Zhilkin's arrest. What hasn’t been done, new work and Morozov: the ex-head of the Astrakhan region spoke about his departure

After the prosecutor Astrakhan region Oleg Dupak was found dead in his apartment, there were rumors that his suicide could be related to the series corruption scandals surrounded by Governor Alexander Zhilkin.

The Moscow Post correspondent was informed about this by law enforcement agencies. Against this background, information appeared on Astrakhan media websites about the detention of the former governor of the Volgograd region, Sergei Bozhenov, who was previously the mayor of Astrakhan.

Mysterious suicide

Last Saturday (August 22, 2015) happened tragic event- Prosecutor of the Astrakhan region Oleg Dupak committed suicide. The wife of the deceased has already told investigators about her husband’s inappropriate behavior on the eve of the tragedy.

According to her, the man returned from a vacation with friends drunk, excited, tried to call someone, and was noticeably nervous. Then he approached his son and began to cry. According to the woman’s testimony, she sent Oleg Dupak to her room to calm down, to which the prosecutor asked her: “Do you want me to shoot myself?”

Some time after this, a shot was heard from award weapons. The prosecutor committed suicide. On this moment the official preliminary cause of the incident is considered careless handling firearms. But, according to experts, everything looks like a successful suicide attempt.

Prosecutor of two regions

Political scientists note that Oleg Dupak could build relationships with the governors of the regions in which he worked in different ways. Let us recall that from 2006 to 2009 Dupak was the prosecutor of the Republic of Karelia, and from 2009 to 2015 he headed the prosecutor’s office of the Astrakhan region.

Local media write that for three years in Karelia, prosecutor Oleg Dupak worked closely with another visiting security official - the head of the republican Ministry of Internal Affairs, Igor Aleshin. Together they became famous for “disrupting” the local elite, represented at that time by the “people of Katanandov” ( former head Karelia). Journalists then began for the first time to write about the war declared by visiting security forces against local officials and businessmen who had reigned supreme in the republic for many years.

During the work of Dupak and Aleshin in Karelia, several high-profile and, one might say, landmark corruption cases were initiated and investigated. Including the case of the Deputy Minister natural resources Valery Panov, later convicted of a large bribe, and the case of the former head of the Road Committee and the State Forestry Committee, Vladimir Kornienko, who was first arrested, but later, after being free for a short time, fled from Karelia and Russia and is still wanted.

It was also Dupak who started the famous “trout business” in relation to former leaders Republican Ministry of Agriculture Vladimir Sobinsky and Wanda Patenko, which has not yet reached the final.

But Dupak’s stay in the Astrakhan region was seriously different from his actions in Karelia. If there he “smashed” “Katanandov’s team,” then in the Astrakhan region he, according to rumors, got along well with “Zhilkin’s team,” that is, with the entourage of the current governor, Alexander Zhilkin.

Was Bozhenov arrested?

It is believed that previously “Zhilkin’s team” included ex-mayor of Astrakhan Mikhail Stolyarov, convicted of bribery to nine years in prison, and former governor Volgograd region Sergei Bozhenov, who was previously the mayor of Astrakhan.

Immediately after his resignation, Bozhenov, fearing arrest, fled to one of the European countries, famous for its luxury resorts. It was previously believed that he was still holed up in Europe.

However, in August 2015, on forums and websites of the Astrakhan media, users began to share data that “according to unverified information, the former governor of the Volgograd region, Sergei Bozhenov, was placed in a pre-trial detention center for the duration of the operational investigative activities of the Russian FSB in the Volgograd region.”

Experts believe that FSB officers have long been interested in “Bozhenov’s affairs.” In this regard, it is possible that this former official was indeed secretly detained abroad and extradited to Russia. In connection with the latest high-profile criminal cases brought against members of the “Zhilkin team”, the arrest of Bozhenov (in person or in absentia) seems highly expected.

Friendship between the prosecutor and the governor

According to political scientists, Dupak, having arrived in Astrakhan, got along well with Governor Zhilkin and his entourage. By the way, the head of the Astrakhan region also supported the head of the regional prosecutor's office.

For example, on May 28, 2015, Governor Zhilkin awarded Prosecutor Dupak the medal of the Order of Merit for the Astrakhan Region.

In addition, Dupak was presented with a Certificate of Honor from the Duma of the Astrakhan Region.

