the 130th Infantry Division, the 4th - into the 155th Infantry Division.

Appendix 9. Hitler’s address to the soldiers of the Eastern Front on the eve of Operation Typhoon

Soldiers of the Eastern Front!

Deeply concerned about the future and well-being of our people, on June 22 I decided to appeal to you with a demand to prevent last minute the most dangerous threat hanging over us at that time. It was the intention, as we learned, of the Kremlin rulers to destroy not only Germany, but all of Europe.

During this time, you, my comrades, have understood the following two points:

1. Our enemy armed himself literally to the teeth for the attack he was preparing, many times overriding even the most serious fears.

2. Only the Lord God saved our people, and the peoples of the European world, from the fact that the barbarian enemy did not have time to move his tens of thousands of tanks against us.

All of Europe would perish. After all, this enemy consists mainly not of soldiers, but of beasts.

Now you, my comrades, have seen with your own eyes what “a paradise for workers and peasants” is. In a country with a vast territory and inexhaustible riches that could feed the whole world, there is such poverty that we Germans cannot understand. This was the consequence of almost 25 years of Jewish domination called Bolshevism, which in its true sense is nothing more than the most common form of capitalism.

The carriers of the system in both cases are the same: Jews and only Jews.

When I appealed to you on June 22 to avert the terrible danger threatening our homeland, you opposed the most powerful power of all time. A little more than three months have passed and you, my comrades in arms, managed, thanks to your courage, to defeat the enemy’s tank brigades one after another, disable his numerous divisions, capture a huge number of his soldiers and capture endless expanses - and not deserted ones, but precisely those , at the expense of which our enemy lived and met the needs of his gigantic military industry for the raw materials of the various types.

In a matter of weeks, all three important industrial area will be in your hands!

Your names, Wehrmacht soldiers, like the names of our valiant allies, the names of your divisions, regiments, ships and air squadrons will go down in world history, associated with the greatest victories in its entire foreseeable period.

Here they are, your deeds:

More than 2,400,000 prisoners,

Over 17,500 tanks and 21,600 guns destroyed or captured,

14,200 aircraft shot down or destroyed on the ground.

The world has never seen anything like it!

The territory that the Germans and allied forces have conquered to date is twice the territory of our Reich within the borders of 1933 and four times the territory of the English metropolis.

After June 22, the enemy’s most powerful defensive systems were broken through, the largest rivers were crossed, numerous settlements were taken by storm, fortifications and fortified areas were destroyed or smoked out. From the far north, where our Finnish allies are forced to prove their heroism for the second time, and to the Crimea, you, together with Slovak, Hungarian, Italian and Romanian divisions, invaded enemy territory to a depth of about 1000 kilometers. Spanish, Croatian and Belgian units are joining you, and others will follow.

This struggle - probably for the first time - will become the struggle of all the nations of Europe and will be considered as a single action in order to save the cultural values ​​of the entire continent.

At the same time, enormous work is underway behind the giant front line:

About 2,000 bridges, each more than 12 meters long, were built.

405 railway bridges were erected.

25,500 kilometers of railway lines were put into operation, of which over 15,000 kilometers were converted to European gauge.

Construction and restoration work is underway on thousands of kilometers of roads.

Vast areas have been brought under civilian administration. Life on them is quickly restored according to quite acceptable laws. Huge warehouses with food, fuel and ammunition are already ready.

The impressive successes of this struggle have not been achieved without losses. However, the number of victims - taking into account the severity of the grief of individual comrades and their families - reaches no more than one fifth of the losses of the First World War.

What you, my comrades in arms, had to endure over the past three and a half months together with the valiant soldiers of our allies, demonstrating the greatest achievements, courage and heroism and overcoming all kinds of hardships and difficulties, is known only to those who themselves fulfilled their soldier’s duty in the past. war.

In three and a half months, soldiers, the preconditions have finally been created for inflicting the last and decisive blow on the enemy even before the onset of winter, a blow that should defeat him completely. All preparatory activities, as far as humanly possible, have been completed. Systematically, step by step, everything necessary has been done to put the enemy in a position where we can deal a fatal blow to him.

Today begins the last greatest and decisive battle of this year.

This battle should bring to its knees not only the enemy, but also the instigator of the entire war - England. For, having defeated the opposing enemy, we will deprive England of her last ally on the continent. At the same time, we will eliminate the danger not only for our Reich, but also for all of Europe, the danger of an invasion by the Huns, as the Mongols once did later. The entire German people will be closer to you in the coming weeks than ever before.

The accomplishments you and our allies have achieved owe us all our deepest gratitude. In the coming last difficult days, our entire homeland will be with you, which, with bated breath, will follow your deeds, blessing you for your exploits. WITH God's help you will achieve not only victory, but also create the most important prerequisites for the establishment of peace!

Adolf Gitler.

Fuhrer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht.

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Optimal tank formation for 1941
The purpose of this study is to determine the optimal staff structure of the Red Army tank formation for June 1941 for the alternative reality “Kirov Spring”.
To do this, we further study in detail the Wehrmacht tank division in 1940-1941, then the Red Army tank corps similar to it in 1943-1945, and finally, a proposal is formulated for the structure of the main formation of the Red Army in the period 1937-1943.

PART ONE. TANK DIVISION OF THE WEHRMACHT IN 1940-1941
When talking about the optimal tank formation for 1941, it is difficult to stay away from the German tank divisions. Their role in the unstoppable expansion of Hitler's Germany since 1939, in Germany's lightning victory over France in 1940, and, finally, in the colossal successes of the Wehrmacht in the summer and autumn of 1941 cannot be overestimated.
Composition of a Wehrmacht tank division in 1941
The German tank division of 1941 (total number of personnel 13,700 people) included:
tank regiment (about 2,600 people, 154-278 tanks),
a motorized infantry brigade of two motorized regiments of two battalions each (about 6,000 people),
motorized artillery regiment (36 guns).
motorized anti-tank battalion (36 guns)
motorcycle battalion (1,078 people),
reconnaissance battalion
engineer battalion
other management, communications and support units
561 cars + 1,402 trucks and tractors (in practice about 2,300 cars)
Let's look at the structure of the German tank division in more detail, focusing first on the structure of the tank component of the tank division itself - the tank regiment. Let us briefly recall that the tank division, in addition to one tank regiment, also included a motorized rifle brigade and a number of other units, the composition of which we will examine below.
It is paradoxical that the vast majority of Internet sources, following WIKIPEDIA, mindlessly indicate literally the following:
“By June 22, 1941, there were 17 tank divisions on the Eastern Front and two more were in the reserve of the Supreme Command ground forces. 11 divisions had two-battalion tank regiments (147 tanks per state) and 8 had three-battalion tank regiments (209 tanks per state). The main tactical unit of the Wehrmacht tank forces, the tank battalion, at the time of the invasion of the USSR, consisted of three companies of light tanks and one company of medium tanks, plus a communications platoon. Each light tank company had 4 platoons of 5 tanks plus 2 tanks in the control platoon. There were 3 platoons in a company of medium tanks.”

