Change in political leadership collapse of Beria. Abstract: development of the USSR after the death of Stalin

In 1946, Stalin appointed Abakumov as Minister of State Security, and this changed the balance of power in his circle. At that time, he carefully concealed his true goals, and we thought that the new appointments at the top of the Kremlin (Zhdanov was transferred from Leningrad to Moscow, Kuznetsov was introduced to the secretariat of the Central Committee, Rodionov became Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation) were just ordinary insignificant rearrangements. But that was not the case. Stalin once again introduced new people into the leadership to emphasize his superiority over rival factions in the Kremlin. In 1946-1948, Zhdanov had the second voice after Stalin in making party and government decisions.

Two episodes shed new light on the power struggle. The first is the case of concealing the facts of the production of low-quality products in the aviation industry; the second, related to the first, is the resignation of Marshal Zhukov and other war heroes. It all started with the accusation of Chief Marshal of Aviation Novikov and People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry Shakhurin of concealing defects on airplanes, which caused plane crashes.

Abakumov, as head of military counterintelligence in 1945, reported letters from pilots complaining about the poor quality of aircraft. When he was appointed Minister of State Security, he, on Stalin’s instructions, opened a criminal case against the leaders of the aviation industry and Novikov, the commander-in-chief of the Air Force, who allegedly concealed these problems. The question was very sensitive. Stalin was furious when his son Vasily, an Air Force general, and Abakumov reported that senior officials in the aviation industry were deliberately hiding equipment defects in order to receive bonuses and awards. Malenkov, due to his position in the Politburo, was responsible for industry and received a gold medal and the title of Hero Socialist Labor for outstanding work in organizing the production of military products.

The investigation showed that the number of plane crashes with tragic consequences was distorted. Basically, all these cases were attributed to pilot errors, and not to equipment deficiencies. Before the war, failures were severely punished. When Valery Chkalov, the pilot who flew non-stop across the North Pole to America, died in a plane crash in 1938, the officer in charge of Chkalov's safety was arrested and executed for negligence in leading to the death of a national hero.

When Stalin, at a meeting of senior MGB officials in July 1946, asked Abakumov: “The guilt of Novikov and Shakhurin has been proven. What punishment do you propose? – he answered without hesitation: “Execution.”

– It’s easy to shoot; it’s more difficult to make it work. We must make them work,” Stalin suddenly said.

Novikov and Shakhurin were arrested, and Stalin demanded confessions from them to expose the military leadership. Their confessions were filed with the cases of Marshal Zhukov and other generals and posed a serious threat to Malenkov. Stalin used these confessions to remove Marshal Zhukov from the post of his deputy and Commander-in-Chief Ground forces in 1946. An order dated June 9, 1946, signed by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, accused Zhukov of “lack of modesty,” “excessive personal ambitions,” and “attributing to himself a decisive role in the execution of all major combat operations during the war, including those in which he did not play at all.” no role." Zhukov was demoted and appointed commander of the Odessa Military District. The order also stated that “Marshal Zhukov, feeling embittered, decided to gather around himself losers, commanders relieved of their positions, thus becoming in opposition to the government and the High Command.”

These accusations were based on the confessions of Marshal Novikov, who, under pressure, was forced to testify against Zhukov. In a letter to Stalin, he spoke about Zhukov’s ambitions and said that he had “anti-Stalin conversations” with him, and also testified that he helped him hide that he was from the family of the Tsar’s policeman.

Zhukov's removal had far-reaching consequences. This was the beginning of a campaign to debunk a number of military leaders - heroes of the Great Patriotic War. So Stalin wanted to get rid of potential enemies. Soon, Admiral Kuznetsov, commander of the Navy, was removed, and as a result of the reshuffle, Bulganin became Minister of the Armed Forces. He was unable to cope with the serious problems of mobilization and changes in the structure of the armed forces. I ran into him several times in the Kremlin during meetings of the heads of intelligence services. His incompetence was simply amazing. Bulganin did not understand such issues as the rapid deployment of forces and means, the state of combat readiness, and strategic planning. He did not understand that sabotage at rear storage facilities was much more important than a direct attack on airfields. Discussing these plans, Bulganin argued with me and General Zakharov, head of the intelligence department General Staff, arguing that instead of explosions in Innsbruck, in Austria - in areas where American fuel depots are located - it would be much more effective to blow up American planes directly at airfields in Germany and France. He said that this would undermine American morale and the Americans would not be able to use their bases in Europe.

Bulganin tried by all means to avoid responsibility for making decisions. Letters requiring an immediate response remained unsigned for months. The entire secretariat of the Council of Ministers was horrified by this style of work, especially when Stalin, having gone to the Caucasus on vacation, entrusted Bulganin with the duties of Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Beria personally appealed to Stalin with a request to speed up the passage of documents on the atomic bomb, which were in Bulganin’s secretariat, through Bulganin. Stalin allowed his deputies to sign the most important resolutions, bypassing Bulganin. Thus, a precedent arose in the Council of Ministers of creating a bureau for various directions government work.

Bulganin's appearance was deceiving. Unlike Khrushchev or Beria, Bulganin, always beautifully dressed, had a noble appearance. Later I found out that he was an alcoholic and really appreciated the ballerinas and singers from the Bolshoi Theater. This man did not have the slightest political principles - an obedient slave to any leader. Stalin, for his loyalty, appointed him First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Khrushchev, for the same, made him Chairman of the Council of Ministers to replace Malenkov. Later, in 1957, when Bulganin, together with Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich and Voroshilov, tried to remove Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich at a meeting of the party group brought forward an original accusation against him. “He was a Stalinist informer. For this Stalin made him a marshal Soviet Union, said Khrushchev. “Of course, after we exposed his anti-party treasonous behavior, we will strip him of his rank and demote him.” (My former deputy, Colonel Studnikov, who was present at that meeting, told me this.)

In March 1958, Bulganin was appointed chairman of the board of the State Bank, then, three months later, he was sent to work at the Stavropol Economic Council, in the region where the then unknown Mikhail Gorbachev began his career. Bulganin eventually retired, and I met him in the center of Moscow in the early 70s in line for watermelons.

By appointing Bulganin, whom the military did not respect, as Minister of the Armed Forces, Stalin achieved his goal and became the arbiter of the destinies of both the real commanders - such as Vasilevsky, Zhukov, Shtemenko, Konev, Rokossovsky and Bagramyan - and Bulganin himself. Bulganin would never take responsibility for any serious decision, even one within his competence, although no one could do anything without his resolution. Thus, neither side - neither the true leaders nor the fake figure - could act independently of each other. This encouraged hostility and rivalry between the military.

Abakumov arrested generals close to Zhukov in Germany on charges that at first seemed non-political: embezzlement of funds and removal (for himself) of valuables, furniture, paintings and jewelry from Germany and Austria. From recently published archival materials it is clear that these people were extorted from testifying about Zhukov’s anti-Stalin statements. In 1944, during the war, Stalin ordered Bogdan Kobulov, Beria's deputy, to install listening devices in Zhukov's Moscow apartment. Listening to the apartments of Zhukov and Admiral Kuznetsov did not give the results that were so hoped for. However, some famous marshals and generals were imprisoned, and some of them were shot for anti-Stalin statements recorded by listening devices, or in connection with testimonies that were extorted from them by Abakumov’s people.

Zhukov and Kuznetsov, maintaining their dignity, openly admitted their mistakes; Zhukov “repented” of awarding the Order of the Red Star to the famous singer Ruslanova. Although during the war he had such a right, in peacetime only the Supreme Council could award awards.

Marshal Kulik and General Rybalchenko were shot in 1959. The rest were in prison; they were released after Stalin's death. Novikov and Admiral Kuznetsov were reinstated in 1951-1953, and after Stalin's death all charges against them were dropped. Zhukov remained in the position of commander of the military district; in 1952, Stalin introduced him to the Central Committee. Only after March 1953 was he recalled back to Moscow and appointed First Deputy Minister of Defense.

Zhukov, understandably, was hostile to the entire apparatus of the Ministry of State Security. He didn’t care who gave the orders to monitor him - Beria, Abakumov or Bogdan Kobulov; they all got into his personal life. The bugging of Zhukov's apartment was stopped in 1953, after Stalin's death, but was resumed by Khrushchev in 1957, and Brezhnev continued the bugging until Zhukov's death in 1974. Even in retirement, Zhukov remained a potential threat to Khrushchev and Brezhnev, a military hero who could lead the military opposition if nominated by the military.

Viktor Abakumov was born in 1908. He served as Minister of State Security from 1946 to 1951. He was a tall man with a shock of dark hair and a strong-willed face. Despite the fact that he had no education, thanks to his innate intelligence and strength of character, he climbed to the very top. His work in the Cheka began with technical support for operations; he had no dealings with agents and dealt with safe houses and cars. Later, during the purge of the 1930s, he made a name for himself under Bogdan Kobulov, Beria's deputy. Shortly before the war, Abakumov was promoted: he became Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs. When Mikheev, the head of military counterintelligence, shot himself while surrounded near Kiev, Stalin replaced him with Abakumov, who was then only thirty-four years old. In his new position, Abakumov was responsible for the political reliability of the troops and the fight against German espionage in the armed forces; At the same time, he gained experience in matters of intelligence and counterintelligence. He could not be compared with Beria in terms of professional abilities, but his business acumen greatly distinguished him from other apparatchiks.

In December 1945, Beria was relieved of the post of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, which he had held since 1938. He no longer supervised the security agencies, unless it directly related to his main work: he headed the Special Committee on Problem No. 1 - the atomic bomb and the fuel and energy complex.

When Abakumov was appointed Minister of State Security instead of Merkulov in 1946, he was not close to Beria. On the contrary, Stalin gave Abakumov instructions to collect incriminating evidence on everyone in whose hands there was power, including Beria. Abakumov was able to prove that Malenkov was well aware of the cover-up of problems in the aircraft industry, and in 1947 Malenkov was reprimanded, removed from his post and temporarily exiled to Kazakhstan. He was removed from the Secretariat of the Central Committee, and his duties were transferred to Kuznetsov, Zhdanov’s protégé. Abakumov and Kuznetsov established the closest friendly relations.

However, two months later, Stalin appointed Malenkov Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Beria supported Malenkov at that time and did not hide the fact that they often met. Abakumov, for his part, informed Stalin that Malenkov and Beria sympathized with the repressed leaders of the aviation industry and the military. Abakumov familiarized himself with police documents about Beria’s guards who grabbed women on the street and brought them to Beria, which caused complaints from husbands and parents.

The balance of power in Stalin's entourage was as follows: both Beria and Malenkov maintained close working relationships with Pervukhin and Saburov, who dealt with economic issues. They were all part of the same group. They promoted their people to powerful positions in government. The second group, which later became known as the “Leningrad” group, included: Voznesensky, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and head of the State Planning Committee; Zhdanov, Second Secretary of the Party Central Committee; Kuznetsov, secretary of the Central Committee, responsible for personnel, including state security agencies; Rodionov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation; Kosygin, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers for light industry and Finance, nominated during the period of preparation and implementation of the monetary reform (in 1948 he was Minister of Finance), and after the “Leningrad Affair” he was transferred to a low-prestige job in the Ministry of Light Industry. The second group appointed its people to the positions of secretaries of district party organizations. Kuznetsov in 1945 nominated Popov, the former director of the aircraft plant, as secretary of the Moscow party organization, and Popov became a member of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee and secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) at the same time. Zhdanov encouraged his attempts to control the ministers through elections to the Moscow Party Committee. Zhdanov and Kuznetsov exercised dual control over members of the government: through Popov and through the Central Committee (Yeltsin tried to do something similar when he became secretary of the Moscow Party Committee. This is one of the reasons for his conflict with the Central Committee apparatus).

Thus, members of the government could be manipulated without the intervention of Beria, Malenkov and Pervukhin. When Zhdanov died in 1948, Popov demanded that the ministers, as party members, submit to him, the head of the Moscow Party Committee. Malenkov, seeking to remove Popov, interpreted this demand as evidence of a “conspiracy” and the emergence of an “independent” center of power in the Moscow party organization. Malenkov's opinion was supported by the ministers, who complained to Stalin that Popov constantly interfered in their work. Khrushchev attended weekly Politburo meetings in Moscow and in those years was close to the group of Beria and Malenkov.

Stalin encouraged this rivalry; he understood that his power would not suffer. In addition, Stalin was aware that the struggle for power within his old guard gave him the opportunity to get rid of them all at the first need. He could always replace them with young party workers from the localities who had no experience of intrigue at the top.

During this struggle for power, Stalin and Zhdanov launched a campaign “to fight the cosmopolitans” in order to strengthen the country’s isolation and drive out any outside ideological influences from the intelligentsia. Another goal of Stalin was to strengthen the position of the USSR in Eastern Europe and establish there basically the same regime as existed in the Soviet Union.

At the same time, Israel's victory in the War of Independence strengthened the consciousness of their own cultural community among Soviet Jews.

It was this campaign that allowed Stalin to get rid of the leaders of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, who had long irritated him. They insisted on fulfilling promises made during the war that were known abroad. Their connections with influential people in the West, much needed during the war, became enough of a clue for Stalin to decide to destroy them. The anti-Semitic views of the party leader played an important role in this.

A year after Churchill gave his famous speech at Fulton in 1946 and the Cold War began, a cooling in all aspects of Soviet intellectual life immediately followed, with so-called scientific debates arose in biology, literary criticism and linguistics, philosophy, political economy. Both Kremlin factions used this campaign, each to their own advantage, trying to find ideological sins in their opponents. This was not just a confrontation between Jews (cosmopolitans) and devout communists; The essence of the campaign, rather, was a radical reshuffling of personnel in scientific and creative circles in the interests of the ruling elite.

Everyone knows the “case of biologists”: the disputes over genetics that arose in the 30s quickly moved from the field of science to the field of politics. On one side were world-famous biologists who made the case for funding further research in genetics. They were opposed by a group of careerists from science, led by Trofim Lysenko, who speculated on Marxist ideology. He presented the government with a vision of an uninterrupted food supply based on the achievements of Marxist biology, promised the beginning of a new era of abundance in ten years, and openly fought against geneticists, arguing that they put spokes in the wheels of progress.

His promises turned out to be a bluff. New debates began, with articles in scientific journals criticizing Lysenko and his followers. Outstanding scientists wrote to the Central Committee, revealing serious mistakes of the Kremlin biologist.

Zhdanov nominated his son Yuri, who was at one time married to Stalin’s daughter Svetlana, to the position of head of the Science Department of the CPSU Central Committee. Yuri Zhdanov supported Lysenko's critics. In this case, Abakumov’s information from scientific biological circles, obtained from trustworthy sources, was used: Academician Lysenko is trying to deceive the government by unfoundedly reporting his achievements in agrobiology, which in fact are absent. In their letters, scientists said that Lysenko's reign in agrobiology since the 1930s and his rejection of any research on genetics were disastrous for scientific progress.

Lyudvigov, head of Beria's secretariat in the Council of Ministers, told me how Zhdanov used this situation to increase his influence in scientific circles. He was not a supporter of freedom of scientific activity, he was not interested in scientific issues themselves - he was rather concerned about expanding his influence. The speeches of scientists against Lysenko helped him appoint his people to posts controlling science and industry.

After Zhdanov’s death, the official line in science again began to lean towards supporting Lysenko and rejecting genetics. Unfortunately, published works on the fate of genetics in the 1940s hardly mention that the sudden changes in official attitudes towards genetic scientists coincided with, and were largely caused by, dramatic changes in the party leadership responsible for science.

At the end of the 40s, I became friends with Anna Tsukanova, deputy head of the Department of Leading Party Bodies, that is, in essence, Malenkov’s deputy.

I knew that my wife had a friend, Anna, but I did not meet her until one day they invited me to dinner at the Ararat restaurant, in the center of Moscow. When I arrived for lunch, met Anna and found out her full name, I realized that this was Malenkov’s deputy. I immediately liked her pleasant appearance and the long dark braid laid at the back of her head - a real Russian beauty. This was the beginning of our long friendship. Anna and I spoke like colleagues who knew each other's responsibilities; We both had access to classified materials, so we could freely discuss our work. And now, more than forty years later, we remain friends.

Anna often said that the line of Comrade Stalin and his comrade-in-arms Malenkov was to constantly move high-ranking party leaders and state security officials, not allowing them to remain in the same place for more than three years in a row, so as not to get used to power.

I was strongly impressed by Anna’s words that the Central Committee does not always take action on cases of bribery, “corruption,” etc., based on reports from the Party Control Commission and security agencies. Stalin and Malenkov preferred not to punish loyal high-ranking officials. If they were considered rivals, then this compromising evidence was immediately used for their dismissal or repression.

Anna revealed to me that the leadership knew about the costs of almost every major ideological campaign, but the goal, as Malenkov said, justified these costs. It is now obvious that the terrible price that the people paid for ideological campaigns and purges was a criminal mistake by the then rulers and undermined the entire system.

Anna did not suspect that she opened my eyes to the real state of affairs at the top, saying that the Central Committee knew: the campaign against cosmopolitans was inflated and exaggerated. True, she was sure that over time these mistakes would be corrected.

It was from her that I learned that Stalin himself made the decision to purge the Georgian party organization. She said that everyone in the Central Committee was afraid to propose any changes in the personnel composition of the leadership of the Georgian Communist Party, since the issue affected Stalin’s personal connections and this could offend him. Anna and I thought that this was how Stalin reacted to bribery in Georgia. Now we know from archival documents that the so-called “Mingrelian affair,” one of the last purges, was organized by Stalin himself.

In the last years of Stalin's reign, the small circle of leaders included Malenkov, Bulganin, Khrushchev and Beria, and Stalin in every possible way contributed to inciting rivalry among them. In 1951, Beria fell out of favor. Stalin ordered listening devices installed in Beria's mother's apartment, deciding that neither Beria nor his wife would allow any anti-Stalin statements, but his mother, Marta, lived in Georgia and could well have expressed sympathy for the persecuted Mingrelian nationalists. Beria was a Mingrelian, and the Mingrelians did not get along with the Gurians, whom Stalin trusted most. The Mingrelians' case was essentially based on trumped-up charges and a conspiracy to secede from the Soviet Union. Stalin started this business, wanting to get rid of Beria. He demanded that Beria destroy his most trusted comrades. Pretending that he still trusted Beria, Stalin granted him the rare honor of addressing party and state activists at the celebration of the thirty-fourth anniversary of the October Revolution on November 6, 1951.

In 1948, four years before the Georgian purge, Stalin appointed General Rukhadze as Georgian Minister of State Security. During the war, he headed military counterintelligence in the Caucasus. His anti-Beria sentiments were well known. On Stalin’s personal order, Rukhadze, with the help of Ryumin, who enjoyed a bad reputation, collected dirt on Beria and his entourage. At first there was simply daily surveillance of Beria’s Georgian relatives. Beria did not hide from either Stalin or Molotov that his wife’s uncle, Gegechkori, was the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Menshevik government of Georgia in Paris; He also did not hide the fact that his nephew collaborated with the Germans while being a prisoner of war during the war.

At the end of the 30s, and then after the war, Soviet intelligence was engaged in Georgian emigrants in France. The most successful in this regard was the work of NKVD officer Vardo Maximalishvili, Beria's former secretary.

At that time, there were rumors in government circles that Beria’s son Sergei was going to marry Svetlana Alliluyeva after her divorce from Zhdanov’s son. Beria's secretary Ludwigov, who told me this story in Vladimir prison, said that Nina, Beria's wife, and Beria himself were resolutely against this marriage. Beria knew that his opponents from the Politburo were using this marriage in the struggle for power, that Stalin’s strength was no longer the same, and if Beria connected himself with Stalin through family ties, then in the event of Stalin’s death he would be doomed. The situation gave rise to their mutual hostility, and from this point of view it can be explained why in 1951 Stalin ordered General Rukhadze to continue the investigation into bribery of Georgian Mingrelian officials. It should be noted that in Georgia there was a very significant layer of Mingrelians in the security agencies and in leadership positions.

