Yuri Solomonov nuclear vertical. The collapse of the "Bulava" project and the white-blue-red power: revelations of Yuri Solomonov

General designer of strategic missile systems wrote a story.

Nuclear vertical: Events and thoughts. Yu. Solomonov. – M.: Publishing House "Intervestnik", 2009.

The release of a book prepared by a high-ranking military leader, statesman, a scientist and an industry leader, is always an extraordinary event. Researchers, historians and, finally, to the common man It is not without interest to learn first-hand how certain decisions were made that influenced the fate of the nation and, without exaggeration, humanity as a whole. Learn about the heroes of the “invisible” front who forged the country’s shield; expand your horizons in the field of weapons, military and special equipment.

Therefore, when I came across the book “Nuclear Vertical”, written by Yuri Solomonov, who for a long time headed one of the leading enterprises developing rocket technology - the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering and remains its general designer to this day, I eagerly began studying it , hoping to “join the secrets of creating a nuclear missile shield” of the Soviet Union and Russia.

However, the initial hope gave way to bewilderment with some disappointment. I was unable to find answers to many questions, in particular to the one that is tormenting many today: was it a mistaken decision to choose the direction of development of the new Bulava SLBM and, if everything was done correctly, what was the reason for the failures during testing?

However, the format of the book itself is quite unusual - the narration is not from the first person, as is customary in memoirs, but from a certain “outside observer.” The author, as if from the outside, observes the events taking place over several decades, in the period 1980–2010, describing them in a peculiar abstract form. In many cases - even without reference to dates or indication of the location of the event.

For example, “there is a meeting of one of the Congress committees. On the agenda is a review of the progress of work on the SDI program.” The author has no information about who and in what committee discussed such important issues? However, then there is direct speech and the content of the speeches of individual participants in the meeting - is this, it turns out, a fiction?

Or: “Within the walls of one of the institutes of the Ministry of Defense, a heated discussion is taking place on the issue of adapting the developed medium-range complex to the conditions of the US deployment of Patriot-type missile defense systems - the SAM-D modification.” Why such secrecy? Is it not possible to indicate what kind of institute it is? I can assure you that the “probable adversary” is no less aware of which institution is responsible for what than the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Defense. But with such omissions, and even from a third person, the book no longer looks like a documentary-historical work, but like some kind of free presentation on a given topic.

But the most surprising thing is different: representatives of the country’s military-political leadership and leaders of science and industry are “encrypted” under pseudonyms (the author warns about changed names in the preface). True, these faces are all well recognizable - but only for those who, as they say, are “already in the know.” If the title says “Events and Thoughts,” why change people’s names, especially since the author criticizes many of them? However, the criticism contained in Yuri Solomonov’s book is correct and does not even require proof - just look at current state Russian Armed Forces and defense industry in order to fully trust the words of the author.

“The totalitarian system suppressed dissent, focusing public attention on countering a strong, insidious enemy” or “The insatiable hydra of the military-industrial lobby fueled the process with its proposals, behind which there was nothing but a struggle for power, influence in society, and the sucking of additional resources that were bleeding the country.” , - this is all about the Soviet period, although the same words can be applied to modern Russia.

“The country is literally being torn apart by a pack of wild animals, and there is no force that would be able to put an end to this lawlessness. Strategic nuclear forces are the guarantor of the country’s security, which means it is necessary to find the means necessary to solve this most important state task,” he asserts the hero of the book, Yuri Solomatin (you must understand that this is the author himself). “But what kind of support for the defense industry could we talk about when the country’s leadership recognized only one mechanism as the only tool for forming a management structure - destruction. Instead of borrowing from what was developed in the Union and proved its effectiveness, there was a systematic destruction of the very foundations of the national economic management system, offering in return, caricature schemes borrowed by blindly copying Western models,” and this, as one can easily understand, we're talking about about modern Russia. And again - words with which one cannot but agree. In general, strictly speaking, when in our “very interesting times” a representative of the highest echelon writes so honestly and openly, this is a feat in itself, inevitably arousing the respect and sympathy of the reader.

However, there are also thoughts in the author’s judgments with which one cannot agree. For example, Yuri Solomonov for some reason has a negative attitude towards the military class. At the very least, there is no other way to interpret this phrase: “Objectively perceiving the limited way of thinking of people in uniform, he (we are talking about one of the government representatives - V.Shch.) nevertheless always knew how to find in their environment where there is very little personalities, worthy people who know how to think broadly, thereby creating a team of like-minded people together with representatives of industry." The unconditional approval of the hero of the book, Yuri Solomatin, is deserved only by those military leaders who agree with his arguments and proposals in the field of development missile weapons. Here is how the visit to the MIT of the new Navy Commander-in-Chief is described: “Admiral Kuropatov (this is a pseudonym - V.Shch.), a short man with a heavy build, entered the office of the general designer without unnecessary posing or panache and after a short greeting, to the surprise of the assembled management staff enterprises, said:

– Colleagues, I came with one purpose – to study. Area of ​​maritime strategic nuclear forces This is new to me, and I will be very grateful for your help in becoming familiar with the subject."

