At the beginning of the war: a comparison of German and Soviet tank groups. Tanks and armored vehicles of Germany during the Second World War

In the summer of 1941, at the time of the invasion of the USSR, the German war machine was at the peak of its power. In the last campaign in the West, German tank groups showed phenomenal organization and coherence. It took just over a month for the German tank and motorized corps, which rushed uncontrollably deep into France, to decide the outcome of the war on the Western Front. The Anglo-French allies were completely helpless in the face of an effective, mobile and highly organized German army. A huge contribution to the victory in the West was made by the tanks of Guderian, Hoth and Reinhardt, who fought as part of a large tank group under the overall command of Ewald von Kleist.

It was large tank formations that were destined to play a major role in the new war in the east. Before the invasion of the USSR, the bulk of German tanks (17 tank divisions, 3226 tanks) were concentrated in four tank groups. These armored “fists” were supposed to make rapid strikes, moving in the vanguard of the advancing forces, enter a breakthrough in vulnerable sectors of the enemy’s front, rapidly advance along its rear, disorganizing the entire defense system and carry out quick operations to encircle large masses of Soviet troops. What were Hitler's tank forces in 1941? German tanks in a number of characteristics were worse than some Soviet models, such as the T-34 or KV, inferior to them in armor and firepower, however, the partial technical dominance of the Red Army over the Wehrmacht was more than compensated by the solid combat experience of the German crews, clear and the quick operational leadership of the commanders, the overall coherence, organization and good control of the German army, the amazing combination of plan and initiative. All this was complemented by phenomenal self-confidence after victories over Poland, England and France.

The following types of tanks were in service with Hitler's army in 1941: "PzI", "PzII", "PzIII", "PzIV", "Pz35(t)" and "Pz38(t)". Tanks "PzIII" and "PzIV" belonged to the class of medium tanks. All other vehicles in service with the Wehrmacht were light. Germany did not have heavy tanks in 1941. The basis of the German tank forces at the beginning of the eastern campaign was the PzIII medium tank. 965 tanks of this type of various modifications were concentrated against the USSR. The armor of the latest models (Panzer III Ausf.H and Ausf.J) was 60 - 70mm of shielded armor in the frontal projection. 45-mm cannons, widely used in the Red Army and mounted on light tanks, could only penetrate such armor at very close ranges. Most of the Panzer III tanks that took part in the attack on the USSR were rearmed with 50-mm cannons, which easily hit light Soviet armored vehicles from any combat distance, and a sub-caliber projectile could be used against well-armored medium and heavy tanks. The “troikas” of the latest modifications were already completely superior to the bulk Soviet tanks, including "BT-7" and "T-26", but were inferior in firepower to the "KV" and "T-34", which were equipped with 76-mm cannons. The sloped 45-mm armor of the Thirty-Fours was not inferior to that of the Troikas. Let's look at other types of German equipment on the eastern front at the beginning of the war. Light tanks "PzI", of which there were 410 units in the German army, were armed only with machine guns and, according to Hermann Hoth, were only a "burden" for the German troops, but not a real fighting force.

The same can be said about the PzII tanks. There were 746 units of these hopelessly outdated combat vehicles in the German army and they could withstand only the most lightly armored Soviet tanks and armored vehicles (T-37, T-38, T-40). It was possible to use "PzII" only if there was no serious enemy anti-tank defense in their lane of movement. The Pz35(t) tanks were also not a formidable force, even though they were superior in performance to the PzII. Weak armor and guns did not allow them to fight on equal terms with the new Soviet combat vehicles. In addition, the number of "Pz35(t)" located on the eastern front was only 149 combat units. In addition to all of the above, the Wehrmacht had 623 Pz38(t) light tanks, which stood out from the rest of the Wehrmacht light tanks due to the good armor of the E modifications produced since November 1940 - the armor of these vehicles was already 50mm, which is much more than the first modifications of these tanks. All German light tanks had weapons that were not powerful enough to fight the new Soviet tanks, but, with the exception of the PzI and PzII, they quite successfully penetrated the armor of light Soviet combat vehicles. And finally, the PzIV medium tank, which the Germans considered heavy at the beginning of the war, was one of the best German tanks, however, at the beginning of the war it was equipped with a short-barreled 75mm gun with a low initial projectile velocity, which could not provide it with superiority or even simply equate it in combat value to the T-34. At the beginning of the invasion, Germany had 439 PzIV tanks.

Some tanks that were part of the German group were, of course, frankly outdated, this applies mainly to “PzI”, “PzII” and “Pz35(t)”, but other types of German combat vehicles, especially medium tanks, when colliding with enemy armored vehicles could quite effectively and successfully cope with most Soviet tanks. German combat vehicles were controlled by strong crews and commanders who had valuable experience of the war in Europe, while the Soviet tank forces, which at the beginning of the war were bulky and clumsy formations, like mechanized corps, lacked training, organization, coherent and competent command at all levels. This ultimately did not allow them to realize their crushing striking force, which could put an end to the German invasion back in 1941. German tank forces, skillfully interacting with other branches of the military, inflicted catastrophic defeats on the Red Army in the summer of 1941, effectively defeating significant forces of the first echelon of the Red Army with minimal losses of their own. And the point here is not at all the absolute mediocrity of the Soviet command; at that time it was difficult even to fully comprehend the revolutionary German strategy of maneuver warfare: no one yet knew the cure for the “blitzkrieg”, one hundred percent protection against rapid breakthroughs of German tank and motorized groups in 1941.

Before the defeat of the Soviet armies of the Western Military District, the Germans just as quickly defeated Poland, France, Denmark, Norway, etc., establishing control over most of Europe. The same scenario initially worked in the USSR - the Red Army, which did not have time to complete its strategic deployment, received a series of sensitive blows from powerful German tank “fists” that passed through its rear, which ultimately led to the collapse of the Western Front at the first stage of the war and being surrounded enormous forces Soviet army, which corresponded to the plans of the German command, which threw its best tank forces forward. In the fast and fleeting operations of 1939 - 1942, the German army showed the whole world the power of its tank formations. At the beginning of World War II, the Germans had no equal in their ability to maneuver their mobile formations and deliver powerful, rapid attacks that the enemy could not parry. This time was the real heyday of German power, the prospect of the end of which began to emerge more and more clearly as military operations on the eastern front dragged on and the resistance of Soviet troops intensified.

In the “statistical study” under the intriguing title “The Classification of Secrecy has been Removed” under general edition Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev provides quantitative data on military equipment that was in the armed forces of the USSR and Germany and their ratio. Regarding Soviet tanks of all types, the following figures are indicated: the active army - 14.2 thousand in the military districts and the reserve of the Supreme High Command - 8.4 thousand. It is clarified that of this number 14.2 thousand in active army 44% of tanks needed medium repairs and 29% needed major repairs, so there were 3.8 thousand fully combat-ready tanks in the active army. As for Germany, the number indicated on the Soviet-German front is 4.3 thousand, and therefore the ratio of tanks in the active armies is 1: 1.1 in favor of Germany. At the same time, in Krivosheev’s “scientific research” there are no references to documents or methods for obtaining this absurd data.

In 1994, the team of the Institute military history The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, as a result of many years of work, published the work: “Combat and numerical strength of the Armed Forces of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War: Statistical collection No. 1 (June 22, 1941)” 1994 Military Publishing House. This collection presents the results of an analysis of monthly reports from the troops, including as of June 1, 1941, on the qualitative and quantitative state of weapons and military equipment, about the manning of troops, the number of armies, corps and many other information. These data completely refute the far-fetched information presented in “ scientific research» authors under the leadership of Krivosheev.

But Statistical Collection No. 1 was published in only 25 copies! In 2001, it was reissued - 100 copies, essentially labeled “for official use.”

Therefore, I present the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of tanks from “Collection No. 1” and information from combat logs of military units and formations.

TANKS OF GERMANY

“As of June 1, 1941, in Germany, the number of all tanks and assault guns received from factories and transferred to the active army and reserve army, as well as to the artillery and technical supply departments, amounted to 5,639 units. Of these, T-I tanks - 877, 35 (t) -187, T-II - 1072, flamethrower tanks - 85, 38 (t) - 754, T-III - 1440, T-IV - 517. Commander tanks - 330. Total tanks - 5362. Assault guns - 377. In the active army in the East on June 22, 1941 there were a total of 3332 tanks (excluding flamethrowers). (B. Müller-Hillebrand. Directory “German Land Army. 1933–1945”).