Summarizing the text into a table, a meticulous researcher will pay attention to the fact that neither 147 nor 209 tanks according to the division's staff flow from such a battalion, but for a two-battalion composition - 166 tanks according to the state and for a three-battalion composition - 249 tanks according to the state.
On the contrary, Mikhail Borisovich Baryatinsky, in the book “German Tanks in Battle” writes:
“In 1938.. The structure of tank divisions was approximately the same: a tank brigade of two regiments, two battalions of three companies each. Of the three companies, two are light tanks and one is mixed... Before the French campaign, the company of medium tanks according to the staff dated February 21, 1940 consisted of eight Pz.IV tanks, six Pz.II tanks and one command tank on the Pz.I chassis. The staff, approved on February 1, 1941, included fourteen Pz.IV and five Pz.II vehicles in a company of medium tanks. In fact, in all tank divisions at the beginning of Operation Barbarossa there was no 3rd platoon in the company, and it consisted of ten Pz.IV. Even more radical changes befell the light tank companies. Before the French campaign, companies of this type included seven Pz.III, eight Pz.II, four Pz.I and one command tank on a Pz.I chassis. The staff of February 1941 already provided for seventeen Pz.III tanks and five Pz.II tanks. As a result, Germany already fielded 19 tank divisions against the Soviet Union, and ended the war with 27 such formations (20 in the Wehrmacht and seven in the SS troops).”


It is possible that in the tables prepared by the German headquarters the picture of the German tank divisions in 1940 and 1941 was exactly this, but the above “Baryatinsky tables” contradict the well-known historical fact that the composition of the German tank divisions was much more diverse:


The final data show that the size of the tank fleet of the Wehrmacht tank divisions in 1941 varied significantly, giving the following average values: 158 tanks in two-battalion tank divisions and 232 tanks in three-battalion tank divisions.
By examining the number of tanks in two-battalion tank divisions manned by German tanks, we obtain the following factual data: there were an average of 79 tanks per tank battalion, of which: 6 - Pz.I, 21 - Pz.II, 36 - Pz.III, 10 - Pz.IV and 6 – PzBef:


Which brings us to the actual staffing structure of a Wehrmacht tank battalion in 1941:


That is, from the “Baryatinsky tables” it is only true that the companies of medium tanks actually had 10 Pz.IVs, which gave two-battalion divisions 20 tanks of this type per division, and three-battalion tank divisions - 30 tanks of this type per division. Otherwise, the staffs of the divisions were formed not in accordance with the staff, but in accordance with the actual presence of tanks in the troops, which can be illustrated by two tables:

Now, having understood the details of the Wehrmacht tank fleet, we can say the following:
1. The main tank formation of the Wehrmacht in the period from 1939 to 1941 was a tank division, which had on average about 200 tanks of various types (both in 1939 and in 1941). In fact, in 1941, the minimum number of tanks in a tank division was 154 in the 9th TD, the maximum was 278 in the 7th TD.
2. The widely circulated statement that “D The Panzerwaffe is characterized by one interesting feature: with an increase in the number of tank formations, they combat power decreased significantly» – wrong. In fact, the combat power of an average tank division in April 1941 was not inferior to the combat power of an average tank division in April 1940 due to the growth in both the number and quality of tanks in tank battalions.
3. In 1940, after the victory over France and before the invasion of the USSR, the Panzerwaffe underwent a highly reasonable optimization of management staff without reducing the average number of tanks in a tank division: instead of two tank regiments, there was one regiment in the division, as a result of which, when the number doubled tank divisions, the total number of colonels and regimental headquarters in the Wehrmacht remained the same.
4. The reorganization of the management of tank units allowed the Wehrmacht to have experienced regimental commanders and well-coordinated headquarters of tank regiments in all 17 new model tank divisions by 1941. The same is true for the command and control of most tank battalions (before the reorganization, a tank division had 4 tank battalions, after the reorganization there were from 2 to 3 tank battalions).
5. The total number of Panzerwaffe tanks, which were controlled by the same colonels in twice the number of divisions, doubled by 1941 due to a fourfold increase in production (in 1940, 1803 tanks and self-propelled guns were produced, and in the previous year 1939, German industry produced only 434 tanks).
6. In addition to the increase in the production of new tanks, the German tank industry switched to producing more advanced tanks: in 1939, instead of the Pz.III with a 37 mm tank gun, modifications with a 50 mm tank gun appeared, and the thickness of the frontal armor increased from 15 to 30 mm; in 1940, production of the Pz.III modification with a frontal armor thickness of 30 + 30 mm began.
7. Tank divisions of 1941, equipped with German tanks, included on average battalions of 79 tanks (6 - Pz.I, 21 - Pz.II, 36 - Pz.III, 10 - Pz.IV and 6 - PzBef).
8. The size of the tank fleet of the Wehrmacht tank divisions in 1941 was slightly different, giving the following average values: 158 tanks in two-battalion tank divisions and 232 tanks in three-battalion tank divisions.
9. A tank platoon contained 5 tanks, a tank company (except Pz.IV) contained 4 platoons + a control platoon of 2 tanks, a Pz.IV tank company contained 2 platoons + a control platoon of 2 tanks, a tank battalion contained 4 companies (of which one company Pz.IV), the tank regiment contained 2 or 3 battalions.

Artillery of a Wehrmacht tank division in 1941
The organization of the artillery of a Wehrmacht tank division in 1941 included:
1. Divisional artillery - one artillery regiment.
2. Anti-tank artillery (divisional and battalion levels).
3. Field artillery (divisional, regimental, and battalion level)
4. Mortars (brigade and company level in a motorized infantry brigade)
5. Anti-aircraft artillery - one air defense company.

The divisional artillery regiment of a tank division consisted of two light artillery battalions with 12 units of 105 mm leFH 18 light field howitzers and one heavy artillery battalion, most often armed with 12 units of 150 mm heavy howitzers sFH 18 (sometimes 8 howitzers + 4 heavy 105 mm sK 18 guns). There are a total of 36 guns in the artillery regiment.
Anti-tank artillery in tank divisions was located not at the regimental level, but at the battalion level. Each motorized infantry battalion had three Rak 35/36. The presence of a divisional anti-tank battalion of 36 guns was also envisaged. As a result, the tank divisions had 48 anti-tank guns.
On the eve of the attack on the Soviet Union, companies of infantry guns were introduced into the motorized rifle regiments of tank divisions - two sIG 33 and four leIG 18. However, at the same time, two light infantry guns remained in the battalions of these regiments, as well as in the divisional reconnaissance battalion. Thus, the 1941 model TD had four sIG 33 and 18 leIG 18.
Mortars (30 per tank division) were mainly concentrated 2 in the infantry companies of the motorized infantry battalion (which gave 6 mortars in the battalion), and the motorized infantry brigade of the tank division also included a platoon of 6 mortars. There were no mortars at the regimental and battalion control levels.
Most divisions at the beginning of Operation Barbarossa had only one motorized company, each of which had 12 20-mm Flak 30 or Flak 38 anti-aircraft guns. Until June 1941, neither 37-mm automatic anti-aircraft guns nor 88-mm No anti-aircraft guns were supplied to tank divisions.
In addition, six TDs (1st, 2nd, 5th, 7th, 9th and 10th) had separate companies of self-propelled heavy infantry guns.


