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Prospects for the development of the customs union and the EAEU. Problems of development of the EAEU

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INTRODUCTION

Since January 1, 2015, a new interstate integration organization has emerged on the geopolitical map of the world - the Eurasian economic union(EAEU), which united the Republic of Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation. During the year, the EAEU was replenished with two new members - the republics of Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. The EAEU is a fundamentally new object of socio-economic research; for this reason, the study of the nuances of its creation and functioning, as well as its place in the global process of globalization, is of great scientific interest.

The Eurasian Economic Community is an international economic organization, which is endowed with functions related to the formation of common external customs borders of its member countries (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan), the development of a common foreign economic policy, tariffs, prices and other components of the common market. The organization, which became the legal successor of the Customs Union, was created in full accordance with the principles of the UN and the norms of international law. This is a clearly structured system with a rather rigid mechanism for making and implementing any decision. The Union and its officials use the privileges and immunities necessary to perform the functions and achieve the tasks provided for by the agreement on the formation of the Eurasian Economic Union and treaties operating within the borders of the Union. The EAEU was created to effectively promote the processes of formation by the member states of the Customs Union of the Common Economic Space, coordinating their approaches when integrating into the world economy and international trading system. One of the main vectors of the organization’s work is to ensure the dynamic development of the Community countries with the effective use of their economic potential in the interests of increasing the standard of living of the population.

The main goal of the work is to consider the prospects for the development of the Eurasian Economic Union.

This paper examines the prospects and problems of development of this Eurasian Economic Union, issues of integration within the Eurasian Economic Union, as well as its interaction with other CIS and non-CIS countries. It is shown that the main problem of integration within the Eurasian Economic Union is the dominance of redistribution over production. The scale of oil and gas transfer from the Russian Federation to partners in the EAEU and the impact of the tax maneuver on its size are considered. It is shown that the creation of mechanisms for the redistribution of profits within the Eurasian Economic Union will contribute to the implementation of favorable economic effects from the conclusion of free trade agreements with non-CIS countries. The risks for the Eurasian Economic Union in connection with the introduction by the Russian Federation of a unilateral ban on the import of food products from countries on the sanctions list are considered.

1. EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION: HISTORY, FEATURES, PROSPECTS

Eurasian European integration sanctions

1.1 Stages of formation and development of Eurasian economic integration

The creation of the Eurasian Economic Union was the result of the Eurasian integration process, which was being prepared within the framework of the CIS, the Customs Union, and the EurAsEC. The development of Eurasian economic integration can be divided into two stages: the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space, as well as the EAEU stage. After the adoption of the Customs Code of the Customs Union in 2009, the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation functioned from 2010 to 2011. His distinctive features were: firstly, the Unified Customs Tariff, as well as uniform measures to regulate foreign trade with third countries, secondly, the free movement of products across the territory of member countries without customs declaration and state control (transport, sanitary, veterinary and sanitary, quarantine, phytosanitary), thirdly - the mechanism for crediting and distributing amounts of import duties, their transfer to the budgets of member countries (87.00% - Russian Federation, 7.25 - Kazakhstan, 4.65 - Belarus, 1.1% - Armenia) .

The formation of the Customs Union made it possible for its participants to increase mutual trade turnover by 72.8% in two years, significantly reduce customs costs and form a common market for products with the exception of medicines, electricity, oil and gas. The Russian Federation accounted for more than 87% of the total customs duties determined by it. In this connection, the existing procedure for transferring customs duties replenishes the budgets of the member countries of the Customs Union, and now the Eurasian Economic Union, at the expense of customs duties collected at the borders of the Russian Federation.

The success of the Customs Union enabled its members to rise to a higher level of integration: to form a single economic space in the period from 2012 to 2014. Thanks to this, it became possible, firstly, the implementation of a coordinated macroeconomic policy to form a common market not only for products, but also a common market for services, capital and labor, secondly, the formation of the Eurasian Economic Commission as a regulatory body for the creation of a single economic space and, in -third, assigning the functions of the Eurasian Court to the EurAsEC Court in the format of judges from three countries.

The foundation of the legal framework of the single economic space was formed by about 20 interstate integration treaties and agreements, covering issues of customs regulation, technical regulations, state and municipal procurement, development of competition, financial interaction, etc. As a result, in 2012 there was a positive dynamics of mutual trade turnover (Figure 1) and active development of industrial cooperation, the formation of joint ventures (in 2015 in Belarus alone there were 5,000 joint ventures with the Russian Federation, in Kazakhstan - 5800). But the reserves inherent in the common product market were largely exhausted, barriers to economic cooperation remained (as of January 1, 2015, there were 300 barriers), the efficiency of the executive and judicial bodies of the common economic space was hampered by the lack of an internationally recognized integration organization. Because the Eurasian Economic Commission was no longer a body of the EurAsEC and, in legal terms, turned out to be a regulatory body without an organization. Which was probably the reason for the drop in mutual trade turnover in 2013-2014.

The adoption of the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union made it possible to give Eurasian integration the proper international legal form. The Eurasian Economic Commission and the EurAsEC Court received the necessary legal personality as bodies of the Eurasian Economic Union. At this stage of Eurasian integration, 71 barriers were removed and a program was outlined for the gradual, until 2025 inclusive, removal of the remaining barriers (229). As a result, over a relatively short period of time, economic cooperation between the member countries of the Eurasian Economic Union has successively passed through four levels of integration: a free trade zone, a Customs Union, a single economic space, and an incomplete economic union, which formed the prerequisites for the creation of a full economic union, including a Monetary Union.

Figure 1. Volume of mutual trade between Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation

The basis of the Eurasian Economic Union is the principles of sovereignty, equality, voluntariness and economic interest. State powers delegated to the bodies of the Eurasian Economic Union are exercised on the principles of equality and consensus (all five countries have equal representation in the Council and Board of the Eurasian Economic Commission, as well as in the court of the Eurasian Economic Union). In addition, the action or inaction of the Eurasian Economic Commission can be challenged by states, as well as business entities in the Court of the Eurasian Economic Union.

As a result of the increase in members of the Eurasian integration, changes occurred in the standards for the deduction of customs duties: the Republic of Armenia receives 1.11% of all customs duties in the Eurasian Economic Union, the Republic of Belarus - 4.56, the Republic of Kazakhstan - 7.11, the Kyrgyz Republic - 1.9, Russian Federation - 85.32%.

At the same time, it is obvious that the absence of a parliamentary structure of the Eurasian Economic Union, firstly, complicates the work on harmonization and unification of state legislation, and secondly, increases the role of national parliaments in this activity. The Eurasian Economic Union should manifest itself in full by the beginning of 2026, when common markets for medicines and medical equipment (2016), electric power (2019), and oil and gas (2024-2025) will be gradually formed. By 2025, it is planned to form a financial center of the Eurasian Economic Union in Astana. The creation of the parliamentary structure of the Eurasian Economic Union is postponed to a later date.

Over 10 years, by 2025, the GDP of the states of the Eurasian Economic Union due to the integration effect alone should presumably increase by 20%. This will, of course, be supported by targeted development within Eurasian competition based on the formation of equal economic conditions for business structures and employees of member countries of the Eurasian Economic Union. For example, competition among customs services has significantly accelerated and simplified customs clearance of goods. Competition between jurisdictions causes the flow of capital to states with the best economic conditions. For example, VAT in Kazakhstan is approximately 12%, in the Russian Federation - 18%, in Armenia - 20%. It is likely that, over time, Eurasian tax legislation will need to be harmonized and even unified.

There are a number of problems in the customs area. They were clearly manifested in the situation with the lack of a solidary reaction of the EAEU states to anti-state sanctions. Goods prohibited in the Russian Federation began to enter our market under the guise of transit or Eurasian goods. In this case, the rule for determining the origin of the goods was violated. If there are at least 50% of own costs in the goods of a subject of Eurasian economic integration. Obviously, the packaging of Norwegian salmon is not a sufficient condition for classifying it as a Eurasian product. For this reason, the priority task is to develop and adopt by 2016 the Customs Code of the Eurasian Economic Union instead of the Customs Code of the Customs Union in force since 2010. The new code needs to minimize references to national legislation, reflect new advanced customs technologies and provide for joint actions in the face of sanctions from third countries. In particular, to ensure the priority of electronic declaration of goods in relation to paper, the prompt re-establishment of the customs services of the three countries and the free admission of partners for control at the customs border of the EAEU.

The reserves for growth of mutual trade turnover associated with the common market for products of the Eurasian Economic Union have largely been exhausted. Seizures so far include alcohol, medicines, electricity, oil and gas. For this reason, priority must be given to the creation of a common market for services, capital, and labor. Which, in turn, presupposes mutual recognition of national licenses, convergence of investment conditions, administration methods, and business conditions in general. It is necessary to ensure a national regime of social and medical security for Eurasian workers.

1.2 EAEU and its geopolitical partners

At the end of 2011, the US government officially announced that it would oppose the formation of the EAEU, which it is implementing in practice. Consequently, the US activity in promoting the European orientation of the CIS states and all kinds of opposition to their Eurasian integration is explained by its interest in eliminating for Europe a Eurasian alternative to US resources and maintaining political tension in the world. In the events in Ukraine, the United States is fighting not for its European choice, but for the American choice of Europe. In this sense, the European orientation of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia is actually pro-American in nature and contradicts the fundamental long-term interests of the EU and the EAEU in the formation of a common European home from Lisbon to Vladivostok.

Extra-legal economic sanctions of the European Union in relation to the Russian Federation, blocking the integration of the European Union with the EAEU determine the intensification of interaction of the Eurasian Economic Union with the states of Southeast and South Asia. Of particular importance is ensuring the confluence of the construction of the EAEU and the Silk Road Economic Belt. In this case, we are talking not only about the formation of a global transport corridor from Shanghai to the European Union through Moscow, but also about the development of cooperation with the People's Republic of China in all areas of the economy, the formation in the future of a common economic space of the Eurasian Economic Union - China. The first step towards this will be the adoption of an appropriate trade and economic agreement.