Stalin ordered Rukhadze to find evidence and look for evidence of foreign connections of the Mingrelians of Georgia, then he could summarize: “These Mingrelians cannot be trusted at all. I don’t want to be surrounded by people with dubious connections abroad.” This was enough for Rukhadze to understand that he had to fabricate a conspiracy. As the writer Stolyarov, who is working on the book “The Praetorians,” told me, shortly after this meeting, Rukhadze attended a dinner party, where, after drinking heavily, he boasted that he was close to Stalin and that he gave him instructions on carrying out sabotage and kidnappings in Turkey and France. Also present at the dinner was Georgian Interior Minister Bziava, a Mingrelian, who the next day wrote a letter to the newly appointed Minister of State Security Ignatiev in Moscow and reported on Rukhadze’s behavior at the dinner. Ignatiev reported this to Stalin. Stalin ordered that this letter be shown to Rukhadze and that the letter be destroyed in his presence. Ignatiev warned Rukhadze that, although he still enjoyed Stalin’s favor, “you must not allow yourself to let yourself go.”

Rukhadze’s next step was the arrest of the former Minister of State Security of Georgia Rapava, Prosecutor General Shonia and academician Shariy, a member of the credentials commission of the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, who for some time worked as deputy chief of foreign intelligence of the NKVD. All of them were accused of having connections with emigrant organizations through NKVD agent Gigelius, who returned from Paris with his French wife in 1947. Gigelia and his wife, despite her French citizenship, were arrested on Stalin's orders and tortured to force them to act according to a pre-planned scenario.

Thus began the purge of the Georgian leadership, those who were close to Beria. The anti-graft campaign in Georgia escalated into accusations of a conspiracy to secede the Mingrelians from the Soviet Union. Stalin did this out of personal hostility towards Beria and in order to deprive Beria of the basis of his influence in Georgia.

Stalin began this campaign in 1951, shortly after Beria's noticeable rise in popularity due to successful work on the atomic problem and carrying out the second test explosion of an atomic bomb. The “master” knew that this was a special achievement because the nuclear device did not copy the American designs of the atomic bomb, but instead of encouraging the success of his protégé, Stalin wanted a person more dependent on him to handle this matter now.

The Politburo invited Beria to head the party commission to investigate the case of “Mingrelian draft dodgers”, sending him to Tbilisi to expose “Mingrelian nationalism” and dismiss his closest ally, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia Charkviani, who, on Stalin’s orders, was replaced by Beria’s longtime enemy Mgeladze. Beria, in addition, had to close Mingrelian newspapers.

At the moment when Beria addressed the participants of the ceremonial meeting on the occasion of the celebration of the anniversary of the October Revolution, the First Deputy Minister of State Security of the USSR Ogoltsov, on the orders of Stalin, sent a group of investigators to Tbilisi to the arrested Mingrelians in order to obtain confessions that would discredit Beria and his wife Nina. In addition, Ogoltsov approved a plan for the rapid development of Beria’s relatives and inner circle. The Mingrelians did not admit to anything. They spent a year and a half in prison, they were not allowed to sleep, they were tortured, and Beria released them only after Stalin’s death. Eight months before his death, Stalin arrested Rukhadze, who became an unwanted witness for him. Officially, he was accused of deceiving the party and government.

Now Kirill Stolyarov has clarified for me the situation in which I found myself in Georgia in 1951 (or 1952), when Ignatiev ordered me to go to Tbilisi. I had to assess the capabilities of the local Georgian intelligence service and help them prepare the kidnapping of the leaders of the Georgian Mensheviks in Paris, relatives of Beria’s wife, Nina Gegechkori. I had to report personally to Ignatiev. I was informed that the initiative to carry out this operation came from Tbilisi, from General Rukhadze, and Stalin personally approved it. Rukhadze insisted that Georgian agents take over this operation. With this idea, he arrived in Moscow and went to see Ignatiev. Going back to Tbilisi, he invited me to fly with him. I preferred to go by train.

What I saw in Tbilisi shocked me deeply. The only capable agent with good connections in France, Gigelia, was in prison on charges of espionage and Mingrelian nationalism. Rukhadze's agents could not be trusted; they even refused to speak Russian to me. Deputy Rukhadze, who planned to go to Paris, had never been abroad. He was sure that if he brought shish kebab and a basket of Georgian wine to the Georgian emigrants, and organized a feast in the most famous restaurant in Paris, he would win their favor. They also proposed sending a delegation of cultural figures to Paris, but everyone understood that these grandiose plans masked Rukhadze’s desire to send his wife to Paris. She was a modest woman and a good singer, but could only represent the Tbilisi Conservatory in the delegation. She had not the slightest idea about her husband's plans.

A group of investigators from Moscow, working on the Mingrelians’ case, meanwhile happily informed Rukhadze that they had almost established a connection between Beria’s family and the arrested nationalists. Then in Rukhadze’s office, under the glass on the table, I noticed a portrait of young Beria, one of his sworn enemies. Rukhadze actively, trying to please Stalin, tried to compromise first Beria’s former subordinates in the intelligence service, and then himself.

Rukhadze’s amateur adventurism scared me and I hastened to return to Moscow to report everything to Ignatiev. He and his first deputy Ogoltsov listened to me attentively, but noted that it was not us who should judge this matter, but the “instance,” since Rukhadze personally corresponded with Stalin in Georgian. Stalin, however, understood that Rukhadze and Ryumin were becoming dangerous: instead of simply seeking confessions of treason, during the investigation they showed great interest in intrigues in the party and government leadership. Abakumov wrote from prison to Beria and Malenkov on October 11, 1952 that Ryumin was interested in internal relations in the Politburo, using information from top secret reports sent by the MGB to Stalin.

Stalin decided to sacrifice Ryumin and Rukhadze. Rukhadze was soon imprisoned in Lefortovo; Ryumin was removed from the post of Deputy Minister of State Security and fired from the authorities in November 1952. After Stalin's death he was arrested, but even if Stalin had been alive, he would still have destroyed him.

After Stalin's death, Beria did not release Rukhadze from prison, but Rukhadze's victims were released. Rukhadze and Ryumin, both under arrest, bombarded Beria with letters asking for his release, addressing him as a “Great Man.” Three months later, when Khrushchev and Malenkov arrested Beria, these letters implicated them in a conspiracy allegedly organized by Beria. Thus, Rukhadze was shot in Tbilisi in 1955 along with his former victims, who were again arrested for their connection with Beria.

Hidden motives and ambitions played a much more important role in political events in the late 40s and early 50s than seemed at the time and seems now. We (those who saw all this and suffered from it as a result) later came to the conclusion that the party elite (Stalin and those who followed him) used campaigns to combat cosmopolitanism and the consequences of the cult of personality only in order to remove the roads of their opponents and adversaries. Their goal was to achieve absolute power or introduce new figures into their circle. They expected that the Party Control Committee and security agencies would constantly supply them with incriminating materials. General rule was to collect incriminating facts against everyone, and, if necessary, use this information. I was both a tool and a victim of this system.

Abakumov reported compromising material to Stalin personally, and on the basis of this information, Stalin could blackmail the entire leadership. After Zhdanov's death, the delicate balance of power was disrupted. Stalin did not allow Zhdanov to finally get rid of Malenkov when he became involved in a scandalous story with the aviation industry; instead, he simply demoted him but kept him as an influential member of the Politburo. Stalin forced Malenkov to “supervise” the correction of errors in the aviation industry, knowing that Malenkov would bend over backwards, fearing further revelations. Thus, he remained in his place as a counterweight to Zhdanov, whose followers soon paid the price.

From Anna Tsukanova I learned amazing facts about the “Leningrad case,” during which all of Zhdanov’s people and the rivals of Malenkov and Beria were convicted and shot. In 1949 we were unaware of the horrific charges against them. At that time, Anna only told me that Kuznetsov and Voznesensky were relieved of their posts because they were involved in falsifying the results of party elections at the Leningrad city party conference. Kuznetsov’s friendship with Abakumov did not save him; Stalin tested Abakumov's sincerity by forcing him to destroy his friend.

We must remember something that is often overlooked: the mentality of the idealistic communists in the late 40s and early 50s. For us, the most terrible crime of a high-ranking party or government figure was treason, but falsification of party elections was no less a crime. The cause of the party was sacred, and especially internal party elections by secret ballot, which were considered the most effective instrument of internal party democracy. Therefore, when Anna told me that the party leaders of Leningrad falsified the election results at the party conference, these people ceased to exist for me.

Specific details of the “Leningrad case” remained a secret to party activists; Even Anna had no idea of ​​the severity of the charges. Now we know that they were accused of trying to split the Communist Party by organizing an opposition center in Leningrad. One of the convicts, Kapustin, was accused of espionage, but no evidence was presented.

All this was fabricated and caused by the ongoing struggle among Stalin's assistants. The motives that forced Malenkov, Beria and Khrushchev to destroy the Leningrad group were clear: to strengthen their power. They were afraid that the young Leningrad team would replace Stalin. Now we know that the results of the vote count during the secret ballot in Leningrad in 1948 were indeed falsified, but those convicted had nothing to do with it. The entire Politburo, including Stalin, Malenkov, Khrushchev and Beria, unanimously adopted a decision obliging Abakumov to arrest and try the Leningrad group, but, no matter what they wrote in school textbooks on the history of the party and no matter what Khrushchev wrote in his memoirs, the initiator of the case was not Abakumov. Indeed, his subordinates, under his leadership, fabricated this case, but Abakumov acted in accordance with the orders received.

At first, all those arrested were accused of crimes of moderate gravity. For example, Voznesensky - in the loss of documents from the secretariat and in nepotism: his younger brother and sister occupied responsible positions in Moscow and Leningrad. This also indirectly affected Mikoyan: one of his sons married Kuznetsov’s daughter.

The “Leningrad Affair” remained a secret even after Stalin’s death, and even I, although I was the head of an independent service of the MGB, did not know about the fate of those who died in obscurity.

The head of the Leningrad MGB, General Kubatkin, was repressed and shot after a closed trial. Now the documents of the “Leningrad case” have been partially published. The hands of everyone who was a member of the Politburo at that time are stained with blood, because they signed the death warrant for the accused three weeks before the start of the trial in Leningrad.

The “Leningrad Affair” also coincided with the sharp debunking of Molotov, who, although he remained a member of the Politburo, was removed from his post as Minister of Foreign Affairs in March 1949. He was replaced by Vyshinsky. Molotov took the arrest of his wife, Polina Zhemchuzhina, a Jew, very hard; At first she was accused of abuse of power and loss of secret documents (which could have been stolen on Stalin’s orders). By order of Stalin, under the coercion of investigators, in order to discredit Zhemchuzhina in the eyes of her husband and the Politburo, two of her subordinates were forced to slander her and admit that they had an intimate relationship with her. She spent a year in prison, and then she was sent to Kazakhstan. Stalin hoped to receive dirt on Molotov from Zhemchuzhina. Her arrest was kept secret, and I learned about it only just before Stalin’s death, when Fitin, who was then the Minister of State Security of Kazakhstan, complained to me how difficult it was to be personally responsible for Zhemchuzhina. Ignatiev kept asking about her, trying to find out about her connections with the Zionists and the Israeli ambassador to the USSR, Golda Meyer. In January or February 1953, Fitin was summoned by Goglidze, the first deputy minister of state security, and ordered Zhemchuzhina to be transferred to the Lubyanka. Fitin realized that the main purpose of all this was to accuse Molotov of having links with the Zionists, and became worried that changes in leadership might affect those who worked with Molotov, including him.

At that time, at the end of 1952 - beginning of 1953, we did not know that Stalin openly opposed Molotov and Mikoyan at the Plenum of the Central Committee. Stalin declared them conspirators. He accused Molotov of caving in to blackmail and pressure from imperialist circles, implying that Zhemchuzhina (although her name was not mentioned) was involved in the Zionist conspiracy and secret connections with Golda Meyer.

Immediately after the plenum, Molotov was demanded to return the original documents on the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which included secret protocols, from the Foreign Ministry secretariat to Stalin’s office. From that day until their publication in 1992, they were kept in the secret archives of the Politburo. I do not exclude the possibility that Stalin was going to charge Molotov with pro-German sympathies or ingratiating himself with Hitler during these secret negotiations.

In September 1950, Drozdov, Deputy Minister of State Security of Ukraine, was transferred to Moscow. We knew each other for almost thirty years. My wife was friends with his wife. Having arrived in Lvov to find the leader of the underground OUN, Shukhevych, I lived with Drozdov in a dacha not far from the city. In Moscow, Drozdov was put in charge of Special Bureau No. 2 of the USSR Ministry of State Security, which was supposed to engage in secret surveillance and kidnapping of Stalin’s enemies within the country - both real and, as I now understand, and fictitious.

At first, Abakumov and Ogoltsov decided that my sabotage and intelligence bureau would be engaged in such operations, both in the country and abroad, and Drozdov would be my deputy, since Eitingon had fallen out of favor. This did not suit Abakumov; he organized the work in such a way that internal operations entrusted to Drozdov. Drozdov had no connections in Moscow, but he was entrusted with these delicate matters. His first task was to monitor the reliability of the eavesdropping system and make sure that our “bugs” were not detected. It was then that I learned from Drozdov that in 1942 Stalin ordered Bogdan Kobulov, Beria’s deputy, to install listening equipment in the apartments of Marshals Voroshilov, Budyonny and Zhukov. Later, in 1950, the names of Molotov and Mikoyan were added to this list. There were grandiose plans to secretly eavesdrop on all telephone conversations in the leadership of the Central Committee, but this was carried out only during the time of Brezhnev, when the technology had reached the required level.

Drozdov was glad that he was not involved in any kidnappings ordered by Stalin, but his subordinates twice had to work for the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence: they had to talk to foreign diplomats who were meeting with Russian writers on the street and start fights. The first thing Beria did when he became Minister of Internal Affairs after Stalin's death was to fire Drozdov because he knew too much about internal intrigues and because he was on bad terms with Bogdan Kobulov. Drozdov's dismissal at the age of fifty was simply salvation for him, although it seemed like a collapse at the time: otherwise he would have been arrested along with Beria.

In July 1951, Abakumov was arrested. In the last year of his work as minister, especially in the last nine months, he was completely isolated from Stalin. The Kremlin list of visitors shows that after November 1950 Stalin did not receive Abakumov. Stalin believed that Abakumov knew too much. For me, his collapse was like a bolt from the blue.

In May or June 1951, when I last time spent several hours in Abakumov’s office, he looked very confident in himself and made decisions without hesitation. Only later did I learn from my cellmate Mamulov that in the last months of 1950 Abakumov tried to get closer to him, since he knew that he had direct access to Beria. Mamulov said that Abakumov asked him to arrange for Beria to accept him, and claimed that he had always been loyal and never participated in intrigues against him.

Abakumov was accused of delaying the investigation into important crimes and concealing information that Gavrilov and Lavrentiev (homosexuals who were infiltrated into the American embassy) were double agents of the CIA and the MGB.

Of course, Abakumov was responsible for fabricated confessions and false testimony given under torture, but it is also true that first the prosecutor’s office, and then Ryumin, accused him of crimes that he did not commit. He was never a politician and could not have organized a conspiracy to seize power; he was absolutely devoted to Stalin and believed in him.

At first I did not understand the circumstances of Abakumov’s collapse; He and I often held opposing points of view, and it seemed to me that the party leadership wanted to correct serious mistakes in the work of the MGB. Politburo Commission, which included Beria and Malenkov. Ignatiev and Shkiryatov (head of the Party Control Commission), from the very beginning seemed interested in checking the effectiveness of intelligence and counterintelligence operations. It soon became clear, however, that Abakumov's arrest was the beginning of a new purge. As a result, Malenkov’s position strengthened, as Stalin appointed his former secretary, later head of the department of the leading party and Soviet bodies of the Central Committee, Ignatiev to the post of Minister of State Security. In the absence of both Abakumov and the Leningrad group, Malenkov and Ignatiev, in alliance with Khrushchev, formed a new center of power in the leadership.

After a meeting with Ignatiev and his deputies for overseas intelligence, Ryasny and Savchenko, I returned to my office in despondency. Their ideas about our active operations abroad were different from mine. They planned to begin eliminating the heads of emigrant groups in Germany and Paris in order to report these high-profile cases to Stalin. They did not care that it was much more profitable for us to influence the activities of emigration. They were going to use two agents, a married couple, to deal with retired general Kapustyansky, a Ukrainian nationalist who received this rank from the tsar himself. He was over seventy, he had retired from politics and was not dangerous to us, but Ignatiev wanted to quickly report on his liquidation in order to impress the government. I was categorically against it and convinced Ignatiev and his deputy Epishev not to do this, since Kapustyansky’s death would deprive us of access to his mail, which was our most important source of regular information about the situation in emigration.

Even now I am amazed by the persistence with which the leaders of the Committee of Information of 1948-1951 sought to initiate terrorist attacks against emigration abroad and political repression in the countries of Eastern Europe. I remember how a young employee of the Information Committee, Kondrashov, who moved there from counterintelligence in 1949 and later became a general, defended the need for terrorism in West Germany. In my opinion, he and Korotkov reported on materials received from Austria about the allegedly criminal Zionist activities of Rudolf Slansky, Secretary General Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, who fell victim to the famous trial of 1953.

I remember that Ignatiev and Epishev signed a directive for our foreign stations to increase the penetration of agents into Menshevik organizations, which were allegedly among our main opponents. This happened in 1952, thirty-five years after 1917. I sharply stated that our station in Vienna deals only with American military installations in Europe and has neither the time nor the people to track down the Mensheviks. Ignatiev, despite the fact that both his deputies Ryasnoy and Epishev supported him, said: “The directive is good, but you are right. Let's call her off."

My wife and I were worried about the frequent arrests among MGB workers. Growing tensions were noticeable both in the anti-Semitic campaign and in government intrigues. My wife felt that she and I were following the testimony of those who were arrested - Raikhman, Eitingon, Matusov, Sverdlov. When Anna came to visit us, for the first time in my life I talked to my wife about prospects and the possibility of finding another job. Being the head of a service under an incompetent minister with deputies like Ryumin, adventurers and careerists, I inevitably had to find myself in a difficult position. I had just received a diploma from the military academy, and this gave me hope for new job in the military or party sphere. Anna agreed to help me...

In 1952, Malenkov called me and said that the Central Committee was entrusting me with an important task, the details of which Ignatiev would tell me. Soon I was invited to his office, where, oddly enough, he was alone. After greeting, Ignatiev said: “At the top they are very concerned about the possibility of forming an “Anti-Bolshevik bloc of peoples” led by Kerensky. This initiative of the American reaction must be decisively stopped, and the top of the bloc must be beheaded.” I was ordered to urgently prepare a plan of action in Paris and London, where Kerensky was expected to visit.

A week later, however, I reported to Ignatiev that difficulties had arisen in preparing the operation, since our man in Paris, Khokhlov, who could find approaches to Kerensky, came to the attention of enemy counterintelligence. The last time he crossed the border, the Austrian police became interested in his documents, and his false passport was seized for verification.

Our illegal battle group in Paris was led by Prince Gagarin, whose task was to find approaches to NATO headquarters in Fontainebleau to destroy communication and alarm systems in the event of an escalation of the situation or the outbreak of hostilities. The existence of this combat group was reported on various occasions to both Stalin and Malenkov. I asked Ignatiev whether we should redirect these agents to eliminate Kerensky.

Ignatiev, who never took risks, said that this should be decided at the top. A day or two later, I read a TASS report that Ukrainian nationalists and Croatian emigrants did not agree to the creation of an “Anti-Bolshevik bloc” under the chairmanship of Kerensky - they did not want to have a Russian at the head of this organization.

The next morning, I sent a report to Ignatiev about the work of the battle group, enclosing TASS information so that he would understand that Kerensky no longer posed a threat to the Soviet Union. Ignatiev called me, Ryasny and Savchenko into the office. He began with reproaches that they proposed the liquidation of Kerensky without delving into the internal hostilities in the anti-communist groups. Ignatiev emphasized that Comrade Malenkov is especially concerned that we do not stray away from the main action, the fight against the main enemy - the United States.

After the meeting, Ignatiev suggested that we prepare proposals for the reorganization of intelligence work abroad. This reorganization was led personally by Stalin. On his initiative, at the end of 1952, the Main Intelligence Directorate was created in the MGB. It was headed by a newly released Lefortovo prison Pitovranov. In order to improve operational efficiency, the new Main Directorate combined intelligence and counterintelligence. His boss took the position of deputy minister.

I was not invited to the Kremlin meeting on this issue, which was chaired by Stalin, but Malenkov officially announced at a meeting in the MGB the decision, which he described as a plan to create a “powerful intelligence network abroad”, “supported” by active counterintelligence operations at home. countries. Malenkov quoted Stalin: “Working against our main enemy is impossible without creating a powerful intelligence and sabotage apparatus abroad. It is not necessary to create residencies directly in the United States, but we must act decisively against the Americans, primarily in Europe and the Middle East. We must take advantage of the new opportunities presented to us by increased European, Baltic and Chinese emigration to the United States. America's vulnerability lies in the multiethnic structure of its population. We must look for new opportunities to exploit minorities in America. No non-Native American who works for us should be forced to work against the country they come from. We must make the most of immigrants from Germany, Italy and France in the United States, convincing them that by helping us they are working for their homeland, which is humiliated by American domination.”

