Witte Sergey Yulievich historical portrait p6. Life path of S.Yu

The reign of Paul I is a controversial period in the history of the Russian Empire. The complex and contradictory foreign policy basically continued the basic idea of ​​Empress Catherine. Bureaucracy and individualism in domestic politics became the reason for organizing the conspiracy and murder of Pavel.

1. After the death of Catherine II in 1796, a short but eventful era of the reign of Paul I began in Russia, which lasted 5 years - from 1796 to 1801, when he was killed as a result of a conspiracy.

Despite the fact that the forces that came to power as a result of the conspiracy of 1801 created a caricature of this emperor for more than 50 years, in the history of Russia, 5 years of his reign became a major breakthrough in all areas of life and a missed historical chance.

The most important achievements of the short reign of Paul I were:

• cessation of political repression, democratization in the country;
• the first attempt in Russian history to limit serfdom;
• timely struggle against France, wide participation of Russia in European affairs, victorious actions of the Russian army in Europe.

2. Paul I (1754 - 1801) was the son of Catherine II and Peter III and ascended the throne in 1796. During the reign of Catherine II, Paul was in opposition to Catherine and almost lost the throne. Catherine was going to transfer the throne to Paul's son and her grandson Alexander, bypassing Paul, but did not have time to do this due to her death.

The main differences between Catherine II and Paul arose on the following issues:

• political repressions carried out by Catherine;
• serfdom;
• absolutism;
• favoritism.

These contradictions laid the foundation for the future domestic policy of Paul I.

3. The first step of Paul I after ascending the throne was to end political repression. Despite their political convictions, all the most famous political prisoners of that time were released from prison - Nikolai Novikov, Alexander Radishchev, Tadeusz Kosciuszko. Persecution for political opinions has stopped. Thus, Novikov continued his criticism of serfdom, and Radishchev was included in the commission for preparing reforms.

Within a short time, favoritism and wastefulness were eradicated by Paul I. Instead, strict order and the requirement to comply with the law were introduced in all spheres of life, from the imperial palace to the ordinary soldier.

In Russia there is a twofold situation:

• the government of Paul I tolerated political opponents and criticism of the regime;
• The government punished the slightest, even insignificant, violation of discipline, instructions and regulations in the most severe manner (including prison).

The innovations of Paul I were negatively perceived by a significant part of the nobility, spoiled under Catherine and accustomed to the irresponsibility and impunity granted by her “Charter of Grant” of 1785. It was they who, after the assassination of Paul, created a caricature of the emperor - a “martinet”, requiring compliance with the slightest instructions. In fact, the tough policy of Paul I was determined by the need to stop Catherine’s arbitrariness at the top, their separation from the rest of the country, which had become threatening; restore legality, discipline and responsibility in the country, which were practically absent. Under Paul I, commissions were created to prepare reforms, which included both senior officials and critics of the regime, even people like A. Radishchev. For the first time in the history of Russia, the issue of the need to abolish serfdom began to be discussed. In 1797, Paul I issued a Decree limiting corvee. For the first time in the history of Russia, the emperor (tsar) limited serfdom by decree. According to the decree, landowners were legally prohibited from exploiting peasants more than 3 days a week (peasants could spend the rest of the time on themselves) and the practice of exploiting peasants around the clock was put to an end.

4. With the coming to power of Paul I, foreign policy changed radically:

• for the first time in history, Russia began to participate on a large scale in pan-European affairs;
• Russia entered and became one of the main participants in the pan-European coalition against revolutionary (and then Napoleonic) France;
• Paul I began a timely war against Napoleon, while he was not strong enough, on his territory;
• Russian troops made successful campaigns in Europe far beyond Russia - Italy, Switzerland and Austria; The Russian fleet won brilliant victories in the Mediterranean.

The purpose of Russia's sudden entry into the international arena was to counter revolutionary France and the growing strength of Napoleon.

The largest military operations of Russia in Europe under Paul I were:

• campaign of the Russian army under the command of Alexander Suvorov to Italy in 1799, defeat French army in the Battle of Adda, the entry of the Russian army into Rome;
• successful assault by the Russian fleet under the command of Admiral Fyodor Ushakov of the previously impregnable French fortress on the island of Corfu in the Ionian Sea (between Italy and Greece) February 18 - 20, 1799; the capture of a fortress defended by 650 guns;
• the heroic transition of the Russian army of A. Suvorov from Italy to Switzerland through the Alps and the Devil's Bridge, impassable for the army, September 21 - October 8, 1799, as a result of which the Russian army unexpectedly went to the rear of the French and, uniting with the army of Rimsky-Korsakov, defeated the French .

5. Drastic changes in domestic and foreign policy, begun by Paul I, were abruptly interrupted by the coup of March 12, 1801 and the assassination of Paul I:

• the process of establishing order and establishing the rule of law in the country was stopped;
• timely wars against Napoleon on its territory were stopped.

During the reign of Paul I (1796-1801), the centralization and bureaucratization of the state apparatus intensified. The emperor strove to rule alone and solved major matters with the help of especially trusted persons. He pursued a policy of eliminating the privileges of individual classes, relying on military force.

Foreign policy developed in the directions outlined by the previous period and the situation in Europe. The main content was the fight against revolutionary France, for which a fleet under the command of F. F. Ushakov and ground forces under the leadership of A. V. Suvorov were sent to Europe. Subsequently, Napoleon's attempts to get closer to Paul I, as well as the dissatisfaction of the nobility with the contradictory, impulsive actions of the emperor, led to a conspiracy, headed by the St. Petersburg military governor Count P. A. Palen. On the night of March 11-12, 1801, Paul I was killed in the Mikhailovsky Castle, which had recently been built for him.

The new emperor Alexander I, the son of Paul I, who took part in the conspiracy against his father, stopped Paul’s innovations, returned benefits to the nobility, and missed the chance for reforms; made peace with Napoleon, which lulled Russia's vigilance and gave Napoleon a chance to conquer half of Europe and gather forces to invade Russia.

Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation

Stavropol State University

on the course "History of the Fatherland"

S.Yu. Witte.

Political portrait

The work was completed by a student

Faculty of Economics,

specialty "Accountant"

accounting, analysis and audit",

I year, group "A"

Malykhina E. F.

Scientific supervisor Associate Professor Sukhanova N.I.

Stavropol, 2002

“In Russia it is necessary to carry out reforms quickly and hastily, otherwise they mostly fail and are slowed down.”

Sergei Yulievich Witte

Plan

Introduction

Personality formation

Public service. Carier start

Witte's reform activities

Political Views

Resignation from the post of Minister of Finance. Diplomatic activities

Conclusion

Bibliography

Introduction

At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, society entered a new phase of its development, in which capitalism became a world system. Russia embarked on the path of capitalist development later than Western countries and therefore fell into the “second echelon” of countries that were called “young predators.” Therefore, Russia needed both political and economic reforms that could strengthen and improve the Russian economy. The head of these reforms should have been the person for whom the fate of Russia was important.

The tragedy of all our reformers - from Peter I to Stolypin, to the creators of accelerated industrialization and collectivization and further, to the authors of "shock therapy" - was that all of them, often staying even at irreconcilable political poles, began to solve Russia's painful problems, too often, instead of untying complex knots, they impatiently cut them to the quick. And then the opposites converged in not feeling the pain of Russia, in stepping over this pain, which M. Voloshin very accurately noted:

Great Peter was

the first Bolshevik...

He, like us, knew no other way,

Beyond the decree, execution and dungeon,

To the realization of truth on earth...

Not in marble, but in meat carved

He axed the living Galatea...

And then the personality of S.Yu. appeared on the historical arena. Witte. He was deeply disgusted by such “reforms”, where living human souls and destinies became only the source material from which zealous “reformers” “not in marble, but in meat” carve their speculative structures and systems. In times of great extremes and inevitable great upheavals, Witte was an unclaimed genius of proportion.

Among the major statesmen of Russia, it is difficult to find a personality as extraordinary, bright, as ambiguous, contradictory as he was.

A number of books have been written about Witt by both Russian and foreign authors. But it cannot be said that these monographs provide an exhaustive description of Witte’s state activities. And after one hundred and fifty years, his controversial personality is causing controversy, and perhaps this interest is the best assessment of the affairs of Sergei Yulievich Witte.

“Man is an extremely complex being, it is difficult to define him not only with a phrase, but with entire pages. ... To define a person, you need to write the novel of his life, and therefore any definition of a person is only strokes that, to a remote extent, determine his figure. For persons For those who know a person, these strokes are sufficient, because the rest is restored by one’s own imagination and knowledge, but for those who do not know, the strokes give a very distant, and sometimes completely incorrect, idea,” Witte wrote in his “Memoirs.” He was a great man with a fairly broad, diversified nature. Therefore, in the words of Witte himself, in order to describe him as a personality, as a statesman, as a person, you need to write a fairly voluminous novel about his life, and since this is impossible to do within the framework of this essay, I will try to convey his personality as it is presented itself to me on the basis of numerous literature about him.

Personality formation

Sergei Yulievich Witte was born on June 17, 1849 in the Caucasus, in Tiflis, in the family of a provincial official. Witte's paternal ancestors came from Holland and moved to the Baltic states in the middle of the 19th century. received hereditary nobility. Witte's father, Julius Fedorovich, a nobleman of the Pskov province, a Lutheran who converted to Orthodoxy, served as director of the department of state property in the Caucasus. Mother, Ekaterina Andreevna, was the daughter of a member of the main department of the governor of the Caucasus, former Saratov governor Andrei Mikhailovich Fadeev and Princess Elena Pavlovna Dolgorukaya, whose ancestors were associates of Peter I.

“In general, my entire family,” he wrote in his “Memoirs,” was a highly monarchical family, “and this side of character remained with me by inheritance.”

The Witte family had five children: three sons (Alexander, Boris, Sergei) and two daughters (Olga and Sophia). Sergei received the usual upbringing for noble families, and “the initial education,” recalled S. Yu. Witte, “was given to me by my grandmother ... she taught me to read and write.” At the Tiflis gymnasium, where he was then sent, Sergei studied “very poorly,” preferring to study music, fencing, and horse riding. As a result, at the age of sixteen he received a matriculation certificate with mediocre grades in science and a unit in behavior. Despite this, the future statesman went to Odessa with the intention of entering the university. But his young age and poor behavior prevented him from entering there... He had to go back to the gymnasium, and only after intensive studies did Witte pass the exams successfully and receive a decent matriculation certificate.

In 1866, Sergei Witte entered the Faculty of Physics and Mathematics of Novorossiysk University in Odessa. In the spring, having gone on vacation, on the way home Witte received news of the death of his father (not long before this he had lost his grandfather, A. M. Fadeev). It turned out that the family was left without a livelihood, Sergei inherited only his father’s debts and was forced to take on part of the care of his mother and little sisters. He was able to continue his studies only thanks to a scholarship paid by the Caucasian governorship.