The choice of the Eurasian Economic Union as the main direction of the Silk Road economic belt is not accidental. Other options are: transit through the southern Caspian Sea, which is complicated by the fact that cargo must pass through an area of instability and conflict, and transit through the Caspian Sea is complicated by the lack of infrastructure and the need to cross many borders. Railroad and road routes from China to Western Europe through Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation are the safest, since there are no customs borders between Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation.

According to some expert estimates, the implementation of the Silk Road Economic Belt project will take 30 years and $7 trillion, and 60 states should be involved in this project. High-speed highways should unite the 28 states of the Silk Road economic belt. This project is intended to redraw the map of world business and throw the United States and Europe to the impoverished outskirts of the Atlantic Ocean.

The lack of infrastructure is a significant obstacle to expanding the export of mineral raw materials and agricultural goods of the Russian Federation to Asia. Today, transporting products from China to Europe by the southern sea route takes 45 days or more, and by Trans-Siberian Railway - 18-20 days; along the Lianyungang - Hamburg highway through Kazakhstan 11-13 days Shanghai Cooperation Organization: model 2014-2015: workbook. No. 21/2015/ S. G. Luzyanin (director) and others; Ch. ed. I. S. Ivanov; Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). M.: Spetskniga, 2015. P. 20. . China's implementation of large infrastructure projects on the territory of the states of the Eurasian Economic Union will have a stimulating effect on their economies during a period of decline. In this case, the competition of the new global transport infrastructure with the Trans-Siberian Railway and the Northern Sea Route will stimulate domestic investment in development and modernization.

Another geopolitical integration direction is the Transport Union of India, Iran and the Russian Federation, an agreement on which was signed in 2000 in St. Petersburg. After the lifting of sanctions against Iran this project can work at full capacity. As a result of the creation of Greater Eurasia, the EU’s interest in integration with the EAEU will increase significantly and one can predict the formation of the world’s leading association of integration unions, covering more than 54 million km with a population of about 4.5 billion people. What is significant is that the center of such a union will objectively be the EAEU itself.2 And it’s not just about geographical location Eurasian Economic Union. Even more significant is that our Union unites the cultural values of Western Europe and Asia.

Protestant (predominant in Western Europe and North America) culture - the culture of work as the basis of wealth, frugality, respect for law and morality, giving independence from the country, freedom of private initiative, protection of property, played a special role in the development of industrial capitalism. But now, as noted in a number of publications by foreign sociologists and economists, Western European civilization is experiencing a deep crisis. Research from the University of Cambridge has shown that these are not only problems in the economy, but also an increase in selfishness and permissive behavior, especially among senior managers and bankers, a decrease in the self-identification of Europeans as Christians and a decrease in trust in religion in general, as well as in traditional political parties.

The crisis of Euro-Atlantic civilization and the existing system of government in many Muslim states is taken advantage of by extremism, which advocates the formation of a global caliphate with the help of jihad and forces that help the internal decay of the “civilization of infidels.” By these forces we mean Western and pro-Western “human rights activists”, essentially defending terrorists, and radical liberals, shaking the foundations of their countries, just as the Bolsheviks did in the Russian Federation during the First World War. The European bureaucracy, instead of instilling in immigrants respect for the cultural values of their countries, often, with the help of subsidies, receives parasites who hate the country that sheltered them. Various views of globalization contain the socio-economic roots of international terrorism, for this reason, without the permission of these different views, it is impossible to defeat this evil of the 21st century.

Unlike Western European practice, the Eurasian concept, Eastern European in nature, is based on the centuries-old experience of peaceful coexistence and cooperation of peoples professing Christian, Muslim, Buddhist and Jewish religions. These peoples did not arrive from other states and not recently, but lived and worked together for centuries. The two main religions of Eurasia in terms of numbers of adherents - Orthodoxy and Islam, with all theological differences, have a fundamentally common feature that distinguishes them from Western Christianity - an orientation towards collectivism rather than individualism, rejection of the desire to increase wealth by any means, respect for the role of the country in harsh conditions continental climate and continuous external military threats.

Consequently, the EAEU, as the embodiment of European and Asian culture, with European priority, geographically, culturally, and in the future economically, acts as a center uniting all parts of Greater Eurasia. But the success of the “integration of integrations,” as well as the success of our own Eurasian integration, is possible only under the condition of active economic growth of each state of the Eurasian Economic Union. Eurasian integration can mitigate the miscalculations of domestic economic policy, but not replace it. A productive national economy of each EAEU state is a condition for the success of their integration efforts.

1. 3 On the Eurasian and European paths of integration in the CIS

The Eurasian Economic Union is the largest integration association in terms of territory with a potential market capacity of 4-4.2% of world GDP. The formation of the Eurasian Economic Union gives rise to the possibility of a geopolitical choice among the CIS states not participating in it between associated relations with European Union or full participation in the Eurasian Economic Union. In this case, the Eurasian Economic Union was established by the most successful CIS states: the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and Belarus, which, according to purchasing power parity, have per capita GDP of 25.6 thousand dollars, 24.2 thousand and 18.1 thousand dollars, respectively. The signatories Association agreements with the European Union of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, this figure amounted to only 8.6 thousand dollars, 7.5 and 5 thousand dollars, respectively.

The main difference between participation in the Eurasian Economic Union and association with the European Union is that in the Eurasian Economic Union the principle of equality of members prevails, and association with the European Union presupposes the dominance of the European Union. Thus, the formation in accordance with the Association Treaty of Ukraine with the European Union led the latter to the loss of its sovereignty in foreign economic activity. Now Ukraine’s decisions in this area must be approved by the Association Council, where Ukraine has only 50% of the votes, i.e. the European Union can block foreign economic decisions of the Ukrainian government. At the same time, the Association Council with Ukraine does not have any powers to influence relevant decisions of the European Union.

Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine have been members of the association with the European Union for more than a year. They took on such obligations. Initially, have a free economic zone with the European Union (i.e. fully open your national markets). This forces the Russian Federation to introduce the same most favored nation treatment for members of the association as for member countries of the Eurasian Economic Union (introduction of customs duties, quotas and restrictions). At the same time, countries that are not members of the European Union and have a free trade zone with it received unilateral access for their products to Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. As a result, for example, in the markets of Chisinau, Turkish grapes began to displace local products. Also, members of the association are required to switch to European technical regulations and phytosanitary standards, which leads to the destruction of Russian industry, loss of markets in Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and the Russian Federation and makes production cooperation with companies of the Eurasian Economic Union impossible. Thirdly, members of the association must switch to European standards in the field of migration. This, on the one hand, makes it possible to have a visa-free tourist regime for three months in the European Union (Moldova has already received this opportunity), on the other hand, it leads to increased migration control on the part of the Russian Federation, the main importer of labor migrants from Moldova and Ukraine.

Figure 2. - GDP per capita (PPP) of countries participating in the Eurasian Economic Union and members of the association with the European Union, 2014 (in dollars, according to the World Bank)

The results of the first year of the association for Moldova are mass protests of the population against the authorities, and in Ukraine there is a decline foreign trade turnover both with the European Union (over 7 months of 2015 by approximately 30%), and with the CIS (over the same period - by almost 60%). In other words, as a result of association with the European Union, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine did not gain new markets, but lost old markets. For this reason, the choice of the Republic of Armenia, which abandoned the Association in favor of membership in the Eurasian Economic Union, is logical.

When determining the future geographical boundaries of the Eurasian economic space, two extremes must be overcome. On the one hand, the desire to expand these boundaries is unjustified without the candidate state fulfilling all the necessary conditions, the main one of which is bringing the legislation of the candidate state into line with the legal framework of the EAEU. It is necessary to take into account the experience of the EU, when, based on the principle of the priority of politics over economics, its borders expanded to include states that were not ready for European unification. This in turn sharpened the differing views between Western, Central and southern parts Europe.

On the other hand, the statement that “many Commonwealth states have already passed the “point of no return” to participation in integration processes is also unfounded.” In principle, it is wrong to deprive any CIS states and their peoples of the historical prospect of deep integration with the Russian Federation, Belarus and Kazakhstan. In this case, in practice, the connection of candidate states to Eurasian integration, as they are ready, can be multi-stage: free trade zone, Customs Union, Common Economic Space, full-fledged Eurasian Economic Union.

For a long time, the “point of no return” for the integration of a number of CIS countries was considered to be their entry into the World Trade Organization without, in this case, agreeing on customs tariffs with the main trading partner - the Russian Federation. Nevertheless, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia became full members of the Eurasian Economic Union, although their conditions for joining the WTO differed significantly from the conditions for Russia and Kazakhstan joining this international organization. The “European-associated” choice of the political elites of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, largely imposed from outside, can radically change by the will of the people, and these states then have the right to claim full participation in the Eurasian Economic Union.

2. PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS OF THE Eurasian Economic Union AT THE PRESENT STAGE

2.1 Different views Eurasian Economic Union and ways to resolve them

The economy of the Eurasian Economic Union has a number of significant nuances that distinguish Eurasian integration from European integration. The EAEU, initially, unites states - exporters and importers of resources. In contrast, the EU unites only resource importing states, i.e. this association of states, poor natural resources. Also, the EAEU formed states with a low level of economic monetization, and the EU united states with a significant level of monetization.

As a result, business entities in the EAEU have advantages, since they acquire inexpensive resources at domestic prices of exporting states. In the EAEU, resources are purchased at world prices. But credit resources in the EAEU are provided at higher interest rates than in the EU. This attracts some CIS states to participate in the European union, despite the obvious advantages of the Eurasian choice.

For the success of the Eurasian unification, a number of different views must be brought to consensus. Let us consider in more detail the features of the territorial, sectoral and financial contradictions of the Eurasian Union.

Territorial and sectoral features determine two groups of different views in the Eurasian Economic Union: between exporters and importers of resources and between exporters. The first group of contradictions is manifested in the interest of importers to resell resources purchased at domestic prices outside the borders of the Eurasian Economic Union at world prices.