It is obvious that the regional authorities treated the “loyal prosecutor” well. Governor Zhilkin was interested in Dupak's powers being extended. And in the spring of 2015, by order of the President of the Russian Federation dated March 8, 2015 No. 45-rp, Dupak’s powers were extended until 2020.

Mistrust on the part of security forces?

However, despite the extension of Dupak’s powers, the federal security forces did not really trust him.

So, for example, when the mayor of Astrakhan was caught red-handed in the fall of 2013, regional prosecutor Oleg Dupak learned about the arrest of mayor Stolyarov from TV.

The arrest was carried out by Moscow FSB units. The fact that the FSB officers did not even notify the prosecutor of the Astrakhan region about the detention of the mayor of Astrakhan clearly indicates distrust of Dupak on the part of the federal security forces

"Roof" for officials?

IN Lately a number of influential Astrakhan officials were able to evade responsibility. For example, at the beginning of June 2015, the Kirovsky District Court of Astrakhan dismissed the case against the ex-minister Agriculture Astrakhan region Ivan Nesterenko, accused of negligence.

According to the investigative department of the Investigative Committee for the region, Nesterenko, knowing about the property management agency’s planned sale of a controlling stake in Astrakhan Product OJSC for 13.6 million rubles, in December 2012 presented to this enterprise state support in the form of subsidies amounting to more than 108 million rubles.

Nesterenko informed the agency about state support, which should have resulted in an increase in the price of the stake being sold, only after the auction.

Thus, a controlling stake in the enterprise, the actual cost of which, taking into account subsidies, amounted to 43 million rubles, was sold for 13.6 million rubles, which resulted in damage to the state budget of 30 million rubles.

It would seem that after the court helped Nesterenko avoid punishment, the prosecutor of the Astrakhan region should have been indignant, but Dupak did not go against Nestrenko (that is, against Zhilkin).

Dupak is also “not worried” about the fate of the former deputy chairman of the government of the Astrakhan region, Viktor Chalov, who now lives in Slovakia as a local millionaire.

Local media say that in fact Chalov serves as the purse and holder of the assets of Governor Zhilkin, performing, on his instructions, various transactions to transfer accumulated funds either from Slovakia to a Cypriot offshore, or from a Cypriot bank to the Virgin Islands.

It is also rumored that the Astrakhan governor Zhilkin has to make considerable efforts to keep Russian law enforcement agencies from investigating Chalov’s Astrakhan affairs and putting him on the Interpol wanted list.

Obviously, Dupak had to start checking the information that Chalov was allegedly pumping “Zhilkin’s money” into offshore companies. But that did not happen.

A blow to “Zhilkin’s team”

But recently, security forces have literally attacked “Zhilkin’s team.” For example, at the beginning of June 2015, the now former Minister of Social Development and Labor of the Astrakhan Region, Ekaterina Lukyanenko, was arrested.

Employees of the Astrakhan department of the Investigative Committee, based on the audit data received from the Economic Security and Commissariat of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation for the Astrakhan Region, accuse Ms. Lukyanenko under the “classic” article 290 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (“Taking a bribe on a large scale”) for Zhilkin’s subordinates.

According to political scientists, in the department of Ekaterina Lukyanenko there could be a so-called “collective quitrent system,” when the leader actually extorts money from his own subordinates, forcing them to pay bribes.

Thus, according to investigators, at the end of May 2015, the suspect put forward a demand to one of her subordinates to collect from managers subordinate to the ministry social development and labor institutions of the Astrakhan region Money in the amount of 700 thousand rubles for general patronage in the form of bonuses and non-disciplinary liability.

The arrest of Ekaterina Lukyanenko was a serious blow to Governor Zhilkin. At the same time, federal security forces continued to “hair” the entourage of the head of the Astrakhan region. And if " former colleague Zhilkin” Sergei Bozhenov is indeed being kept secretly in a pre-trial detention center by FSB officers, and soon he may well testify against both the governor of the Astrakhan region and his entourage.

Apparently, it is no coincidence that Dupak’s suicide coincided with a large-scale “cleansing” of “Zhilkin’s team” by security forces. It was rumored that Dupak was “covering up” for officials close to the governor, playing the role of a “prosecutor’s roof.” Perhaps the security forces were able to find incriminating evidence on Dupak himself.

In any case, the suicide of the prosecutor of the Astrakhan region is a serious blow to the governor. Now it is not a fact that Zhilkin, having lost the prosecutor’s support, will remain as head of the region for a long time.

