23. HOW ANCIENT VELIKY NOVGOROD BECAME A SUPPLIER FOR KIEV OF THE GREAT PRINCE, THE FIRST OF WHICH ASKOLD ORGANIZED THE FIRST BANDIT-CATASTROPHIC CAMPAIGN TO CONSTANTINOPLE Rurik acted imperially with his charges. This is what the monk further wrote down

The first truly big campaign of the Russians against the Eastern Roman Empire was carried out by Prince Oleg. By that time, a clear military organization had already formed in Ancient Rus', which then existed for several centuries.

The first truly big campaign of the Russians against the Eastern Roman Empire was carried out by Prince Oleg. By that time in Ancient Rus' A clear military organization had already formed, which then existed for several centuries.

The basis of the Old Russian state was the rural community, which in the chronicles is called “rope” or “world”. This made it possible to gather a large militia of Slavic tribes. The chronicler, speaking about the state structure of Rus' in ancient times, reported the following:

The "Grand Duke of Russia" was the head of state. And although the people's council of free community members limited his supreme power, he could sometimes ignore the opinion of the council. Management was carried out by “the bright and great princes and his (the prince’s) great boyars.”

The basis of the Old Russian army was the princely squads - the “eldest” of the most experienced warriors and the “younger” of the “youths”. The squads of “princely men” also went to war, that is, boyars, allies from among the steppe inhabitants and the militia of “warriors”, which was exhibited by rural communities and cities. The “voi” militias constituted a foot army, since the princes’ squads were mounted.

The armament of the Rus consisted of double-edged swords and spears, axes and maces, and “boot” knives. For protective purposes, helmets and large wooden shields were common. Chain mail ( chain mail armor) had, as a rule, only combatants. Since ancient times, the Slavs had battle banners and military music.

There was no military fleet in Ancient Rus'. But for trips along rivers and seas, large “propelled” boats were built, which went with oars and sails. Such seaworthy boats could accommodate 40-60 people with weapons and supplies.

Prince Oleg made his famous campaign against Constantinople in 907. Without a doubt, this grandiose military enterprise required great preparation. According to the chronicler, the Russian army set sail on two thousand boats. It can be assumed that Olegov’s army numbered approximately 80 thousand warriors. But most likely, the Russian army was less than half of this figure, even taking into account the allied steppe cavalry.

The boat flotilla, gathered from all over Ancient Rus' near Kiev, went down the Dnieper and moved towards Constantinople along the shores of the Pontus (Black Sea). The cavalry walked along the shore in full view of the flotilla.

When the Russians approached Constantinople, the foot army went ashore, pulling the boats onto land. A battle took place under the walls of the Byzantine capital. The chronicler reports about it this way: Prince Oleg “having fought near the city and committed a lot of murder to the Greeks.” After the first clash with the Rus, the Byzantines took refuge behind the fortress walls, and their enemy began to devastate the outskirts of Constantinople.

The siege threatened to drag on, and strong autumn storms began at sea. Prince Oleg decided to intimidate the “Greeks”. He ordered the boats to be put on rollers (wheels), and with a fair wind, raising all the sails, the Russian boat army approached the city itself. There are reports that at the same time the Russians unleashed on the Byzantines large quantities kites.

It was not these “intimidations” that forced the Byzantines to begin negotiations with Prince Oleg, but defeat in the field under the walls of Constantinople and a dense siege from sea and land. In addition, the “Greeks” became aware for certain that the Russians had begun preparations for the assault on the city.

During the negotiations, Prince Oleg demanded that Byzantium pay him 12 hryvnia for each warrior and give him “rules” for all Russian cities. That is, we were talking about military indemnity, which the winner imposed on the defeated side.

The Byzantines also agreed to provide a number of benefits to Russian merchants: the right to duty-free trade during a six-month stay in Constantinople, free food and washing in Greek baths. In addition, the city authorities pledged to provide merchants from Rus' with food and various ship equipment for their return journey.

