Electronic warfare. Russian industry is creating a strategic electronic warfare system

Strategic planning of military operations is carried out by army headquarters based on several fundamental premises. These include command awareness of the operational situation and uninterrupted exchange of information. If either of these two criteria is not met, even the most powerful army in the world, armed with a huge amount of modern equipment and manned by selected soldiers, turns into a helpless crowd, burdened with piles of scrap metal. The receipt and transmission of information is currently carried out by means of reconnaissance, detection and communication. Every strategist dreams of disabling the enemy's radar and destroying his communications. This can be accomplished by means and methods of electronic warfare (EW).

Early electronic countermeasures techniques

As soon as electronics appeared, they began to be used by defense departments. The advantages of wireless communication invented by Popov were instantly appreciated by the imperial Russian Navy. During the First World War, broadcast reception and transmission of information became commonplace. At the same time, the first methods of electronic warfare appeared, still timid and not very effective. To create interference, airplanes and airships dropped cut aluminum foil from a height, which created obstacles to the passage of radio waves. Of course, this method had many disadvantages; it did not last long and did not completely cover. In 1914-1918, another important method of electronic warfare became widespread, and is still widespread in our time. The tasks of signalmen and intelligence officers included intercepting enemy broadcast communications. They learned to encrypt information very quickly, but even assessing the intensity of radio traffic allowed staff analysts to judge a lot.

The role of information in World War II

After the outbreak of World War II, electronic warfare entered a new phase of development. The power of submarines and aviation of Nazi Germany required effective confrontation. In Britain and the USA, countries faced with the problem of the security of Atlantic communications, serious work began on the creation of long-range detection of surface and air targets, in particular, bombers and FAA missiles. There was also an acute question about the possibility of deciphering messages from German submariners. Despite the impressive work of mathematical analysts and the presence of some advances, electronic warfare only became effective after the (accidental) capture of Engima's secret machine. The real value of research in the field of disinformation and interruption of the information structure of Germany during the Second World War was never found, but experience accumulated.

The army as a living organism

During the Cold War, electronic warfare systems began to take shape close to the modern concept of them. The armed forces, if we compare them to a living organism, have sense organs, a brain and power organs that directly carry out fire on the enemy. The “ears” and “eyes” of the army are means of observation, detection and recognition of objects that can pose a security threat at the tactical or strategic level. The function of the brain is performed by the headquarters. From it, through thin “nerves” of communication channels, military units receive orders that are mandatory for execution. Various measures are being taken to protect this entire complex system, but it remains vulnerable. Firstly, the enemy always seeks to disrupt control by destroying headquarters. Its second goal is to hit information support facilities (radar and early warning posts). Thirdly, if communication channels are disrupted, the control system loses functionality. A modern electronic warfare system goes beyond these three tasks and is often much more complex.

Asymmetry of defense

It is no secret that the military is many times greater than the Russian in monetary terms. To successfully counter a possible threat, our country has to take asymmetrical measures, ensuring the proper level of security using less costly means. The effectiveness of protective equipment is determined by high-tech solutions that create the technical conditions for causing the greatest damage to the aggressor by concentrating efforts on his vulnerable areas.

In the Russian Federation, one of the leading organizations involved in the development of electronic warfare equipment is KRET (Concern “Radio-Electronic Technologies”). The basis for creating means of suppressing the activity of a potential enemy is a certain philosophical concept. For successful operation, the system must determine priority areas of work at various stages of the development of a military conflict.

What is non-energy interference

On modern stage creating universal interference that completely eliminates information exchange is practically impossible. A much more effective countermeasure could be to intercept the signal, decipher it, and transmit it to the enemy in a distorted form. Such a system creates an effect that experts call “non-energy interference.” Its action can lead to complete disorganization of the control of hostile armed forces, and, as a consequence, to their complete defeat. This method, according to some data, has already been used during Middle Eastern conflicts, but in the late sixties and early seventies, the elemental base of electronic warfare equipment did not allow achieving high efficiency. Intervention in the enemy’s control process was carried out “manually.” Today, Russian electronic warfare units have digital technologies at their disposal.

Tactical equipment

In addition to strategic issues, troops at the forefront are forced to solve tactical problems. Aircraft must fly over enemy positions protected by air defense systems. Is it possible to provide them with unhindered passage over the defensive lines? The episode that took place during naval exercises in the Black Sea (April 2014) practically proves that modern Russian electronic warfare systems provide a high probability of invulnerability aircraft, even if their characteristics today are no longer among the most progressive.

The Ministry of Defense modestly refrains from commenting, but the reaction of the American side speaks volumes. A routine flyby of the Donald Cook ship by an unarmed Su-24 bomber during maneuvers led to the failure of all guidance equipment. This is how the Khibiny small-sized electronic warfare complex operates.

Complex "Khibiny"

This system, named after a mountain range, is a cylindrical container suspended from a standard military aircraft pylon. The idea of ​​creating a means of information countermeasures arose in the second half of the seventies. The defense theme was given to KNIRTI (Kaluga Scientific Research Radio Engineering Institute). The electronic warfare complex conceptually consisted of two blocks, one of which (“Proran”) was responsible for reconnaissance functions, and the other (“Regatta”) exposed active jamming. The work was successfully completed in 1980.

The modules were intended for installation on the Su-27 front-line fighter. The Russian Khibiny electronic warfare complex was the result of combining the functions of both units and ensuring their coordinated operation together with the aircraft’s on-board equipment.

Purpose of the complex

The L-175V (“Khibiny”) device is designed to perform several functions, collectively defined as electronic suppression of enemy air defense systems.

The first task that he had to solve in combat conditions was to find the direction of the sounding signal from the radiation source. The received signal is then distorted to make it difficult to detect the carrier aircraft. In addition, the device creates conditions for false targets to appear on the radar screen, complicates the determination of range and coordinates, and worsens other recognition indicators.

The problems encountered by enemy air defense systems are becoming so large-scale that there is no need to talk about the effectiveness of their work.

Modernization of the Khibiny complex

In the time since the L-175V product was put into service, the design of the device has undergone numerous changes, with the goal of increasing technical parameters and reducing weight and size. Improvement continues today, the subtleties are kept secret, but it is known that the latest electronic warfare system can provide group protection of aircraft from the effects of anti-aircraft missile systems of a potential enemy, both existing today and future ones. The modular design allows for the possibility of increasing power and information capabilities depending on the requirements of the tactical situation. When developing the device, not only the current state of the potential enemy’s air defense systems was taken into account, but also the anticipation of the possibilities of their development in the near future (for the period until 2025).

Mysterious "Krasukha"

The electronic warfare forces of the Russian Federation recently received four Krasukha-4 mobile electronic warfare systems. They are secret, despite the fact that ground-based stationary systems for a similar purpose, “Krasukha-2,” have already been in operation in military units since 2009.

It is known that the mobile complexes were created by the Rostov Research Institute "Gradient", produced by the Nizhny Novgorod NPO "Kvant" and mounted on a BAZ-6910-022 chassis (four-axle, all-terrain). According to its operating principle, the newest Russian electronic warfare complex “Krasukha” is an active-passive system that combines the capabilities of re-emission of electromagnetic fields created by early warning antennas (including AWACS) and the creation of active directional jamming. The lack of technical details did not prevent information from leaking to the media about the amazing capabilities of the electronic warfare system, the operation of which “drives crazy” the control systems and missile guidance units of a potential enemy.