As a student, Witte had little interest in social problems. He was not worried about political radicalism or the philosophy of atheistic materialism; he did not show himself in any way in the public sphere, although for some time he was in the same company with the future famous member of the People's Will A.I. Zhelyabov. Under the influence of his uncle, at that time he became interested in Slavophile ideas, read Aksakov, Khomyakov, Tyutchev, especially closely perceiving their views on the nature of the origin and essence of autocracy. Their influence was quite deep and was reflected in Witte’s subsequent life.

Despite his monarchist beliefs, Witte was elected by students to the committee in charge of the student treasury. This innocent idea almost ended in disaster. The so-called mutual aid fund was closed as a dangerous institution, and all members of the committee, including Witte, were under investigation. They were threatened with exile to Siberia, and only the scandal that happened with the prosecutor in charge of the case helped S. Yu. Witte avoid the fate of a political exile, and his punishment was reduced to a fine of 25 rubles.

Public service. Carier start

After graduating from the university in 1870, Sergei Witte thought about a scientific career. However, his relatives did not share his desire to be a professor, since they considered it not a noble thing. In addition, her scientific career was hindered by her passion for actress Sokolova.

And Witte entered the public service: in 1869 he was enrolled in the office of the Novorossiysk and Bessarabian Governor-General, where he dealt with issues of railway traffic service. Almost simultaneously, Witte entered the service of the state-owned Odessa Railway. Having mastered the work of almost all areas of the apparatus, starting with the cashier position, he soon became the head of the movement office.

However, after a promising start, S. Yu. Witte’s career almost ended. At the end of 1875, a train crash occurred near Odessa, causing many casualties. And only the fact that Witte managed to distinguish himself in transporting troops to the theater of military operations, which attracted the attention of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, helped to avoid prison, which was replaced by a two-week guardhouse.

Witte’s activities began quite successfully, which was explained both by his connections and his own extraordinary abilities. In a relatively short period of time, he quickly moved up the career ladder and in 1877 he was already the head of the operation of the Odessa Railway, which by that time had become the property of a private company. Soon the Odessa railway became part of the Society of Southwestern Railways, and in 1886 Witte became the manager of these roads. Service in private railway companies had an extremely strong influence on Witte: it gave him management experience, taught him a business approach, a sense of the situation, and determined his range of interests. A successful career brought him material well-being. As a manager, Witte received more than any minister - over 50 thousand rubles a year.

Less successful during these years was his stay at public service. Back in 1874, Witte was assigned to the department of general affairs of the Ministry of Railways. However, soon after the end of the Russian-Turkish war, due to a conflict with the ministry, he received his resignation, while still in the relatively low rank of titular adviser. Having moved to St. Petersburg on business, Witte prepared a draft of the “General Charter of Russian Railways,” the publication of which in 1895 ended the work of the commission studying the state of railway business in Russia.

Witte’s spiritual world developed under the influence of his uncle, R.A. Fadeev, who opposed the liberal reforms of the 1860s. After the Narodnaya Volya assassination attempt on Alexander II, the indignant Witte proposed fighting terrorists using their own methods, that is, killing them in the same vile and treacherous manner as they kill themselves. His idea found a response at the very top; the “Holy Squad” was formed from among the aristocratic youth. Witte took the oath to a well-intentioned secret society, received codes and passwords, and once traveled abroad on behalf of his squad, but he did not become a terrorist, and subsequently he recalled this episode of his life with embarrassment. He was a man of practical mind, and the influence of Fadeev’s ideas did not hinder him in the second half of the 1880s. to get closer to the group of Katkov, Pobedonostsev, and Tolstoy that controlled the ideology.

After moving to Kyiv, Witte became the initiator of the scientific development of the problem of railway tariffs and the largest specialist in this field. In 1883, he published the book “Principles of Railway Tariffs for the Transportation of Goods,” which brought the author wide fame and authority as a Russian “tariff master.” The implementation of his recommendations into the operation of the roads he led made it possible to significantly increase their profitability.

The authority of S. Yu. Witte as a theorist and practice of railway affairs attracted the attention of the then Minister of Finance I. A. Vyshnegradsky, who appointed Witte director of the railway department, bypassing all levels of the hierarchy, immediately to the rank of full state councilor and with an additional payment to a salary from Cabinet funds. From that moment his dizzying career began. Less than a year later, he was introduced as a representative from the Ministry of Finance to the council of the Ministry of Railways, and on February 15, 1892, he was already appointed manager of the Ministry of Railways.

Quite unexpectedly, a cloud hung over the minister’s brilliant career. Sergei Yulievich decided to get married. For love. Second time.

In his youth, before his marriage, Witte, in his own words, “knew all the more or less prominent actresses who lived in Odessa.” But in his mature years he fell in love seriously and for a long time, and, oddly enough, with married women, and in the most unceremonious manner took them away from the family. This happened both the first and second time. Witte's first wife was N.A. Spiridonova (née Ivanenko), the daughter of the Chernigov leader of the nobility. She was married, but was not happy in her marriage. Witte met her back in Odessa and, having fallen in love, obtained a divorce. But his wife was often sick, spent a lot of time at resorts, and died in 1890. Witte found new love in the theater. Once, in a theater box, he noticed a lady with expressive gray-green eyes. Witte found a way to meet her. Matilda Ivanovna Lisanevich turned out to be a married woman, and also the mother of a small daughter.

The marriage of an official of Witte's rank to a divorced woman was a scandal. And the fact that Madame Lisanevich (nee Nurok) was a baptized Jew could put an end to all of Witte’s administrative activities. Witte paid Mr. Lisanevich twenty thousand rubles as compensation. Alexander III himself blessed the marriage: “For me, marry even a goat. As long as things work out. Let Pobedonostsev help with the divorce.” Matilda Ivanovna was divorced in three days, but she was not accepted either at court or in high society.

It should be noted that Witte’s relationship with high society was far from simple. High-society Petersburg looked askance at the “provincial upstart.” He was offended by Witte's harshness, non-aristocratic manners, southern accent, and poor French pronunciation. Sergei Yulievich became a favorite character in metropolitan jokes for a long time. His rapid progress caused undisguised envy and hostility on the part of officials.

Witte surprisingly easily accepted all those methods of achieving goals that were widely practiced in the highest bureaucratic and court environment: flattery, the ability to conduct behind-the-scenes intrigues, using far from gentlemanly techniques in the fight against the enemy, the press, bribery, rumors, gossip, etc. So , playing on the hostility of I. A. Vyshnegradsky to the then Minister of Railways A. Ya. Hubennet, with the help of his patron, he achieved the resignation of the minister and took his place, having previously compromised A. A. Wendrich, who was considered a candidate for this post, in front of the Tsar. Then, taking advantage of Vyshnegradsky’s illness and Alexander III’s growing dissatisfaction with him, Witte became the head of the financial department, maintaining his influence in the Ministry of Railways.

Witte knew human weaknesses well and shamelessly bribed the people he needed. As Minister of Finance, he had the widest possibilities for distributing cash subsidies, granting privileges, concessions, and appointments to profitable positions. He was one of the first to understand the power of the printed word and used newspapers to carry out his own plans. Custom articles had been practiced before him, but Witte gave this business the appropriate scope. A campaign was waged through the press to discredit Witte's opponents and promote his own plans. Witte himself was no stranger to journalism, although the degree of his personal participation in the works published under his name has always caused controversy.

Alexander III, who himself was rude and harsh, liked the new minister. He liked his clarity of mind, firmness, and ability to present his ideas clearly and convincingly. The sympathy was mutual. Until the end of his days, Witte recalled Alexander III with respect and gratitude as a real monarch, although not without shortcomings and weaknesses, but who generally corresponded to his idea of ​​the bearer of supreme power.

Witte had the ability to attract talented assistants. He was proud that among his employees were such prominent figures in the future as E. L. Plese, I. P. Shipov, V. N. Kokovtsov, A. I. Vyshnegradsky, A. I. Putilov, P. L Barki. He gave D.I. Mendeleev a job in his department, being one of the first to recognize him as a brilliant scientist. Witte wanted to see his subordinates not as simple performers, but as interested participants.

Witte's reform activities

Having taken the post of one of the most influential ministers, Witte showed himself to be a real politician. Yesterday's Slavophile, a supporter of Russia's original development, in a short time turned into an industrializer of the European standard, declaring his readiness to bring Russia into the ranks of advanced industrial powers within two five years. This supremely talented man was given the task of transforming the economic life of the country. In 1897 he said: “The same thing is now happening in Russia that happened in its time in the West: it is moving to the capitalist system... Russia must switch to it. This is an immutable world law.”

At the turn of the 20th century, Witte’s economic platform took on a very definite and targeted character: within about 10 years, to catch up industrially with the more developed countries of Europe, to take a strong position in the markets of the Near, Middle and Far East.

Accelerated industrial development was ensured by attracting foreign capital, accumulating internal resources with the help of a state-owned wine monopoly and increased indirect taxation, customs protection of industry from Western competitors and promotion of exports. Foreign capital was given a special role in it - in the late 90s, Witte advocated their unlimited involvement in Russian industry and the railway business. The Russian government tried to take loans not from international financial organizations, but placed its obligations on the domestic market of foreign countries. “Russian papers” were specially issued in low denominations, making them accessible to the petty bourgeoisie, office workers, even servants.

Witte used protectionism, but protection did not mean closing the market. By limiting the import of foreign goods into Russia with high customs duties, the government encouraged exports with various tax incentives and bonuses. Witte was not afraid to start a real customs war with Germany, achieving equal trade relations with this country. By varying tax rates, the Ministry of Finance created the most favorable conditions in one industry or another, directing the flow of capital in the right direction.

For successful economic competition with the West in the coming 20th century, for more vigorous industrial and agricultural development, financial stabilization was needed. Tough tax, customs and conversion measures made it possible by the end of the 80s. achieve a deficit-free budget and stable growth of gold reserves. S.Yu. Witte saw that throughout the 80s. the exchange rate of the credit ruble was subject to significant fluctuations, and therefore continued to intensively accumulate gold and foreign exchange reserves.

In those days, speculation in the ruble was on a huge scale. Its specificity was that its object was primarily ruble cash. The rubles were secretly and obviously taken abroad in suitcases. And Witte decides to take a bold and daring step. At the very beginning of 1895. The Russian Ministry of Finance purchases on the Berlin Stock Exchange huge sums of Russian rubles offered for a period of time (at the rate of 219 marks per 100 rubles). The government immediately prohibits the export of paper money abroad, indicating to Russian banks that the export of banknotes from Russia will be considered as participation in speculation against the national currency.