Only on such conditions did Prince Oleg lead his army of boats back to Rus'. The chronicler reports that after concluding a “shameful” peace treaty for the Eastern Roman Empire, the Rus “hung their shields in the gates, showing victory, and went to Constantinople.” The fact that Prince Oleg nailed his shield on the Constantinople gates was direct proof of the victory of the 907 campaign.

(based on materials from the Children's Military Encyclopedia)

The reasons that prompted Oleg to attack Constantinople are already known to us from the previous ones: on the one hand, this is the desire of the new ruler of Dnieper Rus' to obtain recognition of his status from the empire and thereby confirm and extend the validity of the “Russian”-Byzantine treaty; on the other hand, the reluctance of the imperial authorities to be in allied relations with the pagans and provide them with trade and any other benefits. The immediate cause of the conflict, judging by the text of the treaty of 911, was some kind of skirmishes between the Rus and the Greeks, in which it came down to a “strike with a sword.”

Oleg's campaign against Constantinople is described in detail in The Tale of Bygone Years. The “conspiracy of silence” that surrounds this event in Byzantine literature appears in striking contrast to the chronicler’s awareness. However, there is still one indirect evidence. In Leo the Deacon we find news that Emperor John Tzimiskes threatened Prince Svyatoslav Igorevich with the fate of his father, who “disdained the oath agreement” - this, of course, is a clear allusion to the previous Byzantine-“Russian” agreement, violated by Igor in 941.

Unfortunately, the detail of the chronicle story does not at all guarantee the accuracy of the information it conveys. First of all, this concerns chronology. The Tale of Bygone Years dates Oleg's campaign against Constantinople to 907. At the same time, it dates preliminary negotiations with the Greeks, the results of which received legal formalization only in 911, when the second, “expanded” embassy of Prince Oleg signed the famous treaty. The reasons for this diplomatic delay are left without any explanation. The chronicler simply filled the resulting time gap with “empty years.” It is difficult to say what considerations motivated him in this case*. But in fact, both events occurred in the same year, evidence of which can be found in the “Tale” itself. In the article marked 907, Oleg’s ambassadors negotiate with the “King of the Walnuts,” the brothers “Leon and Alexander.” Meanwhile, this message can only be true in relation to 911, because it was in this year that Emperor Leo VI the Wise appointed Alexander as his co-ruler. Thus, the standing of “Rus” under the walls of Constantinople most likely lasted throughout August 911 and ended on September 2, the day the treaty was signed.

*It seems that the four-year interval between the campaign and the signing of the treaty in the “Tale” is somehow connected with calculations of the time of Oleg’s death: “and I came to Kiev, and stayed for 4 years, in the 5th year I remember my horse, from him the Magi told the Magi to die Olgovi" (see about this: Kuzmin A. G. Initial stages ancient Russian chronicles. M., 1977. S. 264 - 265; Nikitin A.L. Foundations of Russian history. M., 2000. S. 183 - 184).

The entire article 907 is no more reliable than the date set. This is no wonder, because the chronicler, in fact, composed a hymn in honor of the prophetic prince, in whose person the Russian land triumphed over the Greeks. To take the hymns at their word would, of course, be naive. When reading the story of Oleg’s overseas exploits, it should be remembered that the relationship between history and poetry here is approximately the same as between the Iliad and the real siege of Troy.

The epic grandeur of the campaign planned by Oleg becomes obvious from the very first lines. He allegedly manages to assemble a huge fleet - 2000 “ships”. The chronicler needs this fantastic figure, of course, only in order to send along with Oleg all his “tolkovins” (allies) - “many Varangians, and Slovenians, and Chud, and Krivichi, and Meryu, and Derevlyans, and Radimichi, and Polyans , and the North, and the Vyatichi, and the Croats, and the Dulebs, and the Tivertsy” (moreover, the last four Slavic tribes, according to the chronicle narrative itself, have not yet been “tortured” by the Kyiv princes as tribute). But even this armada of “ships” is not able to accommodate all of Oleg’s “warriors”, of which, we note, there are already 80,000 (based on 40 people per boat - the number indicated in the chronicle), so the other part of them “went” to Constantinople by land , “on horseback,” although equestrian squads among the Rus and Eastern Slavs did not yet exist.