What hides behind the veil of mystery

For obvious reasons, information about the technical characteristics of the latest Russian electronic countermeasures systems is kept secret. Other countries are also in no hurry to share secrets in the field of similar developments, which are certainly underway. However, it is still possible to judge the degree of combat readiness of a particular defense equipment based on indirect signs. Unlike nuclear strategic missiles, the effectiveness of which can only be guessed at and speculatively analyzed, electronic warfare equipment can be tested in conditions that are closest to combat conditions, and even in relation to very real, albeit probable opponents, as happened in April 2014. So far, there is reason to assume that Russian electronic warfare troops will not let you down if something happens.

Analysis of armed conflicts of the late 20th – early 21st centuries. shows that electronic warfare(electronic warfare, or in Western terminology, electronic warfare) is becoming one of the key elements of modern wars. Organizationally, electronic warfare is one of the components of information operations.

The essence of electronic warfare is to temporarily or permanently reduce the effectiveness of the use of enemy reconnaissance assets, weapons, and military equipment through electronic or fire suppression (destruction) of its electronic equipment, control systems, reconnaissance, and communications. Thus, electronic warfare can include both temporary disruption of the operation of enemy radio-electronic systems by jamming, and the complete destruction of these systems (fire damage or capture). Electronic warfare also includes measures for electronic defense (RED) of its information systems and electronic reconnaissance.

The saturation of the modern battlefield with information systems determines the extremely important role of electronic warfare in modern and future wars. The experience of recent military exercises has shown that even if one of the warring parties has an overwhelming superiority in high-precision weapons, it cannot be guaranteed to count on victory if its control structures are suppressed by electronic warfare.

The main targets during electronic warfare operations are:

• elements of troops and weapons control systems;
• reconnaissance means;
• systems for storing, processing and distributing information;
• radio-electronic means;
• automated systems, databases and computer networks;
• personnel involved in decision-making and management processes.

The increasing role of electronic warfare in modern wars is determined by two factors.

Firstly, the increase in the scale and depth of operations, the saturation of troops with modern means of automation, control and reconnaissance led to a sharp increase in the share of supporting forces in operations. According to Western experts, in modern combat operations about 2/3 of all forces perform reconnaissance, command and control, electronic warfare, support, etc. tasks.

Secondly, the increase in the capabilities of electronic warfare forces and means to influence enemy combat control systems. Modern electronic warfare systems are very versatile: they can be used to the depth of both a separate combat operation and the entire theater of war, at any time of the day, use lethal and non-lethal weapons, operate as part of various multi-purpose integrated systems (combat control, communications, computer intelligence support , fire destruction, combating enemy combat control systems), provide comprehensive protection of their control systems and even use enemy computer networks to their advantage.

Nowadays, further improvement of technical means and methods of electronic warfare is taking place very quickly. First of all, this applies to the armed forces of the United States and Great Britain. The armed forces of these countries and the NATO Allied Forces have well developed the methodology of simultaneous or phased strikes against the enemy using fire weapons, electronic warfare, strategic and tactical camouflage, disinformation and psychological warfare.

DEVELOPMENT OF EW IN THE ARMED FORCES OF NATO COUNTRIES

In the mid-80s. last century, the US Armed Forces and NATO allied forces developed the concept of “combat counteraction to communication and control systems” (Command, Control, Communications Countermeasure, CCCCM). In the early 90s. on its basis, a concept for combating combat control systems was developed. At the same time, the creation of an integrated system of combat control, reconnaissance, communications, computer support and electronic warfare began. With the development of electronic warfare forces and means, a new type of information warfare operations emerged - “network warfare” or “cyber warfare”, that is, the disorganization of the enemy’s combat control systems through the impact on his computer, local and global computer networks.

The development of electronic warfare in the US Armed Forces and NATO Allied Forces can be divided into three stages.

First stage- until 1980, when electronic warfare played a small role in combat operations. Electronic warfare operations were of a supporting nature and consisted of interfering with enemy reconnaissance and communications equipment, as well as simulating the operation of various electronic means in order to mislead the enemy regarding the real combat situation.

Second phase– 1980-1993 Creation of a concept for the integrated use of electronic warfare forces and means to influence enemy combat control and communications systems. It implied the coordinated use of electronic suppression, reconnaissance, disinformation and firepower to combat enemy electronic systems. However, the imperfection of automation tools, small throughput communication channels and the lack of an integrated command and control system did not allow the full potential of electronic warfare to be used in combat operations.

However, already during the time of electronic warfare it played one of the key roles. Here, electronic warfare was used within the framework of a single concept developed by American troops during the Green Flag exercises.

In particular, a day before the start of the air offensive operation of the anti-Iraqi coalition, the allied ground-based electronic warfare systems began jamming Iraqi communication channels. The operation itself began with an attack by American helicopters on two Iraqi air defense early warning stations. This opened a hole in the Iraqi air defense, into which planes immediately rushed to attack targets in Iraq. In the first days of the air operation, American F-4G aircraft with high-precision HARM anti-radar missiles, as well as EF-111 electronic warfare aircraft, which “blinded” Iraqi radars with interference, were actively used to suppress Iraqi air defense. At the same time, American reconnaissance aircraft RC-135, TR-1 and E-8 took tight control of Iraqi airspace. Having lost their “eyes” in the form of radars, Iraqi ground means Air defense and fighter aircraft were completely blinded and disorganized, and within a few days they ceased to represent a real fighting force.

During the ground offensive, electronic warfare equipment of US ground forces ensured the suppression of Iraqi radio networks to the depth of the division.

Third stage The development of electronic warfare began in 1993 and continues to this day. An operational-strategic theory of “information warfare” was created. Electronic warfare equipment has significantly improved: their automation has been completed; integrated communications, reconnaissance, control and electronic warfare complexes were created; the creation of promising types of non-lethal electronic warfare weapons that use electromagnetic (for example, the American U-bomb, tested in 1999 during the war against Yugoslavia; the explosion of this bomb produces a powerful electromagnetic pulse that affects electronic control, reconnaissance and communications devices in a large radius), and others types of energy; providing users at the tactical level with access to global databases, issuing target designations for weapons and electronic warfare equipment in near real time.

Thus, if at the first stage electronic warfare was one of the types of support for strike forces, at the second - integral part combat operations of each type of armed forces, then on the third - a component of information warfare and one of the components of military potential.

DEVELOPMENT OF EW IN THE RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES

Electronic warfare has a long history in Russia. For the first time, the suppression of enemy radio networks by interference to disrupt the coordination of artillery fire was successfully used by Russian signalmen back in 1904. Also during World War I, Russian radio communications were used to interfere with German radio networks.

During the Great Patriotic War Electronic warfare was already carried out on an ongoing basis. On December 16, 1942, the State Defense Committee of the USSR issued a decree “On the organization in the Red Army of a special service to jam German radio stations operating on the battlefield.” In pursuance of this resolution, Chief of the General Staff, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR A.M. The next day, Vasilevsky issued a directive “On the formation of a special group and special radio interference divisions.” A special term is introduced - “RPD” (electronic suppression).

After the war, there was a rapid improvement in radio communications, radar and on-board radars of aircraft and ships, and the creation of missiles with radar homing heads. At the same time, the need arose to both reduce the effectiveness of the use of enemy weapons and electronic systems, and to protect one’s own radio networks and electronic systems from suppression. For this 1950s. Special electronic warfare equipment is being developed and supplied to the troops: radio interference transmitters, dipole and corner reflectors. For the purpose of qualified use of electronic warfare equipment in the Soviet army, during the same period, it was created special service electronic warfare.

Subsequently, to equip electronic warfare units, protect aircraft, helicopters, ships, tanks and other military equipment, automated electronic warfare systems began to be created, including reconnaissance equipment, jamming in various wave ranges, and equipment for analysis, information processing and control.

