National-state interests of Russia. The concept of national interests of the state National state interests

Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation

Kazan State Technological University

Department of Public Administration, History and Sociology

ABSTRACT

on geopolitics

on the topic of:

« National - state interests of Russia»

work completed

student of 90-62 groups

Mubarakshina G.R.

checked:

Tuzikov A. R.

Kazan, 2004

Introduction 3

Introductory Notes 4

Economic roots 8

Self-preservation instinct 13

Geopolitical aspect 16

Representation of interests 21

Conclusion 25

References 26

Introduction

Crucial stages of social development are inevitably accompanied by an exacerbation of social contradictions, increased everyday hardships and require, as it were, a rethinking of the historical destinies and future of Russia. This painful process of self-knowledge and self-determination is inseparable from the identification and formulation of national-state interests. They represent the real basis of politics, the fulcrum that alone can give it the highest meaning and purpose.

Ambiguity in the issue of Russia's national and state interests, a careless attitude towards its solution or the desire to brush aside the problem itself is one of the reasons for social cataclysms and zigzags political course, so characteristic of today’s “time of troubles.”

When studying national-state interests, a whole tangle of complex, insufficiently studied and extremely pressing questions arises. But science has neither the moral nor the professional right to evade their analysis. At the same time, no one, naturally, can claim to possess absolute truth, to the indisputability of their assessments and conclusions.

Introductory Notes

National-state, or simply national, interests are one of the key concepts of modern political science. In the West, unlike domestic science, there are entire scientific schools, based on the analysis of vast historical material and having a serious impact on both mass public consciousness and strategic decision-making.

When studying this problem, despite all the differences in approaches and methodological principles of analysis, two of its aspects are clearly visible: internal, based on the awareness of the commonality (from the point of view of the nation as a whole) of interests of various social strata and groups, and external. Most modern Western researchers focus their attention on the foreign policy side of national-state interests. The commonality or conjugation of national interests is perceived as something given and taken for granted. Apparently, this is a distinctive feature of stable, balanced socio-economic systems as well as “organic” stages historical development society. This is also reflected in the deep traditions of civil society and political culture, which require any political force and movements of unconditional adherence to established ideas about the national and state interests of the country. Otherwise, they simply have no chance of gaining any kind of mass support and influence.

The situation observed in modern Russia, is fundamentally different from the one described. Our country is going through a process of radical transformations in the absence of a clearly fixed vector. The state of public minds is extremely chaotic and subject to quite shameless manipulation. There is no need to talk about either civil society (in the strict sense of the word) or political culture at all.

But all this does not at all push into the background the problem of studying national-state interests, but, on the contrary, gives it special relevance. Moreover, when considering its internal and external aspects, the emphasis should be placed on the internal - on the awareness of the reality of certain common interests that stand above the interests of various classes, social strata and groups.

The presence of common national-state interests does not exclude either the diversity of interests, nor their internal contradiction, and sometimes even antagonisticity. But it is common interests that form the basis of civil society and fuel the policy of social harmony. By the ability to correctly understand and clearly express these common interests, one can distinguish statesmanship from political adventurism and selfish service to group interests. Politicians and social scientists in Russia have yet to grasp this truth, proven by centuries of experience in social development.

But the real task facing us today is much more complex. The problem is by no means reduced to the awareness of a certain reality associated with the presence of common interests. They actually exist, but the threads connecting them are extremely weakened due to the “impudent” pressure of group egoistic interests.

It is necessary to persistently and persistently form the very structures of civil society, those supports - moral, social and legal - that connect disparate interests and cement the national-state community of people and their interests. Only on this path is it possible, albeit not soon, to overcome apathy and indifference, isolation and the attempt to survive alone, fear and suspicion, so incompatible with civil society.

As for the awareness and expression of national-state interests, it must be emphasized that this process is extremely complex. Here we are faced with uncertainty and vagueness of this concept, as many researchers point out. Strictly speaking, what has been said applies to most general concepts of political science and social science. The reason for such vagueness and uncertainty lies in the complexity, versatility and mobility of the phenomena described using such concepts. And any attempt to give a simple and unambiguous definition inevitably turns into a distortion of the essence of the object being studied.

The solution to this problem is seen in the study of the objective given national-state interests, in the ability to isolate their roots and separate the interests themselves from their external expression in ideological forms and political doctrines.

It is fundamentally important to emphasize that national-state interests are inseparable from the entire history of a given country, no matter how ancient and contradictory it may be, from the culture, traditions, value system and spiritual makeup of its population that have developed over the centuries. “A nation,” wrote N. Berdyaev, “includes not only human generations, but also the stones of churches, palaces and estates, gravestones, old manuscripts and books. And in order to grasp the will of the nation, you need to hear these stones, read the decayed pages.” . This fully applies to the national-state interests of Russia, which - with all their mobility and variability - do not arise from the moment of proclamation of its independence. History shows that any social cataclysms, revolutions and civil wars do not interrupt the connections of times and eras, do not break the bonds that hold this country and the people, if, of course, the nations do not perish and leave the historical scene. This was the case in France and Great Britain, in Germany and Italy, in China and Japan, and in the USA from the moment of its formation. The question of those social genes, of the mechanism by which this connection of times is realized, heritage and continuity in the development of countries and peoples is ensured, requires self-study and is beyond the scope of this article. Some thoughts on this matter will be expressed in its final section.

At the same time, despite the undeveloped nature of these issues, it remains important to consider the problems of modern Russia (including its national-state interests) in unity with its entire history and original culture, its geopolitical position and civilizational characteristics. These include the formation of Russia as a multinational entity that has integrated a wide variety of peoples and cultures. To a large extent, this process is rooted in the political traditions of Byzantium with its ideal of creating a world empire capable of overcoming the disorderly confrontation of peoples and establishing universal peace. True, after a relatively short period when power was concentrated in the hands of Prince Vladimir and his second son Yaroslav, the Byzantine tradition did not become an active political ideology. The division of Kievan Rus into appanages delayed the emergence of centralized state with imperial claims.

Modern researchers have convincingly shown the qualitative, fundamental differences between Russia and all other empires known in history, emphasizing its organic nature, the formation within it of a single multinational superethnos that has not lost its specificity. This can be debated, but there is an unconditional need to consider precisely the national-state interests of Russia, which in meaning correspond to the concept accepted in Western science " national interests"However, the literal use of the concept of national interests in the Russian language and for Russia sounds ambiguous, feeding equally both “national-patriotic” and separatist sentiments.

Another difficulty that almost all researchers of the problem of national-state interests face is the impossibility of their purely rationalistic explanation. There are certain forces at work here that go beyond such an explanation, social feelings and national pride, the memory of ancestors and the call of blood. Ignoring them does not bring science any closer to understanding the realities of the modern world and developing a holistic concept of socio-economic progress. This is one of the manifestations of the crisis of rationalism in modern social science.

As for the problem of determining national-state interests, it is very multifaceted and includes: the need to ensure favorable conditions for economic prosperity and protection of domestic producers; preservation and improvement of the material, spiritual and moral foundations of life of the corresponding social community of people; fulfillment of functions and obligations dictated by the geopolitical position of the country, its place in the system of world economic ties and relations.

Economic roots

The economic component of national-state interests has always and everywhere appeared in the most obvious and obvious form. Committed to providing normal conditions reproduction, and then to strengthening economic power and prosperity was, albeit intuitively, but the main spring in both the domestic and foreign policy of the state from the moment of its formation. Awareness of this was manifested both in the naive but wise formula of I. Pososhkov “that state is rich in which the people are rich,” and in the reasoning of F. Engels, who wrote: “How many despotisms there were in Persia and India, successively flourishing and then dying “, each of them knew very well that she was, first of all, an entrepreneur in the business of irrigating river valleys, without which any kind of agriculture would be impossible there.” Support and protection of domestic entrepreneurship, agriculture, industry and trade, regardless of forms and types of economic activity, as well as class, guild and other group interests, was the main component of national-state interests. Later, the development of domestic science and education began to play a major role here as decisive factors of economic success.

This has always been associated - consciously or unconsciously - with an understanding of the obvious truth that the power of the state and the well-being of its people are ultimately determined by the amount of national wealth (it is no coincidence that economists from the time of Adam Smith and Ivan Pososhkov to the present day write about the wealth of the people), produced national income.

And if we turn to the history of Russia, we will see how the policy of protecting and supporting producers and traders runs through it as a red thread. This line is clearly visible from the time of the establishment of the trade route “from the Varangians to the Greeks” and is being implemented through the efforts of Novgorod, Tver and Moscow, through the creation of the Vasilsursky (Makarievskaya, later Nizhny Novgorod) fair by decree of Vasily III, through the measures of Peter I to develop manufactories and the opening for Russia sea ​​routes, finally, through all subsequent Russian history, remembering the reforms of S. Witte and P. Stolypin, NEP and industrialization and much, much more.

Tax reforms and the protection of merchant caravans from robbery, the construction of railways and even wars that ensured the development of rich natural resources and access to the sea - all this, regardless of purely external motivation, was ultimately dictated by the economic determinants of national-state interests.

Here we are not talking at all about the moral side of the matter or about the justification of certain political actions. Moreover, all countries did this. It is important to understand that national-state interests have been and remain today the main driving forces of both domestic and foreign policy. Only the forms and methods of their protection and implementation are changing and becoming more “civilized.”