The year 1953 began, and I was very concerned about personnel changes in the MGB on Stalin's initiative. I knew that my name was on a list of 213 people, which included the names of senior executives who were testified to have been repressed in connection with the “Leningrad Affair,” the case of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee and the “Doctors’ Conspiracy.” Using these materials, Malenkov dismissed or completely removed many employees from Moscow, starting a serious personnel reshuffle in the highest party and government structures. He wanted to attract new people to the apparatus who would be new to the mechanisms of power in Moscow and would carry out any order without the slightest hesitation.

This purge soon became bloody. Lieutenant General Vlasik, the head of the Kremlin guard, was sent to Siberia to serve as a camp commander and was secretly arrested there. Vlasik was charged with concealing the famous letter from L. Timashuk, which Ryumin used to start the “doctors’ case”, “suspicious connections with foreign intelligence agents and secret collusion with Abakumov.”

After his arrest, Vlasik was mercilessly beaten and tortured. His desperate letters to Stalin about his innocence remained unanswered. Vlasik was forced to admit that he abused his power, that he allowed suspicious people to attend official receptions in the Kremlin, Red Square and the Bolshoi Theater, where Stalin and members of the Politburo were present, who could thus be exposed to terrorist attacks. Vlasik remained in prison until 1955, when he was now convicted of embezzlement of funds for the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, and then amnestied. Despite the support of Marshal Zhukov, his requests for rehabilitation were rejected.

Vlasik’s dismissal did not mean at all that Beria could now change people in Stalin’s personal security. In 1952, after Vlasik’s arrest, Ignatiev personally headed the Kremlin Security Directorate, combining this position with the post of Minister of State Security.

All the rumors that Stalin was killed by Beria’s people are unfounded. Without the knowledge of Ignatiev and Malenkov, no one from Stalin’s entourage could get access to Stalin. He was an old, sick man with progressive paranoia, but until his last day he remained an all-powerful ruler. He twice openly announced his desire to retire, first after the Victory celebrations in the Kremlin in 1945 and again at the Plenum of the Central Committee in October 1952, but these were just ploys to reveal the balance of power in his circle and inflame rivalry within the Politburo.

In January 1953, Malenkov and Ignatiev ordered me to prepare proposals on how to use the feedback of our adviser in China, who reported to Stalin about the directive of the Chinese leadership to recruit agents from among the Soviet specialists working there. Comrade Stalin, according to Malenkov, decided to send a copy of this message to Mao Zedong, announcing that we were recalling our adviser because we completely trusted the Chinese leadership. Kovalev, I think that’s his last name, was immediately appointed Stalin’s assistant in the apparatus of the Council of Ministers. Malenkov ordered me to consult with Kovalev about creating a new intelligence network in the Far East in order to receive reliable information about China. At the same time, he emphasized that this network should not have connections with old sources that may be known to the Chinese from the time of the Comintern.

The atmosphere was tense. At the end of February 1953, I was summoned to Ignatiev’s office, where Goglidze, his first deputy, and Konyakhin, the deputy head of the investigative unit, were present. Ignatiev said that we were going to the “authority”. It was late - Ignatiev, Goglidze and Konyakhin entered Stalin’s office, and I remained in the reception room for about an hour. Then Goglidze and Konyakhin left, and I was asked, together with Ignatiev, to arrive to Stalin in two hours for a report at his nearby dacha in Kuntsevo.

I was very excited when I entered the office, but as soon as I looked at Stalin, this feeling disappeared. What I saw amazed me. I saw a tired old man. Stalin has changed a lot. His hair had thinned considerably, and although he had always spoken slowly, he now clearly spoke with force, and the pauses between words became longer. Apparently, the rumors about two strokes were true: he suffered one after the Yalta Conference, and the other on the eve of his seventieth birthday, in 1949.

Stalin began by discussing the planned reorganization of foreign intelligence. Ignatiev asked whether there was a need to maintain two independent intelligence centers in the Ministry of State Security: the Bureau of Foreign Sabotage and the Main Intelligence Directorate. I was asked to speak. I explained that in order to carry out operations against American strategic bases and NATO bases surrounding our borders, we must constantly cooperate with the intelligence of the MGB and the Ministry of Defense. The rapid deployment of forces to carry out special missions, such as sabotage, requires cooperation.

I emphasized that the success of our sabotage operations against the Germans depended to a large extent on the quality of the intelligence network spread in the immediate vicinity of the bases that needed to be destroyed, adding that we were ready, in accordance with the directive of the Central Committee, to blow up American fuel depots in Innsbruck, in Austria. We didn't just send a task force there. Our agents had direct access to the facilities, but Abakumov's unexpected order to cancel an operation that could greatly complicate American air transport to Berlin confused us.

Stalin did not answer. There was an awkward pause for several minutes. Then he said: “The Bureau of Foreign Sabotage should be maintained as an independent apparatus, reporting directly to the Minister. It will be an important tool in the event of war for causing serious damage to the enemy at the very beginning of hostilities. Sudoplatov should also be made deputy head of the Main Intelligence Directorate so that he is aware of all our intelligence capabilities in order to use all this for sabotage purposes.”

Stalin asked me if I knew Mironov, a former party worker, now a senior member of military counterintelligence, an assistant to Epishev, and suggested that Mironov become one of the deputies of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the MGB. I replied that I met with Mironov only once, when, on the orders of the minister, I told him about the main tasks of the bureau.

There was another awkward pause. Stalin handed me a handwritten document and asked me to comment on it. This was a plan to assassinate Marshal Tito. I had never seen this document before, but Ignatiev explained that the initiative came from Ryasny and Savchenko, deputy ministers of state security, and that Pitovranov was aware of this action.

Pitovranov stood out sharply for his intelligence and outlook among the leadership of the MGB. During the war, he became head of the NKVD department in Gorky. For some time, Ryumin put him in prison on charges of the “Abakumov conspiracy,” but he was released in 1952. He was friends with my deputy Eitingon, but was forced, following orders, to organize his arrest in October 1951. Two days later, he himself ended up in Lefortovo and sat in a cell opposite Eitingon. Later I heard that Pitovranov wrote a letter from prison addressed to Stalin, where he accused Ryumin of provocatively disrupting the plans of active operations of our counterintelligence. He was released, he returned to his previous place, having received treatment for a month in Arkhangelsk, in a military sanatorium for the high command.

I told Stalin that the document proposed naive methods for eliminating Tito, which reflected dangerous incompetence in preparing the plan. The letter to Stalin read:

“The USSR MGB asks for permission to prepare and organize a terrorist attack against Tito, using the illegal agent “Max” - Comrade. Grigulevich I.R., citizen of the USSR, member of the CPSU since 1950 (certificate attached).

“Max” was transferred by us using a Costa Rican passport to Italy, where he managed to gain the trust and enter the circle of diplomats from South American countries and prominent Costa Rican figures and businessmen who visited Italy.

Using his connections, “Max”, on our instructions, achieved appointment to the post of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Costa Rica to Italy and at the same time to Yugoslavia. Carrying out his diplomatic duties, he visited Yugoslavia twice in the second half of 1952, where he was well received, had access to circles close to Tito's clique, and was promised a personal audience with Tito. The position “Max” currently occupies allows him to use his capabilities to carry out active actions against Tito.

At the beginning of February this year. Mr. “Max” was summoned by us to Vienna, where a meeting was organized with him in secret conditions. During the discussion of the Max's capabilities, he was asked how he could be most useful, given his position. “Max” proposed to take some effective action personally against Tito.

In connection with this proposal, a conversation was held with him about how he imagined it, as a result of which the following possible options for carrying out a terrorist attack against Tito were revealed:

1. Instruct “Max” to achieve a personal audience with Tito, during which he will have to release a dose of pneumonic plague bacteria from a silent mechanism disguised in clothes, which will guarantee infection and death of Tito and those present in the room. “Max” himself will not know about the essence of the drug used. In order to preserve the life of “Max”, he will be pre-vaccinated with anti-plague serum.

2. In connection with Tito’s expected trip to London, send “Max” there, using his official position and good personal relations with the Yugoslav ambassador to England, Velebit, to attend a reception at the Yugoslav embassy, ​​which, as can be expected, Velebit will give in honor of Tito.

The terrorist attack should be carried out by silently firing from a mechanism disguised as a personal item with the simultaneous release of tear gases to create panic among those present, in order to create an environment favorable for “Max” to escape and hide his traces.

3. Use one of official receptions in Belgrade, to which the wives of the diplomatic corps are invited. Carry out the terrorist attack in the same way as in the second option, entrusting it to “Max” himself, who, as a diplomat accredited to the Yugoslav government, will be invited to such a reception.

In addition, instruct “Max” to develop an option and prepare the conditions for presenting, through one of the Costa Rican representatives, a gift to Tito in the form of some jewelry in a box, the opening of which will activate a mechanism that releases an instantly acting toxic substance.

“Max” was asked to think again and make suggestions on how he could carry out the most effective measures against Tito. Methods of communication with him are determined and it is agreed that additional instructions will be given to him.

They would consider it advisable to use the capabilities of “Max” to carry out a terrorist attack against Tito. “Max”, due to his personal qualities and experience in intelligence, is suitable for carrying out such a task.

We ask for your consent."

Stalin did not make any notes on the document. The letter was not signed. In Stalin’s office, looking into his eyes, I said that “Max” was not suitable for such an assignment, since he had never been a terrorist fighter. He participated in the operation against Trotsky in Mexico, against an secret police agent in Lithuania, in the liquidation of the Trotskyist leader of Spain A. Nin, but only with the task of ensuring the militants reached the target of the action. In addition, it does not follow from the document that direct access to Tito is guaranteed. No matter how we think about Tito, we must treat him as a serious adversary who participated in military operations during the war years and, of course, will maintain his presence of mind and repel the attack. I referred to our agent "Val" - Momo Djurovic, a major general in Tito's guard. According to his reports, Tito was always on alert due to the tense internal situation in Yugoslavia. Unfortunately, “Val,” due to internal intrigues not so different from ours, lost Tito’s favor and was currently in prison.

It would be wiser to take advantage of the differences in Tito’s entourage, I noted, feverishly figuring out how to bring Eitingon, who was under arrest, into the game so that he would be responsible for the execution of the operation, since Grigulevich valued him very much - they worked side by side abroad for five years.

Ignatiev did not like my remarks, but I suddenly felt confident because the mention of Tito's high-ranking security source impressed Stalin.

However, Stalin interrupted me and, turning to Ignatiev, said that this matter must be thought over again, taking into account the internal “fights” in the leadership of Yugoslavia. Then he looked at me intently and said that since this task was important for strengthening our positions in Eastern Europe and for our influence in the Balkans, we must approach it extremely responsibly in order to avoid a failure similar to the one that took place in Turkey in 1942, when an assassination attempt on German Ambassador von Papen was foiled. All my hopes of raising the issue of Eitingon's release instantly vanished.

The next day, the ministry gave me two lettered files - “Vulture” and “Nero”, which contained incriminating evidence on Tito. There were also weekly reports from our station in Belgrade. The dossiers included Molotov’s idiotic resolutions: to look for Tito’s connections with pro-fascist groups and Croatian nationalists. In the dossier, I did not find any real facts that would make it possible to approach Tito’s inner circle so that our agents could get close enough to strike.

When I was called the next day to Ignatiev’s office, three of Khrushchev’s men were there - Savchenko, Ryasnoy and Epishev - and I immediately felt out of place, because I had previously discussed such delicate issues only in private with Beria or Stalin. Among those present, I was the only intelligence professional with experience working abroad. How could one tell the deputy ministers that their plan was naive? I couldn’t believe my ears when Epishev gave a fifteen-minute lecture about the political importance of the task. Then Ryasnoy and Savchenko joined in, saying that Grigulevich was better suited for such work than anyone else, and with these words they showed him a letter to his wife, in which he spoke of his intention to sacrifice himself for the sake of the common cause. Grigulevich, apparently out of insurance, was forced to write this letter.

I realized that my warnings would not work, and said that as a member of the party I considered it my duty to tell them and Comrade Stalin that we do not have the right to send an agent to certain death in peacetime. The operation plan must necessarily provide for the possibility of the militant leaving after the action; one cannot agree with a plan in which the agent was ordered to destroy a seriously guarded object without a preliminary analysis of the operational situation. In conclusion, Ignatiev emphasized that we all must think, think and think again about how to implement the party’s directive.

This meeting turned out to be my last business meeting with Ignatiev and Epishev. Ten days later, Ignatiev alerted the operational staff and troops of the MGB and confidentially informed the heads of departments and independent services about Stalin's illness. Two days later, Stalin died, and the idea of ​​assassinating Tito was finally buried.

Meanwhile, my attempts to move to work in party bodies or the Council of Ministers seemed to begin to bear fruit. In 1952, I sent to the Central Committee information received from our station in Vienna about American plans to kidnap the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Austrian Communist Party. I was summoned to the Central Committee to see Suslov to discuss these data. A few days later, in the first days of March 1953, I was told that my candidacy was being considered to fill the vacancy of deputy chairman of the newly formed foreign commission of the CPSU Central Committee on “illegal” relations with foreign communist parties. In fact, it was about my appointment as head of the special intelligence service under the Party Central Committee. My wife and I were full of hope that maybe there would be an end to my service in the security forces, which were headed by completely incompetent people who committed crimes both due to incompetence and out of careerist motives.

But rapidly unfolding events radically changed my destiny. On March 5, Stalin died, and late that same day, Beria was appointed minister of the expanded Ministry of Internal Affairs, which now included both the police and the security apparatus (MGB). I was at Stalin’s funeral and saw how unprofessionally Serov, Goglidze and Ryasnoy controlled the situation in the city. Before I could reach the Hall of Columns to stand guard for my ministry, a cordon of trucks blocked the way, so I had to make my way through the cabs of the trucks. They didn’t even think about how to accommodate all the delegations arriving at the funeral. There was some idiotic confusion, due to which hundreds of mourners, unfortunately, died in the stampede.

During Stalin's funeral, my grief was sincere; I thought that his cruelty and reprisals were mistakes made due to the adventurism and incompetence of Yezhov, Abakumov, Ignatiev and their henchmen.

The day after the funeral, I realized that a different era had begun. Beria's secretary called me at six in the evening and said that the new Boss had left the office and ordered not to wait for his return. From that moment on, I could leave work every day at six in the evening, unlike those years when I had to work until two or three in the morning, while Stalin sat at his desk in the Kremlin or at his dacha.

A personnel shake-up began in the new ministry. Kruglov, who had worked with Malenkov on the Central Committee in the 1930s and had been interior minister for the past seven years, became Beria's first deputy in the expanded MVD. Goglidze, who unwittingly became involved in the “Mingrelian affair,” ceased to hold the post of deputy minister and headed military counterintelligence. Bogdan Kobulov, Beria’s protégé, whom Abakumov dismissed from the state security agencies in 1946, returned to Lubyanka as Beria’s deputy. Serov, Khrushchev's man, retained his position and remained Beria's first deputy. Ryasnoy and Savchenko, who, like Serov, worked with Khrushchev in Ukraine, headed the Main Intelligence Directorate. Fedotov, always balanced and disciplined, who briefly replaced Fitin in the leadership of foreign intelligence in 1946, and later worked in the Information Committee, again, as before the war, headed the Main Counterintelligence Directorate. Beria appointed Lieutenant General Sazykin, my former deputy in the “atomic” intelligence department, as head of the Directorate for Combating Ideological Sabotage and Nationalism, the future 5th “political” directorate of the KGB.

In parallel with these quick appointments, the accusers in the case of the Zionist conspiracy and the “Doctors’ Plot” were debunked. Eitingon, Reichman, Selivanovsky, Belkin, Shubnyakov and other high-ranking officials, arrested on charges of covering up a Zionist plot or assisting Abakumov in plans to seize power, were released at the end of March 1953. Zhemchuzhina’s case was closed by Beria himself on March 23, but she was released the day after Stalin’s funeral, on the occasion of Molotov’s birthday, March 9. Beria ordered a review of the cases of Eitingon and Reichman and quickly settle all the formalities necessary for their release.

Eitingon later told me that he did not expect anything good when, after the death of Stalin, which he did not know about, he was called to the investigator. To his surprise, he saw Goglidze and Kobulov there, who was fired from the authorities seven years ago. He immediately realized that big changes had occurred. He was asked only one question: will he continue to serve after his release? He felt unwell, but after treatment he was ready to continue working. Then Kobulov told Eitingon that Stalin had died and he, Kobulov, was speaking on behalf of Beria, who had recently been appointed head of the expanded Ministry of Internal Affairs, and he was his deputy for investigative work and counterintelligence. Kobulov promised that although the formalities would take several days, Eitingon could rest peacefully in his cell while awaiting his release. Eitingon asked to be transferred away from the investigative unit so that he would not have to hear the screams of the prisoners, on which Ryumin was trying “active investigative methods.” Kobulov replied that Ryumin himself was under arrest for crimes committed, and Beria, having become a minister, with his first order banned beatings and torture of defendants in Lubyanka and Lefortovo.

Then Kobulov called for a convoy, and a guard entered the investigation room to escort Eitingon to his cell. Showing off in front of Kobulov, the guard ordered Eitingon: “Put your hands behind your back!” – ordinary treatment of prisoners. Kobulov immediately cut him off and ordered Eitingon to be treated with due respect, as a major general of state security, since he was no longer under investigation, but under administrative arrest. This finally convinced Eitingon that everything that was happening was not a game.

Beria ordered me and other generals to check the fabricated charges of a Zionist conspiracy. What struck me most was that Zhemchuzhina, Molotov's wife, allegedly established secret contacts through Mikhoels and Jewish activists with her brother in the United States. Her letter to her brother, dated October 1944, had nothing to do with politics at all. As an intelligence officer, I immediately realized that management had authorized her to write this letter in order to establish a formal, covert channel of communication with American Zionist organizations. I could not imagine that Zhemchuzhina was capable of writing such a letter without the appropriate sanction.

I remembered my contacts with Harriman regarding the creation of a Jewish republic in Crimea; From Zhemchuzhina’s testimony, I understood that the sounding of American representatives on this issue was carried out not only through me, but also in other directions, in particular through Mikhoels. This convinced me that my conversation with Harriman was only one of a few attempts to discuss how the Jewish question could be used in the broader context of Soviet-American relations.

When I began to discuss with Beria the role that Zhemchuzhina could play in renewing informal contacts with the international Jewish community, he cut me off, saying that this issue in intelligence operations was closed once and for all.

Instead, he pointed to Maisky, who, according to him, is a much more important figure and an ideal candidate for sounding out our new initiatives in the West. He could make personal contacts on high level in order to carry out our policy, which changed dramatically after the death of Stalin. Academician Maisky, a former ambassador to London and deputy minister of foreign affairs, was already approaching seventy at that time. He was once one of the Menshevik leaders who opposed Lenin, but later achieved amazing heights in the Soviet diplomatic service. He was also accused of a Zionist conspiracy in 1952. Absurd accusations were fabricated against him: it was alleged that Jewish organizations abroad wanted to appoint him as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the new government after “Abakumov seized power.”

Beria told me: “Since you knew Maisky during the war, even before Yalta, and your wife became friends with his wife, you must prepare to work with him in the future.”

The head of counterintelligence, Fedotov, who was “reviewing” Maisky’s case, advised me not to meet with him for now. “Pavel Anatolyevich, from my first meeting with him, when I officially announced to him: “You are under the jurisdiction of the chief of counterintelligence, General Fedotov, who is tasked with considering the absurd charges brought against you and the circumstances of your illegal arrest,” he began to admit that was a Japanese spy, then an English one, and then an American one.” Maisky, of course, tried to convince Fedotov of his guilt in order to avoid beatings and torture. He refused to believe that Stalin died and was buried in the mausoleum; he said that this was another provocation. Fedotov suggested that I postpone all discussions on important diplomatic and intelligence issues for two or three weeks. On Beria's orders, he transferred him from his cell to the rest room behind his office, where Maisky could see his wife and where he was shown documentary footage of Stalin's funeral.