Their types and quantities are as follows:

– T-I (two 7.92 mm machine guns) – about 180;

– T-II (20 mm cannon, 7.92 mm machine gun) – 746;

– 38(t) (37 mm cannon, 2 7.92 mm machine guns) – 772;

– T-III (37 mm or 50 mm cannon, 3 machine guns) – 965;

– T-IV (75 mm short-barreled gun, two 7.92 mm machine guns) – 439

– commanders – 230.

French captured tanks did not fit into the German structure for controlling the battle of tank divisions, so not a single French tank was in service with tank divisions.

Now let’s clarify the tank forces of Germany’s allies (Finland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Italy), which our publicists emphasize and take into account as significant tank forces. The strongest were the Finns and Romanians.

The Finnish army had 86 tanks. At the same time, the basis of the tank fleet was captured Soviet obsolete T-26 and BT, as well as self-propelled guns created by the Finns on their basis. In addition, there were several of our T-28 medium tanks recent years release (they had a long-barreled 76.2 mm cannon and had reinforced armor).

The 60-unit Romanian tank brigade was armed with Czech LTvz35 tanks and some Renault-type tanks produced in the 1920s.

German tank divisions by the fall of 1939, before the German attack on Poland, had 6 tank divisions of the 1939 model and 4 light infantry divisions armed with tanks. After the conversion of light infantry divisions to tank divisions, there were 10 tank divisions on April 1, 1940 (before the start of the Western Campaign). For the first time, tank groups were created, initially one, and at the second stage - three: Kleist, Guderian, Gotha. This achieved the concentration of tank forces, which was important for increasing the force of the strike. During the attack on the USSR, four tank groups were created (from December 1941 they began to be called “armies”).

Thus, the German military command, not in words, but in deeds, implemented the theory of deep military operations, which were based on the maneuverable actions of large tank formations. But it seemed to Hitler that it was not enough to have 10 tank divisions, and therefore the formation of another eleven new ones began - from the 11th to the 21st. But there were no tanks available to form new divisions, and therefore it was decided that the formation would be carried out mainly by reducing the tank units of 10 divisions, i.e. reducing the number of such in them. So, out of all 10 divisions with 2 tank regiments, one regiment was transferred to the newly created division.

As a result, if in the campaign in the West the core tank division amounted to tank brigade from two tank regiments, now the basis of a tank division was one tank regiment of two or three battalions.

USSR TANKS

On June 1, 1941, there were more than 25,000 tanks in the Red Army. 18,844 units were operational. In June 1941, another 305 tanks were produced.

Types of tanks and their number, serviceable in brackets:

– T-35 (76 mm cannon, 2 45 mm cannons, 5 7.62 mm machine guns) – 59 pcs. (42 pcs.)

– KV-1 (76 mm cannon, 4 7.62 mm machine guns) – 412 pcs. (410 pcs.)

– KV-2 (152 mm howitzer, 4 7.62 mm machine guns) – 135 pcs. (134 pcs.)

– T-28 (76 mm cannon, 4 7.62 mm machine guns) – 442 pcs. (292 pcs.)

– T-34 (76 mm cannon, 2 7.62 mm machine guns) – 1030 pcs. (1029 pcs.)

– BT-7M (45 mm cannon, 1 7.62 mm machine gun) – 704 pcs. (688 pcs.)

– BT-7 (45 mm cannon, 1 7.62 mm machine gun) – 4563 pcs. (3791 pcs.)

– BT-5 (45 mm cannon, 1 7.62 mm machine gun) – 1688 pcs. (1261 pcs.)

– BT-2 (37mm cannon, 1 7.62 mm machine gun) – 594 pcs. (492 pcs.)

– T-26 (45 mm cannon, 2 7.62 mm machine guns) – 9998 pcs. (8423 pcs.)

– T-40 (2 machine guns 12.7 mm and 7.62 mm) – 160 pcs. (159 pcs.)

– T-38 (1 7.62 mm machine gun) – 1129 pcs. (733 pcs.)

– T-37 (1 7.62 mm machine gun) – 2331 pcs. (1483 pcs.)

– T-27 (1 machine gun 7.62 mm) – 2376 pcs. (1060 pcs.)

– Su-5 (1 76 mm gun) – 28 pcs. (16 pcs.)

Total: 25,621 registered tanks, of which 19,997 are serviceable (combat ready), more than 78%.

But there are not yet several thousand armored vehicles armed with 45 mm cannons.

In June 1939, a specially created commission chaired by Deputy People's Commissar of Defense E.A. Kulik began to review the organizational structure of the troops, including armored ones. This decision was approved by the Main Military Council. Instead of 4 corps, it was decided to have 42 tank brigades in wartime.

Thus, the previous many years of work on acquiring the experience of leading large mechanized formations, in particular mechanized corps, in accordance with the previously accepted theory of conducting deep combat, was crossed out.

Only six months passed after the disbandment of the tank corps, when the People’s Commissariat of Defense, “based on Stalin’s instructions,” having examined the results of the combat operations of German tank and motorized corps in the West, returned to reviewing the recently adopted decision on tank (mechanized) corps.

On June 9, 1940, the People's Commissar of Defense approved a plan for the formation of new mechanized corps with a special staff. In 1940, 9 mechanized corps were formed. The new mechanized corps included two tank and one motorized divisions. The tank division has two tank, motorized rifle and artillery regiments, and 375 tanks. The motorized division consisted of a tank, two motorized rifle and artillery regiments, and 275 tanks. Thus, in total, the mechanized corps should have had 1031 tanks. In addition to 9 mechanized corps, 2 separate tank divisions were formed.

But nine mechanized corps seemed not enough to the command of the Red Army. Instead of fully equipping the existing ones, in February 1941 the General Staff developed an even broader plan for the formation of new armored and mechanized forces, providing for the creation of another 21 corps (the formation of one mechanized corps was later cancelled). And in April 1941 their formation began.

To staff 29 mechanized corps and 2 separate divisions, it was necessary to create 61 tank divisions (2 divisions per corps). The division was supposed to have: personnel - 11,343 people, tanks 375. The motorized division of the mechanized corps had 2 motorized rifle regiments, a tank regiment (275 tanks) and a cannon-artillery regiment, as well as a separate anti-tank fighter division (30 45 mm caliber guns). In addition, tanks were available in cavalry divisions (regiments), and individual tank battalions- in the airborne troops.

It was not possible to fully staff all 29 mechanized corps to full strength by June 1941. Historians from the department of agitprop loudly trumpeted this as the clearest evidence of our “unpreparedness for war,” hiding the true scale of the armored forces of the Red Army. Therefore, in the current conditions, all mechanized corps were divided into 19 “combat”, 7 “reduced” and 3 “reduced second stage”. By the end of 1941, it was planned to have 18,804 tanks in the mechanized corps and 2 separate tank divisions, including 16,655 tanks in the “combat mechanized corps.” Moreover, the average number of tanks (877) of the mechanized corps was equal to or exceeded the average number of tanks (817) of the German tank group.

Already by February 22, 1941, there were 14,684 tanks in the mechanized corps. The planned increase in numbers by 4,120 units by the end of the year was significantly less than the actual production, which amounted to 6,590 tanks in 1941 (including 1,358 - KV; 3,014 - T-34; 277 - T-40 and other types (T-50, T- 60). For comparison, we note that Germany (for which “all of Europe worked”) in 1941 produced only 3256 tanks (including 243 - T-II; 1713 - T-III; 480 - T-IV; 698 - 38 (t) and 132 commanders (Müller-Hillebrand “Handbook”).

COMPARE SPECIFICATIONS

Having reliable initial data on the number and types of tanks, we will conduct a comparative analysis of the opposing tank groups of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht as of June 1941. Based on their functional purpose and combat characteristics, we will conditionally divide all tanks into 4 categories: “wedges”, “light tanks”, “artillery tanks”, “medium tanks”.