Everything that has been said is directly related to a critical understanding of the modern realities of Russia, the scale of destruction of its economic, scientific and technical potential, the reasons that gave rise to these destructions and, of course, with the development of constructive programs for its revival as a great power. All actions of the authorities, their strategic decisions, various types of programs should be assessed not on the basis of emotions and subjective attachments, but strictly verified from the point of view of their compliance with the national and state interests. Naturally, it will be necessary to find a more or less adequate institutional form of their expression. But this will be discussed in the final section of the article.

The principle of supporting and protecting domestic entrepreneurship does not at all mean a course towards isolation from the world economy or autarky. It only assumes a reasonable, gradual movement towards economic openness, which does not allow damage to the national and state interests of the country and provides for the reasonable use of protectionism. All countries that are today highly developed have gone through this.

The transition from the use of protectionist measures to the implementation of an “open door” policy, and sometimes vice versa, is very indicative from the point of view of mobility, variability of national-state interests, their dependence on the level of economic development countries and the balance of power in world trade. Such turns are accompanied by corresponding theoretical justifications that precede changes in foreign economic policy or justify these changes post factum.

Unlike pragmatically-minded politicians, theoretical scientists tend to absolutize their positions and consider the conclusions they formulate to be indisputable, a kind of absolute truth, suitable at all times and for all countries. However, the specific focus of national-state interests, as well as the mechanisms for their implementation, cannot but change. Only their connection with the support and protection of domestic entrepreneurship, production and exchange, as well as science and education is stable.

As for domestic manufacturers, this concept requires some clarification. These include all those whose activities contribute to increasing the national wealth of the country and the gross national product produced by it. Neither nationality, nor citizenship, nor form of ownership have anything to do with this concept. This may be an enterprise entirely owned by foreign capital, but operating in Russia and operating effectively. It multiplies the economic power of our country and wealth, increases (in the case of product exports) foreign exchange earnings, creates new jobs, and contributes (at least through the tax system) to solving economic, social and environmental problems.

Therefore, attracting foreign capital in the form of direct private investment (as opposed to, for example, loans, for which we will have to pay, if not us, then our children or grandchildren) meets the national and state interests of Russia. Of course, it must also meet the interests of investors.

The complexity of the current situation is that Russia is faced with a number of serious challenges affecting deep-seated national and state interests. Camber Soviet Union had far from clear consequences for Russia. In many ways, her interests were dealt a serious and very painful blow. In addition to the change in the geopolitical situation, which was very unfavorable for the country, and the severance of economic ties, a decisive role in the collapse of the country’s economy was played by a sharp deterioration in its structure (an increase in the share of raw materials and extractive industries), the loss of a significant part of the sea ports, fleet and reliable transport routes.

Russia's interests, seemingly forgotten in the course of the intoxicating destructive work, require reliable protection. But this will have to be done in new, dramatically changed and extremely unfavorable conditions.

The weakening of the country and the lack of clearly verified

strategic guidelines gave rise to powerful external pressure on it. There is nothing unexpected or unpredictable in such pressure. It is the logical result of strict adherence by political leaders of Western countries to their national and state interests aimed at protecting and supporting domestic business and financial structures. All actions, including maintaining restrictions on the export of Russian goods (except for fuel and raw materials) and technologies - just recall the unprecedented pressure in connection with the contract for the supply of cryogenic technologies to India - easily fit into this simple and understandable logical system. As well as proposals developed by Western experts to curtail programs scientific research in Russia (under the slogan of their rationalization), including in the most promising areas.

What is striking is the ease with which those vested with government powers accept the advice of Western experts. They rely entirely not only on their professional competence (which is not always indisputable), but also on objectivity and disinterest. You can’t help but wonder: do we always know what we are doing?

The modern world, especially the global economy with its strict and domineering laws, is very far from a naive idyll and altruism. And it must be considered as it is, without adding anything, but also without leaving anything unattended. And the sooner we realize its harsh realities, the sooner we learn to understand and skillfully defend our national-state interests, the closer the goal of Russia’s revival will be.

Finally, it is worth mentioning the challenge to national-state interests that arises, as it were, from within. We are talking about the predominance in many cases of group and egoistic (compared to general) interests: monopolistic groups and individual regions, trade and intermediary, and to some extent mafia structures, administrative apparatus, etc. And although such a process was largely provoked by mistakes and inconsistency of economic policy, it is completely unacceptable to justify, let alone downplay, its consequences.

And here again it must be emphasized that one can get rid of such a challenge only if reliable support on the national and state interests of the country. Only the implementation of such a course can ensure public consent, lay a reliable foundation for economic reform, and lead to success. This will be a path understandable to the people, corresponding to their hopes and aspirations.

The instinct of self-preservation

To the number the most important factors, which determine the national-state interests, include the preservation (reproduction) and qualitative improvement of the living conditions of the historically established ethnic community of people, the national gene pool. Such circumstances, often pushed into the background in current, everyday life, in critical situations (wars, epidemics, natural disasters) act as the highest priority, that enduring value for which any other values ​​and interests can be sacrificed. History provides a lot of evidence of this and practically knows no exceptions to the general rule. This allows us to consider this factor as a special manifestation of the tribal instinct of self-preservation of ethnic groups. Of course, such an instinct is different from the simplest animal instinct, it is always “clothed” in social clothes, mediated by sociocultural and political-ideological forms. And yet, it acts as an instinct of self-preservation, ultimately determined by the biosocial nature of man.

The implementation of this subsystem of national-state interests involves the implementation of both protective functions(in relation to external and internal threats) and positive measures aimed at improving the living conditions of the relevant community of people. And in both cases we're talking about not only about physical existence and purely material well-being, but also about the preservation and enhancement of spiritual values, national culture, democratic principles, habitat and much more.

The defense of the country and the protection of borders, the protection of its sovereignty and security, care for citizens abroad - all these are just concrete forms of realizing national-state interests. And by how consistently and effectively the named functions will be carried out, one can judge the ability of the country and its people to self-preserve and the compliance of the political course with the interests that determine it. This equally applies to issues of internal civil security - the fight against crime, maintaining the inviolability of the “home”, public and personal property.

Everything that has been said is generally quite well known and obvious. Indeed, at the basis of the very unification of people into civil society, the formation of its institutional structure, the formation of a state, there is initially the need to create the conditions necessary for self-preservation and survival, for the progressive development of the ethnic-state aggregate of people.

The problem is not the novelty of the questions posed, but the fact that processes have arisen and are gaining momentum in Russia that threaten to cause serious damage to its national and state interests. The loss of the main guideline in domestic and foreign policy, the withdrawal of the state and its bodies from performing their inherent functions is complemented by the growth of individualism, group egoism and separatism, the desire to solve emerging problems and overcome threatening dangers alone, on their own. These processes are asocial in nature and can throw society back, leading the country to chaos and anarchy. The urgency of the fight against the “impending catastrophe” makes it so important problem taking into account national and state interests to develop strategies and tactics for the renewal of Russian statehood.

New destructive trends have not yet been fully appreciated, which, if serious and effective countermeasures are not taken, could cause irreparable damage to the people of our country. For several years now, the process of depopulation of the Russian population has been ongoing; mortality has consistently exceeded the birth rate. The proportion of citizens whose incomes are below the physiological subsistence level is increasing. The number of murders and suicides, severe infectious diseases. Children's health is deteriorating sharply. No noticeable improvements in ecological situation in the country, which inevitably affects people’s health, their performance and intellectual level. The “brain drain” of highly qualified specialists and workers is growing.

All this together leads to a deterioration in such a collective indicator as the “quality of the population” and creates a threat to the national gene pool.

However, a responsible policy, a policy that meets the national and state interests, must be able to choose priorities and correctly place emphasis. Today it is extremely necessary, among all other urgent problems, to develop reliable rescue and survival programs, strengthening the physical and moral health of the population. Significant resources must be concentrated here and their rational use must be ensured. Even if it is necessary to limit allocations for other, quite important, but lower priority tasks. A society that fails to do this has no chance for the future.

Geopolitical aspect

The transition to consideration of the geopolitical aspect of the problem of national-state interests implies a significant turn in the analysis of the topic. It should not be confused with the external side of protecting these interests. Everything related to protection (national defense, political, economic and diplomatic assistance to domestic entrepreneurship, protection of the interests of its citizens abroad, etc.) forms only a mechanism for realizing the interests discussed above.

The geopolitical aspect of the problem has a qualitatively different determination, conditioned by the history of the country, its geographical location, place in the global interaction of states and the existing relationship, balance of forces, corresponding restraining factors and balances. Here, therefore, we are again talking not about far-fetched constructions (although the process of understanding and formalizing geopolitical guidelines can be successful or unsuccessful, adequate to historical realities or divergent from them), but about a complex, very multifaceted, but objective in nature, determination of national -state interests.

If we talk about Russia, here we must take into account, as in other similar situations, the features associated with its status as a great power. It determines a rather complex and contradictory combination of its national, state and international interests, and requires the fulfillment of certain obligations aimed at ensuring stability in the world, environmental safety and the survival of mankind.

In general, Russia's status as a great power is inseparable from its responsibility (together with other great powers) for the fate of the world community. And this sets a certain logic for choosing priorities for economic and social policy, allocation of resources, including the corresponding military-political strategy.

