All about the 6th Airborne Company. "Step into Immortality"

The battle at Height 776 is an episode of the second Chechen war, during which large detachment Chechen militants(Khattab) On March 1, 2000, we managed to break out of encirclement through the positions of the 6th company of the 104th parachute regiment of the 76th (Pskov) Airborne Division (Lieutenant Colonel Mark Evtyukhin) near Argun in Chechnya, at the Ulus-Kert-Selmentauzen line, on altitude 776.

After the fall of Grozny (January 30), a large group of Chechen militants retreated to the Shatoi region of Chechnya, where they were blocked by federal troops on February 9. Airstrikes were carried out on the positions of the militants using one and a half ton volumetric detonating bombs. Then, on February 22-29, a ground battle for Shata followed. The militants managed to break out of the encirclement. Ruslan Gelayev's group broke through in the north-western direction to the village of Komsomolskoye (Urus-Martan district), and Khattab's group - in the north-eastern direction through Ulus-Kert (Shatoi district), where the battle took place.

By decree of the President of the Russian Federation, 22 paratroopers were nominated for the title of Hero of Russia (21 of them posthumously), 69 soldiers and officers of the 6th company were awarded the Order of Courage (63 of them posthumously).

On the afternoon of February 29, 2000 federal command hastened to interpret the capture of Shatoy as a signal that the “Chechen resistance” had been finally broken. President Putin was reported “on the completion of the tasks of the third stage” of the operation in the North Caucasus, and... O. OGV commander Gennady Troshev noted that operations to destroy the “escaping bandits” would be carried out for another two to three weeks, but the full-scale military operation had been completed.

Reserve Colonel Vladimir Vorobyov, a former paratrooper who served in Afghanistan (at one time he commanded the 104th “Cherekhin” regiment), will help us in the investigation. The father of senior lieutenant Alexei Vorobyov, who died near Ulus-Kert. Two years after the tragedy, he compiled a complete picture of what happened, which is somewhat at odds with the official version.

Gangs of Chechen field commanders found themselves in a strategic pocket. This happened after a tactical landing, which, as if with a sharp knife, cut the Itum-Kale-Shatili mountain road, built by the slaves of “free Ichkeria”. Operational group "Center" began to methodically shoot down the enemy, forcing him to retreat down the Argun Gorge: from the Russian-Georgian border to the north.

Intelligence reported: Khattab moved to the northeast, to the Vedeno region, where he created an extensive network of mountain bases, warehouses and shelters. He intended to capture Vedeno, the villages of Mekhkety, Elistanzhi and Kirov-Yurt and provide himself with a springboard for a breakthrough into Dagestan. In the neighboring republic, the “Mujahideen” planned to take a large number of civilians hostage and thereby force federal authorities go to negotiations.

Reconstructing the chronicle of those days, you need to clearly understand: talk about “reliably blocked gangs” is a bluff, an attempt to pass off wishful thinking. The strategically important Argun Gorge has a length of more than 30 kilometers. Units not trained in mountain warfare were unable to establish control over a ramified and completely unfamiliar mountain system. Even on old map You can count more than two dozen trails in this area. And how many are there that are not marked on any maps at all? To block each such path, you need to use a company. This turns out to be an impressive figure. With the forces that were at hand, the federal command could not only destroy, but reliably block the gangs going for a breakthrough only on paper.

In what later turned out to be the most dangerous direction, the OGV command deployed soldiers of the 104th Guards Parachute Regiment of the 76th Pskov Airborne Division. Meanwhile, Khattab chose a simple but effective tactic: after reconnaissance of the battles, he intended to find the most weak spots, and then, leaning on the whole mass, escape from the gorge.

On February 28, the “Mujahideen” went ahead. The first to take the blow were the paratroopers of the 3rd company, led by Senior Lieutenant Vasilyev. They occupied commanding heights five kilometers east of Ulus-Kert. Khattab's troops unsuccessfully tried to break through a well-organized fire system and retreated, suffering significant losses.

Units of the 2nd battalion kept control of the dominant heights above the Sharoargun Gorge. There remained a passage between the beds of the Sharoargun and Abazulgol rivers. To exclude the possibility of militants “infiltrating” here, the commander of the 104th regiment ordered the commander of the 6th company, Major Sergei Molodov, to occupy another commanding height 4-5 kilometers from Ulus-Kert. And since the company commander was literally transferred to the unit the day before and did not have time to thoroughly understand the operational situation and get to know the personnel, the commander of the 2nd battalion, Mark Evtyukhin, protected him.

The paratroopers set out while it was still dark. In a few hours they had to make a fifteen-kilometer forced march to a given square, where they would set up a new base camp. They walked with full combat gear. They were armed only with weapon and grenade launchers. The attachment for the radio station, which provides covert radio communication, was left at the base. They carried water, food, tents and stoves, without which it was simply impossible to survive in the mountains in winter. According to Vladimir Vorobyov’s calculations, the unit stretched for 5-6 kilometers, and they walked no more than a kilometer per hour. We also note that the paratroopers went to the heights immediately after a difficult throw along the Dombay-Arzy route, i.e., without proper rest.

Helicopter landing was ruled out because the aerial reconnaissance I did not find a single suitable site in the mountain forest. The paratroopers went to their limits physical strength– this is a fact that no one can dispute. From the analysis of the situation, the following conclusion suggests itself: the command was late with the decision to transfer the 6th company to Isty-Kord, and then, realizing it, set obviously impossible deadlines.

Even before sunrise, the 6th company of the 104th Guards Parachute Regiment, reinforced by a platoon and two reconnaissance groups, was at the target - the interfluve of the tributaries of the Argun south of Ulus-Kert. The actions of the paratroopers were led by the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Mark Evtukhin.

As it later became known, 90 paratroopers, on an isthmus 200 meters away, blocked the path of Khattab’s two thousand strong group. As far as one can judge, the bandits were the first to discover the enemy. This is evidenced by radio interceptions.

At this moment, the “Mujahideen” were moving in two detachments along the Sharoargun and Abazulgol rivers. They decided to bypass height 776.0, where our paratroopers were catching their breath after a difficult forced march.

Moving ahead of both gangs were two reconnaissance groups of 30 people each, followed by two combat security detachments of 50 militants each. One of the head patrols was discovered by Senior Lieutenant Alexei Vorobyov and his scouts, which saved the 6th company from a surprise attack.

