Russian participation in operations to establish and maintain peace in the former Yugoslavia. Russian Airborne Forces

Is it possible to revive a country without the values ​​of brotherhood and friendship of peoples?
The Bulletin of the Bashkir State Pedagogical University published an article devoted to the activities of an active participant in the international movement "Teachers for Peace and Mutual Understanding" Alfiya Fatkullina

SERVING THE IDEALS OF PATRIOTISM AND INTERNATIONALISM

At the end of last year, the Bashkir State Pedagogical University celebrated its 40th anniversary and literally on the same days honored the university veteran Fatkullina Alfiya Fazylzhanovna, who turned 80 years old.

80 years is the age at which the path traveled is seen in the most significant events, deeds, and people. Everything insignificant is erased by the memory. And it is very important when meeting such people to penetrate into the experience they have accumulated, to try on today, preserve it and pass it on to the future. And Alfiya Fazylzhanovna’s experience in patriotic and international education is truly invaluable. For almost half a century she studied and generalized the experience of schools in Bashkiria and all Soviet Union, being the chairman of the republican section of patriotic and international education at the Bashkir branch of the Pedagogical Society of the RSFSR, a member of the scientific council on the problems of patriotic and international education of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of the USSR, a member of the scientific and methodological section of patriotic and international education of youth under the Central Committee of the Komsomol.

She has participated in more than 50 conferences and seminars. It seems that such a vital need to serve people and the practice of patriotism and internationalism is largely due to the spirit of the times, which shaped the mind and heart of a girl, a girl and a specialist - a teacher, a scientist. When she was 14 years old, the Great Patriotic War began. She knows well what “everything for the front, everything for victory” means. Her prom was overwhelmed with the joy and happiness of Victory.

In 1945 she became a student at the Chelyabinsk Pedagogical Institute. I was in Chelyabinsk in 1968 and I know how proud the people of the Urals are of their contribution to the victory, especially of their tanks and Magnitogorsk. I can imagine what a patriotic spirit reigned here in the 40s and 50s!

The pathos of victory and the pathos of restoration of the country gave rise to wonderful poems and songs, feature films and performances. The very air of the country was filled with patriotism, feelings of brotherhood and friendship of peoples, and the school and the teacher did not care special labor participate in the cultivation of these holy feelings. Moreover, the school had a pioneer and Komsomol organization, whose ideology was based on the formation of collectivism, patriotism and internationalism.

Scientists and teachers, party and Komsomol workers thought through and implemented a system of patriotic and international education. The merit of Alfiya Fazylzhanovna is the development of the concept, methodology, methodology and system of patriotic and international education in a multinational school, taking into account the age characteristics of children. The educational and methodological manuals and books she published were highly appreciated in the country, and her speeches at pedagogical seminars and work at the faculty of advanced training for school leaders in the republic contributed to practical application its recommendations in the schools of the republic.

Our heroine’s special pride was the international friendship clubs (KIDs) and museums of military and labor glory. In Ufa alone, 89 clubs and 43 museums were created. The experience of the international friendship club of school No. 86, led by German language teacher Lind E.I., was summarized and recommended to educational institutions. The KID worked wonderfully under Serafimovskaya high school(headed by Zhemaletdinov G.K.), who maintained close contact with the KIDs of the Baltic states, especially Lithuania and Latvia.

It is no coincidence that it was in Ufa, on the basis of the Pedagogical Institute, that in the spring of 1977 the All-Russian scientific and practical conference “Issues of Patriotic and International Education in the Light of the Decisions of the 25th Congress of the CPSU” was held. More than 200 people took part in it: philosophers, sociologists, historians, teachers, subject teachers, heads of kindergartens, clubs and museums.

The changes that took place in the 90s, including the slogan “de-ideologization,” resulted in serious costs in the public and individual consciousness. The collapse of the USSR and the economic crisis hit primarily such feelings as pride in the country, friendship and brotherhood of peoples.

The cult of national isolation and individualism has become one of the reasons for the growth of aggression and intolerance in all social relations, from national to family and interpersonal. The ideas of patriotism and internationalism were, at best, consigned to oblivion, and at worst, anathema.

All this became a mental pain for Alfiya Fazylzhanovna, because she understands that patriotism, friendship and brotherhood of peoples are the psychological foundation of both the present and future of Russia. Without these values, it is impossible to revive and raise the country not so much economically as spiritually. In recent years, both the authorities and part of the intelligentsia have begun to understand this. Words are increasingly being heard about the need to educate a patriot and citizen. New holidays - Russia Day, Republic Day, Concord Day, Flag Day are gradually gaining ideological and emotional saturation. But for the holidays to have the effect of civic education, a huge amount of work is required by the intelligentsia, especially creative and pedagogical ones. The school and the entire teaching community can, through the state, become a social customer for the creation of poems and songs, rituals and attributes, scripts and compositions, television programs and films, textbooks and manuals that help with early childhood to have a great feeling of love for the Motherland. Unfortunately, the authorities have not yet organized this work. Even government concerts dedicated to civil holidays often cause awkwardness with half-naked girls and pop content. And we involuntarily remember May 19 - Pioneer Day, October 29 - Komsomol Day. What wonderful songs, poems, traditions, scripts, films there were. The best poets, writers, composers, directors, and athletes considered it an honor to carry out orders from the Komsomol Central Committee. It is a pity that modern youth organizations have not yet revealed their purpose - the organization and education of children and youth.

The best people of the Belarusian State Pedagogical Institute were engaged in educating young people at that time. Since 1992, she has been a member of the coordinating council of the international movement “Educators for Peace and Understanding”. She took an active part in the work of international congresses (Norway - 1998, Austria - 1998, France - 2000, Germany - 2003, India - 2004). She is now actively involved in the “For a Culture of Peace” movement. On her initiative, an information and methodological center for the culture of peace was created at the BSPU. For her personal contribution to science in 2002, Alfiya Fazylzhanovna was elected in 2002 as a full member of the Academy of Pedagogical and Social Sciences.

Optimism, vitality, and creative activity evoke surprise and deep respect for this woman. And you believe that her life’s work will be continued by new generations of students, teachers, and scientists.

V.V. Goneeva,
veteran of the pedagogical university

Marat Egorov: a word about peace
The newspaper "Bulletin of the World" dated December 25, 2008 published an article by the chairman of the Belarusian Peace Foundation and vice-president of the International Association of Peace Foundations Marat Egorov, “You can’t stop the wind with your palm!”, in which a veteran of the Great Patriotic War expresses his thoughts on peacemaking and peacemakers

YOU CAN'T STOP THE WIND WITH YOUR PALM!
(printed in abbreviated form)

If humanity wants to survive and not burn in the flames of a new world war, it must find the strength to overcome accumulated grievances, grief, the death of loved ones, fires and explosions. And everyone should walk together along the same path of peace.

A real peacekeeping organization is, at its core, a kind of metronome. He is able to make people’s hearts beat in a single rhythm - the rhythm of calm creation and confidence in the future.

Over the entire history of mankind, more than 15,000 wars have taken place, which have claimed over 3.5 billion lives. New types of weapons are capable of destroying all life on our Planet.

In any case, the guiding principle of peace fighters should be humanism. It includes universal human responsiveness, mercy, readiness to help in grief, need, and protection from violence. Peacemaking presupposes activity in defending peace on Earth, as the most important condition further human progress, moral responsibility for the fate of peoples, the preservation of life on earth.

Peace can only be achieved when the ice of alienation between peoples is melted. This can only be done through friendship at all levels: from children to presidents.

For the happiness of living in peace and tranquility, a lot of blood and tears were shed by previous generations of people. We live only because millions of earthlings gave their lives for this.

