Organization of tactical air reconnaissance on the theater of war. Artillery reconnaissance

Aerial reconnaissance arose almost immediately after the appearance of airplanes. Information received from the cockpit influenced not only the results of individual battles, but also the course of history.

Secret mission "Heinkel-111"

After the defeat of the Third Reich and the seizure of numerous archives (including the Luftwaffe) by the Soviet military, it turned out that since 1939, specially trained Heinkel-111 medium bombers had flown at an altitude of thirteen kilometers all the way to Moscow. For this purpose, the cockpits were sealed, and cameras were placed in the bottom of the aircraft. In particular, photographs of some areas of Krivoy Rog, Odessa, Dnepropetrovsk and Moscow, dated August 1939, were discovered. However, it was not only the Germans who photographed objects in the USSR. In March - April 1940, a twin-engine Lockheed-12A aircraft flew over Baku at an altitude of eight thousand meters and photographed oil fields.

Air reconnaissance war

On June 13, 1949, US Air Force Major General Cabell ordered Lieutenant Colonel Towler, head of American air reconnaissance, to begin an “aggressive reconnaissance program.” As a result, over the next 11 years, the Americans made about ten thousand reconnaissance flights, mainly along the borders of the USSR. For this purpose, a Consolidated PB4Y-2 Privateer monoplane was used. He was opposed by the Soviet Il-28R, at that time the best aerial reconnaissance aircraft in the world.

In the years cold war The fate of many reconnaissance pilots, both American and Soviet, turned out to be tragic. Thus, the authoritative American publication United States News and World Report reported that until 1970, “252 American pilots were shot down during spy air operations, of which 24 died, 90 survived, and the fate of 138 aviators has not yet been clarified "

As for Soviet air reconnaissance aircraft, many tragic incidents are still unknown. An incident that occurred in the neutral waters of the Sea of ​​Japan on September 4, 1950, when the plane of Lieutenant Gennady Mishin was shot down, received publicity.

Interrupted flight

During World War II and for the next several decades, it was believed that aerial reconnaissance aircraft owed their invulnerability to altitude. So, until May 1, 1960, Americans flew with impunity over the territory of the USSR on a Lockheed U-2 aircraft, until the crew of Mikhail Voronov’s S-75 air defense system shot down Gary Powers’ aircraft 56-6693.

To assess the potential damage to the national security of the USSR caused by such a flight, it is enough to say that the intelligence officer photographed, in particular, ICBMs at the Tyuratam cosmodrome and the Mayak plant for the production of weapons-grade plutonium. After the aborted flight, the photographs did not reach the Pentagon, and Powers went to jail. However, he was still lucky, because a year later he returned to his homeland - Powers was exchanged for Rudolf Abel.

Higher and faster

Following the Lockheed U-2 aircraft, “high-altitude” reconnaissance aircraft appeared, flying at high speeds. In 1966, the Americans commissioned the SR-71 aircraft, which could even fly in the stratosphere at a speed of 3M. However, it did not invade deeply into the territory of the USSR, except that it flew close to the border. But it was successfully used to photograph objects in China.

Using the material obtained through such aerial reconnaissance was not so easy. For example, the SR-71 photographic equipment photographs 680,000 square meters in one hour of flight. km. Even a significant team of analysts cannot cope with such a number of images, especially in combat conditions, when information must be provided to the military in a matter of hours. Ultimately, the main support for headquarters remained visual information, as it was during Operation Desert Storm.

All hope lies in drones

The successes of radar, in particular promising over-the-horizon systems operating on the principle of “wave reflection from the ionosphere,” have sharply reduced the capabilities of reconnaissance aircraft. That is why they were replaced by “drones” - unmanned aerial vehicles. It is believed that the Americans were the pioneers in this field, but the USSR does not recognize this. The promising Tu-143 drone, part of the VR-3 “Flight” aerial reconnaissance system, made its first flight back in December 1970.

However, after 1991 many Soviet projects were curtailed, while the United States, on the contrary, continued to work on creating the latest models unmanned aerial reconnaissance. Currently, the Americans have installed on the wing the MQ-1 Predator UAV with a flight altitude of 8 thousand meters and the MQ-9 Reaper strategic reconnaissance UAV, capable of patrolling at an altitude of thirteen kilometers.

However, these systems cannot be called invulnerable. For example, in Crimea, in the Perekop region, on March 13, 2014, using the complex electronic warfare 1L222 "Avtobaza" was intercepted by a modern MQ-5V UAV.