In 1962, the term “BRESP” (fighting with electronic means of suppression) was introduced, and the electronic warfare service began to be designated by the same term. Among the tasks of the BRESP service were nuclear and fire destruction, electronic suppression and capture of enemy electronic objects ( command posts, communication centers, radars, etc.). At the same time, there was a certain discrepancy between the tasks and capabilities of the BRESP units: they only had the means of jamming, but not the means of engaging fire and capturing enemy targets. These tasks were the responsibility of the operational departments of the headquarters.

Since the early 1960s. new powerful means of fire destruction of radio-electronic objects have appeared - missiles aimed at radio emission. In 1963, the US Armed Forces entered service. aircraft rocket class development "air" - "radar" "Shrike". In the USSR, similar types of weapons are being created: in 1965, the KSR-11 missile entered service with the Soviet Long-Range Aviation, in 1968 - the Kh-22P, and in 1972, front-line aviation received the Kh-28P missile. The adoption of these missiles was very important for the reason that Soviet aircraft jamming stations were significantly inferior to American ones in power, frequency range and speed, and fire damage to enemy radars could compensate for this deficiency.

In 1969, the term “electronic warfare” was introduced, which is used in the Russian Armed Forces to this day. Accordingly, the BRESP bodies were transformed into an electronic warfare service, which, in addition to electronic warfare functions, was also assigned the task of ensuring electromagnetic compatibility of radio-electronic systems in order to ensure sustainable control of troops and weapons. True, in 1976, instead of electronic warfare, the term EPD (“electronic suppression”) was introduced, but it did not catch on, and in 1977 it was again replaced by electronic warfare.

In order to conduct research and train qualified personnel in the field of electronic warfare, an extensive network of research centers and educational institutions was created in the USSR. In 1960, the leading institute for electronic warfare was created - 21 NIITs (now 5 Central Research Institutes). Specialized departments and laboratories were created in research institutes, training grounds and in centers for the combat use of weapons and military equipment of branches of the Armed Forces. In the interests of electronic warfare, specialists from such institutions as the 30th Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense, the State Research Institute of the Air Force, the 4th TsBP and PLS of front-line aviation, the 43th TsBP of Long-Range Aviation, the Air Force Engineering Academy named after. N.E. Zhukovsky.

In 1980, the Voronezh Higher Military Engineering School of Radio Electronics (later the Voronezh Military Institute of Radio Electronics - VIRE) was created, training qualified technical specialists in the field of electronic warfare. A number of military universities were also created that trained specialists in the field of electronic warfare in Kyiv, Kharkov, Minsk, Riga, etc., but after the collapse of the USSR their potential was lost for Russia. In fact, VIRE remained the only specialized Russian military university that produces electronic warfare specialists for the army. However, in 2006, for unknown reasons, this educational institution was annexed as an electronic warfare department to the Voronezh Military Aviation University.

Training of junior electronic warfare specialists for all types and branches of the military, reserve officers, as well as foreign cadets is carried out at the Tambov Interspecific Training Center (TMTC), established in 1962.

Soviet electronic warfare specialists gained practical experience during the wars in Korea, the Middle East and Afghanistan.

During the first Chechen campaign, the fighting in Dagestan and the subsequent counter-terrorism operation on the territory of the Chechen Republic, Russian electronic warfare units took an active part in the hostilities.

INVFs on the territory of Chechnya created an extensive control and communication system, including cellular, trunk, radio relay, short-wave and ultra-short wave, cable and satellite communications. The tasks of the Russian electronic warfare units were to open and suppress the communication systems of illegal armed groups, as well as to collect information through radio reconnaissance about the number and location of militant detachments, the plans of the Chechen command, etc.

The actions of the electronic warfare forces produced good results. Often, during radio conversations, militants themselves indicated the location of their bases, concentrations of manpower, etc. These data were immediately implemented Russian troops in the form of artillery and air strikes at the indicated places. That's just one episode.

03/20/1995. From radio intercepts of negotiations between Chechen commanders:

"- Where are you?

We are coming to you.

Tell the guys to drive through the Mesker-Yurt intersection and come to us.”

Artillery strikes were carried out on a concentration of militants and equipment in the area of ​​the indicated intersection, as a result of which 2 armored personnel carriers and two vehicles with militants were destroyed.

During the assault on Grozny in the period from December 10 to 20, 1999, electronic warfare units, only through radio reconnaissance, completely revealed the defense system and the number of enemy forces defending the southeast of the city. With such actions, electronic warfare specialists greatly facilitated the conduct of operations by strike units and helped save many lives of Russian soldiers. Being under constant pressure from electronic warfare, the detachments of Chechen militants gradually lost control and coordination of actions, which played an important role in the outcome of hostilities on the territory of the Chechen Republic.

During the "five-day war" with Georgia Russian forces Electronic warfare also operated quite successfully. According to the Latvian military expert, reserve brigadier general Karlis Krustinles: “Georgia has problems both with air defense and with the interconnection of units. There were situations when combat units communicated with each other with the help of messengers, because any communication ceased to function. The Russian army prepared in advance to suppress not only radio-electronic communications and radars, but also ordinary telephone communications.”

There was also counteraction to electronic reconnaissance conducted from NATO ships in the Black Sea.

In the “five-day war” it became obvious that the issue of advantage in an air war is largely a matter of electronic warfare. As it turned out, in the first days of the war, electronic warfare in the Russian group was not very well established. The radio and electronic intelligence forces of the Russian Air Force were transferred to the subordination of the GRU General Staff. However, the latter provided practically no assistance to the air forces, as a result of which they did not have reliable information about the location. The aircraft participating in hostilities did not fully meet the requirements for electronic protection against air defense systems. All this led to aviation losses from anti-aircraft fire, including the most painful - the Tu-22M3 long-range bomber.

After the shock of the first losses, representatives of the Air Force High Command intervened and developed recommendations for the crews of airplanes and helicopters participating in combat missions. A significant place in them was devoted to electronic defense measures. In particular, do not use aircraft in combat that do not have individual electronic warfare equipment, exit from an attack with Su-25 aircraft during a massive shooting of thermal traps, use attack aircraft only under the cover of group means of protection by electronic warfare aircraft and helicopters. After this, aviation losses stopped. However, according to experts, Russian Air Force have serious gaps in the field of electronic warfare, both in terms of personnel training and technical equipment, and in a collision with a truly strong air defense, losses would be many times higher.

In 2009, electronic warfare units and subunits were transformed into a separate type of troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, including electronic warfare formations, units and subunits within the operational-strategic commands.

According to the former commander of the electronic warfare forces O. Ivanov, today the effect of electronic warfare equipment is becoming comparable to the use of modern precision weapons, in some respects it even surpasses it. At the same time, Russian electronic warfare systems are not inferior to their foreign counterparts. In addition to modernizing existing ones, new multifunctional complexes are being created, some of which can be considered technological breakthroughs. According to O. Ivanov, great opportunities are now opening up for electronic warfare. True, he himself, strangely enough, in July 2011 voluntarily resigned from the post of commander of the electronic warfare forces at the age of 45, when, it would seem, great prospects were opening up for successful career and professional growth. According to some experts, among the reasons for the resignation is disagreement with the provisions of the military reform being carried out in Russia, in particular, with the introduction of the new electronic automated command and control system for troops ESU TZ, which the military criticizes for numerous shortcomings inherent in the technical specifications.

GOALS, OBJECTIVES AND MEANS OF EW

The goals for electronic warfare in modern warfare are not only to disorganize the enemy’s combat control systems, but also to deprive him of the ability to use information about the combat situation, ensure that the enemy is ahead of the enemy in making combat decisions, and reduce their losses during combat operations.