The banks complied with this requirement. Alarmed European stockbrokers realized that it had become impossible to get the ruble on time, and that they had obviously missed the sale. Many of them were forced to turn to the Russian Ministry of Finance with a request to allow them to purchase the required amount of rubles. Witte “graciously” allowed it, but “charged” a new price - 234 marks for 100 rubles. Buyers were forced to agree. The Russian treasury was significantly replenished as a result of this operation. There was no longer any need to be afraid of serious attempts to play to reduce the ruble.

S. Yu. Witte had to solve one more problem before the start of the monetary reform: what to base money turnover- on one metal (gold or silver) or on two metals together. Russia at that time was increasingly focusing on friendship and cooperation with France. The largest French financial authorities strongly advised the introduction of monetary circulation based on silver in Russia. But Witte was in no hurry to implement these recommendations. He understood perfectly well that behind these advice there was a sober monetary calculation: France had in circulation the largest amount of silver of all the great financial powers of the then world. And Russia’s consent to circulation based on silver firmly “tied” Russia to France.

S.Yu. Witte convinced that paper money should be issued not to meet current circulation needs, but exclusively for the needs of the State Bank as the main credit institution. Paper money should be considered as obligations of the State Bank, and therefore must have security. The main guidelines that Witte set were also determined: to ensure that the State Bank was able to ensure the continuous exchange of at least 1/2 of the amount of paper money in circulation for gold, and the cash of uncovered “papers” should not be more than 500 million rubles.

And finally, Witte did what his predecessors had failed to do - he introduced gold currency circulation, providing the country with a hard currency until the First World War and an influx of foreign capital. The royal decree “On the minting and release of gold coins into circulation” was issued on January 3, 1897. The ruble was actually devalued by a third. New money was exchanged for “old” with a difference of 1 to 1.5. Free exchange of gold for credit notes was introduced.

The introduction of a gold currency strengthened government finances and stimulated economic development. At the end of the 19th century, Russia was ahead of all European countries in terms of industrial production growth rates. This was greatly facilitated by the wide influx foreign investment into the country's industry. At the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, the gold unit prevailed in Russian monetary circulation and by 1904 it accounted for almost 2/3 of the money supply. Russo-Japanese War and Revolution 1905-1907. made adjustments to this trend, and from 1905 the issue of credit rubles began to increase again. However, right up to the First World War, Russia managed to keep intact the most important principle of currency reform: free exchange paper money for gold.

It is also important that Witte accurately calculated the moment to begin the monetary reform and carried out a lot of preparatory work. "I have committed monetary reform so that the population of Russia did not notice it at all, as if nothing had happened... And not a single complaint! Not a single misunderstanding on the part of people,” he wrote in his memoirs.

At Witte's initiative, a state monopoly on the trade in spirits was introduced. In Russia, vodka has long been the most important source of income for the treasury, and under Witte, vodka was sold only in state-owned wine shops. The Minister of Finance argued that his priority was not fiscal goals, but the desire to eliminate the abuses of the private trade in alcohol. Witte noted in his most humble report: “The cessation of the sale of wine at the expense of the harvest, on mortgage or in exchange for clothes, dishes and other things arouses in the peasants a genuine feeling of joy, and, making the sign of the cross, they expressed gratitude to the father-tsar, who had saved the people from the destructive influence of the pre-reform tavern, which ruined the population." The reality was immensely far from the blissful picture painted by the minister. Under Witt, the wine monopoly generated a million rubles in revenue per day, and it was under him that the country’s budget finally began to be built on getting the population drunk.

Witte's favorite brainchild was railway construction - during his tenure as minister, he almost doubled the length of railways. Witte, as a representative of private capital, was expected to continue the policy of developing joint stock companies. However, despite, or perhaps because of, many years of experience in private service, he considered state-owned roads to be more efficient. If by the time Witte appeared in St. Petersburg, private joint stock companies owned more than 70% of Russian railways, then by the end of his ministry the ratio changed in the opposite direction and almost 70% of the roads were state-owned.

Witte believed that only the state could concentrate enormous resources to implement the most daring plans. A striking example was the Trans-Siberian Railway, built in the shortest possible time for that time. She had to open the gates to the Asian East, and Russia, standing guard at these gates, could take advantage of all the advantages of a mediator. The highway, built at the end of the 19th century, and on the eve of the 21st century remains the main link between European Russia, Siberia, and the Far East. However, Witte’s calculations that it would be possible to route transit cargo flowing through the Suez Canal through Russian territory did not materialize due to foreign policy complications.

The peculiarity of the course given by Witte was that he, like none of the tsarist finance ministers, made extensive use of the exceptional economic power of power that existed in Russia. The instruments of government intervention were the State Bank and the institutions of the Minister of Finance, which controlled the activities of commercial banks.

However, Witte's ambitious plans were not destined to come true. The first blow to them was dealt by the global economic crisis, which sharply slowed down the development of industry; the influx of foreign capital decreased and the budget balance was disrupted. Economic expansion in the Far and Middle East, itself associated with large expenses, also exacerbated Russian-British contradictions and brought the war with Japan closer. With the outbreak of hostilities, there could no longer be any talk of any consistent economic program. The accelerated industrialization of Russia could not be successful while maintaining the traditional system of power and existing economic relations in the countryside. The development of industry in all countries proceeded from funds initially accumulated in agriculture. Where this process proceeded at a natural and leisurely pace, it was not painful. The need for a quick leap turned out to be sensitive. Russia was a catching-up country and was paying for it.

All these factors taken together really led agriculture at the turn of the 19th - 20th centuries to a deep crisis. By the end of the 19th century, both Witte and his opponents were talking about “overstraining the payment forces of the rural population.” Both the development of industry and the state budget rested on the solvency of the peasants. Witte's opponents intensified their attacks on industrialization policies. With their combined efforts, Witte's opponents, with the emperor's obvious sympathy, began to push the Minister of Finance away from the levers of managing Far Eastern policy, which had previously been in his almost exclusive possession. Whatever the total reasons for Witte's dismissal from the post of minister, the resignation in August 1903 dealt him a blow: the post of chairman of the committee of ministers, which he received, was immeasurably less influential.

Political Views

Witte’s political views seem even more contradictory, complex, and in many ways eclectic, as they gravitated towards openly conservative and even reactionary socio-political foundations. As already noted, from childhood he was raised in the spirit of strict monarchism. Indeed, the idea of ​​monarchism, having evolved in a unique way under the influence of external circumstances, continued to dominate his general political ideas about the forms of government.

Analyzing the reasons for the intensification of mass social movements in the world, Witte saw the main one in man’s natural desire for justice, in the fight against inequality. These processes are inevitable, but the social upheavals that result from them can manifest themselves both in “natural” forms, if governments take them into account in their legislative activities, and in the forms of excesses, if these trends are not given the necessary direction and outlet. But correctly assessing the essence and direction of the modern historical process, Witte drew a very peculiar conclusion from this. In his opinion, Europe in general and Russia in particular faced a choice - autocracy or socialism. Only these two forms of government can satisfy the masses. And in his opinion, the best of them in this regard is autocracy, but “an autocracy conscious of its existence in protecting the interests of the masses, conscious that it is based on the interests of the general or socialism, which now exists only in theory.” He considered the bourgeois parliamentary system unviable; he saw in it only a transitional stage of development towards a more perfect social system - monarchical or socialist.

At the end of the 19th - beginning of the 20th centuries special place In the internal policy of the government, the zemstvo theme took over, which became the subject of the most heated debate in the ruling elite in connection with the search for a way out of the worsening political crisis. Witte acted as a strong opponent of projects to decentralize management and expand local self-government. He proposed to reorganize local economic management, strengthening the bureaucracy and allowing only some representation of the local public. In a special note intended for internal government use, but subsequently published, he wrote that his proposals amounted mainly to reforming local government administration. Along with this, he argued that at present Russia does not yet represent a fully formed state and its integrity can only be maintained by a strong autocratic government. This view of autocracy was fully consistent with the ambitious nature of the powerful minister, whose influential position during the heyday of his career was largely based on the personal favor of Alexander III towards him. The position of an all-powerful vizier under an unlimited despot suited him well and, apparently, fed his political preferences. The situation began to change with the accession to the throne of Nicholas II. The latter could not be impressed by the manners of the Minister of Finance, his persistence, some mentoring and didactic tone in conversations, the frequent mention of the will of his father when resolving certain issues. The cooling towards Witte and even the hostility towards him of the imperial couple to some extent, apparently, was aggravated by his behavior during the serious illness of Nicholas II in the fall of 1900, when the question of his successor even arose in the court environment. Then Witte spoke out for the Tsar’s brother, Mikhail, which deeply offended the Empress, in whose favor some dignitaries were disposed. In addition, the growth of his influence seriously worried the royal entourage, which sought to influence the opinion of Nicholas II about Witte.

Resignation from the post of Minister of Finance. Diplomatic activities

All this, along with growing discrepancies in a number of important aspects internal and foreign policy, especially regarding Far Eastern affairs, Russian-Japanese relations, as well as in connection with the reputation established in right-wing circles as a “red”, “socialist”, “dangerous freemason” led in August 1903 to Witte’s resignation from the post of Minister of Finance. One of the main reasons was that he did not want to fight with Japan, but the idea of ​​a small victorious war warmed the soul of the Minister of Internal Affairs V.K. Plehve. Nicholas II found himself on the side of the war party - and Witte was removed.

Taking into account, however, his high international reputation, the need to have a competent adviser at hand for the most complex problems, Nicholas II framed his decision outwardly quite decently: Witte received a large one-time remuneration (about 400 thousand rubles) and was appointed chairman of the Committee of Ministers. This position was honorable, but actually of little influence, since the Committee dealt mainly with small current affairs.

Having been defeated in the political struggle, Witte did not return to private enterprise. He set himself the goal of regaining lost positions. Remaining in the shadows, he tried not to completely lose the favor of the tsar, more often attract the “highest attention” to himself, strengthened and established connections in government circles. Preparations for war with Japan made it possible to begin an active struggle for a return to power. However, Witte's hopes that with the beginning of the war Nicholas II would call him were not justified.

In the summer of 1904, Socialist-Revolutionary E. S. Sozonov killed Witte’s longtime enemy, Minister of Internal Affairs Plehve. The disgraced dignitary made every effort to take the vacant seat, but failure awaited him here too. Despite the fact that Sergei Yulievich successfully completed the mission entrusted to him - he concluded a new agreement with Germany - Nicholas II appointed Prince Svyatopolk-Mirsky as Minister of Internal Affairs.

Trying to attract attention, Witte takes an active part in meetings with the tsar on the issue of attracting elected representatives from the population to participate in legislation, and tries to expand the competence of the Committee of Ministers. He even uses the events of “Bloody Sunday” to prove to the Tsar that he could not do without him, that if the Committee of Ministers under his chairmanship had been endowed with real power, then such a turn of events would have been impossible.