The monuments testify to this. They are not only a tribute to the past, to those whose time has expired. New conscientious and gifted people calibrate their future from the monuments. Obelisks and memorials can be torn down and forgotten. But time is an impartial judge. It calls people People, and all others - little people. It'll be this way forever!

Everyone must find their peak and overcome it. The height of the peak is used to judge what capabilities and abilities a person had. Everest is not for everyone.

VETERANS OF THEIR KIND ARE LIVING MONUMENTS.

Their life is not for everyone
It would be on the shoulder.
Their courage was tested by war.
I don’t want their glory for myself.
Their payment for it was double.
They will not be among us very soon.
Doctors are powerless to prolong their age.
Their wisdom is the support of our resilience.
Their memory is our sister to our conscience.

These words were written not by hand, but by the heart of a front-line soldier - Volgograd resident Yuri Mikhailovich Beledin.

Do universities now teach specifically a historical approach to analyzing the past? It is impossible to ignore the real background against which this or that event took place. Modern standards, in my opinion, are not applicable to it, and their consequences are fraught with mistakes in the future. We must perceive the facts of the past without a shadow of irony or speculation.

Peacekeeping activities are not a one-time assignment, not an annoying burden, but a calling and the high trust of the people. It must be justified, proud of and treasured. It is not enough to simply “perform duties.” It is important not to smolder, but to burn - to warm people with the warmth of your hearts. To illuminate their path to a calm future, like the legendary Danko.

PEACEMAKER. This is not a position or a hobby. This is the meaning of a person’s life, his highest destiny. The creation of the world signifies the absolute harmony of the life around us. That is why the peacemakers were called “sons of God” in the Holy Scriptures. They always followed God's providence, the deepest aspirations of the Almighty. This is why our peacemaking activities are correlated with Divine peacemaking. That is why, honoring fighters for peace, occasionally honoring them with our modest awards, we pay tribute to their deeds, their ascetic work.

I was lucky enough to take part in the international event “Peace in the Middle East,” which brought together representatives of 120 countries. We walked the streets of cities in Palestine and Israel, making a passionate appeal to people who had been at odds with each other for centuries to rise above their prejudices. We chanted: Peace, Peace, Sholom, Salam Aleichem. And we felt that our calls reached the hearts of not only ordinary people, but also the rulers of these countries.

On the picture: Marat Egorov with the flag of the Republic of Belarus - participant in the international action “Peace in the Middle East”.

On this day, each of us imagined ourselves as a sower of good and believed that our words are a kind of seeds that will certainly bring wonderful shoots of good not only to the inhabitants of this long-suffering territory, but also to all of humanity. It seemed to us that the Palestinians and Israelis realized the need to preserve the most valuable, the most important thing - the right to life...

Marat Egorov

The history of the 554th detachment of the UN Peacekeeping Forces in letters from a veteran
In connection with the preparation for publication on the Internet of the electronic version of the Book of Memory “In the Service of Peace. 1973-2008,” the newsletter publishes correspondence with a veteran of the 554th battalion, reserve major Andrei Goncharov

The electronic Book of Memory of Russian Peacekeepers has a section dedicated to the contingents of the UN peacekeeping forces. It will publish the names of participants in UN peacekeeping operations conducted in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

As you know, the list of the Russian contingent of UN peacekeeping forces, currently published on the website of the Museum of Peacekeeping Operations in the section "", was compiled on the basis of data provided to the Museum of Peacekeeping Operations by the Airborne Forces Personnel Department in the late 90s.

In the years that passed before the end of UN operations in the former Yugoslavia, several hundred more Russian military personnel became participants in the peacekeeping process, who, having worthily fulfilled their peacekeeping duty in the Balkans, were awarded the UN medal “In the Service of Peace.”

Andrei GONCHAROV's letters name not only new names of participants in peacekeeping operations, but also describe the history of the 554th Special Operations Brigade - the first peacekeeping battalion of the Russian Armed Forces.

From: V.V. Gergel
To whom: A. Goncharova
date: 04.01.2009 16:55
Subject: Book of Memory

Dear Andrey!

Good afternoon

Valery Vladimirovich Gergel, a participant in the first UN peacekeeping operation (UNTSO 1973-1976), writes to you.

In 1992, the first Book of Memory of Soviet and Russian peacekeepers was published under the title “In the Service of Peace. 1973-1993.” It published a complete list of the 554th battalion, which was at one time provided to us by the Airborne Forces Commander, General Podkolzin, and the Airborne Personnel Department.

On the picture: Damascus (Syria), 1976. The UN Truce Supervision Authority for Palestine (UNTSO). The building of the Mixed Israeli-Syrian Armistice Commission (ISMAC).

At the evening dedicated to National Day one of the UN military observer groups.

From right to left - senior group of UN military observers in Syria, Lieutenant Colonel Vasily Marenko, UN military observer Major Anatoly Isaenko, representative of the German armed forces, military attache of the Soviet embassy in Syria.

Other photographs can be found in the publications.

IN Lately V Russian society a dispute flares up between the leadership of the Airborne Forces and the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces about the directions of reform Airborne troops. The head of the Main Command announced on November 21 that in order to increase combat readiness, the airborne troops will be relieved of peacekeeping functions that are unusual for them. operational management- Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, Colonel General Yuri Baluevsky. The Airborne Forces headquarters confirmed this information and reported that the number of troops would be reduced by 5.5 thousand military personnel. Already this year, the 10th parachute regiment in Gudauta (Abkhazia), the 237th airborne division of the 76th airborne division (Pskov) and the 283rd Podolsk aviation squadron will be disbanded.

Meanwhile, the final decision to deprive the Airborne Forces of peacekeeping functions has not been made, since the President of the Russian Federation has not yet signed a document on the directions of further military development in Russia. As reported by a number of media outlets, the Airborne Forces headquarters agrees with the reduction of some units and subunits, but the leadership of the troops is categorically against depriving the Airborne Forces of peacekeeping functions. The Airborne Forces headquarters associates its arguments on this matter with the following circumstances:

Firstly, there is an instruction from the President of the Russian Federation dated May 17, 1997, which states that the Airborne Forces in peacetime should form the basis of the troops participating in peacekeeping operations.

Secondly, airborne troops are mobile. The peculiarities of their training, the tactics of their actions, the transportability of weapons and equipment allow short time transfer airborne units over long distances. According to paratroopers, this circumstance became one of the main reasons for involving the Airborne Forces in 1998-2000 to participate in more than 30 operations to authorize interethnic conflicts, liquidation of consequences emergency situations, maintaining or restoring international peace and security. Transnistria and South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Armenia (liquidation of the consequences of the earthquake). Central Asia and Chechnya are far from full list regions of operation of the Airborne Forces.

Thirdly, the Airborne Forces headquarters believes that the Airborne Forces have developed a coherent system for training and replacing peacekeeping units. Since January 1, 2000, the 245th training center of peacekeeping forces has been operating (Ryazan), on the basis of which training and rotation of personnel of peacekeeping contingents in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Abkhazia are carried out.

Fourthly, over the eight-year period of participation in peacekeeping operations, the Airborne Forces have developed friendly and respectful relations between the command of peacekeeping units and personnel with the local administration and residents of the conflicting parties, close interaction has been organized with military contingents of other states, representatives of various international organizations (UN , OSCE, etc.).

Fifthly, repurposing the Airborne Forces for purely combat missions is unprofitable in material terms. According to calculations by the Airborne Forces headquarters, the total financial costs for transporting peacekeeping units from the areas of deployment will be about 900 million rubles:

a) according to the conclusion:

– by rail – 138-150 million rubles;

– by air transport – 254-280 million rubles.