PART TWO. TANK CORPS OF THE RKKA IN 1943-1945
Necessary introduction.
The organization of tank forces of the Red Army is characterized by atypical names of units and formations. So, if the rifle brigade had a staff of 6,500 people (two rifle regiments, plus artillery, sapper and other auxiliary units), then the tank brigade had a staff of about 1,300 people, including in 1943:
1. Brigade management - 54 people.
2. Combat units (total 65 tanks by 1945)
Three tank battalions - 148 people each, 21 T-34
Motorized battalion of machine gunners - 507 people.
Anti-aircraft machine gun company - 48 people.
3. Combat support units
Control company - 164 people, 3 armored vehicles
Rifle squad - 8 people. - from 08/06/1944
4. Support, supply and repair units
Technical support company - 123 people.
Medsanplatoon - 14 people.


Thus:
1. The Red Army tank battalion of 1943 (21 tanks) corresponded to the Wehrmacht tank company of 1941 (22 tanks).
2. The Red Army tank brigade of 1943 (65 tanks) corresponded to the Wehrmacht tank battalion of 1941 (78 tanks)
3. The 1943 motorized rifle brigade of the Red Army (3,215 people) corresponded to the 1941 Wehrmacht motorized infantry regiment.
4. An analogue of the Wehrmacht tank division (about 200 tanks, 13,700 personnel) is the Red Army tank corps of 1945 (207 tanks, 12,010 personnel). At the same time, the tank corps was supposed to be used not separately, but as part of a tank army. The tank army was supposed to have two tank and one mechanized corps, as well as heavy artillery and support and control units.
5. By the way, the motorized rifle brigade of the Red Army tank corps of 1945 included three motorized rifle battalion(3215 people) and corresponded to one motorized infantry regiment of the Wehrmacht in 1941.
6. At the end of the war, the three-corps tank army had over 50 thousand personnel, 850-920 tanks and self-propelled guns, about 800 guns and mortars, and more than 5 thousand vehicles. This group of compounds


In 1943, the tank corps consisted of 258 tanks + self-propelled guns and 9,677 people:


In 1943, the artillery of the tank corps included 98 guns and mortars, but by 1945 it had grown to 182 guns and mortars, and was also replenished with 63 self-propelled artillery mounts:


Tanks in the tank corps were concentrated in three tank brigades, and self-propelled guns in three self-propelled artillery regiments (1 control self-propelled guns + 1 control tank + 4 batteries of 5 self-propelled guns each)

PART THREE. OPTIMAL TANK DIVISION OF THE RKKA IN 1941
The optimal tank division of the Red Army in 1941 was more a means of countering the 20 tank divisions of the Wehrmacht than a means of breaking into German fortified areas.
Consequently, for 1941, the Red Army, taking into account post-knowledge, has two needs: tanks with shell-proof armor and a 76-mm cannon (similar or superior to the T-34, but with 5 crew members, hereafter we will call them T-34-76AI), as well as more long-range self-propelled guns on the same tank platform with shell-resistant armor and an 85-mm cannon, similar in ballistics and projectile to the 85-mm anti-aircraft gun (similar or superior to the SU-85, which we will call SU-85AI).
It would be unrealistic to expect that Soviet industry would be able to supply 6000..8000 T-34-76AI and SU-85AI tanks to the troops by April 1941.
However, it is quite possible to increase the frontal armor of the BT-7 turret by shielding up to 60 mm, which would allow using this type of tank from a trench to use it as a highly mobile self-propelled anti-tank gun.

For 1943, it would be good to replace the T-34-76M with the T-34-85, and the SU-85M with the SU-100.

The above-described structure of a tank battalion leads the USSR to the following needs for armored weapons:

By June 22, 1941, 1,651 tanks with anti-ballistic armor were produced in Real History (1,066 T-34, 386 KV-1, and 199 KV-2)
Having started work on a tank with anti-ballistic armor a year earlier than in real story(in 1937), and postponing the development of heavy tanks to the beginning of 1941, we can expect to equip 30 tank divisions of the Red Army with 2000 T-34-76AI tanks and 2000 SU-85AI self-propelled gun mounts by 70...90%.

Structure of the alternative tank division of the Red Army (approximately 14,000 personnel, 264 tanks + self-propelled guns, 218 artillery pieces and mortars)
A tank division should include:
1. three tank battalions (88 tanks and SS each)
2. two motorized rifle regiments (each with 3 battalions with normal mechanical artillery)
3. light artillery regiment with 76-mm divisional guns (preferably F-22 with a powerful cartridge) or 85-mm divisional cannons chambered for anti-aircraft guns - 36 guns.
4. anti-tank division (12 anti-tank guns of 45 mm caliber)
5. anti-aircraft artillery regiment (36 anti-aircraft automatic guns of 37..40 mm caliber)
6. engineer battalion
7. support parts (communications, repairs, supply of ammunition, etc.)

Artillery motorized rifle regiment should be:
Regimental battery of 4 regimental guns of 76 mm caliber
Regimental mortar battery of 6 regimental mortars of 120 mm caliber
Regimental anti-tank division (12 45 mm anti-tank guns)
The battalion artillery of a motorized rifle regiment includes:
Battalion battery of 6 battalion mortars of 82 mm caliber
Battalion battery of 2 45 mm anti-tank guns


The absence of heavy artillery systems (howitzers 122 mm and above) in a tank division is compensated by the fact that shock armies are formed for offensive operations (5-6 tank divisions, 2-3 heavy breakthrough tank regiments, 2-3 breakthrough artillery divisions, 4-6 rifle divisions to defend the flanks of the breakthrough zone).

Wehrmacht
Medium Tank Company
State No. 1175 dated November 1, 1941.
(middlere Panzerkompanie)
(K.St.N.1175 v. 1.11.1941)

Instead of a preface. Analyzing the staff of divisions and units is a very uninteresting and boring task, but without such basic knowledge you have to take on faith the statements of historians and those who write memoirs. And unfortunately, both of them often simply lie. The first either, based on a social order in the interests of turning history into a means of brainwashing their fellow citizens, or, even worse, out of their own dense ignorance, using in their writings something already written by someone else.
The latter often lie (and in some places even lie) out of a desire to justify themselves for not very successful battles, to present their successes in the most beautiful presentation, to elevate, so to speak, their role in history.
In both cases, as a rule, the enemy always has superior forces, his divisions are necessarily selected, but the side that is always praised, no matter what, beats the enemy as it wants, inflicts incredible losses on him and achieves tremendous successes.

Sometimes, for greater persuasiveness, comparative figures are given for the number of divisions of both sides, the number of tanks, aircraft, guns, and personnel. And it’s even more convincing when the historian cites the numbers of these same divisions, brands of tanks, types of aircraft. And this is where the most sophisticated lies often begin. Sometimes involuntary, sometimes intentional.

For example, the number of divisions is compared and a seemingly correct conclusion is drawn. For example, one German division repelled the advance of an entire Soviet army corps and was very successful. At the same time, it is modestly silent that the strength of 1 German division is equal to 1 Soviet corps. This is not my assertion, but that of Field Marshal E. von Manstein in his book “Lost Victories” (1999 edition, p. 521), and a number of other German military historians.
But this is not the whole truth. Military people know that for the success of an offensive, at least a triple superiority in forces is necessary (4 or 5 times more reliable). So it turns out that only more than three Soviet army corps (nine divisions) can break through the defense of one German division.