After such a step, naturally, the admiral earned the respect of Yuri Solomatin and his colleagues. The reader should probably also have respect for MIT, which turns out to be the only organization in the country where the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy can gain the best and most advanced knowledge about the naval component of the strategic nuclear forces. The only question that arises is: who appointed a naval commander to the post of commander-in-chief who did not understand one of the most important components Navy?

We can assume that we are talking about Vladimir Kuroyedov, but in 1976–1978 he graduated with honors from the Naval Academy, in 1987–1989 he graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces with a gold medal, in 1994–1997 he commanded the Pacific Fleet , which still has a large group of strategic nuclear forces, and in 1997 he served as chief of staff of the Russian Navy for several months. And what, over all these years he did not learn anything about the strategic nuclear forces and was forced to go to study with the designers of MIT, before the Bulava program, who, by the way, were not involved in the design of strategic submarine-based missiles?

There are also some not entirely convincing moments in the book. For example, the author seriously criticizes the proposal of some of the generals to rely on the development of a ground-based grouping of Russia's strategic nuclear forces based on stationary missile systems mine-based, leaving mobile missile systems out of the picture. The head of MIT, Yuri Solomatin (under the pseudonym one can easily guess, as already mentioned, Yuri Solomonov himself) sharply opposes such a short-sighted, in his opinion, decision and ultimately convinces the then chief of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces that it is precisely such complexes that will become the main force of a retaliatory strike in the event enemy nuclear aggression.

“In conditions of a retaliatory strike, the effectiveness of stationary mine-based complexes is close to zero, which implies the need to develop mobile complexes,” writes Yuri Solomonov.

The idea seems to be correct. The coordinates of the missile silos are not only known to the potential enemy, but - in accordance with the signed international obligations– voluntarily reported by Moscow. And the one who first decides to strike may well succeed, destroy the missile silos and disarm our Strategic Missile Forces. Mobile complexes can be on the move, constantly changing their location, and therefore are more difficult to detect and, accordingly, hit. But modern means space reconnaissance has not only optical, but also infrared and high-precision radar systems, which allows surveillance around the clock in any weather. And the coordinates of the protected shelters of mobile "Topols" and routes from combat patrol are also known to the potential enemy.

But the Russian public not only tries not to say anything about the progress of work on such programs, but also becomes angrily indignant if materials on this topic appear in the media. Here, for example, is what the author of the book thinks about this: “Imagine that in some other country belonging to the nuclear club, on the pages of ordinary newspapers, magazines, and other non-special media mass media It is simply impossible to publish such a quantity of materials on issues of strategic missile weapons. This phenomenon can be explained by two reasons: the lack of opportunity to apply one’s, as a rule, superficial knowledge for its intended purpose due to its lack of demand and the fulfillment of a direct order, which is rewarded financially. One way or another, in the press with amazing frequency, the cycle of which is determined, apparently, by causeless hormonal surges, publications appear using arguments that convince only their authors, because sometimes understanding outright nonsense, devoid of not only scientific and technical validity, but simply elementary common sense, impossible".

Let’s leave these words to the conscience of the author, I will only note that materials of this kind appear in ordinary, non-specialized (by specialized, Yuri Solomonov probably meant closed departmental publications, inaccessible to a wide range of readers) publications and in countries that are members of the nuclear club. With the possible exception of China. In the USSR, we also knew almost nothing about the Strategic Missile Forces, but since our leadership is building democracy and open society– be kind enough to experience all its “charms”, and not just those that are convenient for you. Yes, and materials about strategic missile weapons appear not with a frequency determined by “unreasonable hormonal surges,” but with the frequency of “bursts” of the “Bulava” falling into the sea, which our military-political leadership “solemnly promised” to put into service last year, or even earlier. There was no need to promise - the public wouldn’t have asked. Otherwise, it turns out that in our open media we publish either “failed would-be general specialists” or “corrupt scribes.” With the same success, using the example of individual thieving representatives of our government or the same defense industry, one can declare the “complete corruption” of all officials and all industrialists. So why tar all the media workers?

In general, we can recommend reading the book by Yuri Solomonov. Row interesting facts You can learn from it, especially about making individual decisions in the field of maintaining the combat effectiveness of our country’s nuclear missile shield. At the same time, the author himself, as stated in the preface, does not claim the exclusivity of his judgments, which leaves room for criticism and controversy, especially with the participation of those who are mentioned by Yuri Solomonov in this work, albeit in a veiled form.