Having mobilized the entire Russian land under Oleg’s banners, the chronicler, however, failed to properly dispose of this countless army. It is literally melting before our eyes. The horse army is the first to disappear, since Oleg’s treaty requires tribute from the Greeks only for the “men” in the “ships”. And then, as if all the Varangian-Finno-Slavic “talkies” fall through the ground, instead of which “Rus” suddenly appears, whose interests are the only ones taken into account in negotiations with the “kings”. This turn of events convinces us that in fact the naval campaign of 911 was carried out by the forces of Oleg’s squad; The militia of the East Slavic tribes did not participate in the raid.

However, in the list of “interpretations” worthy of attention are the “Slovenians”, who later appear in the joke with the sails: “And Oleg said: “Sew the sails of the Russians, and the Slovenes are sprinkled,” and so it was... And Rus' raised the sails of the Slovenes, and the Slovenes are sprinkled, and the wind tore them apart; and deciding to the Slovenes: “let’s take our thick sails [sails made of rough canvas], the essence of the Slovenes’ sails is not given.” Pavoloka in Rus' was the name for expensive fabric of two types: silk and “paper” (cotton). The “Slovenians” also got “woolly” sails, but made of cotton fabric - easily torn (“crumbly”). The meaning of the anecdote is apparently the same as in the fairy tale about tops and roots: dividing the expensive “pavoloks” looted from the Greeks - silk and paper stock - the “Slovenians” were flattered by something more luxurious and durable in appearance than silk, but unsuitable for seaworthiness. actually fabric.

Here the chronicler is clearly retelling a “Russian” squad legend known to him, which depicts some kind of conflict between “Rus” and the “Slovenes” over the division of booty or squad “honor”. Moreover, the “Slovenes” were among the “tolkovins” only due to the fact that they are actors this anecdote, and only to give the chronicler the opportunity to tell it (the chronicler knows nothing else about the “Slovenians”). In the mouth of a Kyiv scribe of the 11th century. the story with the sails sounds like a mockery of the Novgorodians, the rivals of the “Polyan-Rus”. Therefore, “Slovenes” are inserted into the list of “Tolkovinas” immediately after the Varangians, and, being in this place, they should designate Ilmen Slovenes. Despite the fact that the chronicler in this case went from anecdote to history, all commentators on this passage still call the “Slovenes” Novgorodians. Meanwhile, the Slavic contingent of the “Russian” army, apparently, was represented, perhaps, led by a governor (the motive of rivalry between the squads of the prince and the governor is developed later in the “Tale”, in the story of the Drevlyan tribute). It is characteristic that the text of the agreement does not mention “Slovenians”. This could only happen if they were part of “Rus” - a circumstance that was quite natural for, and completely impossible for the Ilmen Slovenes.

In light of the above, a tenfold reduction in the number of Oleg’s “ships” will look like the most likely figure. By the way, this is exactly what the incredulous editor of the Commission List of the Novgorod I Chronicle did.