Total: 392-430 million rubles.

b) by input:

– by rail – 168-180 million rubles;

– by air transport – 288-300 million rubles.

Total: 456-480 million rubles.

In addition, officers believe that this could lead to disruption in the implementation of peacekeeping missions, disruption of the management of units and subunits, disruption of a well-functioning system of interaction and comprehensive support.

Reference

The participation of units and units of the Russian Airborne Forces in peacekeeping operations began in March 1992, when the Russian 554th separate UN infantry battalion, numbering 900 people, formed on the basis of the Airborne Forces, was sent to the former Yugoslavia.

In February 1994, in accordance with political decision Russian leadership Part of the forces of the 554th FSB was redeployed to the Sarajevo area and, after appropriate reinforcement, was transformed into the 629th UN FSB with operational subordination to the Sarajevo sector and the task of separating the warring parties and monitoring compliance with the ceasefire agreement.

After the transfer of powers from the UN to NATO in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 629th UN FSB in January 1996 stopped carrying out peacekeeping tasks and was withdrawn to Russian territory.

Based on the decision of the UN Security Council on the gradual reduction of the military component of the UN mission in Eastern Slavonia in October 1997, the 554th Regiment was transformed into a Security Group and reduced to 203 people. In June 1998, the Security Group was withdrawn to Russian territory.

Since May 1994, on the basis of the Agreement between Georgia and Abkhazia on a ceasefire and separation of forces, in accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, the Collective Peacekeeping Forces (CPKF) were created. The main task is to separate the conflicting parties, maintain law and order, create conditions for a return to normal life in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, prevent the resumption of the armed conflict, and protect important facilities and communications.

The parachute battalion of the 10th separate airborne regiment of the Airborne Forces operates as part of the Collective Peacekeeping Forces.

Units of the 10th Special Operations Division are deployed as follows to carry out peacekeeping missions:

– one parachute battalion in the Gali region,

– one parachute platoon in the Kadori Gorge,

– one parachute platoon performs security and defense tasks at the KPM Headquarters in Sukhumi. The service is organized at one control post and six observation posts: in the Gali district - 6, in the Kadori gorge - 1.

In January 1996, a separate airborne brigade of 1,500 people, formed on the basis of the Airborne Forces, was sent to Bosnia and Herzegovina to participate in the peacekeeping operation of the multinational forces.

The brigade's area of ​​responsibility is 1,750 square meters. km, the total length of the controlled line of separation of the parties is 75 km.

Tasks performed by the Russian brigade:

– separation of warring parties;

– maintaining law and order, returning to conditions of normal life in the assigned area of ​​responsibility;

– participation in the provision of humanitarian assistance;

– assistance in the implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina of December 14, 1996.

The tasks are carried out by serving at four control posts and patrolling routes in the area of ​​​​responsibility, as well as conducting reconnaissance and checking objects and planned targets. The brigade's units are deployed in the base areas of Uglevik, Priboi, Simin-Khan and Vukosavtsi.

The number of Russian military personnel in 1999 was reduced and currently amounts to 1,150 people, armored vehicles - 90 units, automotive vehicles - 232 units.

In June 1999, in accordance with UN Security Council resolution N 1244, based on a presidential decree Russian Federation, and in accordance with the “Agreed Points of Russian Participation in the KFOR Forces” signed by the Ministers of Defense of the Russian Federation and the United States on June 18, 1999 in Helsinki, a decision was made to send to Kosovo (FRY) a military contingent of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation numbering 3,616 people, of which about 2,500 - paratroopers.

The main tasks are:

– creating security conditions for the return and residence of refugees and displaced persons;

– ensuring public safety;

– carrying out work to clear mines and destroy unexploded ordnance and explosive objects;

– fulfillment of border control duties;

– joint activities with KFOR forces to operate the Pristina (Slatina) airfield;

– ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of its forces, the international civilian presence and the personnel of other international organizations.

The tasks are carried out by serving in base areas and at control and observation posts by a security and maintenance group, patrolling routes in the area of ​​responsibility, as well as conducting reconnaissance and checking objects. Units of the Russian military contingent (RMC) are deployed in the base areas - Slatina airfield, Banja, Velika Hoca, Kosovska Kamenica, Donje Karmenjane, Srbica and Kosovo Polje.

Tasks are carried out at 15 control posts and 14 observation posts. 13 guard posts, patrolling 23 routes, traveling patrol in 3 settlements. 19 reserve groups and 4 helicopters are in constant readiness. To ensure their own safety, 10 guards are appointed, patrol groups - 15, checkpoints - 8, and 3-6 columns are escorted daily. Number of airborne units within the RVC in Kosovo:

– personnel – 2445 people,

– armored vehicles – 131 units,

– automotive equipment – ​​387 units.

Thus, at present, the Airborne Forces in three peacekeeping operations - in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo together with NATO, in Abkhazia as part of the Collective Peacekeeping Forces involve: - personnel - about 5,600 people; – armored vehicles – more than 320 units; – automotive equipment – ​​more than 950 units.

Farewell Eastern Slavonia!

Paratroopers of the 554th separate battalion of "blue helmets" successfully completed a peacekeeping mission as part of the UN forces on the Balkan soil.

The peacekeeping operation UNTAES - the UN Interim Administration in Western Sirmium, Baranja and Eastern Slavonia has entered its final phase. Since October 1997, the phased withdrawal of the main mission forces - Russians, Ukrainians, Slovaks, Czechs, Belgians - has continued by air, rail and the Danube River...
On October 26, the flags of Russia and the UN were solemnly lowered at the airfield near Klisa, where the headquarters of the 554th Russian separate battalion of “blue helmets” had been located for five long years. Now the leadership of Croatia, which “integrated” with the help of the United Nations the ancestral Serbian lands of Western and Eastern Slavonia, is rushing the military to leave. And only the Serbian population looks doomedly at the backs of the “blue helmets” who deceived their aspirations and hopes.

To the sound of the anthem, the flags of Russia and the UN are slowly lowered down the flagpoles. This unusual event took place at 16.30 on October 26, 1997 at the Klisa airfield, where the headquarters of the 554th Russian UN battalion is located. The honorable mission of delivering these banners to their homeland is entrusted to paratroopers Captain Vitaly Starikov, deputy company commander for educational work, and Lieutenant Sergei Sergeev, commander of the best platoon.
No matter how laconic and strict this ceremony was, I noticed: from the faces of the officers and soldiers standing in last time In general, in the battalion formation before leaving for their homeland, a chill seemed to run through. I looked at the battalion commander, Colonel Vladimir Osipenko, and his deputies, Colonel Yuri Yakush. Hero of Russia, Lieutenant Colonel Svyatoslav Golubyatnikov, Lieutenant Colonel Oleg Rybalko, Alexey Badeev, company commanders - Majors Sergei Selivanov and Alexey Ragozin, contract sergeants - Yuri Klimenko, Vladislav Baev, Andrey Aktaev... And other, painfully familiar faces of those , who for five and a half years carried out difficult peacekeeping tasks with dignity and honor as part of a battalion in Eastern Slavonia, increased the glory of RUSBAT-1.