The events of the late 20th century in the largest country in the world significantly influenced the formation of the conditions for the existence of human civilization, burdened by the presence of weapons mass destruction. IN modern world everything is interconnected: what happens in one state inevitably affects events in another. As a consequence, there is a need to coordinate interaction, especially in the most sensitive areas, which, of course, include nuclear weapons.
The author is a direct participant in the events described in the book that took place in the Soviet Union and modern Russia over last quarter century, - not only talks about their content, but also gives them his own assessment, without, however, claiming its exclusivity. He deliberately changes last names officials. The point of the presentation lies not in the biographical nature of individual characters, but in an attempt to identify the most bottlenecks in their complex, multifaceted activities on a national scale, in which they, by definition, must be guided state interests. About all this and more in the book Nuclear vertical (Yuri Solomonov)

In the head and soul of this man, incredibly complex structures of military-technical progress and the exploits of great people happily coexist ancient world; he, as a historian, with the greatest care breaks through the gilding of legends in order to reveal to the world the reality of the existence of ancestors and millennia. And put them to the music of poetry.

As the general designer and one of the creators of the nuclear shield of our Fatherland, Academician Yuri Semenovich Solomonov is always at his post: his missiles from the aggressor nuclear deterrence complex are the best, and everyone knows this.
And today - the publishing house "Khudozhestvennaya Literatura" published A new book, the author of which is not a member of the writers' union. But his most striking works have long been in service with the Strategic Missile Forces and our Navy.
Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Hero of Labor of the Russian Federation Yuri Solomonov is known as the creator of land- and sea-based strategic missile systems, and in the recent past he was also CEO and general designer of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering. IN different years The missile systems “Pioneer”, “Topol”, “Topol-M”, “Bulava”, “Yars”, “Rubezh” and many other things were born here, which is not the time to talk about in the media.

The creator of the naval strategic missile "Bulava", whose birth was difficult, could not help but touch its fate. As Solomonov said, all the problems with this missile system associated with the 1990s, with the collapse of the USSR and Soviet rocket cooperation. In addition, in those years the degradation of professionalism in production began. Many true masters of their craft quit due to chronic lack of money and began to look for other jobs. Many grew old and retired without passing on their skills to those who replaced them. Then it backfired quite sadly. And the fact that “Bulava” appeared at all can be considered a miracle. And, of course, the personal merit of its chief designer.

Today all problems have been resolved. "Bulava" stands on combat duty, there are no complaints about it from the military.

It is worth recalling that in the story with this rocket, Yuri Semenovich Solomonov acted like a person for whom the concept of Honor is not an empty phrase. After a series of unsuccessful launches, although they were not his fault, the General Designer of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering, where the Bulava was developed under his leadership, resigned. No one has done this in our country, either before or after him.

One involuntarily recalls this step by Solomonov against the backdrop of a series of disasters of Protons and Soyuzs - back in Soviet time debugged to the highest degree of reliability. Serial rockets fall one after another, but effective top managers don’t even give a damn. Honor and dignity are not about them.

It is interesting that the rocket scientist, who has devoted decades to his work and continues to work, is not sure that our rockets must necessarily roam the expanses of the Universe. He considers it absurd to prepare a human expedition to Mars. Let automatic stations and robots study it. But sending a person to the Red Planet is too expensive and completely unnecessary.

Our home planet, as Solomonov said, today is studied much worse than near space. On the ground, underground and under water, there is still a lot of mysterious, completely unexplored things hidden. But the very existence of human civilization depends much more on what is happening literally under our feet than on the answer to the question: is there life on Mars?

Now Yuri Solomonov is preparing a series of poems about Russian history. In his opinion, it very strongly and very symbolically echoes the history of the world, including the Middle East. And among specific historical figures, the author outlined Dmitry Donskoy and Sergius of Radonezh for “poetic development.”

This is what academician Vladimir Fortov says about Yuri Semenovich Solomonov: His gift became a revelation for me.

Of all the great Soviet defense workers - and Academician Yuri Semenovich Solomonov is certainly in the first row - no one was noticed in his studies of poetry and history. As far as I remember, only Lev Davidovich Landau was professionally versed in poetry. It was a genius. He found some brilliant solutions for atomic bomb. After work, Landau often picked up a volume of Baratynsky, he usually read poetry out loud and then relaxed. But Landau did not write poetry. Even humorous ones.

The poems were written by academician Vladimir Evgenievich Zakharov. Today he has five or six collections. And I am proud that one of his poems is dedicated to me. But Zakharov is amateur poetry. The poetry of Academician Solomonov is of a different kind. First, an overarching historical perspective: Ancient Rome, Ancient Egypt, Asia Minor and Central Asia, Ancient Persia, Macedonia…

Solomonov is the creator of the Russian nuclear shield: “Topol-M”, “Bulava”, “Yars”, “Rubezh”, “Wandering Start” (BZHRK “Barguzin”). Solomonov also studies the history of the ancient worlds as a scientist, and this gift of his became a revelation for me. Working next to him (in some matters with him) long years, I had no idea that the country's chief rocket scientist was a real poet. Your view of history - yes. Deep (and purely personal) assessments - of course.