Based on an understanding of both the experience of recent decades and more distant historical events, it can be argued that the world is supported by a system of unique counterbalances that ensure a balance of power. Most leading political scientists studying this problem come to this conclusion. Here, although with great convention, we can draw an analogy with the balance of power between the legislative, executive and judicial authorities, between the state and non-state structures, central and local authorities, which is an indispensable condition for the successful functioning of civil society. Any imbalance is fraught with the most dangerous trends - from the establishment of a totalitarian regime to rampant anarchy and lawlessness.

The disruption of the existing balance of power caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union is already having a significant impact. Negative consequences and is of grave concern, especially among European peoples. Others are beginning to understand this too. The dictates of one superpower can seriously destabilize the entire international situation. Restoring Russia's authority and influence as a great power is in the interests of the stability of the world community and also meets its own national-state interests, although it presupposes certain obligations.

The last thing you need to see here is nostalgia for the past or wounded pride and pride. Russia's fulfillment of its duty, conditioned by the country's geopolitical position, is its historical calling, its destiny. History has placed Russia in the position of a middle state, located between the West and the East, which has absorbed the features of their culture, value systems, and civilizational structure. In many ways it was, but to an even greater extent it can become a bridge connecting these two very different worlds, promoting their better mutual understanding and mutual spiritual and moral enrichment. If, of course, we abandon primitive and at the same time very dangerous attempts to search for some ideal model of socio-political structure, culture and religion. Based on the recognition of the laws of diversity and equivalence various models socio-economic and spiritual development of countries and peoples belonging to certain types of civilization.

The history of Russia and its geopolitical position have led to a rather peculiar combination of state and individual, collectivist and personal principles, economic rationalism and spirituality. Accumulating over centuries and transmitted through the channels of social memory, they are today integral, irremovable features of its socio-economic appearance, value system and motivation of behavior. Not taking this into account means trying to stop the inexorable movement of history. Such a policy is incompatible with the genuine, deep-seated national and state interests of Russia.

Russia's geopolitical position makes objectively necessary a multilateral orientation of its foreign policy and organic inclusion in all enclaves of the world economy. Any attempts to prioritize its relations with one country or group of countries are contrary to its national-state interests. Multilateral orientation is a strategic principle and it should not be violated for any opportunistic reasons or under the pressure of the moment.

Even raising the question of the priority of relations with a particular region, group of countries - be it the near abroad, former CMEA countries, Southeast Asia, the USA or China - seems incorrect. The question of geopolitical priorities is probably legitimate for many countries, but not for Russia as a great world power. It is on the basis of precisely this approach that a global strategy and daily foreign policy activities should be built, the structure of the apparatus of the relevant departments should be determined, and scientific research and personnel training should be conducted.

In the press one can also find objections regarding the determination of Russia's interests by its geopolitical position. Thus, N. Kosolapov considers unconstructive “the idea that Russia, due to its geopolitical position, is called upon to serve as a bridge or mediator between East and West, North and South. It is impossible to turn into an objective function with a rather vague content - a function that Russia can take upon itself or not to take, and with the implementation of which by Russia others may agree or not, - into the historical fate of the state and the core of public self-awareness."

But if the author recognizes objective this function(regarding the “vague content” was mentioned above), then he - whether he wants it or not - must agree with the need to adapt political actions to its implementation. The objective determination of interests does not require agreement or disagreement. The question of the geopolitical foundations of foreign policy orientation cannot be decided by voting.

The real problem is that these factors can be conscious or unconscious and that the implementation of a historical mission by a particular country does not proceed smoothly, without opposition, but always in struggle. These are the laws of political life.

And the point is not whether this is good or bad, but that this is reality. It would be very useful and instructive to trace, using the example of the history of the Russian state, how this calling was realized, how the main direction of its foreign policy course was traced in the most diverse conditions and under the most diverse political regimes. How, finally, despite growing resistance and bitter defeats, the country again and again taxied to its historical path. If someone doesn’t like to call it historical destiny, then let it be a calling, a destiny, a geopolitical logic or a pattern.

The role played by Russia has always caused concern and sometimes a sense of fear in the West. They were afraid of her. And this is not bragging. These are historical facts. We must honestly admit that representatives of our glorious Fatherland, unfortunately, gave many reasons for such judgments and fueled the desire to humiliate and weaken Russia.

It didn't start today or yesterday. N. Danilevsky wrote with bitterness about the inconsistent and treacherous policies of Western European countries towards Russia and its national-state interests. A. Kerensky writes in detail about plans for the dismemberment of the Russian state dating back to the end of the First World War in his memoirs recently published in our country. He also cites numerous documents that preceded, in his words, the “Versailles tragedy.” Among them are official American comments providing for: recognition of the de facto governments representing the Finns, Estonians, Lithuanians and Ukrainians; consideration of the Caucasus as a sphere of influence of the Turkish Empire; granting any power a limited mandate to govern Central Asia on the basis of a protectorate; finally, the creation of separate, “sufficiently representative” governments for Great Russia and Siberia.”

In a word, real historical processes, as well as the role of the state, determined by its geopolitical position, can hardly be described in terms of “agreement - disagreement”. Forces of a different scale operate here, equivalent in power to tectonic forces.

Of course, in social development, especially in the second half of this century, dramatic changes have occurred. Opportunities are opening up, chances are emerging to regulate relations between countries and peoples on a fundamentally different basis than in all previous history. Russia’s role in this process may also take on a new look, due to its geopolitical position.

One can only wish that these hopeful chances will be realized. But we should not forget that politics remains a harsh matter, strictly programmed by national and state interests. There is no place for baby talk here. Smiles and hugs should not deceive realistic politicians, regardless of their orientation.

Representation of interests

In the final section, the complexity, multi-layered processes and relationships in all areas of analysis of national-state interests reappear. The situation with the representation of interests in external relations, in the system international relations. In this area, it is the state that acts as the sole and authorized representative of national-state interests, their spokesman and defender.

In the internal life of the country, the situation is more complicated. The state is also called upon to be a spokesman for common interests and it performs this function, as a rule, the better and more successfully, the more democratic and legal its structure is. This approach to understanding the role of the state presupposes a rejection of its one-sided consideration only as an instrument of class domination. The theoretical and methodological basis for such an understanding of the functions of the state is the discussion dating back to the 60-70s about the two sides of the state: as an instrument of class domination and as an exponent of the common interests of all classes and social groups, their interaction and integrity.

If the latter circumstance allows us to consider the state as an integral link in the mechanism of representation of common interests, then its class nature makes it possible to understand why the state is unable to be the sole exponent of national-state interests. The struggle for power has always been and remains an arena of intense political struggle. And each party or social movement striving for this power bases its claims on the fact that they are better able than others to express common interests.

As a rule, this is achieved by parties (movements) that express the interests of those classes and social groups that at this stage most coincide with the national-state interests of the country, although complete coincidence is hardly possible here.

And here we can draw at least two conclusions. Firstly, the effective implementation of national-state interests does not presuppose the monopoly of one party, but a certain system of restraining forces and balances, guaranteed recognition of minority rights, open democratic control over the activities of all branches of government, in a word, everything that forms the constitutive features of a rule-of-law state. Secondly, reliable representation of national-state interests requires the “involvement” of all institutions of civil society.

Without considering this aspect of the problem in all detail, we will dwell only on one extremely important and not always taken into account circumstance. As already mentioned, various parties and movements make claims to express national-state interests. Who is the arbiter in their dispute? And are there objective criteria that make it possible, using a certain scale of values, to evaluate the programs and slogans presented to society?

Such a scale obviously does not exist. As for the highest arbiter, it is always the people as the highest sovereign of a democratically organized society. However, such an answer, correct in essence, brings us little closer to revealing the real mechanism of the people's will, especially taking into account the modern scale of manipulation of mass public consciousness.

The solution to the problem, apparently, lies in the analysis of the value guidelines and ideological attitudes inherent in a given society. They accumulate centuries of experience, sometimes an intuitive, subconscious perception of national-state interests. A huge role in their formation is played by the spiritual culture of society, historical traditions, belief systems, folk legends and heroic epics. The memory of the great past, pride in the deeds of one’s ancestors not only form national-state interest, but also give rise to powerful energy of creation and progress.

Today, under the fashionable slogan of de-ideologization, attempts are being made to avoid these issues, to sever the umbilical cord connecting modern Russian society with its history. In this regard, it should be emphasized that historically established political and ideological values ​​and attitudes are by no means far-fetched concepts or features unique to our country. They are universal properties, and are most pronounced in countries with highly efficient and dynamically developing economies, with sustainable socio-political structures.

As an illustration, we can refer to the analysis of the 500-year development of America contained in the International Journal of Social Sciences, the first issue of which appeared in Russian recently (the journal itself has been published by UNESCO since 1949). It contains, in particular, an indication that the integrity and self-awareness of North American society was formed on the basis of recognition by various social groups of “the basic political and ideological prerequisites of American civilization.” Therefore, by the way, she was unable to integrate the Indian population with its “irresistibly original self-awareness, absolutely alien to the new ideological framework and claiming its own independent integrity.” As for the political-ideological attitudes themselves, they included an emphasis on individualism, personal achievements and republican freedoms, anti-ethical pathos (hence the extremely weak development of the concepts and ideology of the state in contrast to the ideology of the people, the republic), giving a quasi-sacred status to the economic sphere.

