The meaning of free will in the newest philosophical dictionary. The problem of free will: philosophy versus neuroscience

FREE WILL

FREE WILL - a person’s ability to self-determinate in his actions. In the context of early Greek culture, the concept of S. V. emphasizes not so much the philosophical and categorical as the legal meaning. A free person is a citizen of the polis, one who lives on the land of his ancestors. The opposite of him is a prisoner of war, taken to a foreign land and turned into a slave. The source of personal freedom is the polis, its land (Solon); free from birth, living on the land of the polis, where a reasonable law is established. Therefore, the antonym of the term “free” is not so much “slave” as “non-Greek”, “barbarian”. In Homer's epic, the concept of freedom reveals another meaning. A free person is one who acts without coercion, by virtue of his own nature. The ultimate possible expression of freedom is in the actions of a hero who overcomes fate and thereby becomes compared to the gods. Theoretical premise of the scientific and philosophical formulation of the question of SV. takes shape in the thinking of the sophists, who contrasted “phusis” (the only possible order generated by nature itself) and “no-mos” (the order of life independently established by each people). Socrates emphasizes the decisive role of knowledge in the exercise of freedom. Truly free, moral action is possible only on the basis of clear concepts of goodness and virtue. No one can act badly of his own free will, a person strives for the best in his actions, and only ignorance, ignorance pushes him to do nothing. Right way. Plato connects the concept of SV. with the existence of good as the highest “idea”. Good sanctifies the order that acts in the world as an expedient order. To act freely means to act, focusing on the ideal of the good, coordinating personal aspirations with social justice. Aristotle considers the problem of SV. in the context of moral choice. Freedom is associated with a special kind of knowledge - knowledge-skill (“phronesis”). It is different from knowledge-“techne”, which provides solutions to problems according to a known model. Moral knowledge-skill, paving the way for freedom, focuses on choosing the best action in the context of ethical choice. The source of such knowledge is a specific moral intuition that is cultivated in a person. Stoicism develops its vision of freedom by recognizing the priority of providence in human life. The Stoics see the independent significance of personality in the observance of duties and duty (Panetius). At the same time, providence can be considered both as a law of nature and as the will in man (Posidonius). Will in the latter case acts as a weapon of struggle against fate, and as such requires special education. Epicurus considers the question of ST. in his atomic physics. The latter is opposed to the deterministic atomism of Democritus. The physics of Epicurus substantiates the possibility of SV: as its physical model, Epicurus points to the possibility of free deviation of the atom from a rectilinear trajectory. The reasons for such a deviation are not external; it occurs completely spontaneously. A special stage in posing the question of SV. constituted Christian ideology. Man is called to realize his essence in unity with the Divine, the Bible teaches. The problem, however, is to combine the universalism of God's will, on the one hand, and the moral effort of man, who has not yet achieved (and in fact never achieves) union with the Divine, on the other. Christian literature dealing with this issue can be classified according to its emphasis on one side or another of this interaction. Thus, Pelagius (5th century) substantiates a fairly broad interpretation of the Christian idea of ​​the participation of man’s will in shaping his destiny, unwittingly downplaying the significance of the atoning sacrifice of Christ. The idea of ​​the universality of Providence in polemics with this point of view is defended by Augustine. The realization of good in human activity is possible only with the help of God's grace. Moreover, Augustine does not connect its action with a person’s conscious appeal to it. It manifests itself independently of him. Thomas Aquinas sees the sphere of the NE. in choosing goals and means to achieve the good. According to him, only one true path leads to the goal. A rational being necessarily strives for good, but evil, as a result of rational choice, is impossible. The diversity of positions also manifests itself in the era of the Reformation; Erasmus of Rotterdam defends the idea of ​​SV. Luther opposes it, insisting on a literal reading of the dogma of Divine predestination. God, initially, called some people to salvation, and condemned others to eternal torment. Future destiny man remains, however, unknown to himself. At the same time, Luther pointed to a special sphere of existence, “experiencing” which a person is able to consider the signs of chosenness appearing in it. It's about about the sphere of human