Air reconnaissance aircraft against aircraft carrier

The arsenal of modern Russian reconnaissance aircraft has the means to overcome the air defense systems of the most developed countries. Thus, twice already - first on October 17, 2000, and then on November 9, 2000 - Su-27 and Su-24 aircraft conducted air maneuvers over the American aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk, while the ship’s crew was not ready to respond. The panic that erupted on the deck of the Kitty Hawk was photographed and the images were sent by email to American Rear Admiral Stephen Pietropaoli.

A similar incident occurred in 2016: on April 12, a Russian SU-24 aircraft flew several times around the destroyer Donald Cook with the Aegis missile defense system at an altitude of only 150 meters.

Aerial reconnaissance

Perhaps it should be considered natural that in the post-war period, in almost all cases when issues of military aviation were discussed, the main attention was paid to strategic bombers, aircraft carriers, jet fighters, guided and unguided rockets and anti-submarine warfare. Events such as the 1953 Korean War and the Dutch and British floods showed that helicopters were becoming important. The issue of transport aircraft came to the fore during the air supply of Berlin and during the first tense days of the Korean War, when vital supplies had to be airlifted to the small patch of South Korea that remained in the hands of United Nations troops. But in no significant work on air power written after the end of the Second World War, one can find information about reconnaissance aircraft and reconnaissance operations, except for occasional comments.

It is difficult to understand why, during the period between the two world wars, most air fleets reconnaissance aircraft began to be assigned a secondary role and why, despite the experience of the Second World War, no changes occurred on this issue. During the first two years of World War I, airplanes and airships were used primarily for surveillance. Their main task was to be the eyes of the army and navy: detect guns and troop movements on land and enemy ships at sea. Naturally, with the advent of new methods of bombing and air combat, the issues of conducting aerial reconnaissance began to be given correspondingly less attention. But each stage of the Second World War convinces us more and more that good or bad air patrols or reconnaissance must be the main factor in the air, land and sea conditions.

The most striking example of the development and activities of reconnaissance aviation was shown by the German Air Force. In 1939, at the very beginning of the Second World War, 20 percent of the total, approximately 3,750 combat aircraft, were long-range and short-range reconnaissance aircraft, seaplanes and flying boats designed for aerial reconnaissance and patrol. Such large percentage reconnaissance aircraft remained until about 1943, when the deployment of fighter aircraft began on a large scale. In the entire history of military aviation, no other country has devoted such a large proportion of its aviation resources to aerial reconnaissance, surveillance and patrol missions. During the first nine or ten months of the war, German reconnaissance aircraft successfully accomplished their mission of obtaining the information necessary for the effective and economical use of German air power. Coast Guard seaplanes successfully carried out surveillance tasks over the coasts of Scandinavia and Baltic Sea. Above North Sea and Western Europe carried out daily meteorological and general reconnaissance; these tasks were carried out by qualified crews of Heinkel twin-engine bombers assigned to each main air force. During the Norwegian campaign, they were assisted in these missions by long-range four-engine flying boats and Focke-Wulf 200 aircraft. Henschel aircraft performed important tactical reconnaissance missions in the interests of ground forces operating in Poland, the Scandinavian countries, France and Flanders. They quickly provided accurate information about the movements of enemy troops, making it possible to quickly use dive bombers on the most advantageous targets. Almost every German tank division had a squadron of Henschel tactical reconnaissance aircraft, which carried out tasks to detect tanks, as well as a flight of Fieseler aircraft, which provided communication communications in combat areas. Each unit of medium or dive bombers had a well-trained unit of reconnaissance aircraft that carried out special tasks for observation and conducting aerial photographic reconnaissance in the interests of their unit. Never before in the history of aviation has the Air Force had such first-class aerial reconnaissance, which would have been able to ensure the use of a minimum number of bombers with maximum efficiency.