A new wave of gubernatorial resignations has hit four regions

The Kremlin has launched a new rotation of governors. RBC looked into how the regions in need of replacing heads were identified, what the logic of personnel decisions was and how much it was influenced by the scandals that accompanied the September elections

Vladimir Putin (Photo: Mikhail Klimentyev / TASS)

​Who has left and is preparing to leave?

A new series of resignations was planned even before voting day on September 9, two interlocutors close to the Kremlin told RBC. A federal official explained that “the president likes the course of updating the governor’s corps.”

In the near future, the governor of the Kursk region, Alexander Mikhailov, will also retire, two RBC sources close to the presidential administration added. The possibility of resignation of Lipetsk governor Oleg Korolev is also being considered, two interlocutors close to the Kremlin said. Korolev and Mikhailov are long-lived political leaders; the Lipetsk governor has led the region since 1998, the Kursk governor since 2000.

Why was it removed?

The powers of 59-year-old Alexander Zhilkin ended in 2019. The Kremlin is replacing heads of regions whose powers expire in a year in order to be able to prepare the acting head of the region for elections, recalls Mikhail Vinogradov, head of the St. Petersburg Politics Foundation.

Zhilkin has long belonged to the category of governors who are in “limbo” - along with the heads of Kursk, Lipetsk, Vologda regions, says political scientist Evgeniy Minchenko. He believes that Zhilkin held his post for too long.

Political scientist Alexander Pozhalov draws attention to the fact that the region faced difficult elections next fall. A Just Russia deputy Oleg Shein is likely to nominate his candidacy in the elections for the head of the region. “Shein rose noticeably on the topic of pension reform. His summer speeches in the State Duma criticizing the pension reform received millions of views on YouTube,” he notes. Taking into account the increase in pensions, inflation and rising prices due to the increase in VAT and the predicted deterioration of the socio-economic situation in the regions, it would be difficult for Zhilkin to fight Shein, he explains.

At the beginning of the year, two RBC interlocutors close to the Kremlin and the regional government spoke about Zhilkin’s impending resignation. They cited a number of factors - the fatigue of the governor himself, who had long asked to resign, personal motives (his wife died in 2014), loss of control in the region, intra-elite and inter-diaspora conflicts in the area where the Tatar and Kazakh communities are influential. They also affect economic problems, increasing contradictions in the local elites - several years ago LUKOIL and Gazprom moved their offices from the region and stopped paying taxes to the local budget - as a result, the region is in a pre-default state.​

Yuri Kokov, who headed the KBR since 2013, was transferred to Moscow to the post of Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council “due to a number of circumstances, including family character", said Vladimir Putin. In September, large-scale interethnic clashes occurred in the republic due to the fact that residents of the Balkar village of Kendelen did not allow Kabardians to go on a horseback ride in honor of the 310th anniversary of the Battle of Kanzhal. After a clash between local residents and security forces, a rally in support of Kabardians was held near the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic government building in Nalchik. “The position of the authorities, who brought in the security forces, became a trigger for the development of the conflict, and the failure of the interethnic situation was taken by the Kremlin as close as possible to its heart. Even Kabardian activists pointed out that the authorities behaved incorrectly,” notes Chief Editor"Caucasian Knot" Grigory Shvedov.

He considers the main reason for Kokov’s resignation to be the poor socio-economic situation in the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic (the worst in the North Caucasian Federal District, according to the calculations of economist Natalya Zubarevich), superimposed on the unstable interethnic situation. According to him, Kokov publicly tried to attribute problems with the socio-economic development of the republic to underground activity and an “atmosphere of fear,” but, according to criminal statistics, there have been no large-scale problems with militants in the KBR for a long time.

Kokov’s main problem was his high anti-rating and lack of managerial achievements, as well as the deterioration of the criminal situation in the KBR over the years of his work, says political consultant Dmitry Fetisov. “Given that Kokov comes from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, this particularly irritated the federal center. The unrest in the KBR over the past week and Kokov’s inability to resolve the situation could have been the last straw,” the expert believes.

As for the candidacy of Kokov’s successor, RBC’s interlocutor connects it with the traditions of continuity in the appointment of leaders in the Caucasus, such as, for example, the appointment at one time of the son of the President of Dagestan Magomedsalam Magomedov as the new head of the republic. The events in Kendelen acted as a trigger, a symbolic end to Yuri Kokov’s career in Nalchik, agrees Sergei Markedonov from the Center for Political Technologies.