I knew that Solomonov writes prose. But when I first heard his poems (and Solomonov reads his poems the way only poets read poetry, reveling in rhyme - “girl “linguistics”), my mouth opened by itself. None of us, his contemporaries, his friends, knew that he was a poet. And he himself didn’t know. This gift was revealed to him after the 90s, when we - all of us - sighed a little, when all this hell, the hell of the 90s, was left behind... You see, there is people who work through strength. They do their job honestly and conscientiously. But work is always a burden to them. And the Bible says: “The Lord does not give a cross beyond one’s strength.” Academician Solomonov’s school is always real creativity. Always! Solomonov works , without getting tired, he was in brilliant shape all his life, and his best students (and there are thousands of them) matched him. He graduated from the Moscow Aviation Institute. Sergei Pavlovich Korolev had a department at the Moscow Higher Technical School, although he was an extremely tired person and (as everyone thought) with complex character, but with the students he relaxed: a lecture is like a vacation, young eyes are around you!

And Solomonov’s poetry, like his entire school, is primarily for young people. It organically complements what is fundamental in his life - strengthening the country's defense capability. Today we are already 10-12 years ahead of the Americans in terms of missiles. Yes, it is the products of the Moscow Institute of Heat Engineering and the cooperation of enterprises headed by it that have moved the third world away from Russia world war, although after Crimea the third world war seemed inevitable.

I do not know today a single scientist who would now have such authority in Russia as Solomonov. And just as freely (inner freedom for a scientist is an absolutely necessary thing), Solomonov writes poetry.

There is such a beautiful science - the theory of functions of complex variables. I took it when I was studying. And Solomonov passed it. This is a complex science. But she is very beautiful. Beauty and complexity. Like two twin sisters. Here is the poetry of the Hero of Labor of Russia, Laureate of the USSR State Prize Yuri Semenovich Solomonov - beautiful and complex. Poetry in one breath...

The book of poems by Academician Solomonov is indeed a continuation (and what a continuation!) of his work, the work of his life. He must surprise people. He must open. And he writes because he cannot help but write - if something is given to a person, it tears him apart from the inside, does not give him peace, and Solomonov (his working day for several decades now begins at the same time: 5 o’clock in the morning) writes mainly in the mornings, Saturdays and Sundays, sometimes, if thoughts come flooding in, at night, in absolute silence, when nothing prevents him from plunging into the depths of centuries and conducting a dialogue with great commanders and thinkers - judging by the published book, they really have something to offer tell each other.

THE COLLAPSE OF THE STATE AS A VALID INSTITUTION

One can argue for a long time about whether it was necessary to start the Bulava project and whether it would have been better to complete the Bark project. This is a separate topic. In our case, another question is important: is the current “vertical of power” a capable state? Can it (as a state) implement complex technical projects that were not difficult even for the Brezhnev USSR? After all, if the decision to implement a project has been made, it needs to be implemented. Otherwise - a tavern, chaos and national disgrace.

And here Solomonov’s book paints a merciless picture. There is no state in the Russian Federation. What is called the “state” is incompetent in everything that does not concern cutting/rollback. Under Putin-Medvedev, there was and is a collapse state power. Its place is taken by a clearly defined criminal, barracks system, completely unsuitable for the purposes of the industrial, scientific and technical development of the country.

It’s just that “Bulava” is a good illustration of this progressive paralysis of the state. If a decision is made in the Russian Federation to implement this or that project, this does not mean anything. All the same, then problems begin and outright sabotage begins. Plus outright meanness and self-interest. "Bulava" faced these realities in all its glory.

“The history of the creation of military missile technology in the USSR has seen many cases of uncompromising struggle between competitors. However, this struggle each time continued until the state leadership made final decisions, after which everything fell into place in accordance with the well-known saying: “After a fight, you don’t wave your fists.” Here, our Ural colleagues, traditional developers of sea-based complexes, and individual officials at the highest level, including the Deputy Prime Minister, and senior officials of the Ministry of Defense, through their actions, not only complicated the development process, but in a number of cases simply blocked it...”- writes Yu. Solomonov.

In an attempt to achieve at least some certainty, the general designer of MIT turned to the head of Roscosmos for help Yuri Koptev(in the book he is listed under the name Kopytov, he headed the RKA/RAKA in 1992-2004) Like, let’s call a meeting with you, let the opponents express all their complaints openly, and we will answer just as openly. We will invite experts from the Moscow Region and the Academy of Sciences. (By the way, this is the completely Stalinist style of meetings on controversial development issues!) But it didn’t help, because this comrade turned out to be unnecessary and not entirely decent. It was spoiled by post-Soviet realities.

“...He felt like a fish out of water among the ruling elite, whose intellectual potential was painted mostly in gray tones...