There is not enough space to name all the names, because over the years there were 11 rotations in the battalion, 15 thousand soldiers passed through it and Airborne Forces officers. I will only mention the names of battalion commanders and colonels:
- Viktor Loginov,
- Leonid Arshinov,
- Sergei Voznesensky,
- Alexandra Kobyleva,
- Alexandra Nizhegorodova,
- Mikhail Zhdanenu,
- Vladimir Osipenko.
Each of them, to the best of their strength and ability, together with the headquarters and all personnel, contributed to the peacekeeping activities of the Russian UN battalion, striving to ensure that Russian peacekeepers worthily represented our Armed Forces in the largest operation of the “blue helmets”, which received in 1992 The official name of UNPROFOR is "UN Peace Force".
And although the Russians had absolutely no experience in operating in such international missions, our “RUSBAT” eventually became known in all four sectors into which the territory of the former Yugoslavia was divided. I had the opportunity to visit our UN battalion more than once and I can say with full responsibility: the 554th battalion was the first to enter its zone of responsibility in the East sector, where until recently there were fierce battles and more than 50 percent of the cities and villages of Eastern Slavonia, including the infamous Vukovar, stood in ruins: he was the first to set up his “check points” here - control posts between Serbs and Croats on a front line 110 kilometers long: he was the first in the sector to ensure that the former opponents began to stockpile heavy weapons, went to the first negotiations " .

Not once during the numerous armed conflicts that broke out between the Serbs and Croats, did our battalion retreat, did not surrender the occupied lines, did not abandon the local population to the mercy of fate, as the vaunted French and British repeatedly did, not to mention the Kenyans, Jordanians, Argentines ... Moreover, when the situation in Sarajevo sharply deteriorated in February 1994, two companies of the battalion made a rapid march through the mountains of Bosnia and, with their decisive actions, actually prevented the bombing of Serbian positions by NATO aircraft, for which they received gratitude from the then UN Secretary General Boutros Thali. Our paratroopers-peacekeepers did not flinch even at the most dramatic moment of Operation UNPROFOR - in the summer of 1995, when the Croatian army, violating all international agreements, seized Krajina and Western Slavonia by force. In a matter of days, three sectors where UN forces were located fell. Only the East sector survived. It survived mainly because there were positions of a Russian battalion here, and the Airborne Forces headquarters planned a parachute landing operation to support it from the air in case of an attack by Croatian troops.
During the peacekeeping mission on Serbian soil, our paratroopers paid a heavy price - 21 officers and contract soldiers were killed and 48 wounded. The first on this sad list is Sergeant Alexander Butorin, who was blown up by an anti-tank mine on January 20, 1993. The last one is senior lieutenant Dmitry Moiseev, who died on October 7 this year as a result of multiple hemorrhages in the lungs.
I repeat: the Russian UN military contingent successfully passed the first test of peacekeeping activities in the Balkans. Belgian Lieutenant General Hanseth, commander of the UN forces in Eastern Slavonia, confirmed this in a conversation with a Krasnaya Zvezda correspondent. The same, unfortunately, cannot be said about our politicians and the foreign policy line they pursue in the Balkans in general and in the Serbian region in particular. Alas, for many years, especially when Andrei Kozyrev was the head of the Foreign Ministry, it was carried out inconsistently, with an eye to the West. More than once I witnessed when, at negotiations in Belgrade and Sarajevo, our high representatives curried favor with the envoys of the United States and Western Europe, thinking more about their careers than caring about Russian interests in the Balkans.

I will refer to just one, in my opinion, very eloquent example. Now on Smolensk Square they apparently prefer not to remember how in the spring of 1995, on the initiative of the Russian Foreign Ministry, a peace treaty on non-aggression was concluded between Croatia and the Serbian Land. While carrying out this task, Russian peacekeepers were forced to move control posts several kilometers, and several people were blown up by mines. But less than a year had passed before Croatian troops, in collusion with the United States and Western European countries, forcibly captured the Serbian Krajina along with its capital, Knin. More than 10 thousand Serbs died, and about 200 thousand became refugees. And what about Russia, a member of the UN Security Council? Our Foreign Ministry did not even dare to declare an official protest against the barbarity of the Croats. What else can we talk about?
And there were many such examples. If behind the Russian contingent in Eastern Slavonia, like, for example, behind the Belgian one, there is not a state that knows what it wants, a logical question arises: was it even worth getting involved here in such a way?
Summing up the UN peacekeeping operation in the Balkans, the role that the Russians played in it, the Yugoslav media and ordinary people always divide it into its component parts: official politicians and the “laborers” of this peacekeeping mission - soldiers and officers of the military contingent, our military UN observers, representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs... It is not difficult, I think, to guess at whose address there is a silent reproach, and at whose address there are words of sincere gratitude.
This is what Dragoljub Jvkovic, secretary of the Ten community for relations with UNTAES, said at the farewell meeting of the Russian “blue helmets”:
- In this difficult hour of parting, on behalf of the entire Serbian people, I express gratitude to the officers and soldiers of Russia for your humane mission, for reliable protection and Slavic kindness. I won’t hide the fact that we say goodbye to the “blue helmets”, especially the Russians, with bitterness. The decision of the UN Security Council to withdraw the military contingent of the mission is difficult for our people. But a bad peace is better than any war."

I won’t lie, the Croats say it differently:
“Our people have always perceived Russian soldiers as defenders of the Serbian aggressors,” elderly railway worker Jovan Petrakovic told me angrily at the loading station in the Croatian town of Vinkovci. - You only prevented us from defending our lands and homes...
Of course, every resident of local communities, Croatian and Serbian, has his own view on the presence of the “blue helmets,” including Russian ones.
...By November 1, the 554th UN battalion had already removed all control posts in the 120-kilometer area of ​​responsibility and was engaged in the planned transfer of people and military equipment from Eastern Slavonia to Russia.
“The main forces of our battalion are already 50 percent on the way home,” Colonel Vladimir Osipenko, battalion commander, told me at battalion headquarters. - Others are completing the preparation of cargo and equipment for shipment. Since October 20, the remaining Russian military contingent has been assigned the following tasks: guarding the residence of the Head of the Interim Administration in the town of Bobota, ensuring the safety of UN civilian personnel and protecting property at the Klisa airfield, as well as monitoring the general situation in the area of ​​​​responsibility...
To the above, I will add that in the area of ​​​​responsibility of the Russian battalion, the transfer of powers for the implementation of the Erdut Agreement to the transitional police under the leadership of the UN civilian police has successfully taken place. Now Slovak sappers, under the cover of Russians, are demining the front-line territories of Eastern Slavonia. Our doctors continue to treat the local population. Every day, 30-40 local residents come to the battalion’s medical center for examination and consultation. And, perhaps, dentist Captain Valery Germanov of the medical service is especially popular among our military doctors. Him kind soul and golden hands, no one knows refusal - neither Serbs, nor Croats.

In the 90s, Yugoslavia demonstrated to the whole world what the collapse of the former Soviet Union could have led to under a slightly different set of political circumstances: protracted and bloody civil wars broke out on the territory of the constituent parts of the former Yugoslavia with the collapse of the vertical state power, the acute problem of refugees and the forced intervention of the world communities.

In various territories and lands (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Eastern Slavonia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Macedonia, Albania, adjacent Adriatic waters, etc.) since 1992, a whole range of operations has unfolded, in which the UN, OSCE, NATO, EU took part , WEU, as well as a number of countries as participants in coalitions to conduct individual operations.

At the same time, a number of operations were in the nature of coercive actions (sea and air blockade of part of the territory of the former Yugoslavia, individual components of the operation in Albania, air pressure operation on the FRY, etc.). The other part of the operations was of a precautionary nature (Macedonia). There were operations and their individual components that correspond to the classical understanding of peacekeeping (for example, the post-Dayton organization of elections in Bosnia under international control and etc.). Not all of these operations were carried out by the UN itself (see Chapter 1 on the role of the OSCE, NATO and WEU in individual operations), and some (the air operation to put pressure on the authorities of the FRY) did not have a UN mandate at all. In general, the complex of operations in the former Yugoslavia and Albania introduced many innovations and changes into the practice of UN peacekeeping.