It was noon. Scouts discovered militants at the foot of height 776.0. The opponents were separated by tens of meters. In a matter of seconds, with the help of grenades, the vanguard of the bandits was destroyed. But after him dozens of “Mujahideen” poured in.

The scouts with the wounded on their shoulders retreated to the main forces, and the company had to take on an oncoming battle on the move. While the scouts could hold back the onslaught of the bandits, the battalion commander decided to gain a foothold on this forested height of 776.0 and not give the bandits the opportunity to escape and block the gorge.

Before the start of the assault, Khattab's field commanders Idris and Abu Walid radioed to the battalion commander and suggested that Yevtukhin let the “Mujahideen” through:

“There are ten times more of us here.” Think about it, commander, is it worth risking people? Night, fog - no one will notice...

It’s not hard to imagine what the battalion commander responded. After these “negotiations,” the bandits unleashed a barrage of fire from mortars and grenade launchers on the paratroopers’ positions. By midnight the battle reached its highest intensity. The guards did not flinch, although the enemy outnumbered them by more than 20 times. The bandits advanced to positions to throw a grenade. In some areas, the paratroopers came into hand-to-hand combat. One of the first in the 6th company to die was its commander Sergei Molodov - a sniper’s bullet hit him in the neck.

The command could only support the company with artillery fire. The fire of the regimental gunners was adjusted by the commander self-propelled battery Captain Viktor Romanov. According to General Troshev, from noon on February 29 until the early morning of March 1, regimental gunners poured 1,200 shells into the Isty-Kord area. They did not use aviation for fear of hitting their own people. The bandits covered their flanks water streams, which were on the right and left, which did not make it possible to freely maneuver and provide effective assistance. The enemy set up ambushes and took up defensive positions on the shore, not allowing them to approach the tributaries of the Argun. Several crossing attempts ended in failure. The 1st company of paratroopers, sent to the rescue of their dying comrades, was able to break through to height 776.0 only on the morning of March 2.

From three to five in the morning on March 1, there was a “respite” - there were no attacks, but the mortars and snipers did not stop shelling. Battalion commander Mark Evtyukhin reported the situation to the regiment commander, Colonel Sergei Melentyev. He ordered to hold on and wait for help. After several hours of battle, it became obvious that the 6th Company simply did not have enough ammunition to hold off the continuous attacks of the militants. The battalion commander radioed for help from his deputy, Major Alexander Dostovalov, who was located one and a half kilometers from the dying company. There were fifteen fighters with him.

We like to say different things on any occasion. beautiful phrases, without really thinking about their meaning. I also liked the expression “heavy fire”. So here it is. Despite the heavy, unquote, enemy fire, Alexander Dostovalov and a platoon of paratroopers somehow miraculously managed to get through to their comrades, who were holding back the frantic onslaught of Khattab’s bandits for the second hour. For the 6th Company this was a powerful emotional charge. The guys believed that they were not abandoned, that they were remembered, that they would be helped.

...The platoon was enough for two hours of battle. At 5 o'clock Khattab launched two battalions of suicide bombers - "white angels" - into the attack. They completely surrounded the height, cutting off part of the last platoon, which never managed to rise to the height: it was shot almost in the back. The company itself was already collecting ammunition from the dead and wounded.

The forces were unequal. One after another, soldiers and officers died. Alexei Vorobyov had his legs broken by mine fragments, one bullet hit his stomach, and another pierced his chest. But the officer did not leave the battle. It was he who destroyed Idris, Khattab’s friend, the “chief of intelligence.”

On the night of March 1, at an altitude of 705.6, there was hand-to-hand combat, which has become focal. The snow at the height was mixed with blood. The paratroopers repelled the last attack with several machine guns. Battalion commander Mark Evtukhin realized that the life of the company was gone for minutes. A little more, and the bandits will break out of the gorge over the corpses of the paratroopers. And then he turned to captain Viktor Romanov. He, bleeding, with the stumps of his legs tied with tourniquets, lay nearby - on the company command post.

- Come on, let's call fire on ourselves!

Already losing consciousness, Romanov transferred the coordinates to the battery. At 6:10 a.m. the connection with Lieutenant Colonel Evtukhin was lost. The battalion commander fired back to the last bullet and was hit by a sniper's bullet in the head.

On the morning of March 2, the 1st company reached Isty-Kord. When the paratroopers pushed the militants back from height 705.6, a terrible picture opened before them: perennial beech trees, “trimmed” by shells and mines, and corpses everywhere, the corpses of “Mujahideen.” Four hundred people. In the company stronghold there are the bodies of 13 Russian officers and 73 sergeants and privates.

Following the “bloody trail,” Udugov posted eight photographs of the killed paratroopers on the Kavkaz-Center website. The photographs do not show that many of the bodies were hacked into pieces. “Fighters for the Faith” dealt with any paratroopers who still had life in them. This was told by those who miraculously managed to survive.

Senior Sergeant Alexander Suponinsky, on the orders of the commander, jumped into a deep ravine. Private Andrei Porshnev jumped next. About 50 militants fired at them from machine guns for half an hour. After waiting, the wounded paratroopers first crawled, and then full height began to leave. The guys miraculously survived.

“There were five of us left,” Andrei Porshnev later recalled, “battalion commander Evtyukhin, deputy battalion commander Dostavalov and senior lieutenant Kozhemyakin.” Officers. Well, Sasha and I. Evtyukhin and Dostavalov died, and Kozhemyakin’s both legs were broken, and he threw cartridges at us with his hands. The militants came close to us, there were about three meters left, and Kozhemyakin ordered us: leave, jump down... For that battle, Alexander Suponinsky received the star of the Hero of Russia.

A list of dead paratroopers was placed on the desk of Colonel-General Gennady Shpak, commander of the Airborne Forces. All the circumstances of this fierce battle were reported in the smallest detail. Shpak made a report to the Minister of Defense, Marshal Igor Sergeev, but in response received instructions: information about the events near Ulus-Kert should be prohibited from being disclosed until a separate order is given.