But by the summer of 1940, even this number of German reconnaissance units was not enough. In the Battle of Britain and during the fighting in the Atlantic, German reconnaissance aircraft underwent their first severe tests and revealed the first signs indicating the weakness of the German air force in relation to aerial reconnaissance. During the Battle of Britain, it soon became clear that 300 Henschel aircraft, which had a low speed, would provide a good target for the Spitfire and Hurricane fighters, armed with eight machine guns and surpassing them in speed by almost 160 km/h, so these vehicles had to be excluded from active operations, although they were partly used for patrolling in the Bay of Biscay coastline. The remaining Dornier, Heinkel and Junkers long-range reconnaissance aircraft also proved vulnerable to Hurricane and Spitfire fighters as they attempted to fly reconnaissance missions over land. As a result, the Germans failed to conduct reconnaissance of many airfields and factories, which were important targets for Goering's bomber aircraft. German reconnaissance aircraft failed to obtain reliable information about the results of their raids on airfields, radar installations and factories. During the Battle of Britain, German naval reconnaissance aircraft also began to experience difficulties in the new Atlantic theater of operations. During operations against ships, mainly in the North Sea or in ports on east coast England, German reconnaissance aircraft carried out meteorological reconnaissance, aerial photo reconnaissance and surveillance missions. When air combat operations spread further to the West and into the Bay of Biscay, German reconnaissance aircraft were not up to the task. From the end of 1940, it began to play more and more of a secondary role, and its actions became less effective. In the Mediterranean theater of operations, long-range reconnaissance in the interests of the German air force was often carried out by Italian aircraft. The position of German reconnaissance aircraft continued to deteriorate on all three major fronts because the Germans knew that they had the means to carry out only the most minimal tasks. In the West, during the period from January 1941 to September 1944, the Germans could not conduct a single sortie based on aerial photography of London. In the crucial period before the Allied invasion of France, a wealth of information about invasion plans could be obtained by aerial reconnaissance of the ports of the south coast of England, but British fighter patrols drove off most of the German reconnaissance aircraft, and the aerial photographs they received were of poor quality and gave very little information. In the East the situation was even worse, since after 1943 reconnaissance aircraft units were often involved in bombing missions. Certainly, German troops, operating against the Soviet Army, received little information from aerial reconnaissance that made it possible to judge the direction and strength of attacks by Soviet troops from the end of 1942. At that time, aviation support for the Suez Canal zone and the central Mediterranean Sea from the Germans and Italians was also insufficient. The position of German reconnaissance aircraft deteriorated at a time when it was especially necessary to strengthen the reconnaissance activities of the German Air Force. When the enemy is weak, the movement of his troops does not matter big role; but when it is strong, the importance of aerial reconnaissance increases.

Air reconnaissance issues have not yet been adequately reflected in modern doctrines of air strategy and air power. Well-organized aerial reconnaissance (or information) is the "first line" air defense and first an important condition for successful aviation operations. If guided missiles and bombers are used as means of attack, then first of all it is necessary to know where the enemy is, what his means and numbers are. To protect ships from attack submarines, it is necessary to detect them in a timely manner. To evaluate the results of bombing during the war, it is necessary to have up-to-date information about the destruction caused, the dispersal of industry, restoration work ah and the construction of new factories. Aerial reconnaissance can completely change the outcome of ground combat operations. The German offensive in the Ardennes in the winter of 1944/45 began during a period of fog, as a result of which allied aerial reconnaissance was not carried out. Hardly in the entire Pacific theater of operations - from Pearl Harbor to Fr. Okinawa - held naval battles, in which aerial reconnaissance would not play an important role.

Yet the value of aerial reconnaissance is always underestimated. During a war, it is impossible to economically distribute forces and means and use them to the maximum without knowledge of the situation. What Clausewitz wrote about the war a hundred years ago is still being studied and has not lost its force: “Many reports received in war contradict one another; there are even more false reports, and the bulk of them are not very reliable.” It is difficult for a non-specialist to understand that the information available to the high command, which serves as the basis for decision-making, is often insufficient and incomplete. Troop commanders can direct combat operations for months without having any information about how many aircraft, ships, tanks or submarines the enemy is releasing. True, there are many sources of intelligence information: prisoners of war, documents captured from the enemy, agents and radio interception. But how do you find out what information a particular prisoner of war has? While it is possible to determine in advance which radiograms can be deciphered and what information they contain, it is not always possible to capture enemy documents containing important information. It is rare to rely on agents to deliver the necessary intelligence in the form required. The only source of obtaining reliable and up-to-date military information is aerial photo reconnaissance. Air reconnaissance activities can be planned and controlled. Almost always, aircraft performing aerial reconnaissance missions bring photographs that provide the most valuable information, since the objects, time and date of photographing are known. Even visual reconnaissance, although subject to human error, can provide rapid intelligence that can satisfy operational requirements. Moreover, knowing exactly the time and place of receiving intelligence information is already half of being confident in its reliability.