The institutionalization of these informal, very vague properties of the “national spirit” is usually associated with the formation of various structures in the sphere of religion, culture, science and education.13 In some cases, more or less formalized state and non-state structures engaged in developing the concept of national development and strategic planning. They are unique accumulators, guardians and exponents of relevant values ​​and principles, which subconsciously, as something indisputable, determine the very type of national thinking, as well as choice and decision-making in political and economic life.

In this subtle and very delicate area, it is naive to rely on the artificial imposition of new values ​​and attitudes that are not based on the basic foundations of public self-awareness. The processes here are happening slowly, latently, which, however, does not mean the departure of the intellectual elite Russian society- the guardian and exponent of his national-state interests - from fulfilling his duty and calling. In a broader sense, the representation of national-state interests is inseparable from the formation of civil society and its institutions.

Conclusion

The significance of national-state interests for the historical destinies of the country and people allows us to consider any threat to these interests as a matter of national (state) security. This approach makes it possible to build a well-thought-out and reliable system of state security, to outline the scope of activity of the relevant structures and bodies. Under certain conditions, not only, say, the defense of the country, but also the fight against environmental threats, against criminal mafia groups, saving the country’s gene pool, strengthening the currency system, etc. can and do become a matter of national and state security.

From the moment a threat to national-state interests arises, group interests and political loyalties must fade into the background. The entire might of the state apparatus and all the forces of civil society must join the fight. As history - domestic and world - testifies, only this path leads to success. A different path leads to the death of the state and makes all the efforts of previous generations meaningless.

Awareness of these historical lessons is intended to become a guiding star both in scientific research into the problem of Russia's national and state interests, and in political actions aimed at their protection and implementation.

List of used literature

1 . Abalkin L. “On the national and state interests of Russia”, // Issues of Economics, No. 2 1994

2. Danilevsky N. Ya. “Russia and Europe”. - M., 1991

3. Klapov N. “Russia: self-knowledge of society and foreign policy,” // World Economy and International Relations, No. 5 1993.

4. Mau V. “National-state interests and socio-economic groups”, // Issues of Economics, No. 2 1994

5. Pozdnyakov E. “Nation, state, national interests, Russia,” // Economic Issues, No. 2 1994

Each state has its own national-state interests related to its perceived needs.

National-state interests is a set of common interests that have historically developed in a single state space. These interests are determined by its economic and geopolitical relations, cultural and historical traditions, security issues, protection of the population from external threats and internal unrest, environmental disasters, etc.

The concept of “national interest” came to Russian political science from Western English-language political literature, and there it has the meaning of “state interest.” National interests are understood primarily as state interests, and this is due to the fact that Western countries are mostly mononational states, and not so much in the ethnic aspect, but in the social one.

A nation is the unity of civil society and the state. National interest is a generalizing interest that removes the contradiction between the interests of the state and civil society. The interests of civil society in different countries are taken into account when solving internal problems and private interests. The interests of citizens have priority in shaping the foreign policy of the state. National interests from this position include in this course parameters that are aimed both at acquiring resources and at increasing the material well-being of the population. “What is good for citizens is good for the state” - this is the principle of the approach to national interests in countries with a developed civil society.

Civil society in Russia is at the beginning of its formation. Therefore, there is no ideological and political consensus on the issue of national interests. In Russia, the search for civilizational identity continues, or, more simply, the question of national Russian patriotism. These searches give rise to an acute and painful struggle both between the Westernizing liberals - the “Atlantists”, and the Slavophile statists - the “Eurasians”. Main question today for Russia: "Who is the subject of national interest?" The first to consider Russia European country and, therefore, highlight a universal civilizational advantage. "Atlantists" consider civil society to be the subject that determines the content of national interests. Therefore, the highest interest is to carry out economic reform that will make Russia richer and freer.

"Eurasians" identify Russia as Eurasian country and do not recognize the liberal understanding of national interests. For them, national interests are the preservation and strengthening of Russian statehood. It is the state that has undoubted priority in shaping foreign policy. Here “national interest” is equated with “state interest”. Ensuring state security is directly linked to the program to strengthen the role of state regulation in the economic sphere. For “Eurasians” the highest national interest is the revival of Russia and its greatness.

Russia has always existed as a multinational state, but the vast majority of states in the post-Soviet space are striving to build ethnic states, which in geopolitical terms weakens the entire post-Soviet space.

If you look into history, you can trace the following features: Russia developed as a union of ethnic groups, cultures and lands, and at the basis of this union lay common goal, united by national values ​​and interests. Values ​​did not imply the superiority of one nationality over another; rather, on the contrary, circumstances gave rise to the formation political unity ethnic groups. It was ethnic diversity that predetermined the peculiarity of Russian national interest, which consists in “the comprehensive strengthening of the state as an organizing principle designed to ensure territorial integrity and external security and develop adequate forms of coexistence of various national-ethnic, religious and cultural communities. That is why Russia’s historically established national interests have become predominantly state interests,” wrote the Russian political scientist Sergei Vadimovich Korshunov (1956-2010) .

In their content and forms of manifestation, the national-state interests of Russia at the specific historical stages of its development changed. For example, the predominance of the role of the state led to a significant infringement of the public interests themselves and, most importantly, the interests of individuals. State interests were placed above all other interests, which gave rise to the “imperial” character of Russia and its great power.

The main interests of the individual, society and the state are currently in Russia a single system of national interests. Russia announced its transition to the rule of law and civil society. At the same time, the interests of the individual are declared to be the primary basis of public and state interests, although the latter are not something secondary or secondary. By Presidential Decree of December 17, 1997, the Concept was approved national security the Russian Federation, which has recorded that at the present stage the interests of the individual are the real provision of constitutional rights and freedoms, personal security, as well as improving the quality and standard of living; in physical, spiritual and intellectual development. The interests of society include strengthening democracy, achieving and maintaining public harmony, increasing the creative activity of the population and the spiritual revival of Russia. The state interests of the Russian state are to be protected constitutional order, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia, as well as in establishing political, economic and social stability; in the unconditional execution of laws and maintenance of law and order, on the basis of partnership and the development of international cooperation.

The state interests of Russia, according to the concept of national security, are determined both in the economic field, in the domestic political, international, defense and information spheres, and in the social field, spiritual life and culture. In the domestic political sphere, these interests consist of ensuring civil peace, national harmony, territorial integrity, unity of legal space, stability of state power and its institutions, law and order, etc.

At the present stage, the main tasks for Russia are to strengthen Russian statehood, improve and develop federalism and local self-government. To implement the constitutional principle of democracy, coordinated functioning and interaction in all government bodies is required, as well as the presence of a rigid vertical of executive power and the unity of the Russian judicial system. All this is ensured by the constitutional principle of separation of powers, a clear functional distribution of powers between state institutions, and the strengthening of the federal structure of Russia. An important goal of protecting Russian federalism is to prevent the transformation and transformation of federal relations into confederal ones.

In foreign policy, priority is given to ensuring the security and integrity of Russia as a socio-economic, political, national-historical and cultural community, with the protection of the economic and political independence of the state; development of relations between the Russian state and the leading countries of the world; comprehensive cooperation and integration within the USSR, as well as Russia’s full participation in world, European and Asian economic and political structures.

The most important national-state interests of Russia are:

• - completion of the process of formation of Russia within its current borders as a modern Russian state;
• - reducing the threat of large-scale war and strengthening strategic stability, consistent demilitarization of relations between Russia and NATO;
• - conflict prevention, crisis management, dispute resolution in the space of the former USSR;
• - involvement in world economic relations on the most favorable terms for the national economy.

Development and formation new Russia occurs in a context where fundamental changes have occurred in the system of international relations over the past decades. They are associated with the collapse of the “socialist community”, and then of its creator - the Soviet Union.

Russia, as the successor of the USSR in the context of the transition to a new system of international relations, has undergone a profound transformation as a participant in the system of international relations. The Russian state is faced with serious geopolitical changes and even temporary disorientation in determining the main enemy in the international arena. There was a regrouping of forces, coalitions and alliances. Previous ideological stereotypes changed, political regimes changed, and new states emerged.

The ongoing processes could not help but weaken Russia's foreign policy positions. In the West, the thesis that the USSR lost the Cold War has become widespread. In fact, everyone lost in the Cold War, but everyone won when it ended. In the West they started talking about “not causing damage to the interests of the USSR.” Such formulations indicate that a new geopolitical balance of forces has emerged, far from being in favor of Russia. Russia faces the real prospect of losing its status as a great power on the world stage.

The West wants to exclude Russia from the decision-making mechanism on key issues of European and world security by expanding NATO to the East and including states - former members Warsaw Pact: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, and later at the expense of the Baltic countries, Ukraine and other countries. Western countries want to present Russia as a “defeated power” and not having equal status in international affairs. Given this state of affairs in Europe and in the world as a whole, Russia must use all possible diplomatic means and the negotiation process to the maximum extent possible.

Despite certain weaknesses, Russia still remains a “too big” and potentially “too strong” country. It is no coincidence that it was invited to join the “Big Seven” of leading developed countries in order to form the “Big Eight” with them.

The main task of the foreign policy of independent Russia is the revival and strengthening of its international positions. The Basic Provisions of the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation developed by the Government of the Russian Federation are aimed at achieving this goal.

The main provisions of the foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation:

• - formation of Russian statehood and protection of its territorial integrity;
• - creating conditions that ensure stability and irreversibility of political and economic reforms;
• - active and full participation of Russia in construction new system international relations, where it would be provided with a worthy place.