But how beautiful it sounds - one division held out against nine enemy divisions! Honor and praise to the German panzergrenadiers, “who once again convincingly proved their tactical and generally military superiority over the Bolshevik-Mongol hordes.”

So that everyone, having studied the real composition of real units, can draw their own conclusions, I took up this thankless topic.

The article will examine a German company of medium tanks of the November 1941 model, or as the Germans call it - mittlere Panzerkompanie, i.e. medium tank company. Let me remind you that this is the period of the decisive offensive of Army Group Center on Moscow.

For those who do not want to crawl through these tables, I have brought forward the conclusions that arise from studying this state.

So - the German tank company of 1941 was more than one and a half times stronger than the Soviet one. For comparison, a Soviet tank company of medium tanks had 10 tanks with ten tank crews, and tank platoon commanders (3 tanks per platoon) simultaneously served as tank commanders. The company commander had his own personal tank, in which he was also the commander of this tank. And nothing and no one else. Counting five crew members per tank, it turns out that in a Soviet tank company there are 50 people on 10 tanks, and if there are four, as was the case in the T-34 tanks of the first half of the war, then there are 40 people.

The German tank company in question has 14 medium tanks and 5 light tanks. At the same time, there are 144 people in the company.

The structure of the company is very interesting. In comparison with the Soviet one, one immediately notices its much greater autonomy and self-recovery capabilities, both in terms of personnel and equipment. It has twice as many officers (8 versus 4 in the Soviet one). In fact, there are not three platoons, but four and a half, although these one and a half platoons are not called that in the state. Two medium tanks (half-platoon) and five light tanks (platoon) are combined into the so-called control group (Gruppe Fuehrer), which is a kind of reserve detachment of the company commander. In addition to his command medium tank, he has another medium tank at hand. And for the command light tanks there is one more officer. In fact, this is the commander of a platoon of light tanks, although his position is called “commander of light tanks of the control department” (Fuehrer der Panzerkampfwagen II des Kp.Trupps). The company commander uses this one and a half platoon as his reserve in battle. The Soviet commander of a tank company has no choice but to throw his command tank into battle as a reserve.

Need I say that at the decisive moment a reserve one and a half platoon can decide the outcome of the battle? I don't think it's necessary.

So it turns out that equating a Soviet tank company with a German one is simply incorrect (and this is done all the time). Even if we take into account medium tanks, the German tank company is one and a half times stronger than the Soviet one. Equal forces are obtained if three Soviet tank companies act against two German tank companies, i.e. tank battalion.

A German tank company has very interesting unit, called "2nd combat support department" (Gefechtstross II). I would call it a platoon of tank crews. This department has 4 non-commissioned officers qualified as tank commanders and 13 soldiers qualified as tank drivers, radio operators and gunners. Almost four tank crews (without loaders). Thus, the company commander has spare tankers with whom he can quickly replace those who are out of action (killed, wounded, sick, or simply exhausted and exhausted). Moreover, this department has two trucks, one of which is for transporting personnel. the second is for property. And if there is no need to replenish combat platoons, field guards can be appointed from these people to give the combat crews an opportunity to rest, they can be sent to deliver food, bring ammunition to the tanks, fuel, clean and check the tanks’ weapons. You never know how many auxiliary matters there are in the company.

For us, all these worries fall entirely on the combat crews, since there are simply no other people in the company. Need I talk about how this affects the combat effectiveness of tankers?
True, it is worth noting that on the other hand, this in our army achieved savings in personnel. Due to this, our command could create more combat units than the German command with, in general, the same human resources. And our industry did not provide as many tanks as it could, but as many as were required. The Germans have it the other way around.
Isn’t this where the origins of the lamentations of German memoirists about the “countless human reserves of the Soviets” lie?

To ensure the life of a German company, it has the “1st combat support department” (Gefechtstross I), headed by a company sergeant major, or as the Germans call this position - Hauptfeldwebel. First of all, this department has a field kitchen truck with two cooks and a driver. Those. Hot food is prepared in the company and promptly delivered to the soldiers, as they say, “hot, hot.” In the same department there is a non-commissioned officer, a radio specialist. He sets up and makes minor repairs to tank radios. Four gunsmiths fix minor problems with weapons and align sights. A medical service non-commissioned officer with a heavy motorcycle with a sidecar and a motorcyclist-medic provide first aid and evacuation of the wounded.

In total, in this department, in addition to two motorcycles and three trucks (of which two are for transporting fuel), there is also a passenger car for the company sergeant-major. He can quickly resolve all issues of providing crews, constantly moving from company to battalion and regimental logistics services.

And finally, a unit that personally spoils my mood to the extreme. This is the repair department (Kfz.Instandsetzungsgruppe). In essence, this is a real tank repair platoon. It has 17 specialist repairmen, equipped with two motorcycles with sidecars, a passenger car-workshop, a truck with equipment, spare parts, and two half-track tractors.

Isn’t this the secret that during the war the Germans always lost fewer tanks than we did, and significantly less?

Quote for comparison. This is from a memo from the Special Department of the NKVD at the headquarters of the 1st Shock Army dated February 14, 1942, which State Security Captain Brezgin sent to the People's Commissar of the NKVD:

"...The main shortcomings in the use of tanks were:

1.Lack of repair facilities for repairing tanks that failed due to technical faults and were damaged in battle. So, for example: until 16/01 42. the army did not have a single repair brigade to restore tanks and there was a complete lack of spare parts.

2. Lack of evacuation facilities for the evacuation of damaged and damaged tanks, resulting in:

a) the tanks stuck in the swamps have not been pulled out to this day due to the lack of tractors... when the tanks are absolutely in good working order and could participate in battles;

b) 33 vehicles hit by enemy artillery fire and 42 vehicles disabled due to technical faults were abandoned by their crews in different places in the area of ​​army operations without being evacuated...".

And the Germans' damaged, damaged and faulty tanks could be quickly evacuated by the company itself, restored by its own forces and sent back into battle. It turns out that in order for a German tank to be considered destroyed, it needs to burn out completely, explode, or receive such damage to the hull that it is impossible to restore it.
But we have enough for a tank to simply get stuck in a swamp, or for its gearbox to fail, or even to simply run out of fuel. That's it, this tank can be considered destroyed. It’s half a disaster if this happened during the offensive and the special forces eventually force the wasted equipment to be collected, and at least repaired by the army or the front. What if we leave? Isn’t this how we lost up to 14 thousand tanks in 1941 (according to German data). And isn’t this where those one and a half hundred Soviet tanks came from, which later bore German crosses and several dozen tanks transferred by the Wehrmacht to its allies (Finns, Romanians)?

It is no coincidence that our military historians want to prove that German tanks sts were not distinguished by outstanding combat abilities, they easily and with documents in hand prove, for example, that “... of the 385 tanks that the Soviet 8th division had at the beginning of the war, in the counterattack area by the end of June 27 (1941) ... "Only 65 tanks arrived. Large losses were associated with technical malfunctions that arose during the march and the impossibility of eliminating them: there were no spare parts or repair facilities."

And if we now compare the Soviet 8th Panzer Division, which met in the summer of 1941 in battle with the German 11th Panzer Division, then Hitler’s Panzersoldaten can easily take credit for 320 destroyed Soviet tanks, although in reality these were the victims of their own tankers. It’s bitter to write these lines, but it’s true - for Soviet tanks the most dangerous enemy was the Soviet tankers, and not Guderian’s panzers.