The different views of resource importers are reflected in different export duties Oh. Thus, in the Russian Federation, the duty on oil exports, given its significant price, was 10 times higher than the similar duty in Kazakhstan, in the Russian Federation, the duty on the export of scrap metal was 9 euros, and in Belarus there was none at all. Without the permission of these views, it is impossible to form a common market for electricity, oil and gas, that is, to ensure equal business conditions for businesses of various states of the Eurasian Economic Union in the fuel and energy complex. It is possible to bring to a consensus different views between exporters and importers of resources by crediting export duties to the budget of the states of the Eurasian Economic Union - importers of resources (this practice in a number of cases took place in 2015 when exporting oil products produced from domestic oil). To resolve different views between resource exporters, it is important to agree on convergence in the level of export duties.

But all these are half-measures, implemented at the expense of the budgets of states that export resources and are of a non-systemic nature. It would be possible to follow the path of EU practice and transfer the main part of export duties to the EAEU budget. After which these funds could be directed to integration programs approved in the budget. But in the Eurasian Economic Union, unlike the European Union, there is not yet a common budget created not only through shared contributions of participants, but also through the delegation of part of national income to the integration center. For this reason, it is possible to fundamentally solve the problems of the different views under consideration only by aligning the level of domestic prices for resources to the level of world prices, using all kinds of tax maneuvers (for example, increasing the mineral extraction tax). In this case, all economic entities in the Eurasian Economic Union will indeed be placed in the same conditions, and the national budgets of the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan will benefit. But energy costs will increase for all Eurasian companies, which will at the same time stimulate energy efficiency. This will take some time, for this reason the common electricity market is planned to be formed by 2019, and the oil and gas markets in 2024-2025.

Another problem of the Eurasian Economic Union is the reduced level of monetization of the economies of the participating countries, established as the ratio of the M2 money supply to GDP. It fluctuates in the Eurasian Economic Union from 11.7% in Belarus to 42.7% in the Russian Federation. The lack of finance leads, on the one hand, to significant interest rates on loans, and on the other hand, to the dollarization of the economy. All this increases the speed of money circulation and redistributes financial resources from the real economy to the trade and financial area. Even for infrastructure projects implemented by Rosatom, RusHydro, InterRao in the states of the Eurasian Economic Union, the Russian Federation allocates loans in dollars, not rubles.

Figure 3. Level of monetization in the CIS countries (M2: GDP)

The shortage of money supply causes the weak development of the common capital market, the formation of joint companies, and the implementation of infrastructure projects.

The accumulated direct investments of the Russian Federation at the end of 2013 amounted to 20.01 billion dollars, including in Armenia - 2.2, in Belarus - 7.9, in Kazakhstan - 9.27, in Kyrgyzstan - 0, 64 billion dollars. This, of course, is not enough for a successful large-scale Eurasian unification.

The level of monetization in the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan is 42.7 and 20%. This is significantly less than in China and Japan - 195 and 245%. For this reason, China and Japan really need to accumulate gold and foreign exchange reserves, cooling the national economy. In the Russian Federation, the existing $360 billion is quite sufficient and instead of accumulating gold and foreign exchange reserves, it is necessary to implement non-cash money emission. This conclusion, in our opinion, is also true for Kazakhstan, whose level of gold and foreign exchange reserves per capita exceeds the domestic one. Monetization of the economies of the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan will significantly intensify not only the mutual trade of the states of the Eurasian Economic Union, but also develop production cooperation and form joint companies.

The reciprocal of the level of monetization of the economy is the velocity of circulation of the money supply M2. The speed of financial turnover in an economy depends on its reproductive structure. It is normal when this value is in the amount of one revolution per year or a maximum of two. But we also do not observe such a situation in the economy of the Eurasian Economic Union, and in particular in the Russian Federation. Despite the positive trend towards a decrease in the velocity of money circulation, its level has not yet reached not only the normal, but even the threshold value.

Table 1 - Monitoring of mutual investments in the CIS countries (2014) Monitoring of mutual investments in the CIS countries 2014. EDB Center for Information Studies, 2014.

Figure 4. Level of monetization in the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, China and Japan (M2: GDP)

Figure 5. Velocity of money circulation M2 in the Russian Federation.

If the economy has a huge share of high-precision engineering and high-tech products, and there is also extensive investment support for fundamental scientific research, then the rate of financial turnover slows down, since these industries have a long production cycle. If the economy produces mainly consumer goods and services, the rate of financial turnover increases, since the production cycle in these industries is relatively short.

Laid out in the early 1990s. The model of demonetization of the Russian economy has not yet been eliminated for 25 years. Even at the moment, the velocity of circulation of the money supply is 2.34 times, and previously there were values of 9, 8, 7 times. With such significant turnover, it is impossible to ensure an equilibrium state of the economy and develop its real sector, including the area of high-tech and innovative goods. In such conditions, financial resources go to the financial and banking area (and then mainly to the interbank market and the currency exchange), to the area of trade, and also to the area of the virtual economy. “Extra” liquidity is transferred abroad. In such a situation, the market is dominated not by Russian or Eurasian goods, but by imported consumer and industrial goods. This is the paradox that when there is a shortage of funds within the state, the Russian and a number of other states of the Eurasian Economic Union, the banking system helps foreign producers of goods.

Figure 6. Dynamics of GDP growth, M2 monetary base and inflation in the Russian Federation as a percentage of the previous year

Opponents of the monetization of the Eurasian economy believe that inflation depends only on the volume of the money supply, and are confident that by reducing the volume of the money supply, they also reduce inflation, but practice does not confirm this. Of course, inflation correlates with an increase in the money supply, but, initially, it depends not only on this factor; there is also a non-monetary reason for the formation of inflation. Figure 6 clearly shows the relationship: with an increase in the level of monetization of the economy, the rate of increase in GDP increases and the rate of increase in inflation decreases.

From 1999 to 2013, an increase in monetization by 3.53 times (from 12.1 to 42.7%) determined the growth of the real volume of GDP of the Russian Federation by 2.06 times. Note that the main foreign exchange earnings due to the increase in oil prices began in 2005, when the price of oil was $54.4 per barrel, and before this period it was in the amount of $20-30. In other words, for 2000- 2004 the average annual growth rate of real GDP amounted to 107.2% and was the most significant in the history of the Russian Federation in the 21st century, despite relatively low energy prices. In 2014, the increase in monetization stopped, or rather, remained at the same level, and for this reason, the increase in GDP in 2014 was only 0.6%.

Under the conditions of Western sanctions, the policy of Import substitution makes money emission extremely popular: Import substitution should be based on the policy of replacing foreign currency loans with ruble ones. In this case, we propose to carry out the issue in a non-cash form to finance investment projects of Russian and Eurasian commodity producers, the selection of which should take place on a competitive basis, with the help of refinancing by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation of commercial banks that meet certain criteria and are capable of providing a multiplier effect from the non-cash money issue. Only this will increase the monetization coefficient to a normal level, provide a quick and reliable source for the development of Russian and Eurasian production, replenishment of the federal budget revenue, resumption of financing of investment and innovation projects, develop the necessary competition that undermines the monopoly of imported products and, as a result, a decrease over time prices, will ensure the protection and stability of the ruble and, with appropriate actions in Kazakhstan, the tenge. If the emission for imports is carried out correctly, it can be calculated using share premiums rather than foreign exchange earnings.

Note that monetization in the Russian Federation has significant territorial features. With a shortage of money supply, it is unevenly distributed across the regions of the country and is overly concentrated in Moscow and the Moscow region (65% of the total). Consequently, if the state average level of the monetization coefficient is 42.7%, then in the capital it clearly exceeds the optimal norm (70%), and in other regions it is significantly less than this average level. Accordingly, when compared with the rest of the state, an inflated monetary demand has formed in Moscow, stimulating an increase in inflation.

For this reason, money emission should be aimed not only at additional financing of priority industries, but also at supporting the regions of the Russian Federation and joint Eurasian projects. This, in our opinion, implies, initially, an increase in the role of regional banks in the financial and credit system, as well as the orientation of capital banks towards lending to regional and Eurasian programs. As a result, inflation will decrease and the levels of wages and prices in different parts of the state will be equalized. This, in turn, will reduce internal and external migration to Moscow and St. Petersburg, ensure a more even distribution of labor resources and production across the territory of the Russian Federation, and smooth out disparities between the living standards of urban and rural populations. Lending to Eurasian projects will also reduce migration to the Russian Federation from other states of the Eurasian Economic Union and ensure convergence of living standards of the population different parts union.

By stimulating an increase in profits, without disturbing in this case the proportion between the increase in labor productivity and wages, we will be able to ensure internal effective demand - the main engine of economic growth. Investment through the issue of additional significant Russian funds in priority sectors, production and social infrastructure of regions and states of the Eurasian Economic Union will create incentives for foreign direct investment in the real sector of the economy and will increase the demand for Russian currency.

The advantage of the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, and other states in the Eurasian Economic Union is that if the West has already used all its “trump cards”, and the PRC and the “Asian” tigers have problems with overheating of the economy, then in the Eurasian Economic Union there are no problems associated with either with one situation or another, he still had both potential and resources. Having made the right conclusions from world practice and successfully brought the monetization of the economy to normal parameters, the states of the Eurasian Economic Union are able to take their rightful place in the international division of labor. With chronic demonetization of the economy, no other sources without monetization will be able to ensure sustainable economic growth and Eurasian integration.

Creating conditions for increasing the role of national currencies in mutual settlements, reducing the volume of dollarization, improving payment and settlement relations between states, pursuing a coordinated monetary policy, eliminating imbalances in the conduct of monetary policy are essential directions for deepening Eurasian economic integration. The result of the strengthening and development of the monetary system of the Eurasian Economic Union and, first of all, its leading national currencies - the ruble and the tenge - will be the formation of a payment and then currency union of the EAEU. This will make it possible over time to transform the future financial center of the Eurasian Economic Union into the Eurasian Central Bank, providing loans to commercial banks of the Eurasian Economic Union at low interest rates. A powerful basis for financial stability and modernization of the monetary system is formed by the colossal national wealth of the Russian Federation, which, according to the World Bank, amounts to $60 trillion (for comparison, the national wealth of the United States is estimated at $24 trillion) Statistics. Economic statistics. National wealth. www.Grandars.ru. Taking into account the national wealth of Kazakhstan, Belarus, and other member states, the EAEU will take a leading position in the world economy.