In the system of international relations, despite all the existing difficulties, Russia remains one of the great powers, both in terms of its potential and influence in the world. At the moment, Russia is responsible for the emerging new world order, for building a new system of positive relationships between states that were previously part of the USSR.

Any actions aimed at undermining the integrity of the Russian Federation are considered a threat to the national security of the country and the vital interests of its citizens; obstacle to integration processes in the CIS, as well as violation of human rights and freedoms; armed conflicts in neighboring states. Especially important to protect Russia's foreign economic interests, it has to maintain and develop economic ties with the former Soviet republics in all spheres of the economy.

In Russian foreign policy, the focus remains on its relations with the countries of East and Central Europe. For Russia, relations with Western European countries are also of great importance. These relations are important from the point of view of their entry into the emerging political, economic, legal, social space, the core of which is the European Community. And in the Asia-Pacific region, Russian foreign policy priorities include developing balanced and stable relations with all countries, especially China, Japan and India.

The modern Russian foreign policy concept aims to create the necessary national consensus around itself, which will help Russia acquire its characteristic self-sufficiency. Russia, which has a centuries-old history, culture, and Orthodox faith, will take its rightful place in the world. The position of a regional power with limited international interests (this is exactly what many skeptics of geopolitics see Russia today) will be replaced by a situation where our country will be guaranteed access to the role of a world power, which will happen in the near and foreseeable future. Russia simply has no other way!

After the collapse of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact in 1990, the world entered

into a new phase of global political development. If before that

moment, global security was based on the principle of nuclear

containment and balance of power of the two military blocs, then after the dissolution

The Warsaw Pact changed the balance of power in favor of NATO.

The entry into its ranks of the Baltic states and some states

Eastern Europe in 2005 expanded the boundaries of the alliance to state

borders of Russia. In this case, Russia is actually alone

opposes military power NATO. The current situation requires

Russia to develop such a model of behavior in the international arena,

which would enable it to pursue an international policy consistent with

its national interests. However, making an ego is not easy.

The hopes of the political elite led by Boris Yeltsin for Western

assistance during the reform period of the 90s of the XX century. led to rough

miscalculations in domestic and foreign policy, which significantly reduced

economic and military potential of the country. Economic decline

Russia's technological and military power significantly reduced its international authority, made its leadership accommodating, forced it to make numerous concessions and betray the country's national interests. When solving pressing international problems, the opinion of the Russian leadership is practically not taken into account, as, for example, when resolving the “Yugoslav crisis”. Russia's international influence was indicated only by its nuclear status. Striving to build partnerships with Russia and integrate it into European and other international structures Western countries did not. The West did not want to write off Russia’s debts to the USSR, which placed a heavy burden on the country and its citizens.

It is obvious that the preservation and development of Russia as an economic,

political and cultural-psychological integrity is possible

ensure only through the efforts of its people, and not through humanitarian,

financial and other assistance from Western countries. Only economic

prosperity, political stability, moral health

Russian society are able to guarantee its national

security and the return of high international authority to it.

Russia's prestige in the international arena largely depends on success

economic, political and sociocultural transformations

within the country, achieving harmony and peace between its peoples.

Awareness of this and the return of Russia to the number of global players

world politics was associated with the efforts of the presidential administration

V. Putin (1999^2008).

Russia's foreign policy priorities

For the first time since the collapse of the USSR (1991), the political leadership

Russia has formulated the basic principles of ensuring

national-state interests of the country in the new geopolitical

situations. This was done by Russian President V. Putin

2007 in Munich. Assessments and provisions expressed by V. Putin

in the “Munich speech”, formed the basis of modern foreign policy

doctrine of the Russian Federation, developed by the country's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. President's speech

20 Political science was programmatic and significant: it marked the beginning of changes in relations between Russia and Western countries and influenced Russia’s relations with the outside world.

It should be noted that the Munich Conference is a kind of

equivalent to the World Economic Forum, only concentrating

its attention to military-political issues and other

security problems. It involves representatives of political,

military and business elites of many countries.

Speaking at this meeting, V. Putin gave a general assessment of the situation

in the world and relations between Russia and Western countries, warning

that he will speak “without excessive politeness” and empty diplomatic

stamps. It came out harsh and at times unflattering.

First position: “We have come to a turning point when

must seriously think about the entire global security architecture

" According to the Russian President, the basic principle is being violated

international security, the meaning of which can be summarized

to the thesis: “the safety of everyone is the safety of everyone.” Moreover,

the end of the Cold War, despite the obviousness of such a recipe,

did not lead to the triumph of the said principle. On the contrary, how

stated V. Putin, this time is marked by an attempt to create a unipolar

the world is “a world of one master, one sovereign.” In his opinion,

“Today we are witnessing an unrestrained, hypertrophied

use of force in international affairs, military force, force,

plunging the world into successive conflicts, - said

V. Putin, - We see an increasing disregard for the fundamental

principles of international law. Moreover, separate

norms, yes, in fact, almost the entire legal system of one state,

first of all, of course, the United States of America, having stepped over

their national borders in all spheres - in economics, in politics

and in the humanitarian sphere - and is it imposed on other states?

Who will like this? According to V. Putin, the US attempt to impose

The model of a unipolar world has failed.

Second situation: growing problems in the field of international

security, first of all, this is stagnation in the field of disarmament and

the threat of militarization of space. They have become worse in recent years

and pose a direct threat to Russia's national security.

This threat came from the actions of the United States and NATO. First of all,

this is the US intention to deploy elements of missile defense

in Poland and the Czech Republic. In addition, it is in a state of crisis

Treaty of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). It happened

due to the refusal of NATO countries to ratify the adapted

version of this document. In this connection, V. Putin also recalled

that the US is creating forward bases in Bulgaria and Romania, and NATO

moves its troops to the Russian borders, while the Treaty

ties Moscow's hands. At the same time, V. Putin recalled that

in the 90s of the XX century. NATO countries gave assurances that they would not interfere

NATO troops outside the territory of Germany.

Third situation: the international landscape is now significantly

is changing, primarily due to new centers of global growth.

These are primarily the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China).

Russia intends to play an ever increasing role in international affairs

role by pursuing an independent foreign policy. Having strengthened

its economy and its position in the world, Russia is unlikely to agree,

so that she would henceforth be treated like a poor relative.

Fourth position: V. Putin proposed to negotiate on

all international problems. In particular, he spoke in favor of

so that stakeholders come up with a joint solution

on the issue related to missile defense and on the issue of ratification of the modified CFE Treaty.

The harsh assessments expressed by V. Putin caused a wide resonance.

The first reaction to the words he said was the question: it won’t lead

Whether such a sharp polemic led to a resumption of the Cold War.

Such fear, however, did not last long, since no one

discovered the cessation of cooperation between Russia and the United States and others

Western countries on a number of important international issues.

It is significant that official representatives of Washington and NATO,

who became the main object of criticism from V. Putin, do not consider

that the Russian president's speech leads to a resumption of the "cold

war." Moreover, in response to calls from the President of the Russian Federation, the administration

Bush promised to “deepen” dialogue with Moscow. True, activation

contacts between both countries on military-political issues

(meetings under the “2+2” formula with the participation of defense ministers have resumed

and heads of foreign policy departments, several expert

meetings on the issue of missile defense) have not yet brought any new

agreements. Moreover, Moscow announced a moratorium on participation

Russia's place in the system of modern international relations

The modern political landscape is increasingly becoming

signs of multipolarity and asymmetry, in which relations

Russia with various countries will be built taking into account its national

interests, and not to the detriment of them. There are several

vectors of Russian foreign policy, the implementation of which is related

with the defense of its national interests: Russian-American

relations, Russia and Europe, Russia and the CIS.

Russia and the USA: vectors of confrontation

The basic contradiction is related to Russia’s role in the global energy sector.

From strategic partnership, the relationship between Russia and

USA in the second half of the 2000s. entered a cooling period.

2007 These changes were caused by objective shifts in the global

politics.

Firstly, the fuse of the worldwide struggle against the international

terrorism compromised by the US war in Iraq.

Now peoples and governments themselves understand the contours more clearly

terrorist threat, without minimizing or exaggerating it.

Terrorists were unable to gain access to weapons of mass destruction,

and in the matter of countering “ordinary terrorism,” states have already learned something.

Secondly, the pole of confrontation in the world has changed. In the first

for half a decade its most important element was antagonism

USA with many Islamic countries. In the mid-1990s. imagination

most striking were the contradictions in NATO between the United States

The States, on the one hand, and France and Germany,

with another. At this moment, Russia, cautiously drifting away from close partnership

with Washington (since 2001), managed in a dispute between the United States

and mainland Western Europe call out fewer American

reproaches than Paris and Berlin. Then diplomacy second

Bush administration regrouped resources and, weakening

forceful onslaught in some peripheral, although important, areas

its policy (DPRK and South Asia), focused on

on the central ones. One of these has always been relationships

with NATO. Now relations with the region have risen on par with them

Greater Middle East, which, according to American ideas,

extends in the north to Transcaucasia, the Black Sea region and the Caspian Sea.

European direction of American policy at the level

practical actions began to transform even more quickly into European-

Caspian and European-Caucasian. Asianization of NATO

continues. Just like three or four years ago, its main incentive

the US desire to strengthen strategic positions in the regions remains

presumed presence energy resources. At the same time, the main thing

the formal justification for the new “march to the East” is “nuclear

threat from Iran,” which Moscow and Washington take seriously

diverge.