It just so happened that on February 29, Marshal Sergeev reported to Vladimir Putin about the successful completion of the tasks of the “third stage.” Only a few hours passed and a powerful group of militants struck the positions federal troops. What happened near Ulus-Kert in no way correlated with the victorious reports about the imminent and final defeat of the militants. And Comrade Marshal probably felt embarrassed for his last report. In order to somehow smooth out the embarrassment, the military was ordered to keep quiet. Only Gennady Troshev, on March 5, dared to tell part of the truth: “The 6th parachute company, which was at the forefront of the bandits’ attack, lost 31 people killed and some were wounded.”

During those same days, the country was experiencing another tragedy, which was reported by all the country’s television channels: 20 riot policemen from Sergiev Posad were killed in Chechnya. The military command was afraid to announce the riot police and paratroopers at the same time. The losses were too great...

Ulus-Kert has become one of the symbols of the newest Russian history. For how many years they tried to eradicate the Russian military spirit from us, it didn’t work. For many years the army was portrayed as a bunch of drunks, degenerates and sadists - and the paratrooper boys, living and dead, silenced the critics. This was a real feat that cannot be cast a shadow on. Although such attempts have taken place. Just like after the Alpha and Vympel fighters freed the hostages at Dubrovka - an operation in which FSB special forces could have died under the ruins of the Theater complex. From Ulus-Kert there is a road to Dubrovka. In both cases, mercenaries and terrorists got in the way Russian soldiers and officers, bearers of our age-old traditions.

Pavel Evdokimov. Russian special forces, 2002.

12 years ago, 90 paratroopers of the 6th company of the 2nd battalion of the 104th parachute regiment of the 76th (Pskov) Airborne Division in the mountains entered into battle with militants numbering about 2,000 people. The paratroopers held back the onslaught of the militants for more than a day, who then offered money over the radio to let them through, to which the paratroopers responded with fire.

The paratroopers fought to the death. Despite their wounds, many threw grenades into the midst of their enemies. Blood flowed in a stream along the road leading down. For each of the 90 paratroopers there were 20 militants.

Help could not arrive to the paratroopers, since all approaches to them were blocked by militants.

When the ammunition began to run out, the paratroopers rushed into hand-to-hand combat. The dying company commander ordered the survivors to leave the heights, and he himself called artillery fire on himself. Of the 90 paratroopers, 6 soldiers survived. The losses of the militants are more than 400 people.



Prerequisites

After the fall of Grozny in early February 2000, a large group of Chechen militants retreated to the Shatoi region of Chechnya, where on February 9 they were blocked by federal troops. Airstrikes were carried out on militant positions using one and a half ton volumetric detonating bombs. This was followed by a ground battle for Shata from 22-29 February. The militants managed to break out of the encirclement: Ruslan Gelayev’s group broke through in the north-western direction to the village of Komsomolskoye (Urus-Martan district), and Khattab’s group - in the north-eastern direction through Ulus-Kert (Shatoi district), where the battle took place.

Parties

Federal forces were represented by:

    6th company of the 2nd battalion of the 104th parachute regiment of the 76th (Pskov) Airborne Division (guard Lieutenant Colonel M. N. Evtyukhin)

    a group of 15 soldiers of the 4th company (Guard Major A.V. Dostavalov)

    1st company of the 1st battalion of the 104th parachute regiment (guard major S.I. Baran)

Artillery units also provided fire support to the paratroopers:

    artillery division of the 104th parachute regiment

Among the leaders of the militants were Idris, Abu Walid, Shamil Basayev and Khattab; the units of the last two field commanders in the media were called “White Angels” battalions (600 fighters each). According to the Russian side, up to 2,500 militants took part in the battle; according to the militants, their detachment consisted of 70 fighters.

Progress of the battle

February 28 - the commander of the 104th regiment, Colonel S. Yu. Melentyev, ordered the commander of the 6th company, Major S. G. Molodov, to occupy the dominant heights of Isty-Kord. The company moved out on February 28 and occupied height 776, and 12 scouts were sent to Mount Isty-Kord, located 4.5 kilometers away.


Battle scheme

On February 29 at 12:30, the reconnaissance patrol entered into battle with a group of about 20 militants and was forced to retreat to Hill 776, where the guard company commander, Major Molodov, entered the battle. He was wounded and died later that day, and Guard Lieutenant Colonel Mark Evtyukhin took command of the company.

At 16:00, just four hours after the capture of Shatoy by federal forces, the battle began. The battle was fought by only two platoons, since the third platoon, which stretched for 3 kilometers during the ascent, was fired upon and destroyed by militants on the slope.
By the end of the day, the 6th company lost 31 people killed (33% of the total number of personnel).

On March 1, at 3 o’clock in the morning, a group of soldiers led by Major A.V. Dostavalov (15 people) was able to break through to the encirclement, who, having violated the order, left the defensive lines of the 4th company at a nearby height and came to the rescue.

The soldiers of the 1st company of the 1st battalion sought to rescue their comrades. However, while crossing the Abazulgol River, they were ambushed and were forced to gain a foothold on the bank. Only on the morning of March 3 did the 1st company manage to break through to the positions of the 6th company.

Consequences

At 05:00 the height was occupied by CRI militants.

Captain V.V. Romanov, after the death of M.N. Evtyukhin, who commanded the company, called fire on himself. The height was covered with artillery fire, but the militants managed to break out of the Argun Gorge.

The commander of the guard reconnaissance platoon, Senior Lieutenant A.V. Vorobyov, destroyed the field commander Idris (according to other sources, Idris died only in December 2000)

Survivors

After the death of A.V. Dostavalov, the last officer left alive was Lieutenant D.S. Kozhemyakin. He ordered A.A. Suponinsky to crawl to the cliff and jump, and he himself picked up a machine gun to cover the private. Following the officer’s order, Alexander Suponinsky and Andrei Porshnev crawled to the cliff and jumped, and by the middle of the next day they reached the location of the Russian troops. Alexander Suponinsky, the only one of the six survivors, was awarded the Gold Star of the Hero of Russia.

At the beginning of March 2000, in one of the clashes during the second Chechen campaign Most of the personnel of the 6th company of the 2nd battalion of the 104th Guards Parachute Regiment of the 76th Guards Airborne Division (Pskov) were killed.

How did the 6th company of Pskov paratroopers die?