...This was a natural reaction of a person who grew up within the strict framework of the state administrative machine of the USSR and was faced with a lack of basic executive discipline, when the instructions of the country's leadership on sometimes the most important issues were not carried out - and no one was responsible for this. This could not but give rise to non-obligation in big and small, if a person is predisposed to this, which is what happened in in this case...»

Koptev acted ugly: he promised to schedule such a meeting, but then canceled it - and did not inform MIT.

At the same time, another story is developing: it’s 2004, but for two years now Putin’s order to begin work on modernizing the Topol-M complex in order to expand its combat capabilities has not been fulfilled. Then Y. Solomonov proposes to the head of the defense industry department of the government apparatus: let me draw up a draft government resolution myself and coordinate it with all interested ministries and departments. Because the state machine in this case is simply stuck. The head of the department agrees with one condition - mandatory approval of the project from the Ministry of Defense.

To do this, it was necessary to enlist the support of the head of the General Staff A. Kvashnin and hold a meeting with him with the participation of the head of the main operational directorate of the General Staff, the head of armaments of the Ministry of Defense and the head of the scientific and technical committee of the ministry. And then it turned out: these military men are against the work on modernizing the Topol-M. Kvashnin risked losing the support of the military department. The head of the scientific and technical committee bluntly stated: “The Ministry of Defense does not need this work!” And yet, Kvashnin endorsed the draft resolution.

Having collected the visas of all the necessary departments on a draft form of the draft resolution, Solomonov had to go through the second round: collect the same signatures - but on a “belovik”, the so-called “red form”. This was done in the USSR - and it never caused any difficulties. After all, the text has already been agreed upon, it’s just completely rewritten. In the Soviet Union, repeat visas were collected by mid-level officials. But not in the Russian Federation! Here Solomonov had to go himself. And then the Chief of the General Staff began to doubt whether to sign?

“The same thought was persistently pounding in my head: “Why should I mind my own business, confronting a virtually non-functioning state machine?”- writes the author. He still managed to persuade Kvashnin, but a heavy aftertaste remained.

From other sources I know how Solomonov has been trying all these years to meet with top officials to discuss problems that need to be solved at top level, and failed over and over again. It seemed wild. After all, Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev always accepted general designers in projects of this level.

But this was Erethiya, and not the Soviet Union. Soon after the events described, the Ministry of Finance, headed by Kudrin, began to openly disrupt the financing of mass production of new “poplars”...

FRADKOV HELPED - BUT NOT FOR LONG...

The Votkinsk plant is the only enterprise in the Russian Federation producing ballistic missiles. intercontinental missiles ground-based- could not switch to serial production of Topol-M. Government investment was needed. Even the visits of high government officials to the enterprise did not help.

"In most cases, attention various kinds level of managers when visiting the enterprise was of a non-public, non-ostentatious nature. Based on the results, specific decisions were made each time to help resolve current issues. And, unfortunately, there were more and more of them. The degradation of the military-industrial complex was acquiring an avalanche-like character, which required constant cooperation efforts to ensure stable production. The market declared in the country has not become the norm of economic interaction between its participants in the field of special mechanical engineering...

At one of these moments, when an acute confrontation between industry and the Minister of Finance was brewing on the issue of resource support for the preparation of serial production of enterprises that develop and manufacture domestic strategic weapons, another off-site meeting was held under the leadership of the government. The vertical of power once again failed. The direct instructions of the president of the country were ignored, with good reason it could be stated that in the power structures there was a mutual responsibility irresponsibility..." - writes Yuri Solomonov, touching on the events of 2007.

At that time, the prime minister was M. Fradkov (listed in the book as Fradkin, prime minister in 2004-2007). Solomonov was pleasantly surprised when, at an off-site meeting in Votkinsk, Fradkov showed himself to be an understanding and businesslike boss. Then the author of “Nuclear Vertical” said: defense engineering works on extremely worn-out machine parks. Preparations for serial production of Topol-M will make it possible to at least slightly update the equipment. There is an order from the President of the Russian Federation. But " For two years, the Minister of Finance has been engaged in outright sabotage, ignoring the approval of the Program under various pretexts.”

The conversation, as you understand, was once again about the unforgettable liberal-monerarist Alexei Kudrina. Who, even in “rising Russia”, successfully continued the work of Gaidar/Chubais, while remaining untouchable. And Kudrin still doesn’t give a damn about the “formidable Putin”.

And Solomonov, looking into Fradkov’s eyes, continued:

“It is impossible not to mention the process of loss of unique technologies in production and, above all, in materials science. A comprehensive government program with funding is needed.

Finally, the most serious personnel issue. Average age The number of people working in the defense industry is growing steadily, having exceeded 50 years. Enterprises themselves will not be able to solve the problem of rejuvenating their personnel without the state... The task is extremely complex, but without solving it, it is simply impossible to count on maintaining the defense-industrial potential in the next 10-15 years...”