Let's begin the analysis of tanks from the Army Group South opposing the German 1st Panzer Group of Colonel General von Kleist and the Soviet mechanized corps of the Kyiv OVO (South-Eastern Front) and OdVO (Southern Front). Among the “wedge heels” of the 1st Tank Group, out of a total number of tanks of 799 units, we include 8 T-I tanks; 217 T-II and all 65 command ones. We will compare our outdated T-26, which was discontinued at the beginning of the war, with these Wehrmacht tanks, and more specifically, the German “cannon” T-II tanks.

Although the thickness of the armor of the T-II tank is 2 times greater than that of the T-26 tank, this did not turn it into a tank with anti-ballistic armor. The 45 mm caliber gun of the Soviet T-26 tank type 20K confidently penetrated such armor at a range of 1200 m, while the projectile of the 20 mm KwK-30 gun retains the necessary penetration only at a range of 300-500 m. This combination of armor and weapon parameters allowed the Soviet a tank, when used correctly, can be shot with almost impunity German tanks, which was confirmed in battles in Spain. The T-II tank was also unsuitable for performing its main task - destroying enemy firepower and manpower, since the 20 mm cannon shell was completely ineffective for this task. To hit a target, a direct hit was required, like from a rifle bullet. At the same time, a “normal” high-explosive fragmentation projectile weighing 1.4 kg was developed for our gun. Such a projectile hit targets such as a machine gun nest, a mortar battery, a log dugout, etc.

Now about the quantity. Against the 280 tankettes of the 1st Tank Group of the Wehrmacht in ten mechanized corps of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts, 1501 T-26 tanks were combat-ready out of 1873 registered. The ratio of the number of tanks in this category is 1: 5.3 in favor of Soviet tanks. In addition, as of June 1, 1941, in the Kiev OVO and Odessa VO there were more than 421 units of T-37 and T-38 amphibious tanks with machine gun armament, as well as 111 new T-40 amphibious tanks armed heavy machine gun DShK 12.7 mm caliber and a machine gun 7.62 mm caliber.

Next, let's look at comparative combat characteristics the second category - “light tanks”. These include all Wehrmacht tanks armed with a 37 mm caliber cannon and machine guns. These are German-made T-III tanks of the D, E, F series and Czech-made tanks 35(t) and 38(t). In the 1st Tank Group, the five tank divisions were armed with no Czech-made tanks, and there were 162 T-III tanks of the above series. On the Soviet side, we will accept for comparative analysis light tanks BT-7 and BT-7 M.

In terms of “armor, mobility and weapons,” our “light tanks” BT-7 are at least as good as the German “troikas” in at least two respects, and the Czech tanks are significantly superior in all respects. The 30 mm thick frontal armor of the T-III tanks of the indicated series, as well as the T-II tanks, did not provide shell protection. Our tank with a 45 mm cannon could hit a German tank at a kilometer range, while remaining relatively safe. In terms of mobility and range, the BT-7 (7M) tanks were the best in the world. Fragmentation projectile(610 g) 37 mm caliber Skoda tank gun was 2 times smaller than the projectile Soviet gun 20K, which caused a significantly less destructive effect on infantry. As for the action against armored targets, the 37mm caliber guns were ineffective (the German troops called them “army door knockers”).

On June 1, 1941, there were 994 BT-7 and 192 BT-7M combat-ready tanks of the “light category” in the mechanized corps of the Kiev Military District, and 150 BT-7 and 167 BT-7M in the Odessa Military District. The total number of serviceable “light tanks” of the BT series in the two districts was 1,503 (out of 1,970 registered), which was a numerical ratio of 1:9.1 in favor of the Soviet troops.

Infantry artillery support tanks were not originally intended to fight similar targets. Distinctive feature tanks of this category were short-barreled guns (the T-IV tank had a barrel length in L calibers of 24), the initial velocity of the projectile and, therefore, the penetration of these guns was very low (the 45 mm Soviet 20K gun was superior in armor penetration to the 75 mm German gun of the T tank -IV at all distances). To combat infantry, our T-28 tank (due to the presence of two separate machine-gun turrets) was better armed. In addition, some of the T-28 tanks of recent years of production were armed with longer-barreled guns and shielded with additional armor plates 20–30 mm thick. A similar modernization in terms of strengthening armor took place with German tanks ( T-I tanks The first V series A, B, C and others had forehead armor - 30 mm, side armor - 20 mm). As for the short-barreled gun, it was replaced by a long-barreled one (L 43) only in April 1942. The wide tracks of the Soviet T-28 tank provided it with better maneuverability. In general, in terms of the entire set of tactical and technical characteristics, these tanks were equivalent.

The 1st Tank Group of the Wehrmacht consisted of exactly 100 T-IV artillery support tanks: 20 tanks per division. As of June 1, 1941, the mechanized corps of the Kiev OVZ had 171 combat-ready T-28 tanks (out of 191 registered) and 42 serviceable five-turret giant T-35s, armed with one 76 mm caliber cannon, two 45 mm caliber cannons and machine guns. There were about 10 T-28 tanks in the Odessa Military District. In total, on the Southern theater of operations there were more than 213 serviceable " artillery tanks", i.e. twice as many as German ones.

THE BEST

Let us finally consider the best that was in service with the tank divisions of the Wehrmacht and the tank divisions of the Red Army on June 22, 1941, conditionally included in the category of “medium tanks”.

“The best” was determined not by the author of this article, but state commission(out of fifty engineers, designers and intelligence officers), who, under the leadership of People's Commissar Tevosyan, three times in 1939–1941, familiarized herself in detail with the state of German tank production and, from everything she saw, selected only a single T-III tank for purchase. The T-III tank of the H and J series became the best thanks to two circumstances: the new 50 mm KwK-38 gun and the 50 mm thick frontal armor of the hull. Our specialists were not interested in all other types of tanks. By the way, under the guise of a friendship agreement the following were purchased: Messerschmitt-109 - 5 pieces; "Messerschmitt-110" - 6 pieces; 2 pieces of "Junkers-88"; 2 pieces of Dornier-215; one newest experimental Messerschmitt-209; battery of 105 mm anti-aircraft guns; drawings of the newest largest battleship in the world, Bismarck; tank radios; sights for dive bombing and many other weapons systems and military equipment. And only one German tank of one type.

This tank was comprehensively studied and tested at the Soviet training ground by firing at armored targets. Therefore, our military-political leadership was well aware of the level of German tanks and the state of the German tank industry as a whole.

In the Red Army, the “best” of the “medium tanks” category was the T-34 tank.

In all respects - mobility, armor protection, armament, the T-34 tank was superior to the best German T-III tank of the H and J series in June 1941. The long-barreled 76 mm cannon of the F-34 penetrated any armor of the most protected German tanks at a distance of 1000–1200 meters . At the same time, not a single Wehrmacht tank could hit the T-34 even from 500 meters. A powerful diesel engine ensured not only speed and relative fire safety, but also made it possible to travel more than 300 km at one gas station.

The most complete and qualified assessment of the Soviet T-34 tank was given by German General B. Müller-Hillebrand: “The appearance of the T-34 tank was an unpleasant surprise, because due to its speed, high maneuverability, enhanced armor protection, armament and, mainly, the presence of an extended 76 mm The gun, which had increased shooting accuracy and the penetrating ability of projectiles at large, hitherto considered unattainable distances, was a completely new type of tank weapon. Although the German infantry divisions each had a total of 60–80 anti-tank guns and had a sufficient number of other anti-tank weapons, with the caliber of the 37 mm guns they had almost no destructive effect on the “thirty-fours”. The 50 mm anti-tank gun introduced into service with the German troops at that time was also insufficient effective means┘" And further he writes: "The appearance of T-34 tanks radically changed the tactics of tank forces. If until now certain requirements were imposed on the design of the tank and its armament, in particular to suppress infantry and infantry-supporting means, now main task there was a requirement to hit enemy tanks at maximum range in order to create the preconditions for subsequent success in battle.” Other Wehrmacht generals make similar reviews.

And now about the quantity: in the 1st Tank Group there were 255 T-III “medium tanks” of the H and J series. The mechanized corps of the Southwestern Front had 555 T-34 tanks, and the Southern Front had another 50 (605 T-34 tanks in total).