Finally, on January 17, 1905, Nicholas II, despite all his hostility, nevertheless turns to Witte and instructs him to organize a meeting of ministers on “measures necessary to calm the country” and possible reforms. Sergei Yulievich clearly hoped that he would be able to transform this meeting into a government of the “Western European model” and become its head. However, in April of the same year, new royal disfavor followed: Nicholas II closed the meeting. Witte again found himself out of work.

True, this time the fall did not last long. At the end of May 1905, at the next military meeting, the need for an early end to the war with Japan was finally clarified. Witte was entrusted with difficult peace negotiations, who repeatedly and very successfully acted as a diplomat (negotiated with China on the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway, with Japan - on a joint protectorate over Korea, with Korea - on Russian military instruction and Russian financial management, with Germany - on concluding a trade agreement, etc.), while showing remarkable abilities.

Nicholas II accepted Witte's appointment as Ambassador Extraordinary with great reluctance. Witte has long pushed the Tsar to begin peace negotiations with Japan in order to “at least calm Russia down a little.”

On August 23, 1905, the Portsmouth Peace was signed. It was a brilliant victory for Witte, confirming his outstanding diplomatic abilities. The talented diplomat managed to emerge from a hopelessly lost war with minimal losses, while achieving “an almost decent peace” for Russia. Despite his reluctance, the tsar appreciated Witte’s merits: for the Peace of Portsmouth he was awarded the title of count (by the way, Witte was immediately mockingly nicknamed “Count of Polosakhalinsky,” thereby accusing him of ceding the southern part of Sakhalin to Japan).

Returning to St. Petersburg, Witte plunged headlong into politics: he took part in the “Special Meeting”, where projects for further government reforms were developed. As the revolutionary events intensify, Witte more and more persistently demonstrates the need for a “strong government”, convincing the tsar that he can play the role of “the savior of Russia”. At the beginning of October, he addresses the tsar with a note in which he sets out an entire program of liberal reforms. In critical days for the autocracy, Witte inspired Nicholas II that he had no choice but to somehow establish a dictatorship in Russia, or Witte’s premiership and take a number of liberal steps in the constitutional direction.

Finally, after painful hesitation, the tsar signed the document drawn up by Witte, which went down in history as the Manifesto of October 17. On October 19, the tsar signed a decree on reforming the Council of Ministers, headed by Witte. In his career, Sergei Yulievich reached the top. During the critical days of the revolution, he became the head of the Russian government.

In this post, Witte demonstrated amazing flexibility and ability to maneuver, acting in the emergency conditions of the revolution either as a firm, ruthless guardian or as a skilled peacemaker. Under the chairmanship of Witte, the government dealt with a wide variety of issues: reorganized peasant land ownership, introduced a state of exception in various regions, resorted to the use of military courts, the death penalty and other repressions, prepared for the convening of the Duma, drafted the Basic Laws, and implemented the freedoms proclaimed on October 17 .

However, the Council of Ministers headed by S. Yu. Witte never became similar to the European cabinet, and Sergei Yulievich himself served as chairman for only six months. The increasingly intensifying conflict with the tsar forced him to resign. This happened at the end of April 1906. S. Yu. Witte was in full confidence that he had fulfilled his main task - to ensure the political stability of the regime. The resignation essentially marked the end of his career, although Witte did not retire from political activities. He was still a member of the State Council and often appeared in print.

With the aggravation of the internal political situation in the last pre-war years, the retired dignitary is again trying to remind himself. He is actively working on his memoirs, republishing his main early works, intensifying his attacks on V.N. Kokovtsov, who was at that time Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Finance and with whom he had previously had good personal relations. Taking advantage of the first signs of the impending economic recession, he sharply criticizes him, accusing him of perverting the financial and economic course he developed, of abusing the wine monopoly, etc. The Prime Minister was forced to resign. But her successor in this post was I. L. Goremykin, and the Ministry of Finance was headed by P. L. Barg. Witte was so disappointed and confused that he even tried to seek the patronage of G. Rasputin, who had influence on the Tsar and Tsarina. He tried to talk about him in the “higher spheres,” but, apparently, sensing the strong antipathy of the imperial couple, he did not dare to insist.

In February 1915, Witte caught a cold and fell ill. An inflammation of the ear began, which spread to the brain. On the night of February 25, he died, just shy of 65 years old. On his tombstone in the Alexander Nevsky Lavra, “October 17” is carved in gold. He was buried modestly, “in the third category.” There were no official ceremonies. Moreover, the deceased’s office was sealed, papers were confiscated, and a thorough search was carried out at the villa in Biarritz. Soon after his funeral, Nicholas II wrote: “The death of Count Witte was a deep relief for me.”

Sergei Witte left three houses as an inheritance to his wife - in St. Petersburg (on Kamenny Island), in Brussels and Biarritz, as well as tens of millions of rubles in banks in Berlin and London. After 1917, the Witte family emigrated.

After his death, his office was immediately sealed, the papers were examined and taken away by officials of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. However, the manuscripts of the memoirs that so interested Nicholas II were not found either in Russia or in the villa in Biarritz, where Witte usually worked on them. They were published later, when the Romanov dynasty and the tsarist regime itself had already fallen under the pressure of the revolutionary waves of 1917.

Conclusion

In the history of Russia at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. The figure of Sergei Yulievich Witte occupies an exceptional place. The head of the Ministry of Railways, the long-term Minister of Finance, the Chairman of the Committee of Ministers, the first head of the Council of Ministers, a member of the State Council - these were the main official positions in which his activities took place. This famous dignitary had a noticeable, and in many cases decisive, influence on various areas of foreign, but especially internal policy of the empire, becoming a kind of symbol of the possibilities and at the same time the helplessness of a powerful state system.

“Witte did so much in a short time that Russia stepped forward in just two decades and became on par with the leading states of the world at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries,” says Doctor of Historical Sciences Vladimir Fedorov. “All states began to reckon with Russia, they made agreements with Russia treaties France, England, Japan. Russia could not have risen to such heights if it had not had such smart leaders and statesmen as Witte. The economy was on the rise, culture too, it was the era of the “Silver Age.” We "Not only did they not buy bread, but they fed Europe, and not only Europe, with bread. But some evil forces literally “shot” our country on the rise. World War I broke out, and then the revolution."

Witte was well versed in the intricacies of the intrigues of the Russian imperial court and in the intricacies of global economic policy, skillfully balancing between attracting Western investment and protectionist support for domestic producers. The gold currency he introduced became an accurate measure of such balancing. Witte himself, not without pride, took credit for the fact that “thanks to this reform, we withstood the unfortunate Japanese war, the unrest that broke out after the war, and the entire alarming situation in which Russia finds itself to this day.”

The New Economic Policy (NEP) proclaimed by Lenin, point by point, repeated Witte's industrialization program. Nikolai Kutler, a man from Witte’s team, became an adviser to the People’s Commissar of Finance Grigory Sokolnikov and one of the founders of the State Bank of the USSR. The monetary reform of the Bolsheviks, even in detail - right down to the minting of gold, silver and copper coins - resembled Witte's plan. By introducing the ruble, backed by gold, the Bolsheviks defeated inflation in two years. Like Witte, Lenin sought external loans. The Bolsheviks established a wine monopoly. Witte was a supporter of state capitalism - in Soviet Russia A whole system of government bodies in charge of industrialization was created.

On June 29, 1999, Russia celebrated one hundred and fifty years since the birth of Sergei Yulievich Witte. The anniversary was modest, especially against the backdrop of Pushkin’s celebrations, but several symposiums and conferences were still held dedicated to this outstanding statesman. In all the reports delivered on this occasion, a red thread ran through the idea that Witte, in essence, had to solve the same economic, financial and political problems that Russia still faces.

Bibliography

Witte S.Yu. Selected memories. M., "Thought", 1991

Russia at the turn of the century: historical portraits. //ed. Karelina A.P. M., Publishing House of Political Literature, 1991

History of Russia XIX - early XX centuries. //ed. Fedorov. M. "Mirror". 1998

History of Russia in portraits, vol.1. Smolensk "Rusich". 1996

Ananyin B.V., Ganelin R.Sh. S.Yu. Witte. "Questions of History", 1990, No. 8, p. 32-53

On June 29 (June 17, old style), 1999, Russia celebrated one hundred and fifty years since the birth of Sergei Yulievich Witte. The anniversary was modest, especially against the backdrop of Pushkin’s celebrations, but several symposiums and conferences were still held dedicated to this outstanding statesman. In all the reports delivered on this occasion, a red thread ran through the idea that Witte, in essence, had to solve the same economic, financial and political problems that Russia still faces. Witte, as a politician, was woven from contradictions.

He was born into a family in which exactly opposite principles coexisted. On his father’s side, he came from a family of humble immigrants from Holland; the family received Russian nobility only in the middle of the 19th century, and Witte’s father was a middle-ranking official who served in the Caucasian governorship. But on his mother’s side, Witte was related to the Dolgoruky princes and had many influential relatives. It is curious that Witte’s cousin was Helena Blavatsky, the founder of theosophical teaching. He himself, a descendant of Lutherans, was brought up in the spirit of the formula “Orthodoxy, autocracy, nationality” and, under the influence of his uncle General R. A. Fadeev, a famous publicist of the Slavophile persuasion, read the works of Aksakov, Khomyakov, Tyutchev.

In his younger years, Witte professed purely conservative, even reactionary views. After the Narodnaya Volya assassination attempt on Alexander II, the indignant Witte proposed fighting terrorists using their own methods, that is, killing them in the same vile and treacherous manner as they kill themselves. His idea found a response at the very top; the “Holy Squad” was formed from among the aristocratic youth, which the great satirist M. E. Saltykov-Shchedrin sarcastically called a society of agitated loafers. Witte took the oath to a well-intentioned secret society, received codes and passwords, and once traveled abroad on behalf of his squad, but he did not become a terrorist, and subsequently he recalled this episode of his life with embarrassment.

By upbringing, Witte was close to the noble nobility, but his aristocratic relatives left him neither estates nor capital. He graduated from Novorossiysk University, writing a dissertation on infinitesimal quantities, but his desire to remain in the department of pure mathematics was not destined to come true, mainly due to lack of funds. Witte had to simply earn a living and entered the service of the Odessa Railway. He began his career, frankly speaking, in a way completely unusual for young man with connections. Witte, a candidate of mathematics, started as a ticket office cashier, then went through all the other levels, studying the business in great detail. Witte thoroughly studied all the details of his new business and quickly established himself as a valuable employee. Colleagues recalled: “It seemed as if he had some kind of magic wand that showed him how to increase the profitability of the commodity service.” His strong point was railroad tariffs; Possessing mathematical abilities, he memorized entire tables of numbers and subsequently wrote a study on the basic principles of tariff formation. Within fifteen years, Witte rose through the ranks to become manager of the Southwestern Railways. He became a highly paid manager, enjoyed weight in the business world of Kyiv, where the road management was located, and was given a luxurious mansion in the most aristocratic district of Kyiv, opposite the palace of the Governor General. His future seems determined once and for all.