It is also necessary to take into account the fact that China, as well as other BRICS states, are forming an international financial system alternative to the Western one. The extensive use of the yuan in international payments in the future will lead to a radical weakening of the ability of the United States and the European Union to exert pressure on the Russian Federation and other countries of the world by introducing economic sanctions. In this case, we cannot allow the “dollarization” of the economies of the Eurasian Economic Union to be replaced by their “yuanization.” For this purpose, it is necessary to speed up the work on the formation of the Eurasian Monetary Union on the basis of a common Eurasian currency.

2.2 Prospects for integration

Discussion of the likely integration of the Russian Federation as a member of the EAEU with third countries intensified in 2011-2012, when the prospects for concluding agreements on free trade zones with New Zealand, Vietnam and the ASEAN states began to be discussed. Later, negotiations began on concluding a trade agreement with the European Free Trade Association (which includes countries such as Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, Liechtenstein), and in 2014 - with Israel. The possibility of forming free trade zones with India and the United States was discussed. Trade and economic integration with the European Union has been discussed since the Russia-EU summit in 2005. So far, none of these agreements have been signed, and some negotiations (with countries such as Norway, Switzerland, New Zealand, the USA, the EU) have been suspended, or did not even start for political reasons.

If we analyze the results of any trade agreements of the EAEU states with different partners, then, as in the case of other trade agreements, in addition to the general favorable impact on welfare due to a decrease in inefficiency due to the mutual weakening of trade restrictions, it is necessary to take into account industry effects, which, very significantly differ in the short and long term. For specificity, we will talk about lowering import duties, but the presented logic may well be applied to any type of trade restrictions, for example, to non-tariff barriers that have become increasingly significant in recent years.

In the short term, the reduction of customs duties on the import of goods within the borders of free trade zones causes four main effects:

a) increasing the real profit of the economy by lowering prices both for end-use products and for investment and intermediate products used by Russian industry in production activities;

b) switching consumption from products produced in the EAEU and other countries to products of a partner in free trade zones;

c) an increase in the import of goods from the state - a partner in free trade zones and the displacement of Russian production, which, in turn, determines the redistribution of labor and capital from less productive industries to more productive ones;

d) partial compensation for the decrease in demand for Russian goods by increasing profits.

In the long term, lowering barriers, which increases profits and welfare, ensures an increase in savings and investment, which leads to a further increase in production in any sector, which can compensate and cover the decline due to increased imports of goods. In addition, increased competition stimulates increased efficiency, which causes increased productivity and production.

The quantitative effects of one or another free trade zone for the economy and different sectors of each member of the EAEU will depend on the existing value of zero duties, the sectoral structure of production and consumption, the sectoral structure of trade with each other and with the partner in the free trade zones. It is significant that the transfer of issues of joint trade policy to the supranational level means, in particular, that a trade agreement can only be concluded with the EAEU in general, and its terms will equally apply to each member of the EAEU. This may lead to the fact that, under specific conditions, despite a favorable outcome for the entire EAEU, some of the participants may face losses from such integration. The fact is that trade flows within the EAEU for some of its members can be reoriented to states that are partners in the trade agreement.

For regions of a particular state, these losses can be compensated by internal budget transfers. In the EAEU, trade policy has been partly brought to the supranational level, but not budget policy; for this reason, for the full operation of the EAEU and the development of integration with other states, a mechanism for income redistribution is needed, which is not prescribed in the EAEU, although the redistribution of resources within the EAEU is present on a large scale (see. higher).

Today, one of the most popular and sought-after tools for analyzing the results of concluding trade agreements is a computational general equilibrium model (Computable General Equilibrium, CGE). The structural equations of this model reflect the general equilibrium in all markets, which makes it possible to analyze the impact of various foreign economic changes on the national economy. The most popular models assume perfect competition and capital accumulation.

When modeling, it is assumed that imported products are differentiated, divided by national origin and states, and elements of monopoly power are imputed, which is realized through their tariff rate. As a result of lowering tariffs, significant effects may arise from changes in the terms of trade due to the weakening of monopoly power. The differentiation of products of one industry depending on the state of origin (including Russian ones) is modeled using a function with constant elasticity of substitution (CES). With this form of aggregation of composite consumer products, Russian and imported products will not be completely either substitutes or compliments: in any equilibrium, all products are simultaneously consumed in strictly positive quantities. This property of the CES function allows us to model unequal costs for Russian and imported products and is consistent with the actual situation in which both Russian and imported substitute products are consumed in almost all countries.

Agreements on free trade zones, which imply only the mutual zeroing of import duties (the first stage of serious economic integration), provide favorable economic effects for the EAEU in general and for the Russian Federation in both the short and long term. From the point of view of the impact on the gross product, the largest income for the Russian Federation, which is quite natural, is achieved in free trade zones with the most significant trading partner - the European Union (about half of the total trade turnover) - from 15 billion (=0.8% of GDP) in short-term to $40 billion in the long term (=2.0% of GDP).

Other probable agreements give less significant results: the income of the Russian economy from free trade zones with the states of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) - from 6 billion (=0.3% of GDP) in the short term to 19 billion dollars (=0.9% of GDP) in the long term; from free trade zones with the states of the ASEAN bloc - respectively, from 1.5 billion (=0.08% of GDP) to 4.5 billion dollars (=0.25% of GDP); from free trade zones with Vietnam - respectively from 0.3 billion (=0.02% of GDP) to 0.9 billion dollars (=0.05% of GDP). Free trade zones with other countries bring in less income as a result of small trade turnover with them: in the long term, free trade zones with Israel will give the Russian Federation up to 250 million, with New Zealand - up to 50 million dollars.

Kazakhstan can also expect favorable effects in both the long and short term. But the same cannot be said about Belarus. If free trade agreements with developing countries give it favorable results, then free trade zones with developed countries mainly have a negative impact on the Belarusian economy due to the structure of the export of Belarusian goods to Russia, which will be greatly affected by the liberalization of the trade regime as a result of a shift in demand from Russian Federation from Belarusian products to products of partner states. Belarus may suffer the greatest losses from the free trade zones of the Customs Union with the European Union and the TPP states - up to $400 million; the smallest - from free trade zones with New Zealand - up to $ 4 million. It is clear that the losses of Belarus are significantly less than the income of the Russian Federation, not to mention the total income of the economies of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan, for this reason, resolving issues of income redistribution within the EAEU is necessary condition for integration with developed countries. At the same time, it is necessary to take into account the insufficiency of this condition: in order to develop integration with non-CIS countries in the investment sphere, it is desirable to form competitive industries and improve the investment climate within the EAEU.

It is possible to compensate for potential losses to Belarus from EAEU agreements with developed countries, for example, by temporarily changing in its favor the standards for the distribution of profits from import duties. At the same time, mutual transfers within the EAEU, despite their scale, are not taken into account when making any decision on free trade zones. Belarus, along with the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan, is a full member of the EAEU and has the right of veto on any significant issue. This led, for example, to the Belarusian side blocking in 2012 the formation of free trade zones with New Zealand, losses from which would initially appear in the dairy industry, financed, among other things, from resources received from the oil and gas transfer of the Russian Federation. At the beginning of 2014, the parties envisaged concluding an agreement with New Zealand precisely through the Russian Federation’s acceptance of an obligation to purchase Belarusian oil in the volumes desired for this state. A. Knobel. Economic issues. 2015. No. 3. P. 87--108.

2.2 Problems of the EAEU under sanctions

The ideology of an integration association with integration no less than a customs union is based on such main principles as:

1) coordinated trade policy in relation to other states;

2) creation and functioning of the customs territory. The use of retaliatory sanctions by the Russian Federation since August 2014 against food producers from countries such as the USA, EU, Australia, Norway and Canada, in the absence of such decisions in Belarus and Kazakhstan, violates the first basic principle: the trade policy of the EAEU members is becoming less coordinated. In this case, questions arise about the supply of goods from the above states to our country through the territory of two other members of the EAEU.

In the general design of the EAEU, this situation contradicts the functioning of the common customs territory, since when crossing the external customs border, products must move freely within the integration association. Under the new conditions, Belarusian products can be imported into our country without restrictions from Belarus, but food products from countries on the sanctions list are not allowed. The determination for all products, whether it is Belarusian or not, in the CIS is in practice regulated by the rules according to which a product is considered manufactured in the territory of a CIS state or the Customs Union if it is sufficiently processed or the cost of materials of foreign origin does not exceed 5% of the cost of the final product.

Eurasian Economic Union: achievements and problems

In the post-Soviet space, there are no workable intercountry associations with growth prospects with development potential similar to the EAEU. The CIS, unfortunately, could not emerge as a full-fledged instrument of post-Soviet integration. The unification of post-Soviet states into separate regional blocs (for example, the Central Asian Union) also did not bring the expected effect. The prospect of integration into the EU structures for most post-Soviet states remains speculative and does not guarantee economic and social gains, at least in initial stage. In this regard, it is important to closely consider both the overall integration potential of the EAEU and possible specific areas of integration.

The Customs Union and the EAEU have come into existence as structures, their core has been formed, and a common integration strategy has been agreed upon. Now the question is about deepening cooperation, which gradually goes beyond the purely economic sphere, touching on political issues, as well as emerging security problems. Whereinthe EAEU expansion strategy should be more comprehensive, aimed at creating a consolidated subject of geo-economic and geopolitical relations , a working model of regional international cooperation that is attractive to new participating countries. The development of any international institution presupposes the formation of supranational bodies, which does not mean the loss of sovereignty and their own development opportunities by the participating countries.

The EAEU acts as a multifunctional platform of a strategic, long-term nature . The first stage and form was an economic union designed to ensure the free movement of goods. In 2015, the formation of a single energy market began, and by 2025 it is planned to form a single Eurasian hydrocarbon market, which is intended to stimulate the development of the Eurasian economy. A near future is the transition to consideration of issues of a social, cultural and political nature.