But the Red Army had been in service with the KV heavy tank since December 1939. The Soviet 48-ton KV-1 tank, having frontal armor of 95 mm (turret - 100 mm), and side armor - 75 mm, was invulnerable to tanks and the best German anti-tank guns. The only means of fighting it were a few German 88 mm anti-aircraft guns with special shells. The forced diesel V-2K developed a power of 600 hp, providing a speed of 35 km/h. In the summer of 1941, the F-34 76 mm caliber gun could shoot at any German tanks at any distances and at any firing angle. Until June 22, 1941, KV tanks were produced in two modifications: the KV-1 with a 76 mm caliber cannon and the 52-ton KV-2 with a 152 mm caliber howitzer. With the outbreak of the war, production of KV-2 tanks was discontinued.

There were no heavy tanks in the Wehrmacht tank divisions. No one!

As of June 22, 1941, the mechanized corps of the Southwestern Front had 277 serviceable KV-1 and KV-2 tanks, and the Southern Front had 10. Total 280 units. Due to the Wehrmacht’s lack of heavy tanks, we will compare them with the best German T-III tanks of the H and J series, which are truly incomparable!

So, against the 255 best German tanks of the 1st Panzer Group von Kleist in the mechanized corps of the Kiev OVO and Odessa Military District on June 22, 1941 there were 605 T-34 tanks and 280 heavy KV-1 and KV-2 tanks, a total of 885 tanks, which exceeded the total number (799) of German tanks of all types of the 1st Panzer Group, including obsolete T-I tanks with machine gun armament, TII with a 22 mm caliber cannon, T-III with a 37 mm caliber cannon and “commander” tanks.

So, as of June 1941, twenty Soviet tank and eleven motorized divisions, armed with 5,997 combat-ready tanks, opposed 799 tanks of the 1st Tank Group of the Wehrmacht, which were in service with five tank divisions (there were no tanks in the German motorized divisions).

So where is this notorious quantitative and qualitative superiority of German tanks over Soviet ones, about which even venerable doctors and academicians – “experts” in the initial period of the war – have been lying about for more than sixty years? What “5-6-fold superiority in breakthrough areas” did G.K. Zhukov recall in his memoirs?

By the beginning of the second day of the war, having practically not fired a single shot, the strike group from the Soviet mechanized corps (15th MK Brody, 4th MK Lvov, 8th MK Drogobich), numbering more than two and a half thousand tanks, including 720 T-34 and KV tanks, ended up in the rear of the German advanced units. An attack on the flank and rear of the breakthrough German troops, including an attack on Lublin in accordance with Directive No. 3, could radically change the situation on the entire Southwestern Front. But this, unfortunately, did not happen...

Artillery is the god of war!

Infantry is the queen of the fields!!

Tanks are an iron fist!!!.

Dear colleagues, I bring to your attention information about the state and balance of forces of tank armies at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War.

How was it possible to lose in 41? having 26,000 tanks?!

Notes (hereinafter simply - Note). Once again, a person, exploring the reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in 1941, tries on the Wehrmacht the same methods (and the same shirts) that were in the USSR. No more than the number of tanks. And the quality indicators of tanks (both the USSR and Germany) are generally replaced. We will highlight and analyze these places separately.

I immediately picture long and slender columns of armored vehicles - like the Parade on Red Square...
Well, let's compare the tanks on 06/22/41. QUANTITATIVELY and QUALITATIVELY….
SO – QUANTITATIVELY
As of 06/22/41 The USSR had 12,780 tanks and wedges in the Western districts...
The Wehrmacht had 3,987 armored vehicles on the border of the USSR + German satellites advanced 347 tanks to the borders of the USSR.
Total – 3987+347= 4334

Note The number 4334 also includes tanks and wedges. Let's really figure it out and count. Nothing secret, official network data.

1. Tank Pz I (no more than a wedge), all modifications (Ausf A and B), including command ones, as of June 22, 1941, serviceable - 877 units (78%), not serviceable (under repair) - 245 (22% ).
In total, there are 1122 wedges. This wedge had no cannon armament at all. The main armament is two MG-34 machine guns with a caliber of 7.92 mm. The maximum armor thickness is 13 mm.

2. Tank Pz II. Directly on June 22, 1941, production series from Ausf A to G4 took part ( latest version April 1941). There are 1074 tanks in total. Immediately serviceable - 909 (85%), in repair - 165 pieces (15%). The maximum armor thickness is 30 mm.

3. Tank Pz III. Directly on June 22, 1941, production series from Ausf A to J took part. A total of 1000 tanks. Immediately serviceable - 825 (82%), in repair - 174 pieces (17%). The maximum armor thickness is 30 mm.

4. Tank Pz IV. Directly on June 22, 1941, production series from Ausf A to E took part. A total of 480 tanks. Immediately serviceable - 439 (91%), in repair - 41 pieces (9%). The maximum armor thickness, only on the E series, and for 223 tanks, is 50 mm frontal.

At the same time, there are 223 (7%) (maximum number, excluding faulty tanks) tanks with an armor thickness of 50 mm.

Tanks with armor thickness from 13 to 30 mm - 2827 (93%) units. And the most popular Wehrmacht tank is the Pz I wedge - 1,122 units.

Now we begin to deal with satellite tanks.

347 tank is generally all the tanks in the bunch of all the allied countries of Germany in World War II. This includes Romanian tanks, Renault FT-17 and French B-1bis and Italian Vickers 6 tons. On June 22, 1941, these may have been modern and serviceable tanks, but nothing more than that, if you just want to laugh. We will not take them into account in our article. Because we will not follow Gareev’s methods.

The superiority is exactly 3 times...

Note So far the superiority is exactly 4 times.

However, there is an English proverb: (the devil is in the details).
Let's see the DETAILS
FIRST
Sometimes those who say that, well, we had it there, 3 times more tanks than the Germans, they forget that the Germans, in principle, have 4334 - this is serviceable tank equipment, combat-ready.

Note Why on earth did ALL 4334 BECOME SERVICEABLE AND COMBAT READY? This is where the details start to emerge. Everything is fine. But we won’t believe it.

In our country, only tanks of the first two categories (out of 4 available) could be combat-ready... The first category is a completely new technology.
The second category is serviceable Combat vehicles, used and faulty military equipment requiring routine repairs.
The third and fourth categories are already there different kinds repairs - medium repairs, major repairs, non-repairable, and so on. That is, this third or fourth category can actually be discarded. As for the border districts, there were about 8,000 tanks of the first two categories (minus those requiring routine repairs).

2. Categorizing equipment is nothing more than bureaucratic correspondence only for repair departments. Categorization is intended to indicate the service level of a tank (or other equipment) in the army. Categorization has nothing to do with the practice of using tanks.

3. Medium repairs were carried out in departments by departments with the involvement of specialists from repair departments. In average repair there may be tanks not only of III or IV categories, but also II and even I. A tank is transferred to the fourth category only before it is written off. Before this, the tank was in category III. And it will be repaired.

Pay attention to the logic of the author, who is trying to prove that the USSR had as many tanks as Germany. First, ALL THE TANKS that GERMANY COULD HAVE are counted. Including tanks with bulletproof armor, as well as tanks manufactured in 1917. And in relation to the USSR, a note is used that only tanks of the first two categories, that is, new tanks, will be counted. That's just not how things are done. If you want to count, count, just apply the same methods to everyone. Because if we start counting only new German tanks, produced in 1940 and 1941, then our number of German tanks will be reduced to 1124 and no more.

Where did the number of 8000 tanks come from?

Very simple. This is arithmetic (Pupkina, without pictures). It’s just that 4,780 tanks are stupidly equated with old, outdated and faulty tanks. Why was this done? In order to try to prove that there were about 8000 serviceable types.
Once again, pay attention. When counting German tanks, the words " near" not used. Everything is accurate. There are so many of these. Plus these have so much more. And everything is fine.
And the USSR (poor thing) has about 8000. There is no accuracy. And it cannot be.
Let's really look at the details. And let's compare.

As of June 22, the Western Special Military District alone had 1,136 T-26 tanks. It was customary to laugh at this tank in the USSR. But, by the way. Captured T-26s were used by the Wehrmacht in both 1941 and 1942. And in Finland, the T-26 was in service until 1961.

October 1941. The German infantry is advancing under the cover of... the Soviet T-26 tank (already in other hands).

October 1941. BT-7M, on the other side.

Armored car Ba-20 from the Germans.

Another Ba-20 in different hands.