Magazine: (6), summer 2018
Category: Chechnya
Text: Russian Seven

The death of the paratroopers, who entered into battle with a detachment of Chechen militants significantly superior in number, even after 16 years, raises a lot of questions. The main ones are: how could something like this happen and, just as important, why did it go unpunished for the command? Three main versions of what happened at height 776 (area of ​​the Chechen city of Argun, at the Ulus-Kert - Selmentauzen border): a fatal coincidence of circumstances that did not allow the paratroopers to come to the aid, the criminal inability of the command to organize a combat operation and, finally, the bribery of representatives of federal troops with a chain by militants obtaining the necessary information about the time and route of the 6th company's advance.

Initially unequal forces

At the end of February 2000, federal troops defeated Chechen militants in the battle for the village of Shatoy, but two large bandit groups led by Ruslan Gelayev and Khattab emerged from encirclement and united. A company of Pskov paratroopers had to fight this formation, which broke through into the Ulus-Kert area. According to the Russian side, the bandit detachment numbered up to 2,500 militants. In addition to Khattab, they were led by such famous field commanders as Shamil Basayev, Idris and Abuap-Vapid.
The day before the end of the fighting in Shatoi (February 28), the commander of the 104th regiment, Colonel S. Melentyev, the commander of the 6th company of paratroopers, Major S. G. Molodov, was ordered to occupy the dominant heights of Isty-Kord. After securing at height 776, which was 4.5 kilometers from Mount Isty-Kord, 12 scouts set off towards the final point of the route.
On February 29, the reconnaissance patrol entered into battle with a bandit group of about 20 militants and retreated to height 776. From this clash began a battle that cost the lives of more than 80 servicemen of two companies (in addition to the 6th company, 15 soldiers of the 4th company also fought at the height) . The battle at height 776 began just 4 hours after the federals captured Shatoy.
It was obvious that the forces were unequal: at first only two platoons of the 6th company fought with the advancing militants, the third, stretched out while climbing to a height of 3 kilometers, was fired upon and destroyed on its slope. At the end of February 29, the company lost more than a third of its personnel killed.
One of the six surviving soldiers of the 6th company, Andrei Porshnev, recalled that the militants came at the paratroopers like a wall: as soon as they put down one “wave” of the attackers, half an hour later another was coming, shouting “Allahu Akbar”... Artillery worked against the bandits, but for the Russian fighters It was not clear why there was no help, because the 4th company was located nearby.
The opponents met in hand-to-hand combat. The retreating militants then used the radio to offer the paratroopers money for free passage.

To come to the rescue is not ordered

Early in the morning of March 1, they broke through to their surrounded comrades, led by Major A.V. The 15 paratroopers from the 4th company, which occupied defensive lines at a nearby height, were delivered to Stavalov. No one gave them the order to go to the rescue. The paratroopers of the 1st company of the 1st battalion unsuccessfully tried to break through to height 776: while crossing the Abazulgol River, they ran into an ambush and were forced to gain a foothold on the bank. When they finally reached the positions of the 6th company on March 3, it was already too late.
When it became clear that the heights could not be maintained, and there was nowhere to wait for help, captain V.V. Romanov, who took command of the 6th company after the death of senior officers, called fire on himself. At 5 a.m. on March 1, militants occupied the heights. Despite the massive artillery fire that covered height 776, the remnants of Khattab’s bandit group, having lost, according to some sources, about 500 people, were still able to leave the Argun Gorge.
In the battle for Hill 776, 84 soldiers of the 6th and 4th companies were killed, including 13 officers. Only six soldiers managed to survive.

Were the paratroopers betrayed?

There are still debates about why the Pskov paratroopers were not given effective support or were not given the order to withdraw the company. De jure, no one from the command of the federal forces was punished for what happened. At first, Colonel Yu.S. was made extreme. Melentyev, who gave the order to advance the 6th company to the heights of Ista-Kord. A criminal case was opened against him for improper performance of duties. But then the case was closed due to an amnesty.
Although Melentyev’s comrades claim that the colonel, immediately after the start of the battle, several times asked the command for permission to withdraw the company, but to no avail. Colonel Melentyev, who died in 2002 from a heart attack, is also credited with such an assessment of what happened at height 776 in late February - early March. He allegedly shared with a friend shortly before his death: “Don’t believe anything they say about Chechen war in the official media... They exchanged 17 million for 84 lives.”
General Gennady Troshev in his book “My War. The Chechen diary of a trench general” says that assistance was still provided to the paratroopers then - it was serious fire support: regimental 120-mm guns at a height of 776 almost continuously fired about 1,200 shells from the afternoon of February 29 until the morning of March 1. According to Troshev, it was the artillery that inflicted the most serious damage on the militants.
Another version says that the command of the eastern group of troops, led by Gennady Troshev, did not take into account the specifics of the mountainous and wooded terrain, in which the unit does not have the opportunity to form a continuous front or even control the flanks. Plus, no one expected a large group of gangs to break through in one place. The paratroopers could be helped by the front and army aviation, but she wasn’t there either.
Igor Sergeev, the then Minister of Defense, explained the impossibility of transferring additional forces to the combat area due to the dense fire of militants.
About the details of the death of Pskov paratroopers officials initially they didn’t want to talk openly. Journalists were the first to talk about what happened at height 776, and only after that did the military break the days-long silence.

On the night of February 29 to March 1, 2000, the Russian army in last time fought in the style of the 90s

Last Stand The 6th company of the 104th Guards Parachute Regiment of the 76th Airborne Division is perhaps the most dramatic and heroic battle of the Second Chechen Campaign.

Despite its relatively small scale, the battle at Hill 776 is without a doubt historic. For the last time, the Russian army fought a large Chechen gang in the style of the 90s: fewer in number, with poor communications, without air support and the help of comrades, compensating for the shortcomings and sloppiness of the generals with mass heroism and the lives of soldiers.

In subsequent years, the army leadership, albeit with difficulty, learned the bloody lessons of the mountains. Already in 2008, saving South Ossetia from the Georgian attack, Russia demonstrated a completely different style of introducing war, .

The rats are cornered

The winter of 1999–2000 turned out to be a bad time for the Ichkerians (gangs who fought for the independence of Chechnya). Flywheel of war, spun by invasion Shamilya Basayeva And Khattaba to Dagestan, grinding down one gang after another. The federals not only stopped the invasion, burying hopes of an “imarate from sea to sea,” but also, during the summer campaign, regained control of flat part republics, besieged and took Grozny. As in the first campaign, having suffered defeat in the fields, the Chechen troops began to retreat to the mountainous and wooded areas in the south.