everyday life and, above all, about professional activity, the successful implementation of which is a sign of the solvency (chosenness) of the individual in the face of the world and God. Calvin takes a similar position, believing that the Will of God completely programs human existence. Protestantism practically reduces free will to minimum value. The fundamental paradox of Protestant ethics, however, is that by postulating the passivity of the human will in the implementation of God’s grace, it, forcing a person to look for the “ciphers” of chosenness, thereby managed to cultivate an activist type of personality. The Jesuit L. de Molina (1535-1600) argued with Protestantism: among the various types of God's omniscience, his theory highlighted a special “average knowledge” about what can happen in general, but will specifically be realized if a certain condition is met. Molina associated this condition with the living human will. This view was further developed by Suarez, who believed that God imparts his grace only to those human actions during which God’s help does not suppress the self. The teaching of C. Jansen (1585-1638) essentially revives the ideas of Calvin and Luther - a person is free to choose not between good and evil, but only between various types sin. A similar view was also developed by the mystic M. de Molinos, who affirmed the idea of ​​the passivity of the human soul in the face of God (see QUIETISM). Theme SV. finds itself in the philosophy of modern times. For Hobbes, St. means, first of all, the absence of physical coercion. He interprets freedom in an individual-natural dimension: a person is the more free the more opportunities for self-development open to him. The freedom of a citizen and the “freedom” of a slave differ only quantitatively: the first does not have absolute freedom, the second cannot be said to be completely unfree. According to Spinoza, only God is free, because. only his actions are determined by internal laws, but man, as a part of nature, is not free. Nevertheless, he strives for freedom, translating vague ideas into distinct ones, affects into rational love of God. Reason multiplies freedom, suffering reduces it, says Leibniz, distinguishing between negative freedom (freedom from...) and positive freedom (freedom for...). For Locke, the concept of freedom is equivalent to freedom of action; Freedom is the ability to act in accordance with conscious choice. It is spirituality, opposed to reason, that acts as the fundamental definition of man - such is Rousseau’s view. The transition from natural freedom, limited by the forces of the individual himself, to “moral freedom” is possible through the use of laws that people prescribe to themselves. According to Kant, St. is possible only in the sphere of moral law, which opposes itself to the laws of nature. For Fichte, freedom is an instrument for the implementation of the moral law. Schelling finds his solution to the problem of St., considering actions to be free if they stem from the “internal necessity of essence”; human freedom lies at the crossroads between God and nature, being and non-being. According to Hegel, Christianity introduces into the consciousness of European man the idea that history is a process in the awareness of freedom. Nietzsche considers the entire history of morality to be the history of misconceptions regarding the SV. According to his opinion, SV. - fiction, “delusion of everything organic.” Self-realization of the will to power presupposes its purification from moral ideas freedom and responsibility. Marxist philosophy saw the condition for free development in the fact that associated producers are able to rationally regulate the exchange of substances between society and nature. The growth of the productive forces of society creates the material prerequisites for the free development of individuals. The kingdom of true freedom was conceived in Marxism as communism, destroying private property, exploitation, and thereby the very basis of coercion. NE. - one of the central concepts of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. Freedom is the deepest definition of being, the “foundation of foundations,” which places existence in a permanent situation of choice. Likewise, for Sartre, freedom is not a quality of the individual or his actions, but rather a supra-historical definition of the generic essence of man. Freedom, choice and temporality are one and the same thing, the philosopher believes. In Russian philosophy the problem of freedom, St. was specially developed by Berdyaev. The world of objects, where suffering and evil reign, is opposed by creativity, designed to overcome conservative forms of objectification. The results of creativity will inevitably be objectified, but the creative act itself is just as inevitably free. Perhaps the dominant trend in interpretations of SV. (especially in v. 20) there is a point of view according to which a person is always worthy of what happens to him. It is possible to find grounds for justification only in “borderline” cases.