The scale and strength of the Russian contingent involved in operations in this region (varying from 900 troops in 1992 to a maximum of 1,500 in 1994 and slightly exceeding 1,000 currently) is, let's say, significant. in comparison with operations in Moldova and South Ossetia (in 2000, 460 and 462 Russian peacekeepers were deployed there, respectively), but far from decisive. For comparison, it is enough to mention that only the ground component of the forces of the SFOR operation amounted to 33,400 troops different countries, not counting civilians.

However, in many respects, Russia's involvement in operations in the former Yugoslavia was and remains unique.

Firstly, this is an atypical situation in which the Russian military and not only Western military “observers”, but also NATO combat units, who have been training for decades for a “big war,” acted together in solving the tasks set by the UN.

Second, the level of military force used in these operations as a whole was extremely high, on average much higher than in most all other operations of previous decades, with the exception of Desert Storm. As a result, there were increased demands on military professionalism and the ability of real combat interaction between the Russian military and the military of other countries, and not only those that were previously allies under the Warsaw Pact.

Thirdly, in conditions of ethnic and historical proximity or the relationship of individual countries with certain warring forces, it was particularly difficult to maintain an unbiased, equidistant attitude of peacekeepers towards the parties to the conflicts. Although the unofficial “pro-Serbian” orientation of Russian peacekeepers only balanced the unofficial “pro-Croatian”, “pro-Muslim” or “anti-Serbian” orientation of some Western countries participating in the coalitions, in general Russia is not playing the nationalist “card” in this complex of conflicts ” and takes the position of a relatively unbiased mediator.

Fourthly, Russia’s cooperation with other countries and organizations in conducting operations in the former Yugoslavia was significantly affected by the Russia-NATO contradictions in connection with NATO expansion and NATO’s actions without a UN mandate in the FRY in 1999. More broadly, peacekeeping cooperation in Yugoslavia was and remains influenced by the intersection and clash of interests of the great powers in the Balkans and in Europe as a whole.

Units and formations of Russian airborne troops were first involved in the UN peacekeeping mission in Yugoslavia already in 1992. At that time, there were no specially trained peacekeeping contingents in Russia (with the exception of a small group of military observers from previous UN operations, which had experience only of non-combat operations “under the banner” of the UN). A special Russian motorized rifle battalion for landing in Yugoslavia was formed from airborne units on the basis of the Presidential Decree “On sending the Russian contingent to Yugoslavia to participate in UN peacekeeping operations” and the order of the Commander of the United Armed Forces of the CIS[i]. The size of the contingent was determined to be 900 people, armed with small arms, and equipped with 150 vehicles and 15 armored personnel carriers. The battalion was formed and underwent reduced training and instruction in 6 weeks.

Both the simple structure of the contingent (headquarters, headquarters company, five motorized rifle companies), and light weapons and the absence of communications, reconnaissance, and reinforcement units indicated that Russia did not have adequate experience in participating in force peacekeeping operations and was preparing for “classic” peacekeeping, in which weapons are used only for "show of force". But the real situation civil war in Yugoslavia forced during the UNPROFOR operation, even before the transition to SFOR, to change the rules of combat contact and strengthen the combat power of the contingent. The battalion requested and received from Russia 54 more modern BTR-80 armored personnel carriers, 82mm artillery guns, mobile anti-tank missile launchers and portable anti-aircraft systems. “Separating” the warring parties required action according to the rules of a serious war.

In 1994, the 554th Separate Motorized Rifle Battalion was reinforced by the 629th Separate Motorized Rifle Battalion, and the total number of Russian military personnel in Yugoslavia reached 1,500 people. on 95 armored combat vehicles.

When on December 15, 1995, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1031 on the former Yugoslavia, the Russian contingent received a new status and changed its structure (brigade) and scale. First of all, in connection with the adoption in the Russian Federation in the same year of a new law on the participation of Russian contingents in peacekeeping operations, the issue of the participation of Russian peacekeepers in the UN operation was brought up for discussion in the Russian parliament. The Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation confirmed the decision on Russia's participation in the operation, and in mid-February 1996. The President of the Russian Federation by his decree increased the permitted number of troops to 1,600 people.

The Russian brigade received an area of ​​responsibility in Yugoslavia of 1,750 square kilometers, which included a line of separation of the warring parties 275 kilometers long. An American brigade, a Turkish brigade, and a joint brigade “North”, consisting of peacekeeping contingents from Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway and Poland, served in close proximity to the Russian peacekeepers.

The tasks carried out in Bosnia by the Russian contingent also included control at five checkpoints, patrolling of numerous roads and territories, reconnaissance, search and inspection of facilities. During its participation in SFOR/IFOR operations in 1997-1999, in which NATO forces played a leading role in agreement with the UN, the Russian brigade was not involved in mass battles. The losses of 4 people killed and 11 wounded occurred mainly as a result of mine explosions.

A matter of political significance was the establishment of a chain of command. For “ideological” reasons, it was considered wrong to agree to the direct subordination of the Russian contingent to the command of NATO structures, although it was the NATO command, in accordance with the UN mandate, that carried out the overall coordination of operations. Through diplomatic channels, a military-political special condition was agreed upon: the commander of the Russian brigade, General L. Shevtsov, received the status of Deputy Commander of the entire operation in the former Yugoslavia and reported directly to the Commander-in-Chief of NATO ground forces in Central Europe.

Russian command group at the Supreme Headquarters of NATO in Europe (SHAPE), she solved problems not only of a military, but also of a political and diplomatic nature. Among them, in particular, coordination of the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreements with the Bosnian military-political leadership, as well as the organization and holding of meetings of joint reconciliation commissions, in which representatives of the Bosnian political forces and the military leadership of the SFOR operation.

By March 1999, when the NATO air operation in the FRY, which began without UN Security Council authorization, led to the freezing of Russia-NATO relations and the formal withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from the NATO-led operation in Bosnia, the overall result of cooperation between Russian peacekeepers and the military of the coalition countries was generally positive. The crisis was not caused by internal factors in the development of the operation in Bosnia itself, but became a projection into the sphere of peacekeeping of “macropolitical” tension in Russia-NATO relations.

Political complaints about NATO's actions in the FRY can be summarized as follows:

• The alliance violated the UN Charter by launching a coercive operation in the territory sovereign state contrary to the will of the legally elected government of the country and without a mandate from the UN Security Council;
• The operation was carried out outside NATO's area of ​​direct responsibility, limited, in accordance with the Washington Treaty of 1949, to the territory of member countries;
• The operation was exceeding the limits of necessary use of force, since not all channels of political influence have been exhausted;
• Operation violates prerogatives regional organizations , because, firstly, the OSCE as the leading regional organization collective security was pushed aside by NATO and the OSCE mandate was also absent, secondly, NATO itself never recognized itself (and was not recognized by the UN) as a regional security organization and, thirdly, operations with elements of coercive action (bombing and blockade) fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the UN Security Council rather than regional organizations and agreements;
• The operation is controversial from the point of view of being categorized as a “humanitarian motivated intervention”, since the fact of genocide of the Albanian population of Kosovo (which could be the basis for such an intervention) was not recorded and confirmed by the UN or OSCE, and the flow of refugees from Kosovo after the start of the intervention (bombing) the flow of refugees significantly exceeded before the operation;
• Finally, NATO and Western powers have set a dangerous precedent by openly ignoring Russian protests and the position of powers such as China and India, which, among others, have spoken out at the UN against forceful intervention.

At the same time, it is obvious that Russia was reacting not only and not so much to the events in the former Yugoslavia itself (although opposition to the bombing was consistent and supported by public opinion within Russia), but to ousting Russia from the process of making fundamental decisions on problems of pan-European security (which, undoubtedly, , related to the decision to bomb Yugoslav territory).