The Argun Gorge became the real lifeline for the separatists, along which their families fled to Georgia and the wounded were transported. Caravans with weapons, medicines and equipment traveled along it to Chechnya.

The Russian command perfectly understood the significance of this road and made a move: they flew border guards and paratroopers to the heights above the gorge by helicopters. The troops were delivered to positions above the heads of the gangs; They were also supplied by air.

The first landing was landed on December 17, and by the end of January the militants’ retreat routes to Georgia were completely cut off. 2,300 “border guards” and paratroopers dug in at all key heights along the border. They were given mortars and artillery.

The militants were also supported from the plain. A group of 20 thousand led an attack on Shatoi, the last regional center under the control of terrorists. The army men came from the north, west and east, forming a huge arc and breaking any resistance in front of them.


Under their attacks, about a thousand militants rolled into this area from Grozny. Another two thousand under the command of Khattab moved towards them from Itum-Kali. In addition, the area already had “its own” gang - 1,400 militants from Basayev’s group.

The mountainous and forested area helped to evade clashes with the main forces of the Russians, but strategically it was a mousetrap. Russian aviation carried out up to 200 sorties a day, destroying mountain fortresses and forest bases of militants. Special forces operated in the forests, armored vehicles and motorized rifles occupied the valleys. The militants had almost no room for maneuver, and the army had an almost unlimited supply of shells and bombs.

Thus, a situation arose in which the Russian army sought to hold and finish off the remnants of the Ichkerians in the Shatoi area. The terrorists, on the contrary, dreamed of breaking out of the military cordons and spreading throughout the republic.

Company against Khattab's gang

The 6th company of the 104th Guards Parachute Regiment, although it was part of one of the most elite divisions Russian army, was not professional at all. It was staffed with contract soldiers and paratroopers from other units shortly before deployment. Some were enlisted in the company literally before loading onto the plane.

The 2nd battalion, in which the company was to fight, was also not in in better shape. Just a month before the trip, an inspection found him “not ready for battle.” Combat Mark Evtyukhin I tried to put the unit in order, but there simply wasn’t enough time for training. On February 3, the battalion was transferred to Grozny; After some time, the paratroopers were assigned to guard the base near the village of Oktyabrskoye.

In addition to the soldiers and officers of the 6th company, a group of 15 soldiers from the 4th company of the same 2nd battalion also took part in the battle. In total - 90 paratroopers. They were covered by fire from the Non division (120 mm guns).

The enemy they faced was by no means simple. The Chechen fighters decided to break out of the encirclement in two large groups. One under command Ruslana Gelayeva went to the northwest, aiming at the village of Komsomolskoye, and the other, under the command of Khattab, moved in almost the opposite direction - to the northeast. It was with them that the paratroopers of the 104th regiment had to meet.

Exactly how many thugs went with Khattab is a moot point. According to official data, there were about 2.5 thousand of them, according to terrorists - 700. One way or another, the detachment was many times larger than the paratroopers.

In the gang, in addition to Chechen terrorists, there were a large number of Arab mercenaries. The militants were well armed and well motivated: by that time Russian aviation used one and a half ton weapons on their positions vacuum bombs and cluster munitions. Apart from death, they had nothing to expect at Shatoi. At the same time, unlike the paratroopers who found themselves in this area for the first time, the militants knew the area very well.

Rota goes into eternity

February 28 commander of the 104th regiment Sergey Melentyev ordered to occupy the dominant heights of Ista-Kord. Initially, battalion commander Evtyukhin intended to send the 4th company, which had more heavy weapons and was better prepared, on this mission. However, due to equipment breakdowns, people did not have time to arrive. The 6th company of the major was ordered to become a barrier Sergei Molodov.

The paratroopers advanced to the heights on foot. The soldiers carried not only weapons and ammunition, but also tents, stoves, and a large amount of additional equipment.

Meanwhile, the militants began to probe the regiment's positions in search of a weak point. At about 11 o'clock in the morning Khattab reached the positions of the 3rd company. The militants radioed the commander, calling him by name, and offered him money for passage. The company commander responded by pointing artillery at them. Having left several corpses in front of the positions of the intractable paratroopers, the Khattabites decided to try their luck elsewhere.


At half past twelve, 12 scouts of the 6th company encountered 20 militants on Mount Isty-Kord, after which they retreated to the main forces. The company forded the Abazulgol River. The overloaded paratroopers were very tired and stretched out along the slope.

The head patrol and command rose to the top at the same time as Chechen intelligence. A short but fierce firefight took place. During the battle, Major Molodov was mortally wounded, and the company was led by battalion commander Evtyukhin himself.

The Chechens retreated and regrouped. Around four in the afternoon the first powerful attack followed. The militants managed to catch and shoot the third platoon of the company on the slope, which never managed to rise. Only three soldiers from this platoon survived.

Then the assault on the summit began. Up to 1.5 thousand militants took part in the attack. The terrorists crushed the paratroopers with massive fire, and the defenders fired back. A self-propelled division fired at the slope; the attack was repulsed.

However, the situation was already critical: many were killed, the rest were almost all wounded. The problem was that the paratroopers could not dig out trenches in the frozen rocky soil, and the militants did not spare mortar shells and grenade launcher fire.

At about ten o'clock in the evening the second attack began. The Nonas were still hammering at the heights, but the militants had nothing to lose. Around three in the morning, 15 scouts of the 4th company, under the command of Major Alexandra Dostavalova.

For the final assault, the militants assembled a group of 70 volunteer suicide bombers. By that time, no more than 40-50 paratroopers remained at the top. The wounded died not only from bullets: many died from severe frost.

Nevertheless, the wounded and frostbitten soldiers continued to fire from the advancing horde for several more hours. At 6.01, battalion commander Evtyukhin made contact for the last time, causing fire on himself. Around seven in the morning the last shots were fired.

Brother, where is the help?

Why did the 6th company die? On the one hand, miscalculations in preparing the operation affected, on the other hand, extremely unfavorable circumstances in which the battle was fought.