However, how effectively the Soviet tank crews fought is demonstrated by these lines from this same German state in 1941:

“*Due to the current situation in the company, only 2 platoons have tanks. Excess personnel are sent as instructors to the replenishment battalions. The 3rd platoon is organized in the company upon receipt of tanks.”

I'll decipher it. By November 1941, the German command was officially forced to reduce its tank companies by a third in comparison with the staff. Every third German tank by this time had been completely destroyed, so much so that there was simply nothing to make up for the losses in the near future. And this is despite all the excellent repair possibilities! And despite the fact that all German tanks that failed for all reasons remain on their territory, while the Soviet ones, even with fairly minor malfunctions or damage, very often turned out to be lost forever, as we retreated.

But every medal has two sides. Of the 144 personnel of the tank company, 55 hang around in the rear during the battle. The company commander always has a headache for his rear troops. Those. the company is too tied to its rear. If the tanks have broken through far ahead, then the company's rear services are forced to fight their way forward through hostile terrain, surrounded by a hostile local population and the remnants of defeated Soviet units. And if each company has such a rear, then one can imagine what a wild jumble of cars, motorcycles, carts, not directed or organized by anyone, formed behind the battle formations of the tank companies. The German generals themselves, in their memoirs, more than once complain about the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of moving reserves forward and maneuvering forces along roads clogged with convoys of units fighting ahead.

So the development of company logistics support is both good and bad.

It turns out how many interesting things can be learned by studying the staff of just a company and how much can be understood and appreciated in a new way.

End of the preface.

Let's move on to the state itself.

Medium tank company (or medium tank company, whatever you like to call it) state number 1175 dated November 1, 1941. employs 144 people. Of these, 8 officers, 51 non-commissioned officers and 85 soldiers.
The main armament of 14 medium tanks of the Pz.Kpfw type. IV and 5 light tanks of the Pz.Kpfw type. II.
Vehicles: 4 motorcycles without sidecars, 3 motorcycles with sidecars, 3 cars, 7 trucks and 2 half-track tractors.

Tank Pz.Kpfw. II is armed with a 20 mm. cannon, 7.92 mm machine gun and 7.62 mm. submachine gun. Crew of 3 people (commander (aka gunner), driver, radio operator (aka loader)).

Tank Pz.Kpfw. IV is armed with a 75 mm. short-barreled cannon, two 7.92 mm machine guns and 7.62 mm. submachine gun. Crew of 5 people (commander, driver, gunner, loader, radio operator).

As a personal small arms military personnel of military specialties are armed with pistols, auxiliary units with carbines. In total, the company has 88 pistols and 36 carbines.

The company consists of:
*Management group,
*1st tank platoon,
*2nd tank platoon,
*3rd tank platoon,
*Repair department,
*1st combat support department,
*2nd combat support department,
*Storage compartment.

From the author. It is worth clarifying that military ranks in tank units of the Wehrmacht depended on the basis of which unit a particular tank regiment was formed. If on an infantry base, then the ranks (except for ordinary soldier and senior soldier) were identical to infantry. And if the regiment was formed from a cavalry unit, then the ranks in such a regiment were cavalry. However, the difference is small. Instead of feldwebels there are sergeants, and instead of Hauptmann there are Rittmeisters.

The correspondence between titles and positions is also interesting. The officers are about the same as the Red Army. Those. lieutenant - senior lieutenant is the position of platoon and half-platoon commanders, captain is the position of company commander. But with sergeant positions, the Germans had a wider gap. A serviceman in the position of loader or radio operator could have the ranks of panzersoldate, oberpanzersoldate, or gefreiter. A person holding the position of tank commander, driver, or gunner could receive the ranks of Obergefreiter, Stabsgefreiter, Non-Commissioned Officer, Unterfeldwebel. A serviceman in a position equal to a deputy platoon commander could receive the ranks of Feldwebel, Oberfeldwebel. Well, higher, i.e. approximately the sergeant major of the Oberfeldwebel company - Stabsfeldwebel. However, see the tables for the exact correspondence of titles and positions.

Those. The regiment commander, depending on the zeal of the serviceman and his level of qualifications, could reward him with a higher rank. Naturally, the salary also increased. In the German army, rank meant a lot. One of the Soviet generals once remarked: “What discipline they have! Even in captivity, an ordinary soldier will not smoke without the permission of the corporal.”

Management group (Gruppe Fuehrer)

Consists of the company commander and the company management department (Kompanietrupp).
In total there are 2 officers, 6 non-commissioned officers and 21 soldiers.

Job title	Rank	Weapon	Transport
Company commander (also medium tank commander)	Hauptmann	gun
Company management department (Kompanietrupp)
Company commander's tank driver		gun	Medium tank Pz.Kpfw. IV
Gunner of the company commander's tank	Obergefreiter-Unterfeldwebel	gun
Radio operator of the company commander's tank	Obergefreiter-Unterfeldwebel	gun
Company commander's tank loader	panzersoldat - gefreiter	gun
The commander of the company control department (also the commander of a medium tank)	Obergefreiter-Unterfeldwebel	gun
Driver of the squad leader's tank	Obergefreiter-Unterfeldwebel	gun	Medium tank Pz.Kpfw. IV
Gunner of the squad commander's tank	Obergefreiter-Unterfeldwebel	gun
Radio operator of the squad commander's tank	Obergefreiter-Unterfeldwebel	gun
Squad commander's tank loader	panzersoldat - gefreiter	gun
Light tank commander (aka light tank commander)	leutnant - oberleutnant	gun
Tank driver of the light tank commander	Obergefreiter-Unterfeldwebel	gun	Light tank Pz.Kpfw. II
Radio operator of the light tank commander's tank	Obergefreiter-Unterfeldwebel	gun
4 light tank commanders	Obergefreiter-Unterfeldwebel	gun
4 light tank drivers	panzersoldat - gefreiter	gun	4 light tanks Pz.Kpfw. II
4 light tank radio operators	panzersoldat - gefreiter	gun
	Kraftwagenfarer - Gefreiter	carbine	Medium all-terrain vehicle with equipment box Kfz.15
3 motorcyclist messengers	kraftradfarer - gefreiter	carbines	3 motorcycles without sidecars

The control group includes 2 medium tanks, 5 light tanks, 1 passenger car and 3 motorcycles without sidecars
Armament: 25 pistols, 7 submachine guns (on-board weapons of tanks), 4 carbines, 9 machine guns (on-board weapons of tanks), 2 75 mm cannons. on tanks and 5 20 mm guns. on tanks.

From the author. It should not be surprising that an officer is part of a control squad, while the squad commander is a non-commissioned officer. In fact, this officer is the deputy company commander, and only the crew of his tank is administratively subordinate to the squad commander. An officer leads light tanks into battle, and the commander of the control section in battle is actually only the commander of the second medium tank.
Naturally, a passenger car is the company commander’s official traveling vehicle. With the help of motorcyclists, he maintains contact with tank platoons, and also uses motorcyclists on the march as close-in reconnaissance and as advanced patrolmen.

Oddly enough, most Soviet war films usually correctly show a German tank column approaching along the road - first motorcyclists, then tanks.