Yuri Kokov (Photo: Alexey Druzhinin / RIA Novosti)

Kursk Governor Mikhailov is one of the long-lived political leaders; he has led the region since 2000. He is a rather weak leader, says one source close to the Kremlin. A big disadvantage is staying at the head of the region for too long, he adds.

The Kursk governor was always not in the best standing - conflicted, ineffective, with a low, if not low level support among the population and lack of support in federal groups influence, agrees political scientist Ekaterina Kurbangaleeva.

Lipetsk Governor Oleg Korolev, whose resignation is also possible, is in good standing, one of RBC’s interlocutors clarifies, but he has also been at the head of the region for too long.

Besides federal center I don’t like the controversial tweets that Korolev periodically writes, says a source close to the Kremlin. For example, on June 29, after the defeat of the German national team at the World Cup, the head of the region wrote on Twitter that the Germans “started two world wars on this land,” and now “tens of millions of souls” are taking revenge on them. After some time, the tweet disappeared, and then a new entry appeared. “Someone told me something on Twitter again... now about the Germans in football. Apparently, this “someone” is very jealous of us because of our productive cooperation with Germany,” the governor wrote, urging “not to blurt out”, “not to interfere,” because it is “useless.”

Korolev is generally stronger than his colleague as a manager and politician: he was able to build relationships with the main influence groups in the region and beyond, and compares the two governors Kurbangaleev. But a long stay in the chair of the head takes its toll - “he began to talk, what are his sometimes incoherent public performance and scandalous posts, his political instincts and reactions have become dulled,” the expert argues.

Political scientist Vitaly Ivanov also says that the Queen could be removed precisely because of his long stay in power: “You cannot be in power for too long.” The exception today is the governor of the Belgorod region, Evgeny Savchenko, who last year was elected to new term, Ivanov notes: “They also wanted to dismiss him, but Savchenko has too many influential friends, and the president treats him with respect.”

In addition, Korolev was in constant conflict with the owner of Novo-Lipetsk metallurgical plant Vladimir Lisin, Ivanov continues: “The conflict either flared up or died down, but never stopped completely.”

In general, both Mikhailov and Korolev are very average governors in very average regions, Ivanov believes: “If these were richer regions, they would have been replaced long ago. But neither the Kursk nor the Lipetsk regions are particularly interesting to anyone (of the federal players).

Who was appointed?

So far, Putin has announced the appointment of new acting governors in the Astrakhan region and Kabardino-Balkaria. Zhilkin was replaced by the Deputy Head of the Federal Customs Service Sergei Morozov, Kokova was replaced by his namesake, Kazbek Kokov, who previously worked in the Kremlin.

Sergei Morozov has been deputy chairman of the Federal Customs Service since August 2017. Before that, he was an assistant to Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and an employee Federal service security

Morozov worked in the personal security of Prime Minister Viktor Zubkov (he headed the cabinet of ministers from September 2007 to May 2008), says an acquaintance of the acting head of the Astrakhan region. At the same time, the current governor was Zubkov’s adjutant and the head of his security Tula region Alexey Dyumin, adds RBC's interlocutor. After Zubkov resigned and Putin became prime minister, Morozov “returned to the shift,” as the personal security of top officials is called, the source explains. Later, Morozov became Putin’s adjutant, just like Dyumin, who had been appointed to this position earlier, says an acquaintance of Morozov. “Morozov was very closely associated with Dyumin a good relationship. But Dyumin patronized him a little because he came (to the service) earlier,” says RBC’s interlocutor. The fact that Morozov worked in Putin’s personal security was also previously reported by The Bell’s source in the FSO.

The figure of Sergei Morozov is absolutely non-public, and little is known about him, experts agree. This is probably a temporary appointment for him, Vinogradov suggests. Considering that Morozov is a person with a security background and no experience in public politics, he has a year to get promoted and enter the campaign, states Pozhalov.

Political scientist Fetisov believes that the Federal Customs Service allowed Zhilkin’s successor, Morozov, to work for a year so that he could gain the necessary experience. And in his new post, his main task will be to establish trade relations with the Caspian countries, primarily with Iran and Azerbaijan.