In accordance with the views of the American command, the main element of electronic warfare is an electronic attack using ground- and air-based electronic warfare systems, as well as portable ones and those thrown behind enemy lines.

Electronic attack means are conventionally divided into two types: non-destructive and destructive.

Non-destructive means of electronic jamming, electronic disinformation, infrared countermeasures (false thermal targets and stationary generators of pulsating infrared interference, designed to combat air-to-air and ground-to-air missiles equipped with infrared homing heads). The tasks of these means are: suppression or disabling of radio-electronic or optical-electronic systems, reconnaissance, communications, and navigation equipment; imitation of the operation of radio-electronic systems in order to mislead the enemy; overload of enemy communications systems; impact on its personnel servicing radio-electronic systems or participating in command and control processes.

Destructive weapons are directed energy weapons (electromagnetic weapons), precision weapons and ammunition with radio-electronic radiation homing heads.

Directed energy weapons are worth looking at in a little more detail. These systems are also called magnetrons, and in Western terminology – active electronically scanned array (AESA). This weapon affects the electronic systems of enemy equipment with microwave waves, disabling them. With its help, you can completely turn off the on-board electronics of an aircraft, stop the engine of a car or ship, etc. When exposed to a large area, this weapon can act as non-destructive.

Directed energy weapons entered service with the US Armed Forces relatively recently. The latest American aircraft are equipped with it: the F-35 (however, its electromagnetic weapons are of a defensive nature and are intended to disable enemy missiles) and the Boeing EA-18G Growler carrier-based electronic warfare aircraft. The latter can carry five suspended containers with electronic warfare weapons, including AESA equipment. The EA-18G was successfully used to suppress Libyan air defenses in 2011. There are plans to install directed energy emitters on ships and ground combat vehicles. Prototypes of non-lethal directed energy weapons have also been created, designed to impact a person (dispersing a crowd, etc.).

Speaking about directed energy weapons, we should also mention the US testing of laser weapons to combat ballistic missiles, but at the end of 2011 this program was closed.

The tasks of destructive electronic attack means are: suppression, defeat, destruction of enemy reconnaissance, navigation, control systems, electronic systems of military equipment and weapons; defeat of enemy personnel involved in servicing these systems.

An important element of electronic warfare is electronic protection of friendly troops. It includes three areas:

• direct protection of radio-electronic systems (protection from enemy interference, atmospheric interference, radio-guided weapons, directed energy means, electronic disinformation);
• ensuring electromagnetic compatibility at control points and in combat formations of troops (protection of radio-electronic systems of friendly troops from mutual interference, including from electronic attack means used against enemy electronic systems);
• electronic defense during information operations (protection of information circulating in combat control systems, information protection of reconnaissance assets, electronic attack and electronic defense).

In the interests of electronic defense, comprehensive technical control is carried out. Its task is to control the enemy’s ability to collect intelligence information from radio-electronic systems.

Comprehensive technical control includes:

• radio control - control over information circulating in their radio networks;
• radio engineering control - monitoring the enemy’s ability to collect information about the technical parameters of their electronic distribution systems;
• radar control - control to ensure that the power, nature, direction and types of emissions of one's own electronic zones do not exceed strictly established standards in order to make it difficult for the enemy to collect information about them (electronic camouflage);
• electro-optical control - control over the possibility of the enemy obtaining information using television cameras, receiving thermal radiation;
• acoustic and hydroacoustic control - monitoring the possibility of the enemy receiving information by receiving sound signals propagating in the air and water.

Programming and reprogramming of electronic warfare equipment during a combat operation, although not a component of electronic warfare, directly affects its effectiveness. Their tasks are: ensuring timely targeting of electronic warfare equipment to priority targets; restructuring of electronic warfare equipment in connection with the requirements of the situation; achieving the highest efficiency of their use in terms of power, direction, type of electronic attack (defense) when the object of attack (defense) changes the parameters of electromagnetic radiation and performs a maneuver; reservation and timely replacement of electronic warfare equipment when they fail.

EW DEVELOPMENT TRENDS

Based on the experience of military operations at the beginning of the 21st century. we can highlight the main trends in the field of electronic warfare for the near future:

• the use of electronic warfare forces in conjunction with combat command and control systems in information operations;
• transition from solving individual tasks to integrated management of electronic warfare in the interests of the entire group of troops;
• adoption of new universal electronic warfare systems with a significantly expanded frequency range and functionality;
• an increase in the number of targets simultaneously controlled, engaged, and suppressed by one electronic warfare system;
• expansion of the list of objects affected by electronic warfare in connection with the creation of directed energy weapons;
• creation of electronic warfare systems with an open architecture, the functionality of which can be changed by adding additional modules.

Russia has placed an “umbrella of a very cunning system” over Syria

Russian electronic warfare systems have proven to be highly effective and can be considered as an asymmetric weapon for a new generation of wars.

The withdrawal of Russian main forces from Syria did not relieve USA and their allies NATO for headaches, writes Military Review. The work of Russian electronic warfare systems is actively discussed in the Western community. The reason for such close attention, apparently, is that Russian technology is capable of covering large areas in which modern high-tech weapons and military equipment become ineffective.

This is very disliked by those who previously widely and successfully used their electronic warfare systems in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, Libya, and the Balkans. But the advantage in this area that pleased our “friends” is a thing of the past, writes the Russian portal.

The Americans themselves were the first to announce this. In particular, Lieutenant General Ben Hodges (commander of US forces in Europe), Ronald Pontius (deputy chief of cyber command), Colonel Jeffrey Church (chief of the electronic warfare department of the ground forces), Philip Breedlove (at that time the commander in chief of NATO forces in Europe).

With reference to the latter, edition Daily OSNet reported that in the zone of operation of the Russian military group, American troops and their NATO allies became blind and deaf on the ground, in the air and in space - in a “bubble” with a diameter of about 600 kilometers. Previously, according to Breedlove, Moscow “inflated” such “bubbles” over the Black and Baltic Seas. He also spoke about the mind-blowing capabilities of Russian electronic warfare systems, which are capable of creating vast areas A2/AD (anti-access/area denial).

They should be understood as zones of guaranteed prohibition for enemy access and any opposition to the use of their own weapons. Everything is like in Edita Piekha’s famous song: “I don’t see anything, I don’t hear anything, I don’t know anything, I won’t tell anyone anything.”

What actually happened? At one time, we were not hysterical about the use of Western electronic warfare systems in Yugoslavia or Iraq. Apparently, there are good reasons for such a nervous reaction from our sworn friends. Only a real effect could cause a breakdown for those who do not even allow the thought of Russia’s possible superiority in some military matters.

Situation control levers

With the escalation of the electronic warfare ongoing today, it would be stupid not to use our capabilities to protect the Russian group and inflict maximum damage on terrorist groups. After the destruction of our plane by a Turkish fighter, Deputy General Director for Foreign Economic Affairs of OJSC Radio Engineering Concern Vega, Lieutenant General Evgeny Buzhinsky stated: “Russia will be forced to use means of suppression and electronic warfare”.

What exactly do we have in Syria?

The first can presumably be called ground-based mobile complex "Krasukha-4", which serves to set up broadband active jamming to suppress radio-emitting reconnaissance and data transmission facilities of space, air and ground-based systems at ranges of 150-300 kilometers. The complex is effective for countering radio-electronic means (RES) of reconnaissance satellites such as Lacrosse And Onyx, AWACS and Sentinel aircraft, as well as drones.