Platoon (Zug) The company has three platoons. They are completely identical in composition. As mentioned above, there may not be a third platoon in the company. If a company suffers losses in tanks, then the remaining tanks of this platoon are transferred to the first and second platoons, and the “horseless” crews go to the replenishment battalion.

From the author. In the Wehrmacht there was an unwritten rule - officers were candidates for promotion to a higher position in the order of command of platoons. Those. If the company commander is out of action, then the commander of the first platoon is appointed in his place. The commanders of the second and third platoons move accordingly. An officer newly arrived in the company to make up for the loss always takes the position of commander of the third platoon.
Well, it’s convenient for the authorities - you never need to ask the stupid question “Who is your best platoon leader?” Or decide which platoon to send on a responsible mission.

Each platoon has 20 personnel. Of these, 2 officers, 10 non-commissioned officers and 8 soldiers

Job title	Rank	Weapon	Transport
Platoon commander (aka tank commander)	leutnant - oberleutnant	gun
Tank gunner	Obergefreiter-Unterfeldwebel	gun
Tank driver	Obergefreiter-Unterfeldwebel	gun	Medium tank Pz.Kpfw. IV
Radio operator	panzersoldat - gefreiter	gun
Charging	panzersoldat - gefreiter	gun
Tank commander	Obergefreiter-Unterfeldwebel	gun
Tank gunner	Obergefreiter-Unterfeldwebel	gun
Tank driver	Obergefreiter-Unterfeldwebel	gun	Medium tank Pz.Kpfw. IV
Radio operator	panzersoldat - gefreiter	gun
Charging	panzersoldat - gefreiter	gun
Half-platoon commander (aka tank commander)	leutnant - oberleutnant	gun
Tank gunner	Obergefreiter-Unterfeldwebel	gun
Tank driver	Obergefreiter-Unterfeldwebel	gun	Medium tank Pz.Kpfw. IV
Radio operator	panzersoldat - gefreiter	gun
Charging	panzersoldat - gefreiter	gun
Tank commander	Obergefreiter-Unterfeldwebel	gun
Tank gunner	Obergefreiter-Unterfeldwebel	gun
Tank driver	Obergefreiter-Unterfeldwebel	gun	Medium tank Pz.Kpfw. IV
Radio operator	panzersoldat - gefreiter	gun
Charging	panzersoldat - gefreiter	gun

There are a total of 4 medium tanks in the platoon (in 1941 it was a Pz.Kpfw. IV with a short gun).
Armament: 20 pistols, and on-board weapons of tanks - 4 submachine guns, 8 machine guns, 4 75mm cannons.

There are no other combat units in the company. Below are the combat support, repair and supply units.

Repair department (Kfz.Instandsetzungsgruppe)

There are 17 military personnel, including 3 non-commissioned officers.

Job title	Rank	Weapon	Transport
3 tank repairmen (one of them is also a squad leader)	Obergefreiter-Unterfeldwebel	carbines
Tank repairman	panzerwart - gefreiter	carbine	heavy motorcycle with sidecar
7 tank repairmen (including 1 welder and 1 electrician)	panzerwart - gefreiter	carbines
2 tank radio equipment repairmen	panzerfunquart - gefreiter	carbines	heavy motorcycle with sidecar
Car driver	Kraftwagenfarer - Gefreiter	carbine	Medium all-terrain vehicle workshop
	Kraftwagenfarer - Gefreiter	carbine
2 tractor drivers	Kraftwagenfarer - Gefreiter	carbines	2 light half-track 1-ton tractors Sd.Kfz.10

In total, the repair department has 2 heavy motorcycles with sidecars, 1 medium passenger car-workshop, 1 truck and 2 half-track tractors.

Armament: 17 carbines.

1st Combat Support Section (Gefechtstross I)

This department has 17 military personnel. Of these, 7 are non-commissioned officers. It is headed by the company sergeant major, or as this position was called by the Germans “Hauptfeldwebel”. This is the assistant unit of the sergeant major. The main tasks of the department are preparing food for personnel, repairing small arms, transporting fuel, medical support and maintaining official records.

Job title	Rank	Weapon	Transport
Company Sergeant Major	Oberfeldwebel- Stabsfeldwebel-	submachine gun
Car driver	Kraftwagenfarer Gefreiter	carbine	Light all-terrain vehicle Kfz.1
Clerk	Schreiber-Gefreiter	carbine
Accountant		gun	Heavy motorcycle
Radiomaster	feldwebel - oberfeldwebel	gun
Weapon repairman	feldwebel - oberfeldwebel	gun
3 assistant gunsmiths (1 of them is the second driver of the car)	Waffenmeistergehilfe- gefreiter	pistols
Equipment non-commissioned officer (also commander of the combat support department)	Obergefreiter-Unterfeldwebel	carbine
Non-commissioned officer cook (also the second driver of the kitchen vehicle)	Obergefreiter-Unterfeldwebel	carbine
Cook	Feldkoch - Gefreiter	carbine
Truck driver	Kraftwagenfarer - Gefreiter	carbine	Medium truck for field kitchen
Medical non-commissioned officer	Obergefreiter-Unterfeldwebel	gun
Nurse-porter (aka motorcycle driver)	krankentröger - gefreiter	gun	Heavy motorcycle with sidecar
2 truck drivers	Kraftwagenfarer - Gefreiter	carbines	Medium fuel truck

Total in 1 combat support department: 9 pistols, 8 carbines. Equipment includes 1 motorcycle without a sidecar, 1 motorcycle with a sidecar, 1 passenger car and 3 trucks.

2nd Combat Support Section (Gefechtstross II)

This department is a reserve for replenishing tank crews to replace those who have retired. It has 17 military personnel. Of these, 4 are non-commissioned officers.

Job title	Rank	Weapon	Transport
4 tank commanders and tank drivers (1 of them acts as a squad commander)	Obergefreiter-Unterfeldwebel	pistols
10 gunners, radio operators, loaders and tank drivers	panzersoldat - gefreiter	pistols
3 truck drivers	Kraftwagenfarer - Gefreiter	carbines	1 medium truck for transporting personnel 1 medium truck for transporting property.

Total in the 2nd combat support department: 14 pistols, 3 carbines. Equipment includes 2 trucks.

Weighing compartment (Gepaecktross)

This department has 4 people. Of these, one is a non-commissioned officer and 3 soldiers. The main task of the department is the repair of shoes and uniforms and the transportation of reserve clothing and shoes.

From the author. German memoirists never mention the existence of such departments. Still would. It refutes their claims that Hitler, when starting the war, did not take care of warm soldiers’ underpants and overcoats. And they say that’s why they lost the battle of Moscow. They were supposedly defeated not by General Zhukov and Marshal Shaposhnikov, but by General Bezrogez and Marshal Frost.
A very remarkable unit. It was intended specifically for the transportation and maintenance of winter uniforms for company personnel. The tailor and shoemaker had the main task of accepting summer clothing in the fall and issuing winter uniforms and shoes carried in a truck. During the winter season, repair the summer one, wash and dry it, i.e. prepare for repeated wearing. And warm clothes were prepared in the rear warehouses, if not for all the soldiers of the Eastern Front, then certainly for all combat units.