In Soviet military circles, the words “tactical (military) intelligence” (reconnaissance) and “strategic intelligence” (intelligence) are synonymous. Yet the USSR never attached as much importance to tactical intelligence as the Germans did between the two world wars. The Soviet Air Force always had (and still has) reconnaissance aviation regiments of 30–40 aircraft, but they were never enough to meet the army's intelligence needs. Has anyone ever heard of the existence of an air reconnaissance command in the air forces of the Western powers, equal in position to the bomber and fighter air commands and the coastal aviation command of the British air force? Position, dignity and popularity play as important a role in military life as in civilian life. It is rare to hear of a reconnaissance aircraft pilot or navigator becoming a national hero. At the time the Bruneval raid was reported, few had heard of the valuable low-altitude aerial photographs taken by Air Major Hill. Intelligence obtained from aerial photographs provided the input for the raid on Bruneval. He subsequently took many aerial photographs of radar stations during flights that required skill, courage and enterprise; but, as was the case with many other reconnaissance pilots who delivered valuable information both during the First and Second World Wars, his feat was soon forgotten. Apparently, fighter and bomber pilots are considered the aristocrats of the air and the exclusive bearers of the Victoria Cross and the Congressional Order of Honour. This opinion is erroneous, since every pilot or navigator of a reconnaissance aircraft must be a first-class specialist in order to cope with his tasks. With modern radio and radar equipment on bombers and fighters, a moderately qualified crew can often achieve good results. It is significant that in the British Air Force the navigator wears only half a wing on his military uniform and rarely rises to the rank of colonel. Those who fly know how often the navigator is the most important and authoritative member of the aircraft crew. And yet, did at least one navigator who participated in the First World War become an aviation general or air marshal during the Second World War?

Modern air forces must consider organizing aerial reconnaissance on a completely new basis. At the beginning of the Second World War, only the German air force was able to provide intelligence data for bombing operations. In the US Army Air Forces! The lenses of many aerial cameras satisfied only the requirements of peacetime cartographic aerial photography. In many cases, their dimensions were insufficient to obtain aerial photographs at the scale required for detailed interpretation. There were very few trained code breakers and reconnaissance pilots.

During the Second World War, aerial reconnaissance of all types was widely developed, but the war did not teach the basic strategic lesson that the conduct of multi-role air operations on a large scale requires multi-role aerial reconnaissance of the appropriate scale. In modern warfare, aerial reconnaissance missions are very diverse. Coastal aviation conducts reconnaissance on sea communications, meteorological reconnaissance is carried out over land and sea, radar reconnaissance is carried out to detect enemy radar stations, and strategic aviation reconnaissance is carried out to determine the results of bombing and obtain intelligence data on targets. In addition, there is tactical reconnaissance, which includes adjusting artillery fire, identifying camouflaged objects and targets, and monitoring the movement of enemy troops along highways and railways. During the Second World War, reconnaissance activities for each of the above tasks hardly lasted more than a few months. During the first two years of the war, no aerial survey of Japan's growing aircraft industry was conducted in the Pacific theater. The British conducted insufficient meteorological reconnaissance over German territory. Captured battle logs revealed that what the Allies thought were bad weather days in important cities like Berlin and Leipzig were actually clear, on sunny days. Winston Churchill wrote about the British air raids on Berlin, which began in November 1943: “We had to wait until March 1944 to obtain sufficiently clear aerial photographs necessary to evaluate the results of the bombing. This was partly due to poor meteorological conditions, but also insufficient number of Mosquito reconnaissance aircraft. American aircraft, which carried out raids on oil refineries in Romania in 1943, and subsequently did not have aerial photographic reconnaissance data both during the period of planning operations and during the period of assessing the results of bombing. Effective air patrols in coastal areas and good radio communications could have thwarted the Japanese air attack on Pearl Harbor. The German battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, during their breakthrough across the English Channel, were accidentally discovered by a Spitfire aircraft performing a combat air patrol mission, and not by reconnaissance aircraft. Many examples can be given where, at the decisive stages of the Second World War, the organization of aerial reconnaissance was poorly organized.