The three-week delay almost became fatal, because Maisky’s case was not closed, unlike the others, in May 1953. When Beria was arrested, Maisky, who was treated poorly by Malenkov and Molotov, was living on the Lubyanka with his wife, in a room behind Fedotov’s office. Now Maisky was accused of conspiring with Beria to become his minister of foreign affairs and was again sent to prison, where he had a nervous breakdown.

Later, my wife met his wife in the Butyrki reception area, where both Maisky and I were sitting. Maiskaya said that she is leading fantastic life, - although all of Maisky’s money and all government bonds were confiscated, her personal bonds of the last five years remained with her, and one of them won 50,000 rubles on a government loan (at that time one ruble was equal to four American dollars). When she met my wife in prison, where they both brought food parcels for their husbands. Maiskaya could not immediately remember where they met. “In Paris, in London or at a reception in the Kremlin?” – she asked. My wife smiled and reminded her that it was at Emelyan Yaroslavsky’s dacha, not far from our dacha, and at Yaroslavsky’s apartment in the center of Moscow.

After spending four years in prison, Maisky finally appeared before the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court on charges of aiding Beria to seize power and maintaining ties between Beria and British intelligence. Maisky denied all charges, and the Military Collegium could not find evidence of his guilt. Gorsky (the NKVD resident in London at the time Maisky was ambassador there) was summoned to testify about Maisky's treacherous connection with Beria, but he changed his original testimony and did not support the accusation. The guilt was reduced to exceeding the ambassador's authority, since Maisky sent telegrams from London not only to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but also to Beria's NKVD - suddenly he was accused of standard requirements for sending out special messages from ambassadors. He was also accused of criminally admiring the Western way of life and cultivating Western manners at the Soviet embassy in London. Maisky was sentenced to ten years in prison, four and a half of which he had already served, and he was soon amnestied. He was rehabilitated only in 1964.

The case of the Zionist conspiracy in the security agencies was finally closed in mid-May 1953, when Andrei Sverdlov and Matusov, senior MGB officials, were released. Beria appointed Sverdlov to the position of head of the department responsible for investigations and verification of anonymous letters. His colleague Matusov, from whose records one can learn a very interesting chronology of the purges from 1930 to 1950, was released in 1953, but was not reinstated in service. He died in the late 60s. My wife used his legal advice to support requests for my release. Matusov was soon expelled from the party and deprived of his MGB pension for his involvement in repressions. Relying on the support of Sverdlov, he continuously appealed to the CPC under the CPSU Central Committee.

In 1963, Matusov and Sverdlov were summoned by the deputy chairman of the Party Control Committee, Serdyuk, a protégé of Khrushchev, who demanded that they stop writing letters to the Central Committee, otherwise the party would punish them both for spreading gossip, and, moreover, for illegally persecuting the famous writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn.

Sverdlov and Matusov protested violently, claiming that they had not fabricated this case. Solzhenitsyn's letter, criticizing the Soviet system and Stalin personally for military failures, was intercepted during the war by military censorship, which began the case against Solzhenitsyn. In war conditions, criticism of the military command was regarded as at least suspicious. Serdyuk interrupted them and said that, judging by the evidence available to the Party Control Commission, Solzhenitsyn had always been a die-hard Leninist, and showed them the letter that Solzhenitsyn wrote to Khrushchev.

Sverdlov received a reprimand on the party line, but continued to work as a senior research fellow at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee of the CPSU, where he was transferred after the arrest of Beria. Matusov was expelled from the party “forever.” It was officially announced that this decision would never be revised, but he was left alone and allowed to deal with literary activity. Together with Sverdlov, he wrote a number of detective stories.

Abakumov was not released. Beria and Malenkov had a grudge against him. He was accused of falsifying the Zhemchuzhina case. At that time I was not interested in Abakumov, I had my own reasons for not liking him, but I learned from Reichman that Abakumov denied the charges linking him with the Zionist conspiracy, despite the fact that Ryumin brutally tortured him. Reichman told me that he behaved like a real man with a strong will. In 1990, I was called as a witness when his case was examined by the military prosecutor's office; I changed my mind about him because no matter what crimes he committed, he paid for it in full in prison. He had to endure incredible suffering (he spent three months in a refrigerator in shackles), but he found the strength not to submit to the executioners. He fought for his life, categorically denying the “doctors’ conspiracy.” Thanks to his firmness and courage in March and April 1953, it became possible to quickly release all those arrested involved in the so-called conspiracy, since Abakumov was accused of being their leader.

However, Beria and Malenkov decided to put an end to Abakumov. At a meeting in his office, Beria officially announced that although Abakumov’s charges of conspiracy were unfounded, he still remains under investigation for squandering government funds, abuse of power and, what was more serious, for falsifying a case against the former leadership of the Ministry of Aviation Industry, command Air Force, against Polina Zhemchuzhina, for the murder of Mikhoels.

As soon as Eitingon was released on March 23, 1953, he was immediately admitted to the hospital due to an ulcer and general exhaustion. He asked me to speed up the release of his sister Sonya, who was arrested with him in 1951 and sentenced to ten years in prison “for refusing to treat Russian patients and facilitating the Zionist conspiracy.” Sonya was initially sentenced to eight years, but prosecutor Daron, a Jew by nationality, who oversaw the investigation at the MGB, fearing accusations of sympathy for Jews, insisted on a longer term. I took advantage of my next meeting with Beria to give him a letter from Eitingon, who asked for his sister. Fortunately for Sonya, Beria’s first deputy, Kruglov, was also in Beria’s office at that time. When I tried to explain what was the matter, Beria interrupted me, handed the letter to Kruglov without signing it, and said: “Immediately organize her release.”

I followed Kruglov into his office, where he dictated a short presentation to the Supreme Court:

“The inspection of the charges against Sonya Isakovna Eitingon undertaken by the Ministry of Internal Affairs showed that the case was fabricated and the evidence of her guilt was falsified. The Ministry of Internal Affairs enters the Supreme Court with a proposal to cancel the verdict and dismiss the case against S.I. Eitingon for lack of corpus delicti.” Signature: “S. Kruglov, First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR."

I saw to it that the letter was submitted to the Supreme Court and tried to expedite the formalities necessary for her release. The Supreme Court's ruling was signed only three weeks later, but it took another week for the administration of the camp where she was imprisoned to receive it. I personally called the camp director, asking for her speedy release, but he replied that she was in the hospital and would undergo surgery. Using my position, I gave the order to immediately discharge her from the camp and transfer her to a local hospital as soon as the operation was done.

She was lucky that Kruglov, and not Beria, signed the letter about her release. Beria was arrested a few weeks later, and his written resolution would keep her out of prison for at least two years, when other prisoners serving time on charges of Zionist conspiracy and agitation were also released. Sonino's case was one of the first in the wave of rehabilitation started by Beria after Stalin's death.

Of course, it is clear that even this wave, which seemed to be a correction of past mistakes, was caused by Beria’s ambitious plans.

The new Charter of the Communist Party was approved at the 19th Congress of the CPSU in 1952, before Stalin's death. According to this Charter, there was only one ruling body - the Presidium of the Central Committee, greatly expanded. The Politburo, which had only eleven members, was abolished. The new Presidium consisted of twenty-five people, including the old guard - Molotov, Kaganovich and Voroshilov - and relatively young people like Brezhnev, Chesnokov and Suslov.

However, real power was concentrated in the Bureau of the Presidium, unknown to the general public, which was elected at the last Plenum of the Central Committee. where Stalin presided, in October 1952. The Bureau included Stalin, Malenkov, Beria, Khrushchev, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Saburov, Pervukhin. It did not include Molotov and Mikoyan, influential figures of the old guard, who by this time had been deprived of real power. The new Bureau was ruled by Stalin and the younger generation.

At the Plenum of the Central Committee on April 2, 1953, when not even a month had passed after Stalin’s death, Beria announced the facts that Stalin and Ignatiev had abused their power by fabricating the “doctors’ case.”

Ignatiev was Malenkov's man. His removal after the death of Stalin as the secretary of the Central Committee, who oversaw the security organs, suited Beria and Khrushchev, but did not suit Malenkov, who was losing his support in the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the party. For Malenkov this was especially dangerous, since in April 1953 he retired from working in the apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee, having been relieved of his post as Secretary of the Central Committee.

The materials of the April Plenum of 1953 contain basically all the sensational accusations with which Khrushchev surprised the world in 1956 in his revealing report at the 20th Party Congress.

Without going into an assessment of the motives of Beria’s initiatives in April - June 1953, one cannot help but admit that his proposals for the liquidation of the Gulag, the release of political prisoners, and the normalization of relations with Yugoslavia contained all the main measures to “eliminate the consequences of the personality cult” implemented by Khrushchev during the “Thaw” "

During the last years of Stalin's rule, Khrushchev used his alliance with Malenkov and Beria to increase his influence in the party and state. He achieved the rare honor of addressing the 19th Congress of the CPSU with a separate report on the Party Charter. Having defeated his rivals through intrigue, he placed his people in influential positions. It is rarely noticed that Khrushchev managed in the last year of Stalin’s rule to introduce four of his proteges into the leadership of the MGB - Ministry of Internal Affairs: Serov, Savchenko, Ryasnoy and Epishev became deputy ministers. The first three worked with him in Ukraine. The fourth served under him as secretary of the regional committee in Odessa and Kharkov.

Immediately after the Plenum of the Central Committee in April 1953, Malenkov lost his leadership position as Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, who controlled all the day-to-day work of the party apparatus. And although he concentrated a lot of power in his hands, as head of government, he actually moved away from controlling the situation in the regions and republics of the country. There, power continued to remain in the hands of regional committee secretaries. In Moscow, young Malenkov, having lost the support of regional leaders, found himself, as it were, a hostage “captive” of the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee who were members of the Council of Ministers.

Thus, his position in the leadership now depended entirely on his alliance with Beria. He did not understand this and exaggerated his authority, still thinking that he was the second person after Stalin in the party and state and that everyone around him, including the Presidium of the Central Committee, was interested in good relations with him. However, after Stalin's death, the behavior of members of the Soviet leadership became more independent, and everyone wanted to play their own role. Thus, a new situation arose that opened the way for Khrushchev’s ascension to the heights of power.

Could this happen?

Certainly. At the time of Stalin’s death, Beria was one of the strongest political figures in the USSR, and in the first weeks after the death of “Koba”, his influence increased even more. The division of powers, curiously, occurred during Stalin’s lifetime. Starting on March 1, the “Leader’s” entourage gathered daily at the dacha in Kuntsevo, trying to decide what to do. Members of the Politburo Central Committee apparently expected Stalin's death, but did not understand when it would come. The likelihood of recovery for the 73-year-old man, who had been paralyzed for several days and had not regained consciousness, was negligible. The “Leader’s” entourage, however, was afraid to take risks. As a result, the decisive meeting took place on March 5 at half past eight in the evening. An amazing event happened there: Stalin was dismissed. He had about an hour to live; he could not know what was happening. But the fact remains that Stalin died no longer as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and head of the Central Committee.

Beria. (wikipedia.org)

Koba was given a place on the Presidium of the Central Committee, but was relieved of his duties as secretary. Both posts went to Georgy Malenkov, the most experienced Stalinist apparatchik and a very sophisticated intriguer. True, just nine days later, on March 14, Malenkov had to make a choice between the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers and the post of Secretary General. Malenkov believed that the post of head of government was more important and retained it. The Central Committee of the party was headed by Khrushchev. He received the very position that once ensured Stalin’s complete victory in the fight against Trotsky, Zinoviev and other party oppositionists.

Meanwhile, Beria turned out to be both Malenkov’s and Khrushchev’s deputy. Power over the security forces was concentrated in his hands. Beria headed the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in which, at the same meeting, two departments were merged. In addition to, in fact, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the MGB (Ministry of State Security) was also included here, the same one that after the war was removed from Beria’s subordination, forming a separate People’s Commissariat from it. Now Beria had the same powers that the head of the NKVD once enjoyed. Soon, Beria initiates the abolition of a number of high-profile cases, for example, the “Doctors’ Case” and the “Mingrelian Case,” which greatly harmed him. Beria's authority and popularity increased. The Soviet press began to call him “Stalin’s best student.”

Meanwhile, Beria quickly eliminated “alien” leaders from the former MGB, replacing them with his own people. Khrushchev and Malenkov were frightened by such activity and instantly united against a common threat. As a result, Beria was arrested (Zhukov personally took part in the arrest), discredited, convicted and executed. Many researchers believe that the case against the minister was fabricated. But the fact remains that they got rid of Beria as quickly as he himself, in his time, got rid of the people who interfered with him. He was arrested in the summer of 1953, and in December the minister was already shot. Beria, by the way, understood everything. A few days after his arrest, he wrote a letter to Malenkov asking for forgiveness. Beria repented and asked for mercy. Malenkov ignored the letter. And yet, Beria had a chance to take power. In May 1953 he reached the peak of his power. At this moment, the Minister of Internal Affairs could himself arrest Khrushchev and Malenkov. Why he didn't do this is a mystery. The game, however, followed very strict rules. If not you, then you.

First scenario

Here we will consider two scenarios for the future of the USSR, in the event of Beria’s victory. It is important that further developments would depend on how Laurentius would come to power. Let's start with open conflict with opponents. The arrest of Khrushchev and Malenkov was the most realistic way for Beria to take the helm of the USSR and take Stalin’s place. To fabricate a case, to accuse him of an anti-Soviet conspiracy - all this would not have been difficult for Beria. Of course, we would have to face some problems.

It would be necessary to arrest several dozen more supporters of Khrushchev and Malenkov, and, at the same time, explain to the Soviet people that terrible traitors and enemies of the Soviet people had crept into the highest echelons of power. However, the headless opposition would quickly capitulate. All this looked like a military coup, but Beria’s authority and popularity would help him retain power. And then Beria would find himself in a situation where he himself would have doubts about his legitimacy. And in this situation, he would be forced to destroy everyone who would doubt this legitimacy. This means that a new wave of terror and repression would sweep across the USSR, on the scale of 1937-1939.

Malenkov. (wikipedia.org)

Beria would have carried out organ cleansing using Stalinist methods. Arrests of prominent communists, along with their proteges, relatives and household members, building up the cult of personality of the new leader. Stalin's henchmen would be repressed and replaced by Beria's people. Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Bulganin - all would have gone to execution. Mikoyan might have survived, although this is also not a fact. In a word, Beria would get rid of Stalin's friends in the same way as Stalin got rid of Lenin's friends. It is difficult to say whether Beria would have raised his hand against the heroes of the War - Zhukov and Rokossovsky, but such a turn of events cannot be ruled out. By the year 55, the USSR would have had a cult of personality of the new “Leader” and, at the same time, a critical aggravation of relations with the USA and Great Britain. Perhaps it would not be cold, but hot war. Perhaps, of course, not. It cannot be ruled out that Beria would have tried to eliminate the Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito, especially since Stalin had such plans.

Second scenario

Under other circumstances, Beria could have come to power without a coup. To do this, he would somehow need to be at the head of the Central Committee. Then he would have initially concentrated large hardware capabilities in his hands and would have been able to suppress Malenkov and Khrushchev, transferring them to secondary roles, but maintaining their support. It would be a collective leadership with Beria at the head. Beria himself would have become a kind of Brezhnev. The result is stagnation. Then Beria could enjoy power without shaking the huge Union. He would somehow come to an agreement with the West.

Khrushchev. (wikipedia.org)

It wouldn't cancel the Cold War. Relations would have remained difficult, but things would not have come to a direct conflict. Beria would have grown old peacefully at the head of the USSR, would have awarded himself orders and titles, and the Politburo would have supported him as the most powerful, and therefore necessary, figure. This scenario of maintaining dictatorial power is incredibly effective. He helped many dictators remain at the head of their countries for a long time. The most famous example is Brezhnev.

Recently, more and more scientific and journalistic works have appeared in which Soviet historians, analyzing recently opened archives, analyze in detail the fallacy of the myths that have dominated the history of our country for the last 60 years. According to some myths, from the 30s of the 20th century until his death, Stalin was absolutely omnipotent: as soon as he wanted, all his political initiatives were immediately realized, and his political enemies instantly collapsed. Other myths describe the bloody executioner and treacherous scoundrel Beria, who wanted to seize power in the USSR in June 1953. Such myths are not only an obvious simplification that leads away from understanding complex political processes, but also an absolutely false representation of historical reality, which is much more complex and multifaceted than they want to imagine.

Very often, such political myths are created as a result of a struggle for power among several elite groups, one of which ultimately wins. In this case, all mistakes are blamed on the losing side, and all sorts of negative qualities are attributed to it. A typical example of the creation of such myths is coups d'etat.

The purpose of this work is a political analysis of the “palace” coup carried out in June 1953 in the USSR by representatives of the highest echelons of power, as a result of which one of the main contenders for supreme power in the USSR, Minister of Internal Affairs Lavrenty, was removed from all posts, arrested and subsequently shot Pavlovich Beria. The work examines the reasons that led to this conspiracy, the course of the coup, as well as the roles of the conspirators who ultimately committed the “political murder” of Beria and turned him into one of the demons of the Soviet era.

The first chapter provides a general description of the political struggle in the highest echelons of power in the USSR in the late 40s and early 50s. The main political events of those years, which subsequently had an impact, are described. greatest influence for the struggle for power in March-June 1953. The main components of the internal political struggle both between various elite groups, and these groups themselves with Stalin are analyzed.

The second chapter describes the political programs carried out in March-June 1953 by the main contenders for power: Malenkov and Beria. More attention is paid to the analysis of Beria's policies, since it was his policies that became one of the main reasons for the emergence of a conspiracy against him. The actions of other leaders of the USSR, which are important for understanding the details of the coup, are also analyzed.

Thus, chapters I and II describe the historical context on the eve of Beria's overthrow.

The third chapter examines in detail the technology and progress of the revolution. The prerequisites for the conspiracy of the USSR leaders against Beria, as well as their role in the conspiracy, are analyzed. The course of the coup, as well as the subsequent “political murder” of Beria at the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, is described step by step. The unofficial version of the murder of Beria in his mansion is considered separately.

The fourth chapter sums up the results of the coup and gives a brief description of the new configuration of the political Olympus of the USSR.

One of the historians who in the last twenty years has made a great contribution to exposing the myths of perestroika and has published many new historical documents is Yuri Zhukov. Zhukov is a researcher of the Stalin era who received (one of the few) access to the secret archival funds of Stalin, Yezhov and Beria. In his book “Be proud, not repent! The truth about the Stalin era,” he, analyzing documents from Politburo meetings of the 50s, proves that already in 1950-1951 Stalin, either for compelling reasons (for example, a serious deterioration in his health), or due to a loss in the political struggle, transferred a significant part of his political powers to the “triumvirate” consisting of Bulganin, Beria and Malenkov. As one of the justifications for such a statement, Zhukov cites the Politburo decision of February 16, 1951, in which Beria, Bulganin and Malenkov (at that time Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR) were allowed to make all the most important decisions in the country, and issue all resolutions and orders signed Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Comrade Stalin. Zhukov notes that such a decision has never - neither before nor later - been found in documents of this kind.

Another Soviet historian, Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, in his book “The Mystery of Stalin’s Death,” argues that in 1952 a situation arose in which Stalin’s decisions were blocked by the actions of the “quartet” of Beria, Malenkov, Khrushchev and Bulganin, and that while Stalin was still alive, they carried out a political revolution against him. Avtorkhanov notes that Stalin’s power was based on “absolute obedience to the direct managers of the machine of power” and that the “four” could cooperate to block Stalin’s decisions and prevent their implementation. It should be noted that Avtorkhanov is an ardent anti-Soviet; during the Great Patriotic War he was a collaborator and subsequently fled to the United States, where, in particular, he taught Sovietology at the American Military Academy (later called the Russian Institute of the US Army).

Zhukov partially agrees with Avtorkhanov that the leaders of the USSR had the intention of eliminating Stalin from the political game, citing as confirmation the arrest of Vlasik (the head of Stalin’s personal security), the removal of Poskrebyshev (the head of Stalin’s secretariat) and the removal of the head of the Kremlin’s Lechsanupr Egorov from his post. At the same time, Zhukov notes that such actions could have been a complex game by Stalin himself against his political competitors, which he did not manage to complete.

Pavel Sudoplatov, a Soviet intelligence officer, lieutenant general of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, who was repressed in 1953 in the Beria case, notes in his memoirs that by the end of 1952 Malenkov and Beria entered into an unspoken political alliance, forming a tandem that had very great political power . At the same time, according to Sudoplatov, their union was forced; each of them, acting together, dreamed of ruling individually.