However, there areobjective obstacles to the expansion of the EAEU and deepening integration within its framework :

conflict tension in relations between Russia and the West, the consequences of which are projected onto the post-Soviet space and complicate the advancement of Eurasian integration in the European direction;
own modernization projects of candidates for the EAEU, which may not correlate with the overall strategy of Eurasian integration, developed and implemented by the main participants in this process;
incoherence of economic models used by various post-Soviet states (a strategy that involves relying on their own development resources);
weakness or insufficient consolidation of political and power-administrative institutions within some potential participant states, which limits the possibility of their participation in integration and, more broadly, modernization processes in the post-Soviet space;
lack of an adequate level of political consensus among the elites of some countries - potential members of the EAEU, which makes it difficult for them to choose in favor of an integration strategy;
the incompleteness of the formation of the structures of the EAEU itself, designed to guide integration and ensure its high-quality content.

You can also point toSeveral main problem areas associated with the expansion of the EAEU:

1) Transfer of national and regional problems to the EAEU as an international institution . An example of a flexible and balanced approach to the integration of such states into the association is the integration of Armenia into the EAEU. The dispute with Azerbaijan over the possession of Nagorno-Karabakh, which resulted in the 1990s. in a full-fledged war and a situation of “frozen conflict” became the object of international settlement. The possibility of transferring the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict to the level of the EAEU threatened to destabilize the integration structure. The unfavorable geopolitical environment of Armenia and its lack of borders with other members of the EAEU complicated the interaction of the new member with members of the established “core” of the EAEU. The key position was the position of the President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev: Armenia will join the EAEU within the borders determined by the UN. This helped to relieve political tension and gave the leadership of Azerbaijan a clear signal that the EAEU is an economic structure and does not plan to address issues of interethnic conflicts and territorial disputes, replacing political associations. Similarly, it was possible to avoid adding to the agenda activities of the EAEU ethnopolitical and ethnoconfessional issues, which the previous government of Kyrgyzstan tried to emphasize.

2) The need for EAEU member countries to respond to international conflicts, in which other participants are forced to be involved . The events in Ukraine and the reunification of Crimea with Russia are causing well-known concern among a number of EAEU member countries. The leadership of Kazakhstan stated that it perceives the referendum in Crimea as a free expression of the will of the population of the Ukrainian autonomy and treats Russia’s decision with “understanding”. Despite the attempts of some Kazakh experts to draw analogies between the situation around Crimea and the state of affairs in the north of Kazakhstan itself, such assessments have not received recognition among most of Kazakh society and the elite. The leadership of Kazakhstan continued its course towards developing relations with Russia, considering it to best meet the interests of the country. Moreover, Kazakhstan and President N. Nazarbayev played an important mediating role in establishing a dialogue between Russia and the EU on the situation in eastern Ukraine, stimulating the launch of the Minsk process. At the same time, Kyrgyzstan, then still a potential member of the Customs Union and the EAEU, went even further, officially recognizing the results of the referendum.

An insufficiently defined and differently interpreted statement was disseminated by Armenia. According to official information, in a telephone conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin, his Armenian counterpart Serzh Sargsyan said that Yerevan considers the Crimean referendum to be the exercise of the right to expression of will (obviously, drawing a mental parallel with the possible fate of Nagorno-Karabakh). The leadership of Belarus took a balancing position, not supporting either side and refusing to officially recognize the results of the Crimean referendum. At the same time, actual recognition of the new situation with Crimea took place. President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko stated in the spring of 2014: “De facto, Crimea has become part of Russia... And we will be with the Russian Federation. What will happen de jure will happen later.” This position allowed the leadership of Belarus to maintain the possibility of maneuver and offer itself as a mediator in negotiations between representatives of Russia, Ukraine and Donbass.

While remaining faithful to its allied relations with Russia, Minsk gravitates toward developing relations with both Ukraine and the EU. The first is a fairly large foreign trade partner of Belarus, and the prospects of Belarusian exports to Europe and relative political stability in the country depend on the second. Direct export of the “color revolution” to Belarus itself is hardly possible in the near future, but its geopolitical position in the light of new realities and the activity of the West has become noticeably more complicated. A. Lukashenko said that he would not allow a repetition of the Kyiv events in his country. The only country that can help him in this is Russia.

Thus, the crisis in relations between Russia and the West, caused by the situation in Ukraine, did not lead to any large-scale crisis within the Eurasian structures and did not impede the creation of the EAEU. At the same timethe future of Eurasian integration processes will largely depend on the development of relations between Russia and the West , from the lifting or maintenance of sanctions against the Russian Federation, from the general strategy of the EU’s actions in the post-Soviet space.

3) An attempt by new members of the EAEU to achieve unilateral benefits and privileges , going beyond the agreements that form the legal framework for the activities of the EAEU. The latter, in particular, was manifested in the behavior of Kyrgyzstan, which tried to obtain very large-scale compensation, since the closure of borders with China would worsen the economic situation of a significant part of the population engaged in the re-export of Chinese goods, as well as due to difficulties due to integration into the EAEU in implementing joint China's infrastructure projects. Integration, as was once feared in Bishkek, could disrupt the logistics of projects and complicate the movement of equipment, people and equipment necessary for their implementation. The introduction of additional duties, in turn, led to an increase in the cost of such projects. Here we should also add the wish of Kyrgyzstan not to apply the EAEU requirements for sanitary control over its agricultural products. It is necessary to recall that the Treaty on Kyrgyzstan’s accession to the Eurasian Economic Union was signed on December 23, 2014, after which the authorities of the republic had to fulfill 181 points of the Roadmap for final entry into the EAEU. Bishkek was able to achieve additional benefits that, for example, Belarus did not have, increasing its share of the total customs duties of the EAEU to 1.9% (for Armenia this share is 1.11%) and receiving a number of trade and economic preferences for five years. In addition to this, it was announced the creation of a Kyrgyz-Russian fund with a capital of $1 billion, the funds of which will be used for the restoration and development of the country's industry. The significance of the benefits provided to Kyrgyzstan upon joining the EAEU placed additional responsibility on the shoulders of other participants, and above all, Russia and Kazakhstan.

The formation of such an “exception zone” could create an unfavorable precedent given the likely expansion of the EAEU. There is a need for consolidated economic, social and economic-legal spaces, unity of institutionalized “rules of the game” for all participants, simultaneously with the activation of mechanisms to ensure flexible consideration of the interests of individual participating countries. The results of Eurasian integration depend on how deep and systemic these exceptions are.

4) An issue related to ensuring real and actual equality of the EAEU member countries , on preventing imbalances in relations between the “core” that form the founding countries of the EAEU and its new members, and above all between the states included in this union that differ from each other in economic potential. Particularly important from the point of view of the prospects for expanding and deepening integration within the EAEU isRussia’s responsible position, which did not allow the emergence of a conditional center and periphery within the emerging general economic space . The relevance of this issue is related to the structural features of the EAEU, since the potential of its member states is not comparable.In order to avoid concerns among other EAEU member countries about the possibility of some kind of “neo-imperial course,” Russia should put forward new initiatives related to the comprehensive development of the socio-economic potential of these states and justify the mutual benefit of cooperation initiatives . Overcoming such fears would also be facilitated by official recognition at the level of EAEU institutions of the possibility of multi-level and multi-tempo integration, as well as diversity possible forms inclusion of new members and partners in the structure of the association.

5) Concerns of the “current” members of the EAEU regarding new applicant countries , primarily concerning their readiness to be reliable partners, as well as the extent to which their participation in the activities of the Union is strategic and long-term, and not dictated by tactical and short-term benefits. Related to the last problem is the readiness of many states to strictly and punctually fulfill their international obligations, whether they have the necessary political institutions and political will for this, as well as the necessary level of support among the population and elites.

Nevertheless, despite the difficulties and contradictions, the development of the EAEU, including the improvement of its institutional organization and the repositioning of its traditional member countries, continues.

Thus, a new composition of the Eurasian Board was formed - two members from each participating country. The appointment of the representative of Armenia T. S. Sargsyan as the head of the Collegium emphasizes the interest of other member countries of the association in closer integration of Armenia into the structures of the EAEU, as well as in strengthening the political positions of its leadership. Armenia, which made its choice in favor of the EAEU at the end of 2013, is in difficult conditions. Its full integration will require time and effort, and will be complicated by geopolitical factors (primarily the conflict with Azerbaijan) and the difficult internal political situation.

As for Georgia, as is known, the position of its elite and a significant part of the population suggests integration into Euro-Atlantic structures, and not into the Eurasian project. The only obstacle to this remains the problem of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, whose independence official Tbilisi does not recognize. Continued tensions with Russia make Georgia's inclusion in the free trade zone a purely hypothetical prospect.

For Azerbaijan, despite Russia’s desire to “softly” connect it to the structures of the EAEU in accordance with the “broad partnership” formula, it appears that formal stay outside this association, which includes Armenia, is still more attractive. It is difficult to imagine a situation in which Baku and Yerevan, without resolving extremely complex political issues, could mutually open their borders in the near future for the free movement of goods and labor. Positioning itself as a neutral “non-aligned state”, part of the “Turkic world” and acting as a strategic partner of both NATO and Russia, allows the Azerbaijani leadership to count on political and economic dividends. The tension around Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as the recent deterioration in relations between Russia and Turkey, which is one of Azerbaijan’s priority partners, does not allow us to count on its consistent inclusion in Eurasian integration in the near future. Azerbaijan's participation in a number of energy transit projects that compete with Russian ones also complicates participation in the EAEU. Azerbaijan refused to sign the Association Agreement with the EU, without making any indication of the possibility of joining the Customs Union or the EAEU. Some Azerbaijani experts believe that Baku should consider participating in the Eurasian integration project, but this remains only an expert opinion. The armed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, “unfrozen” in early April 2016, makes the EAEU’s partnership with Azerbaijan, which relies on the support of Turkey, completely ephemeral, and its participation in Eurasian projects unrealistic in the existing conditions.

Central Asian direction of integration

In the emerging geopolitical situation, the Central Asian direction is acquiring particular importance for Eurasian integration. By integrating Kyrgyzstan and planning to take similar steps in relation to Tajikistan in the foreseeable future, the leadership of the EAEU countries and, above all, Russia is seeking to be proactive, strengthening its influence in the Central Asian region. Thanks to this, Russia and its closest partners gain additional opportunities for political influence, access to new markets and access to significant communications and sources of raw materials. However, the consequences of new members joining the EAEU may be ambiguous. After all, modern Central Asia is a whole complex of problems associated with the heterogeneity of its constituent countries, the instability of state institutions and political regimes, the need for power and political transition, the general instability of raw materials and agrarian raw materials economies, as well as the growing threat of export of radical political Islam to the region.