Trouble crept up on the Wehrmacht from the other side. The German railway workers failed to cope with their tasks. So, in the fall of 1941, just for the current (!!) supply of Army Group Center with fuel, ammunition, and food, 80 trains were required every day, but due to the poor organization of railway transportation, German transport workers could only provide about 23 trains. Where is the need for warm pants if there is an acute shortage of even cartridges, shells, and fuel. This is what the German Gefreiter G. Biederman (commander of the 37-mm. anti-tank gun): "The supply of food and supplies from the rear to the troops became a very conventional concept, so the troops learned to supply themselves with everything they needed at the expense of the conquered territory and captured enemy resources." The partisans had nothing to do with it; they practically didn’t exist then.

Job title	Rank	Weapon	Transport
Commander and accountant	Obergefreiter- unterfeldwebel	carbine
Tailor (aka driver's assistant)	to the gefreiter	carbine
Shoemaker (aka driver's assistant)	to the gefreiter	carbine
Driver	to the gefreiter	carbine	Light cargo 2-tonne vehicle for property and equipment

Total in the combat support department: 4 carbines and 1 2-ton truck.

Summary table of company personnel, vehicles and weapons:

	Control group	1 platoon	2nd platoon	3 platoon	Repair. dept.	1 department fights provide	2 dept. fights provide	Thing. dept.	Total
Officers	2	2	2	2	-	-	-	-	8
Non-commissioned officers	6	10	10	10	3	7	4	1	51
Soldier	21	8	8	8	14	10	13	3	85
Total personnel	29	20	20	20	17	17	17	4	144
Pistols	25	20	20	20	-	9	14	-	108
Submachine guns (in tanks)	7	4	4	4	-	-	-	-	19
Carbines	4	-	-	-	17	8	3	4	36
Machine guns (in tanks)	9	8	8	8	-	-	-	-	33
20 mm. guns (in tanks)	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
75 mm. guns (in tanks)	2	4	4	4	-	-	-	-	14
Motorcycles without sidecars	3	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	4
Motorcycles with sidecars	-	-	-	-	2	1	-	-	3
Passenger cars Kfz.1	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	2
Passenger car workshops Kfz 2/40	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
All-terrain trucks 3 tons.	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
Trucks	-	-	-	-	-	3	2	1	6
Half-track tractors Sd/Kfz. 10	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	2
Light tanks Pz.Kpfw. II	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
Medium tanks Pz.Kpfw. IV	2	4	4	4	-	-	-	-	14

Company structure diagram

The numbers mean: number of officers / number of non-commissioned officers / number of soldiers = total number of hp.

From the author. I understand that this is a slightly different structural diagram of departments that is usually drawn in all textbooks, books, and websites. But I think it's clearer this way. The black rectangle is a tank platoon. Inside is written the name of the platoon, the number and types of tanks, and the number of personnel. The management department is also indicated. It is part of the control group, in which, in addition to this section, there is only the company commander. Green rectangles are support, repair and supply units. It is immediately clear what is part of what and where it goes.

By the way, it turns out that the number of support personnel in the company is 55 people. Those. The Germans approached the issues of the number of their units on the basis that a combat soldier should only fight, and the rear would provide the rest.

On the one hand, this is reasonable, since it allows the most productive use of each combat soldier and each weapon.
On the other hand, with an overall large number of units and subunits, no more than two-thirds or three-quarters of people can be used in the battle itself. This leads to the fact that even a company is actually forced to organize itself into two echelons - combat and rear. The rear zone of even a battalion, not to mention a regiment and a division, turns out to be overloaded with personnel and vehicles.

If in positional defense this situation is quite acceptable, then during the offensive the roads leading to the front turn out to be clogged with convoys, which prevents the advance of combat reserves. The situation becomes completely critical if you have to retreat hastily. The rear units are always less mobile than the combat units, and the latter, in the retreating movement, stumble upon their own convoys and cannot tear themselves away from the enemy. They have to stop and take the fight at a disadvantage until the rear withdraws and clears the roads. Advance withdrawal of convoys further to the rear is also unacceptable, because the delivery arm lengthens and combat units do not receive supplies (ammunition, food, fuel) on time and quickly enough.

This is what German General F. Melentin, chief of staff of the 48th Tank Corps, writes in his memoirs about the hasty retreat in the spring of 1944 in the Zhitomir region:

"The rears of all first echelon formations were concentrated at road junctions...
...and at that time there were so many cars there that huge traffic jams were created that were impossible to eliminate...
traffic jams prevented important movements of tank units, which literally drowned in this whirlpool of people and cars...
...all rear units were concentrated in populated areas, which were communication hubs. "

In general, this is a difficult question: which is better, either the Soviet state system, which provides a minimum of rear services, or the German one with the most developed auxiliary forces. On this score, there has always been a fierce debate in the highest headquarters and continues today. No middle ground can be found. You have to make compromises all the time. And compromises are always a half-hearted solution that does not satisfy anyone.

Sources and literature

1. Kriegsstarkenachweisung 1175 (K.St.N.1175) von 1.11.1941.mittlere Panzerkompanie
2.TM-E 30-451 Hanbook on German Military Forces. War Department. 15 March 1945
3. S. Drobyazko, I. Savchenkov. Second World War 1939-1945. Wehrmacht infantry. AST. Moscow. 1999
4. Website "Red Army" (www.rkka.ru)
5.Site "World War II day by day"(chrit.users1.50megs.com)
6.I.P.Shmelev. Armored vehicles of the Third Reich. Arsenal-Press.Moscow. 1996
7.W.Oswald. Complete catalog of military vehicles and tanks of Germany 1900-1982.AST. Astrel. Moscow. 2003
8.Militaerfaerfahrzeuge of the Wehrmaht. Ryton Publication. Bellingham.
9.E.von Manstein. Lost victories. AST. Phoenix. Moscow. Rostov-on-Don. 1999
10. I. Statyuk. Defense of Western Ukraine.Exprint. Moscow, 2006
11. Magazine "Sergeant". No. 2-1997
12.K.Shishkin. German Armed Forces. 1939-1945. Directory. St. Petersburg. 2003
13.G.Goth. Tank operations. Rusich. Smolensk 1999
14. G. Guderian. Tanks, forward! Rusich. Smolensk 1999
15. G. Biderman. In mortal combat. Memoirs of an anti-tank commander, 1941-1945. Centerpolygraph. Moscow. 2005
16.F.Mellentin. Armored fist of the Wehrmacht. Rusich. Smolensk 1999

In the post-war decades, Soviet cinema created many films dedicated to the events of the Great Patriotic War. Most of them touched on the theme of the tragedy of the summer of 1941 in one way or another. Episodes in which small groups of Red fighters, with one rifle for several people, confront formidable terrible hulks (their role was played by plywood-covered T-54s or other modern vehicles) occurred very often in films. Without questioning the valor of the Red Army soldiers who crushed Hitler’s, it is worth analyzing some statistical data available to the modern reader interested in history. It is enough to compare the staffing of a tank division and the Wehrmacht to make sure that the fascist military power was somewhat exaggerated by silver screen artists. Despite our qualitative superiority, there was also a quantitative advantage, which was especially evident in the second half of the war.