These facts do not at all mean that Stalin was a weak political figure and did not participate in the political struggle. They show that not only Stalin himself was a subject of political processes, but also other representatives of the highest political power, as well as their groups and clans, fought both with each other and together against Stalin.

Important components of the political struggle that took place at that time were political criminal cases: “Leningrad Case”, “Doctors’ Case”, “Mingrelian Case”, “Case of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee”.

Rudolf Pihoya believes that the “Leningrad Affair” is a struggle between the Malenkov-Beria group and the Voznesensky-Kuznetsov group. One reason for this struggle was that Stalin could, at the end of the 40s, strengthen the position of the Voznesensky and Kuznetsov group in the Politburo, which would mean their group coming to power and removing Malenkov and Beria from supreme power. Accordingly, this forced both Malenkov and Beria to use all means to fight political opponents, including through political affairs.

Another reason was Voznesensky’s certain inclination towards “great power chauvinism.” As Anastas Mikoyan writes in his memoirs “Stalin even told us that Voznesensky was a great-power chauvinist of rare degree. “For him,” he said, “not only Georgians and Armenians, but also Ukrainians are not people.”. Apparently, the strengthening of such chauvinist sentiments in the Voznesensky-Kuznetsov group, as well as actions on the part of Malenkov and Beria directed against this group, ultimately led to Stalin explicitly or implicitly agreeing to deprive them of his support. This ultimately led to the “Leningrad Affair,” in which Malenkov played the main role, and to the execution of Voznesensky and Kuznetsov.

At the same time, there were cases directed against Malenkov and Beria. The “Mingrelian affair” hit Beria. In this case, about 500 senior party and prosecutorial figures of Georgia - Beria's nominees - were arrested and accused of bribery and nationalist sentiments. The “Aviators' Case” in 1946 hit Malenkov hard, who then managed to avoid arrest, but he was eventually deprived of senior political posts and found himself in disgrace for several years.

Speaking about Voznesensky’s inclination towards “great power chauvinism”, it is also necessary to outline other positions regarding the national question that existed among the top leaders of the USSR. Beria was a clear supporter of greater political rights for the republics of the Soviet Union, while Stalin and Malenkov stood for the position of a “single Soviet nation” and a rigid federal structure of the USSR, which in a rough approximation can even be called “unitary”. A more detailed description of the positions of Stalin, Malenkov and Beria on the national question will be given in the second and third chapters. Now it should be noted that the ideas of Beria, Voznesensky and Stalin-Malenkov regarding the national question and, as a consequence, the rights of the union republics were radically different from each other. Thus, the national question was another important factor in the political struggle.

The next component of the political struggle of those years was the clashes between different generations (or generations) of the leaders of the USSR. Three such generations can be distinguished. First, the “old Bolshevik guard”: Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov and Mikoyan. Their public authority was very high; they were considered by the people and the elite to be the main associates of Stalin since the 20s. Stalin launched a serious political attack on this group in the early 50s. It can be concluded that he wanted either the clear removal of this group from power or a serious reduction in their political influence. The second generation of leaders are the people who were promoted by Stalin in the late 30s and early 40s: Malenkov, Beria, Khrushchev, Pervukhin and Saburov. They can be conditionally considered “Stalin’s assistants,” that is, they were clearly lower in rank than the “old Bolsheviks.” This generation of USSR leaders at the time of Stalin's death had the greatest political power. In the last years of his stay in power, Stalin tried to balance the power that this generation of leaders had with the next generation of leaders, namely young promoters, whom Stalin began to gradually introduce into the highest echelons of power in the early 50s. In the eyes of this “young” generation of leaders, Stalin was an indisputable authority, a “communist god.” This generation includes Ponomarenko, Shepilov, Suslov, Brezhnev.

Another characteristic important for analyzing the political situation in the USSR in the 1950s is the gradual shift of the center of political power from the party to the state apparatus. For example, Elena Prudnikova notes that the Politburo, whose meetings were held less and less often, is beginning to lose its importance as a power structure. At the same time, many researchers of the Stalin era (Zhukov, Mukhin, Prudnikova) agree that Stalin tried to deliver the decisive blow to the separation of the party from the management of the state apparatus at the 19th Party Congress.

Thus, we can distinguish three main components of the political struggle in the USSR in the late 40s - early 50s, the subjects of which were Stalin, as well as various groups (clans) in the top leadership of the USSR.

Firstly, the struggle between the state apparatus and the party apparatus.

Secondly, the struggle between different ideas regarding the national policy of the USSR.

Thirdly, clashes between different generations of leaders: the “old Bolshevik guard”, the “mature” generation of leaders and young nominees.

The 19th Party Congress took place on October 5–14, 1952, after a thirteen-year break (the previous congress took place in March 1939). Among all the events that took place at this congress, the most interesting within the framework of this work are the following:

I. The Politburo of the Central Committee was abolished and the Presidium of the Central Committee of 25 people was created

The Presidium consisted of twenty-five members and eleven candidates for members of the Presidium, who had an advisory vote.

Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, elected at the 19th Congress (in brackets - the year of joining the party):

Members of the Presidium: V. M. Andrianov (1926), A. B. Aristov (1921), L. P. Beria (1917), N. A. Bulganin (1917), K. E. Voroshilov (1903), S. D. Ignatiev (1924), L. M. Kaganovich (1911), D. S. Korotchenko (1918), V. V. Kuznetsov (1927), O. V. Kuusinen (1905), G. M. Malenkov (1920), B A. Malyshev (1926), L. G. Melnikov (1928), A. I. Mikoyan (1915), N. A. Mikhailov (1930), V. M. Molotov (1906), M. G. Pervukhin ( 1919), P.K. Ponomarenko (1925), M.Z. Saburov (1920), I.V. Stalin (1898), M.A. Suslov (1921), N.S. Khrushchev (1918), D. I. Chesnokov (1939), N. M. Shvernik (1905), M. P. Shkiryatov (1906).

Candidates: L. I. Brezhnev (1931), A. Ya. Vyshinsky (1920), A. G. Zverev (1919), N. G. Ignatov (1924), I. G. Kabanov (1917), A. N. Kosygin (1927), N. S. Patolichev (1928), N. M. Pegov (1930), A. M. Puzanov (1925), I. F. Tevosyan (1918), P. F. Yudin (1928).

As some researchers note, for example, Yuri Mukhin and Elena Prudnikova, the majority of the twenty-five members of the new Presidium were not party members, but government officials responsible for industrial and party control, and, accordingly, such a replacement of the Politburo with the Presidium was one of the forms of transfer of leverage power from the party apparatus to the state apparatus.

Yuri Emelyanov in his book “Khrushchev. Troublemaker in the Kremlin,” analyzing the composition of the Presidium of the Central Committee, comes to the conclusion that the new cadres in the Presidium were more educated and more knowledgeable in modern production, and that Khrushchev treated the appearance of such people as "temporary celebration dark forces» , which could have been used by Stalin to fight members of the abolished Politburo.

In the book “Stalin before the Court of the Pygmies,” Emelyanov also cites the testimony of the USSR Minister of Agriculture in 1947–1953, Benediktov, and a member of the CPSU Central Committee since 1985, Lukyanov, who worked for a long time with Stalin’s archive and other materials of the General Department of the Central Committee, that Stalin was planning appoint Ponomarenko, elected as a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee at the 19th Congress, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and even agreed on this appointment with the majority of members of the then party leadership, but the sudden death of Stalin a few months after the congress did not allow this appointment to take place.

Avtorkhanov also suggests that Stalin was trying to balance out the old members of the Politburo with a new generation of younger leaders who had less experience and in whose eyes Stalin was the unquestioned authority. Avtorkhanov believes that by relying on them, Stalin could subsequently launch a political attack on the old members of the Politburo.

Yuri Zhukov draws attention to the fact that at the Plenum of the Central Committee on October 16, 1952, in violation of the CPSU Charter, the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee was formed in the following composition: Beria, Bulganin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Pervukhin, Saburov, Stalin, Khrushchev. Zhukov believes that the creation of this body gave an advantage only to Beria, Bulganin, Malenkov, Khrushchev, Saburov and Pervukhin, whom no one could balance politically. Perhaps this was a forced (and probably temporary) concession from Stalin, the purpose of which was to balance the power of the members of the old Politburo and calm them down for a while, in order to soon launch an attack on some of them and dissolve the non-statutory body.

II. Stalin's struggle with the "Old Bolshevik Guard"

At the 19th Congress, Stalin sharply criticized Molotov, Mikoyan and Voroshilov and expressed complete political distrust of them at the congress. In addition, Stalin accused Molotov of spying for America, and Voroshilov for spying for England (the spouses of both were already arrested on charges of espionage at that time).

According to Yuri Mukhin, by his struggle with the old party members, who had been members of the Politburo for the longest time, Stalin wanted to warn the party apparatus against attempting to nominate a second leader. Avtorkhanov gives another explanation. The 19th Congress was solemnly opened by Molotov, and closed by Voroshilov, and according to party tradition, this was trusted to the most popular old members of the Politburo. Therefore, Stalin, planning their defeat at the congress, from Avtorkhanov’s point of view, would not have entrusted them with these honorable affairs. Avtorkhanov concludes that this could only happen if they were nominated not by Stalin, but by the Politburo, or more precisely, by the apparatus led by Malenkov and Beria. According to Avtorkhanov, it turns out that Malenkov and Beria foresaw Stalin’s plans to attack Molotov, Mikoyan and Voroshilov and tried to organize a counterattack in order to subsequently enlist the support of the “old guard of the Bolsheviks” and form a political alliance with them.

III. Abolition of the position of Secretary General

In the new Party Charter, which was adopted at the 19th Congress, the party was renamed CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union). In this Charter, the position of the General Secretary - the leader of the party - was abolished.

It should be noted here that (as some researchers note) the position of “General Secretary” in the period from 1934 to 1953 was rarely mentioned in documents, and Stalin often signed himself as “Secretary of the Central Committee”, and many documents were addressed to “Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks” Comrade Stalin." Nevertheless, in a number of documents Stalin used the title of General Secretary of the CPSU (b), and there are documents addressed to Stalin for this period in which he was addressed as “General Secretary of the CPSU (b)”.

Yuri Mukhin believes that the change in the Charter in 1952 and the obvious failure to include the post of General Secretary in it was Stalin’s attempt to permanently abolish this party post and eliminate unity of command in the party. Now the party had ten secretaries of the Central Committee, who did not form any body, but simply all belonged to the Presidium, in which, according to the Charter, there was no chairman, no first secretary, no chief representative from the party. According to Mukhin, such a move by Stalin greatly reduced political role party and its ability to strengthen this role subsequently.

At the Plenum, held immediately after the congress, Stalin was elected a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee and Secretary of the Central Committee. It is interesting to note that Stalin also asked to be relieved of his position as party secretary. And although some researchers interpret this as an attempt to test the loyalty of his comrades and force them to clearly choose him as party secretary, others, for example Prudnikova, believe that with this step Stalin wanted to break the connection between himself and the party and clearly deprive it of its leadership in his person. It is interesting that, when resigning from the post of secretary, Stalin did not ask to be relieved of his post as Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

Analyzing the XIX Congress, several conclusions can be drawn:

Stalin created a counterweight to the group of Beria, Malenkov, Khrushchev, Bulganin, introducing young functionaries into the Presidium of the Central Committee and thereby endowing them with the highest party power.

Stalin clearly tried to cut off the old guard of the Bolsheviks from the top political leadership: Molotov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, who were considered the closest and longest-standing associates of the leader.

Stalin weakened the party and reduced its political role.

Accordingly, it can be assumed that Stalin was clearly preparing serious political transformations in the USSR. However, if we recall the version of Yuri Zhukov, given above, that instead of Stalin, the role of Chairman of the Council of Ministers since February 1951 was played by the “triumvirate” of Bulganin, Beria and Malenkov, then it turns out that all of Stalin’s actions should be considered as an attempt by a ruler cut off from all real levers of power if not to change the political configuration, then at least to give the vector of development of the political situation in the USSR a certain direction.

Particularly interesting in relation to the 19th Congress of the CPSU is the fact that the materials of this congress have not yet been published, the transcripts of the congress have not been published in full. During the Soviet Union, under Brezhnev, they began to release transcripts of all congresses, released transcripts of the 1st and 20th congresses at the same time, and stopped releasing transcripts at the 18th congress. Yuri Mukhin puts forward the version that this was a conscious decision of the party nomenklatura, for which the danger was posed not only by the congress, but also by the plenum, the transcript of which also had to be released along with the materials of the congress.

Indeed, as of 2014, the transcript of the plenum has still not been published, and this cannot but raise questions. Many studies regarding the 19th Congress are based on the memoirs of the writer Konstantin Simonov, a member of the Central Committee of the Party, published in 1989. The fact that historical research is based not on documents but on memories means that today's understanding of the political struggle that took place in the last years of Stalin's life may be largely erroneous. It will be possible to find out only after publication materials XIX congress.

However, many researchers of the Stalin era are trying to find documents that could at least indirectly tell about what happened at the 19th Congress. One of these researchers is Alexander Khansky, who collected newspaper publications from 1952, as well as materials from various collections and reference books that contain references to the 19th Congress. Khansky published all these materials in one electronic book, “The 19th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) - CPSU (October 5–14, 1952). Documents and materials." And although this book does not contain, for example, a transcript of the plenum that took place after the congress, this material seems very interesting for a more detailed study.

Stalin's death in early March 1953 changed all the political processes that took place in the USSR in the last years of the leader's life. Stalin's inner circle: Beria, Malenkov, Khrushchev and Bulganin - began to divide power among themselves and change the policies that emerged in the last years of Stalin's life, in particular, the decisions of the 19th Congress.

On the morning of March 4, 1953, a “Governmental message on the illness of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Comrade Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin” was broadcast on Moscow radio, in which, in particular, it was reported that “...the serious illness of Comrade Stalin will entail a more or less long-term absence from participation in leadership activities. The Central Committee and the Council of Ministers, in the leadership of the party and the country, take seriously all the circumstances associated with Comrade Stalin’s temporary departure from leading state and party activities.”. Analyzing this message, as well as the newspapers that were published these days, Yuri Zhukov comes to the conclusion that already on March 3, 1953, invitations were prepared for an urgent Plenum of the Central Committee, which was originally intended to be held on the evening of March 4.

Zhukov notes that on March 3 there was no final agreement on the redistribution of power, but qualitative changes had already begun to occur: Malenkov and Beria returned Molotov to the political Olympus, from which Stalin had gradually removed him since 1949. Zhukov believes that this return was mainly made by Malenkov, because Malenkov, who could be considered Stalin's most likely successor, was not yet ready to take the full power that Stalin had, and therefore offset the influence of Beria (his most likely competitor) with Molotov , who was (or who could still be openly portrayed) one of Stalin’s closest associates. According to Zhukov, the inclusion of Molotov required the expansion of a new narrow leadership to the five Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Bulganin, Kaganovich. Such an organization of power was subsequently presented as a “collective leadership”, the collectivity of which was not in the community and unity of goals and means of the country’s development, but in the minimum condition for balancing the conflicting views and interests of the top leadership.

Immediately after finding a compromise and establishing “collective leadership,” the reorganization of power structures began. For example, the Presidium and the Bureau of the Council of Ministers were merged, as well as the Bureau of the Presidium with the Presidium of the Central Committee. The purpose of this reorganization was an attempt to “shuffle” the existing personnel and appoint new people to the appropriate posts, while each sought to achieve the best balance of power for his team. Yuri Emelyanov also notes that Beria, Malenkov and Khrushchev were clearly in a hurry to revise the decisions of the 19th Congress and the October Plenum: concentrating in their hands a large political force, they sought to exclude all new nominees of Stalin. The new Presidium of the Central Committee consisted of Malenkov, Beria, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Saburov, Pervukhin, Molotov and Mikoyan. The Presidium of the Council of Ministers turned out to be half the size: Malenkov was approved as chairman, and Beria, Molotov, Bulganin and Kaganovich were appointed as his first deputies. Brezhnev, Pegov, Ignatov and Ponomarenko were removed from the Central Committee secretariat (the latter, as noted above, Stalin planned to appoint as Chairman of the Council of Ministers). To replace those removed, political supporters of Malenkov were appointed to the secretariat: Pospelov and Shatalin.

Analyzing the actions of Beria, Malenkov, Khrushchev and Bulganin to redistribute political power in the country, Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov comes to the conclusion that they carried out a political revolution, distributing among themselves - bypassing the Presidium of the Central Committee - the main power in the country and removing other heirs of Stalin from the first roles in the created political configuration.

Yuri Zhukov believes that Malenkov had the greatest power at the time of Stalin’s death and therefore turned out to be more prepared for the first round of the struggle for sole power. The fact that his rivals apparently did not have time to come to an agreement and block Malenkov’s actions allowed the latter to concentrate in his hands greatest number power over the state and party apparatus. As Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, he had the greatest influence on domestic and foreign policy, and as Secretary of the Central Committee, he had a direct influence on the decisions taken by the Secretariat and Presidium of the Central Committee.

The Pravda newspaper, published on the morning of March 5, 1953 with an editorial about the “Great Unity of the Party and the People,” mentioned three names: Lenin, Stalin and Malenkov. Thus, the people and the elite were clearly indicated new leader, which had to be guided when making political decisions.

On the same day, March 5, 1953, at eight o’clock in the evening, a joint meeting of the Plenum of the Central Committee, the Council of Ministers and the Presidium of the Supreme Council took place. The meeting was short, lasting only 40 minutes. This meant that all appointments had already been agreed upon in advance and the meeting was only a form of legitimation of these appointments and a demonstration that a collective leadership had been formed (represented by Malenkov, Beria, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Saburov, Pervukhin, Molotov and Mikoyan), which assumed full power and removed all potential competitors from it (in particular, young personnel promoted by Stalin earlier).

The facts presented by Rudolf Pihoya, who served as head of the State Archival Service of Russia from 1993 to 1996, are interesting. Since 1996, he has been vice president of the international foundation "Democracy" (Yakovlev Foundation). Pihoya mentions a note written by Beria to Malenkov on March 4, 1953, in which the most important government posts were distributed in advance, which were approved at a meeting on March 5.

Pihoya cites another interesting statement made by Malenkov on March 5, 1953 at a joint meeting of the Plenum of the Central Committee, the Council of Ministers and the Presidium of the Supreme Council, that the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee “instructed comrade Malenkov, Beria and Khrushchev to take measures to ensure that the documents and papers of Comrade Stalin, both current and archival, are put in proper order.". According to Pihoy, access to the Stalin archive was a strong lever of influence over potential political competitors. Thus, Malenkov, Beria and Khrushchev were implicitly declared the main political leaders in collective leadership. In his memoirs, Anastas Mikoyan also recalls that Malenkov, Beria and Khrushchev were in the last years of Stalin’s life as one team and grouped together to impose their opinion on the Presidium of the Central Committee.

An hour after the end of the joint meeting, news arrived of Stalin's death. Therefore, the new leadership decided not to inform the population about the political decisions just made. A message was prepared about Stalin's death, which also mentioned new program political leadership. This program did not contain theses about the need to develop heavy industry as the basis of the Soviet economy and set the goal of raising the material well-being of the population. The main enemy of the Soviet Union - imperialism and its “bastions” the USA and NATO - were not mentioned in the text of the program. Most likely, this message most fully reflected the ideas for the development of the USSR that Malenkov expressed. This conclusion can be drawn after analyzing the speeches of the country's top officials at Stalin's funeral on March 9, 1953. The programs put forward at Stalin's funeral by the main contenders for power are discussed in detail below.

Thus, following the results of the first round of political struggle, Beria became the second person in the state. He was inferior to Malenkov in terms of concentrated political power and the ability to influence key decisions. Beria headed two law enforcement agencies: State Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which after Stalin's death were merged into one - the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The new united ministry had its own military units and industrial enterprises, and, most importantly, gave Beria the opportunity to obtain the necessary information that could be used against political competitors. At the same time, collecting such information against Beria in these conditions became almost impossible.

In addition, Beria held a strong position in the military department, as he was responsible for secret atomic-nuclear and rocket-building programs. Beria had strong connections with industrial ministries, which were obliged to carry out orders for the secret programs he supervised out of turn and even in violation of five-year plans.

The rest of the collective leadership received significantly less political power than Beria and Malenkov. Molotov became Minister of Foreign Affairs and head of foreign policy intelligence - the Information Committee. Bulganin headed the Ministry of Defense. At the same time, both Bulganin and Molotov were appointed deputies who were clearly not among their supporters: Molotov had Malik and Vyshinsky, Bulganin had Vasilevsky and Zhukov. Kaganovich became First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and, although he oversaw several ministries, did not receive any ministerial post. Voroshilov was appointed Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council.