Thirdly, and most importantly, for the first time in a decade and a half

Russia began to pointedly oppose the habitually assertive

The US “eastern strategy” has its own unusual offensive line. This new policy includes an unconditional refusal

not only from solidarity actions with Washington in the 1990s.

20th century, but also from the more firm course of “selective resistance” to American policy, which was followed by the Russian

diplomacy throughout most of V. Putin's administrations.

The nerve of the moment lies in the fact of “counter diplomatic escalation

» Russia and the USA. This is not the case in Russian foreign policy.

it was a very long time ago.

Among the sources of Russian-American contradictions lies

divergence of points of view on many problems: from disagreement

Americans with the direction of political processes in Russia

to discrepancies in positions on a number of issues of nuclear non-proliferation-

different weapons and policies in relation to individual countries and situations.

Russia is annoyed that Washington is trying to teach it how to build

relationships with neighbors, including unpleasant or dangerous ones.

Moreover, by giving “advice” regarding Russia’s relations with its neighbors,

The US itself does not risk anything. For them, the Russian borderland is

“foggy distance”, for Russia - a zone of key economic, political and military interests. The essence of Russian-American

mistrust - not in the exchange of barbs about the assessment of “farcical

regimes" in Georgia or Iran and not even in consolidating the military presence

The USA is at the borders of Russia, although it, of course, cannot be considered

a sign of friendliness. However, the basic contradiction between the US and

Russia has opposing views on the optimal role

Russia in the global energy sector. Moscow strives to the utmost

strengthen it as consistently as the US tries to prevent

to her in this. “Imitation of integrity” in disputes over conflicts

in the “pipeline Transcaucasus” and the situation around Iran - derivatives

from Washington’s intention to eliminate competitors from the region,

which is considered a possible alternative to the Middle East in

as the world's energy storehouse. Everything is made worse by the lack

between Russia and the United States A systematic dialogue on global

issues, primarily military-political. Recreation

a mechanism for such dialogue appears to be an urgent need,

based on the desire to retain Russian-American

relations along the lines of at least a “cool” partnership. Aggravating

circumstance - the upcoming elections in 2008 in both countries.

In these conditions, politicians and diplomats have no time for international

security. There is a danger of missing the moment.

American missile defense in Europe is unacceptable for Moscow

Another vector of disagreement between Russia and the United States is related to the deployment in Europe of the 3rd position area of ​​the American strategic missile defense system. The most acute disagreements on this issue arose in the spring of 2007, and they reached their culmination on November 21, 2007, when the Russian Foreign Ministry received an official letter from the United States State Department. It left no doubt: Washington

Rais and Robert Gates will under no circumstances give up

deployment of its strategic missile defense system in Eastern Europe. Even though

that the missile and nuclear threat from Iran may

and not to be. In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the General Staff

The Russian Armed Forces publicly assessed American intentions

as a forceful technique aimed at weakening Russian strategic

nuclear deterrent forces. And although the US Congress has not yet - pending the completion of negotiations with the governments of the Czech Republic and Poland, as well as an assessment of the effectiveness of the missile defense system in Europe by independent experts - to the deployment of missile defense elements near the borders of the Russian Federation, Russian generals have already threatened Washington and its allies with adequate and asymmetrical measures, including targeting operational-tactical missiles at the radar station in Brdy near Prague and the missile defense base in Ustka on the Baltic coast. Moreover, the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Yuri Valuevsky, warned

Poles that Russia’s strategic deterrence system can automatically respond to the launch of an American anti-missile missile. True, for some reason Russian generals do not remember the first two areas of the US strategic missile defense system, located in Alaska and

in California, where there are about forty interceptor missiles, not ten,

as planned in Poland. Apparently, behind the slogans about the strategic partnership of the two states, which were exchanged more than once

Presidents George Bush and Vladimir Putin, in fact there is a strategic confrontation, the content of which was not only the anti-missile fence with which the United States surrounds Russia, but also problems

Kosovo, nuclear energy in Iran, development of democracy in our country

and press freedom. These problems are unlikely to go away on their own.

Russia - European Union

The EU has found a replacement for the Constitution.

Reform Treaty. Operating principles document

The EU will come into force after ratification by all states. Expected,

that this will happen at the beginning of 2009. However, it is not excluded

surprises.

Portugal ending its six-month presidency

in the European Union, kept her word - presented the promised agreement.

in a solemn atmosphere by the heads of state and government, and

also by the leadership of the European Commission. The treaty replaced the draft constitution,

rejected in referendums in France and the Netherlands in 2005.

The reform agreement provides for the introduction of the post of president

European Council, which will represent the organization at

international arena. High Representative for General Foreign Affairs

politics and security policy will actually turn into a minister

foreign affairs In the structure of the executive branch there is also

changes will happen. From 2014 the number of European Commissioners will be equivalent

two thirds of EU member states. In the meantime, each of the 27 states

presented by a member of the European Commission.

The Treaty increases the role of the European Parliament. Deputies will be able to influence

on legislation in areas such as justice, security and

migration policy. Total number of seats in the European Parliament

will be reduced from 785 to 750. National parliaments will have the right

participate in legislative activities at the EU level. They

will be able to make their own amendments to the text of bills. If a third of national parliaments do not approve the draft law, it will be sent to

revision to the European Commission.

according to the so-called double majority formula. According to this

principle, a decision is considered adopted if it is voted for

representatives of 55% of states containing at least 65% of the EU population. However, countries that fail to create a blocker

minorities will be able to postpone the issue and propose

continue negotiations. This system will come into effect in 2014.

The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides for

general energy policy and implementation of the overall strategy

combating global warming, helping one

or several members in the event of terrorist attacks or natural disasters

disasters.

In addition, the document contains an article about the possibility of exiting

from the EU, the decision on which will be made based on the results of the general

negotiations

European Policy Center analyst S. Hegman said,

that, although the signed treaty contains some elements of European

Constitution, these two documents should not be compared.

In form, this is an ordinary intergovernmental agreement, and it is

therefore, for example, it does not mention national symbols,

flag and anthem. According to the expert, the agreement does not talk about the transfer by the governments of EU member states of part of the powers to the pan-European leadership, but about clarifying the list of powers already transferred.

In other words, we are talking about improving the existing

systems. According to the analyst, the signing of the Lisbon Treaty

happened in a completely different environment compared to 2004,

when the draft European Constitution was being considered. There are more Eurosceptics

far less. In particular, because the management has changed

in Poland and Denmark.

The signed document has a very complex structure, and significant efforts are required on the part of governments and other forces,

so that its meaning and content are correctly understood by the population.

All EU countries, with the exception of Ireland, intend to limit

parliamentary ratification. However, there may be surprises here too.

In particular, experts do not undertake to predict how things will go in the UK.

Russia and NATO

The Russia-NATO Council was created in 2002, the corresponding agreement

signed by V. Putin and the leaders of 19 NATO countries in Rome. European

leaders said then that in relations between Moscow

and the alliance enters a qualitatively new stage, Russia “with one foot

joined NATO" and the "Cold War" finally ended."

At that moment, the European CMs repeated in unison that Russia was ready

join the North Atlantic Alliance, and V. Putin was quoted as saying,

did not exclude such a possibility even before his election as president.

However, already in the fall of 2002, NATO, despite Russia’s objections

accepted seven new members into its ranks. After this, despite

to regular contacts within the Russia-NATO Council,

relations between Moscow and the North Atlantic Alliance have become rapidly

deteriorate.

In December 2007, a regular meeting of the Council was held in Brussels

Russia - NATO. Representatives of the North Atlantic Alliance stated that relations with Russia have entered a critical phase,

and decided that already next year the process of NATO expansion by

the east will continue. The parties admitted that they could not agree

on none of the key international issues - from the placement

American missile defense system in Europe and Russia's withdrawal from the CFE Treaty

status of Kosovo.

To the next meeting of the Russia-NATO Council in Brussels, at which

Russia was represented by the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation S. Lavrov, preceded

meeting of the heads of the Russian Foreign Ministry of 26 NATO member countries. The main unpleasant thing

news for Moscow was the statement made by the Secretary General

NATO Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, who confirmed that already in April 2008 at the summit in Bucharest a decision will be made on admitting new members to the alliance. Croatia, Albania, Macedonia and Georgia are considered the most likely recruits to NATO. At the same time, the Secretary General referred to the decisions of the NATO summit held in Riga in 2006, where the leaders of NATO member countries confirmed that the doors of the alliance would remain open to new members.

It is noteworthy that at the Riga NATO summit for the first time ever

time after the collapse of the USSR, the leaders of the alliance discussed the threats posed by

from Moscow. However, the specific question of expansion

alliance was not on the agenda at that time, as he stated in December 2006

none other than Jaap de Hoop Scheffer himself. Having endured a year

pause, NATO decided to speed up the admission of new members into its ranks.

Despite the difficulties that have arisen with Ukraine, NATO does not release

out of sight and this country. Yesterday a meeting was also held in Brussels

Ukraine-NATO commission, following which Jaap de Hoop

Scheffer promised to make “the foundation of bilateral relations

even stronger." The news that NATO is preparing to make another

step towards the Russian borders did not come as a surprise to Moscow.