The tactical lessons of World War II have been well learned. It is now clear that reconnaissance aircraft must be the best, and their crews must be the most qualified. Bombers and fighters intended for reconnaissance should be stripped of their weapons and replaced with additional fuel tanks in order to increase their range and flight speed. All the best aircraft of the Second World War: Mosquito, Mustang, Lightning, LaG and Messerschmitt jets were used for aerial reconnaissance. In the post-war period, aircraft such as the Canberra, a twin-engine jet design The Tupolev, Saber and other jet fighters, as well as the B-36 and B-52 strategic bombers, have all been specially adapted for aerial reconnaissance missions.There may also be a heavy bomber variant that will launch a supersonic fighter when approaching enemy territory -reconnaissance officer It is absolutely clear that during aerial photography great importance has precise control of heading, altitude and flight speed - something that only a few pilots can achieve; Choosing a flight route and accurately maintaining the time spent above the target are also important. Currently, cameras with lenses having focal lengths from 150 to more than 1500 mm are widely used; they provide large area large-overlap photography, allowing detailed interpretation of aerial photographs taken from altitudes above 9,000 m. All modern air forces use machines that provide fast and efficient interpretation. As soon as the plane lands, the 16- or 35-mm film is quickly transported to the local mobile processing center, where the first stage of processing is carried out within a few hours: developing, washing, drying, printing and initial decoding. Using these images, you can quickly estimate the damage caused by a bombing, or calculate the approximate number of cars, trains and troops on the move. In order to make maximum use of the aerial photographs obtained after the first processing for operational purposes, it is necessary to have a good file of intelligence information and military maps of the latest editions. In itself, information about the number of ships in the port, aircraft at the airfield or trains at the marshalling yard is of dubious value. It is necessary to know for what purpose certain funds are concentrated. This point can be illustrated with an example from the Second World War. At an airfield in central Norway, photographic reconnaissance discovered a large number of four-engine bombers designed to combat ships. This indicated that the Germans were preparing an attack on ships off the coast of Scotland or Ireland. There was turmoil on the ships. A decision was made to remove them to safety or take other measures. In fact, it turned out that the concentration of a large number of aircraft at one airfield was caused by bad weather in the area of ​​​​air bases in south-western France and south-western Norway, as well as due to the lack of spare parts at bases in central Norway, which caused the failure of several airplanes. What is often not taken into account is that aircraft photographed at the airfield may turn out to be faulty. A lot of information can be gleaned from each image, but in order for this information to be accepted as fact, it must be supplemented with other data.

At the second and third stages of deciphering aerial photographs, a more thorough study of them is carried out. The use of a stereoscope increases the accuracy of interpretation. The dim shadows on the hills and valleys become clear. Viewing aerial photographs through a stereoscope helps identify parked aircraft, camouflaged bridges and buildings by determining the difference in height of an object compared to surrounding objects. A stereoscope allows you to see the relief of an object by its shadow, which is often the last key for recognizing objects during deciphering. By studying the details of aerial photographs, a large amount of intelligence data can be obtained, such as comparative data on the development of a network of radar stations and firing positions anti-aircraft artillery, information about the construction and expansion of airfields with a significant lengthening of runways. With the help of data obtained through aerial photographic reconnaissance, the preparation of the Axis countries for the failed airborne landing on the island was revealed. Malta from Sicily, where airfields and runways were specially built for this purpose. It was with the help of aerial photographic reconnaissance that it was discovered that in Peenemünde the Germans were developing new weapons that could play a role in the future decisive role in war. The role of aerial reconnaissance of strategic targets cannot be overestimated. Accurate and reliable basic intelligence can be obtained from other intelligence sources. But only with the help of aerial reconnaissance can reliable information be obtained about the best flight route to the target, taking into account air defenses in the area, enemy camouflage, and important target areas that have recently undergone reconstruction or restoration.

However one important question aerial photography is often misunderstood. Currently, it is still claimed that using aerial photographs it is possible to determine how long a particular object has been out of action. During the Second World War, aerial photographs were used to conclude something like this: "It is estimated that the facility's production capacity has been reduced by 50 percent for a period of two to three months." No one can calculate the percentage of destruction from aerial photographs with such accuracy. The pace of restoration work depends on many factors: the morale of the population, the order of work, the supply of electricity, the availability of labor and raw materials. In 1944, assessments of the destruction of German aircraft factories based on aerial photographs were optimistic because the enemy had dispersed industrial plants and used production space in unknown factories. Assessments of the destruction of Japanese aircraft factories in 1944–1945 have often been pessimistic, since the pace of reconstruction work in Japan was slow, and the overestimation of the destruction of German factories in 1944 is probably too well remembered.