Khrushchev did not receive any government positions; he resigned from the post of First Secretary of the Moscow Regional Committee, since he was instructed by the decision of a joint meeting of the Plenum of the Central Committee, the Council of Ministers and the Presidium of the Supreme Council to “focus on work in the Central Committee.” Yuri Zhukov believes that in this way Khrushchev’s status in the Secretariat of the Central Committee was raised, although in the new composition of the Secretariat he was actually deprived of the opportunity to conduct an absolutely independent policy and was forced to coordinate his decisions with Malenkov.

Yuri Zhukov and Pavel Sudoplatov note that both Malenkov and Beria considered Khrushchev as a likely supporter in the fight against each other, and Khrushchev, taking advantage of the situation, maintained good relations with both for some time.

The evidence of Beria's son Sergo seems interesting for analysis. In his memoirs, published in 1994, and in his interviews in 1994, he mentions that Khrushchev in March 1953 advised Beria to agree to take the post of head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and said that there was no need to be afraid of Malenkov as chairman of the Council of Ministers, since he was very is associated with the repressions of 1937, and this fact can be “influenced” on him.

From a general analysis of the political struggle at the time of Stalin’s death, we can conclude that key positions of power were occupied by representatives of the “mature” generation of leaders of the USSR, who partially returned to political life the “old Bolshevik guard” and completely removed from power the “young” cadres promoted by Stalin in recent years. At the same time, Malenkov and Beria concentrated the greatest power in their hands. Thus, the collegial leadership was a forced compromise and preserved the existing contradictions between potential heirs to sole power.

Beria, finding himself in the second most powerful position, was forced to act more actively in the next stages of the struggle for power. As all Beria researchers note, he was a decisive and very active leader and politician, so he joined the struggle for power with maximum force, especially realizing that his starting position was inferior to Malenkov’s. Other members of the collective leadership occupied weaker political positions and were considered by Malenkov and Beria as potential allies in the fight against each other.

The first major political event at which the main contenders for power could outline the priorities of their future policies was Stalin's funeral on March 9, 1953. The funeral meeting, as chairman of the commission for organizing the funeral, was opened by Khrushchev, who, however, did not make a speech. Malenkov, Beria and Molotov spoke.

Malenkov was the first to speak. In domestic policy He outlined the further improvement of the material well-being of the Soviet people as his main priority. In foreign policy, Malenkov several times emphasized the thesis about the possibility of coexistence and peaceful competition between the capitalist and socialist systems.

Beria spoke next. Regarding domestic policy, he also mentioned “satisfying the growing material and cultural needs of the entire Soviet society”. In his speech, a very interesting thesis was voiced about the observance of the rights of citizens of the USSR, as written in the Soviet Constitution. At the same time, Beria also mentioned Lenin and Stalin, who “they taught us to tirelessly increase and sharpen the vigilance of the party and the people to the machinations and intrigues of the enemies of the Soviet state” and called “to further strengthen your vigilance.” Speaking about the priorities of economic development, Beria focused on strengthening the economic and military power of the state. Turning to foreign policy, he also mentioned the peace policy professed by the USSR, but did not say a word about the possible peaceful coexistence of capitalism and socialism. Separately, it should be mentioned that Beria in his speech, speaking about the peoples of the Soviet Union, placed emphasis, albeit small, not just on the friendship of peoples, but “on the lasting unification of all Soviet national republics in the system of a single great multinational state”.

Molotov, in his speech, speaking about foreign policy, just like Beria, expressed theses about the “aggressor” against whom it is necessary to strengthen the armed forces, and about the fight against “the machinations of enemies, agents of imperialist aggressive states.” Also in foreign policy, Molotov noted the importance of the national and interethnic issue, especially in connection with "with the formation of people's democracies and the growth of the national liberation movement in the colonies and dependent countries".

The speakers' theses were obviously directed not so much at the people as at the elite, who were offered various goals for the development of the USSR, as well as ways to achieve these goals. Comparing the programs of the speakers, one can clearly notice the peacemaking bias of Malenkov’s speech, his orientation in foreign policy towards the policy of détente, in domestic policy - towards the development of light industry and towards increasing the living standards of the population and the elite. Beria and Molotov, on the contrary, emphasized a possible confrontation with the enemies of the USSR both within the country and abroad, and proposed developing heavy and defense industries, which meant a much lower standard of living for the population and elite compared to Malenkov’s program.

Yuri Zhukov concludes that such a prioritization of the country's development led to the fact that Molotov was more inclined to side with Beria and, as a result, they formed a temporary alliance in order to together resist the actions of Malenkov. In support of this interpretation of events, one can cite the memoirs of Pavel Sudoplatov, who writes that on March 9, at a wake on the day of Stalin’s funeral, Beria informed Molotov, whose birthday was March 9, about a “gift” - the release of his wife Polina Zhemchuzhina. By order of Beria, she was released on March 10, 1953, rehabilitated and reinstated in the party. This also indicates Beria's attempt to build an alliance with Molotov in the future.

Thus, in March 1953, the top leaders of the USSR began to implement their programs, while at the same time waging a political struggle with each other.

The first political clash between participants in the “collective leadership” happened a few days after Stalin’s funeral. On March 14, a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was supposed to take place, which was suddenly postponed for a day on March 13, since an extraordinary Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee was scheduled for March 14. The actual reason for which the Plenum was held was, according to Zhukov, an attempt by the majority of members of the Presidium of the Central Committee (Beria, Molotov, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Khrushchev and Mikoyan) to curtail Malenkov’s powers through the separation of two branches of power: state and party. It was decided to no longer concentrate the highest state and party posts in the hands of one person, namely Malenkov. Malenkov at that time did not have enough authority and strength to claim the role of sole leader, and without such authority, combining the highest party and government posts was impossible. It is interesting to note that this separation of powers was officially recorded in the resolution of the Plenum as the satisfaction of Malenkov’s request to be relieved of his duties as Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, “bearing in mind the inexpediency of combining the functions of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.”

A number of researchers, for example, Prudnikova and Pihoya, believe that this was only evidence of the desire of the top leadership to once and for all separate the two branches of power. Others, for example Zhukov, on the contrary, believe that this was primarily a move against Malenkov, who, although he did not suffer a clear defeat, nevertheless, having made a forced compromise, could not immediately secure for himself the full power that had come to him initially in early March. Accordingly, the question is what was the goal and what served as a means to achieve the goal. If we assume that the goal was the separation of powers, then it is unclear why this was not done on March 4–5, when a complete reconfiguration of the political Olympus took place. The urgency and suddenness of holding the Plenum, which raised such a serious issue, is also incomprehensible. In this regard, Zhukov’s version seems closest to reality, according to which Beria cooperated with Molotov, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Kaganovich and Mikoyan in order to reduce Malenkov’s power through the division of party and state power.

As a result of this decision, the balance of power in the party apparatus also changed. Two people were removed from the recently renewed Secretariat of the Central Committee: Aristov and Mikhailov. Khrushchev, Suslov, Pospelov and Shatalin remained in the Secretariat of the Central Committee. At the same time, Khrushchev had the greatest authority in the Secretariat, but he was just one of the secretaries of the Central Committee. Yuri Zhukov notes that Malenkov not only lost, but also gained certain political benefits from these changes: Pospelov and Shatalin were supporters of Malenkov, through whom he had serious influence in the party apparatus through the Secretariat. The separation of powers also allowed Malenkov to obtain the consent of the Plenum to expand the rights of USSR ministers, which freed Malenkov from unnecessary tutelage from the departments of the Central Committee and, in particular, from Khrushchev.

In his speech at Stalin's funeral, Malenkov paid great attention to the possibility of peaceful coexistence of the capitalist and socialist systems, which made it possible to reduce military spending and redirect it to other sectors of the economy in order to improve the standard of living of the population, which Malenkov also mentioned in his speech. Yuri Zhukov believes that these two priorities - peaceful coexistence and increasing living standards - were the main ones in Malenkov’s policy in 1953.

At the Plenum, which took place on March 15, Malenkov managed to make a decision to revise the national economic plans and budget. At the same plenum, as Zhukov notes, Malenkov made a political message to his opponents that, having agreed to the redistribution of power and the refusal to combine senior party and government posts, he warned them that he would not allow any of them to claim sole leadership, with This emphasizes that in the leadership, which, although collective, Malenkov plays the main role.

According to Yuri Zhukov, Malenkov was planning a large-scale reorientation of production from military products to peaceful ones. Moreover, the extent of the reorientation was specifically hidden by Malenkov, because neither Beria, nor Bulganin, nor Molotov would support a reduction in military spending. Therefore, Malenkov made an attempt to present his transformations as a reorganization of the management system: the sectoral bureau under the Council of Ministers was eliminated, the resolution on “Expanding the rights of ministers” was revised, which now clarified that not all ministries have freedom of action, but only the ministries of industry, construction and transport . Additionally, the resolution contained clauses that allowed the director's corps to sell, buy, donate and receive surplus materials, dismantled equipment, and the funds themselves. According to Zhukov, this was the first attempt to change the conservative-bureaucratic mechanism for managing the economy, which was suitable for the first five-year plans, but was not at all suitable in the new conditions. Zhukov also notes that Malenkov’s actions led to the decentralization of the military-industrial complex, and therefore provided opportunities for its weakening and a reduction in its budget.

In May, Malenkov took the next step to reorganize the economy - reducing the staff of ministries. At the first stage alone, more than 100,000 people were released from management structures, most of whom were redirected to production. Many officials were demoted and deprived of huge salaries and privileges. At the same time, realizing that such reforms could set the bureaucratic apparatus against him, Malenkov, by secret resolution of the Council of Ministers of May 26 and June 13, significantly increased the “additional payment in envelopes” to those officials from the apparatus on whom he expected to rely in the future. Such an action, however, as Zhukov notes, also worked against Malenkov, because the “offended” were party cadres, whose additional payments in envelopes were always at the same level as ministerial ones. Zhukov cites data that party officials bombarded Khrushchev with requests in envelopes to increase additional payments for them. A few months later, after the overthrow of Beria, Khrushchev paid the party members the corresponding difference, which subsequently attracted them to his side, which allowed him to gain the upper hand in the fight against Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich a few years later.

The policy pursued by Beria in March–June 1953 can be divided into three directions.

Reform of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, closure of political cases, rehabilitation and mass amnesty

After Stalin's death, Beria was appointed minister of the united Ministry of Internal Affairs, which was formed from the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. As many researchers note, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security were competing and even hostile departments. Therefore, from the very first minutes of his stay in power, Beria began reforming the united ministry in order to form a well-functioning department, not torn apart by contradictions within the apparatus, as well as to strengthen his position in this department.

Beria had not been Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs since 1945 and did not oversee either the Ministry of Internal Affairs or the MGB through the Politburo, so he could not truly rely on the existing leadership of the ministry. Already on March 4, before officially taking up his new position, he, having coordinated his actions with the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee, appointed Goglidze, Kruglov and Serov as his first deputies, and Kobulov and Fedotov as his deputies. As Yuri Emelyanov notes, Serov was also politically close to Khrushchev, with whom he worked together in Ukraine.

The next step was the removal of giant construction projects and enterprises from the responsibility of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and their transfer to the industrial and construction ministries. For example, Dalstroy, Glavzoloto and the Norilsk Non-Ferrous and Rare Metals Plant were transferred to the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry, and Hydroproject was transferred to the Ministry of Power Plants and Electrical Industry.

Next, Beria initiated a stop, and in some cases, a cessation of the construction of huge facilities that were carried out by the Gulag. With the total estimated cost of all GULAG construction projects at that time amounting to 105 billion rubles, Beria stopped the construction of facilities, the estimated cost of which was 49.2 billion rubles. Moreover, by order of Beria, the Gulag was transferred to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice. At the same time, the Ministry of Internal Affairs included two previously independent institutions: the Main Directorate of Geodesy and Cartography and the Office of the Commissioner for the Protection of State and Military Secrets in the Press (Glavlit).

As a result, Beria withdrew all industrial and production facilities from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Thus, he relieved himself of responsibility for carrying out economic tasks (coal mining, designing canals), which made it possible to reorient the joint department to fulfill direct special service goals. As all researchers of this period note, this was a significant reform of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. After these transformations, which allowed Beria to strengthen his position in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and get rid of “non-core” tasks for the law enforcement agency, he became more actively involved in the political struggle.

Beria's next step was a mass amnesty for prisoners. As a result of this amnesty, about one million two hundred thousand people out of two and a half million prisoners were released from prison. The amnesty covered all those sentenced to a term of up to 5 years (including political prisoners), as well as women who had children under 10 years of age, pregnant women, minors, the elderly and the sick. At the same time, the sentences of those sentenced to more than 5 years were reduced by half, with the exception of sentences for counter-revolutionary activities, banditry, premeditated murders, and major thefts. According to some researchers, for example, Elena Prudnikova, this was an attempt to soften the repressive system and unload the camps. Prudnikova believes that most of those amnestied did not pose a great threat to society, and those of them who, upon release, committed crimes again, again ended up behind bars. That is, in her opinion, de facto the amnesty did not play a role for them. According to other researchers, such as Rudolf Pihoy and Andrei Sukhomlinov, the mass amnesty was a populist move by Beria and led to a sharp increase in crime. As Sukhomlinov notes, Beria also planned a broader amnesty project, which, however, was not accepted by the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. Pavel Sudoplatov also notes that the return to freedom of a large number of prisoners led to a sharp increase in crime, which forced Beria to transfer the Ministry of Internal Affairs to work in an enhanced mode. In particular, troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs began to patrol the streets of Moscow. Another part of Beria's mass amnesty policy was the decree of May 20, 1953, which lifted passport restrictions for citizens released from prison, allowing them to find work in large cities. These restrictions, according to various estimates, affected three million people.

Still, the scale of the one-time amnesty, which covered 50% of all prisoners, cannot be attributed simply to “unloading the camps.” What seems most plausible is that this political action by Beria pursued several goals.

Firstly, it created a certain image for the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Beria of relaxing the policy of the security department.

Secondly, the scale of the amnesty suggests that Beria was trying not only to influence the perception of his image and the image of his ministry among the people (and the elite), but also to give a clear signal that this was the beginning of some new course towards the liberalization of the repressive apparatus, and a significant liberalization .

Thirdly, putting the Ministry of Internal Affairs on high alert can be interpreted as Beria’s attempt to also demonstrate to his political competitors the power potential of his department.

(To be continued.)

Having solemnly demonstrated their loyalty to Stalin's cause at his funeral, the heirs hastily began to strengthen their power. To do this, many problems had to be solved - first of all, to get rid of the constant mortal threat that hovered over each of the party functionaries during the life of the leader.

The sudden fatal illness of I.V. Stalin forced his closest associates to urgently take measures to preserve and strengthen their positions. In the last hours of the leader’s life, a meeting was in full swing on the fate of Stalin’s legacy. In 40 minutes - from 20 hours to 20 hours 40 minutes on March 5, 1953 - at a meeting that called itself the Joint meeting of the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR, a redistribution of power took place.

N.S. Khrushchev presided. After information from the USSR Minister of Health Tretyakov about Stalin’s health, the floor was given to G.M. Malenkov. He reported that the Bureau of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee instructed him to “report... a number of measures on the organization of the party and state leadership in order to adopt them as a joint decision of the plenum of the Central Committee of the Party, the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.” However, Malenkov did not begin to report. The word was conveyed to Beria.

Let us quote the recording of his speech: “The Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee carefully discussed the current situation in our country due to the fact that Comrade Stalin is absent from the leadership of the party and the country. The Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee considers it necessary to now appoint a Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. The Bureau makes a proposal to appoint comrade Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Malenkova G.M. Comrade's candidacy Malenkova is nominated by the members of the Bureau unanimously and unanimously. We are confident that you will share this opinion that in the times our party and country are going through, we can only have one candidate for the post of chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR - the candidacy of Comrade. Malenkova (numerous exclamations: “That’s right! Approve!”).”

Having received such support, Malenkov announced that Beria, Molotov, Bulganin, and Kaganovich were recommended for the post of first deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers. Malenkov made proposals on personnel movements and appointments, including the merger of the Ministries of Internal Affairs and State Security into one - the Ministry of Internal Affairs - and the appointment of L.P. Beria as Minister of Internal Affairs; on the appointment of V.M. Molotov as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and N.A. Bulganin as Minister of the Armed Forces; on the merger of a significant number of ministries. Of fundamental importance was the proposal “to have in the Central Committee of the CPSU, instead of two bodies of the Central Committee - the Presidium and the Bureau of the Presidium - one body - the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, as defined by the Party Charter.”

The touching concern for observance of the CPSU Charter, however, turned out to be not as sincere as Malenkov stated. In practice, it was not the Bureau of the Presidium that was liquidated, but rather the Presidium itself, which was reduced to the size of the previous Bureau. Instead of the previous Presidium of 25 people, a new one appeared, which consisted of 11 members and 4 candidate members of the Presidium. Stalin, Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Saburov, Pervukhin were declared members of the Presidium; candidates - Shvernik, Ponomarenko, Melnikov, Bagirov. Ignatiev, Posledov, and Shatalin became the secretaries of the Central Committee.

In the official abbreviated publication of the resolution adopted at this meeting and its decisions in Pravda on March 7, 1953, Stalin’s name was no longer mentioned among the members of the Presidium.

The changes that took place at the meeting on March 4-5 contradicted the CPSU Charter. Apparently, this is precisely why the decisions taken at the meeting needed to be formalized as a joint decision of the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR - in order to give the appearance of legality to such a radical revision of the decisions of the 19th Congress of the CPSU.

Let us note that the reshuffles in the top party leadership were distinguished by a peculiar sequence: on the one hand, they strengthened the positions of the Stalinist party leadership of the post-war era, on the other, they preserved all the old contradictions between the “sworn friends” in Stalin’s circle.

Having solemnly demonstrated their loyalty to Stalin's cause at his funeral, the heirs hastily began to strengthen their power. To do this, many problems had to be solved - first of all, to get rid of the constant mortal threat that hovered over each of the party functionaries during the life of the leader. It was precisely such considerations that prompted Stalin’s closest associates to stop the flywheel of the “doctors’ case” (or, if we follow the terminology of Ignatiev and Malenkov, the “Abakumov-Shvartsman case”).

Then there was everything else - the distribution of power between state and party bodies, the solution of accumulated socio-economic problems, including the most pressing of them - food, foreign policy problems (the Korean War, the conflict with Yugoslavia, etc.).

Beria, having just become Minister of Internal Affairs, ordered the creation of an investigative group to review a number of particularly important cases. These included: “the case of arrested doctors” (it is worth paying attention to the change in terminology), “the case of arrested former employees of the USSR MGB”, “the case of arrested former employees of the Main Artillery Directorate of the USSR Military Ministry”, “the case of a group of locals arrested by the MGB of the Georgian SSR workers." The leadership of the work on reviewing the cases was entrusted to Deputy Ministers S.N. Kruglov, B.Z. Kobulov and the head of the 3rd Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (intelligence and counterintelligence) S.A. Goglidze.

On April 2, 1953, Beria submitted a note to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee about the murder of S.M. Mikhoels, in which he reported that his acquaintance with Mikhoels became the basis for accusations of terrorist and espionage activities against doctors M.S. Vovsi, B.B. Kogan, A.M.Grinshtein, Molotov's wife - P.S.Zhemchuzhina. The note indicated that all charges against Mikhoels were falsified. The real organizers of his murder were named Stalin, Abakumov, Abakumov’s deputy S.I. Ogoltsov and former Minister of State Security of Belarus L.F. Tsanava.

The next day, April 3, 1953, the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, which met with almost the same composition as on January 9 of the same year, adopted a resolution on the report of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs on the “case of pest doctors.”

The rehabilitation of military personnel and aviation industry leaders convicted in 1946 in the “aviator case” took place. On May 26, 1953, Beria sent a message to Malenkov that the Ministry of Internal Affairs did not find any crime in the cases of former People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry A.I. Shakhurin, Air Force Commander A.A. Novikov, Air Force Chief Engineer A.K. Repin, member of the Military Council Air Force N.S. Shimanov, head of the Main Directorate of Air Force Orders N.P. Seleznev, heads of departments of the Personnel Directorate of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks A.V. Budnikov and G.M. Grigoryan.