And this is the T-34, on the other side.

This is a modernized (by the Germans) KV-1 tank

August 1941, apparently - these are not serviceable tanks?

November 1941. Modernized and improved (by the Germans) thirty-four.

September 1941. The Germans did not pass by the KV-2, they also brought it to mind. The finishing is visible to the naked eye.

March 1945. Soviet tank crews did not disdain German tanks.

Armor - 15 mm (20 mm since 1939), in 1940 the T-26 received shielded armor. But, let’s not let the T-26, armor is the only thing that the T-26 was inferior to German tanks on June 22, 1941.
But in terms of armament he was superior to them. Because the T-26 had a 45-mm 20-K tank gun. starting speed armor-piercing projectile 760 m/s. Until December 1941, this was quite enough to knock out any German tank at a distance of 300 meters.
Little of. The latest modifications of the T-26, produced in 1938 and 1939, had a stabilizer in the vertical plane of the gun and sight. Therefore, it was easier for this type of tank (the latest modification consisted of 2567 vehicles) to fire on the move, without short stops.

The ratio is 1 to 2... It seems to be good... However, there is such a sad thing: 95% of Soviet tanks had bulletproof armor and could be hit by any anti-tank gun...

Note And 93% of German tanks (we have already proven this above) were tanks with bulletproof armor.

The PAK 35/36 penetrated 40 - 50 mm of armor with a sub-caliber armor-piercing projectile from 300 meters. With a conventional shell, it penetrated the armor of 95% of Soviet tanks from half a kilometer away.

Note And the Soviet 45-mm anti-tank gun 53-K penetrated 40-50 mm of armor from 300 meters with a sub-caliber armor-piercing projectile. With a conventional shell, it penetrated the armor of 100% of German tanks from half a kilometer away.

Speed ​​- firing 10-15 rounds per minute...

Note The Soviet gun has the same rate of fire, 10–15 rounds per minute.

Both the Wehrmacht in 41-42, and the Red Army in 43-45, tried to avoid an oncoming tank battle in the offensive: what’s the point of spending a lot of ammunition, people and equipment forming a breakthrough, and introducing a tank corps/division into it, in order to 20-30 km, exchange your tanks in battle for enemy tanks? - It would be much wiser to place your anti-tank missile system under counterattack by enemy tanks...

Note But stop here. Dear! You are a blacksmith who jumps from topic to topic. We are not interested in what happened in 1942 and 1943. We're looking specifically at 1941.

The attacker uses his infantry formations, which are the majority in the army, to attack a pre-selected area of ​​defense. The defender can only cover this blow to a limited extent with the same infantry formations - he could assemble for “ sealing» breakthrough only those of them that were in close proximity to the affected area. The defender is forced to use valuable motorized mechanized formations to parry the attack, pulling them towards the section of the front that is being breached….where he runs into anti-tank defenses on the flanks of the enemy’s attack….
THAT. the entire number of Soviet tanks was devalued by their bulletproof armor...

Note The same thing applied to German tanks, whether on defense or on the offensive. However, this is not the answer to the question “ Why" This is nothing more than speculation on the topic. Combat is organized and coordinated actions. And not rides, in order to “ pulling together, bumping" Any anti-tank unit is not without its limits. And even more vulnerable than the tank itself. That’s why in the USSR the 45-mm anti-tank gun (PTP) was called “ goodbye Motherland"(there was also an option " death to the enemy..... calculation"), and in the Wehrmacht the 37-mm Pak 35/36 anti-tank gun was called " mallet».

Now let's look at the QUALITY side...

We had the best tank in the world, T-34-76 and KV... They would have prayed to roll it out " in an open field» - « crowd on crowd"all German tanks...

Hmm...I immediately remember a joke...

There is a tour of the zoo. He reaches a cage with a huge elephant. And then one person asks:
- What does he eat with you?
“Well,” the guide answers him, “cabbage, hay, carrots, vegetables, a total of 100 kilograms.”
- So what - will he eat all this? - the curious tourist is surprised.
“He’ll eat something,” the guide answers, “but who will give it to him?!”

Note And who, one might ask, is to blame for the fact that Soviet tanks (elephants) were not given 100 kilograms of something a day? And the anecdote given is somewhat inappropriate. Need an example? Please. In August 1941, a tank platoon of senior lieutenant Zinovy ​​Konstantinovich Klobanov disabled 22 enemy tanks in just one battle. If we take the example of Kolobanov in August 1941, then the question arises, who limited Kolobanov’s elephants? Nobody. That is, when no one interfered with the tank crews of the Red Army in battle (from the elephant breeders, in the form of senior management), the tank crews not only achieved results, but also accomplished real feats.

If there were idiots in the Wehrmacht who only dreamed of clashing in an oncoming tank battle with enemy tanks, then it’s clear that we would have given them a task... But the trouble is, the vile little thing, both at Prokhorovka, and at Lepel, and wherever it could - exposed her anti-tank missile system to the counterattack of Soviet tanks... against which the tank attacks were safely broken up... and if the T-34 or KV had a chance, then other tanks were burned at distant approaches...

Note The point is not that there were idiots in the Wehrmacht or not. But the point is that, I repeat, the battle is organized and coordinated actions. It is not a single tank that achieves success in battle, but only as a result of joint active actions. And if the Germans’ reconnaissance worked at the proper level and identified Soviet tanks: without infantry, without artillery and air support, then why blame the Germans? It turns out that it was not the Germans who were idiots, but the Soviet command. Which is not clear what he was thinking when he sent his tanks into battle.

BUT! It seems like we were talking about 1941. It’s not clear how to return the author to 1941? Prokhorovka is just flowers. But the berries appear further. There really is a joke there.

Here’s a small detail - the share of tanks with normal armor (i.e. medium and heavy) capable of resisting anti-tank artillery was:
- in the Red Army - about 5%;
- in the tank forces of the Wehrmacht on the eastern front - about 50%.

Note Here they are, the berries appeared. It turns out that in 1941 the Germans had medium and heavy tanks, in percentage terms as much as 50%. Whereas in the USSR there are only 5% of them. This is an anecdote, if only they could compare it with the tank fleet of Italy, there would be no problems. But with USSR tanks it’s funny. Did the Germans have something equal to the T-35? Or maybe there was something equal to the T-28? Why these tanks were lost will be answered below.
We can name the Soviet heavy tanks of 1941 without any problems. But, just let the respected author name “ heavy"German tanks on June 22, 1941?

Once again, pay attention to what words are used to describe German tanks - “ medium and heavy" And for the Soviet " faulty and outdated" This is a method of NLP (neuro-linguistic programming). The key to this method is the union " And" This was always done in the USSR when it was necessary to denigrate something. This method can be used to denigrate anything at all, for example: “ astronauts and sadomites" We didn’t say anything bad about the astronauts, but the negativity is already obvious. The result will come if you repeat this constantly. This was proven back in the 19th century by Gustave Lebonne.

But our medium tanks were better than the German ones! Isn't it true!?

Note In some ways yes, but in others no.

I’m disappointed, but the best tank of the Red Army was the T-34-76 in 1941. still inferior to his German " opponent».

Note Keyword in the sentence above, the word " after all" Therefore, we will answer the author in the same word (and method): the T-34-76 in 1941 was not inferior to any German tank. And therefore we will disappoint the respected author.

ARMOR - as an opportunity to resist enemy anti-tank weapons:
T-34-76 - 40 – 45 mm.
PZ-3-J - 50 mm.

Note Pz III Ausf. J is a tank manufactured in March 1941. This is the only thing the author grabbed onto. But there is one small thing. From March to December 1941, the Pz III Ausf J was produced with a 50 mm KwK 38 L/42 gun (50 mm tank gun, model 1938, with a barrel length of 42 calibers, or 2100 mm).
Since December 1941, Pz III Ausf J began to be produced with a 50-mm KwK 39 L/60 cannon (50-mm tank gun, model 1939, with a barrel length of 60 calibers, or 3000 mm).

Since March 1941, all T-34s have been equipped with a 76.2 mm F-34 cannon with a barrel length of 41.5 calibers, which is 3162 mm.

Two clarifications need to be made here:
- the strength of German armor was approximately 1.5 times higher than that of Soviet armor (in 1941, where did this come from?)
- the T-34 armor plates have a rational angle of inclination.