Alexander Zhilkin (Photo: Vladimir Sergeev / RIA Novosti)

45-year-old Kazbek Kokov is the son of the first president of the KBR, Valery Kokov, who led the republic from 1992 to 2005. In a conversation with the new acting head of the republic, Putin emphasized that the Kokov family is connected with Kabardino-Balkaria “in the most intimate way.” He noted that the father of the new acting in the republic is “very kind, good memory“,” called Kokov Sr. an effective leader and “a very reliable comrade.”

Since 1995, Kazbek Kokov has been engaged in business, from 2003 to 2007 he was a deputy of the Nalchik city council, and in 2009 he was elected as a deputy of the republican parliament. In 2010, Kokov was appointed Deputy Minister of Agriculture of the KBR. Since 2013, he moved to the presidential administration - he oversaw the North Caucasus region as an adviser to the regional control unit on domestic policy.

Shvedov associates the fact that Kokov became Kokov’s successor with the traditions of continuity in the appointment of leaders in the Caucasus, such as, for example, the appointment at one time of the son of the President of Dagestan Magomedsalam Magomedov as the head of the republic.

How does the Kremlin choose governors?

The current rotation of governors is the fourth mass replacement of regional heads since Sergei Kiriyenko became the first deputy head of the presidential administration in October 2016, responsible for domestic policy. ​From July 2016 to February 2017, the Kremlin replaced ten regional heads; in the fall, the change of governors continued: 11 have already resigned. RBC interlocutors close to the Kremlin explained the logic of the administration as follows: people have a request to update the top officials in the regions. By changing governors and relying mainly on those who had passed a complex testing system, Putin was signaling that he had begun to form a new generation of the managerial elite, one of RBC’s interlocutors. Almost all governors and regional heads who were replaced during this time had problems that had accumulated over the years of their reign: advanced age, intra-elite conflicts, public scandals, a difficult socio-economic situation, low ratings, etc.

In several regions, officials under 50 years of age were appointed to leadership positions, whom experts and political scientists defined as “young technocrats,” and they, as a rule, were “Varangians.” So, in Perm region 38-year-old Maxim Reshetnikov was appointed, 43-year-old Alexander Brechalov was appointed to Udmurtia, and 45-year-old Nikolai Lyubimov was appointed to Ryazan region. But when selecting new governors, the authorities do not always stop exclusively at “young technocrats,” experts from the pro-government Agency for Political and Economic Communications. The trend towards rejuvenation was not evident in the appointments of 62-year-old Alexander Uss to Krasnoyarsk region and 68-year-old Vladimir Vasiliev to Dagestan - the fundamental criteria for the Kremlin when making personnel decisions were efficiency and the establishment of controllability in the regions, experts pointed out.

New regional leaders were not always “Varangians”: the same Uss, before his appointment, served as chairman of the Krasnoyarsk Legislative Assembly, and Dmitry Azarov, appointed acting head Samara region, several years before working in the Federation Council, he was the mayor of the administrative center of the region.​

Three or four years ago, governors were usually changed in March-April, leaving the acting governors six months before the elections, but since last year they began to change almost a year in advance, essentially giving the new appointee the maximum possible time lag, notes Kurbangaleeva.

Is the new rotation connected with the scandal in the regional elections?

According to Kurbangaleeva, “a series of new gubernatorial resignations and reappointments was caused by the high-profile fiasco in four regions of the “second round”: “First of all, long-lived regional heads are being replaced, fearing that the effect of electoral fatigue will again play a bad joke on the governors.” But you don’t want to get “pig in a poke”: it’s unpleasant for your reputation federal authorities, and risky from the point of view of the subsequent socio-economic manageability of these territories, the expert adds.

Based on the results of the second rounds of the September elections, we can conclude that by the time the old-time governors next elections can become the personification of negative stability and irremovability of power and consolidate protest sentiments around themselves, Pozhalov notes. In particular, this, in his opinion, could influence the Kremlin’s decision to remove Zhilkin. Political scientist Vinogradov also does not rule out that Zhilkin’s replacement was accelerated by the elections in Vladimir region and Khabarovsk Territory.

Personnel changes in the gubernatorial corps traditionally take place in the spring and autumn. Perhaps this is an attempt by the presidential administration to shift attention from the problematic elections and the topic of pension reform, Vinogradov suggests.

Yesterday the governor of the Astrakhan region was replaced

Instead of Alexander Zhilkin, who headed the region since 2004, whose powers were prematurely terminated by Vladimir Putin’s decree, Sergei Morozov will lead in Astrakhan. For now, with the prefix “temporary.”