One of the sad lessons of the Korean air war is that the experience of aerial reconnaissance during the Second World War was lost. Firstly, there was a great shortage of qualified codebreakers. The work of interpreting aerial photographs requires great preparation and skill. Many good codebreakers lost their skills while working in civilian institutions. In 1950, the US Air Force had only two air reconnaissance squadrons in Japan and Korea, one of which was dedicated to mapping. The second squadron could not be used effectively, as it suffered greatly from a lack of material and personnel. When these squadrons began to carry out their tasks, the tactical lessons of the forties were already forgotten. They received too many impossible requests for large-scale aerial photographs that needed to be taken from low altitudes and at high speed. There were various bodies which, despite limited resources, used aerial reconnaissance to meet their own needs; it happened that on the same day, according to requests various organizations reconnaissance flights were made twice along the same route. The worst thing is that there were no codebreakers. But these initial difficulties were soon overcome. By the beginning of 1952, mobile photo laboratories were organized, equipped with vans, trailers with power units and water tanks. There were vans for printing photographs and developing photographic films, workshops for repairing photographic equipment, a film library - that is, everything necessary for processing aerial photographs in the field. The number of equipment, personnel and aircraft gradually increased. Requests for aerial reconnaissance were coordinated by the US Air Force Intelligence Directorate at Far East, and the operations of the United Nations troops in Korea became more economical and expedient.

Of the lessons of aerial reconnaissance during the Second World War, one lesson has perhaps remained unlearned - the inadmissibility of underestimating the use of seaplanes and flying boats. During the war, American Catalina flying boats, British Sunderland, Soviet MR and German seaplanes and Heinkel and Dornier flying boats conducted coastal and meteorological reconnaissance, carried out anti-submarine patrols and performed other tasks in the interests of the naval forces. strength But after the war, seaplanes and flying boats fell out of fashion in the air forces of Western powers, although a few such squadrons remained in the Soviet Union. Fortunately, the Communists in Korea had a negligible bomber force; If the few airfields that the United Nations had at its disposal during the early period of the Korean War had been subjected to even mild air attack, their aircraft would have been forced to operate from air bases in Japan, losing much of their advantage. In many cases, only seaplanes and flying boats, dispersed at anchorages in case of air attack, can provide important information about enemy movements and changing weather conditions. The Germans came to appreciate flying boats and seaplanes in 1940 during the Norway Campaign, when they had few airfields at their disposal and meteorological and other intelligence was essential to the rapid success of the campaign. There is no doubt that in the future there may be conditions similar to those in the Pacific theater in which flying boats will play an important role. Flying boats are a convenient and economical means of passenger transportation on civil airlines; they are capable of carrying large payloads and can be quickly adapted for military purposes. Flying boats are more valuable than many realize.

The need for weather forecasts on a global scale is now greater than ever before, but the role of aerial reconnaissance in this regard is difficult to define. If it becomes necessary to move aircraft squadrons across large bodies of water at speeds in excess of 1,100 km/h, as was the case in early 1954, then the weather service must provide weather forecasts on a global scale. Currently, thousands of land and sea weather stations have been established in all countries, delivering basic weather data. There is countless previously collected information about weather conditions and climate that can help establish relationships between current local weather data and possible long-term weather trends. Electronic equipment is increasingly being used to predict the weather. VHF radios are used to warn of impending storms that pose a danger to aircraft flights. With the help of radar stations, the nature of winds in the upper layers of the atmosphere is determined. It would be impractical to keep large numbers of aircraft busy with weather reconnaissance when these aircraft are needed for more important missions. It would be more expedient to increase the number of land-based mobile weather stations and ships for weather reconnaissance at sea, improve meteorological instruments and ensure reliable communications with central authorities that summarize information on weather conditions.