But having overcome one peak, Witte began to realize that the private entrepreneurial field was narrow for his irrepressible energy. He thinks about theoretical problems, turns to the works of the classics of political economy, finally decides to have his say and in 1889 publishes the book “National Economy and Friedrich List.” If you think about the question of why Witte was attracted to the little-known German economist F. List, then the answer, obviously, is that Witte saw in his teaching a reflection of his own thoughts. In those years, Witte, by his convictions, was a Slavophile (he even collaborated in Slavophile press organs), that is, he believed that Russia was destined for a completely different, original path. In Liszt's theory attention was paid precisely to national characteristics economic systems. Promoting the teachings of Liszt, Witte emphasized that he did not deny the conclusions of Adam Smith and David Ricardo. However, in his opinion, the creators of classical political economy created a science that would be more correctly called not political, but cosmopolitan economy. Meanwhile, life itself daily refutes the universality of their axioms; facts prove that each national economy has its own, largely unique path. Witte was amazed at the doctrinaires who intended to carry out reforms with the help of textbooks of political economy. “We Russians,” he wrote with sarcasm, “in the field of political economy, of course, were towed by the West, and therefore, given the groundless cosmopolitanism that has reigned in Russia in recent decades, it is not surprising that we have an understanding of the laws of political economy and their everyday understanding.” took an absurd direction. Our economists came up with the idea of ​​shaping economic life Russian Empire according to the recipes of a cosmopolitan economy. The results of this cutting are obvious." Witte's main conclusion was that general economic principles must certainly "be modified to suit different national conditions."

The economic views of a private railway manager, set out in a small brochure about a German economist of the first half of the 19th century, would have no significance if not for one circumstance. Literally a few months after Witte found it necessary to systematize his views, he began his government activities, and his economic credo soon formed the basis of government policy. The sharp turn in Witte's career was largely due to chance. As manager of the Southwestern Railway, he had the audacity to limit the speed of the royal train, causing outrage among the courtiers. On other roads, the managers were less obstinate, and the train was driven at breakneck speed until a crash occurred near the Borki station. Emperor Alexander III was saved only by his colossal strength, which allowed him to hold the roof of the carriage on his shoulders. It was then that they remembered Witte’s warning that the sovereign’s head would certainly be broken. In 1889, Witte was appointed director of the department of railway affairs and, contrary to all the canons of the Table of Ranks, was immediately promoted to the rank of full state councilor.

The St. Petersburg bureaucracy greeted the upstart with caution. His manners, behavior, even his speech, which was influenced by life in the southern Russian provinces, caused dull irritation. The owner of a fashion salon, A.V. Bodanovich, saw Witte for the first time and wrote in her diary that “he looks more like a merchant than an official.” The provincial, taking advantage of the emperor's favor, quickly pushed aside his rivals. Less than a year passes before he is appointed Minister of Railways, and a year later he is appointed Manager of the Ministry of Finance. During a period of turbulence economic development this department was key, since a lot depended on the distribution of budget items and the determination of tax rates. Witte essentially concentrated in his hands the threads of control of the entire economy of the empire. It was difficult to name an area of ​​activity that his department would not be involved in. Moreover, gradually the Ministry of Finance turned into a state within a state, which had its own diplomatic representatives abroad, its own fleet and seaports, and independent armed forces - a border guard corps.

Witte's attitude towards people has always been purely utilitarian. E. V. Tarle accurately noticed that this was precisely the basis for the assessments that Witte gave to contemporary statesmen: “What do you want? Help me? So, the most wonderful and ideal, even if you were Grand Duke Sergei Alexandrovich or Rachkovsky. intends to interfere with me? That means he’s a scoundrel, a thief, a stupid person, a nonentity.” At the same time, Witte had the ability to attract talented assistants. He was proud that among his employees were such prominent figures in the future as E. L. Plese, I. P. Shipov, V. N. Kokovtsov, A. I. Vyshnegradsky, A. I. Putilov, P. L Barki. He gave a job to D.I. Mendeelev in his department, being one of the first to recognize him as a brilliant scientist. Witte wanted to see his subordinates not as simple performers, but as interested participants. One of the officials recalled: “Witte’s reports took place in a very curious situation. The speaker does not have papers or a pencil with him, and for two hours the speaker and Witte walk from corner to corner in the office and argue furiously. At the same time, Witte introduces his interlocutor into circle of his ideas and ardently defends the project he defends. If Witte gave in to the arguments of his interlocutor, then he usually began to get excited and shout: “I don’t understand you, what you want to do,” and after some thought: “Well, do it, do it... ".

Witte knew human weaknesses well and shamelessly bribed the people he needed. As Minister of Finance, he had the widest possibilities for distributing cash subsidies, granting privileges, concessions, and appointments to profitable positions. He was one of the first to understand the power of the printed word and used newspapers to carry out his own plans. Custom articles had been practiced before him, but Witte gave this business the appropriate scope. Dozens of Russian and foreign journalists worked for him, and brochures and substantial works were published on his orders. A campaign was waged through the press to discredit Witte's opponents and promote his own plans. Witte himself was no stranger to journalism, although the degree of his personal participation in the works published under his name has always caused controversy. Characterizing the activities of the Minister of Finance, P. B. Struve wrote: “Witte’s economic genius should be sought not in bad treatises on political economy, written by someone else’s hands, but in state creativity, free from the shackles of doctrines and with some kind of sovereign ease, resolving difficulties before which the sages and experts dwelt upon."

With this sovereign courage, Witte introduced the gold standard, that is, the free exchange of the ruble for gold. In his own words, “almost everyone was against this reform.” thinking Russia", because some (primarily exporters of raw materials) benefited from a weak ruble, others were afraid of the complexity of this financial transaction. Witte convinced his opponents that the paper ruble was the main obstacle to normal development: "In essence, the paper tokens circulating with us instead of money are a constant reminder of the impotence of the state treasury." When new gold imperials were minted, experts predicted the immediate washout of these, as they were ironically called, "Wittekilder" from circulation. However, the Minister of Finance carefully prepared the reform, having previously accumulated a large gold reserve. The ruble turned from a weak currency into one of the strongest and most resilient in the world.

At Witte's initiative, a state monopoly on the trade in spirits was introduced. In Russia, vodka has been the most important source of income for the treasury since ancient times, although the methods of generating income have changed several times. In the 60s of the XIX century. The completely discredited tax farming system was replaced by excise taxes on every degree. Witte went even further. From now on, vodka was sold only in state-owned wine shops. The Minister of Finance argued that his priority was not fiscal goals, but the desire to eliminate the abuses of the private trade in alcohol. Witte noted in his most humble report: “The cessation of the sale of wine at the expense of the harvest, on mortgage or in exchange for clothes, dishes and other things arouses in the peasants a genuine feeling of joy, and, making the sign of the cross, they expressed gratitude to the father-tsar, who had saved the people from the destructive influence of the pre-reform tavern, which ruined the population." The reality was immensely far from the blissful picture painted by the minister. Under Witt, the wine monopoly generated a million rubles in revenue per day, and it was under him that the country’s budget finally began to be built on getting the population drunk.

When we're talking about about Witte’s activities as Minister of Finance, the wine monopoly and the gold standard come to mind first. Meanwhile, despite the importance of these reforms, they were only part of a policy known as the “Witte system.” This system was a complex of financial, credit and tax measures through which the state stimulated the development of industry. Witte used protectionism, that is, the protection of Russian producers from foreign competitors. However, protection did not mean closing the market. “Creating your own industry,” the Minister of Finance emphasized, “this is the fundamental, not only economic, but also political task that constitutes the cornerstone of our protection system.” By limiting the import of foreign goods into Russia with high customs duties, the government encouraged exports with various tax incentives and bonuses. Witte was not afraid to start a real customs war with Germany, achieving equal trade relations with this country. By varying tax rates, the Ministry of Finance created the most favorable conditions now in one or another industry, directing the flow of capital in the right direction.

Particular attention was paid to attracting foreign capital, private and public. The government took out large foreign loans, placing, however, not with international financial organizations, but by placing obligations, and during Witte’s tenure as Minister of Finance, Russia’s external debt increased sharply. Since up to 150 million rubles were spent annually on servicing this debt alone, it was necessary to take out new loans to pay interest on the old ones. The Russian government tried to take loans not from international financial organizations, but placed its obligations on the domestic market of foreign countries. “Russian papers” were specially issued in low denominations, making them accessible to the petty bourgeoisie, office workers, even servants. They all gave away their accumulated savings of centimes or pfenings in the hope of becoming a rentier. Although Witte could not foresee that the Bolsheviks would refuse to pay off these debts, it seems that the fate of the holders of Russian securities was the last thing on his mind. The main thing, he argued to his critics, was that “all borrowed money went exclusively to productive purposes.” Not without reason, in those years they said that Russian railways were built with the money of Berlin cooks.

Witte's favorite brainchild was railway construction. Having begun his government activities, he took over 29,157 versts of railways; after resigning, he left 54,217. Witte’s predecessors contributed in every possible way to the development of joint-stock companies, covering the losses of private owners at the expense of the treasury. In essence, on the railroad magnates, whatever the results of their commercial activities, golden rain was constantly pouring out. Witte, as a representative of private capital, was expected to continue the same policy. However, despite, or perhaps because of, many years of experience in private service, he considered state-owned roads to be more efficient. If by the time Witte appeared in St. Petersburg, private joint-stock companies owned more than 70% of Russian railways, then by the end of his ministry the ratio changed in the opposite direction and almost 70% of the roads were state-owned.

Witte believed that only the state could concentrate enormous resources to implement the most daring plans. A striking example was the Trans-Siberian Railway. Witte called this project an event “in which new eras begin in the history of peoples and which often cause a radical revolution in the established economic relations between states.” The start of construction of the road coincided with the famine that struck the country in the early 90s. XIX, but at Witte’s insistence the work was not curtailed. Moreover, the Ministry of Finance put forward the idea of ​​completing construction several years earlier than envisaged in the original plan. The speed of laying rails exceeded American models. True, to achieve this, the railway engineers had to use some tricks - they built the road single-track and used lightweight rails.