The military was unable to detect the advance of large enemy forces in time. The command, with good intentions, forbade the paratroopers to conduct reconnaissance on their own outside the artillery “umbrella”, and interaction with the Vympel special forces detachments and the 45th regiment special purpose it was not established. Therefore, when the paratroopers faced a monstrous danger, neither the commanders on the spot nor the command at headquarters understood this.

The aviation, which had been mauling the militants the other day, also could not help: throughout the entire day the area was covered in thick fog, and rain and snow fell from low clouds.

However, it cannot be said that they did not try to save the company. At night, fellow soldiers from the 1st company advanced to the besieged heights. But Khattab, who was well versed in the tactics of mountain warfare, had already placed machine-gun secrets at the fords of the Abazulgol River, which did not allow the relief group to approach the battlefield.

The only help that reached the 6th company were the same 15 scouts who were brought by Major Dostavalov, who exactly fulfilled Suvorov’s behest: perish yourself and help your comrade.

Nevertheless, the paratroopers fought to the end. No one raised their hand to surrender, no one asked for mercy. The soldiers fired back even after the company's control fell apart. The commanders shared the fate of the soldiers: all of the 13 officers who participated in the battle died. The last to give his life was Lieutenant Dmitry Kozhemyakin, covering the retreat of two wounded soldiers. Only six paratroopers survived the battle at the height.

The breakthrough through the company's positions, according to various sources, cost Khattab from 50 to 500 militants. Soon Russian troops more than 200 militants surrendered; most of them were wounded, and many at Hill 776. The enemy paid a very high price for passing through the positions of the 6th company.

This article is for informational purposes and provides an opportunity to get acquainted with two points of view (Chechen and Russian side) on the battle of paratroopers of the 6th company of the 104th regiment of the 76th Airborne Forces and Chechen militants under the command of and.

Version of the battle near Ulus-Kert from the Chechen side:

At the end of February and beginning of March, there is another anniversary of the famous battle near Ulus-Kert, during which the Mujahideen destroyed Russian infidel paratroopers from Pskov.

Despite the fact that the fabrications of the Kremlin propaganda about this battle have been repeatedly refuted by the Chechen side, Moscow is still trying to push lies into the public consciousness of the average person and impose its interpretation of that unprecedented battle in which the Mujahideen, exhausted by a 2-week winter march, completely defeated elite unit Russian troops.

10 years ago, on February 29, 2000, near Ulus-Kert, a fierce battle took place between a selected detachment of invaders and a unit of Chechen Mujahideen. 70 volunteer fighters stormed the height on which there was a company of those same Pskov paratroopers who, as Russian propaganda lies, allegedly “restrained the onslaught of 2 thousand militants.”

1,300 Mujahideen marched from Shatoi in the direction of Dargo-Vedeno. Exhausted by a long march, frozen, wounded, sick, the Mujahideen reached the gorge of the Vashtar River (Abazulgol). Intelligence reported that at a height between Ulus-Kert and Duba-Yurt, a detachment of invaders was located at their disposal with mortars.

Eyewitnesses and participants in that battle say that after a short meeting, the wounded Shamil Basayev (he was carried on a stretcher with his leg torn off) ordered Khattab to select the assault group and attack the paratroopers. Khattab initially refused, saying that the column (although under fire) would be able to pass the paratroopers without coming into fire contact. However, Shamil pointed out that in the event of passage under enemy fire, the losses would be disproportionately greater, and that the rearguard of the column would be under the threat of mortar fire.

Then Shamil Basayev turned to Khattab and said, “If you do not carry out my order now, then on the Day of Judgment I will testify before Allah that you did not carry out the order of your amir.” Hearing these words, Khattab immediately apologized and began to form an assault group, which he himself led. As Khattab himself later said, he was afraid of Shamil’s words and the fact that on the Day of Judgment he would have nothing to justify himself before the Almighty.

Khattab selected a group of Mujahideen of 70 volunteer fighters. Before the battle, Shamil addressed the Mujahideen with a speech. Then the assault began.

As the participants in the battle say, they climbed to the heights under heavy enemy fire at an incredibly slow speed. There was practically no strength to move up. The Mujahideen used their hands to help themselves move their legs. There was no talk of targeted shooting at paratroopers. When the advance group climbed the height, an impressive and at the same time strange picture appeared before them.

About 100 corpses were dumped in one heap, as if someone had deliberately dragged them to one place. Horror froze on the faces of all the paratroopers. The faces were gray-ash color. Almost all of them had bullet wounds to the head and chest, almost below the throat.

The Mujahideen lost 25 fighters (according to other sources, 21). Almost all those who died near Ulus-Kert are buried in populated areas Vedeno district: Tevzana, Makhkety, Khattuni.

As Khattab and the fighters of the assault group subsequently stated, all participants in that battle had a clear feeling that the cause of the death of the paratroopers was not so much their shooting, but the action of another force - Allah and his Angels.

Khattab, who loved to tell episodes of various battles, almost never talked much about the battle near Ulus-Kert. There is little about this fight
Other participants also spoke about it. When the Mujahideen tried to ask Khattab about that battle, he usually answered briefly - “It was not our work...”.

Meanwhile, Russian propaganda, trying to distort real events that battle, continues to tell tales “about hordes of militants and a handful of Russian heroes.” Articles and books are written, films and productions are made, generals and politicians appear on TV. Moreover, every year Russian state propaganda names different figures for Mujahideen losses, sometimes 500, sometimes 1500, sometimes 700 (this latest version). Moscow propagandists prefer not to answer a simple question - “where is the mass grave of militants?”

By the way, in those days, in the Ulus-Kert area, the Mujahideen killed up to 200 special forces of the Russian army. However, only the losses among the Pskov paratroopers were made official, which could not be kept silent about, since they were all from the same unit and the same city, and all residents of Pskov were aware of these losses.

About a week after the battle near Ulus-Kert, in the town of Duts-Khoti of the Selmentauzen rural administration, the Russian invaders, with the help of local apostates, betrayed and then vilely shot 42 wounded and unarmed Mujahideen, who, by decision of the Mujahideen command, were temporarily left in one from buildings on the outskirts of the village.

Subsequently, the traitors were found and destroyed.

Version of the battle near Ulus-Kert from the Russian side:

On the afternoon of February 29, 2000, the federal command hastened to interpret the capture of Shatoy as a signal that the “Chechen resistance” had been finally broken. Vladimir Putin was reported “on the completion of the tasks of the third stage” of the operation in the North Caucasus, and acting. O. OGV commander Gennady Troshev noted that operations to destroy the “escaping bandits” would be carried out for another two to three weeks, but the full-scale military operation had been completed.