Fradkov understood everything. At its meeting (unlike Putin’s Novo-Ogarevo disgrace in 2002), minutes were kept. And then Prime Minister Fradkov was able to interrupt two years of sabotage, went against the Ministry of Finance - and two weeks later signed two resolutions on the preparation of mass production of missiles. He even gave instructions to prepare a draft program for the preservation and development of materials science. But they never got around to the problem of rejuvenating personnel. In connection with the beginning of Medvedev's nomination for the presidency and the preparations for Putin's replacement as prime minister, Fradkov was removed from the post of head of government.

Is it any wonder, friends, that today the Russian defense industry is falling apart more and more?

ANDROID INVASION

Then Solomonov’s life deteriorates sharply. The power of gray executors, blindly loyal to the Great Pu, is being established in the Russian Federation. Androids. Oh, yes, in February 2007, furniture maker Serdyukov sat in the chair of the Russian Ministry of Defense. The current champion of the transition to foreign procurement military equipment and weapons.

Instead of Kvashnin, the Chief of the General Staff by that time was Yuri Baluevsky(depicted in the “Nuclear Vertical” as General Baluev, the head of the General Staff in 2004-2008) Solomonov portrays him as an extremely uninitiative boss, guided by the principle “The best decision is not to make any decisions.”

However, Baluevsky became the National General Staff even before Serdyukov, under the head of the Ministry of Defense, philologist and “foreign intelligence officer” Sergei Ivanov (at the head of the Ministry of Defense in 2001-2007). Solomonov writes that this friend of Putin did not help MIT or the Topol-M and Bulava projects in any way. Let me give you a juicy quote from the book.

“The minister is an extremely unique person. Ability to keep distance fine features his face, his correct literary speech, his very manner of behavior - everything in him indicated that he presented himself as an intellectual leader. At the same time, the position itself created the image of a large-scale personality.

Knowledge of several languages, an invariable attribute of professional affiliation in the recent past, only complemented the portrait of a high government official of the new formation. Perhaps there was one thing that was alarming about the communication - very unusual facial expressions. The smile that appeared from time to time, revealing magnificent, albeit artificial, teeth, and designed to win the favor of the interlocutor, upon careful examination turned out to be not so friendly. The reason for this conclusion was given by the eyes - cold, prickly, living their own lives, as if warning: trust is not our method of interaction.

The meeting, the rules of which were worked out to the smallest detail, went on as usual. Reports, questions, answers, comments, presented in an extremely restrained form - everything is as always. Familiarization with the information, general satisfaction with the results, the best decision - no decisions..."

“...A paradoxical situation has arisen: the executive branch, whose official and even sacred duty is to create conditions for the unconditional implementation of the decisions it makes, has turned into an outside observer, proving the incapacity of the vertical of power...”

So, I will add, the defense industry has been strangled by doing nothing. For Putin's eight-year plan... After Yeltsin's eight-year pogrom...

What saved “Topol-M” (according to Yu. Solomonov) was not the General Staff or the Ministry of Defense (they almost openly played against), but the efforts of the Strategic Missile Forces command. If it weren't for it, it would be bad.

The author of the rebus book also describes other androids. For example, Boris Gryzlov (Priemov in the book) and Sergei Mironova. But repeating their portraits is pointless: Solomonov clearly demonstrates their purely decorative role in the Erethian system. They practically cannot influence the decisions of the authorities.

INSORED

More interesting are Solomonov’s impressions from the meeting on defense industry problems. Dmitry Medvedev.

“...Irritation was in the air. A rather harsh opening statement, the obvious nervousness of the chairman’s behavior, and the expressed desire to quickly end the discussion of generally very important issues indicated either his excessive fatigue or the importance that was attached to the meeting with the leadership of the government, the president’s office and directors of corporations.

The speakers instantly sensed this leader’s spirit and, without hesitation, using only the numbers known to them, reported on the work done.

Yuri tried to make proposals in order to streamline the work of the commission, headed by one of the deputy prime ministers, but the meeting participants were not in the mood for any positive work, which once again demonstrated the effectiveness of the system...”

Thus, the squalor with his “insorted” brains did not want to delve into anything. What for? After all, in 2009 it was already decided: why the hell do we have our own defense industry? It is more efficient to import weapons.

THE SYSTEM FALLS INTO INSANE: PERSONNEL CHAOS

The author of “Nuclear Vertical” also damningly depicts how the Russian Federation system began to fall into distinct insanity. How a real personnel disaster occurred after Soviet managers were replaced by Russian ones in the “zero” years.

“The Soviet system of personnel education, which certainly suffered from protectionism, politicization, in some cases, planning and patriotism, in relation to the military-industrial complex fully met its objectives. Wherein decisive rule when appointed to a particular position were professional quality applicant. The same thing happened in the military environment...