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1999. See what “FREE WILL” is in other dictionaries:

The concept of European moral philosophy, finally formed by I. Kant in the meaning of an individual’s intelligible ability to moral self-determination. In retrospect (pre- or post-Kantian theories), the term "St." can be considered... Philosophical Encyclopedia

A person’s ability to self-determinate in his actions. In the context of early Greek culture in the concept of C.B. The emphasis is not so much on philosophical categorical as on legal meaning. A free person is a citizen of the polis, one who lives... ... History of Philosophy: Encyclopedia Free will

A category denoting the philosophical and ethical problem of whether a person is self-determined or determined in his actions, i.e. the question of the conditionality of the human will, in the solution of which two main positions emerged: determinism and indeterminism.... ... Big Encyclopedic Dictionary

The great reformers of the church stood for unfree will, and the Jesuits for free will, and yet the former founded freedom, the latter slavery of conscience. Henri Amiel You call yourself free. Free from what, or free for what? Friedrich Nietzsche We... ... Consolidated encyclopedia of aphorisms

FREE WILL, a category denoting the philosophical and ethical problem of whether a person is self-determined or determined in his actions, i.e. the question of the conditionality of human will, in the solution of which two main positions emerged: determinism and... ... Modern encyclopedia

free will- FREEDOM OF WILL, a category denoting the philosophical and ethical problem of whether a person is self-determined or determined in his actions, i.e. the question of the conditionality of human will, in the solution of which two main positions emerged: determinism and... ... Illustrated Encyclopedic Dictionary

free will- see will. Dictionary of a practical psychologist. M.: AST, Harvest. S. Yu. Golovin. 1998 ... Great psychological encyclopedia

Who is a free person? The answer to this question is not as simple as it might seem at first glance. Many philosophers have tried to comprehend the concept of freedom. The conclusions they came to are presented in this article.

The problem of freedom in philosophy

It should be noted that in philosophy the problem of freedom is usually conceptualized in relation specifically to a person, to his behavior. In nature, freedom is considered as an “unknown necessity”, an accident. The problem that interests us received its development in such issues as free will and the associated human responsibility. The problem of the very possibility of being free was also touched upon, they talked about freedom as a force that regulates public relations. Probably, no philosophical question has such a great political and social resonance as the one that interests us. It is very important to determine who a free person is and whether people can be considered free at all. Why? Let's figure it out.

How important is freedom for a person?

Possessing it for an individual is a moral, social and historical imperative, a criterion of her individuality, as well as an indicator of the level of development of society. Strict regulation of human behavior and consciousness, arbitrary restriction of his freedom, reduction of him to the role of a “tool” in technological and social systems harms not only the individual, but also society as a whole. After all, it is a free person who ultimately makes up a society that becomes capable of not only adapting to the social and natural circumstances of reality, but also transforming them in pursuit of its goals.

The personality is always a material concrete bearer of freedom and acts as its subject. Accordingly, they are also communities (classes, social groups, nations) in which it is included. However, a free person inevitably faces necessity. How to resolve this contradiction?

Freedom and Necessity

Human freedom has been traditionally considered in the history of philosophy in relation to necessity. Necessity, in turn, was usually perceived in the form of predestination, fate, fate, commanding the actions of people and denying the freedom of human will. This understanding of necessity found its most expressive embodiment, perhaps, in the Latin proverb, according to which fate guides those who accept it and drags those who resist it. The contrast of such concepts as “necessity” and “human freedom”, the replacement of one of them by the other or the denial of one or the other for more than two thousand years was a stumbling block for philosophers who could not find a satisfactory solution to this problem. The old question of necessity and freedom arose before the idealists of the 19th century, as did the metaphysicians of the 18th century and all philosophers who considered the relation to thinking of human existence.