Reserve Colonel Vladimir Vorobyov, a former paratrooper who served in Afghanistan (at one time he commanded the 104th “Cherekhin” regiment), will help us in the investigation. The father of senior lieutenant Alexei Vorobyov, who died near Ulus-Kert. Two years after the tragedy, he compiled a complete picture of what happened, which is somewhat at odds with the official version.

Gangs of Chechen field commanders found themselves in a strategic pocket. This happened after a tactical landing, which, as if with a sharp knife, cut the Itum-Kale-Shatili mountain road, built by the slaves of “free Ichkeria”. Operational group "Center" began to methodically shoot down the enemy, forcing him to retreat down the Argun Gorge: from the Russian-Georgian border to the north.

Intelligence reported: Khattab moved to the northeast, to the Vedeno region, where he created an extensive network of mountain bases, warehouses and shelters. He intended to capture Vedeno, the villages of Mekhkety, Elistanzhi and Kirov-Yurt and provide himself with a springboard for a breakthrough into Dagestan. In the neighboring republic, the “Mujahideen” planned to take a large number of civilians hostage and thereby force the federal authorities to negotiate.

Reconstructing the chronicle of those days, you need to clearly understand: talk about “reliably blocked gangs” is a bluff, an attempt to pass off wishful thinking. The strategically important Argun Gorge has a length of more than 30 kilometers. Units not trained in mountain warfare were unable to establish control over a branched and completely unfamiliar mountain system. Even on the old map you can count more than two dozen trails in this area. And how many are there that are not marked on any maps at all? To block each such path, you need to use a company. This turns out to be an impressive figure. With the forces that were at hand, the federal command could not only destroy, but reliably block the gangs going for a breakthrough only on paper.

In what later turned out to be the most dangerous direction, the OGV command deployed soldiers of the 104th Guards Parachute Regiment of the 76th Pskov Airborne Division. Meanwhile, Khattab chose a simple but effective tactic: after reconnaissance of the battles, he intended to find the weakest points, and then, with his entire mass, break out of the gorge.

On February 28, the “Mujahideen” went ahead. The first to take the blow were the paratroopers of the 3rd company, led by Senior Lieutenant Vasilyev. They occupied commanding heights five kilometers east of Ulus-Kert. Khattab's troops unsuccessfully tried to break through a well-organized fire system and retreated, suffering significant losses.

Units of the 2nd battalion kept control of the dominant heights above the Sharoargun Gorge. There remained a passage between the beds of the Sharoargun and Abazulgol rivers. To exclude the possibility of militants “infiltrating” here, the commander of the 104th regiment ordered the commander of the 6th company, Major Sergei Molodov, to occupy another commanding height 4-5 kilometers from Ulus-Kert. And since the company commander was literally transferred to the unit the day before and did not have time to thoroughly understand the operational situation and get to know the personnel, the commander of the 2nd battalion, Mark Evtyukhin, protected him.

The paratroopers set out while it was still dark. In a few hours they had to make a fifteen-kilometer forced march to a given square, where they would set up a new base camp. They walked with full combat gear. They were armed only with small arms and grenade launchers. The attachment for the radio station, which provides covert radio communication, was left at the base. They carried water, food, tents and stoves, without which it was simply impossible to survive in the mountains in winter. According to Vladimir Vorobyov’s calculations, the unit stretched for 5-6 kilometers, and they walked no more than a kilometer per hour. We also note that the paratroopers went to the heights immediately after a difficult throw along the Dombay-Arzy route, i.e., without proper rest.

A helicopter landing was ruled out because the aerial reconnaissance did not find a single suitable site in the mountain forest.

The paratroopers walked to the limit of their physical strength - this is a fact that no one can dispute. From the analysis of the situation, the following conclusion suggests itself: the command was late with the decision to transfer the 6th company to Isty-Kord, and then, realizing it, set obviously impossible deadlines.

Even before sunrise, the 6th company of the 104th Guards Parachute Regiment, reinforced by a platoon and two reconnaissance groups, was at the target - the interfluve of the tributaries of the Argun south of Ulus-Kert. The actions of the paratroopers were led by the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Mark Evtyukhin.

As it later became known, 90 paratroopers, on an isthmus 200 meters away, blocked the path of Khattab’s two thousand strong group. As far as one can judge, the bandits were the first to discover the enemy. This is evidenced by radio interceptions.

At this moment, the “Mujahideen” were moving in two detachments along the Sharoargun and Abazulgol rivers. They decided to bypass height 776.0, where our paratroopers were catching their breath after a difficult forced march.

Moving ahead of both gangs were two reconnaissance groups of 30 people each, followed by two combat security detachments of 50 militants each. One of the head patrols was discovered by Senior Lieutenant Alexei Vorobyov and his scouts, which saved the 6th company from a surprise attack.

It was noon. Scouts discovered militants at the foot of height 776.0. The opponents were separated by tens of meters. In a matter of seconds, with the help of grenades, the vanguard of the bandits was destroyed. But after him dozens of “Mujahideen” poured in.

The scouts with the wounded on their shoulders retreated to the main forces, and the company had to take on an oncoming battle on the move. While the scouts could hold back the onslaught of the bandits, the battalion commander decided to gain a foothold on this forested height of 776.0 and not give the bandits the opportunity to escape and block the gorge.

Before the assault began, Khattab field commanders Idris and Abu Walid radioed the battalion commander and suggested that Yevtukhin let the “Mujahideen” through:

“There are ten times more of us here.” Think about it, commander, is it worth risking people? Night, fog - no one will notice...

It’s not hard to imagine what the battalion commander responded. After these “negotiations,” the bandits unleashed a barrage of fire from mortars and grenade launchers on the paratroopers’ positions. By midnight the battle reached its highest intensity. The guards did not flinch, although the enemy outnumbered them by more than 20 times. The bandits advanced to positions to throw a grenade. In some areas, the paratroopers came into hand-to-hand combat. One of the first in the 6th company to die was its commander Sergei Molodov - a sniper’s bullet hit him in the neck.