The description of military operations at the walls of Constantinople again raises the question of the actual relationship of the entire chronicle article of 907 to the “legends of deep antiquity” and, even more so, to the “memoirs of the participants in the campaign.” It has been noted, for example, that the story about the robberies and robberies of “Rus” in the vicinity of Constantinople (“and you fought near the city, and committed many murders to the Greeks, and destroyed many chambers, and burned churches; and in their name, the plunderers, some were flogged, others were tormented , some I shot, and others were swept into the sea, and I did a lot of evil to Rus' to the Greeks, as much as they did wars”) is compiled from reports of two Byzantine sources - the Continuator of the Chronicle of George Amartol and the Life of Vasily the New - about the attack on Constantinople by Prince Igor in 941 .( Shakhmatov A. A. “The Tale of Bygone Years” and its sources // Proceedings of the Department of Old Russian Literature of the Institute of Russian Literature of the USSR Academy of Sciences, IV. M.; L., 1940. S. 54 - 57, 69 - 72). This gave rise to a number of researchers to argue that the 911 treaty “does not have any hint of hostile relations between the Russians and the Greeks” ( Bakhrushin S.V. Works on source study, historiography and history of Russia in the era of feudalism. M., 1987. S. 30 - 31; Tikhomirov M. N. Historical connections of Russia with Slavic countries and Byzantium. M., 1969. P. 109). There is some truth in these arguments, but it would be wrong to completely deny the authenticity of the chronicle account of the atrocities of the Rus. In medieval and, in particular, Old Russian literature, there are many descriptions of real events using (sometimes verbatim) ancient, biblical, etc. "model" texts ( Bibikov M. V. Byzantine historical prose. M., 1996. S. 30 - 31). Meanwhile, the text of Oleg's treaty retained clear traces of the fact that the swords of the Rus were stained with the blood of the civilian population of the Byzantine Empire. Its “chapters” open with a statement about the end of violence: “At the first word, let us make peace with you, Greeks,” and at preliminary negotiations, Emperors Leo and Alexander demanded that the Russians no longer “do dirty tricks in the villages and in our country.”

But the cited criticisms are correct in the sense that there really was no “Russian-Byzantine war,” that is, full-scale military action, in 911. Oleg did not sail to Constantinople to fight with Byzantium; the demonstration of military force was supposed to persuade the Greeks to conclude a peace treaty. Oleg's strategic plan was to break into the Golden Horn Bay (the Byzantine fleet at that time was involved in naval operations against the Arabs in the Mediterranean). This vulnerable spot of the Byzantine stronghold had been known to the Russians since 860. Then they managed to take the city by surprise. But now, for some reason, the surprise attack failed, and the entrance to the bay was securely blocked by a chain stretched between both banks. And yet Oleg carried out a maneuver, thanks to which, 542 years later, Mehmed II entered the Church of Hagia Sophia as a winner. At this point in his story, the chronicler again resorts to poeticization of history: “And Oleg commanded his howls to make wheels and put ships on wheels, and with a fair wind they raised the sails... and went to the city.” The peninsula separating the inner harbor of Constantinople from the sea is covered with vineyards, arable land and quite mountainous; in order to make the boats placed on wheels here move, a wind of such extraordinary strength is needed that it would rather disrupt the entire enterprise than help it come true. But there is nothing incredible in the very fact of transporting the boats overland to the Golden Horn Bay. Of course, the ships were unlikely to be placed on wheels; rather, they were laid on round rollers and pulled by a drag. Wood in the required quantity could be obtained without difficulty - the Thracian forests were then approaching Constantinople itself.

The success of this maneuver stunned the Greeks. Seeing enemy ships floating in the middle of the bay, which was considered inaccessible, the co-emperors agreed to begin negotiations with Oleg. They were also forced to take this step by the repentant mood that gripped the population of the capital. Suddenly they remembered how several years before, in 904, the imperial authorities refused to help Thessalonica, which was under siege by the Arabs. The inhabitants of Thessalonica were outraged that they were left to the mercy of fate, and prophesied that Saint Demetrius, the patron saint of the city, would certainly punish Constantinople for this betrayal. And now in the capital on every corner one could hear: “It is not Oleg, but Saint Dmitry himself who was sent to us by God.” It was unthinkable to resist the heavenly punishment. Further intransigence of the government to the demands of the barbarians, who merely sought to have a profitable bargain in the Constantinople market, threatened to lead to open rebellion. Both of these circumstances - Oleg’s seizure of the territory of the Golden Horn and the tense situation inside the city - ensured unforgettable diplomatic success for the ambassadors “of Russian descent.”