The meaning of solving the problem of freedom and necessity

Of great practical importance is the philosophical solution to the problem of the relationship between such concepts as “freedom of the soul” and “necessity” in the behavior and activity of an individual. This is important primarily for assessing people's actions. This problem neither law nor morality can be ignored, since it is impossible to talk about legal and moral responsibility for actions without recognizing the freedom of the individual. If people act only out of necessity, and they lack freedom of soul, then the question of a person’s responsibility for their behavior loses its meaning. Then “retribution according to deserts” is either a lottery or arbitrariness.

Existentialism and essentialism

The solution to the antinomy “necessity or freedom” depended in the history of philosophy on which direction the philosophers belonged to - existentialism (from the Latin word meaning “existence”) or essentialism (from the Latin “essence”). In other words, existence or essence was original or primary for them. For supporters of essentialism, freedom was only a manifestation, the embodiment of necessity, deviations from which were accidental. Representatives of existentialism, on the contrary, considered freedom as the primary reality of human life, and considered necessity an abstract concept. Man in existence acquires essence; there is no higher nature before existence, as well as predestination (destination) of man.

The meaning of freedom of choice

Freedom of choice is central to the progress of society, just as natural selection is in biological evolution. Both of them play the role of the main driving factor of development (in the second case, wildlife, and in the first, society). However, there is a fundamental difference in the mechanism of their action. Biological individual in process natural selection is the object of evolutionary laws, according to which the organisms most adapted to the environment survive. Freedom of choice implies that the individual social individual is a subject of the social process that perceives the achievements of the spiritual and material culture of all humanity.

The biological advantages of individuals during the action of natural selection are transmitted only to their immediate descendants. Freedom of choice leads to the fact that the achievements of people in a variety of areas of activity - spiritual and moral values, practical experience, inventions, accumulation of knowledge - can potentially be perceived by all people who have access to them. For the full development of humanity, a society of free people is necessary. This raises the question of free will.

Solving the Free Will Problem

In philosophy, since ancient times, there have been endless debates about free will, that is, the possibility of a person’s self-determination in his own actions. They began from the time of Socrates. Is the will subordinate to something external or is it self-positing? Is its source within oneself or does it come from outside? These questions were caused by the great significance of this problem, the idea of ​​the individual as a subject of creative and moral activity. Their solution contained the following contradiction: if any action is strictly defined and nothing other than what it is, then it cannot be credited or blamed. However, on the other hand, the idea that the will is only the “ultimate cause” of some moral action, not conditioned in advance by anything, implies that the causal series of phenomena is broken. On what then are the thoughts of a free person based? This is contrary to the need for sound, logical scientific explanation.

Determinism and indeterminism

In understanding free will in accordance with these two sides of the antinomy, two main philosophical positions have emerged. The first of them is determinism (from the Latin word meaning “causing”, “determination”). Representatives this direction believed that the will should be explained by certain reasons. The second is indeterminism, which rejects this possibility. In accordance with various factors(spiritual, mental, physical), which are recognized as the cause of volitional actions, among the concepts of determinism it is customary to distinguish between mechanical, or “geometric” determinism (Hobbes, Spinoza) and psychological, or mental, less strict (T. Lipps). The most consistent indeterminism can be considered the teachings of Maine de Biran and Fichte. However, indeterminism taken to its logical conclusion rests on the so-called freedom of indifference, that is, equal opportunity opposing decisions. This, in turn, leads to paralysis of the will (remember, for example, “Buridan’s donkey,” that is, the need to choose between two equal alternatives), as well as to the absolute randomness of the choice made. Arguing this way, it cannot be argued that every person is free. Therefore, in the history of philosophy, the principle of mixed (eclectic) doctrine turned out to be predominant. This is, for example, Kant's dualism.

Kant's dualism

According to this philosopher, being a rational being, belonging to the intelligible (intelligible) world, a person must be free (in determining his behavior, in moral life). However, in the empirical (experienced, natural) world, in which natural necessity dominates, people are not free in their choice, their will is causally determined.