Measures were taken to return to their homeland people “illegally evicted from the territory of the Georgian SSR.” Along with the rehabilitation of those accused in certain political trials, Beria proposed making a number of changes to the then existing judicial system. He took the initiative to hold an amnesty.

On March 27, 1953, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued the Decree “On Amnesty”, according to which about a million people sentenced to up to 5 years were released - more than a third of Soviet prisoners. A few months later, when at the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee a kind of political trial of the already arrested Beria took place, Khrushchev would assess this event as “cheap demagoguery.” Those who were imprisoned under the famous Article 58, which presupposed the existence of a political crime, as well as murderers and bandits, were not subject to amnesty.

At Beria’s proposal, it was supposed to cancel the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of February 21, 1948, on the basis of which especially dangerous state criminals could be sent into indefinite exile.

The Minister of Internal Affairs also made a proposal to limit the rights of the Special Meeting under the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. At Beria’s proposal, the rights of the Special Meeting were to be limited to considering only those cases “which, for operational or state reasons, cannot be transferred to the judicial authorities,” and the Special Meeting had the right to impose penalties of no more than 10 years in prison.

The draft resolution of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, attached to Beria’s letter, was supposed to “revise the decrees and resolutions issued in recent years by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Presidium of the Supreme Council and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which contradict Soviet criminal legislation and provided the Special Meeting with broad punitive functions.” There is no doubt that the revision of the legislation should have entailed a review of the cases of people previously convicted by the Special Meeting.

At a meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, Beria's proposal did not meet with approval. Khrushchev, with the support of Molotov and Kaganovich, stated that he was “categorically against this, because it is necessary to review the entire system of arrests, trials and investigative practices... And the question of whether to sentence you to 20 or 10 years does not really matter, because you can convict first for 10 years, and then for another 10 years, and again for 10 years.”

On April 4, 1953, Beria signed an order that prohibited the use, as it was written in this document, of “savage “interrogation methods” - gross perversions of Soviet laws, arrests of innocent Soviet citizens ... brutal beatings of those arrested, round-the-clock use of handcuffs on hands turned behind the back ... long-term sleep deprivation, confinement of those arrested naked in a cold punishment cell.”

As a result of torture, the minister stated, those under investigation were reduced to moral depression, and “sometimes to the loss of human appearance.” “Taking advantage of this condition of the arrested,” the order stated, “the falsifying investigators slipped them prefabricated “confessions” about anti-Soviet and espionage-terrorist activities.”

Serious changes have taken place in the Ministry of Internal Affairs itself. Already in the first days of his management of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Beria approached Malenkov with a proposal to transfer a number of enterprises and construction projects that previously belonged to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (among them Dalspetsstroy in Kolyma, the special department of Yeniseiskstroy, the Main Directorate of the Mining and Metallurgical Industry) to the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry, the Hydroproekt Institute - to the Ministry of Power Plants and Electrical Industry of the USSR. Industrial enterprises of the Ministry of Internal Affairs also received the Ministry of Petroleum Industry, the Ministry of Railways, the Construction Materials Industry, the Forestry and Paper Industry, and the Marine and River Fleet.

This led to the cessation of the existence of the “great construction projects of socialism”, provided with practically free labor by Gulag prisoners. Among them are the Salekhard - Igarka, Krasnoyarsk - Yeniseisk railways, the Baikal-Amur Mainline, a tunnel that was supposed to connect the mainland with Sakhalin Island, numerous hydraulic structures - from the Main Turkmen Canal to the Volga-Baltic Waterway.

Beria also made an attempt to transfer the Gulag - forced labor camps and colonies with a camp apparatus and paramilitary guards - to the jurisdiction of the USSR Ministry of Justice.

These actions of Beria directly affected the economy of the Soviet Union. The Ministry of Internal Affairs was not only a punitive, but also an industrial and production ministry. Only the estimated cost of the capital construction program of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was then a huge figure - 105 billion rubles.

Major changes began to occur in the staff of the Ministry. Many MGB officers who were convicted in the “Abakumov case” and rehabilitated after Stalin’s death returned to service again - already in the Beria Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The phenomenon of Beria in the history of the USSR still needs special research. It was for domestic historians for many years - until the early 1990s. - a taboo figure. The reputation of a villain and executioner, which was assigned to him after the XX and XXII Congresses, was confirmed in the public consciousness of the time of perestroika by the film directed by T. Abuladze “Repentance”, where the main negative character - the concentrated evil of totalitarianism - was endowed with some features of the head of the Soviet punitive authorities.

In this relation to Beria, two not at all identical approaches to the past merged. For the liberal intelligentsia, Beria was the embodiment of repression, an integral part of Stalinism, an insidious scoundrel. Party propaganda supported these assessments, but also tried to contrast Beria and the “punitive bodies that were out of control of the party” with the party itself and its leadership, which supposedly knew nothing and therefore was not guilty of past crimes.

All these estimates are very far from reality. Of course, Beria is responsible for crimes committed by the authorities, but to the same extent as his comrades - Malenkov, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Bulganin, and those executed in different time Yagoda, Yezhov, Kamenev, Bukharin, Kuznetsov, not to mention Stalin. We state the obvious, although undesirable for several generations of domestic and foreign researchers of the history of the CPSU: Beria’s moral principles were no higher and no lower than those of his comrades in the party leadership.

Beria was different from his colleagues. He was undoubtedly the most informed person in the then leadership, and his information was varied, accurate and independent of other departments. As Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, he received information about the state of the country's economy, its individual sectors, in particular about the “great construction projects of socialism”; as the head of intelligence, Beria was aware of many issues of politics and international relations, real problems that arose between the USSR and other countries.

Beria was directly responsible for the development of nuclear weapons, and this connected him with the army, with the creation of new types of weapons. He had the most reliable information about the internal political situation in the country, about the mood of the people, about all any noticeable expressions of protest.

It is unlikely that Beria considered himself responsible for the mass repressions of the 1930s. He was appointed People's Commissar of Internal Affairs in the fall of 1938, when the peak of these repressions was behind us. In 1939, some of the repressed were even released. This, again, was not the personal merit of the new People's Commissar, but distinguished him from Malenkov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov or Khrushchev, who were personally responsible for the terror of the 1930s.

Numerous problems that accumulated in the post-war period required solutions. The country could no longer maintain an army according to wartime standards, have 2.5 million prisoners, spend money on “great construction projects,” continue to exploit the peasantry, escalate conflicts around the world, create new enemies even from its recent allies, like this happened to Yugoslavia. Relations with the “countries of the socialist camp” risked becoming explosive. The instability of the ruling nomenklatura layer and threats of repression worsened the controllability of the state.

Reforms became inevitable. Beria was the first to consciously decide to implement them. His intervention, as the first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, unexpectedly and strongly manifested itself in those areas of public life that seemed not to be directly within his competence.

Beria's position in the field of international relations assumed the need for a speedy normalization of relations with Yugoslavia, overcoming the ideological conflict inherited from Stalin. Beria, according to Malenkov, “proposed not to correct the course towards the accelerated construction of socialism, but to abandon any course towards socialism in the GDR and set a course for bourgeois Germany.” In the future, this will become one of the articles of accusation against the former Minister of Internal Affairs.

Khrushchev accused Beria of underestimating the leading role of the party. “What is the Central Committee? - he quoted Beria. - Let the Council of Ministers decide everything, and let the Central Committee deal with personnel and propaganda.

I was surprised by such a statement,” Khrushchev told the participants of the plenum. - This means that Beria excludes the leading role of the party, limits its role to work with personnel (and then, apparently, at first) and propaganda. Is this a Marxist-Leninist view of the party? Is this how Lenin and Stalin taught us to treat the party? Beria’s views on the party are no different from Hitler’s views.”

Khrushchev was echoed by Molotov: “Since March, we have had an abnormal situation... For some reason, all issues of international politics moved to the Presidium of the Council of Ministers and, contrary to the constant Bolshevik tradition, ceased to be discussed at the Presidium of the Central Committee... All this was done under pressure from Beria.” .

It is also necessary to pay attention to the fact that Beria was a supporter of a more active national policy in the USSR, proposing, in particular, that leadership positions in the republics should be filled primarily by their natives. This work was hastily carried out in his Ministry of Internal Affairs. It is obvious that Beria was aiming at the holy of holies of the apparatus - the nomenklatura, which had its own laws that made it possible to appoint L.I. Brezhnev as first secretary in Moldova, and P.K. Ponomarenko - in Kazakhstan.

However, Beria’s positions were not at all as strong as they later tried to prove. First of all, he had no support in the country's party apparatus. The head of the punitive authorities was not connected with the actual apparatus activities of the CPSU Central Committee. In the Council of Ministers of the USSR, he was responsible for a fairly narrow range of affairs. The creation of nuclear weapons was a very important, but still quite specific task.

And Beria’s positions in the new Ministry of Internal Affairs were by no means unshakable. Let us recall that he ceased to be the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs already in December 1945, and only in March 1953 he again directly headed the punitive authorities. The new ministry was formed from two departments that were at war with each other - the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs - and therefore could not be united. Moreover, the massive return from prisons of those arrested in the late 1940s - early 1950s. MGB officers, whom Beria appointed to key positions in the reorganized Ministry of Internal Affairs, gave rise to contradictions and created conflicts in his apparatus.

The department, assembled from two ministries, inherited the contradictions of the past, trained by numerous repressions and never left the political leadership of the Central Committee, dissatisfied, as subsequent events showed, with the revision of the “doctors’ case”, changes in punitive policy, was by no means a monolith, which Beria could lean on.

In the context of the struggle for power that unfolded in the Kremlin corridors, Beria was confronted by strong rivals: Malenkov (Chairman of the Council of Ministers, in the recent past directly associated with the activities of the punitive departments, who had a strong position in the party apparatus, where he was well known as the long-term head of the Personnel Department of the CPSU Central Committee ) and Khrushchev (Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, who inherited this position in the party from Stalin). Khrushchev was supported by the Minister of the Armed Forces Bulganin, his colleague in the 1930s. (at that time one was the first secretary of the capital city party committee, and the other was the chairman of the Moscow executive committee).

There were many signs that a clash was brewing between Beria and his comrades in the party leadership. For example, taking advantage of the fact that the archival department was part of the structure of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Beria gave instructions to the head of the Central Archival Department V.D. Styrov to collect incriminating information about Malenkov.

Beria became an increasingly dangerous figure for different people and by various reasons. He was feared and hated. For some, he was a dangerous revisionist who tried to re-evaluate the foundations of Stalin’s policy, a man who insisted on the adoption on May 9, 1953 of the resolution of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee “On the design of columns of demonstrators and buildings of enterprises, institutions and organizations on public holidays”, which abolished the practice of using portraits current chiefs to grace these events. This desacralization of party and state power in the USSR caused sharp rejection in the party leadership at various levels.

To the military elite, Beria seemed a dangerous adversary; the generals hated him for the repressions of the late 1930s - early 1950s; the persecution of the senior command staff of the post-war era was identified with his name (and not without reason); Beria's special officers were a constant threat to any commander.

Let me suggest that Beria’s personal involvement in the development of nuclear missile weapons and the changes that inevitably followed in the structure and role of the branches of the Soviet army also did not arouse enthusiasm among the generals.

It is also important that the local apparatus of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was a parallel government, well paid, interfering in everything and not being responsible for anything. Therefore, he was dangerous for party functionaries, and for Soviet officials, and for economic managers.

In addition, in the eyes of most residents of the USSR, Beria was a symbol of the constant threat of turning into camp dust.

Arrest of Beria on June 26, 1953 at a meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee (or the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which in in this case the same thing) occurred as a result of an agreement between Malenkov and Khrushchev, who, by the way, had close personal, almost friendly relations. To the main acting persons Minister of the Armed Forces Bulganin, Marshal Zhukov, and a number of members of the Presidium of the Central Committee joined.

The conspiracy has been described many times; there is a large memoir literature that provides details of Beria’s arrest. Beria was arrested entirely in the spirit of party punitive traditions - almost the same as before the Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks A.A. Kuznetsov and his accomplices. Kuznetsov was taken after a meeting of the Secretariat, when leaving Malenkov’s office, and Beria was taken at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee. The technical performers were representatives of the generals, among whom were the commander of the Moscow Military District, General Moskalenko and Marshal Zhukov.

Beria's arrest forced the country's political leadership to determine a number of important directions in domestic policy. They were officially voiced by Khrushchev and Malenkov at the July (1953) plenum of the Central Committee, criticism of Stalin’s personality cult, condemnation of “unjustified repressions,” the responsibility for which was placed entirely on Beria. Let us note the great public outcry of Beria’s arrest. Regardless of the nature of the charges brought and the goals pursued by the participants in the conspiracy, this event acquired a symbolic meaning, marking a break with Stalin’s time.

So, Beria was arrested. Without waiting for the court's verdict, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR already on June 26, the day of the arrest, issued a decree signed by K.E. Voroshilov, depriving Beria of his parliamentary powers. The arrested man was removed from his post as First Deputy Predsovminmin of the USSR, stripped of all titles and awards, and put on trial...

The first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, a member of the Politburo, and a marshal ended up in prison. Just four months ago, speaking at Stalin’s funeral, it was Beria who proclaimed his political heir, saying that among the most important decisions made after Stalin’s death and “aimed at ensuring uninterrupted and correct leadership of the entire life of the country” was “the appointment to the post of chairman of the Council Ministers of the USSR, a talented student of Lenin and a faithful ally of Stalin, Georgy Maximilianovich Malenkov "...

An explanation was required.

On July 2-7, 1953, a plenum of the CPSU Central Committee was held, at which the issue “On the criminal anti-party and anti-state actions of Beria” was discussed. I would like to draw the attention of readers to the fact that this and similar “personnel” plenums of the Central Committee were a kind of “photograph of public opinion” of the party elite at a time when the official point of view on the events taking place had not yet taken shape. In such situations, party leaders sometimes allowed themselves such assessments that they later had to regret.

At the July plenum, three approaches to the Beria case were outlined. First of all, let us note Malenkov’s point of view; he was the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the highest official in the state. Knowing the party ritual well, all subsequent speakers referred to his opinion. Thus, N.A. Mikhailov, first secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU, said: “The report of Comrade Malenkov clearly and sharply sets out the whole essence of the issue of the vile provocative anti-Soviet activities of the enemy of the party and the Soviet people, Beria. Comrade Malenkov’s report also sets out the most important tasks of our party work.”

What did Malenkov see as the “essence of the issue”? Beria’s “vile, provocative anti-Soviet activity” manifested itself, in particular, in his desire to analyze the national composition of the leading cadres in the union republics and replace people sent from Moscow with local ones. Malenkov borrowed the main facts for the charges from a message from Ukraine, from the head of the Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Lvov Region.

Beria was accused of violating the directive of the Central Committee of December 4, 1952 “On the situation in the MGB and sabotage in the medical field,” containing the demand “to put an end to the lack of control in the activities of the MGB and to place work in the center and locally under the systematic and constant control of the party.” Contrary to this, Beria carried out systematic surveillance of the leaders of the party and government under the guise of their protection.

Another accusation is Beria’s interference in international politics, the desire to normalize relations with Yugoslavia and abandon plans for building socialism in the GDR.

Criticism of the amnesty carried out by Beria, as presented by Malenkov, sounded as follows: “We ... believe that this amnesty measure is absolutely correct. But, having now revealed the true face of Beria, we come to the conclusion that he approached this event from his own position, he had his own plans in this regard.” As we see, Malenkov did not speak very clearly (or very carefully); his colleagues then spoke much more clearly.

Finally, Malenkov accused Beria of being responsible for Stalin’s negative assessments of Molotov and Mikoyan: Stalin formed this opinion “under the influence of slanderous slander from enemy elements from the Ministry of Internal Affairs.”

A slightly different point of view was presented by Khrushchev. As in his future speeches, he is more talkative and “sloppy” in his statements and does not care too much about the logical consistency of his constructions.

Khrushchev claimed that already about a day before Stalin’s death he was alarmed by the news of Beria’s desire to become Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and “to seize such positions in the state as to be able to establish espionage over members of the Politburo”; Khrushchev, according to him, shared these fears with Bulganin.

Khrushchev accused Beria of creating “bogus cases” like the “doctors’ case”, “Mengrel case”, etc. At the same time, a not entirely logical accusation was made that Beria appointed those unjustly convicted, but released after Stalin’s death, to high positions.

Khrushchev dwelled in great detail on Beria’s attempts to draw a distinction between party and state power, to limit the influence of party bodies only on personnel issues: “This came from his [Beria’s] consciousness that the role of the party should fade into the background.” In this regard, Khrushchev makes an assumption-statement that Beria generally wanted to destroy the party.

Let us draw your attention to the fact that the topic of party leadership was completely absent from Malenkov’s speech.

Khrushchev talked a lot and colorfully about the threat constantly emanating from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to leaders at all levels, about the actual lack of control of the representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the party both in the center and in the localities.

Khrushchev did not skimp on abuse against Beria - a scoundrel, a provocateur, an agent of imperialism, smart, cunning and treacherous. In Khrushchev's portrayal, Beria turned out to be to blame for almost all the problems of the USSR - from the political processes of the late 1940s to early 1950s. and foreign policy problems to the neglected state of agriculture and the lack of potatoes in the cities.

Note that Khrushchev tried to enlist the support of the party apparatus, guaranteeing it stability and peace if Beria was eliminated. A rather successful tactical move was Khrushchev’s attempt to attribute all the repressions, all the crimes of the regime, to Beria, to make the arrested man the main, if not the only, scapegoat.

Khrushchev's point of view was supported by Molotov. He recalled that the proposal to appoint the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers came from Beria, and not from Khrushchev, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Molotov criticized the procedure when decisions of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee are signed not by the Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee (as Stalin signed), but deafly by the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. Molotov's statements should apparently be interpreted as an offer of an alliance to Khrushchev; such an alliance could turn out to be directed against Malenkov, who carefully avoided the topic of separation of party and state power.

Molotov outlined the role of Beria as an intriguer who pushed Stalin towards repression in the 1930s and 1940s. This was very prudent, since responsibility for the repressions of that time was removed from those who, by the time Beria arrived in Moscow, were already part of Stalin’s inner circle - Molotov himself, Voroshilov, Kalinin...

The third point of view was reflected in the speeches of long-time members of the Stalinist Politburo - L.M. Kaganovich and A.A. Andreev. Both, speaking about Beria, used the harshest expressions: “anti-state criminal”, “fascist conspirator”, “spy”, “enemy who wanted to restore power for the restoration of capitalism”.

Mentions of Beria’s amnesty were accompanied by the statement that those amnestied were to become “the core of Beria’s fascist gang.” The rage of Kaganovich and Andreev was caused by the fact that Beria allegedly “insulted and portrayed Stalin in the most unpleasant, insulting words. And all this was presented under the guise that we now need to live in a new way... That haste, hissing pandemonium that Beria raised showed that this careerist, an adventurer who wants, by discrediting Stalin, to undermine the foundation on which we we sit and clear the way for ourselves. He wanted to undermine the basis of the teachings of Marx - Engels - Lenin - Stalin... Beria was hostile to statements that Stalin was the great successor of the work of Lenin, Marx - Engels. Today, having eliminated [the very characteristic belief that arrest is tantamount to sentencing] this traitor Beria, we must completely restore Stalin’s legal rights and call the Great Communist Teaching the teaching of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin (applause).”

“The party is above all for us...” Kaganovich continued. “For us, old Bolsheviks, the Central Committee is the party, political and economic leadership of the entire life of the party, country and state.”

Perhaps the most important political result of the plenum was the confirmation of the principle of party leadership, and not in theoretical, but in the most practical terms. An attempt to differentiate the powers of party and state authorities began to be regarded as a manifestation of Beria’s “sabotage, anti-state and anti-party activities.”

Although the participants of the plenum, as already noted, emphasized the special role of Malenkov in the party, the result of the discussion was precisely the strengthening of the role of the Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Therefore, it was quite logical to introduce at the next - September 1953 - plenum the post of First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, which N.S. Khrushchev received, consolidating his special status in the party.

Malenkov and Khrushchev united in the fight against Beria, but each of them had their own interests. In the emerging rivalry between the two recent allies, Khrushchev clearly began to gain the upper hand.

Stalin died at the Blizhnaya dacha in Kuntsevo. Beria, without saying a word of sympathy to his daughter Svetlana, hurried to the exit: “Khrustalev, a car!” If you believe what Malenkov told his son many years later, then Beria had reasons for his haste - he was leaving to “take power.” I was in no hurry...