With a high degree of probability, we can talk about the use of the Khibiny aircraft multifunctional electronic warfare complex, which became widely known after it completely crushed the reconnaissance and control systems, as well as the Aegis missile defense system of the American destroyer Donald Cook in the Black Sea. “Khibiny” can be a group means of protecting aircraft from all existing anti-aircraft and aviation weapons. In this capacity, the complex proved its best in 2008 during the operation to force Georgia to peace.

In September, two Il-20 electronic reconnaissance and electronic warfare aircraft arrived at the Khmeimim air base. With a complex of various sensors, antennas and other optical-electronic means, these machines are capable of solving assigned tasks during a 12-hour flight in any weather and climatic conditions, day and night. It was also reported about the transfer of complexes to Syria "Borisoglebsk-2", which today are considered one of the most complex in the world in their class.

To create an electronic umbrella on the border with Turkey, other new electronic warfare equipment could be used. To suppress radars and disrupt the operation of guidance, control and communication systems - complexes such as “Lever”, “Moscow”, “Mercury”, “Porubshchik”. The latter is based on the Il-22, which is equipped with side antennas and a cable with a transmitting device that unwinds several hundred meters in flight. Along with these electronic warfare systems, disposable targeted jamming transmitters could also be used to protect our planes and helicopters.

It cannot be excluded that they will be used to combat radio-controlled land mines, improvised explosive devices and precision weapons, as well as to disrupt cellular communications and in the VHF range of electronic warfare systems. "Infauna" and small-sized noise generators such as "Little Forest". The media reported a likely demonstration of the capabilities of active jamming stations "Lever-AV" And "Vitebsk". The first can be installed on any military equipment and suppress enemy control systems and air defense systems.

According to the Chief of the Electronic Warfare Troops of the Russian Armed Forces, Major General Yuri Lastochkina, the developed means make it possible to provide the possibility of radio reconnaissance and radio suppression of collective communication systems, covert, selective blocking of enemy cellular communication subscriber terminals. Experts believe that electronic warfare systems approximately double the capabilities of ground troops and increase the survivability of aviation by 25-30 times.

You can't drown out this song...

Taking into account the potential and purpose of our electronic warfare systems, one of the main tasks in Syria was to cover the Russian military group and the Khmeimim airbase from possible air and ground attacks, as well as protect personnel and equipment from being hit by radio-controlled landmines and improvised explosive devices.

The effectiveness of the solution in this case is closely related to measures to protect one’s electronic zones from technical reconnaissance and electronic jamming. The need for this is due to known facts transmission of intelligence information to the armed opposition and terrorist groups by intelligence services Turkey, USA, Saudi Arabia and other countries.

Other, no less important tasks of electronic warfare equipment are constant monitoring of the radio-electronic situation in the areas where their group is based and the Khmeimim airbase and strict compliance with the rules of electromagnetic compatibility to ensure the normal functioning of their own radio-electronic equipment.

To ensure high-precision fire destruction of command posts and other important objects, the problem of determining their location was solved by establishing the coordinates of the radio-emitting equipment located on them. It is also known about the suppression of ground- and space-based radio communications, drone control channels and data transmission from them.

Finally, an important condition for the reconciliation of warring parties was the information confrontation on the air using electronic warfare equipment.

Thus, Syria turned out to be a testing ground where important experience was gained in real combat conditions, including in confrontation with the electronic zones of developed Western countries. It allowed us to identify the strengths and weaknesses of our technology and become the basis for further enhancing the capabilities and methods of its application. Much, for obvious reasons, remains outside the scope of publicly available information. But what is already known allows us to draw some conclusions.

First and, probably, the main thing: electronic warfare systems are one of the main asymmetric means of waging wars of the new generation. In the West they persistently call them hybrids and try to shift their authorship to Russia. Today we are accused of allegedly being the first to conduct such a war, which resulted in the annexation of Crimea. But much earlier there had been a “non-contact” aggression by the Western coalition led by USA, as a result of which a single Yugoslavia. And it was hybrid wars, planned and unleashed by the same forces, that turned out to be the cause of the current pitiful fate Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, situations in Syria and the catastrophic refugee situation in Europe. It is obvious.

The main capabilities of electronic warfare systems should be hidden as much as possible from potential opponents, and the tactics of their use should be based on surprise. This will not allow taking proactive measures, but in combination with the principles of massiveness and concentration on the main direction (priority objects), it will ensure the achievement of the set goals.

Extremely important and the fact that the basis for the creation of our electronic warfare systems should be domestic components. Otherwise, as experience shows, this may become our sore spot, which opponents will not fail to hit with sanctions. A striking example of this is the condition and combat readiness of the main types of Syrian equipment, which today is 50% or lower.

With the further improvement of domestic electronic warfare systems, it is imperative to increase their selectivity and targeted impact on enemy electronic warfare systems. This will minimize bad influence for the operation of their radio-electronic systems.

Currently, one of the main directions should be considered the active development and creation of electronic warfare equipment with millimeter and terahertz operating frequency ranges. Today they are being actively developed by manufacturers of new generation electronic systems and high-precision weapons. What will it give? So, if in the lower bands there can be 10 working channels, then at a frequency of 40 GHz there are already hundreds of them. Consequently, to “close” them, more complex automated electronic warfare systems will be required.

Another important conclusion: The West is concerned about our successes in this area and is stimulated to improve its electronic warfare equipment and methods of their use. There is no doubt that our “friends” will find the finances for this, especially in the conditions of ongoing anti-Russian hysteria. Therefore, the very valuable combat experience gained should be maximally used by the military and manufacturers of electronic warfare equipment for its further development and maintaining its leading position.

Russia made the right conclusions following the war with Georgia in 2008. Current successes confirm this. Today, according to Yuri Lastochkina, our electronic warfare equipment is superior to foreign analogues in terms of range, range of targets, and other parameters. At the same time, the share of modern weapons and military equipment in electronic warfare forces is 46%. About 300 basic and more than a thousand small-sized electronic warfare systems were supplied under the state defense order.

Some in the West, not without some gloating, savored the information about the Turkish the latest system electronic warfare "Coral" (Koral), which, they say, will negate the capabilities of our S-400 air defense system. Without a shadow of embarrassment, they took on faith the statement of the General Staff of the Turkish Army that it would disable all Russian radar systems in Syria. Indeed, Coral, with a range of about 150 kilometers, is designed to suppress modern land-based, sea-based and air-based radars.

But, firstly, anyone who is at least a little familiar with the specifics of our anti-aircraft missile systems can say that they are created taking into account possible electronic countermeasures. Secondly, confirmed evidence of Coral’s capabilities has not yet appeared. Thirdly, the S-400 air defense system has already implemented highly effective anti-jamming measures that will prevent our assets from being jammed.

The report of the US Army Office of Foreign Forces Research noted that today Russia has great electronic warfare potential, and the political and military leadership understands the importance of such means of warfare. “Their growing ability to blind and disable digital communications systems could help them (the Russians. – A.S

It became a means of armed struggle. The United States today practically does not conduct military operations without the active use of electronic warfare (EW), as events in Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and Syria clearly demonstrated. This is of particular relevance in connection with the situation in Ukraine, which our counter-partners sleep on and see in NATO, as well as with the deployment of a third missile defense position area in Poland and Romania.

What will Russia oppose? This and other questions are answered by the acting head of the electronic warfare troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Yuri Lastochkin.

Dependency effect

– What do the latest trends in the development of electronic warfare indicate, what are our priorities?