Questions to answer

The Wehrmacht tank divisions strove for Moscow, they were held by the famous Panfilov men or unknown companies, and sometimes even squads. Why did it happen that the country in which industrialization was carried out, which had a cyclopean industrial and defense potential, lost in the first six months of the war a significant part of its territory and millions of citizens captured, maimed and killed? Perhaps the Germans had some monstrous tanks? Or was the organizational structure of their mechanized military formations superior to the Soviet one? This question has worried our fellow citizens for three post-war generations. How did the fascist German tank division differ from ours?

Until June 1939, the Red Army had four After Deputy People's Commissar of Defense E.A. Kulik headed the commission that checked the activities of the General Staff, a reorganization of the system of subordination of this began. The reasons for the change in the corps structure can only be guessed at, but the result was the creation of 42 tank brigades, which had, respectively, , fewer units of equipment. Most likely, the goal of the reforms was the possible implementation of an updated military doctrine, providing for the conduct of deep, penetrating strategic operations of an offensive nature. However, by the end of the year, on the direct orders of I.V. Stalin, this concept was revised. To replace the brigades, not the previous tank corps, but mechanized corps were formed. Another six months later, in June 1940, their number reached nine. Each consisted of 2 tank and 1 motorized division. The tank, in turn, consisted of regiments, a motorized rifle regiment, an artillery regiment and two tank regiments. Thus, the mechanized corps became a formidable force. He possessed an armored fist (more than a thousand formidable vehicles) and enormous power of artillery and infantry support with all the necessary infrastructure to ensure the life of the giant mechanism.

Pre-war plans

The Soviet tank division of the pre-war period was armed with 375 vehicles. Simply multiplying this figure by 9 (the number of mechanized corps), and then by 2 (the number of divisions in the corps) gives the result - 6750 armored vehicles. But that is not all. Also in 1940, two separate divisions, also tank ones, were formed. Then events began to develop with uncontrollable speed. Exactly four months before the attack by Nazi Germany, the General Staff of the Red Army decided to create another two dozen mechanized corps. The Soviet command did not have time to fully implement this plan, but the process began. This is evidenced by the number 17 of the corps, which received number 4 in 1943. The Kantemirovskaya tank division became the successor to the military glory of this large military unit immediately after the Victory.

The reality of Stalin's plans

29 mechanized corps with two divisions each plus two more separate ones. There are 61 in total. Each staffing table 375 units, a total of 28 thousand 375 tanks. This is the plan. But in fact? Maybe these numbers are just for paper, and Stalin was just dreaming while looking at them and smoking his famous pipe?

As of February 1941, the Red Army, consisting of nine mechanized corps, had almost 14,690 tanks. In 1941, the Soviet defense industry produced 6,590 vehicles. The totality of these figures is, of course, less than the 28,375 units required for 29 corps (which is 61 tank divisions), but the general trend suggests that the plan was, by and large, carried out. The war began, and objectively, not all tractor factories could maintain full productivity. It took time to carry out a hasty evacuation, and the Leningrad “Kirovets” ended up in a blockade. And still he continued to work. Another tractor-tank giant, KhTZ, remained in Nazi-occupied Kharkov.

Germany before the war

At the time of the invasion of the USSR, the Panzerwaffen troops had 5,639 tanks. There were no heavy ones among them; T-I, included in this number (there were 877 of them), can be attributed, rather, to wedges. Since Germany was at war on other fronts, and Hitler needed to ensure the presence of his troops in Western Europe, he sent not all of his armored vehicles against the Soviet Union, but most of it, in the amount of approximately 3,330 vehicles. In addition to the mentioned T-Is, the Nazis had (772 units) with extremely low combat characteristics. Before the war, all equipment was transferred to the four tank groups being created. This organizational scheme justified itself during the aggression in Europe, but in the USSR it turned out to be ineffective. Instead of groups, the Germans soon organized armies, each of which had 2-3 corps. The Wehrmacht tank divisions were armed with approximately 160 armored vehicles in 1941. It should be noted that before the attack on the USSR, their number was doubled, without increasing the total fleet, which led to a decrease in the composition of each of them.

1942 Panzergrenadier regiments of tank divisions

If in June-September 1941 German units quickly advanced deep into Soviet territory, then by the fall the offensive slowed down. The initial success, expressed in the encirclement of protruding sections of the border, which became a front from June 22, the destruction and capture of huge reserves of material resources of the Red Army, the capture of a large number of soldiers and professional commanders, eventually began to exhaust its potential. By 1942, the standard number of vehicles had been increased to two hundred, but due to heavy losses, not every division could support it. The Wehrmacht tank armada was losing more than it could gain as replacements. The regiments began to be renamed panzergrenadier regiments (there were usually two of them), which largely reflected their composition. The infantry component began to prevail.

1943, structural changes

So, the German division (tank) in 1943 consisted of two panzergrenadier regiments. It was assumed that each battalion should have five companies (4 rifle and 1 engineer), but in practice they made do with four. By the summer the situation had worsened, the entire tank regiment included in the division (one) often consisted of one battalion of Pz Kpfw IV tanks, although by this time the Pz Kpfw V Panthers had appeared in service, which could already be classified as medium tanks. New technology Hastily arrived at the front from Germany, untested, and often broke down. This happened in the midst of preparations for Operation Citadel, that is, the famous Battle of Kursk. In 1944, the Germans had 4 tank armies on the Eastern Front. A tank division as the main tactical unit had different quantitative technical content, from 149 to 200 vehicles. In the same year, tank armies actually ceased to be such, and they began to be reorganized into conventional ones.

SS divisions and separate battalions

The transformations and reorganizations that took place in the Panzerwaffen were forced. The material part suffered from combat losses, broke down, and the industry of the Third Reich, experiencing a constant shortage of resources, did not have time to make up for the loss. Special battalions were formed from heavy vehicles of new types (self-propelled gun fighters "Jagdpanther", "Jagdtiger" "Ferdinand" and tanks "Royal Tiger"); as a rule, they were not included in tank divisions. The SS tank divisions, which were considered elite, underwent virtually no transformations. There were seven of them:

• "Adolf Hitler" (No. 1).
• "Das Reich" (No. 2).
• "Death's Head" (No. 3).
• "Viking" (No. 5).
• "Hohenstaufen" (No. 9).
• "Frundsberg" (No. 10).
• "Hitler Youth" (No. 12).

The German General Staff used individual battalions and tank divisions of the SS as special reserves, sent to the most dangerous sectors of the fronts both in the East and in the West.

Twentieth-century warfare was characterized by rivalry between resource bases. Despite the impressive successes of the Wehrmacht in 1941-1942, German military specialists already three months after the attack on the USSR for the most part understood that victory was becoming impossible, and hopes for it were in vain. Blitzkrieg did not work in the USSR. The industry, which survived a large-scale evacuation, began to operate at full capacity, providing the front with a huge amount of military equipment. excellent quality. There was no need to reduce the staffing levels of the Soviet Army formations.

Guards tank divisions (and there were practically no others; this honorary title was awarded to all combat units leaving for the front in advance) were equipped with a regular number of units of equipment since 1943. Many of them were formed on the basis of reserves. An example is the 32nd Red Banner Poltava Tank Division, created on the basis of the 1st Airborne Corps at the end of 1942 and initially received No. 9. In addition to the regular tank regiments, it included 4 more (three rifle, one artillery), and also an anti-tank division, a sapper battalion, communications, reconnaissance and chemical defense companies.