But the slope of the armor plates makes sense when the caliber of the projectile is equal to the thickness of the armor. Therefore, for example, the artilleryman of a 50-mm cannon was “ purple“At what angle are the armor plates of the tank bent... the main thing is to hit it.

Note It turns out that rational angles of inclination are bullshit? Why then did all the countries in the world subsequently switch to rational angles? But! On a German tank from June 1941, a 50 mm cannon with a short barrel. A very wonderful weapon. But this weapon could only cause harm to the T-34 manufactured in March 1941 from a distance of 300 meters, and to the side or rear. All. In all other cases, it could not. But that’s not even the main thing. Not every hit on a tank and penetration of the armor means the defeat of the tank.

And the T-34 could, with its 76-mm cannon, harm the Pz III Ausf J from at least 500 meters, even from 1000. Not just because the gun was more powerful, but in addition to the cannon, the Pz III Ausf J lacked rational armor angles. Which they hit at everything not with a 50 mm cannon, but with a 76 mm one.
In the same example with Klobanov, the KV-1 tank received more than 40 hits to the armor during the battle German shells. And not only was it not damaged, but it was also capable of further battles. Very surprisingly, Kolobanov’s tank did not fall into category IV after the battle on August 22. This was for the Soviet tank crews " purple whether a German shell will hit them or not. Because they knew very well that the Germans had short-barreled tank guns, which were not intended to fight armored targets.

By December 1941, the Wehrmacht command had just reconsidered its attitude towards its tanks. Because the Wehrmacht tankers were far from “ purple“A Soviet 76-mm armor-piercing shell will hit them or it won’t.

ENGINE:
T-34-76 -engine " V-2» « was dying» after 40-60 hours of operation. This is an indicator of production quality.
Pz-III Ausf. J - engine " Maybach"had a service life of 400 hours. This is also an indicator of production quality.

SPEED (Highway/Road):
T-34-76 – 54/25 km/h
Pz-III Ausf. J - 67/15 km/hour
But! On the gravel highway Kubinka Pz-III Ausf. H and J accelerated at a measured kilometer to a speed of 69.7 km/h, while the best figure for the T-34 was 48.2 km/h. The BT-7 on wheels, singled out as a standard, reached only 68.1 km/h!
AT THIS POINT: The German vehicle surpassed the T-34 in terms of smoothness, it also turned out to be less noisy - at maximum speed the Pz.III could be heard from 150–200 m away, and the T-34 from 450 m away. Even in this case, you can add the author that Soviet tankers, sadly enough, were very fond of the Pz-III Ausf. J and not only, but even version N. Why? Because the tank was of high quality. Nothing whistled, fell off, or turned on its own.

CREW CONVENIENCE:
Pz-III Ausf. J - had a three-man turret, in which there were quite comfortable conditions for the combat work of crew members. The commander had a comfortable turret, which provided him with excellent visibility, and all crew members had their own intercom devices.
The T-34 turret could hardly accommodate two tankers, one of whom served not only as a gunner, but also as a tank commander, and in some cases, as a unit commander. Only two of the four crew members – the tank commander and the driver – were provided with internal communications. All of the above is absolutely true. But this does not apply directly to the tank itself. This is the problem of Soviet tank generals. Who ordered the T-34, while the tank commander was not a gunner, but a loader. This generally applied to all Soviet tanks produced before 1943. And we emphasize that this is not a problem with the T-34, it’s a problem with the Soviet tank school.

"ARMOR PIERCING" tank in '41:
- T-37-76 – limited by the lack of armor-piercing shells. At the end of 1941 solved.
- Pz-III Ausf. J – limited by a relatively weak gun.” At the end of 1941 solved by introducing a new gun...

Note The absence of an armor-piercing shell is not an indication that a tank cannot fight against a tank. German Pz-III Ausf. J behind the eyes and ears, a 76 mm hit would be enough high-explosive fragmentation projectile. And just one. After the battle, the crew would have to be removed from a completely intact tank and replaced with another.

After reading, the answer to the question does not come. So what is the reason? Why did the USSR, having even 8,000 serviceable tanks, manage to dry out 3,050 tanks in the initial phase of the war, of which the vast majority were wedges?

After all, everything is calculated very simply. For every German tank there are 2 Soviet ones and another 1900 can be left in reserve. Just in case. You never know.
But they didn’t do that. And they didn’t.

As of October 28, 1941, there were 441 tanks on the Western Front, of which: 33 KV-1, 175 T-34, 43 BT, 50 T-26, 113 T-40 and 32 T-60. This is from 3852 of the original composition, on June 22, 1941.
On October 28, 1941, on the Western Front, there were 8.7 (almost 9) times fewer tanks than there were on June 22 of the same year!

But if you already need to answer the question, then there is no problem.

REASONS for the loss of tanks in the USSR from 6/22/1941 to 10/28/1941:

1. any Wehrmacht tank is not just an armored cart. Each tank had appropriate communications equipment. He didn't just have something. These means of communication have been tested, there was some experience in using them. And if a person did not understand or did not want to understand: how a means of communication works, what it is needed for, and what is achieved with the help of means of communication in battle, then this person would NEVER BE PUT TO THE POST OF A TANK COMMANDER;

2. The Wehrmacht command tank is not just the same tank as the others, just a little different. This is a control vehicle that could take part in battle on an equal basis with all the tanks in the platoon. But with all this, she not only controlled, but had a connection with each participating tank. And among other things, the commander of a Wehrmacht tank platoon had in his command tank: communications for interaction with infantry, communications for interaction with artillery, communications for interaction with aviation and a means of communication with senior authorities. And if the commander of a tank platoon could not CORRECT ARTILLERY FIRE, DIRECT OWN AVIATION, AND COULD NOT INTERACT WITH INFANTRY, then such a person would never be appointed to the position of commander of a tank platoon.

As of 2013, in the Russian army, the commander of a tank platoon not only does not have (but does not even dream of having) means of communication to interact with aviation, and does not have contact with his own artillery. He has very infrequent and very unstable communication with his tanks, as well as (not always) with the infantry;

3 . A Wehrmacht tank platoon is not three tanks, as was customary in the USSR and now in Russia. A Wehrmacht tank platoon consists of 7 tanks. Two in each compartment, plus the commander’s tank itself, the 7th tank. Therefore, a Wehrmacht tank company could be used to carry out operational tasks. And I was attracted. But why? It is still not clear in the USSR and in Russia. Because the organization is not just different. But completely different. Not even close to Soviet.

There were two tanks in each squad for a reason. The essence of the application is simple: the first one performs a maneuver (any), and the second one covers it at this time. There are generally a lot of options for action;

4 . The term for coordinating a Wehrmacht tank crew is two years (the figure is still wild for the USSR army and especially for Russia). People not only learned from the practical experience of their predecessors, but the crews literally got used to each of their people. In order to achieve understanding in battle without words at all, from one half glance. At the same time, special attention was paid to which crew was supporting and which was operating. And therefore they did not create a mixture of people.

The Wehrmacht tank commander was not a loader. He was only a gunner in the Pz I tank. On all other Wehrmacht tanks, the tank commander controlled the crew in battle.

And one last thing. The specific customers of tanks in Germany were not generals, but those who fought in tanks. That is, when the German Minister of Armaments sent his representatives to the troops so that they would give a clear and clear picture of what and how to modernize, then representatives of the Ministry of Armaments talked with driver mechanics, gunners and tank commanders. And not with the commanders of tank divisions. The tank division commander could only facilitate the delivery of a representative of the Ministry of Armaments to each unit and its protection.

That's why the Germans didn't have " flying tanks“, but this is precisely why the Wehrmacht managed to get to Moscow on Pz I Ausf A wedges.
And everything that was slapped in the USSR before 1941, into which a simply colossal resource was poured (factories sank space for almost 20 years, it turns out just like that), it was either stupidly abandoned (and accordingly went to the Germans) or lost - because was not intended for war at all. For travel during parades on Red Square, and nothing more.

Gareev’s methods still live today. Not only do they rewrite history. To this day, only a quantitative indicator is assessed in the Russian army. And everything is not of high quality. The training of those who will fight in general is not taken into account. So not so long ago, boss General Staff in Russia Gerasimov stated that: “ The troops are poorly prepared, but the headquarters are very well prepared».