In a photograph from those years, above the tunnels under construction, one of many dozens cut into the rocks, you can see the slogan “Forward to the Pacific Ocean!” This echoes Witte's idea that the Trans-Siberian Railway will open the gate to the Asian East, and Russia, standing guard at this gate, will take full advantage of the mediator. After regular traffic between St. Petersburg and Vladivostok began in 1898, this idea seemed close to being realized. English newspapers anxiously predicted that the Siberian Road “will make Russia a self-sufficient state, for which neither the Dardanelles nor Suez will no longer play any role, and will give it economic independence, thanks to which it will achieve power, the likes of which no other state has ever dreamed of.” ". The highway, built at the end of the 19th century, and on the eve of the 21st century remains the main link between European Russia, Siberia, and the Far East. However, Witte’s calculations that it would be possible to route transit cargo flowing through the Suez Canal through Russian territory did not materialize due to foreign policy complications.

The English historian Stephen Marks called his monograph on the Trans-Siberian Railway “The Road to Power,” arguing that the plans of the road builders were dictated mainly not by economic, but by military-strategic and geopolitical considerations. Western historiography, in general, denies Witte the right to be called a supporter of free enterprise and the market. Most often he is classified as a champion of state capitalism controlled by the bureaucracy. Sometimes it is even said about Witt that in his mentality he was closer to Stalin’s people’s commissars of the 30s, who in their industrialization policy followed mainly the outlines and plans developed by the Tsarist Ministry of Finance. Of course, these are extreme estimates. Witte never encroached on the foundations of private enterprise, and as for the development of industry with the help state power, then in this respect he can be considered the ideological heir of Peter I and other Russian reformers.

It is characteristic that for his contemporaries and compatriots, Witte was undoubtedly the “father of Russian capitalism,” although most often such an assessment had a negative connotation. The Minister of Finance was accused of artificially planting capitalism on Russian soil. The minister's enemies were forced to remain silent when National economy Russia was on the rise, but at the very beginning of the 20th century. Another economic crisis broke out and Russia, already integrated into the world economy, experienced the costs of capitalism for almost the first time. Witte was made responsible for the global economic downturn, and his entire economic system was subjected to heavy criticism. the system he implemented over the course of a decade was. The minister was accused of selling out Russia, concluding unprofitable loans, etc. that he overemphasized trade and industry at the expense of the traditional agricultural sector.

Witte had a difficult relationship with Nicholas II, probably because for him the Tsar forever remained a young heir who had to be constantly taught and corrected. Meanwhile, the emperor became increasingly burdened by this guardianship. The mentoring tone of the Minister of Finance, his independence and intransigence, constant references to the great reign of Alexander III - all this sharply contrasted with the flattering speeches of the courtiers. Nicholas II was whispered from all sides that Witte had turned into a grand vizier, ignoring the autocrat.

On August 16, 1903, Nicholas II, having listened to Witte’s next report, treated him kindly, and at parting, embarrassedly said that he was depriving him of the post of Minister of Finance. According to the courtiers, after this audience the emperor breathed out a sigh of relief: “Ugh!” To gild the pill, Witte was appointed chairman of the Committee of Ministers. Despite the pompous name, it was a very modest post and nothing really depended on the dignitary who occupied it. Of course, this kind of activity did not satisfy Witte. He firmly believed that the insignificant figures who had pushed him away from the helm of the ship of state would not cope with control, and dreamed of returning to power.

Witte's hour struck when Russia suffered a humiliating defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. It must be said that when he was Minister of Finance, Witte contributed to the gradual involvement of Russia in the Far Eastern conflict. In an effort to straighten the direction of the Trans-Siberian Railway, Witte proposed laying part of the road through the territory of Manchuria. He obtained consent from the Chinese government to build the Chinese Eastern Road by bribing the 72-year-old mandarin Li Hongzhang, who was considered a reformer and admirer of novelty at the Beijing court. Russian railway engineers appeared in Manchuria, then border guard detachments were introduced into the exclusion zone, then the Russian government, together with the governments of other foreign powers, took part in imposing enslaving agreements on China, leased the Liaodong Peninsula, began building the Port Arthur naval base and a commercial port Further. In court circles they started talking about establishing a protectorate over Manchuria, and talked about establishing a military bridgehead in Korea. Witte disowned these adventuristic plans, saying that he was only planning to ensure Russia's economic interests in Northern China and nothing more. “Imagine,” he gave a risky analogy, “that I invited my guests to the Aquarium, and they, drunk and drunk, ended up in a brothel and caused scandals there. Am I really to blame for this? I wanted to confine myself to the Aquarium.”

Russia's main rival in Far East there was Japan, whose government nurtured exactly the same expansionist plans regarding China and Korea. Removed from power, Witte watched powerlessly as the conflict developed, which led to a military clash in January 1904. The Russian army suffered one defeat after another, but Witte was most worried about the performances within the country. After Bloody Sunday on January 9, 1905, Witte, polemicizing with the main ideologist of the conservatives, Chief Prosecutor of the Synod K. P. Pobedonostsov, predicted: “Such sacrifices and horrors do not go in vain, and if the government does not take the current of the population’s thoughts into its hands, then we will all we will perish, because in the end, the Russian commune, a special kind, will triumph." In a letter to the commander-in-chief of the Russian troops in Manchuria, General Kuropatkin, he emphasized that in the next 20-25 years Russia will have to abandon an active foreign policy and deal exclusively with internal affairs: "We “We will not play a global role - well, we need to come to terms with this... The main thing is the internal situation, if we do not calm the unrest, we may lose most of the acquisitions made in the 19th century.”

The death of the Pacific squadron in the Tsushima Strait forced the ruling circles of Russia to accept the proposal of US President T. Roosevelt for mediation. Witte was appointed the first representative in negotiations with the Japanese, held in the American town of Portsmouth. He had to show great diplomatic skill to minimize Russian losses. In fact, at the negotiating table, Witte even returned some of what was lost on the battlefields. Nevertheless, he had to agree to the cession of the southern part of Sakhalin, which had already been captured by the Japanese. On the last night before his conclusion, Witte reflected on the outcome of the negotiations: “On the one hand, my mind and conscience told me: “What a happy day it will be if tomorrow I sign peace,” and, on the other hand, my inner voice told me: “But you will It’s much happier if fate takes your hand away from the Portsmouth Peace, everything will be blamed on you, because no one wants to confess their sins, their crimes before the fatherland and God, not even the Russian Tsar, and especially Nicholas II. " Witte looked into the water After the signing of peace on August 23, 1906, he was given the title of count, but his ill-wishers immediately dubbed him “Count of Polosakhalinsky.”

The Portsmouth Peace, which gave a respite to the autocracy, significantly strengthened Witte's influence. One of the dignitaries reported: “It’s funny to see the turmoil of various local spheres on the occasion of the imminent return of “Judas,” crowned with laurels as a peacemaker. He is loved less than ever and feared more than ever, and at the moment all sorts of things are being invented and discussed measures to “neutralize it.” Witte liked to repeat: “If there were no unlimited autocracy, there would be no Russian Great Empire"and argued that democratic forms are unacceptable for Russia due to its multilingualism and diversity. But as a pragmatist, he understood that under the circumstances the autocracy must give in. Having returned from abroad, Witte began developing a reform program, ordering, as usual, materials several executors at once, and not lawyers, but journalists. An employee of the conservative "New Time" M. O. Menshikov, without further ado, took from the library a brochure by private assistant professor F. F. Kokoshkin on European constitutions and in one evening sketched out a plan for a radical transformation for Witte Russia. Another journalist I. I. Kolyshko recalled that Witte gave him precise instructions: “Write two reports: for the Tsar and for the public. The tsar must be driven away from fear of the constitution. But carefully lead him around, like a timid horse near a bush. Well, for the public - so that it is clear to everyone that I will give a constitution, but not right away. Gradually. Do you understand?" 10

On October 9, 1905, Witte presented a note to Nicholas II, which pointed out the danger of the revolutionary development of events: “The Russian revolt, senseless and merciless, will sweep away everything, turn everything into dust. What kind of Russia will come out of this unprecedented test - the mind refuses to imagine; the horrors of the Russian rebellion may surpass everything that has happened in history." 11 Witte saw the solution in immediate reforms from above, emphasizing that natural development would inevitably lead Russia to a constitutional structure. He cynically taught Nicholas II: “First of all, try to create unrest in the enemy camp. Throw a bone that will direct all the mouths aimed at you at yourself.” The Tsar agreed with these arguments and proposed to prepare a corresponding manifesto.

Since it was the tradition of the Russian authorities to delay transformations until the last minute, the situation in the capital was tense to the limit and the issue of evacuating the royal family on a German cruiser was already being discussed at court. The manifesto was prepared under time pressure, in deep secrecy and using typically bureaucratic methods. Not a single public figure was involved in the work. Two of Witte’s assistants, N.I. Vuich and Prince A.D. Obolensky, prepared several versions of the manifesto. Nicholas II hesitated until last minute, pondering whether to make concessions or intensify repression. However, none of the dignitaries dared to take responsibility for restoring order with armed force. The Minister of the Imperial Court, V. F. Fredericks, summed it up bitterly: “Everyone is shying away from dictatorship and power, they are afraid, everyone has lost their head, and inevitably they have to surrender to Count Witte.” On the evening of October 17, Nicholas II signed the manifesto as amended by Witte. In his diary, he wrote: “After such a day, my head became heavy and my thoughts became confused. Lord, help us, pacify Russia!”

The Manifesto of October 17, which began with the mournful words, “Troubles and unrest in the capitals and in many localities of Our Empire fill Our heart with great and grave sorrow,” granted loyal subjects “the unshakable foundations of civil freedom on the basis of actual inviolability of the individual, freedom of conscience, speech, assembly and unions.” ". The government was entrusted with the responsibility “to immediately attract to participation in the Duma, to the extent possible, the appropriate brevity of the period remaining before the convening of the Duma, those classes of the population that are now completely deprived of voting rights.” The Manifesto also declared: “It shall be established as an inviolable rule that no law can take force without the approval of State Duma and so that those elected by the people are provided with the opportunity to truly participate in monitoring the regularity of the actions of the authorities appointed by Us.”

Thus, autocratic power was limited to an elected representative institution and for the first time in many centuries the population received political freedoms. Literally the next day after the manifesto appeared, the question arose whether it could be considered as a constitution. At first, Nicholas II admitted that he was granting a constitution and wrote to D.F. Trepov: “There were few of us who fought against it. But support in this fight did not come from anywhere. Every day more and more people turned away from us and in the end the inevitable happened !". 12 But after the period of panic and confusion had passed, the prevailing opinion in the royal circle was that the sovereign had only made minor changes in the procedure for passing laws and that the manifesto in no way turned the Russian autocrat into a constitutional monarch. Very soon, most of the solemn promises were subject to revision and arbitrary interpretation. Since the military-administrative apparatus remained at the complete disposal of the previous government, many of the promised freedoms turned out to be a fiction. Nevertheless, the October 17 manifesto had a huge impact on domestic politics. The main provisions of the manifesto could no longer be undone. Russia has entered a new phase of its political development.