“At the upcoming NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008

this issue will be one of the central ones, it was confirmed the day before

at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation - For us this is an extremely sensitive moment, especially

in relation to the states of the post-Soviet space." Noting

that “the process of NATO expansion has nothing to do with

modernization of the alliance itself or to ensuring security in Europe

", the planned expansion on Smolenskaya Square was named

alliance "a serious provoking factor, fraught with the emergence

new dividing lines."

The Permanent Representative of Russia spoke even more harshly

(since January 2008) at NATO D. Rogozin: “When NATO talks about threats

from the south, but at the same time expanding to the east, this indicates how

about an absolute lack of understanding of the situation, and about the insincerity of the leadership

alliance" According to him, "expecting to expand due to

former Soviet republics, NATO hopes in vain that the reaction

Russia will not be too sharp,” as happened before. "They are not

suspect that Russia is no longer what it was before,” pointedly

Mr. Rogozin noted. “NATO did not understand the full benefits of cooperation with Russia when it was ready for deeper integration. And now Russia has new ambitions, it has grown from

shirt that NATO sewed for her,” said D. Rogozin.

In the decision adopted following the meeting of the Russian Foreign Ministers of NATO countries (December

2007) joint statement states that “in ten

years after the signing of the first founding document

about cooperation between Russia and NATO, the partnership between them is entering a critical phase.” Following the meeting of the Council Russia-

NATO and both sides said they had failed to bring their positions closer together.

Disagreements relate to the solution of all fundamental problems:

and the plan for the deployment of the American missile defense system in Europe, and the Treaty on

conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE), from which Russia

For example, Russian Foreign Minister S. Lavrov criticized

NATO's position regarding the control regime over conventional

weapons in Europe. He stated: “We do not understand individual actions

alliance, including near the borders of Russia. In particular,

modernization of military infrastructure in the Baltics, creation of American

bases in Romania and Bulgaria. Such steps complicate the situation

around conventional arms control in Europe, which

has been at a dead end in recent years.” Trying to convince partners

refuse to support the independence of Kosovo, S. Lavrov noted,

that the decision on the status of Kosovo will become a precedent for the unrecognized

republics on post-Soviet space. According to him, “those

who is planning to take liberties with international law, with the charter

The UN, with the Helsinki Final Act, must once again

think carefully before you step onto the very slippery slope that

may be fraught with unpredictable consequences and not add

stability in Europe." Finally, the Russian minister said,

what if NATO recognizes the US missile defense system being created in Europe

element of its missile defense, then Russia “will find it difficult

continue to cooperate within the framework of the Russia-NATO Council on this

subject."

Thus, the meeting in Brussels actually drew a line under

period of relations between Russia and NATO, which until recently

moment, despite disagreements, by inertia they continued to call

allied. It is noteworthy that the warmest relations

Moscow and Brussels were precisely during the first presidential

term of V. Putin. However, during the second term, the “allied”

relations" between Moscow and the North Atlantic Alliance came

clash of interests and fierce confrontation in all directions,

increasingly reminiscent of a new Cold War.

NATO is concerned about the strengthening of Russia. For this reason, the Pentagon

leaves troops in Germany.

Contrary to initial plans, the United States will not reduce the number of its troops in Europe in 2008. Two American combat brigades

will remain in their locations in Germany. About this USA the other day

NATO headquarters in Brussels was notified. Currently

Four combat brigades of the American army are stationed in Germany,

numbering 43 thousand soldiers and officers. There should have been two before them

be returned to the United States by the end of 2008. In this case, the number

Pentagon ground forces in Europe would drop to 24 thousand

Human. But now these plans are frozen.

Officially, the US Department of Defense motivates this by the unavailability of American quartering sites intended for

for the return of the teams. However, the commander of the ground forces

The USA in Europe D. McKiernen explained with military directness

review of the decision to reduce the number of American garrisons

in Germany “a new strengthening of Russia.” Politicians and military

NATO expresses "bitter disappointment" over increased

Russian criticism of the Alliance, accused

in “building muscle.” According to the Brussels headquarters

apartment of the organization, behind the criticism of Moscow lies its desire

use your economic recovery to realize your own

foreign policy and military interests. In this regard, the Viennese

the publication sees in the refusal to reduce the number of American

troops in Europe "is a definite sign that the military

The United States is beginning to prepare for a new confrontation with Russia.”

Despite the Pentagon's preventive measures, the US Ambassador to

NATO V. Nuland remains optimistic. She believes that achievement

agreement with Russia on controversial issues is possible: “We are facing

threats and dangers that equally concern both Russia,

so do us in the West. So we must find opportunities

cooperation from which both sides will benefit.”

Meanwhile, in Washington and Brussels NATO authorities

Moscow's suspension of the Conventional Armed Forces Treaty

forces in Europe (CFE) is interpreted as further evidence of the strengthening

Russia, requiring countermeasures. A remarkable signal

is the call of the leading Republican contender for the presidency

USA R. Giuliani to begin increasing numbers

American armed forces in response to the strengthening of Russia's position.

According to him, Russian intentions “still cause

anxiety." Therefore, R. Giuliani convinced voters in the state of South

Carolina, US "needs to become even stronger militarily"

" In turn, the American analytical center Stratfor

anticipates the mobilization of Western intelligence services. According to RIA

News, the center's employees are experienced experts in the field

intelligence and business, and its services are used by hundreds of large firms,

government and military departments. In a recently published

A Stratfor policy brief in Washington states, in part:

“The abandoned CFE Treaty will force NATO to at least intensify

their intelligence efforts to track the movements of

Russian armed forces and receive information that the Russians would normally provide themselves as part of the mechanisms

Russia in the post-Soviet space

One of the main vectors of Russia’s global policy is

maintaining influence on the former republics of the USSR that became independent

states after 1991 Initial organizational-

legal form of “civilized divorce” of former Soviet

republics after the collapse of the USSR became the Commonwealth of Independent

States (CIS), which included 11 states. However, as shown

In practice, weakly integrated groups, like the CIS, are ineffective. Decisions made at CIS forums are not implemented.

In addition, the elites of the Commonwealth countries have different political

orientation. Some of them are burdened by Russian influence and turn

their views towards the United States (as Ukraine and Georgia do), others, on the contrary,

still focus on Russia (for example, Uzbekistan,

Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan), and others (Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan)

are trying to build a multi-vector foreign policy related to

with equal distance from the two poles of influence. Post-Soviet

the space is attractive mainly due to its significant

natural resources, the control of which is currently being fought

different states. Taking this fact into account, Russia strives

more clearly declare their national-state interests,

using new tactics: where political

arguments, it is quite possible to try to solve the problem with economic

methods, to increase the attachment of the economies of the CIS countries to Russian

financial and stock markets.

RF and Belarus

Closest relationship (allied) due to geopolitical

situations are developing between Russia and Belarus, which

announced the construction of a union state. Different ideas about

models of union (federal or confederal) have caused controversy

between countries. This became an obstacle to the construction of a new

states. Under these conditions, Russia decided to change its attitude towards

Belarus tactics. Where political arguments do not work,

It’s quite possible to try to solve the problem by not making it too big

for Russia with money. If Belarus does not abandon Russian

cheap money, which is extremely unlikely, the degree of economic integration

two countries will inevitably increase, as will the affection of Belarus

to the Russian financial and stock markets.

2007 to Moscow, was dumbfounded by the unexpected generosity of Russia.

The total amount of government loans that Belarus was promised until 2008.

to issue Russia, increased from 1.5 billion dollars to 3.5 billion dollars, which is

7% of Belarusian budget expenditures in 2008. In addition, vice

Prime Minister A. Kudrin, who implemented an attraction of unprecedented generosity,

promised Belarus loans on the domestic Russian market in the amount of 10 billion.

rub. Belarus, apparently, will not resist, having encountered Russia’s desire

Russian interstate loan to cover losses from the increase

prices for Russian oil and gas supplies in the amount of 1 billion.

dollars, the promised money was allocated. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister

Finance A. Kudrin and Belarusian Minister of Finance N. Korbut signed

agreement to provide Belarus with a state loan in the amount of

1.5 billion dollars. In addition, Belarus was promised another loan

in 2008 in the amount of $2 billion, and it was proposed to place bonds

on the Russian market in the amount of 10 billion rubles. and if, these papers

will receive a demand, repeat this operation as necessary.

As A. Kudrin explained, 1.5. Billion dollars provided by Russia

for a period of 15 years at a rate of LIBOR+0.75%. The agreement provides

and a 5-year grace period during which interest is paid

will not. At the current rate LIBOR + 5% A. Kudrin

estimated the cost of the loan for Belarus to be “about 6%.” But right after

signing of the agreement, the Deputy Prime Minister announced that Russia is ready

provide Belarus with another loan - for $2 billion in 2008.

N. Korbut tried to argue that this amount should be commercial

loan from Russia to Belarus. But Mr. A. Kudrin insisted,

that the type of loan - a government loan or a commercial loan "will be studied." But before that, “one of the next steps will be to place

public loan of Belarus on the Russian market,” issued another

the secret of Russian-Belarusian financial relations A. Kudrin.

According to him, “the Russian side has already received a request for registration

such a loan." After this, N. Korbut had to admit

that the volume of placement could be up to 10 billion rubles. in 2008 He

he only clarified that “this will not be a one-time placement, but in tranches.”

Russia will provide the first $1.5 billion to Belarus with more than two

in portions, but all at once. As N. Korbut explained, the country expects to receive

will be used to finance the Belarusian budget deficit,

which for 2008 has already been determined at 1.9% of GDP, or $1.2 billion.