Schelling's concept

Schelling's concept also bears traces of such duality. This thinker defines, on the one hand, freedom as an internal necessity. On the other hand, he recognizes that the nature of the initial choice is self-positing. The latter nevertheless prevails in Schelling. This philosopher says that man is placed at a crossroads. He has within himself a source of free movement towards both evil and good. The connection of these principles in him is free, and not necessary. Whatever a person chooses, his action will be the consequence of his decision. Thus, free life is a dual concept.

Hegel's opinion on freedom and necessity

The dialectical formulation of the problem of necessity and freedom that interests us is most clearly expressed in philosophy by Hegel and Spinoza. Hegel believed that freedom is a conscious necessity. However, this thinker, proclaiming freedom of will, essentially endows it with the “world spirit” (that is, the absolute idea), and not with man. After all, in this case it cannot be said that a person is born free. It is Hegel’s “world spirit” that is the embodiment of free will in its pure form.

Other trends in understanding free will

Among the trends in the understanding of free will, presented in the idealistic philosophy of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, personal (personalistic) and voluntaristic indeterminism prevails. The positivist attitude not to touch this problem is also widespread. In Bergson both tendencies are intertwined. He refers in his defense of free will to the uniqueness and organic value of mental states, which cannot be resolved into certain individual elements, and are therefore not causally determined. Windelbandt considers volitional acts in some cases as free, and in others as causally determined.

Also, the problem of free will is in the center of attention of atheistic existentialism (Camus, Sartre), who saw a person rooted in “nothing” (that is, in absolute openness to being, potentiality, possibility) as a bearer of absolute freedom, who opposes the outside world, actually reducing him to self-will and freedom of will turning into rebellion to “freedom of indifference.”

Philosophy of life

This irrationalist school of philosophy originated in Europe at the end of the 19th century. Its founder is F. Nietzsche. The philosophy of life was developed in the works of A. Bergson, W. Ditley, Schopenhauer and Spengler. She opposed the era of romanticism and rationalism that dominated at that time. Schopenhauer, combining Kantian and Buddhist ideas, declared that the world's will is the most important thing.

Nietzsche rejected the use of rationalism and reason in philosophy because it could kill life. It was proposed to rely on feelings and intuition as knowledge. Nietzsche thus solved one of the main problems of philosophy - the relationship between thinking (mind) and life. He divided them and thereby attracted the attention of many other thinkers. This philosopher, having introduced the concept of “life”, declared that it was she who was the source of everything. Everything comes from life: consciousness, matter, living beings, etc. Life, in his opinion, does not disappear in the absolute, since it is inherent in us. Nietzsche also introduced a new concept - "will to power." It is the main driving force of evolution, its stimulus, and permeates the entire existence of man.

free will

FREE WILL- the concept of European moral philosophy, which was finally formed by I. Kant in the meaning of an individual’s intelligible ability to moral self-determination. In retrospect, the term “free will” can be considered as a historical and philosophical metaphor: its historically recorded connotations are much broader than the possible normative meaning of the term, which emphasizes the meaning of the concept of “freedom”, and “will” can be replaced by “decision”, “choice” and so on. equivalents. However, over the course of many centuries, the meaningful “core” of the metaphor demonstrates a high degree of invariance of the main problems: what is moral action; Does sanity imply free will? In other words: should moral autonomy exist (as a condition of morality and as the ability to generate extra-natural causation) and what are its limits, i.e. How does natural (divine) determinism relate to the intellectual and moral freedom of the subject?

In the history of philosophy, two main ways of deducing the concept of free will can be distinguished. The first (it was adhered to by Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas and Hegel) comes down to the analytical deduction of the concept of free will from the very concept of will as the ability of the mind to self-determinate and generate special causality. The second method (traced from Plato and the Stoics through Augustine and most of the scholastics up to Kant) is the postulation of free will as independence from external (natural or divine) causality and, therefore, as the ability to self-determination. For the second method, there are two types of justification. Firstly, theodicy (known since the time of Plato and found its completion in Leibniz), where free will is postulated to prove the innocence of the deity in world evil. Secondly, the Kantian method of proof, opposite in its initial premise (denial of any theodicy), but similar in principle, where free will is postulated by morally legislating reason. These two proofs are similar in the sense that they do not depend on the substantive definition of the will: it is enough to assume a certain quantity that ensures the formal correctness of the “moral equations.” That is why “free will” is equivalent here to “freedom of choice”, “decision”, etc.