– The emphasis of armed struggle is increasingly shifting to the information sphere. With regard to modern technically developed states, one can quite reasonably say: their power is largely a consequence of the use of high technologies, primarily information ones. This process is based on the large-scale (total) introduction of radio-electronic equipment and computer equipment into all spheres of military operations, as well as the construction on their basis of network control (network-centric) structures within a single information space.

Recent armed conflicts have shown that the degree of realization of the combat potential of a group of forces increases significantly not only and not so much due to the use of high-precision weapons, but primarily due to gaining superiority in the control of subordinate forces and means. It is achieved and maintained at rational use modern means of reconnaissance and control.

Thus, by receiving more accurate and complete information on the battlefield in a timely manner, making adequate decisions and promptly communicating them to subordinates, the side in the conflict with superior control becomes capable of defeating an enemy that is many times superior to it.

The technical basis of all modern weapons and military equipment systems, primarily such as intelligent, high-precision and robotic reconnaissance, electronic warfare, control and communications systems, is radio-electronic equipment (RES). In the interests of achieving the goals of operations, they are usually combined into systems of varying levels of complexity and purpose.

However, in conditions of high saturation of all spheres of armed struggle with them, a paradoxical situation has arisen. On the one hand, the ability to achieve the goals of operations (combat operations) sharply increases, on the other hand, a violation of the normal functioning of the electronic zone can negate all the advantages, and even cause a complete loss of combat effectiveness. Thus, the so-called effect of the dependence of the armed forces of technically developed states on the quality of the functioning of electronic power systems as part of weapons and military equipment systems becomes quite obvious.

In such conditions, it is electronic warfare, as a relatively low-cost and fairly easily implemented method of disrupting the work of individual enemy electronic zones and protecting one’s own, that comes to the fore. Under certain conditions, it is the use of electronic warfare methods that can be considered as asymmetrical measures that neutralize the advantages of high-tech systems and means of armed warfare.

However, all of the above requires systematic approach to electronic warfare. Under this we need to consider a purposeful system with appropriate properties, that is, the presence of system-forming, system-preserving factors, synergy, emergence, multiplicativity, etc. It should be remembered: only a system with a no less level of complexity can successfully resist a system. In addition, the practice of using electronic warfare means shows their higher effectiveness in combination with means of influence (protection, reconnaissance) for other functional purposes.

A significant expansion of the frequency range, a reduction in radiation powers and communication distances, an increase in data transmission speeds, special operating modes, the formation of network structures, and the widespread use of air, space and unmanned systems and means suggest a number of promising directions development of the electronic warfare system in general and individual means in particular. These areas include:

— expanding the functionality of individual electronic warfare equipment and increasing their versatility;

— use of open architecture with the ability to change their functionality by adding additional modules;

— inclusion of electronic warfare equipment as an element in almost all systems of armed warfare;

— transfer of efforts to destroy radio-electronic systems into enemy territory, widespread use of unmanned and airborne electronic warfare systems;

- the emergence of technology for functional destruction of enemy electronic systems - weapons of powerful directed electromagnetic radiation;

— use of special means to disrupt the operation of computerized control systems built on a network principle;

— selection of control and reconnaissance systems as priority targets for the impact of aerial, unmanned, robotic and satellite RES;

— development of new ways to disrupt (change) the conditions of radio wave propagation;

— creation of technologies to reduce the visibility of weapons and military equipment in the interests of countering enemy reconnaissance;

— creation of a complex radio-electronic environment for enemy technical reconnaissance and simulation equipment in areas of operations (combat operations).

It is obvious that these areas can, in the medium term and especially long term, undergo a transformation arising from the logic of the development of armed struggle, science and technology, and as a result should be the object of close attention of the scientific community.

– How is the development of electronic warfare troops going after the stagnation and large-scale reduction of the Armed Forces in 2012?

– In recent years, the intensity of combat training has increased significantly. Since the beginning of 2014, the electronic warfare forces alone have conducted more than 15 exercises of various sizes. In addition, to create a complex and dynamic environment of active radio-electronic influence from the enemy, military units and electronic warfare units are involved in all operational and combat training activities. The quality of training of officers and personnel in general has increased.

The main educational institution of the electronic warfare forces of the RF Armed Forces and federal bodies executive power is a military training and scientific center Air Force"Air Force Academy" (Voronezh). It provides training in all major electronic warfare specialties. And junior specialists are trained by the Interspecific Center for Training and Combat Use of Electronic Warfare Troops (Tambov).

The center celebrated the 110th anniversary of electronic warfare with serious results. During the academic year, over a four-month program, it trained over 1,500 junior specialists in electronic warfare, radio and electronic intelligence in more than 15 specialties. Being an experimental site for testing new types of electronic warfare and radio reconnaissance equipment, the center takes an active part in military-technical cooperation with defense industry enterprises, including OJSC Tambov Plant Revtrud, FSUE TNIIR Efir, CJSC Signal.

As for the development of electronic warfare systems of the Russian Armed Forces as a whole, it is currently being carried out in accordance with the State Armament Program for 2011–2020 (GPV-2020), approved by the President of the Russian Federation on December 31, 2010. The implementation of GPV-2020 activities is carried out within the framework of annual state defense orders (SDO). Fulfilling the parameters of the GPV-2020 will make it possible to increase the level of provision of electronic warfare forces with advanced equipment by 2020 to 70%.

Lessons for Russia

– What experience of using electronic warfare in past military conflicts is of professional interest to you and why?

– First of all, Iraq and Yugoslavia, although, it would seem, those events are long behind us. But, firstly, not everything was told. Secondly, such techniques and methods of using electronic warfare are still used today, for example, during the operation against Libya. Thirdly, it is useful to once again analyze those events from the height of our time.

Judge for yourself. In the war with Iraq (1991), in the interests of the electronic warfare of the MNF, a space group of reconnaissance assets (up to 40 satellites) and ground-based (1550) radio and electronic reconnaissance and direction finding posts were created.

The electronic warfare aviation group consisted of 108 aircraft to suppress radars, radio communication lines and destroy air defense systems with anti-radar missiles. All US, British, French and British air force strike aircraft and ships are equipped with individual stations to protect against detection by electronic means and destruction by guided weapons. A significant part of aviation is equipped with suspended containers with electronic warfare equipment for collective protection.

In the conflict area, the group of ground forces deployed 60 ground stations and 37 electronic warfare helicopters, which made it possible to solve the tasks of reconnaissance and electronic suppression of HF, VHF and radio relay communications at the tactical and operational-tactical control level at a range of up to 120–150 km.

The main task of US electronic warfare was to suppress and disorganize the Iraqi air defense command and control system throughout the country. Without a successful solution to this problem, the massive use of aviation would entail significant losses of military equipment and personnel. As a result of the use of RTR, REP and control aircraft together with anti-radar missiles (in the almost complete absence of electronic countermeasures from the Iraqi troops), up to 80 percent of all combat-ready Iraqi radars were disabled in the first 10 days of hostilities.

In fact, for the first time in the practice of electronic warfare, a form of “electronic strike” was implemented, as a result of which it was possible to create favorable conditions for the sudden use of aviation and ground groupings of troops (forces), high-precision weapons, and achieve overall superiority in control.

During the second campaign in Iraq (2003), an electronic warfare operation was simultaneously carried out, which, in addition to powerful jamming barrage and targeted suppression of radio-electronic equipment for state and military purposes, included many high-precision fire strikes on radio-emitting objects with special high-precision missiles with dusty graphite and metallized warheads that hit transformer substations and relay automation of power plants. The share of their use increased by 30% compared to the previous conflict.

For the first time during the operation, an experiment was carried out to suppress the enemy’s information potential - television and radio stations, repeaters, editorial offices of electronic and printed media mass media, which were used to cover the progress of military operations and propaganda. As a result, Iraq's information and propaganda potential has been completely suppressed.