Oleg's treaty with the Greeks

The signing of a long-term peace treaty was preceded by negotiations to end hostilities. Oleg wanted to receive a “tribute” - a ransom for his “warriors”. This place in the Tale is generally quite dark. The chronicler gives a double calculation of tribute: first, Oleg “commanded” to give tribute “for 2000 ships, 12 hryvnia per person, and 40 men per ship”; but his ambassadors, who came to Constantinople, asked to “give 12 hryvnia per key to the wars for 2000 ships.” Historians have explained the obvious discrepancy between the sizes of these two tributes in different ways. But few people took into account the capabilities of the imperial treasury and considerations of imperial prestige. Even if, following the Novgorod I Chronicle, we estimate the strength of Oleg’s army at 8,000 people (200 rooks of 40 soldiers each), then the tribute required for them will be 96,000 hryvnia or 2,304,000 spools (the hryvnia of the early 10th century was equal to about a third of a pound, that is, 24 Byzantine spools). Here we must remember that the Byzantine treasury received approximately 8,000,000 zolotniks annually and that Emperor Mauritius quarreled to death with the Avar Khagan Bayan over 100,000 zolotniks - an amount 23 times less than what we received as a result of a tenfold reduction in the number of Oleg’s soldiers! (According to the chronicle, it turns out that Oleg demanded to pay him three annual budgets of the empire - another evidence of the fantastic nature of the chronicle calculation of his army.) But international status The Avar Kagan far exceeded the dignity of the “blessed Russian prince.”

It seems that the tribute of 12 hryvnia per warrior is a creation of the heated imagination of the ancient Russian warriors, which was included in the chronicle from their “Constantinople” legends. The two systems for calculating tribute probably reflect the fact that Oleg, excited by the success achieved, initially asked for too much, but then, during the negotiations, agreed to take “according to rank.” The expression “12 hryvnia per key” is usually understood as payment per key (steering) oar, that is, per boat. However, V. Dal in his dictionary (article “Klyuch”) also indicates that among the Western Slavs the word “key” means an estate of several villages and hamlets with a town, governed by a key. “Oleg’s rook power,” he writes, “was probably divided into keys according to the volosts from which the boats were deployed, or according to private commanders over the keys, departments of people.” Considering Oleg’s Carpathian origin, perhaps this interpretation of the size of the tribute received from the Greeks should be preferred. Another part of the tribute was given in precious things and products. Returning to Kyiv, Oleg took with him “gold, and grass, and vegetables, and wine, and all sorts of ornaments.”

Another important point of the negotiations was the “structures” that the Greeks pledged to “give to Russian cities.” The text immediately following the list of cities regulates the conditions of detention of “Russian” ambassadors and merchants: “let them eat a month for 6 months, bread and wine, and meat, and fish, and vegetables; and let them give them [bath] as much [as] they want; and then go home to Rus', and let them take from our Tsar on the way the brush, and anchors, and ropes, and sails, and as much as they need.” With the second mention of cities, the agreement determines the order of trade for Russian merchants: “and let them enter the city through the same gates with the Tsar’s husband, without weapons, 50 men each, and let them make purchases as they need, without paying toll [duties] at any cost.” with what". Thus, by “way of life” we must understand the trade charter, which stipulates the rules of trade of the Rus on the Constantinople market. As we see, Oleg achieved extremely favorable conditions for the “Russian” merchants: they received support from the imperial treasury and were exempt from duties.

The agreement was sealed with an oath. Emperors Leo and Alexander “kissed the cross themselves, and Olga took the company [oath], and his men, according to Russian law, swore by their weapons, and by Perun, their god, and Volos, the god of cattle, and established peace.” The name Volos does not at all prove that among Oleg’s ambassadors there were representatives of the Slavic aristocracy of Kyiv. This deity was also known to the Western Slavs and, most likely, the ambassadors who swore by Volos belonged to the Croats or Moravians.

On September 2, fourteen “men from the Russian family” signed a written agreement on “irreversible and shameless” love between the Rus and the Greeks. His articles can be divided into four main sections:

1. The procedure for examining and punishing criminal offenses committed by the Russians or Greeks against each other on the territory of the Byzantine Empire. Murder, as required by imperial law, was punishable by death and confiscation of property, with the exception of that part that was due to the murderer's wife. For causing bodily harm, a fine was imposed on the perpetrator (“five liters of silver according to Russian law”), and if he was “unmovable,” then he had to remove “the very ports” from himself. The caught thief was exacted three times the amount taken; if they resisted capture, the owner of the stolen property could kill him with impunity. The verdict was passed only on the basis of irrefutable evidence; at the slightest suspicion of falsity of testimony, the opposing party had the right to reject it, swearing “according to their faith.” Perjury was punishable by execution. The parties agreed to extradite the escaped criminals to each other.