Simultaneously with the promulgation of the manifesto on October 17, Witte was appointed the first chairman of the Council of Ministers in Russian history. A clarification needs to be made here. Formally, the Council of Ministers, in the form of an irregularly convened meeting of senior dignitaries chaired by the tsar, existed before, but in fact, in October 1905, a completely new government body was established - the so-called united government. Witte obtained the consent of Nicholas II to attract public figures to the government and entered into negotiations with the delegation of the newly formed cadet party F.A. Golovin, F.F. Kokoshkin and Prince G. E. Lvov. He said that he was ready to support the Cadets, “but on one indispensable condition: that she cut off the revolutionary tail.”

However, the liberals did not intend to abandon allies on the left and called the convening of a Constituent Assembly on the basis of universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage as preconditions for participation in the government. Witte argued that such a drastic measure was impossible in the context of bloody clashes between one part of the population and another, but the delegation was adamant. Subsequently, one of the cadet leaders V.A. Maklakov expressed bitter regret that due to the shortsightedness of his party comrades, a unique chance for the peaceful evolution of the regime was missed: “Did the delegation understand what it had done? I remember the pride with which Kokoshkin was hoarse.” from repetition, in a voice, he spoke about the victory of the Zemstvo people over Witte... But there was something sadder than Kokoshkin’s pride. This was the approval that his story met with in our public. She was glad that the Zemstvo delegation had taken Witte aback." 13

After the refusal of the cadets, Witte turned to public figures of a more moderate persuasion - D. N. Shipov, A. I. Guchkov, M. A. Stakhovich, who were involved in creating the Union of October 17 party. However, the Octobrists also avoided participating in the government. Witte gave vent to his frustration and irritation at his negotiating partners. He accused them of inflexibility, lack of a sense of responsibility, political immaturity and even basic cowardice: “at that time, public figures were afraid of bombs and Brownings, which were in great use against the authorities, and this was one of the internal motives that whispered to everyone in the depths of their souls : “It’s better to be away from danger." As a result, Witte compiled the so-called “business cabinet" from the usual bureaucratic environment. Minister of War A.F. Roediger wrote: “the very composition of Count Witte’s cabinet was extremely motley; along with members of the liberal and even leftist movement, like Kutler, Count Tolstoy, Prince Obolensky (Alexey), the completely conservative Durnovo sat in it; Birilev and I were also conservatives... The unification of the government was purely external, and there could be no talk of unity of views." 14

The involvement of such different-spirited figures was explained by the fact that Witte’s cabinet had to solve two problems simultaneously: to suppress the revolution and implement the necessary minimum of reforms. In essence, there were two centers of power in the capital - the official government and the St. Petersburg Council of Workers' Deputies, headed by G. S. Khrustalev-Nosar and L. D. Trotsky. It got to the point that when the Chairman of the Council of Ministers needed to send an urgent dispatch to Kushka, he was able to get this from the postal and telegraph employees only after a petition from the Executive Committee of the Council. The newspapers wondered who would arrest whom first: Count Witte Nosar or Count Witte's Nosar. The issue was resolved on December 3, 1905, when the police arrested the entire Council. The response to this arrest was an armed uprising in Moscow. Witte was not the direct leader of the suppression of the rebels, but advocated for the most stringent measures. His speeches contained overt threats: “Russian society, insufficiently imbued with the instinct of self-preservation, needs to be given a good lesson. Let it get burned; then it itself will ask for help from the government.” Nicholas II, who remembered the prime minister’s recent liberal speeches, was surprised that now Witte “wants to hang and shoot everyone” and concluded: “I have never seen such a chameleon or a person changing his beliefs like him.”

The most serious of the reforms that Witte tried to carry out during his premiership was the agrarian project prepared by the chief manager of agriculture and land management N.N. Kutler. The project provided for the possibility of forced purchase by peasants of privately owned lands. When discussing the draft, ministers said that compulsory expropriation affects the sacred principle of private property. In response, Witte burst into a sarcastic tirade: “Some Romans once said that the right of property is inviolable, but we have been repeating it like parrots for two thousand years; everything, in my opinion, is inviolable when it is necessary for the common good.” 15 But as soon as the project went beyond the walls of the Council of Ministers, the landowners turned against it. Even foreign landowners were afraid, and Emperor Wilhelm I called this idea “pure Marxism.” Witte had to back down, disown the project and agree to the dismissal of its author.

Witte found himself between two fires. For the democratic part of society he was the strangler of freedom, for conservatives he was almost the inspirer of the revolution. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers maneuvered, but his position became more and more precarious every month. Anticipating his imminent resignation, Witte decided to consolidate the most important changes adopted during his premiership in the form of a new edition of the Basic State Laws. Since the elections to the First State Duma gave an advantage to the left parties, the government sought to confront the deputies with a fait accompli. On the other hand, Witte sought to avoid the restoration of the old order by cutting the ground from under the feet of the conservatives.

The discussion of the Basic Laws took place at a meeting of the highest dignitaries of the empire in Tsarskoe Selo from April 7 to April 12, 1906. 16 Unity and indivisibility Russian state and the monarchical form of government were not subject to debate, but the article containing the definition of monarchical power caused heated debate. Witte proposed retaining the mention of autocratic power, removing the term “unlimited” from the royal title and leaving the term “autocratic”. He motivated his proposal by the fact that in Ancient Rus' “autocratic” was synonymous with sovereignty, therefore, did not contradict the existence of elected legislative bodies, while the term “unlimited” conflicted with the manifesto of October 17. Nicholas II remained extremely dissatisfied with this innovation: “... I am tormented by the feeling whether I have the right before my ancestors to change the limits of the power that I received from them. The struggle within me continues. I have not yet come to a final conclusion.” But with the exception of I.L. Goremykin, the tsar was not supported by any of the meeting participants. Nevertheless, Nicholas II hesitated and only on the last day of the meeting, after persistent questions about whether to exclude the term “unlimited,” he reluctantly muttered: “Yes.”

However, changing the wording meant little, and it was not without reason that the experienced Stishinsky advised: “You should only delete the word, but retain power.” Basic state laws assigned enormous powers to the emperor. His person was sacred and inviolable, he took the initiative on all subjects of legislation, including the exclusive right to revise the Fundamental Laws, the emperor was the supreme leader of all external relations of the Russian state and the sovereign leader of the army and navy.

At the same time, it was proclaimed that the “Russian Empire” is governed on the firm basis of laws issued in the prescribed manner,” and the position of the October 17 manifesto was repeated that no law could be passed without the approval of both chambers and take force without the approval of the Tsar. In the Basic Laws the "immutable foundations of civil liberties" granted by the manifesto of October 17 were specified. The inviolability of the home was proclaimed, every Russian subject had the right to freely choose his place of residence and freely travel abroad. Every subject had the right to organize meetings, express his opinion orally and in writing and disseminate it through the press or by other means. It was allowed to form societies and unions for purposes not contrary to the laws. Freedom of conscience was proclaimed.

All this could be called a real Liberty Charter if Witte did not explain that “This whole section, from a practical point of view, is of no importance.” In the few months following the October 17 manifesto, the authorities managed to pass a number of resolutions restricting freedom of speech. Has been installed criminal liability“for the dissemination of false information about the activities of government institutions and officials,” temporary rules were adopted that allowed the Minister of Internal Affairs to close societies and unions at any time if he considers their activities to threaten public peace. It is characteristic that the Basic Laws did not contain an article protecting the secrets of private correspondence. Witte explained that the government reserves the right to inspection, since “with the current organization of the police, judicial and detective units, this cannot be avoided.” Some of the dignitaries proposed to at least formally guarantee the inviolability of correspondence, to which the Minister of Internal Affairs P. N. Durnovo melancholy replied that he, in fact, was not against it, but “there will be a lot of complaints about torn envelopes.”

The new edition of the Basic State Laws was introduced by imperial decree to the Senate on April 23, 1906, three days before the opening of the First State Duma. Opposition forces were outraged that the government, like a “thief in the night,” stole power from the people. Indeed, the Basic Laws preserved autocratic power and protected the privileges of the ruling elite. The state still prevailed over both society and the individual. The basic laws were a document of a transitional era, the imprint of inconsistency lay on each article. But no matter how these laws were criticized, no matter how anti-democratic their content was, they still became a definite step towards a rule of law state.

Witte and his cabinet resigned immediately after the publication of the Basic State Laws. Witte's departure caused a storm of delight from right and left. For the right, the resignation of the prime minister symbolized the long-awaited abandonment of the reformist course; the left, on the contrary, saw it as a sign of the weakness of the tsarist autocracy. This was the end of Witte's six-month premiership, which tried to reconcile political extremes.

Witte's career was over. True, he did not realize this for a long time, arranged various combinations, intrigued, even tried to use G.E. Rasputin to return to power. But even the favorite of the royal couple could not help him with this, complaining that “father and mother” could not stand “Vitya”. On February 25, 1915, Witte died in his house on Kamennoostrovsky Prospekt, and that same night his office and papers were sealed. The police were looking for his memories, which kept the entire ruling elite in awe. However, Witte took precautions. The manuscripts were kept abroad in the safe of one of the banks. Witte's memoirs were first published after the revolution in 1921-23. They still remain, probably, the most popular, repeatedly reprinted and most frequently used historical source. The paradox is that Witte’s three-volume memoirs give a very distorted idea of ​​both himself and the statesmen with whom he had the opportunity to communicate. They are extremely subjective and subordinate to him political interests. A number of books have been written about Witt, both by Russians, 17

Laue T. H. Sergei Witte and the industrialization of Russia. New York, London, 1963; Mehlinger H. D., Thompson J. M.. Count Witte and the Tsarist Government in the 1905 Revolution. Blomington, London, 1972

Doctor of Historical Sciences, Associate Professor of the Peoples' Friendship University of Russia. Stepanov S.A.

Source International Historical Journal N3, May-June 1999

Basic information about S. Yu. Witte

Sergei Yulievich Witte (1849-1915) is an outstanding Russian political and statesman, a bold reformer with extraordinary political foresight and strategic thinking. Witte, in particular, held the following positions in his life: Minister of Railways, Minister of Finance, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Chairman of the Committee of Ministers, etc.

Witte was Dutch by origin. Received Russian nobility in 1856. He had a higher education (graduated from the Faculty of Physics and Mathematics of the University). Witte was a supporter of the monarchy.

The contribution of S. Yu. Vite to the development of the country is colossal. Immediately after graduating from university, Sergei Yulievich began his career as a cashier at the Odessa Railway. S. Yu. Witte devoted approximately 20 years of his life to service on the railways, which gave him the opportunity to thoroughly study this industry.