But, " highly professional staff"they cannot prepare in any way (even before their " almost"level) of those who will bring victories or defeats to these headquarters in the war.

In 1941, the headquarters were also prepared to such an extent “ Fine"that this did not prevent the Red Army from retreating all the way to Moscow.

Alexander Shirokorad

Were combat-ready on paper

Why in 1941 Soviet tank forces were weaker than German ones

The Wehrmacht tank forces did not have vehicles equal to the Soviet T-34 and KV, but they had well-trained crews.
Photo from the book “1941”

In the article by Mikhail Shutenko “", published in No. 19 "NVO" for 2007, the overwhelming superiority of Soviet tanks over German ones, both new (KV and T-34) and old (BT and T-28), is shown in detail. However, the reasons for the “tank pogrom” in the summer of 1941, apparently due to lack of newspaper space, are not considered by the author. That is why his publication clearly needs updating. Moreover, the Red Army was unable to get rid of a number of shortcomings, which will be discussed below, even two years later, by the beginning of the Battle of Kursk (its 64th anniversary is being celebrated these days).

CHARACTERISTIC “SECRETS”

Yes, the overwhelming majority of the figures given by Mikhail Shutenko are correct. But in general, there was no “order” in the Soviet tank forces on the eve of the Great Patriotic War.

Indeed, by June 22, 1941, the industry of the USSR produced significantly more tanks than were produced on all inhabited continents of our planet over the previous quarter century. Undoubtedly, at that time the T-34 was in service with the Red Army, and the armies of the strongest militarily states did not have an equal medium tank. And the Soviet KV was generally the only mass-produced heavy tank in the world. Finally, our designers equipped heavy and medium tanks with one V-2 diesel engine, which in itself was a great achievement.

However, even the most best tanks without well-trained crews they will not gain the upper hand in battle. It is not technology that wins, but people. And therefore, it is no coincidence that data on the literacy of the personnel of the Red Army and specifically tank units is still classified in our country. However, it is already clear that the comparison between the Wehrmacht and the Red Army on this indicator will not be in favor of the latter. A little-known fact today: in Soviet military schools in the 1920s or 1930s, training was often accelerated and simplified, often one cadet took a test or exam per group...

But the Germans had guys in their tanks, most of whom had graduated high school and received excellent military and psychological training in the Hitler Youth. But the main thing is that they went through an excellent, almost two-year, combat training on the battlefields throughout Europe.

Now all the streets of Moscow are plastered with advertising posters: “At 100 Horse power I need at least one head.” But our tankers did not have this “head”. I mean the commander of an armored vehicle - a person engaged solely in monitoring the situation on the battlefield and directing the actions of the crew. This is what happened to the Germans. In our case, the commander also performed the duties of a gun loader or gunner.

German tanks had much better observation devices, and most importantly, sights. According to a secret Soviet report, the largest number of tanks in the Red Army units were hit by German 76-mm cannons from a distance of 600 m, and by 88-mm cannons from 800 m. Wehrmacht tanks at Kursk Bulge They shot our armored vehicles with impunity at distances where the fire of Soviet tank guns was ineffective. And at the end of 1943, German tanks began to be equipped with rangefinders, active and passive night vision devices.

Here, by the way, I note that Mikhail Shutenko is mistaken when he claims that by June 1941 the T-34 and KV-1 had a 76-mm F-34 cannon. It was put into service only in July 1941 and was installed only on the “thirty-four”. A modification of the F-34 gun, the ZIS-5, was specially created for the KV, mass production of which began in October 1941. By June 22, 1941, all KV-1 and T-34 were armed with 76-mm L-11 and F-32 cannons, which differed from the F-34 in a shorter barrel length (30 versus 40 calibers) and, accordingly, worse ballistics and armor penetration.

It is appropriate to say something about this indicator here. I happened to read a document from 1935, which ordered, in order to raise the morale of the Red Army soldiers... to add increased armor penetration to the secret firing tables of 45-mm anti-tank and tank guns! It was also shamelessly overestimated in the firing tables for 76 mm, and in 1944-1950, for 85 mm anti-tank guns.

DISAPPOINTING INDICATORS

Another eloquent example. In October 1939, during an offensive against Polish troops in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, Soviet units managed to capture two German tanks - T-II and T-III. There, in the former eastern provinces of Poland, the T-III was shot twice from a 45-mm cannon from a distance of 400 m. Both standard BR-240 armor-piercing shells left only dents in the 32 mm frontal armor. Later, the experiment was repeated at the Kubinka training ground. From the same distance, at an angle of impact from the normal of 30±, only two out of five shells penetrated the armor. The conclusion of the commission of Soviet specialists: German cemented armor with a thickness of 32 mm is equal to the strength of domestic 44 mm homogeneous armor.

But that's not all. It turned out that on the measured kilometer of the gravel highway on the Kubinka-Repishche-Krutitsy stretch, the German tank showed maximum speed at 69.7 km/h, and the best value for the T-34 was 48.2 km/h, for the BT-7 - 68.1 km/h. At the same time, the testers gave preference to the German tank due to better ride quality, visibility, and comfortable crew positions.

I will add to this that the B-2 diesel engines had poor air cleaners, as a result of which they did not develop full power, rapid wear of the cylinders occurred, etc. In addition, the B-2 was equipped with unreliable starters, had an unsatisfactory transmission, etc.

A small but extremely important detail, not noticed by our historians: thanks to special hatches in the engine compartments, the engines of German T-III tanks and T-IV were quickly replaced in field conditions. In the summer of 1941, German vehicles often did not have time to deliver spare “engines” to advanced tank units and they were transferred on Yu-52 aircraft. The Germans had armored repair and recovery vehicles, but the Red Army did not. Little things, little things, little things...

CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES

Mikhail Shutenko writes: “French captured tanks did not fit into the German structure for controlling the battle of tank divisions, so not a single French tank was in service with tank divisions.”

On this occasion, it is worth mentioning the half-century dispute between German and Soviet historians about the German tanks that stormed Sevastopol. Ours talk about entire tank armadas of 200, 300 and 400 armored vehicles scouring the Crimea. The Germans claim that there, in addition to the Kerch Peninsula, there were only two divisions of self-propelled guns on the T-III chassis. That's all.

The casket opens simply: German commanders in the vast majority of cases did not show in their reports the participation of captured tanks in battles. In the attacks on Sevastopol, exclusively thick-armored captured vehicles were used: French B-2s and Soviet KV-1s. French tanks also showed up near Moscow in the winter of 1941-1942, and in many other sectors of the Eastern Front. These vehicles, including light ones, had strong armor and a good chassis, but their weapons were rather weak. Therefore, the Germans are over 2 thousand. French tanks converted into self-propelled guns.

Whether it was necessary to create mechanized corps before the war is a moot point. However, they were put together ugly. Here, for example, is the presence of tanks in the 2nd Tank Division of the 2nd Mechanized Corps: KV-1 - 32, KV-2 - 19, T-28 - 27, BT-7 - 116, T-26 - 19, chemical tanks - 12. Total 252 cars. But the composition of the 32nd Tank Division of the 2nd Mechanized Corps: KV - 49, T-34 - 173, BT-7 - 31, T-26 - 70, T-27 - 38.

The diversity is impressive - as if we were talking about the material base of a training unit or a tank museum. By the way, the capabilities of the entire division are determined by the worst tank, that is, cross-country ability on bridges - KV-2, speed on highways - T-26, etc.

And now I will give data on the 202nd motorized division of the 12th mechanized corps: a total of 105 tanks of seven (!) types, 66 tanks were able to be alerted, the rest are faulty. Combat losses in two weeks of fighting - 27 tanks, 31 tanks were left on the battlefield for technical reasons, 8 tanks were available.

By the way, KV-2 tanks, armed with 152-mm howitzers, were created not for field troops, but for storming concrete structures such as the Mannerheim Line. Naturally, almost all of them died uselessly in the first weeks of the war. And the Soviet generals, without further ado, decided: heavy tanks with powerful howitzers and mortars were not needed. It turned out to be an absurd situation - for the first time in the world, the USSR created a relatively good assault tank, the KV-2, but its production was stopped. But the Germans and British, on the basis of their heavy Tiger-I and Churchill tanks, created the Sturmtiger assault tanks with a 380-mm installation and AVRE with a 305-mm mortar. Both machines performed excellently during specific tasks.