A loan in the amount of $1.5 billion, according to A. Kudrin, will increase the gold and foreign exchange reserves of Belarus, and the budget of Belarus will receive

amount converted into Belarusian rubles. Where will they be sent?

another $2 billion, as well as money from Belarusian bonds, was not specified. For Belarus, we note, 3.5 billion dollars of loans in

2007-2008 - amounts that are macroeconomically significant. This is about 7%

expenditures of the country's consolidated budget for 2008 (24.4 billion).

dollars), and a little smaller size social support fund (combines

part of the functions of the Pension Fund and the social insurance system) -

$5.6 billion in 2008

Even on the eve of V. Putin’s visit, political scientists assumed that

Russia's loan to Belarus may be payment for A. Lukashenko's consent

agree on the Russian version of the provisions on Union State.

However, now that rates have increased 2.5 times, the reason

they see it differently. Most likely, they agreed with A. Lukashenko on

wide admission of Russia into the country's economy, and not only about

participation of Russian companies in the privatization of Belarusian ones, but also about

wider cooperation. Plus security agreements,

After all, Belarus borders on Poland. Finally, perhaps

that this is a payment for a possible transition to the Russian ruble.

Russia and Central Asian countries

Of particular interest to Russia are the pantries of the countries of Central

Asia, which make the region attractive for everyone.

As economic growth increases, the need for energy increases.

After the collapse of the USSR SSR, Central Asia was the region where Moscow

traditionally dominated. However, in recent years this region

is rapidly turning into a springboard for geopolitical struggle

between Russia losing ground, increasing “draconian

» at the pace of China, which habitually seeks its interests throughout

to the US world and seeking to reduce energy dependence

from Russia to Europe. The most fierce struggle unfolds

for oil and gas produced in Central Asia. All

of these players, except the United States, are either reaching an agreement or have already

agreed on construction in their direction from this region

oil and gas pipelines. The situation in the Central Asian countries themselves

countries is ambiguous.

Kazakhstan. In 2007, Kazakhstan continued to move towards the target

The goal is to become one of the 50 developed countries in the world. In 2007, according to

annual report The Global Competitiveness Report (about the global

competitiveness), he took 68th place out of 131. In addition, the long-time dream of President Nursultan Nazarbayev came true - in 2010.

Kazakhstan will become the chairman of the OSCE. And this despite criticism

international observers of the past parliamentary elections.

Let us remind you that the pro-presidential Nur Otan received more than 88% of the votes

voters, and the rest were unable to overcome the 7% barrier.

Thus, the new legislative body (mazhi-lis) turned out to be

Within the Borders nation state The subjects of politics are individuals, social groups (classes, strata), parties, movements pursuing individual and group interests. However, independent states themselves do not develop in a vacuum; they interact with each other and act as subjects of a higher-level policy - international.

The goals of international politics are determined by the specific context of the specific historical situation in which the world community finds itself, and the nature of the relations that exist between states. To the extent that external factors influence the living conditions of a particular state, they also determine the content of international politics.

National interest is the nation’s conscious need for self-preservation, development and security, a set of balanced interests of the individual, society and the entire state in economic, domestic political, social, international, information, military, border, environmental and other spheres of society. National interest can also be defined as awareness and reflection of its needs in the activities of state leaders. This applies to both multinational and ethnically homogeneous states. In fact, national interest means national-state interest.

Traditionally understood, the fundamental national-state interest includes three main elements:

• - military security;
• - economic prosperity and development;
• - state sovereignty as the basis for control over a certain territory and population or the preservation of a nation as a free and independent state.

Sometimes the following elements are added:

• - growth of national welfare;
• - protection of the economic and political positions of the state in the international arena;
• - expansion of its influence in world politics.

However, today both these elements and the content of national interest as a whole are undergoing significant changes under the pressure of new facts and circumstances.

Now states and regions are becoming increasingly permeable to the growing flows of ideas, capital, goods, technologies and people crossing their borders. Traditional bilateral and multilateral ties between states are complemented by new ones operating in a variety of areas, such as transport, economics and finance, information and culture, science and education, etc.

Under these conditions, national interest cannot be ensured without creating such conditions for the existence of the state as internal stability, economic well-being, moral tone of society, security (in the broad sense of the word), a favorable foreign policy environment, prestige and authority on the world stage. It should be borne in mind that ensuring national interest is achieved only when these conditions are balanced, representing an open system of interdependent and complementary elements. Full provision of each of them is possible only ideally. In real practice, cases of insufficient development of one or another of these elements or conditions are typical, which is compensated by more intensive development of others. Ensuring such a balance is the essence and art of international politics.

There is a distinction between constant (fixed) and variable content of national interest. The constant part includes the task of ensuring the external security of the state. The variable content is viewed through the prism of national traditions, personal qualities of political leaders, trends in economic, social spheres social life, etc. Real material and political needs for the development of the state may change, and along with them, interests, goals, means and foreign policy activities change accordingly. A change in the needs and interests of the state leads to a change in ideological values.

In relation to the surrounding outside world, national interests are expressed in the totality of the foreign policy interests of the state, which differ in their importance for its life. There are two levels of national interests of the state: the level of main foreign policy interests and the level of specific interests. The first is associated with ensuring its security and integrity as a socio-economic, political, national-historical and cultural community, with the protection of the economic and political independence of the state. The state ensures its main interests by all military, economic, diplomatic and ideological means.

The second level covers individual, relatively private, although important in themselves, interests of the state in the field of international relations.

National interests are fundamentally objective, because they reflect the aspirations of the citizens of the state to ensure stable and sustainable development of society, its institutions, and improve the standard of living of the population; minimizing threats to the personal and public safety of citizens, the system of values ​​and institutions on which the existence of society is based.

These aspirations of citizens are embodied in the concept (doctrine) of national interest, the specific content of which is also determined primarily by objective parameters, such as:

• - the geopolitical position of the state on the world stage, whether it has allies or opponents who pose a direct threat to the national-state interests of the country;
• - position in the system of international economic relations, degree of dependence on foreign markets, sources of raw materials, energy, etc.;
• - the general state of the system of international relations, the predominance in it of elements of rivalry or partnership, force or law.

The concept of “national interest” was developed by G. Morgenthau. He defined the concept of “interest” in terms of power. The concept of national interest consists of three elements: 1) the nature of the interest that must be protected; 2) the political environment in which the interest operates; 3) national necessity, which limits the choice of goals and means for all subjects of international politics.

G. Morgenthau included the following in the concept of “national interest”:

• 1. National interest is an objective reality. It is based, firstly, on the uniqueness of the geopolitical position of the state and the associated features of geo-economic and socio-cultural development; secondly, it is mediated by the peculiarities of human nature.
• 2. Statesmen must proceed from the premise that good policy is rational policy based on properly understood national interest. The basis of such a policy is a clearly constructed image of the state, through which the perception of national interest occurs.
• 3. National interest is fundamentally different from public interest. National interests are ensured foreign policy, and public - internal. They should neither be opposed nor merge.

The foreign policy of an independent state, according to G. Morgenthau, should be based on a certain physical, political and cultural “reality” that is capable of realizing the nature and essence of its own national interest. This “reality” is the nation. All nations of the world in the international arena strive to satisfy their primary need, namely the need for physical survival. In a world divided into blocs and alliances, where the struggle for power and resources continues, all nations strive to protect their physical, political and cultural originality (identity) in the face of outside invasion.

Probably, this position of G. Morgenthau was relevant during the Cold War, when the world community was divided into two opposing camps: socialist and capitalist. In the modern world, when countries, for various reasons, are interdependent and interconnected with each other, their survival and development can only be ensured through their cooperation and interaction. Under these conditions, any state, while pursuing its own national interest, must respect and take into account the interests of other states.

By combining its own interests and the needs of other states, a nation can ensure its security. National security means the state of protection of the vital interests of the individual, society and state from internal and external threats, the ability of the state to maintain its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to act as a subject of international law.

The concept of “security” for the individual, society and the state does not coincide in everything. Personal security means the realization of his inalienable rights and freedoms. For society, security consists in preserving and increasing its material and spiritual values. National security of a state presupposes internal stability, reliable defense capability, sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity.

Nowadays, when the danger of nuclear war remains, national security is an integral part of global security. Until recently, global security was based on the principles of “deterrence through deterrence,” confrontation and confrontation between nuclear powers (USSR, USA, France, Great Britain, China). But truly universal security cannot be ensured by infringing on the interests of any states; it can only be achieved on the principles of partnership and cooperation. The turning point in the formation of a new system of universal security was the recognition by the world community of the impossibility of victory and survival in a world nuclear war.

It is impossible to ensure national security without the identification, awareness, and declaration by the state of vital national interests. Otherwise, the foundations of national security can be easily destroyed by anyone - as happened in the USSR during perestroika, and then in independent Russia. Unidentified, unconscious and undeclared national interests are not protected in any way, i.e. are areas of vulnerability, Achilles heels, and therefore the main directions of a new war.

In a viable and effective state, the priority of national interests is determined by their vital importance. The state protects national interests by all available means. It should also be taken into account that interests that are not vital and even alien to the nation can be proclaimed as national interests; priorities of national interests may change; Relevant problems may not be adequately formulated and addressed. In this case, the country will self-destruct using its own forces and means.