The NAVSTAR navigation system was widely used to guide high-precision weapons. The share of such weapons in the war was 95 percent (in 1991 - 7%). The experience of the described armed conflicts confirmed the well-known views of the US and NATO command on electronic warfare as an integral part of military operations of any scale, on the methods of its organization and conduct, once again showing in practice that electronic warfare has grown from a means of operational (combat) support into a means of armed warfare.

– What new did the Americans use in Yugoslavia?

– The actions of the United States and NATO in the spring-summer of 1999 in Yugoslavia became the prototype of the sixth generation war. It was a non-contact local war, based on aerospace-sea operations and information warfare.

During military operations within the framework of information warfare, NATO forces carried out an electronic warfare operation, which, in addition to electronic suppression, included many high-precision fire strikes on radio-emitting objects. For the first time, an experiment was carried out to suppress the information potential of Yugoslavia.

New sea-launched cruise missiles AGM-109 were tested, carried by US Navy ships and submarines. Interestingly, they were guided to targets using the GPS space navigation system, and the flight was carried out in complete radio silence without emitting electromagnetic energy to measure their flight altitude. Only at the final section, directly in the target area, was the DSMAS optical system activated for precise targeting to a specific critical point of the object.

The main targets of the defeat were key military and economic facilities, infrastructure and communications of Serbia and Kosovo. In the vast majority of cases they were successfully defeated. According to official Pentagon data, 1.2–1.5 thousand high-precision weapons were used to strike 900 economic targets. cruise missiles, most of which were experimental. So to speak, democracy in action.

– Space reconnaissance assets were used with the same intensity?

“They not only played an extremely important role in the operation, but were system-forming military-technical tools for conducting combat operations. The United States has created a powerful constellation of 50 satellites for various purposes. There were 8–12 spacecraft simultaneously located above the theater of war, which, together with air and sea carriers, formed the basis of reconnaissance and strike combat systems.

From space, continuous surveillance of the theater of operations was carried out by optical reconnaissance satellites KN-1 (USA), Helios-1A (France), and radar reconnaissance Lacrosse (USA), as well as control, navigation, communications and weather support. US GPS spacecraft navigated the latest high-precision air- and sea-based cruise missiles.

Special spacecraft "Spot" (France) transmitted a television image of the earth's surface and documented experimental strikes on the economic and infrastructure facilities of Serbia and Kosovo in order to determine the real effectiveness of high-precision cruise missiles.

As a result, Yugoslav air defense was completely suppressed by electronic warfare. High-precision anti-radar missiles from NATO troops destroyed almost every source of radio emission. As a rule, after the first start anti-aircraft missile even the most advanced Yugoslav air defense anti-aircraft missile system, which used the principle of active radar in its operation, was doomed to defeat regardless of whether it remained on or off after that.

Each radar that briefly emitted electromagnetic energy was certainly destroyed either by an anti-radar missile or by a missile targeting the thermal radiation of the radar vehicle engine or its power units when the radar itself was turned off. This led to the fact that during the first two to three days of the war, 70% of the S-125 and S-75 mobile air defense systems were disabled.

During the operation, NATO forces, simultaneously with fire damage to air defense systems and infrastructure facilities, carried out an electronic warfare operation, which, in addition to powerful jamming barrage and targeted suppression of Yugoslav state and military electronic means, included many high-precision fire strikes on other radio-emitting objects. Anti-radar missiles aimed at any detected sources of electromagnetic energy radiation destroyed radars, air defense systems, radio communication stations, conventional and cellular communication centers, television stations, radio broadcasting stations, and computer centers.

During the electronic warfare operation, the enemy's information potential was suppressed - television and radio stations, repeaters, electronic and print media, which were used to cover the progress of military operations and propaganda. When choosing targets, the United States and other NATO countries did not always adhere to the norms of international humanitarian law governing the rules of warfare, as evidenced by the defeat of the purely civilian television and radio center.

The main means of electronic warfare were the ES-1 ZON and EA-6B aircraft, which operated outside the air defense zone of Yugoslavia, as well as tactical fighters for delivering high-precision missiles homing at the radiation source to the launch lines.

Electronic information impact on the automated control networks of the Yugoslav Armed Forces was a new element of information warfare for the United States, used for the first time in a real armed conflict. Previously, they were limited to more crude methods of influence, such as disabling automated systems by overloading them with extraneous information.

"Alurgit", "Infauna" and others

– What experience in the use of electronic warfare forces and means did the troops gain from the fight against gangs in the North Caucasus in 2000?

– Before the active phase of combat operations during financial assistance of a number of foreign states, militants have created an operational and flexible communication and control system, technical basis which consisted of a large number of various, including portable radio, radio relay and satellite communications, as well as mobile cellular and trunk communication systems.

The task of identifying and suppressing them, especially in mountainous and forested areas, is significantly difficult. This is primarily due to the peculiarities of the propagation of electromagnetic waves, short communication distances, and limitations in the choice of positions for electronic warfare equipment.

Based on the experience of the previous campaign to restore constitutional order in 1994–1996 and making extensive use of theoretical and experimental developments in the field of creating the latest electronic warfare equipment and systems, new and modernized samples of special equipment were quickly developed and practically tested during combat operations. In conditions of intensive use of electronic warfare equipment and complexes, failed equipment was quickly restored by mobile repair teams. This has largely made it possible to successfully solve electronic warfare problems in the North Caucasus region.

The objectives of electronic warfare were to reduce the ability of illegal armed groups to control forces and assets and to ensure the stable operation of radio-electronic equipment of the Joint Group of Forces. These goals were achieved by coordinated actions of forces and means of electronic warfare, reconnaissance, other branches of the military and special troops OGV.

The presence of maneuverable electronic warfare groups in each combined arms formation made it possible to accurately determine the location of radio stations of field commanders of bandit formations and, in some cases, after additional reconnaissance, to eliminate them with artillery fire and air strikes.

Thus, with the integrated use of reconnaissance, fire destruction and electronic suppression means, it was possible to disable the most important radio-electronic objects in the control system of the illegal armed formations, suppress their main radio communication channels with radio interference and, in general, disrupt the control of gangs in the main directions of the troops’ operations. As a result, the leaders almost completely lost control and were forced to use small-sized portable communications equipment, the operation of which was quickly and effectively suppressed.

In the course of carrying out combat missions in the North Caucasus, a wealth of experience has been accumulated, which is taken into account in the educational process, when implementing programs for the development of electronic warfare equipment, and improving the forms and methods of conducting electronic warfare.

– What new types of weapons and military equipment are being supplied to the troops today in accordance with the State Defense Order? What is their advantage?

– In recent years, positive preconditions have been created for radical renewal electronic warfare weapon systems. The scientific and technical groundwork formed within the framework of the State Program of Promotion 2015 and State Program of Promotion 2020 made it possible to successfully complete state tests of 18 new models of electronic warfare equipment in the period 2010–2013. These are “Borisoglebsk-2”, “Alurgit”, “Krasukha-2O”, “Krasukha-S4”, “Moscow-1”, “Parodist”, “Lorandit-M”, “Leer-2”, “Leer-3” , “Lesochek”, “Loess”, “Magnesium-REB”, “Field-21”, etc.

For the first time, the newly developed tools will allow:

— provide the possibility of radio reconnaissance and radio suppression of integrated communication systems and data transmission for collective use, increase the probability of selecting suppression targets by 1.5–1.8 times, and reduce reaction time by 10 times;

- implement the possibility of hidden, selective blocking of enemy cellular communication terminals by location and (or) system address, increase the size of the effective impact zone through the use of non-traditional (non-energy) methods of intelligent blocking of cellular communication subscriber terminals up to four times, and much more.