2. Providing mutual assistance on the territory of other states. In the event of a shipwreck of a Byzantine merchant ship near the coast of any other country, the nearby “Russian” merchants were obliged to take the ship and crew under guard and escort the cargo to the borders of the empire or to a safe place. If trouble overtook the Greeks near the “Russian land”, then the ship was transported to the latter, the goods were sold and the proceeds were to be transported to Constantinople with the first embassy or trade caravan. Violence, murders and robberies committed by the Russians on the ship were punished in the above manner. The agreement is silent about the fact that “Russian” merchants had the right to demand the same from the Greeks. This circumstance is probably due to the fact that the Rus went on trade expeditions in entire flotillas (according to rough estimates, one trade caravan arriving from Kyiv to Constantinople in the middle of the 10th century consisted of at least a thousand people - see. Konstantin Porphyrogenitus. About managing an empire. Note 63. P. 329). The large number of “Russian” merchants is also reflected in the Greek demand to limit their access to Constantinople: they had to enter the city through one gate of 50 people. It is clear that with such a scale trading enterprises The Russians did not need outside help.

3. Redemption of “Russian” and Greek slaves and prisoners of war and capture of fugitive slaves. Seeing a Greek captive at the slave market, the “Russian” merchant had to ransom him; The Greek merchant was obliged to do the same in relation to the captive Rus. In the homeland of the slave, the merchant received the ransom amount for him or the average price of the slave at the current exchange rate (“20 zlotys”). In the event of a "rati" (war) between the "Russian Land" and Byzantium, a ransom of prisoners of war was provided for - again at the average price of a slave. Runaway or stolen “Russian” slaves were to be returned to their owners; the latter could search for them on the territory of the empire, and the Greek who resisted the search of his house was considered guilty.

4. Conditions for hiring Russians for military service. When announcing the recruitment of mercenaries into the army, the Byzantine emperors were obliged to recruit into the service all the Rus who wished it, and for the period that would suit the mercenaries themselves (the Rus sought long-term mercenary service, up to lifelong). The property of a killed or deceased mercenary, in the absence of a will, was transferred to his neighbor “to Rus'.”

The negotiations ended with a solemn ceremony, which was supposed to show the barbarians the power of the empire and encourage Oleg to follow the example of previous “Russian” princes who converted to Christianity. The Russian ambassadors were invited to the Church of Hagia Sophia to inspect Christian shrines: “Tsar Leon honored the Russian ambassadors with gifts, gold and pavilions... and put your men to them, show them the church beauty, and the golden plates, and in them real wealth: there is a lot of gold , and trails, and precious stones, and the passion of the Lord, a crown and a nail, and a scarlet robe, and the relics of saints, teaching them to their faith and showing them the true faith; and so release them to your land with great honor.” But it seems that none of the Rus wanted to leave.

Before leaving his camp, Oleg once again confirmed his firm intention to maintain “incorruptible and shameless love” with the Greeks, ordering his shield to be hung on the city gates, “showing victory.” This symbolic act is usually interpreted in a completely opposite sense - as a sign of the victory of the Rus over Byzantium. However, the word “victory” in the 11th - 12th centuries. it also had the meaning of “protection, patronage” (cf. victorious - “intercessor, defender” in the Assumption Collection). Likewise, the shield nowhere and never symbolized victory, but only protection, peace, cessation of warfare. The raising of his shield by the leader of the army during a battle meant a call for the start of peace negotiations; in 1204, noble crusaders hung their shields on the doors of the houses they occupied in Constantinople to prevent other knights from plundering them. The prophetic prince left his talisman to the Greeks, which was supposed to protect the city from enemy attacks; he returned to his own not as a conqueror of Byzantium, but as its ally and defender.