It should be realistically realized that the Russian leadership did not shy away from the use of military force in the Yugoslav conflict in general, and the recognition of the need for coercive actions, including in relation to the government of S. Milosevic, in particular. The political problem consisted primarily of the violation by the North Atlantic Alliance (and the leadership of a number of Western powers) of the rules and procedures for decision-making on the use of force in the international community. As soon as 11 weeks after the start of the bombing, the UN Security Council managed to adopt an agreed resolution regarding the international operation in Kosovo and the FRY, the Russian military-political leadership persistently returned the Russian contingent to the international intervention force (the famous paratrooper raid led by General Zavarzin from Bosnia to Pristina airport in Kosovo). Cooperation between Russia and NATO in peacekeeping was immediately unfrozen. At the same time, although the bombing as a type of influence on the government of S. Milosevic was stopped, other coercive elements in the operation (for example, a strictly controlled embargo on the supply of weapons to the parties to the conflict) remained.

The allocation of a zone of responsibility to the Russian contingent in Kosovo in the predominantly Albanian sector led to difficulties in carrying out peacekeeping functions and partial blocking of elements of the contingent by the local population. However, Russia has returned to the number of countries actively participating in the peace process in the former Yugoslavia.

Some lessons from the complex of operations in the former Yugoslavia can be summarized as follows:

• There has been a certain “specialization” of various international organizations in conducting operations in conflict regions. The UN is failing modern conditions with the organization of force operations to establish peace (enforce peace), if the conflict has the scale of a real civil war. This requires a “working” integrated military organization. The involvement of NATO is generally assessed in UN circles as effective and, apparently, will continue to be practiced if there is consensus within the ranks of NATO itself. The WEU was unable to effectively establish itself even in the “hothouse” conditions of conducting elements of operations “under the wing” of NATO. The OSCE skillfully carries out activities to restore political infrastructure and hold free elections in conflict regions. The UN ensures general political coordination of the interests of powers regarding the conflict and intervention in it, and this function (coordination of the interests of major powers regarding the conflict) is becoming increasingly important.
• Yugoslavia demonstrated the stages of deterioration in interaction between organizations of the international community (UN. OSCE) and the great powers (the first such disarray occurred during the conclusion of the Dayton Agreements on Bosnia outside the UN and the OSCE, the second during the deployment of NATO actions in the FRY contrary to the position of a number of great powers) , and the stages of their coordinated interaction. Experience shows that, as before, in the international community, the positive involvement of the UN, OSCE, and other multilateral mechanisms in the peacekeeping process cannot be replaced by the will and strength of individual powers. The international community still considers it normal for “great powers” ​​and “great organizations” to act together, rather than to pit their efforts against each other.
• At the same time, as a relatively new formula of interaction is developing (and, apparently, will expand in the future), the practice of transferring operations by the United Nations to created adhoc coalitions of powers. It is advisable for Russia to develop the practice of participating in such coalitions and apply it to the development of coalition participation in peacekeeping in the CIS.

Operations in the former Yugoslavia showed the need (and possibility) of close political interaction between broad groups of powers in real time of the unfolding conflict ( we're talking about not only about the relatively successful maintenance of consensus in ambiguous conditions by NATO countries, but also about the practice of agreeing on decisions in adhoc coalitions of countries that carried out operations in Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo). This is an important example for Russia, which needs to use the mechanisms of political consultations and maintaining consensus among the CSTO countries.

[i] Order dated February 26, 1992. Strictly speaking, due to the well-known hopes for maintaining a single military infrastructure At first, the CIS contingent was not “Russian”; it represented the entire former Soviet Union, all CIS countries, and only later in Yugoslavia began to talk about separate Russian and separate Ukrainian contingents.

A year later, the “ceiling” was lowered to 1,400 people, and the real number in the late 90s. did not exceed 1340 people.

The successful implementation of logistics support tasks during peacekeeping operations is influenced by the following: factors: conditions for conducting peacekeeping operations; the scale of the conflict between the warring parties; tasks of the UN Security Council, unified command, General Staff Sun; constructing a line of demarcation between warring parties; depth of the area of ​​responsibility; military-political situation in the area of ​​responsibility; physical and geographical features of the area; the order of logistics support for peacekeeping forces established by the UN mission, the General Staff of the Armed Forces, and the Armed Forces Logistics Headquarters.

Largest scale Armed forces Russians were used during peacekeeping operations during the Yugoslav conflict. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation participated in the peacekeeping operation in Yugoslavia from April 1992 to February 1994 on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution No. 743 of 02/26/1992 and Resolution of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation of 03/06/1992 No. 2462, initially as part of the 554th separate infantry battalion ( "Rusbat-1") in the amount of 420 people.

The tasks of the 554th separate infantry battalion, prescribed by the UN mandate, were: delimitation of the warring parties; monitoring compliance with the terms of the truce; monitoring compliance with the conditions for the withdrawal of heavy weapons beyond the 30-kilometer zone from the line of contact of the parties; escorting convoys with humanitarian aid; patrolling areas of responsibility; assistance to civilians (protection, health care, evacuation) in the event of the outbreak of hostilities. The main objective was to prevent the resumption of hostilities and the separation of the Serbian Yugoslav People's Army and the Croat-Muslim confederation in the area settlements Osijek, Vukovar, Vinkovci, Klisa, Tenja, Orolik, where armed clashes between the parties took place due to territorial disputes. The battalion command post was located on the territory of the airfield in the Croatian city of Osijek, the remaining combat units were stationed 20-25 km from the command post along the line of the battalion’s zone of responsibility.

The battalion was subordinate to the command of the UN sector headquarters and interacted with the French, Norwegian, Danish, English and Ukrainian battalions.

The 554th separate infantry battalion consisted of two infantry companies (each company had three infantry platoons and a utility department) and a headquarters company, which included a reconnaissance platoon, an anti-aircraft missile platoon, a communications department, a repair platoon and a utility platoon (Fig. 30.1).

Fig. 30.1 Organizational and staffing structure 554 OPB

The utility department of the infantry company consisted of two units of refueling trucks (AC-5.5-4320 - 1 unit; ATMZ-5-4320 - 1 unit) and an ambulance UAZ-452A. He supervised the work of the rear of the infantry company - the deputy company commander for logistics. This composition of the rear increased the autonomy of the infantry company in logistics terms when performing peacekeeping missions in the areas of responsibility.

The rear of a separate infantry battalion included the following officials: deputy battalion commander for logistics (officer); head of the fuel and lubricants service (officer), head of the fuel warehouse (warrant officer); head of the clothing service (officer), head of the clothing warehouse (ensign); the head of the food service (officer), the head of the food warehouse (ensign) and the head of the canteen (ensign). The logistics platoon of the headquarters company had functions similar to the logistics platoon of a motorized rifle battalion.

At the beginning of 1994, the situation in the area of ​​the city of Sarajevo worsened, and in February an additional 629 separate infantry battalion (Rusbat-2) was sent there with the task of stabilizing the situation in this sector, providing humanitarian assistance to refugees and ensuring their safety. To carry out this task, the battalion was assigned a zone of responsibility with an area of ​​40 km 2 (the distance between 554 opb and 629 OPB was about 200 km).