The command could only support the company with artillery fire. The fire of the regimental gunners was adjusted by the commander of the self-propelled battery, Captain Viktor Romanov. According to General Troshev, from noon on February 29 until the early morning of March 1, regimental gunners poured 1,200 shells into the Isty-Kord area.

They did not use aviation for fear of hitting their own people. The bandits covered their flanks with water flows that were on the right and left, which did not make it possible to freely maneuver and provide effective assistance. The enemy set up ambushes and took up defensive positions on the shore, not allowing them to approach the tributaries of the Argun. Several crossing attempts ended in failure. The 1st company of paratroopers, sent to the rescue of their dying comrades, was able to break through to height 776.0 only on the morning of March 2.

From three to five in the morning on March 1, there was a “respite” - there were no attacks, but the mortars and snipers did not stop shelling. Battalion commander Mark Evtyukhin reported the situation to the regiment commander, Colonel Sergei Melentyev. He ordered to hold on and wait for help.

After several hours of battle, it became obvious that the 6th Company simply did not have enough ammunition to hold off the continuous attacks of the militants. The battalion commander radioed for help from his deputy, Major Alexander Dostovalov, who was located one and a half kilometers from the dying company. There were fifteen fighters with him.

We like to say various beautiful phrases on any occasion, without really thinking about their meaning. I also liked the expression “heavy fire”. So here it is. Despite the heavy, unquote, enemy fire, Alexander Dostovalov and a platoon of paratroopers somehow miraculously managed to get through to their comrades, who were holding back the frantic onslaught of Khattab’s bandits for the second hour. For the 6th Company this was a powerful emotional charge. The guys believed that they were not abandoned, that they were remembered, that they would be helped.

...The platoon was enough for two hours of battle. At 5 o'clock Khattab launched two battalions of suicide bombers - "white angels" - into the attack. They completely surrounded the height, cutting off part of the last platoon, which never managed to rise to the height: it was shot almost in the back. The company itself was already collecting ammunition from the dead and wounded.

The forces were unequal. One after another, soldiers and officers died. Alexei Vorobyov had his legs broken by mine fragments, one bullet hit his stomach, and another pierced his chest. But the officer did not leave the battle. It was he who destroyed Idris, Khattab’s friend, the “chief of intelligence.”

On the night of March 1, at an altitude of 705.6, there was hand-to-hand combat, which took on a focal character. The snow at the height was mixed with blood. The paratroopers repelled the last attack with several machine guns. Battalion commander Mark Evtukhin realized that the life of the company was gone for minutes. A little more, and the bandits will break out of the gorge over the corpses of the paratroopers. And then he turned to captain Viktor Romanov. He, bleeding, with the stumps of his legs tied with tourniquets, lay nearby - on the company command post.

- Come on, let's call fire on ourselves!

Already losing consciousness, Romanov transferred the coordinates to the battery. At 6:10 a.m. the connection with Lieutenant Colonel Evtukhin was lost. The battalion commander fired back to the last bullet and was hit by a sniper's bullet in the head.

On the morning of March 2, the 1st company reached Isty-Kord. When the paratroopers pushed the militants back from height 705.6, a terrible picture opened before them: perennial beech trees, “trimmed” by shells and mines, and corpses everywhere, the corpses of “Mujahideen.” Four hundred people. In the company stronghold there are the bodies of 13 Russian officers and 73 sergeants and privates.

Following the “bloody trail,” Udugov posted eight photographs of the killed paratroopers on the Kavkaz-Center website. The photographs do not show that many of the bodies were hacked into pieces. “Fighters for the Faith” dealt with any paratroopers who still had life in them. This was told by those who miraculously managed to survive.

Senior Sergeant Alexander Suponinsky, on the orders of the commander, jumped into a deep ravine. Private Andrei Porshnev jumped next. About 50 militants fired at them from machine guns for half an hour. After waiting, the wounded paratroopers first crawled, and then began to leave at full height. The guys miraculously survived.

“There were five of us left,” Andrei Porshnev later recalled, “battalion commander Evtyukhin, deputy battalion commander Dostavalov and senior lieutenant Kozhemyakin.” Officers. Well, Sasha and I. Evtyukhin and Dostavalov died, and Kozhemyakin’s both legs were broken, and he threw cartridges at us with his hands. The militants came close to us, there were three meters left, and Kozhemyakin ordered us: leave, jump down...

For that fight, Alexander Suponinsky received the Hero of Russia star.

A list of dead paratroopers was placed on the desk of Colonel-General Gennady Shpak, commander of the Airborne Forces. All the circumstances of this fierce battle were reported in the smallest detail. Shpak made a report to the Minister of Defense, Marshal Igor Sergeev, but in response received instructions: information about the events near Ulus-Kert should be prohibited from being disclosed until a separate order is given.

It just so happened that on February 29, Marshal Sergeev reported to Vladimir Putin about the successful completion of the tasks of the “third stage.” Only a few hours passed and a powerful group of militants struck the positions of the federal troops. What happened near Ulus-Kert in no way correlated with the victorious reports about the imminent and final defeat of the militants. And Comrade Marshal probably felt embarrassed for his last report. In order to somehow smooth out the embarrassment, the military was ordered to keep quiet. Only Gennady Troshev, on March 5, dared to tell part of the truth: “The 6th parachute company, which was at the forefront of the bandits’ attack, lost 31 people killed and some were wounded.”

During the same days, the country experienced another tragedy, which was reported by all television channels in the country - 17 people died in Chechnya. The military command was afraid to announce the riot police and paratroopers at the same time. The losses were too great...

On August 2, 2000, Russia celebrated its 70th anniversary Airborne troops. On this day, Vladimir Putin arrived in the 76th airborne division, stationed in Pskov to pay tribute to the heroic paratroopers of the 6th company, which died in the Argun Gorge in Chechnya.

Having met with the soldiers and families of the victims, the President for the first time in ten years of unprincipled and stupid Russian politics in the North Caucasus, he publicly repented to the people, openly admitting the Kremlin’s guilt “for gross miscalculations that have to be paid with the lives of Russian soldiers.”

Ulus-Kert has become one of the symbols of modern Russian history. For how many years they tried to eradicate the Russian military spirit from us, it didn’t work. For many years the army was portrayed as a bunch of drunks, degenerates and sadists - and the paratrooper boys, living and dead, silenced the critics.

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