If the Soviet command in June 1941 had guessed to withdraw all KV-2s to the rear, as was done with the 203-mm B-4 howitzers and heavier artillery systems, then in 1944-1945 these tanks could have played a big role in the battles for Berlin and other German cities and save many thousands of Soviet soldiers from death.

ALSO IMPORTANT REASONS

A few words about tank tactics. A tank cannot fight alone, without the support of infantry, artillery and aviation. General Guderian noted back in 1936: “The task of the infantry is to immediately use the effect of a tank attack to quickly advance and build on success until the terrain is completely captured and cleared of the enemy.”

“The armor is strong, and our tanks are fast!” What's the point if our artillery tractors (mostly ordinary agricultural tractors) pull the “god of war” at a speed of 3-5 km/h. German half-track tractors carry the heaviest artillery systems at speeds of up to 35 km/h.

By June 1941, the Germans were in service with many hundreds of armored personnel carriers - wheeled, half-tracked and tracked ones of German, English and French production. And in the Red Army throughout the war there were no armored personnel carriers, with the exception of those supplied under Lend-Lease, and the infantry could accompany the tanks only on ZIS-5 trucks with very low maneuverability.

What happened to Soviet aviation in the summer of 1941 is well known. But few people know that our tank armadas had nothing to protect them from air strikes. The first anti-aircraft guns - 37-mm 61K - began to enter the troops only at the end of 1940. There were very few of them in the units, and even those were placed on bulky four-wheeled carts, thereby depriving them of mobility and the ability to participate in battles as field artillery.

On the contrary, German 20-mm and 37-mm anti-aircraft guns were mounted on an easily detachable two-wheel drive. They moved quickly as crews on the battlefield and had (when separated from each other) a lower silhouette than anti-tank guns. In our country, a similar system (ZU-23) was put into service only in 1960.

By June 22, 1941, the Germans had many dozens of 20-mm and 37-mm anti-aircraft guns mounted on half-track tractor chassis and were capable of accompanying tank units. The first ZSUs based on Alket tanks began to be delivered back in January 1941, and in 1942-1943 the Wehrmacht was supplied with hundreds of anti-aircraft guns on the chassis of tanks 38(t), T-III and T-IV. At the Red Army similar installations did not exist throughout the war.

And one last thing. Our writers, film directors and, what is much worse, generals still believe that in the Great Patriotic War, the majority of Soviet and German tanks became victims of tank guns. In fact, the overwhelming number of damaged armored vehicles comes from towed artillery fire. In the summer of 1941, the Germans used with great success not only their standard 37-mm anti-tank guns (by the way, equivalent to our “forty-fives”, created on the basis of the 37-mm Rheinmetall), but also more powerful 47-mm captured ones. We are talking about 823 French guns (model 1937), 400 Czech, 50 Austrian (model 1935), etc.

During the war, the percentage of tanks hit by self-propelled guns gradually increased. But the Germans used self-propelled guns on tank chassis even during the battles in France in 1940...

Panzerwaffe (Panzerwaffe) is the tank forces of the Wehrmacht, which appeared under this name in 1936 and ceased to exist in 1945. Tanks became one of the main forces of the German army and the basis of blitzkrieg tactics, they received attention from Adolf Hitler himself.

In 1931, Oswald Lutz, serving as inspector of automobile troops under the command of Heinz Guderian, proposed the use of large tank formations. According to the Treaty of Versailles, Germany had the right to create armored vehicles weighing up to 5 tons, which significantly complicated the production of tanks, and during exercises German soldiers were forced to use wooden mock-ups of tanks.

However, Germany, together with the USSR, created a tank school in the Kazan region, where 30 officers were trained. At the same time, light tanks were being produced under the guise of tractors for civilian use.

In 1933, the Panzer I appeared, becoming the first German tank of the Wehrmacht. It was created to train future tank crews, but became the basis of the German tank fleet.

In 1935, Erich von Manstein proposed the creation of assault artillery capable of supporting attacking infantry with fire. The idea formed the basis of the StuG III self-propelled gun, produced in quantities of more than 8,600 units.

German tanks of the Wehrmacht of World War II

Light: Pz.Kpfw I, Pz.Kpfw II, Pz.Kpfw II "Luchs".

Medium: Pz.Kpfw III, Pz.Kpfw IV, "Panther".

Heavy: Pz.Kpfw. VI "Tiger I", Pz.Kpfw. VI Ausf. B "Tiger II", Pz.Kpfw. VIII "Maus".

Trophy

In addition to vehicles of its own production, Germany used captured ones, applying its own camouflage to them and modernizing them according to the requirements of the German army.

French tanks in the Wehrmacht are the most popular foreign vehicles, if you close your eyes to the Czechoslovak ones. They were not very different modern design and weak firepower, but had sufficient armor and good reliability. Due to weak weapons, they were used mainly in the rear for security, training, and so on.

Also, French equipment was converted into self-propelled guns, installing wheelhouses and German guns on the chassis.

Captured Soviet tanks of the Wehrmacht, to the surprise of many inexperienced readers, were not very popular. During the summer-autumn of 1941, according to German data, 14,079 USSR tanks were captured and destroyed. Of these, 1300 - 1700 BT, KV, T-26, T-28 and T-34 were in park storage and were in excellent condition.

By October of the same year, about 40 armored vehicles had been put into operation, a completely ridiculous figure. On paper, domestic tanks in 1941 were superior to all German tanks, with the exception of Pz.Kpfw IV, in armament; in practice, Soviet 45 mm guns did not correspond to the tabulated data and did not pose a danger to Panzerwaffe tanks at distances of 400 meters.

The Germans were dismissive of the T-26 and BT, since it was cramped and uncomfortable inside, and the armor was not enough to adequately protect the crew.

The Germans did not follow the path of creating self-propelled guns based on Soviet tanks. The T-26, BT and T-28 engines required scarce high-quality gasoline. At the same time, German engines quietly ran on synthetic.

The T-34 and KV, equipped with diesel engines, were also not suitable for the Germans, who tried to replace diesel fuel with a mixture of crude oil with kerosene and oil.

As a result, during the Great Patriotic War, the Wehrmacht used less than 300 Soviet tanks and converted 10 T-26s into self-propelled guns.

Coloring

Beginning in 1939, German tanks were painted in a dark blue-gray, the so-called ball color. It completely covered all the outer parts and inner sides of the hatches opening outwards. Light cream paint was used on the inside.

The disdain for camouflage is explained by the dominance of German troops at that time and their use in blitzkrieg tactics, which involved rapid attacks.

Camouflage

Having attacked the USSR, German troops already realized during the first winter that the lack of camouflage was fatal. Solutions of lime and chalk were used as improvised camouflage.

On February 18, 1943, a new standard for painting armored vehicles appeared in German factories. It was painted dark yellow, after which it was equipped with two sets of paints, supplied in cans. These were olive green and red-brown colors, which were applied to the tank by the crew depending on the location of use.

Later, precise paint application schemes appeared, including camouflage small-spotted and deforming large-spotted camouflages. The first was applied to light and medium armored vehicles, the second to heavy Tiger and Panther tanks.

In 1944, a three-color deforming ambush camouflage appeared, combining the advantages of the two previous colors.

At the end of 1944, a paint shortage began, which led to incorrect application of camouflages in order to save money. Soon the supply of paint finally stopped to all units except the elite SS.

It is worth mentioning Zimmerit, which was used to coat German armored vehicles starting in 1943. This light gray material protected against magnetic mines and was hidden under the paint, making it slightly darker.

On the Eastern Front

At the time of the attack on Soviet Union 4,711 tanks and assault guns were concentrated on the eastern front; for comparison, the USSR had 15,857 units.

Between 1943 and 1944, the Wehrmacht increased the number of tanks, reaching 9,149 vehicles at the beginning of 1944. However, impressive losses and a constant lack of fuel reduced the quality of the Panzerwaffe.

Losses

Between 1941 and 1942, Germany lost up to 80% of its armored vehicles. According to Soviet data, by the end of the war Germany had lost more than 32,000 armored vehicles. A significant part was destroyed by artillery fire and tanks, only a small part by aircraft.