The provision of fuel, oils and lubricants was carried out through a fuel depot deployed by the French battalion in the area of ​​Sarajevo airport. The fuel service staff includes 629 OPB in addition to 8 units of fuel tankers (2 units in each infantry company and 2 units in the headquarters company), there were: an MNUG-20 motor pump unit, R-4 and R-8 tanks domestic production, as well as French-made R-5 tanks, which were used to equip the battalion’s fuel warehouse with a capacity of 65 m 3 . In total, the battalion warehouse contained 2.0 filling stations of motor gasoline and 1.8 filling stations of diesel fuel. A battalion refueling point was equipped, where equipment was refueled and the storage and distribution of oils and lubricants was organized. In order to organize the protection of the warehouse, the tanks were placed on the ground and lined with sandbags. An earthen parapet was placed around the perimeter of the warehouse.

The battalions were supplied with Slovenian-made fuel, oils and lubricants High Quality, gasoline was supplied grade A-95, diesel fuel high degree removal of paraffins, gear oils of seven grades, gun oil - three grades. A peculiarity of accounting and reporting on the fuel service was that UN specialists from the sector headquarters required daily faxing of data on the consumption and availability of fuel in the battalion as of 15.00. Based on these fax reports, they wrote off fuel from the battalion. Receipt of fuel was carried out after the head of the battalion fuel service showed in the report the presence of free containers. The battalion received an invoice by fax for receiving fuel and lubricants from the sector warehouse; according to this document, fuel, oils and lubricants were received.

To the features of logistics support 554 and 629 OPB The following can be attributed: the supply of battalion personnel was carried out according to UN standards, the same for all battalions; personnel were given televisions, refrigerators, video equipment, audio equipment, microwave ovens, fans, heaters, washing machines as equipment; badges of belonging to the UN troops were issued: blue berets, blue ceremonial scarves, UN sleeve insignia, UN flags; The battalion personnel had their own uniform (uniform) - domestic; washing of personnel was carried out in shower modules of battalions (French production); underwear was washed in units (each platoon had a washing machine), bed linen was washed in city laundries; food was obtained from a warehouse established by the French near the Sarajevo airport, the range of products is very wide (fruits, juices, mineral water, cheeses, seasonings, etc.); food for personnel was provided in the officers' and soldiers' canteens (staff from the local population worked in the officers' canteen); the battalion was provided with dry rations made in France; storage of perishable products was carried out in container-type refrigeration chambers; to improve nutrition on the battalions' territory, smokehouses were built with their own resources and resources for smoking chickens and fresh fish; Meals at checkpoints were organized using small-sized kitchens, which necessitated the training of additional freelance cooks.

The attitude of the local population (Bosnians and Muslims) towards the presence of Russian battalions in Bosnia and Herzegovina was extremely negative, which significantly complicated the work of the rear.

In 1995, the Russian leadership decided to withdraw battalions from Sarajevo, as provocations and the continued presence of Russian troops this region was becoming dangerous. Combat operations with the use of heavy equipment resumed in the region; in August-September 1995, UN coalition forces made attempts to stabilize the situation, NATO aircraft bombed the positions of the Yugoslav People's Army, but no significant success was achieved. A refugee problem arose; Serbs fled from Bosnia and Herzegovina and settled along the border with Serbia, proclaiming the formation of a state not recognized in the world - the Republic of Srpska.

In connection with the current situation, the Government of the Russian Federation, on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution No. 1031 of December 15, 1995 and Federation Council Resolution No. 772 of January 5, 1996, decided to increase its presence in the conflict zone. In accordance with the directive of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, on the basis of two airborne divisions, a separate airborne brigade was formed to participate in the peacekeeping operation and subsequently introduced into the conflict zone (Fig. 30.2).

The brigade's task was to prevent the resumption of hostile actions and ensure the security of the situation. 20 days were allotted for the formation and immediate training of the brigade. A special feature of the training was the correct determination and creation of the optimal organizational and staffing structure of rear units with the appropriate technical equipment, which makes it possible to increase the autonomy, adaptability and flexibility of the brigade’s tactical actions.

Rice. 30.2. Organizational and staffing structure of a separate

airborne brigade

The special features of the brigade rear staffing structure were: in addition to the head of the service, the food service staff included an auditor officer, a catering officer, a veterinarian, a food service technician (ensign), the head of the officers' canteen, the head of the soldiers' canteen, a cook-instructor, a mobile mechanized bakery (the head of the bakery is an officer, the bakery technician is a warrant officer); In addition to the head of the service, the fuel service staff included an inspector officer, a warehouse manager, and a warehouse mechanic; the staff of the clothing service consisted of the head of the service, the head of the warehouse, the head of the clothing repair shop, the head of the field bathhouse, and the head of the field laundry; the apartment maintenance service was headed by the head of the service, the service staff was partially staffed by military personnel rmo(electrician, plumber, driver of a garbage collection vehicle, driver of a cleaning and watering vehicle), part of the staff was recruited seasonally from local residents (Serbian refugees) for the positions of stokers in the boiler room of the brigade.

20 days before the brigade’s departure, in early 1996, a reconnaissance group led by the brigade commander was sent to the area of ​​the peacekeeping operation. The deputy brigade commander for logistics took part in the work of the reconnaissance group. The group's tasks were: selection and preparation of unloading sites; selection of base areas for the deployment of brigade headquarters, battalions, special forces and support units; determining the location of checkpoints; studying the situation on the spot and making decisions on further actions in the conflict zone. Simultaneously with the arrival of the reconnaissance group at the Tuzla airfield from the cities of Ivanovo, where the headquarters and most of the combat, rear and technical support brigades (signal company, rmo, repair company, medrota, isr, vrhr), Kostroma, where 1 pdb, commandant company, military police platoon, sabatre; special forces reconnaissance group 45 was trained ORP Airborne Forces, and from Pskov, where 2 were formed pdb And sabatre, the railway trains set off towards Yugoslavia. At the end of January 1996, the trains, having completed a 3,200-kilometer journey through Ukraine, Hungary, and Serbia, arrived at the Bijeljina railway station.

Upon arrival of the trains at their destination, practice has confirmed the difficulties of organizing the unloading of materiel, logistics equipment, their delivery to base areas and placement. There was a lack of means for mechanizing loading and unloading operations.

In addition to peacekeeping tasks to disarm the conflicting parties and clear mines, the brigade monitored the condition of combat equipment and the movement of military equipment, as well as residents and monitored the situation. The brigade solved problems of ensuring the delivery of food and other humanitarian supplies, assisting in organizing and holding elections, monitoring the observance of human rights, assisting in the restoration of administrative systems and infrastructure, solving problems of its own logistical support, interacting with the command of the 1st MD of the US Army , with local suppliers and service organizations. The Russian military contingent was ready to assist the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and others international organizations in carrying out humanitarian assistance.

The most difficult tasks for the rear were: establishing connections and concluding contracts for the replacement and washing of linen, the supply of food, fuel, fuel from local suppliers; organizing bread baking; organization of electricity and water supply; evacuation of the wounded and sick.

In Yugoslavia it was fundamentally changed material supply scheme. A mixed method was used, in which support was carried out both by the forces and means of the joint command of the peacekeeping forces, and by the forces and means of the Center (Moscow Military District, airborne rear services). There was no delivery by rail or river (sea) transport. Part of the cargo (standard and camp tents, uniforms and shoes, engineering equipment, oils and special liquids, logistics equipment, repair kits for technical equipment for logistics services) was transported by air, military transport aircraft (Il-76) from a military airfield near Moscow "Chkalovsky" and Ivanovo military airfield "Severny" to the airfield of the Bosnian city of Tuzla.