In the emerging new social formation of modern Russia, the formation of a hierarchical management structure occurred in an absolutely chaotic manner. The spineless “Yeltsinism” that gave rise to chaos and anarchy in the country, which had catastrophic consequences for National economy, was replaced by military-police methods of strengthening power, which, against the backdrop of the events that took place, seemed absolutely logical. Not required knowledgeable people, but obedient performers. The lack of criticism of management decisions could contribute to strengthening the vertical of power and, under certain conditions, increasing the efficiency of the management process itself. The danger lay in the very psychology of managers. Once a feeling of infallibility has arisen, it is impossible to remove it from the gray matter without surgical intervention, and if this does not happen, then more and more often in the process of preparing and implementing adopted laws and regulations, anomalies arise, the frequency of which is largely determined by the health of the economy... In such conditions, the principle of professionalism in personnel selection is replaced by the appointment of “convenient” people, why the predominant color scheme these frames with very rare foreign inclusions become pastel gray tones..."

Solomonov describes how the General Staff was filled with outright opportunists.

Everything is learned by comparison - I’ll say a hackneyed phrase. Reading "Nuclear Vertical" Maksim Kalashnikov At the same time, I studied another interesting material: an interview with Expert magazine, given by the director of the All-Russian Institute of Aviation Materials, Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Evgeny Kablov. He also talks about the dominance of dullness in the state apparatus of Erefiya.

“...I am amazed by the courage with which some people take on any position without having any preparation for this. I sometimes encounter officials responsible for science and technology policy who have to explain what they should know upon graduating from university. I'm not talking about knowing any details. This is the problem. And we need people who understand the problems of science and technology, because they have experienced them through themselves. Therefore, I was attracted by the words of US President Obama, who said that it is necessary to give technocrats and scientists the right to influence government decision-making...”

Do you know how Kablov got into the elite in the 1970s, while still a young researcher?

“...After graduating from the Moscow Aviation Technological Institute, I was sent to VIAM. Along with my diploma, I have already prepared candidate's thesis on the modification of silumins, these are alloys of aluminum with silicon, and I expected to work on this topic, but they unexpectedly decided to send me to the laboratory of heat-resistant alloys. This was explained by the fact that in the mid-70s, when engines began to be produced fourth generation, problems with the fatigue strength of turbine blades were discovered. The engines only worked for 50-40 hours, and then the blades broke. And then it was decided to send capable young guys to work on this topic.

It struck me that I young specialist, entrust the decision the most difficult problem. After analyzing the work already carried out and the literature, I came to the conclusion that in order to achieve the required reliability of the blades, it is necessary to change the manufacturing technology of the casting mold, into the surface layer of which it is necessary to introduce a modifier that allows the grain of the surface of the cooled blade to be refined. My calculations and research showed that cobalt aluminate was suitable for this role, which had to be synthesized from starting materials and then applied to the mold during its manufacture. To do this, we had to independently develop a special technology...

We manufactured the blades using new technology and sent them for testing. After two weeks it became clear that we had never had such properties. I still remember this test report. Then, visually, looking at the form, I could determine its quality. Because if the form is of high quality, then on its surface the so-called Berlin glaze is obtained, like Gzhel with majolica. But when I came to my laboratory head with these results, he told me: young man, you don’t know the theory well, it’s impossible that such reliability characteristics could be obtained with a fine-grained structure of the material. The point is that when high temperatures destruction of materials as a result of diffusion of the main alloying elements occurs along the grain boundary. The smaller the grain, the greater the extent of the boundaries. That is, our result contradicted the generally accepted logic of things.

Additional research was needed to show that new technology mold manufacturing made it possible not only to reduce the grain size, but also to improve the quality of their boundaries, which significantly reduced the diffusion permeability and mobility of these boundaries.

When all the questions were resolved, they decided to introduce this process into product 89, which previously could not pass state tests due to engine failure.

- What kind of plane are we talking about?

- Su-24. Academician Arkhip invited me Mikhailovich Cradle, the general designer of the Saturn Design Bureau, which developed the engine for it, listened - and I got to manage practically half the foundry shop for a week. When we did everything and passed the tests, the engine for the first time received a 100% service life. And the minister signed an order that all engine factories must implement my method when casting blades from ZhS6U and VZhL 12U alloys. And I went to all the big engine factories Soviet country implement this process, which is still in use and working today...” (http://www.expert.ru/printissues/expert/2010/14/interview_pochemu_lopatki_razrushautsya_iznutri/)

That is, in the USSR, people were selected for the elite according to business criteria. In this case - young innovators. Everyone knows by what criteria personnel are selected in Erefia. That’s why the USSR was moving forward, and the Russian Federation was going backwards. And we are ruled by gray cretins, arrogant as hell, unshakably confident in their infallibility. Under Putin, there was a massive expulsion from the management structures of Russian-Soviet-trained technocrats; they were replaced by stupid redneck androids of the white-blue-red times.

And therefore, with them, only one thing awaits the defense industry - death.