In addition, such Electronic warfare equipment will satisfy the following basic requirements:

— comprehensive and effective impact on a wide range of radio-electronic and computer systems and means;

— implementation of comprehensive technical control of measures to camouflage objects in all physical fields and electronic zones, ensuring the protection of information from leakage through technical channels and damage by means of software (hardware and software) influence;

— conflict stability in conditions of the opposing side’s use of electronic warfare and radiation-homing weapons;

— high performance characteristics (reliability, maintainability, ergonomics, etc.) and great modernization potential.

Thanks to a several-fold increase in the supply of arms and military equipment, more than 10 electronic warfare units have already been completely re-equipped with modern and promising equipment.

– And the last question. Which defense industry enterprises do you work most closely with?

– I would especially note the growing role of integrated structures in the development and production of electronic warfare equipment. Currently, two such structures have been formed and are effectively functioning: JSC Concern Sozvezdie (Voronezh) - in the direction of developing electronic warfare equipment with command and control systems and JSC Concern Radioelectronic Technologies (Moscow) - in the direction of developing electronic warfare equipment with weapon control systems . Close cooperation with defense industry enterprises allows us to look confidently into the future.

Electronic warfare

Electronic warfare (EW)- a set of activities and actions of troops (forces) coordinated by goals, objectives, place and time to identify radio-electronic equipment (RES) and control systems for enemy troops (forces) and weapons, their destruction by all types of weapons or capture (disablement) and radio-electronic suppression (REP), as well as electronic defense (RED) of their radio-electronic facilities and systems for command and control of troops and weapons, as well as radio-electronic information support and countering the enemy’s technical reconnaissance means; type of combat support.

The purpose of electronic warfare is to disrupt the control of forces (troops), reduce the effectiveness of reconnaissance, the use of weapons and military equipment by the enemy, as well as ensure the stability of the systems and means of controlling one’s own forces (troops) and weapons.

Electronic warfare is divided into actions to temporarily disrupt the operation of enemy electronic equipment (jamming) and actions associated with long-term (or permanent) disabling of this equipment (forceful destruction).

Electronic warfare components

Electronic jamming

Maintenance of aircraft radio jamming station AN/ALQ-184

Electronic suppression is a set of measures and actions to disrupt (disturb) the operation or reduce the effectiveness of the enemy’s combat use of electronic systems and means by influencing their receiving devices with electronic interference. Includes radio, electronic, optical-electronic and hydroacoustic suppression. Electronic suppression is ensured by the creation of active and passive jamming, the use of decoys, decoys, and other methods.

Electronic defense

Electronic defense is a set of measures and actions of troops (forces) for the electronic destruction of enemy radio-electronic objects, radio-electronic protection of their own radio-electronic objects, as well as radio-electronic information support.

Electronic intelligence

Electronic intelligence - collection of intelligence information based on the reception and analysis of electromagnetic radiation. Electronic intelligence uses both intercepted signals from communication channels between people and technical means, and signals from operating radars, communication stations, radio jamming stations and other radio-electronic means.

Comprehensive technical control

Electromagnetic damage

An electromagnetic effect (pulse) that disables enemy electronic, communications and power equipment. The damaging effect is achieved by inducing induction currents. First noted during nuclear explosions in the atmosphere.

Currently, magnetrons are used to create the damaging pulse. Electromagnetic destruction systems are in service in the United States and other NATO countries.

Story

Electronic warfare was first used by the Russian Navy during the Russo-Japanese War. On April 15, 1904, during the artillery shelling that the Japanese squadron conducted along the internal roadstead of Port Arthur, the radio station of the Russian battleship Pobeda and the Zolotaya Gora coastal post, by creating deliberate interference, seriously hampered the transmission of telegrams from enemy spotter ships.

Nevertheless, radio equipment at that time was mainly used to provide communications, identify enemy communication channels and intercept information transmitted through them. Preference was given to intercepting radio transmissions rather than jamming them. However, during the First World War, radio interference began to be used sporadically to disrupt radio communications between the headquarters of armies, corps and divisions and between warships. At the same time, special radio jamming stations already appeared in the German army.

During the period between the world wars, radio communications actively developed, and means of radio direction finding, radio control and radar appeared. As a result, the concept of command and control and interaction between the ground forces, air force and navy is radically changing. All this led to the further development of methods and techniques for countering enemy electronic weapons.

During World War II, participating countries actively used electronic and hydroacoustic suppression. Special units and radio jamming units were formed and widely used to support combat operations. Extensive experience has been accumulated in conducting reconnaissance and creating radio interference, as well as electronic defense.

In the post-war period, the development of electronic warfare equipment continued. New ship- and aircraft-based radio jamming devices are appearing.

In modern wars and military conflicts, the role of electronic warfare continues to increase. The development and adoption of high-precision and high-tech weapons by many states leads to the emergence of new objects of radio-electronic influence. The use of anti-radar missiles significantly reduces the survivability of modern radio-electronic systems (radars, air defense systems) built on the basis of active radar systems. The widespread use of satellite reconnaissance, communications and navigation systems necessitates their neutralization, including through electronic jamming. Portable electronic reconnaissance and jamming equipment is being developed to combat new means of communication and navigation, search for and neutralize radio land mines and other remote detonation devices. Electronic warfare equipment has gained the ability to have system-software influence on automated control systems and other computer systems.

XXI Century

Electronic warfare in Russia

Development of electronic warfare equipment

• Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
• Research Center for Operational and Strategic Justifications of the 24th Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
• Research Center for Radio-Electronic Weapons 14th Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
• Research Communications Center 34 Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
• Federal State Research Center for Electronic Warfare and Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Reducing Significance of the Russian Defense Ministry

Training of electronic warfare specialists

• Voronezh higher military school radio electronics

Military Space Academy named after. A.F. Mozhaisky

Training of Navy electronic warfare specialists

• Higher special officer classes
• Naval Institute of Radio Electronics named after. A.S. Popova
• Tambov Interspecific Training Center for Electronic Warfare Specialists

Training of civilian electronic warfare specialists

• Baltic State Technical University "Voenmekh"
• Ryazan State Radio Engineering University
• Voronezh State Technical University (until 2009)
• Vladivostok State University of Economics and Service
• St. Petersburg State University of Telecommunications named after prof. M. A. Bonch-Bruevich

see also

Notes

Literature

• Dobykin V. D., Kupriyanov A. I., Ponomarev V. G., Shustov L. N. Electronic warfare. Forceful destruction of radio-electronic systems. - M.: University Book, 2007. - 468 p. - ISBN 978-5-9502-0244-5
• Paliy A.I. Essays on the history of electronic warfare. - M.: University Book, 2006. - 284 p. - ISBN 5-95020-108-6
• Modern electronic warfare. Methodological issues. - M.: Radio engineering, 2006. - 424 p. - 700 copies. - ISBN 5-88070-082-8
• Electronic warfare. Radio masking and interference protection. - M.: MAI, 1999. - T. 1. - 240 p. - 1000 copies. - ISBN 5-7035-2253-6
• Tsvetnov V.V., Demin V.P., Kupriyanov A.I. Electronic warfare. Radio reconnaissance and radio countermeasures. - M.: MAI, 1998. - T. 2. - 248 p. - 1000 copies. - ISBN 5-7035-2186-6
• Ch. ed. Chernavin V.N. Naval Dictionary. - M.: Military Publishing House, 1990. - P. 357. - ISBN 5-203-00174-x