The deputy brigade commander for logistics sent a request for the necessary material to the airborne logistics headquarters. Within a month, the property specified in the application was received at the bases of the center and district, prepared for shipment (by the forces of a separate airborne communications regiment) and transported by plane to Yugoslavia. The decision to deliver cargo was made by the Airborne Forces Commander in agreement with the VTA command. The cargo was delivered by landing by Il-76 aircraft in VAK-5 containers. The organization of the reception of material resources was as follows: in the brigade, by order of the commander, an officer was appointed in charge of receiving cargo at the airfield of the city of Tuzla; a team was allocated in advance to work on unloading material, equipment and combat guards for automobile convoys were allocated; with the departure of the plane from Moscow, the automobile convoy assigned to receive cargo was sent to the airfield of the city of Tuzla, located 80 km from the base area of ​​the brigade; with the arrival of the plane, the delivered material was accepted according to act f.4 and delivered to the brigade; After receiving the material, a report f.200 about the received cargo was sent to the Airborne Forces rear headquarters. Subsequently, the first copy of the acceptance certificate f.4 was sent to the Airborne Forces logistics headquarters.

Economic calculations showed that delivery of one 5-ton container to the territory of Yugoslavia costs 50 thousand US dollars, so it was decided to procure part of the material resources locally. Practically, for all rear services, contracts were concluded for the purchase of material resources and the performance of certain types of services. A peculiarity of the financial support of the peacekeeping operation was that for all material resources and all types of services received locally under contracts it was necessary to pay in foreign currency not through a bank, but in cash immediately as the service was provided. The head of the rear service, as part of the commission, accepted material resources from local suppliers (fuel, food, laundry), upon application for an advance payment, received money from the brigade cash desk (from 2 to 5 thousand US dollars) and, having issued invoices, paid with suppliers. Then he filled out an advance report with attached documents for receiving material resources, and the amount previously received at the brigade cash desk after the report was approved by the brigade commander was written off from the report.

Delivery of materials included a number of sequential activities: obtaining material resources from local suppliers; receiving cargo delivered by military transport aircraft; preparation of materiel for transfer to battalions; loading and delivery of materiel to the base areas of the battalions, transferring them to recipients in the base areas of the battalions or directly to outposts and checkpoints (Milijas, Spasojevici, Čelich, Bare, Vukasavtsi) with subsequent registration of transfer through the battalion. The order of delivery was planned by the deputy brigade commander for logistics in coordination with the brigade chief of staff and depended on the importance of the task being performed or on the direction of concentration of the main efforts, the location of the battalion's base area.

Yes, CP 1 pdb was 30 km from the brigade CP, and CP 2 pdb 70 km away, in addition, the base area of ​​the 2nd battalion, outposts, and checkpoints were entirely located on the territory of an aggressive population (Bosnians), so the first delivery was carried out by 2 pdb. For this purpose, as a rule, transport was used rmo teams, in exceptional cases empty transport WMO battalions. The frequency of delivery and the range of material resources depended on the intensity of their consumption in different situations. The supply of fuel and food was carried out once a week, bread - once every two days, linen was changed - 2 times a week.

Main vehicles The brigade's supply vehicles were all-terrain vehicles of the Ural-4320 type, which were used in the mountainous and wooded areas of the conflict zone. On the flat part, KAMAZ-5310 type vehicles were used. IN winter period To cross mountain passes, the rear columns included wheeled tractors of the TK-6M type. The work of supply transport became especially intense when the situation became more complicated. The consumption of material resources increased, and the departure of rear columns to areas of responsibility was reduced to a minimum in order to prevent the occurrence of provocations and attacks on our military personnel. In such cases, a reliable military guard was created, 2-3 units of BTR-80, R-142 N were included in the automobile columns, and also, in the most difficult situations, Black Hawk helicopters from the 1st MD Squadron of the US Army were involved, which accompanied our convoys to the areas where materiel was transferred.

Features of the organization of rear management during the peacekeeping operation in Yugoslavia, it turned out that in units and subunits, command posts and rear control points were, as a rule, located together. This made it possible to use the command post controls in the interests of the rear, and to increase the reliability of the rear control system, since standard rear communications equipment provided only the minimum required level of control.

Features in organizing the work of rear services brigades in carrying out the tasks of peacekeeping operations became as follows.

1. For food service. Agreements were concluded for the supply of food (bread, meat, vegetables, fruits, mineral water, cookies, dairy products, etc.) from local suppliers; food preparation was carried out in the base area of ​​the brigade in the PAK-200 kitchens and subsequently on stationary equipment in the dining room; in the base areas of battalions and companies, food was prepared in the kitchens of KP-125, KP-130, at outposts and checkpoints - in the kitchens of KP-20, MK-30, KO-75, and therefore the need for spare parts for the above equipment increased due to intensive operation, there was also a need to train freelance cooks-gunners at the rate of 2 cooks per platoon; food provision was carried out in accordance with Order of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation of 1994 No. 395 according to a special norm with the provision of additional food (per day: mineral water - 1.5 l, cookies - 50 g, milk - 100 ml, meat - 100 g, cheese - 30 g , fruits – 100 g). When accepting products from local suppliers, special attention was paid to checking the quality of meat - a task carried out by the team’s veterinarian; storage of perishable products was carried out in the brigade food warehouse in an ALKA refrigerated trailer; storage of perishable products in battalion food warehouses was organized in adapted premises using refrigeration equipment of the ShKh-0.5 type; storage of perishable products at checkpoints and outposts was carried out in specially adapted rooms and devices.

2. For clothing service. At first, laundry was washed in a brigade laundry station equipped with MPP-2.0. However, in the future, due to difficulties in maintenance and repair of technical equipment, as well as as a result of assessing the economic feasibility of completing the task, an agreement was concluded with a local laundry company in the suburbs of Bijeljina. Upon replacement, personnel arrived at the brigade fully equipped with clothing; in the brigade, property was not issued according to supply plans, with the exception of the issuance of items that had become unusable. Washing was carried out in the base area of ​​the brigade in a room adapted for washing personnel, using disinfection-shower units DDA-66 and DDP-2, according to a schedule for six days a week. In the base areas of the battalions, washing is carried out in premises adapted for washing personnel using DDP-2 and DDA-66. At outposts and checkpoints, washing was carried out using simple devices equipped in the form of showers. Due to the intensive use of technical means of washing (DDP-2, DDA-66), the wear of equipment (rubber-fabric, rubber-technical products, nozzles, injectors, boilers) was significantly increased, which necessitated the need to provide spare parts, as well as increased requirements for technical training service personnel. Some units were housed in standardized tents of the UST-56, USB-56, UZ-68 type (2 pdb, isr, management units 1 pdb) which increases the wear and tear of tents and especially rigging.

3. For fuel service. Fuel was obtained from local suppliers on the basis of a contract. From Hungary through Vojvodina and Serbia, diesel fuel and motor gasoline were supplied to the brigade by the supplier's transport. In the base area of ​​the brigade, after quality control, fuel was pumped from the supplier’s transport into the brigade’s transport; tanks in the fuel warehouse were not buried in order to increase protective properties dug in and lined them with sandbags.

4. For medical service. The brigade's medical center was staffed by a reduced staff of the division's separate medical battalion and had a full complement of medical specialists capable of providing qualified medical care.

5. For apartment maintenance service. Furniture, equipment and property of the IES were brought in trains at the beginning of the operation for the entire duration of the operation. Firewood was collected from local sources, under agreements with local administration authorities. Payment for electricity, water and others utilities was carried out on the basis of contracts in currency, through a team, in cash.

A feature of the work of the rear was that officials and rear management bodies, commanders of rear units had to make appropriate decisions not only on issues of logistical support, but also on organizing combat, performing peacekeeping functions, planning in detail and providing for measures for protection, defense, protection and camouflage of rear facilities. Logistics officers were required to know the capabilities of the standard weapons of the units entrusted to them, the ability to use them, and to have appropriate operational-tactical and tactical-special training.