In 1889, S. Yu. Witte finally became a civil servant (at first he was the head of the Department of Railway Affairs). Soon the career of the future reformer took off rapidly and after just 3 years he became Minister of Railways. From 1892 to 1903, Witte served as Minister of Finance.

Note 1

It is worth saying that no matter what position S. Yu. Witte held, he always pursued a policy maximally aimed at development domestic economy and industry. Thus, in particular, Witte managed to achieve the introduction of the “gold standard” (in 1897). In addition, Sergei Yulievich contributed in every possible way to the influx of foreign capital into the country. He paid considerable attention to issues of investment in railway construction (intensifying the construction of the Great Siberian Road is one of Witte’s outstanding achievements). Largely thanks to Witte’s active and thoughtful reform efforts, it was possible to achieve a significant acceleration in the growth rate of Russian industry.

Witte was distinguished by his extraordinary political foresight. Many years ahead of his time, he sought to implement the most daring reforms. He managed with extraordinary insight to capture new, most progressive phenomena in the political life of various countries.

Witte's main activities

In domestic politics:

• stabilization of the national currency
• fairly effective protectionist policy
• acceleration of industrial growth
• introduction of a wine monopoly
• intensification of the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway
• tight fiscal policy
• preparation of the famous reforms, which P.A. later managed to implement. Stolypin
• Manifesto 10/17/1905
• creation of the State Duma.

In foreign policy:

• defense agreement with China
• trade agreement with Germany
• diplomatic activities generally aimed at expanding the country’s influence in the Far Eastern region.

It is worth noting that some of Witte’s reforms were not received properly (to many contemporaries they seemed “too liberal”), and therefore did not receive support from the tsar. However, it was precisely thanks to some successfully carried out reforms that by the beginning of the 1910s. Russia demonstrated fairly high rates of industrial growth.

Results of the activities of S.Yu. Witte

The most outstanding of Witte's achievements can be called

• strengthening of statehood, important political reforms
• increasing the regulatory role of the state
• intensification of industrial development and economic growth (it was possible to achieve industrial growth and stabilization of the financial system, protectionist measures were applied quite effectively)
• attracting foreign capital to the country
• conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan, successful negotiations with Germany and China

By that time, activities within the Southwestern Roads Society began to seem limited to Witte and ceased to satisfy his ambitious nature, seeking scope and scale. He increasingly recalled his work in Baranov’s commission, which allowed him to deal with the matter on a nationwide scale. In principle, he was ready to take the position of director of the department. However, the transition to public service had a number of difficulties. Firstly, to occupy the post of director required quite high rank, which Witte did not have. Secondly, as a manager of a private road, he received about 60 thousand rubles, which was much higher than even the ministerial salary, and, therefore, the transition to the civil service, even immediately to the position of director of a department, was financially unprofitable. The decisive role was played by the intervention of Alexander III, who personally knew Witte. The latter repeatedly had to accompany the emperor during his trips to the south. On the eve of the railway accident of the royal train in Borki on October 17, 1888, he warned about the possibility of a crash due to the train being overloaded and exceeding speed. Did without tragic consequences, and the tsar undoubtedly remembered the road manager, who warned the retinue accompanying him with rude directness that they would “break the sovereign’s head.”

Civil Service Witte

On March 10, 1890, Witte was appointed director of the production department, bypassing all levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy, immediately to the rank of full state councilor and with an additional salary from the Cabinet. From that moment his dizzying career began. Less than a year later, the new head of the department was introduced by a representative from the Ministry of Finance to the council of the Ministry of Railways, and on February 15, 1892, he was already appointed manager of the Ministry of Railways. Less than a year has passed - and he is already the manager of the Ministry of Finance, and since 1893, due to the illness of I. A. Vyshegradsky, Minister of Finance with promotion to the rank of Privy Councilor, an honorary member of the Imperial Academy of Sciences.

In the public service, Witte develops vigorous activity. Theoretical and practical training, breadth of views, experience acquired in the areas of private entrepreneurial activity make him stand out against the backdrop of the bureaucratic environment. He immediately becomes an active collaborator of Vyshnegradsky, and constantly goes beyond the boundaries allotted to him. With his active participation, the protective tariff of 1891 was developed, which played an exceptional role in foreign trade policy Russia and became a protective barrier for the developing domestic industry. Witte is a member of various commissions - on the problems of merchant shipping and navigation, on land reclamation and small loan etc. In the fall of 1890, he accompanies Vyshnegradsky on his trip to Central Asia, and upon returning, he makes proposals to expand cotton production there and create a raw material base for the textile industry.

As director of the department and then minister, Witte showed remarkable administrative abilities and organizational talent. Taking advantage of the position of the Tsar's nominee. He is pursuing a personnel policy that is unusual for the state apparatus: he recruits people, giving priority not to origin, rank and length of service, but above all to professional training, knowledge and efficiency, and he dramatically changes the style of work of the units he leads. His behavior and attitude towards his subordinates were unusual, fell outside the usual stereotypes, and seemed to many to be overly democratic. As his employees later recalled, he allowed people to disagree with themselves, argue, and valued independence and initiative. “Witte’s reports took place in a very curious situation,” wrote his successor as director of the department of railway affairs, V.V. Maksimov. “The speaker has neither papers nor a pencil with him, and for two hours the speaker and Witte walk from corner to corner.” corner of the office and are arguing furiously. At the same time, Witte introduces his interlocutor into the circle of his ideas and ardently defends the project he defends. If Witte gave in to the arguments of his interlocutor, then he usually began to get excited and shout: “I don’t understand you, what you want to do,” and after some thought: “Well, do it, do it...” "" He himself was extremely proud of that , that from the circle of his employees came many government figures, such as, for example, Ministers of Finance E. D. Pleske, I. P. Shipov, V. N. Kokovtsov, as well as prominent representatives of the Russian business world A. I. Vyshnegradsky, A. I. Putilov, P. L. Bark et al.

Of course, he also often made mistakes and misconceptions, sometimes commensurate with the scale of his activities. But he was disgusted by the bureaucratic tradition of departments, under the pretext of studying and all kinds of discussions, to slow down the solution of pressing problems. “Because of the desire for perfection, do not retard the growth of life,” he told his employees. “If you made a mistake, admit it and correct yourself. Russia suffers from an excess of self-criticism and the desire to find error-free solutions that would satisfy even stupid people who often end up on interdepartmental commissions, and that is why we have delays in pressing issues, and the duration of their resolution is measured in multiples of twenty years.” True, he himself did not really like to admit mistakes, often preferring to resort to very unseemly methods of blaming his subordinates, which was especially characteristic of the time when he reached the top of the bureaucratic hierarchy and boiled in its “cauldron.”

It must be said that he surprisingly easily accepted all those methods of achieving goals that were widely practiced in the highest bureaucratic and court environment: flattery, the ability to conduct behind-the-scenes intrigues, using far from gentlemanly techniques in the fight against the enemy, the press, bribery, rumors, gossip, etc. . And. So, playing on the hostility of I. A. Vyshnegradsky to the then Minister of Railways A. Ya. Hubennet, with the help of his patron, he achieved the resignation of the minister and took his place, having previously compromised A. A. Wendrich, who was considered a candidate for this post, in front of the Tsar. Then, taking advantage of Vyshnegradsky’s illness and Alexander III’s growing dissatisfaction with him, Witte became the head of the financial department, maintaining his influence in the Ministry of Railways.

The rapid emergence of Witte among the highest bureaucracy and metropolitan society made a strong, but far from unambiguous, impression. The notorious prince V. G1. Meshchersky, a reactionary publicist and publisher close to the court, recalled his first meeting with the new “star” that suddenly flashed on the St. Petersburg horizon: “I saw in front of me a tall, well-built man with an intelligent, lively and friendly face of a man who is stronger Most of all, he impressed me with the complete absence of any bureaucratic scum... I immediately became sympathetic to Witte for his naturalness, artlessness in his manifestation of his personality. In a black frock coat, cheeky and free in his speech and in his every action, his appearance reminded me of an English statesman.” True, to others he seemed somewhat primitive. General A.V. Bogdanovich wrote in her diary that “in appearance he looks more like a merchant than an official.” A conversation with him immediately revealed his natural talent. In his professional field, he was well acquainted with scientific literature. In the humanitarian sphere, he had a lot of serious gaps. In particular, according to Meshchersky, he had a poor command of French and had poor knowledge of literature and history, although he tried to supplement his education. He did not shine with manners either. His whole appearance betrayed him as a provincial. “He came from Southwestern Russia with habits that were poorly adapted to the environment in which he had to work; he had absolutely no gift of words; the forms of speech were incorrect and bore the imprint of a long stay in Ukraine, recalled former comrade minister V.I. Kovalevsky. “His very figure, his manner of speaking sharply and categorically, his angular gestures made a varied impression on official circles and the polished public of the capital...”

Alexander III, who himself was rude and harsh, liked the new minister. He liked his clarity of mind, firmness, and ability to present his ideas clearly and convincingly. The sympathy was mutual. Until the end of his days, Witte recalled with respect and gratitude Alexander 3 as a real monarch, although not without shortcomings and weaknesses (“below average intelligence, below average abilities and below average education”), but who generally corresponded to his idea of ​​​​the bearer of the supreme power. power (“enormous character, wonderful heart, complacency, justice, firmness”)."

In high society, the “upstart” from the provinces actually never became one of his own. Anecdotes circulated about him, legends were created, various “uniformed” people never ceased to be sophisticated in their wit about his French pronunciation and behavior. bulky figure, his family life. Witte was married twice and both times to divorced women, making a lot of efforts in each case to divorce his future wives from their husbands. His first wife N.A. Spiridonova, nee Ivanenko, the daughter of the Chernigov leader of the nobility, died in the fall of 1890. Soon Witte married M.I. Lisanevich, for which, according to rumors, he had to pay compensation and even resort to threats. The scandalous story of the divorce became public, and the minister's official position was somewhat shaken. But Alexander III supported his protégé. The marriage turned out to be successful in family terms, although Witte had no children. However, the wife of the powerful dignitary was never accepted either at court or in high society, which extremely annoyed Witte throughout his life.

The Ministry of Finance, which Witte headed, was a kind of conglomerate of departments. The management of not only finances, but also industry, trade, merchant shipping, and partly public education, commercial and agricultural credit. The Ministry of Railways was actually under his control. Finding himself in such an influential position, Witte gave free rein to the energy that was bursting within him. True, at first he did not have any clear economic program. To some extent, he was guided by the ideas of the German economist of the first half of the 19th century, F. List. Analysis from this point of view of the practices of the post-reform decades served as the starting point for Witte’s development of his own concept of economic policy. His main task was the creation of an independent national industry, protected at first from foreign competition by a customs barrier, with a strong regulatory role! state, which was ultimately supposed to strengthen Russia’s economic and political positions in the international arena.