Thus, according to experts from the Institute of CIS Countries, the key problems of Kyrgyzstan are the structural degradation of the economy, low levels of productivity and the triumph of the trade intermediary model based on re-export and re-import. At the same time, the integration of Kyrgyzstan into the EAEU makes it possible, with the participation of a neutral party, to resolve border disputes and conflicts with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Among the problems associated with the integration of Kyrgyzstan into the EAEU, one should highlight migration, the rootedness of informal practices in socio-political life, and dependence on the economic situation in Russia.

In this regard, experts rightly note that even after joining the EAEU, the economic situation will not improve on its own due to the factor of “economic donation.” At the same time, thanks to joining the association, Kyrgyzstan has a chance to use the mechanisms of the EAEU to stabilize and improve the socio-economic situation.

As for Tajikistan’s possible entry into the EAEU, these plans today have both supporters and opponents. Shortly before the conclusion of the agreement on the creation of the EAEU, Tajikistan developed a road map for the strategy of joining the Eurasian Economic Union. A study by the Eurasian Development Bank conducted three years ago, assessing the economic effects of Tajikistan’s accession to the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space, emphasizes the country’s economic potential for such integration.

However, the possible integration of Tajikistan into the EAEU raises concerns due to the possibility of involving other members of the association in regional conflicts. Since in recent years there have often been attempts to intensify the activities of Islamist organizations (an example of which is the terrorist attack on the central office of the country’s Ministry of Defense and the department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the city of Vakhdat in September 2015), Russia’s role in stabilizing the Tajik statehood will only increase in the near future.

At the same time, experts remain concerned about the weakness of the Tajik state and the ongoing degradation of the social sphere, as well as the official ban on the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), which led to the loss of control over the religious and political sphere and the destruction of the mechanisms of the coalition that emerged as a result of civil war 1992-1993

Problems related to the fight against drug trafficking, Islamic terrorism, and illegal migration are problems for both the EAEU countries and applicants for membership in this association; coordination of the efforts of Tajikistan and the EAEU in this matter is an urgent need. Tajikistan needs a version of the road map adapted to its special conditions. Today it is actively working within the free trade zone with the EAEU.Full membership of Tajikistan in the EAEU seems to be a matter of the near future and will depend on the level of guarantees (economic and military-political) from other EAEU members , primarily Moscow and Astana. As well as on Dushanbe’s ability to fit its plans into the overall agreed strategy of the Eurasian integration process.

As for states that do not have a common border with the current members of the EAEU and those showing interest in creating a free trade zone with it (Egypt, Israel, Tunisia, Pakistan, Jordan, Mongolia), then the problems here are even more complicated. The heterogeneity of these countries, their belonging to different geopolitical and geo-economic regions, existing foreign policy and foreign economic obligations and weak economic ties with the Greater Eurasia region make their possible inclusion in a single economic space the subject of serious discussion.

Significant difficulties also exist with respect to other, more likely candidates for joining the EAEU. First of all, this applies toUzbekistan , who left the CSTO in 2006 and for some time relied on Western political guarantees necessary to ensure the transit of power (which the country’s leadership refused in 2014). Uzbekistan has long counted on carrying out socio-economic modernization relying on its own resources (raw materials and demographics), including own program(re)industrialization. A potential market for Uzbek products was supposed to be created within the framework of the Central Asian Union, a project that was thwarted by Kyrgyzstan's accession to the WTO in December 1998. Following this course, Uzbekistan never sought full economic integration with other former Soviet republics. He at one time withdrew from the Central Asian Union, left the Eurasian Economic Community, rejected the proposal to join the Customs Union, and did not even intend to join the WTO until 2020. However, the country's raw material base turned out to be limited, the problems of demography and unemployment became more and more obvious, and individual successful investment and high-tech projects did not allow us to talk about comprehensive and consistent reindustrialization.

Therefore, if the seriousness of Uzbekistan’s intentions to integrate into structures related to ensuring national and regional security today is beyond doubt, its desire to connect to the economic component of the Eurasian integration processes faces a number of objective limitations. And above all - with the preservation of autarkic elements in the country’s economic policy, with complex processes within the Uzbek political elite, where competition between regional clans continues in a latent form. In addition, among the business elite of Uzbekistan, in addition to the traditional competition with Astana for leadership in the region, there is a fear of economic “absorption” by the more powerful Kazakhstan, whose business is integrated with the even more powerful Russian economy.

President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov, at a meeting with Vladimir Putin in Tashkent in December 2014, only promised to begin consultations on the creation of a free trade area (FTA) with the EAEU, but a strategic breakthrough in this direction has not yet occurred. At the same time, Russia remains Uzbekistan’s largest economic partner, accounting for almost 23% of its foreign trade. This allows us to count in the near future only on associated relations between Uzbekistan and the EAEU with the possible creation of an FTA.

Takes a special position in relation to any external associationsTurkmenistan , which has huge gas reserves. Having officially secured its neutrality, it balances between the interests of the EU, Russia, China and Iran. This is confirmed by the situation with the summer “gas” aggravation of 2015 between Russia and Turkmenistan, which is considered by the West, Iran, and China as the most important partner in the energy sector. This is no coincidence: gas production has reached a record 80 billion m3, and its production is increasing by 10% from year to year. At the same time, the aggravation of the situation on the Turkmen border with Afghanistan (a series of attacks on border posts with casualties among Turkmen border guards) makes Ashgabat’s “self-sufficiency” strategy, at least, questionable and encourages it to strengthen ties with the SCO.

The 5+1 agreement recently concluded between the five Central Asian states and the United States at the initiative of Washington cannot guarantee the security of the Central Asian states. Effective regional security mechanisms can only be created on the basis of a broader coalition of states, including Russia and China. At the same timethe integration of Turkmenistan into the EAEU in the foreseeable future is unlikely due to the divergence of its economic interests from the interests of the EAEU members .

the need to transform the integration strategy

The expansion of the EAEU is not limited to the post-Soviet space. Along with the establishment of close relations with Vietnam, which is becoming an important link with the ASEAN countries, it seems likely that a free trade agreement will be concluded with Laos, which is similar in many economic aspects to Vietnam. The association strives for rapprochement with China and participation in large-scale projects, primarily in the “New Silk Road”. The growing Chinese economy needs the raw materials that Central Asia is rich in and access to transit to Europe. This is encouraging China to implement large-scale infrastructure projects. For Russia and the Central Asian countries, joining Chinese projects means investing in transport infrastructure, reviving the economy in the regions included in the project and adjacent to them, and additional opportunities for exporting energy resources to China.

China , extending its influence and infrastructure elements to the Central Asian region in order to access local energy sources and markets,for now he prefers to act within the framework of his own project “New silk road» , showing no interest in regional economic associations. China's creation of a free trade zone jointly with the EAEU faces the problem of the latter's competitiveness. Therefore, its full implementation may take from 10 to 30 years. The first step towards the creation of such an FTA should be an agreement on trade and economic cooperation between the EAEU and China. The creation of more sustainable and institutionalized mechanisms is a matter for the more distant future.

The range of partnerships built by the EAEU is not limited to cooperation with China. On May 29, 2015, the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Vietnam signed an agreement to create a free trade area (FTA). The document, which provides for the elimination of duties on almost 90% of goods within 10 years, will more than double trade turnover, and will also mark the beginning of subsequent integration with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region.

As for the possibility of extending such experience to other countries, the Eurasian Economic Commission has not yet undertaken to predict when and with whom a new agreement on a free trade zone will be signed, but they confirm that there are enough proposals for concluding such agreements today.

Thus, the EEC is almost ready, but “postponed” agreements with New Zealand and the European Free Trade Association (Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Liechtenstein). In relation to India and Egypt, a similar possibility is being considered and studied by experts. The EU is not currently considered as a potential participant in such agreements for political reasons.

As for the possibility of concluding agreements on the creation of free trade zones with the unrecognized Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, resolving this issue faces a number of difficulties. Obstacles are the unrecognized status of these states (coupled with the blockade of Transnistria), their connection with unresolved ethnopolitical conflicts, as well as low economic potential (South Ossetia). The conclusion of bilateral agreements with these countries is possible only after at least a relative clarification of their political status and future, which requires numerous approvals within the EAEU and diplomatic efforts on the part of Russia.

Further expansion of the EAEU involves adjusting the strategy taking into account changing political and socio-economic circumstances.Refusal to understand the “multi-vector” strategy as permanent maneuvering between centers of power to obtain unilateral benefits is almost inevitable. Otherwise, destabilization of the structural and institutional foundations of the EAEU is likely, which could make the union ineffective . And if now the main directions of cooperation between Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan have been agreed upon and defined, then with regard to new and possible future members of the union the situation remains not fully defined. And this makes it difficult to plan the next stages of the integration process and coordinate their management.

To deepen and improve the quality of integration, the Eurasian Economic Union needs political “reinforcement” related towith the strengthening of parallel structures that ensure systemic security in Eurasia . The formation of the EAEU by countries seems equally necessaryindependent regional policy , not only promoting interregional cooperation and cross-border cooperation, but also allowing for better use of the resources of the regions included in the Union space for general socio-economic development. It seems equally important to develop and implement a common demographic and migration policy, which will avoid many risks and make the process of Eurasian integration more manageable and predictable, avoiding catastrophic and crisis scenarios.

Literature

Accession of the Kyrgyz Republic to the Eurasian Economic Union: impact on migration processes. -http://24.kg/ekonomika/20765_aza_migranyan_v_kyirgyizstane_parazitiruyuschaya_ekonomika_kotoraya_ne_sozdaet_bazyi_dlya_razvitiya/ (date of access: 06/04/2016).

Among the largest modern international associations is the Eurasian. It was formally established in 2014, but by the time the agreement on its creation was signed, the EAEU member states already had significant experience of interaction in the mode of active economic integration. What are the specifics of the EAEU? What is this - an economic or political association?