“Free will” in ancient and medieval thought (Greek τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, αὐτεξούσιον, αὐτεξουσία, less often προαίρεσνς, αὐτονομ ία; lat. arbitrium, liberum arbitrium). Greek moral reflection originated in a universal cosmological paradigm, which made it possible to explain the moral, social and cosmic orders through each other: morality acted as one of the characteristics of an individual’s “involvement” during cosmic events. The law of cosmic retribution, appearing in the guise of fate or fate, expressed the idea of ​​impersonal compensatory justice (clearly formulated, for example, by Anaximander - B 1): what is of fundamental importance is not subjective guilt, but the need to compensate for the damage caused to the order by any “culprit” or “cause” " In archaic and preclassical consciousness the thesis dominates: responsibility does not presuppose free will as an indispensable condition (for example, II. XIX 86; Hes. Theog. 570 sq.; 874; Opp. 36; 49; 225 sq.; Aesch. Pers. 213 -214; 1001 sq.

Socrates and Plato discovered new approaches to the problem freedom and responsibility: imputation is more firmly associated with the arbitrariness of decisions and actions, morality is understood as an epiphenomenon of the highest moral good, and freedom as the ability to do good. Responsibility in Plato has not yet become a fully moral category, but it no longer remains only a problem of violation of the cosmic order: a person is responsible because he has knowledge of moral duty (parallels in Democritus - 33 p.; 601–604; 613–617; 624 Lurie). The virtue of an action is identified with its reasonableness: no one sins voluntarily (οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνει – Gorg. 468 cd; 509 e; Legg. 860 d sq.). From the need to justify the deity, Ptaton develops the first theodicy: each soul chooses its own lot and is responsible for the choice (“It is the fault of the chooser; God is innocent” - (Rep. X 617 e, cf. Tun. 29 e sd.). However, freedom for Plato, it lies not in the autonomy of the subject, but in the ascetic state (in participation in knowledge and the intelligible highest good).

Plato's theory represents a transitional stage from archaic schemes to Aristotle, with whom he is associated important point understanding free will: understanding the “volitional” as the self-determination of the mind, which allows us to talk about the “spontaneity” of arbitrariness and analytically derive the concept of the independence of the decisions of the mind from the concept of the decision itself; definition of voluntary as “what depends on us” and an indication of the unconditional connection of imputation with the voluntariness of the act. Reason is first understood as a source of specific causality, different from other types - nature, necessity, chance, habit (Nic. Eth. III 5, 1112a31 s.; Rhet. l 10, 1369 a 5–6); arbitrary - as something the cause of which is in the performer of the action (Nic. Eth. III 3, 1111 a 21 s.; III 5, 1112 a 31; Magn. Mor. I 17, 1189 a 5 sq.), or “that what depends on us” (τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν) - imputation makes sense only in relation to rationally voluntary actions Nic. Eth. III 1, 1110 b 1 s.; Magn. Mor. I 13, 1188 a 25 s.). The concept of “guilt” receives, therefore, a subjective and personal meaning. Aristotle outlined the future semantic circle of the terms “will”, “choice” (“decision”), “arbitrary”, “goal”, etc. All terms were adopted by the Stoa, and through it passed to Roman authors and into patristics. Aristotle's conclusions are extremely productive, but he often presents them in a social context (the morality of free citizens).