Of course, there is still a need to use a certain number of aircraft for meteorological reconnaissance, especially in conditions of increasing range of all types of aircraft, when bombers can encounter a variety of meteorological conditions during the flight to the target. It is difficult to anticipate the full scope of operational requirements in the field of meteorological reconnaissance, as well as in the field of military reconnaissance. As the ability to use expensive atomic weapons for close air support grows, tactical military reconnaissance becomes more and more important. We must not allow atomic weapons to be wasted on secondary purposes. In the era of atomic missiles and tactical atomic bombs that can be fired from fighter-bombers, timely and reliable information is extremely important. Expensive tactical guided projectiles also cannot be used against small objects. If ground forces operate in Africa, South America, Asia and the Middle East, where many areas have not yet been mapped, then the needs for aerial photography will be significant. This is evidenced by the experience of military operations in Malaya. The existing maps of Malaya turned out to be useless for military purposes. It was necessary to draw up new military maps, which required aerial photography of an area of ​​more than 10 thousand square meters. km. Much of this work was carried out using helicopters. These vehicles also proved extremely valuable for aerial reconnaissance during the Korean War. But the territories of Korea and Malaya cannot be compared, for example, with the vast expanses of Asia, where there are also no modern large-scale military maps and the compilation of which will require colossal efforts of aerial reconnaissance. It's safe to say that any future conflict that involves aerial reconnaissance will almost certainly involve the entire world. The number of reconnaissance aircraft will be very limited. What can be done in a relatively calm peacetime environment to best prepare for war with limited resources? The first and most important condition is the conduct of universal training of armed forces personnel in visual surveillance. Part of the time spent on physical training and lectures on current issues, it is useful to use for the study of meteorology, camouflage, aerial surveillance techniques, geography, terrain features - that is, all issues that develop theoretical and practical reconnaissance skills among personnel of all types of armed forces. Activities such as showing special documentary films to all personnel, conducting practical checks after flights to determine the assignment of a special observer badge, which entitles them to a salary supplement, will increase general level intelligence training. All Air Force bomber fighter and transport units must have more pilots specially trained for reconnaissance missions. If the initial training of observers is organized on a large scale in the armed forces, it will not be difficult to create reconnaissance detachments in combat air units and staff them with personnel. In addition, conditions must be created for a more flexible switching of aircraft to conduct aerial reconnaissance. Why not, for example, use an entire air wing of bombers and fighters to survey an entire area and thus obtain visual reconnaissance data for that area. But too often only two or three aircraft are allocated for aerial reconnaissance. Just as a good boxer saves his signature punch until he knows the strong and weak sides enemy, the successful conduct of offensive operations in the air requires detailed knowledge of enemy territory, and it is often advisable to delay the commencement of operations until the necessary information has been obtained. Saving effort and money for aerial reconnaissance only leads to a waste of money during bombing.

If the vast spaces covered by modern warfare necessitate large-scale aerial reconnaissance, they also require special attention to issues of communications and centralized control. The USA, Great Britain and the USSR have created central intelligence departments, but they mainly perform strategic intelligence tasks. It is necessary to organize a unified intelligence service of the armed forces, which would include a unit of photo decipherers who process all intelligence materials received through all channels: this department should include both military and civilian specialists. Of course, in this department there should be specialized units: technical, scientific, industrial, etc., but these units should be general, without any preference to one of the branches of the armed forces. Intelligence information is valuable to all branches of the armed forces: intelligence about weather conditions, radar stations, enemy ships and almost all other information is rarely of interest to only one branch of the armed forces.

Likewise, reconnaissance aviation units and additionally created reconnaissance observer detachments should also serve the entire armed forces, and not just the aviation forces. Aerial reconnaissance, like strategic bombing, must be conducted in accordance with national military policy determined by the Departments of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The control of Soviet long-range bomber aircraft during the Second World War was carried out by the State Defense Committee, and reconnaissance aviation units were dispersed, being at the disposal of the commanders of the ground army formations and navy. The Anglo-American Strategic Bomber Force was temporarily subordinate to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but it never sought the subordination of air reconnaissance, which was often the eyes of the Strategic Bomber Force and the assessor of the results of its actions. Of course, there is currently an increasing trend towards unification of the armed forces. Joint intelligence departments and joint committees have already been organized, and the joint development of many staff documents is underway. The time has now come for the abolition of the different uniforms of the separate branches of the armed forces and for the development of detailed plans for the closest possible unification of the army, navy and air force at all levels where possible. However, this is a big independent question, which is discussed in more detail in Chapter IX. Chapter 3. Reconnaissance Conducting reconnaissance in the mountains is more difficult than on flat terrain. Mountainous, rugged terrain, the presence of mountain spurs and ridges, gorges and valleys between them contributes to the secrecy of enemy movements and the location of his units. In addition, folds