General information about the organization

Let's begin our exploration of the question posed by reviewing the key facts about the organization in question. What are the most noteworthy facts about the EAEU? What kind of structure is this?

The Eurasian Economic Union, or EAEU, is an association within the framework of international economic cooperation of several states of the Eurasian region - Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Belarus and Armenia. Other countries are expected to join this association, since the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is an open structure. The main thing is that candidates for joining the association share the goals of this organization and show a willingness to fulfill the obligations stipulated by the relevant agreements. The creation of the structure was preceded by the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Community, as well as the Customs Union (which continues to function as one of the structures of the EAEU).

How did the idea of forming the EAEU come about?

As a number of sources testify, the state that was the first to initiate the processes of economic integration in the post-Soviet space, which grew into the establishment of the EAEU, is Kazakhstan. Nursultan Nazarbayev expressed a corresponding idea at a speech at Moscow State University in 1994. Subsequently, the concept was supported by other former Soviet republics - Russia, Belarus, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan.

The main advantage of a state being part of the Eurasian Economic Union is freedom economic activity entities registered in it on the territory of all member countries of the union. It is expected that a single trade space will soon be formed on the basis of the EAEU institutions, characterized by common standards and norms for doing business.

Is there room for political interaction?

So, what is the EAEU, a purely economic structure, or an association that may be characterized by a political component of integration? At the moment and in the near future, as various sources testify, it would be more correct to talk about the first interpretation of the essence of the unification. That is, the political aspect is excluded. Countries will integrate in pursuit of economic interests.

There is evidence of initiatives regarding the creation of certain supranational parliamentary structures within the EAEU. But the Republic of Belarus and Kazakhstan, as evidenced by a number of sources, do not consider the possibility of their participation in building the respective countries. They want to maintain full sovereignty, agreeing only to economic integration.

At the same time, it is obvious to many experts and ordinary people how close the political relations of the countries that are members of the EAEU are. The composition of this structure is formed by the closest allies who have no publicly expressed fundamental differences regarding the difficult situation on the world stage. This allows some analysts to conclude that economic integration within the framework of the association under consideration would be very difficult if there were significant political differences between the countries participating in the association.

History of the EAEU

Studying some facts from the history of the association will help us better understand the specifics of the EAEU (what kind of organization it is). In 1995, the heads of several states - Belarus, the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, and a little later - Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, formalized agreements establishing the Customs Union. On their basis, the Eurasian Economic Community, or EurAsEC, was established in 2000. In 2010, a new association appeared - the Customs Union. In 2012, the Common Economic Space opened - first with the participation of the states that are members of the Customs Union, then Armenia and Kyrgyzstan joined the structure.

In 2014, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus signed an agreement on the creation of the EAEU. Later Armenia and Kyrgyzstan joined it. The provisions of the relevant document came into force in 2015. The EAEU Customs Union continues to function, as we noted above. It includes the same countries as the EAEU.

Progressive development

Thus, the member states of the EAEU - the Republic of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan - began to interact long before the corresponding association was established in its modern form. According to a number of analysts, the Eurasian Economic Union is an example of an international organization with a progressive, systematic development of integration processes, which can determine the significant stability of the corresponding structure.

Stages of development of the EAEU

Several stages of development of the Eurasian Economic Union have been defined. The first is the establishment of a free trade zone, the development of norms according to which trade between the EAEU member countries can be carried out without duties. At the same time, each state retains independence in terms of conducting trade with third countries.

The next stage in the development of the EAEU is the formation of the Customs Union, which involves the formation of an economic space within which the movement of goods will be carried out unhindered. At the same time, foreign trade rules that are common to all member countries of the association should also be determined.

The most important stage in the development of the union is the formation of a single market. It is expected that it will be created within the framework of which it will be possible to freely exchange not only goods, but also services, capital and personnel - between the member states of the association.

The next stage is the formation of an economic union, the participants of which will be able to coordinate the priorities of implementing economic policy among themselves.

After the listed tasks are solved, it remains to achieve complete economic integration of the states included in the association. This involves the creation of a supranational structure that will determine priorities in building economic and social policies in all countries included in the union.

Advantages of the EAEU

Let’s take a closer look at the key benefits that EAEU members receive. We noted above that among the key ones is the freedom of economic activity of economic entities that are registered in any state of the union throughout the entire territory of the EAEU. But this is far from the only advantage of the state joining the organization we are studying.

EAEU members will have the opportunity to:

Take advantage of low prices for many goods, as well as reduced costs associated with the transportation of goods;

Develop markets more dynamically by increasing competition;

Increase labor productivity;

Increase the volume of the economy due to increased demand for manufactured goods;

Provide employment for citizens.

GDP growth prospects

Even for such economically powerful players as Russia, the EAEU - most important factor economic growth. Russia's GDP, according to some economists, may, thanks to the country's entry into the association under consideration, receive a very powerful growth stimulus. Other EAEU member countries—Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Belarus—can achieve impressive indicators of GDP growth.

Social aspect of integration

In addition to the positive economic effect, the EAEU member countries are expected to integrate in the social aspect as well. International business activities, as many experts believe, will contribute to the establishment of partnerships and stimulate strengthening the friendship of nations. Integration processes are facilitated by the common Soviet past of the peoples living in the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union. The cultural and, what is very important, linguistic proximity of the EAEU states is obvious. The composition of the organization is formed by countries in which the Russian language is familiar to the majority of the population. Thus, many factors can contribute to the successful solution of the tasks facing the heads of state of the Eurasian Economic Union.

Supranational structures

The Treaty on the EAEU has been signed, it’s up to its implementation. Among the most important tasks within the framework of the development of the Eurasian Economic Union is the creation of a number of supranational institutions, whose activities will be aimed at promoting economic integration processes. According to a number of public sources, the formation of some basic institutions of the EAEU is expected. What structures could these be?

First of all, these are various commissions:

Economics;

For raw materials (she will set prices, as well as quotas for goods and fuel, coordinate policies in the field of precious metals circulation);

For interstate financial and industrial associations and enterprises;

By input monetary unit for calculations;

On environmental issues.

It is also planned to create a special Fund, the competence of which will include cooperation in a variety of areas: in the economy, in the field of development of science and technology. It is expected that this organization will deal with issues of financing various studies and help participants in cooperation in resolving a wide range of issues - legal, financial or, for example, environmental.

Other important supranational structures of the EAEU that are planned to be created are the International Investment Bank, as well as the arbitration of the Eurasian Economic Union.

Among the successfully created associations that are part of the governance structure of the EAEU - Let us study the features of its activities in more detail.

Eurasian Economic Commission

It can be noted that the EEC was created in 2011, that is, even before the agreement on the creation of the EAEU was signed. It was founded by Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Initially, this organization was created to manage processes at the level of such a structure as the Customs Union. The EAEU is a structure in the development of which the Commission is called upon to directly participate now.

The EEC has established a council and a board. The first structure should include deputy heads of government of the member states of the association. The board should consist of three people from the EAEU member countries. The Commission provides for the creation of separate departments.

The Eurasian Economic Commission is the most important, but not the most important supranational governing body of the EAEU. It is subordinate to the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council. Let's look at the key facts about him.

This structure, like the Eurasian Economic Commission, was created several years before the states signed the agreement on the creation of the EAEU. Thus, for a long time it was considered a supranational body within the structure of the Customs Union, as well as the Common Economic Space. The Council is formed by the heads of the EAEU member states. It should meet at the highest level at least once a year. The heads of government of the member countries of the association must meet at least 2 times a year. A peculiarity of the functioning of the Council is that decisions are made in a consensus format. The approved provisions are mandatory for implementation in the EAEU member countries.

Prospects for the EAEU

How do analysts assess the prospects for the development of the EAEU? We noted above that some experts believe that simultaneously with economic integration, political rapprochement of the member states of the association is inevitable. There are experts who share this point of view. There are experts who completely disagree with her. The main argument of those analysts who see prospects for the politicization of the EAEU is that Russia, as the leading economic player in the association, will in one way or another influence the decisions made by the authorities of the EAEU member states. Opponents of this point of view believe that, on the contrary, it is not in the interests of the Russian Federation to show excessive interest in the politicization of the corresponding international association.

Provided that a balance is maintained between the economic and political components in the EAEU, the prospects for the union, based on a number of objective indicators, are assessed by many analysts as very positive. Thus, the total GDP of the member states of the structure under consideration will be comparable to the indicators of the leading economies of the world. Taking into account the scientific and resource potential of the EAEU, the volume of economic systems of the member countries of the union can grow significantly in the future.

Global collaboration

According to a number of analysts, the prospects for cooperation with the EAEU are attractive for countries that seem to be far from the economic space formed by the countries that signed the EAEU treaty - Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Belarus and Armenia. For example, Vietnam recently signed a free trade agreement with the EAEU.

Syria and Egypt are showing interest in cooperation. This gives analysts reason to say that the Eurasian Economic Union can become a powerful player in the world market.

In the last days of February, Russian President Vladimir Putin made official visits to a number of post-Soviet Central Asian republics: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

It can be considered that the trips were made as part of further cooperation within the framework of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), since Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (along with Armenia and Belarus) are already members of this union, and Tajikistan is currently negotiating accession to this organization.

Thus, discussion of the problems and prospects of the EAEU was on the agenda of Putin’s meetings with the three Central Asian leaders. It should be noted that the idea of creating a Eurasian Union was first voiced more than 20 years ago by Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev. Since then, several attempts have been made to form something like a single economic space within the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Since 2011, V. Putin has been involved in the implementation of the plan. On January 1, 2015, Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, which were members of a pre-existing economic bloc called the Customs Union, formed the EAEU. The next day, Armenia joined the organization, and in August of the same year, Kyrgyzstan joined it.

However, the economic situation that prevailed at the time of the creation of the EAEU did not allow its members to experience the immediate results that they initially expected. This was largely predetermined by the impact of the economic crisis on Russia, as well as the deterioration of relations between Russia and the West.