The official wording of Zhilkin’s resignation, voiced publicly by Putin himself, is quite harmless - “he asked for a new job.” I asked and they let me go.

But we will still try to figure it out and remember the events last year in Astrakhan, Astrakhan region, which could influence the Kremlin in terms of changing the governor of our difficult subject.

In the past year, as in previous years, the Astrakhan region continued to be shaken by high-profile corruption scandals, trials and arrests. Caught embezzling federal funds allocated under the " Pure water", ex-Minister of Housing and Communal Services of the region Viktor Yakovlev has already been convicted and is in prison. By the way, he was called a close friend of Zhilkin.

Quite recently, another ex-minister, Vasily Korniliev, went to a pre-trial detention center. He worked as the head of the Ministry of Construction and Housing and Public Utilities, and he worked so “fruitfully” that he is now suspected of multimillion-dollar theft. Several other people of lower rank were also arrested with him. Korniliev was “taken” right off the plane at Moscow’s Sheremetyevo Airport on August 9. According to rumors, he intended to fly to Spain. But I didn’t have time.

Failure of priority land allocation programs large families and gasification can also hardly be considered an asset for ex-governor Zhilkin. The allocation of land plots for Astrakhan families has repeatedly become the subject of discussion at the federal level, because this is one of the items of the so-called “green folder” - an indicator of the performance of a particular head of the region. At first the issue was not resolved at all, then the families were given plots on which it was impossible to build anything, much less live. The gasification program stalled due to systematic non-payments by the population for gas, and therefore Gazprom actually curtailed it at some point.

The tasks for dredging the Volga and other rivers in the region have not been completed either. The scope of work planned several years ago has only been partially completed, which creates certain problems for shipping, and also causes difficulties in the development of such an important project for the country as the North-South transport corridor connecting Asia and Europe through the Astrakhan region.

And the most interesting thing is that some problems could be solved. There was money for this. Several years ago, the Government of the Astrakhan region launched a 24-hour channel “Astrakhan 24”. Even then, experts said that the hat was not for Senka. To date, more than 300 million rubles have been spent on television maintenance, although it is still not available in many remote homes in the region. “Astrakhan 24” is not publicly accessible and does not have independent broadcasting. The editors post their programs on the Internet and on one of the cable networks.

We cannot discount the protest activity that has significantly manifested itself in Astrakhan due to the pension reform initiated by the Russian government. In our region, protests gathered with an impressive number of participants (compared to other regions), which could not help but be noticed in Moscow. It was in Astrakhan that they quite openly called for the resignation of President Putin. To rallies against the increase retirement age This year, pickets were also added, for example, in defense of trolleybuses - also very numerous and noticeable.

To this we can add constant scandals in Astrakhan itself.

Zhilkin never managed to curb the almost open conflict between the teams of the head of the Astrakhan administration Oleg Polumordvinov and the head of the city (and the City Duma) Alena Gubanova. The confrontation here is taking place both through the media and social networks, and through street actions - Polumordvinova or Gubanov are periodically called upon to leave various kinds activists with posters.

And this is only part of the recent scandals in the Astrakhan region visible to the general public. But we can also recall the recent past: protests by the opposition, confident of election fraud in 2009 and 2012, criminal cases against ex-mayor of Astrakhan Mikhail Stolyarov, ex-Minister of Labor and Social Development Ekaterina Lukyanenko, ex-Minister of Agriculture Ivan Nesterenko, corruption in the administration of Astrakhan, money wasted on large collapsed projects such as the Volodarsky dairy plant or a fish farming plant, a significant reduction in regional benefits, the loss of the notorious “oil taxes”, virtually the complete collapse of the public transport system in Astrakhan. In general, there will be a decent amount. It is obvious that at some point the Kremlin could have decided: the red line has been passed and something needs to be changed. Change has begun.

Political scientists call him a predictable move by the Kremlin, who sat in his chair for 14 years. Although the new head of the region is an unknown Major General Sergei Morozov, a “Varangian” and a “dark horse”. The castling took place in three regions at once and experts agree that the president began a purge of governors whose powers expire in next year. And the regions will face a whole series of changes.

BEGINNING OF GOVERNOR ROTATION

Political scientist Mikhail Vinogradov:

I think Zhilkin’s replacement is the beginning of a rotation of governors whose powers end next year. We will see another series of such resignations in the near future. Morozov is little known in the public space, while his appointment is perceived in the logic of the nomination of other federal people from the security forces to the gubernatorial positions - Dyumin in Tula and Mironov in Yaroslavl. For the Astrakhan region, it is significant that there was no full-fledged change of elites there for many years - Zhilkin was Guzhvin’s successor, and there were no powerful upheavals in the elites during his arrival.