The Stoics cleared the “metaphysical” core of the problem from the social “husk” and came close to the concept of “pure” autonomy of the subject. Their theodicy, or rather cosmodicy, developed the ideas of Plato: if evil cannot be a property of cosmic causality, it stems from man. Imputability requires the independence of the moral decision from external causation (Cic. Ac. pr. II 37; Gell. Noct. Att. VII 2; SVF II 982 sq.). The only thing that “depends on us” is our “consent” (συγκατάθεσις) to accept or reject this or that “representation” (SVF I 61; II 115; 981); The idea of ​​moral obligation was based on this basis. The Stoic scheme of free will was therefore conceived with a double margin of safety. The decision of reason is the source of spontaneous causality and, by definition, cannot but be free (Aristotelian train of thought). Secondly, it must be free in order for its imputation to be possible in principle (conclusions from a theodicy of the Platonic type). However, such autonomy did not fit into the deterministic picture of Stoic cosmology.

The alternative concept of Epicurus, developed somewhat earlier, proceeded from almost the same premises, seeking to free arbitrariness (τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν) from external determinism and connect imputation with the arbitrariness of action (Diog. L. X 133–134; fatis avolsa voluntas - Lucr. De rer. nat. II 257). However, having replaced the determinism of fate with the equally global determinism of chance, Epicurus lost the opportunity to explain the final basis of a moral decision, and his concept remained a marginal phenomenon. Thus, the idea of ​​moral autonomy and the unconditional connection between freedom and imputability of action became dominant no earlier than the 3rd century. BC. and found its paradigmatic expression in Plotinus (Enn. VI 8.5–6). At the same time, internal responsibility in the ancient understanding has a strong legal connotation: for the ancient consciousness, the difference between morality and law did not have the fundamental character that it acquired in the era of Christianity, and especially in modern times. The universal imperative of antiquity can be formulated as follows: the goal is one’s own perfection and the right of one’s neighbor. Normative terms conveying the concept of free will in the texts of non-Christian authors were Greek. τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, less often προαίρεσις (mainly in Epictetus), even less often αὐτονομία and αὐτεξουσία (including derivatives, for example, Epict. 'Diss. IV 1.56; ; Procl. II p. 266.22; ,3 Kroll; In Tim. III p. 280.15 Diehl), lat. arbitrium, potestas, in nobis (Cicero, Seneca).

Christianity 1) radically transformed the moral imperative, declaring the goal of the good of one’s neighbor and thereby separating the sphere of ethics from the sphere of law; 2) modified the theodicy, replacing impersonal cosmic determinism with unique divine causality. However, the problematic side of the issue has not undergone significant changes. The established semantic field and tested trains of thought are invariably present in eastern patristics from Clement of Alexandria (Strom. V 14,136,4) and Origen (De pr. I 8,3; III 1,1 sq.) to Nemesius (39–40) and John Damascene (Exp. fid. 21; 39–40); along with the traditional τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, the term αὐτεξούσιον (αὐτεξούσια) begins to be widely used. The formula of Nemesius, going back to Aristotle, “reason is something free and autocratic” (ἐλεύθερον... καὶ αὐτεξούσιον τὸ λογικόν De nat. hom. 2, p.36,26 sq. Morani) skaya reflection (cf. Orig. In Ev. Ioan, fr.43).

At the same time, the problem of free will increasingly became the property of Latin Christianity (starting with Tertullian - Adv. Herrn. 10–14; De ex. cast. 2), finding its culmination in Augustine (he uses the technical term liberum arbitrium, which is also normative for scholasticism). In his early works – the treatise “On the Free Decision” (“De libero arbitrio”) and others – a classical theodicy was developed, based on the idea of ​​a rationalistically understood world order: God is not responsible for evil; the only source of evil is the will. For morality to be possible, the subject must be free from external (including supernatural) causality and able to choose between good and evil. Morality consists in following moral duty: the very idea of ​​a moral law acts as a sufficient motive (although the content of the law is of a divinely revealed nature). In the later period, this scheme is replaced by the concept of predestination, which reaches its completion in anti-Pelagian treatises (“On Grace and Free Decision”, “On the Predestination of the Saints”, etc.) and leads Augustine to a final break with ethical rationalism. Antagonists of late Augustine, Pelagius and his followers, defended the same classical theory of free will and imputation (in the form of “synergy,” i.e., the interaction of human and divine will) that Augustine developed in his early writings.