However, some features within the new union turned out to be very useful for its individual members. Thus, positive changes associated with the status of labor migrants from Kyrgyzstan in Russia are obvious. They now compare favorably with the status of migrants from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. As a result, the number of labor migrants heading to Russia from Kyrgyzstan has increased, while the same figure for Tajikistan and Uzbekistan is decreasing.

If we translate the dynamics into numbers, the following picture emerges: if since 2013, the volume of remittances from Russia to Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan began to fall sharply, then in the first nine months of 2016, migrant workers from Kyrgyzstan (which became a member state of the EAEU ) sent transfers in the amount of 1 billion 286 million dollars, which is 21 percent more than in 2015.

It is obvious that the example of Kyrgyzstan makes membership in the EAEU attractive for Tajikistan. Even before the creation of the EAEU, approximately every eighth citizen of Tajikistan worked in Russia.

Unfortunately, at the moment the EAEU remains a group of allies in the economic sphere. In terms of political approaches and assessments, there is no unity among the members of the organization, which distinguishes the EAEU from the EU. The EAEU cannot act on the international political arena as a single force, since its members do not have a common position on the issue of Ukraine.

There are other internal complications. Thus, the short-term disagreement between Russia and Turkey after the incident with the downing of a Russian plane by Ankara in November 2015 on the Turkish-Syrian border did not pass by the interests of the EAEU member countries.

First of all, the difficulties were caused by the fact that Russia's decision (albeit temporary) to close its borders to goods coming from or going there from Turkey complicated the situation for Central Asia as a whole, but in particular it affected the Central Asian members of the EAEU such like Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, which have strong trade ties with Turkey.

There is also a complication associated with the Chinese factor. The Central Asian countries that are members of the EAEU have relations with China, which is, in fact, the leading investment and trade partner for all Central Asian countries.

Will the EAEU be able to become economically attractive for a group of countries, against the background of the large-scale international trade project “One Belt, One Road” promoted by China, which aims to connect dozens of countries by rail, road and sea routes?

Aidar Khairutdinov

The Eurasian Economic Union, in comparison with the European Union, is a rather young association. In 2025, the EAEU will celebrate its 10th anniversary. At the same time, the member states (Kazakhstan, Russia, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Belarus) are not afraid to set ambitious goals and objectives.

In the future, until 2025, within the framework of the EAEU it is planned to implement the “four freedoms” - the complete elimination of barriers that impede the free movement of goods, services, labor and capital. It is also planned to create a single market for energy resources (it will include a common market for electricity, oil, petroleum products and gas), a single transport space, and a coordinated agro-industrial policy. In addition, by decision of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council No. 28 of October 16, 2015, the directions along which the EAEU will develop until 2030 were specified. These include: 1 - ensuring macroeconomic stability, 2 - creating conditions for the growth of business activity and investment attractiveness, 3 - innovative development and modernization of the economy, 4 - ensuring the availability of financial resources and the formation of an effective financial market of the union, 5 - infrastructure development and implementation of transit potential, 6 - development of human resources and creation of a system for monitoring the movement of labor, 7 - cooperation in the field of resource saving and increasing energy efficiency, 8 - interregional and cross-border cooperation, 9 - realization of foreign trade potential through the conclusion of non-preferential and preferential trade agreements, as well as in the form of dialogue interactions.

However, it cannot be denied that there are certain difficulties in implementing the integration project, which are not least due to the peculiarities of the internal development of the member states, the discrepancy between their economic interests, and the desire to protect their domestic market. In addition, experts include turbulence in the global economy, high volatility of financial and energy markets, crisis phenomena in the global and regional policy, which in conditions of high interdependence has a particularly painful impact on developing economies.

Experts from the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) presented their vision of the prospects for the development of integration processes within the EAEU during the traditional “city breakfast” Úrbi et órbi, organized by the RIAC.

The event was attended by: Elena Kuzmina, head of the sector of the Center for Post-Soviet Studies, IMEMO RAS. EAT. Primakova, RIAC expert; Elena Alekseenkova, manager for analytical work at RIAC, researcher at the Center for Global Problems at MGIMO University of the Russian Foreign Ministry.

During the meeting, the RIAC workbook “Prospects for the development of the EAEU project by 2025” was presented.

What are the expectations of the participating countries from the EAEU?

Elena Alekseenkova notes that the presence of a single document at the EAEU level, which sets out development directions until 2030, indicates that all member states share a common vision for the development of the union in a given time frame. The expert lists the following as general expectations from integration within the EAEU:

Expanding sales markets for national products, increasing export opportunities; (most important direction)

Increasing the competitiveness of national business and national goods, attracting more investments;

Development of our own transit potential and transport and logistics infrastructure;

Reindustrialization of the economy, industrial cooperation within the union;

Creation of a single labor market and better implementation of existing human capital;

Coordination of economic macroregulation.

However, we must not forget that the expectations of member states from the EAEU are formed in close connection with national goals and objectives of internal economic development. The round table experts spoke about the national strategies of the participating countries for a better understanding of the place and role of the EAEU in their economic policies.

The expectations of the member states from the EAEU are formed in close connection with national goals and objectives of internal economic development

Thus, the Development Strategy of the Republic of Armenia for 2014 - 2025 states that the state’s membership in the Customs Union (at the time of development of this strategy, Armenia was a member of the Customs Union and was not a member of the EAEU - editor’s note) will facilitate local producers’ access to more than a consumer market of 170 million, will provide cheaper imports of energy resources, open up the possibility of combining a favorable trade regime with the EU and the EAEU, and make the country a crossroads for trade interaction between the two unions. However, this strategy does not talk about specific steps to implement these tasks.

The Belarusian strategy in the EAEU has been worked out in the most detail. We are talking not only about a single market for energy resources and a single market for oil and gas, which interests Belarus most of all, but also about other industries, primarily mechanical engineering. The country's leadership is confident that it is necessary and possible to develop Belarusian industry within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union. At the same time, it is planned not only to use the export potential of the EAEU, but also free trade zones (FTAs) that will be established with other countries (to date, an FTA agreement has only been signed with Vietnam).

Kazakhstan is one of the most active participants in the EAEU, which has many development programs (for example, “Strategy 2050”, as well as various transport development programs). However, only in the “2050” program there is a mention that Kazakhstan should use the opportunities of the EAEU. Thus, most programs are more focused on the internal development of Kazakhstan.

The strategy of Kyrgyzstan for 2013-2014 mainly deals with the creation of sectoral regional programs: agriculture, hydropower with projects to create new capacities, and mining. As for the Eurasian integration project, the emphasis in this document is mainly on labor migration. If you look at more recent programs, Kyrgyzstan’s main task is to resolve the issue of return migrants who were expelled from the countries of the union for non-compliance with the law.

As for the Russian side, the Concept of long-term socio-economic development of the Russian Federation for the period until 2020, which was adopted in 2013, states that the Customs Union serves as the basis for the development of cooperation both with the CIS countries and with everything else peace. Later, this concept was reinforced by other programs. This can be seen in the Russian foreign policy strategy adopted in 2016. In addition, at the last St. Petersburg forum V.V. Putin came up with the idea of “Greater Eurasia”, the basis of which should be the Eurasian Economic Union. At the same time, experts note with regret that the Concept 2020, like most countries, does not clearly outline steps to unlock the trade, transport and other potentials of the EAEU.

Elena Kuzmina believes that current national development programs have a pronounced export-oriented orientation, taking into account, first of all, national, rather than all-Union interests. In addition, despite the fact that the member countries envision the formation of a coordinated industrial policy and a common market for engineering products, currently difficulties in achieving this goal are associated with the small volume of mutual investments in the real sector of the economy and the weak activity of industrial companies. At the same time, the EAEU member countries will maintain their main industry priorities until 2025 and will continue to use their participation in the Eurasian Economic Union for their further development and strengthening of their national economies. In turn, the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) is carrying out targeted work to overcome the disunity of interests within the union and move towards the formation of a coordinated or common policy in different spheres of the economy.

Current national development programs have a pronounced export-oriented orientation, taking into account, first of all, national, rather than all-Union interests.

EU - EAEU

Elena Alekseenkova noted that for most member states the European Union is a key trading partner. Therefore, the fate of the latter will largely depend on how relations between the EU and the EAEU develop until 2025. Thus, about 30% of Armenia’s foreign trade is with the EU. This state uses the GSP+ system of preferences, which allows it to export more than 6 thousand items of goods of its own production to the EU countries at zero or significantly reduced customs duties. Since 2016, an expanded partnership and cooperation agreement has been in force between Kazakhstan and the European Union. Today, the European Union accounts for 50% of the country's foreign trade turnover and 52% of investments. The EU market is no less important for Belarus. This state is trying to position itself as an “export hub” of the EAEU. It is interesting that by 2020, the country’s leadership has set a goal to achieve the following proportions in foreign trade: 1/3 of the country’s trade turnover should come from the EAEU, 1/3 to the EU market and 1/3 to other countries.

In this regard, sanctions and counter-sanctions between Russia and the EU are perceived as a factor hindering successful economic cooperation within the EAEU.

Are the goals achievable?

Answering a question from a correspondent for the magazine “International Affairs”, how realistic is it for the EAEU member countries to achieve all the tasks set by 2025, Elena Kuzmina replied: “I’m not sure that all the goals will be achieved by 2025. The Eurasian Bank is very seriously considering the issue of a single currency, but its introduction should not be expected in the medium term. A lot will depend on the economic development of Russia, since within the EAEU our state is the undisputed economic leader - the largest market, the most economically developed country. Unfortunately, member countries have not yet completely moved away from the practice of placing bilateral relations at the forefront. The region is still divided. It takes time to remove all barriers to greater integration of the Eurasian space.”

Elena Alekseenkova, answering the same question, said: “It all depends on whether consensus is reached on all issues on the agenda of the EAEU. By taking measures, we protect our own market of national producers, and when trying to provide them with any privileges, we often do this to the detriment of other EAEU partners. Everyone uses these tools. But it is important to understand the long term here. Whether the set goals correspond to our interests or not. Let's take the general electricity market. It is clear that everyone has a common interest, but at some point there are situations when national governments believe that national sovereignty may be infringed. This is a painful issue, but the EU has also gone through this, and disputes on many issues still flare up among its members.

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