THE KREMLIN DOES NOT INTEND TO CEED THE ASTRAKHAN REGION TO A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE OPPOSITION

Putin offered Morozov the post of acting governor of the Astrakhan region. At a meeting at the presidential residence in Novo-Ogarevo, Putin invited the deputy head of the Federal Customs Service to work in one of the Russian regions

Andrey Serenko, coordinator of the Lower Volga Region Experts Club, expert Russian society political scientists (ROP):

The resignation of Alexander Zhilkin has been talked about in Astrakhan for the last three years. According to rumors, back in 2015, he asked the president to transfer him to work in Moscow and then wrote a letter of resignation. at will with an open date. However, Zhilkin had to stay in the governor’s post in order to hold first the State Duma elections in 2016, and then the presidential elections in March 2018. Now that these two political tasks have been completed, Zhilkin is leaving the chair of the head of the Astrakhan region. However, Zhilkin’s departure is connected not only with his long-standing desire.

It is obvious that the Kremlin is not satisfied with the inability of Zhilkin’s team to solve some acute and complex problems.

Firstly, there is a chronic deficit in the regional budget, which has annually exceeded 10 billion rubles since 2015. Because of this, the Astrakhan region is teetering on the brink of default and is kept from bankruptcy only thanks to the support of the federal center.

Secondly, budget problems and a reduction in the food supply led to an intensification of intra-elite conflicts. The rivalry between the Astrakhan City Duma and the city manager of the regional center became public, thereby revealing a conflict of interests between various influence groups. And in this conflict, Alexander Zhilkin turned out to be not an arbiter, but a participant.

Finally, thirdly, budgetary and, as a consequence, socio-economic problems in the region led to a fall in the ratings of Zhilkin and the party in power and to an increase in the popularity of the local opposition and its leader Oleg Shein. There is a real prospect of Shein winning the gubernatorial elections in September 2019, which means a repetition of the scenario that developed this year in the Vladimir region and Khabarovsk Territory.

Moscow's decision to replace Zhilkin with Morozov is a signal that the Kremlin does not intend to cede the Astrakhan region to a representative of the opposition. Of course, a change in the head of the region will be a certain stress for the Astrakhan elite - for the first time in the last 25 years, the region was headed by a “Varangian”, and not a representative of local clans. Sergei Morozov has to be found mutual language not only with local interest groups, but also with ordinary Astrakhan residents. The latter are most important, because the success of the governor’s project of Sergei Morozov and the Kremlin, which has relied on it, largely depends on the support of the region’s residents.

10 GOVERNORS AT RISK ZONE

Political scientist Ilya Grashchenkov:

There are about 10 governors in the risk zone, including Berdnikov (Altai Republic), Volkov (Mordovia), Mikhailov ( Kursk region), Kovtun ( Murmansk region), Dubrovsky ( Chelyabinsk region), Korolev (Lipetsk region) as well as some of the regions where governors can be promoted - Rostov region, Volgograd region, Kaluga region. There are areas where everything is still unclear - Tverskaya (Rudeni’s position has weakened extremely), Ulyanovsk (Morozov hung up after the campaign, but worse examples appeared), Smolensk region(can be awarded for winning the LDPR in Khabarovsk and Vladimir). A separate question about the North Caucasian Federal District...

The Astrakhan governor, fearing resignation, began a “cleansing” of personnel. What will pseudo-reforms lead to?

Alexander Alexandrovich finally decided to prove himself a formidable boss. It took him thirteen years to do this. Zhilkin decided to dismiss the head of his government, Konstantin Markelov.

“I confirm the information about the dismissal of the head regional government Konstantina Markelov with today", said the press service representative.

Political scientists say that Zhilkin decided not to wait for the security forces, who have recently been actively arresting people of the Astrakhan governor.

"Everything goes according to plan"

Let us recall that last summer they already managed to convict the former Minister of Social Development and Labor of the Astrakhan Region, Ekaterina Lukyanenko. She collected “tribute” for “March 8” and other holidays from all members of the board of directors of institutions subordinate to the regional Ministry of Social Development. The “rate” was 20 thousand rubles.