Lavrenty Beria

Stalin's heirs had to negotiate a redistribution of power. Malenkov became the main “continuator of Stalin’s work” - he took the position of Chairman of the Council of Ministers. His first deputies were Beria, Bulganin, Molotov and Kaganovich. The Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR is Voroshilov. Malenkov tried to arrange things in such a way as to move the party committees away from management. Real power was supposed to rest with those who controlled the economy.

Georgy Malenkov

Malenkov could also take the place of General Secretary. But he already had his own plans for the future, his own plan for transformation. For this he needed the position of Chairman of the Council of Ministers. The post of General Secretary did not mean anything to Malenkov, especially since in the distant future he thought of equating the Communist Party with the trade unions and making these two forces the basis of a two-party system.

The plenum on March 6, 1953 outlined a new balance of power. Malenkov became chairman of the Council of Ministers. The Presidium of the Central Committee was reduced to 10 people. Thus, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and his team began to play a leading role. It was kind of coup d'etat, the partyocracy has taken a back seat. Only Beria remained the real force, relying on the MGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

And there was a “trifle” that Malenkov underestimated - the secretariat of the Central Committee was headed by Khrushchev.

The next redistribution of power began to brew very quickly. The partners were smart enough not to trust each other. And the most unreliable was Beria. The position of first deputy implied that if the chairman of the Council of Ministers was unable for some reason to fulfill his duties, then Beria would become his official successor. Thus, he created for himself a position most convenient for seizing power.

Beria began to place his figures in key positions in the territories, regions, republics - “on the ground.” The next step is an amnesty: those released would have to support him. Moreover, the change of the sign above his department absolved all the sins of the NKVD that remained in the past; the new ministry is no longer guilty of anything. It closed the “doctors’ case” and punished “those” investigators. And Beria began the first revelations of Stalin’s crimes - precisely in connection with the case of the “killer doctors.” The testimony of the former head of the investigative unit, Ryumin, was circulated, where he claimed that it was Stalin who demanded that he tighten up the interrogations...

The fact that a hidden struggle had begun between the dictator’s heirs became noticeable after two or three weeks. More than once it happened that Beria gave an order, and then Malenkov called and canceled it. As one of the Kremlin clerks put it, they were “on their ears” at that time - it was difficult to understand who ruled and who to obey.

In the very first days after coming to power, already in March, Malenkov orders the beginning of a new investigation into many political cases, including the “Leningrad case” and the “case of Gosplan workers.” This new investigation was supposed to not only rehabilitate the innocent, but also name the guilty. Such rehabilitation was too dangerous for many. And in May 1953, a decree on amnesty was issued signed by Voroshilov. According to it, not a single prisoner was released under the “political” Article 58 - the decree applied mainly to criminals. Thus, the very idea of ​​amnesty was discredited, the population literally groaned from rampant crime. And most importantly, this decree actually canceled the investigation of past crimes. Why, if there was already an amnesty?..

Beria knew what materials could be revealed against him. He understood that even the power that he possessed would act together with him and on his orders only as long as he had authority, even if based on fear. If he is declared an executioner and a criminal, he will lose all his potential allies. In the meantime, he can rely on Bulganin, because he himself promoted him to the position of Minister of Defense, and on the “simpleton” Khrushchev...

Khrushchev himself willingly talked about this redistribution of power. The overthrow of Beria, according to Khrushchev, looked like this:

“Beria’s attitude towards me did not seem to change, but I understood that this was a trick... At the same time, he developed frantic activity to interfere in the life of party organizations. He fabricated some kind of document about the state of affairs in the leadership of Ukraine. He decided to strike the first blow against the Ukrainian organization...

At this point I told Malenkov:

“Don’t you see where this is going?” We are heading towards disaster.

Malenkov then answered me:

- I see this, but what to do?

I speak:

- We must resist. The questions that Beria poses are anti-party in nature.

- What are you doing? Do you want me to be left alone?

- Why do you think you'll be left alone? You and I are already two. Bulganin, I am sure, also thinks the same way, I exchanged opinions with him. Others, I am sure, will also go with us if we argue with reason, from party positions... We are drawing up an agenda, so let’s raise pressing issues that, from our point of view, are incorrectly introduced by Beria, and we will object to him. I am convinced that we will mobilize other members of the presidium, and these decisions will not be made...

We saw that Beria is forcing events. He already felt superior to the members of the presidium, put on airs and even outwardly demonstrated his superiority.

We were going through a very dangerous moment. I thought it was necessary to act. I told Malenkov that I needed to talk with the members of the presidium... I had spoken with Bulganin on this issue before, and I knew his opinion.

Finally Malenkov also agreed:

“Yes, we need to act.”

“We agreed,” writes Khrushchev, “that a meeting of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers would be held, but we invited all members of the Presidium of the Central Committee there... I, as we agreed in advance, asked the chairman Malenkov to speak and proposed the question of Comrade Beria. Beria was sitting to my right. He immediately perked up:

- What are you doing, Nikita? I speak:

- So listen...

I started with the fate of Grisha Kaminsky, who disappeared after his statement about Beria’s connection with the Musavatist counterintelligence... Then I pointed out Beria’s last steps after Stalin’s death in relation to party organizations - Ukrainian, Belarusian and others... I spoke about his proposal instead of a radical solution to the issue of unacceptable the practice of arresting people and trying them, which was under Stalin, change the maximum term of conviction by the Ministry of Internal Affairs from 20 to 10 years... I ended with the words: “As a result, I got the impression that he is not a communist, that he is a careerist, that he got into party for careerist reasons”...

Then the others spoke. Molotov spoke very correctly, from party positions. Other comrades also showed adherence to principles... When everyone spoke, Malenkov, as chairman, had to sum up and formulate a resolution. He was apparently confused; the meeting ended at the last speaker.

I asked Malenkov to give me the floor to make a proposal. As we agreed with our comrades, I proposed to raise at the plenum of the Central Committee the question of releasing Beria... from all government posts that he held.

Malenkov was still at a loss. In my opinion, he didn’t even put my question to a vote, but pressed the secret button and called the military, as we agreed. Zhukov was the first to enter. Behind him are Moskalenko and other generals. There were one or two colonels with them...”

What else can we talk about and what issues should we put to a vote when the military in the next room is just waiting for the call? To make the picture of those days more objective, we will also give the floor to those who were directly involved in the arrest.

“Bulganin called me,” he was then the Minister of Defense, and said: “Let’s go to the Kremlin, there is an urgent matter,” recalled Marshal Zhukov. - Go. We entered the hall where meetings of the presidium of the party's Central Committee usually take place... Malenkov, Molotov, Mikoyan, and other members of the presidium were in the hall. Beria was not there.

Malenkov was the first to speak - that Beria wants to seize power, that I, together with my comrades, are entrusted with arresting him. Then Khrushchev began to speak, Mikoyan only gave remarks. They talked about the threat that Beria creates by trying to seize power into his own hands.

-Can you complete this risky task?

“I can,” I answer. It was decided this way. Persons from the personal security of the members of the presidium were in the Kremlin, not far from the office where the members of the presidium gathered. Serov was tasked with arresting Beria’s own personal guard. And I needed to arrest Beria.

Malenkov said how this would be done. The meeting of the Council of Ministers will be cancelled. Instead, a meeting of the presidium will open.

I, together with Moskalenko, Nedelin, Batitsky and adjutant Moskalenko, must sit in a separate room and wait until two calls are heard from the courtroom to this room... We leave. We are sitting in this room. An hour passes. No calls. I was already alarmed... A little later (it was in the first hour of the day) one bell rang, then a second. I rise first... Let's go to the hall. Beria sits at the table in the center. My generals walk around the table, as if intending to sit against the wall. I approach Beria from behind and command:

- Get up! You are under arrest! “Before Beria had time to get up, I twisted his arms back and, lifting him up, shook him. I look at him - pale, very pale. And I went numb.

We lead him through the rest room, into another that leads through the emergency passage. There they did a general search for him... They kept him until 10 o'clock in the evening, and then they put him in the back of a ZiS, covered the seats at the feet with a carpet and took him out of the Kremlin. This was then done so that the guards in his hands would not suspect who was in the car.

Moskalenko was driving him. Beria was sent to prison in the Moscow Military District. He was there during the investigation. And during the trial, they shot him there.”

In fact, it was a dangerous operation that Bulganin and Zhukov developed. The NKVD troops are a powerful force. In addition, the MVO troops were commanded by Colonel General Artemyev, Beria’s man. Defense Minister Bulganin found a plausible excuse to remove him from Moscow - for summer maneuvers near Smolensk. But a division was still stationed near Moscow internal troops named after Lavrentiy Beria, and in the Lefortovo barracks there was a regiment of Beria’s troops. Beria’s authority “among his own people” was very great; they were ready to fight for him!

It was decided to surround the division and blockade the regiment in the barracks. The operation was scheduled for June 26. General Venedin, the commandant of the Kremlin, called a regiment from near Moscow, commanded by his son. Cadets from the school named after the All-Russian Central Executive Committee were brought into the Kremlin. Khrushchev called the commander of the air defense forces of the Moscow Military District, General Moskalenko, whom he knew from Ukraine. His troops were supposed to block Beria’s forces, and Moskalenko himself with reliable people arrived in the Kremlin to arrest Beria.

This was not at all easy to do. Beria prudently introduced a procedure in which security inside the Kremlin was carried out by GB officers - well-tested elite units, devoted to him personally. You cannot enter the Kremlin with weapons; they were left with the guards. It seemed that Beria had foreseen everything...

“At Bulganin’s suggestion, we got into his car and drove to the Kremlin,” General Moskalenko recalled. “His car had government signals and was not subject to inspection when entering the Kremlin. Arriving at the building of the Council of Ministers, I took the elevator with Bulganin, and Baksov, Batitsky, Zub and Yuferev climbed the stairs. Following them, Zhukov, Brezhnev, Shatilov, Nedelin, Getman and Pronin drove up in another car. Bulganin led us all into the waiting room at Malenkov’s office, then left us and went to Malenkov’s office.

A few minutes later Khrushchev, Bulganin, Malenkov and Molotov came out to us. They informed us that a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee would now begin, and then, according to a prearranged signal transmitted through Malenkov’s assistant Sukhanov, we needed to enter the office and arrest Beria. By this time he had not yet arrived. Soon they went to Malenkov’s office, when everyone had gathered, including Beria, the meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee began.

... About an hour later, that is, at 13.00, June 26, 1953, a prearranged signal followed and we, five armed people and the sixth, Zhukov, quickly entered the office where the meeting was taking place. Comrade Malenkov announced: “In the name of Soviet law, arrest Beria.” Everyone drew their weapons, I pointed them directly at Beria and ordered him to raise his hands up. At this time, Zhukov searched Beria, after which we took him to the rest room of the chairman of the Council of Ministers, and all members of the presidium and candidates for members of the presidium remained to hold the meeting, and Zhukov also remained there.

Beria was nervous, tried to go to the window, asked to go to the restroom several times, we all accompanied him back and forth with our weapons drawn. It was clear from everything that he wanted to somehow give a signal to the guards, who were stationed everywhere military uniform and in civilian clothes. Time dragged on for a long time...

On the night of June 26-27, at about 24 hours, with the help of Sukhanov (Malenkov’s assistant), I called five ZIS passenger cars and sent them to the headquarters of the Moscow Air Defense District. By this time, by my order, 30 officers had been trained under the command of Colonel Erastov. All of them were armed and brought to the Kremlin. Surrounded by guards, Beria was taken outside and placed in a ZIS-110 car in the middle seat. The armed men Batitsky, Baskov, Zub and Yuferev, who accompanied him, sat down there. I myself sat in the front of this car, next to the driver. The other vehicle carried six of the arriving air defense officers. We drove through the Spassky Gate without stopping and took Beria to the Moscow garrison guardhouse.”

The next day, Beria was transferred to the headquarters of the Moscow Military District. He was placed in a small room, about 12 square meters. A special office was assigned to the prosecutor. It was here, in the bunker, that the investigation was carried out. The trial took place behind closed doors from December 18 to 23, presided over by Marshal Konev. The state prosecutor was Rudenko. All the accused - Beria and six of his supporters - were sentenced to death.

The verdict itself leaves no doubt: the executioner and the murderer were executed. But the way the investigation was conducted, the guilty verdict itself and the haste with which it was carried out is puzzling. It is clear that Beria is an executioner. But there is an opinion that in all this proceedings the main goal was to preserve the integrity of the party, to separate Beria from the party. And the main charges brought against Beria are “crimes against the party.” But was it really only Beria and his six assistants, and not the entire leadership of the CPSU and the NKVD-MGB-KGB who had to answer for the millions of people arrested, tortured, and shot?!

There is no doubt that Beria deserved his sentence. But other criminals escaped him...

Material by O. Lebedeva

WAS “LUBYANSK MARSHAL” A REFORMER?

Nikolai Nepomniachtchi - 100 great mysteries of the 20th century...

The shocking news of the appearance in St. Petersburg of a public committee advocating the rehabilitation of L. Beria excited society. The sinister role of this man in the history of our country, it would seem, was proven a long time ago. How, then, can we explain the attempt to revise previous estimates? How legitimate is it to talk about him as an initiator of reforms in domestic and foreign policy?

Already in July 1953, recent comrades in the Politburo, who even in the days of Stalin’s funeral called Beria a “faithful Leninist” and “a most devoted comrade to the cause of building communism,” unanimously began to convince the people that the “beloved leader” had become a “victim of Beria’s intrigues,” and to represent “ most devoted comrade" as the absolute embodiment of evil, the main criminal of Stalin's times. As if completely forgetting about his flattering characteristics of Beria, Khrushchev angrily threw from the podium of the plenum: “Even during the life of Comrade Stalin, we saw that Beria was a great intriguer. This is an insidious person, a cunning careerist. He clung his dirty paws very tightly to the soul of Comrade Stalin, he knew how to impose his opinion on Comrade Stalin...”

Behind these revealing speeches there was a certain calculation: by placing all the blame for the lawlessness committed on Beria, eliminate a political rival and at the same time whitewash themselves and the system that they all served so faithfully. It is no coincidence that the same N.S. Khrushchev, aware of the precariousness of his reputation, constantly emphasized the arrest and elimination of Beria as his special merit to the party and the people. According to him, it turned out that it was Beria who could become the main obstacle to the initiated political and economic reforms.

The veil of secrecy remained lowered in the first years of perestroika. They began to write openly and quite a lot about Beria, but the general tone of these publications remained clearly negative. Only the publication of the transcript of the July (1953) plenum of the Central Committee became a kind of sensation, as very interesting details were revealed. Including in relation to Beria’s “reform program”.

Let us recall that the Supreme Court of the USSR, which sentenced Beria and his accomplices to death, charged them with grave crimes: treason, organizing an anti-Soviet conspiratorial group in order to seize power and restore the rule of the bourgeoisie, terrorist acts against political figures loyal to the Communist Party and the people of the Soviet Union, criminal connections with foreign intelligence services. This entire set of accusations, traditional for the Stalin era, to eliminate political opponents, as well as the entire hastily cobbled together image of the “English spy - sexual maniac,” looks quite ridiculous today. But that's not what this is about.

As can be seen from the transcript, the sharpest reaction was caused by those actions of Beria, in which the speakers saw doubts about the correctness of Stalin’s course in internal affairs and in the international arena. The verbatim recordings of speeches are replete with expressions: he acted “with the wrong methods”, single-handedly stopped the “doctors’ case”, “called for the restoration of legality”, tried to belittle the authority of Stalin and limit the functions of the party to propaganda and personnel work, intended to restore relations with “revisionist” Yugoslavia, demanded to refuse from the course of building socialism in East Germany... Those who spoke at the plenum did not hesitate to use harsh words, trying to add their own touch to the assessment of Beria’s personality and methods of his work. It is unlikely that at that moment they thought about the possibility of a reverse effect. Meanwhile, behind the speeches of the speakers, regardless of them, there emerged the image, if not of a reformer in the usual sense of the word, then of a person who tried to take some initiative in dismantling Stalinist socialism. Another question is what prompted him to take this step?

There are different versions on this matter, but they all require documentary evidence. For now, only one thing is clear: Beria, earlier than other heirs of Stalin, proclaimed the need for reforms. And he not only proclaimed, but actually took into his own hands in the first months after the leader’s death the initiative for reform initiatives. Beria’s opponents, including Khrushchev, looked at the plenum as ardent Stalinists, defending every bit of the legacy of their “great” teacher.

Assumptions about Beria's reform program are confirmed in a number of other documents: in his memos, certificates, draft orders and government resolutions. The documents related to the activities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR are most fully presented - in particular, on the reorganization of the economy and the liberation of law enforcement agencies from functions unusual for them, on the reorganization of the Gulag system, on the reduction of the construction of facilities in the construction of which the labor of prisoners was used, on the transfer to the jurisdiction of the ministry Justice of forced labor camps and colonies; on limiting the rights of a special meeting under the NKVD of the USSR.

All these facts could not help but lead scientists to realize the need for a more in-depth analysis of some aspects of Beria’s political career, and first of all, the short, three-month period when he acted as an independent politician arouses increased interest. The existence of Beria’s reform plans, as already mentioned, is beyond doubt. The dispute is about incentives, and depending on this, whether or not Beria can be considered a reformer. Some believe that Beria's reform efforts should be recognized and assessed from a historical perspective without any reservations; others are convinced that his reform efforts were worthless, since all these were just tactical maneuvers in the struggle for power.

Defending the second point of view, Doctor of Historical Sciences V. Naumov draws attention: for the revision of investigative materials after the death of Stalin, which is credited to Beria, he took on those cases that arose during the period when he was not directly related to the investigative work. In addition, Naumov notes, all those organ workers who, on Stalin’s orders, collected compromising materials on Beria himself, came under attack. The public and demonstrative cessation of the “doctors’ case,” undertaken, as reported in the newspapers, on the initiative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, made it possible not only to count on a positive reaction from the intelligentsia, but also served as a good reason for the personnel purge of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of “strangers.” First of all, from Khrushchev’s supporters, who during the fabrication of the “Doctors’ Case” occupied many key positions in this department.

Differences in views, especially on a topic that was recently closed for discussion, are, in principle, a completely normal phenomenon. But, it seems, in this very formulation of the question - to consider Beria as a disinterested reformer who had an epiphany, or as a clever careerist who dressed himself up in reformist clothes to disguise himself - there is some simplification of the situation. The problem of reforms cannot be separated from the question of power, since it is impossible to implement a policy of reforms without having power. And, besides, it is necessary that the “hour of reform” come. Turning to the first months after Stalin's death, we can say that the main directions of the necessary transformations were, so to speak, predetermined by the situation that had developed at that time.

Let's remember the situation in the country. The economic and political situation within the state itself, the height of " cold war“at the international level, the complexity of relations with partners in the socialist camp - all this created a whole series of problems that would inevitably have to be solved by anyone who came to lead the country. By that time, the main “pain points” had also been identified: repressive policies, the continuation of which not only did not meet the objectives of economic feasibility, but also created a threat to political stability; a complex set of problems in the agricultural sector, where without radical and immediate measures it was difficult to prevent the crisis, numerous difficulties in foreign policy, in which, on the one hand, resistance to the dictates of Moscow in the countries of Eastern Europe grew, and on the other, harsh confrontation with the West.

Thus, the entire “troika” (Beria, Malenkov, Khrushchev), in whose hands power was concentrated, was doomed to choose the reformist path. Each of them had “its own set of reforms”: Beria had national policy, restructuring of the Ministry of Internal Affairs/MGB system, foreign policy initiatives; Malenkov has a new agrarian course, a turn to social programs, the idea of ​​détente in international affairs; Khrushchev has virgin lands, economic councils, a new military doctrine. Evaluating these “programs” in retrospect, one should most likely talk about personal initiatives, since none of them represented a holistic concept.

Let us return, however, to the conversation about Beria as a reformer. According to many scientists and political scientists, the performance of the “Lubyansky Marshal” in such a role was doomed to failure from the very beginning, even if his career in this field had not been interrupted by his former comrades. The reason is not the proposals themselves - ironically, most of them, rejected in 1953 and blamed on Beria, were later implemented. But society could not accept as a reformer a person who had a dark trail of mass repressions and other crimes behind him. In order to recognize Beria’s right to be called a reformer, it was necessary to rehabilitate him, to separate from him the shadow of Stalin’s main executioner. As the historian Oleg Khlevnyuk rightly noted in the article “Beria: the limits of historical “rehabilitation””, no matter what new information and considerations are brought in defense of Beria, nothing can outweigh his crimes...

Material by Vladislav Ivanov