THE INEVITABILITY OF TROUBLE

“Unreasonable, absolutely far-fetched reform of the public administration system(Putin’s government reform of 2004 - M.K.’s note) in relation to the military-industrial complex, it created an atmosphere of irresponsibility for the state of its health and, as a consequence, ongoing, sometimes irreversible, degradation.

Thanks to the incredible efforts and support of the miraculously surviving professional managers in the White House apparatus, who withstood unprecedented pressure from the ambitious, incompetent administrative elite, it was possible to keep the huge ship of cooperation between developers and manufacturers of strategic weapons afloat. It seemed obvious that the natural support in this the most difficult situation should become the Ministry of Defense. However, this did not happen. Moreover, burdened with their own problems of reform, involved in the redistribution of property and setting themselves the goal of more actively influencing industry through property processes, the leadership of the department threw out the baby with the bathwater. Not understanding, due to the lack of any experience, the real mechanisms of the functioning of the defense industry, acting with authoritarian methods, not disdaining the use of tools behind the scenes, exploiting the trust of the country’s leadership, it ultimately opposed itself to the interests of the state...”

“...The huge margin of safety of Soviet industry allowed this, without exaggeration, the most developed sector of the economy, to stay afloat, but by the end of the century it became obvious: radical government intervention was required, without which further movement forward became impossible...

The complexity and multifaceted nature of the contradictions, obscured by the “tame” media, many times aggravated by the financial and economic policy of the authorities, who did not believe in the intensive path of development of the country and relied on its financial and industrial prosperity, were doing their job: the high technologies mastered with such difficulty, all Highly professional personnel were less in demand, and the lack of labor motivation in the defense industry acquired real contours, which increasingly turned into a duty rather than a creative need.

The above was complicated by the itch of endless reforms in the structures of the military-industrial complex, the meaning of which, due to their closedness and inconsistency, was simply impossible for the participants in the reform process to understand...”

VERTICAL OF DEGENERATION

"Improper, superficial management decisions, each time changing the form, did not affect the content of the reform, but led to the expected results... Demonstrating on modern stage its development obvious signs systemic ill health due to the loss of obvious links between the real economy and its finances, these ( capitalist) relations significantly accelerated the process of degradation of the defense industry..."

“The proclaimed campaign to create vertically integrated structures - holdings, the participants of which were united on the principle of shop affiliation, was gaining momentum. The involuntary analogy with the deplorable experience of creating economic councils in the 50s of the last century did not set one in an optimistic mood...”

It would seem that it is necessary to create a holding company from all the enterprises that are part of one MIT production complex. Holding company for the production of the only intercontinental ground complex of the Russian Federation - “Topol”. But the Ministry of Defense is against the institute’s proposals. Anatoly Serdyukov has his own plans. He is the only one of all departments who disagrees. And he addresses Prime Minister Putin directly to Medvedev with his draft decree.

“And now the newly-minted Demiurge, the head of the defense department, holding a position that is certainly significant in the hierarchy of power, but still being a member of the cabinet, did not agree with the opinion of the government and turned over his head to the president of the country. The case is unprecedented in the history of government.

Established stalemate situation, regardless of its outcome, testified to one thing: power is in a systemic crisis, the basis of which, along with the objective difficulties of formation new Russia constitutes the process of personnel placement, which, as we know, decides everything...”

This is how Academician Solomonov describes the situation that developed around the defense industry of the Russian Federation at the end of Putin’s second term, in the first half of the Medvedev kingdom and at the beginning of Serdyukovism.

Who said that we have a KGB oprichnina and a dictatorship? Ours is a mess. No dictatorship will allow what is happening in the Russian Federation. This is a crisis of power itself, the stinking finale of the anti-Soviet-anti-Russian project.

Truly, one smart defense specialist was right when he said: “Maxim, our designers are world-class players to whom the Americans take off their hats with respect. And the current rulers are scum, mediocrity, gray rabble. They just subconsciously hate designers. This is where all the troubles stem from. This is envy, Maxim, the usual envy of mediocrity in relation to talent.”

So it was successfully built new Country Fools, in which the defense-scientific-industrial complex simply has no place. He is doomed to disappear. And the Elite Fools hopes to buy everything abroad.

AFTERWORD: THE HOUR HAS COME!

Workers of the Russian defense complex!

If you have not yet forgotten how to think, join the ranks of the opposition. Because your industry is a candidate for destruction. Just like you. You have to be a complete idiot to expect something good and reasonable from this government.

We, the opposition to this Degenerate system, this redneck democracy, will save the defense industry. Here are our suggestions on what needs to be done in strategic rocket science - http://forum-msk.org/material/power/1726543.html

That's it, comrades, the masks have been dropped and the hour has struck. The system turned to the defense industry of the Russian Federation with its disgusting face - the face of a corpse eater, looter and destroyer. Only in struggle can we defend our lives and the Future...

M. Kalashnikov