It turned out that in the end the amount was very worthy: 360-380 thousand rubles for each holiday.

The ex-minister put forward a demand to one of her subordinates “to collect money from the heads of institutions subordinate to the Ministry of Social Development and Labor in the amount of 700 thousand rubles for general patronage in the form of bonuses and non-disciplinary action.”

Let us note that the Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Fishing Industry of the Astrakhan Region, Yuri Tuzhilkin, was also convicted of bribery.

In the summer of 2015, the prosecutor’s office of the Astrakhan region approved the “indictment in the case of the region’s ex-Minister of Agriculture Ivan Nesterenko.”

The fact is that Mr. Nesterenko, considered an active supporter of Zhilkin, was accused of “improper performance of official duties” (negligence, Art. 293 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation), which resulted in causing major damage.

Security officials established that in 2012, Minister Nesterenko “provided the poultry agricultural enterprise OJSC Astrakhan Product with government subsidy in the amount of more than 108 million rubles.” The most important thing is that Nesterenko was aware that a controlling stake in the company was put up for sale for 13.64 million rubles. If 51% costs 12.64 million rubles, then 100 shares clearly do not cost more than 30 million rubles. So the subsidy immediately raised questions.

It seemed that Zhilkin would be removed in 2013, when his main ally, the mayor of Astrakhan Mikhail Stolyarov, was arrested. Representatives of the Astrakhan opposition say that “Stolyarov and Zhilkin were on the same team.” Oppositionists claim that the mayor of Astrakhan could even share kickbacks with the governor.

A CEO Council for National Strategy Valery Khomyakov generally stated that “Stolyarov’s candidacy was actually imposed by the governor of the Astrakhan region, Alexander Zhilkin.”

The Ministry of Economic Development of the Astrakhan Region was also shaken by corruption scandals. In 2015, law enforcement agencies began to clean up the housing and communal services sector. For example, “in September 2015, a criminal case under Article 290 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (Taking a bribe) was initiated against former first Deputy Minister of Housing and Communal Services Svetlana Arkharova.”

We can talk a lot about who Zhilkin is, but it is enough to just mention that he “came to power thanks to the support of local authoritative businessman Alikber Pashayev, who financially supported the company of 2004 and 2012.” Pashayev, as an adviser to the Astrakhan governor, illegally built up Astrakhan. “... Zhilkin’s connections with ethnic structures and criminal elements are confirmed business activity his friends! For example, journalists actively wrote about how the ex-deputy State Duma Astrakhan region, and now adviser to the Astrakhan governor Alikber Aleskerovich Pashayev is illegally building up Astrakhan.”

In general, under Zhilkin the level of corruption constantly increased. And what’s interesting is that we often came across officials who were considered to come from Zhilkin’s “clan”.

But active investigations began after the head of the regional FSB Directorate was replaced in the Astrakhan region in 2014. Since then, Yuri Seryshev has been leading the security officers. In the same year, Oleg Agarkov was appointed head of the department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation for the Astrakhan region.

It was after this that Zhilkin “dismissed even his closest associates, including the former head of the regional Ministry of Property Nina Popova and the former Minister of Health of the Astrakhan Region Viktor Chalov.”

To visit the governor?

But the security forces can even “enter” the office of Zhilkin himself. For example, to check the information according to which the governor owns a stake in OJSC Astrakhan Distillery Distillery (in common parlance ALVIZ).

There is talk about Alexander Alexandrovich’s involvement in a “raider attack on business” famous entrepreneur Gennady Smirnov (brand “Smirnov”), who built his own distillery near Astrakhan.” Alexander Vasiliev wrote about the situation back in 2008.

"Portrait of a Governor"

During his “devil’s dozen” years of rule, Zhilkin brought the region to 23 billion rubles of public debt. By the way, when Alexander Alexandrovich headed the region in 2004, the debt was 773 million rubles!

In parallel with this, Zhilkin is trying to save money on the most disadvantaged segments of the population. In 2015, it turned out that “more than 70 thousand beneficiaries in the region want to be deprived of social payments for 2 years.” Among them are “family members of killed or deceased combatants”!

It should be noted that in the performance rating of governors of the Development Fund civil society Zhilkin is constantly at the bottom, occupying either 82nd place or 83rd. Against the background of almost massive resignations of governors, the next one will most likely be Zhilkin, who during the years of his rule brought the Astrakhan region to a crisis. And “ostentatious” resignations are unlikely to help...