The medieval problem of free will in its main features goes back to the tradition of Augustine’s “De libero arbitrio”; The mediators between Augustine and scholasticism are Boethius (Cons. V 2–3) and Eriugena (De praed. div. 5;8;10). Early scholasticism - Anselm of Canterbury, Abelard, Peter of Lombardy, Bernard of Clairvaux, Hugo and Richard of Saint-Victor - steadily reproduced the classical scheme, focusing on the Augustinian version, but not without some nuances. In particular, Anselm of Canterbury understands liberum arbitrium not as a neutral capacity of arbitrariness (later its liberum arbitrium indifferentiae), but as freedom to good (De lib. arb. 1;3). High scholasticism presented the classical tradition with a noticeable peripatetic accent: in the 13th century. the basis of the argument becomes the Aristotelian doctrine of the self-movement of the soul and the self-determination of the mind, while the Augustinian theodicy with the postulation of free will recedes into the background. This position is typical of Albertus Magnus and especially of Thomas Aquinas, who uses direct borrowings from Aristotle, in particular Sth. I q.84.4= Eth. Nic. III 5.1113 a 11–12). Liberum arbitrium is a purely intellectual ability, close to the ability of judgment (I q.83,2–3). The will is free from external necessity, since its decision is itself a necessity (I q. 82.1 cf. Aug. Civ. D. V 10). A key aspect of the problem of free will is imputation: an act is imputed on the basis that a rational being is capable of self-determination (I q.83,1).

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5. Adkins A. Merit and Responsibility. A Study in Greek Values. Oxf., 1960;

6. Die goldene Regel. Eine Einführung in die Geschichte der antiken und früchristüchen Vulgärethik. Gott., 1962;

7. Hall J. Historische und systematische Untersuchungen zum Bedingungsverhältnis von Freiheit und Verantwortlichkeit. Königstein, 1980;

8. Pohlenz M. Griechische Freiheit. Wfesen und Werden eins Lebensideals, 1955;

9. Clark M.T. Augustine. Philosopher of Freedom. A study in comparative philosophy. N. Y.–P., 1958.

A.A. Stolyarov

The Renaissance, with its characteristic anthropocentrism, and the Reformation gave particular urgency to the problem of free will. Pico della Mirandola saw the dignity and originality of man in free will as a gift of God, thanks to which creative participation in the transformation of the world is possible. God does not predetermine either man's place in the world or his responsibilities. By his own will, a person can rise to the level of the stars or angels or descend to a bestial state, for he is the product of his own choice and efforts. The original sinfulness of human nature recedes into the shadows.

The rise of human free will forced us to return to the problem of its reconciliation with the omnipotence and omniscience of God. Erasmus of Rotterdam (De libero arbitrio, 1524) insisted on the possibility of “synergy” - the combination of Divine grace and human free will, subject to a willingness to cooperate. Luther (De servo arbitrio, 1525) declared free will to “pure deception” as an “illusion of human pride”: the will of man is not free for either good or evil, it is in unconditional slavery either to God or to the devil; the outcome of all actions is predetermined by God's will. In the human soul spoiled by the Fall, pure thoughts cannot arise without Divine grace. Took an even tougher position on the issue of predestination J. Calvin in the “Instructions of the Christian Faith” (1536): even faith in Christ itself is an action of Divine grace, people are eternally predestined to salvation or damnation, and no act can either gain grace or lose it.

Thus, the founders of Protestantism took the providentialist point of view of the late Augustine to its logical extreme. The consistent implementation of such “supranaturalistic determinism” led to contradiction, if not absurdity. Luther and Calvin excluded the possibility of free self-determination, but thereby denied man's ability to be an agent, a subject, and not an object of action, and called into question human godlikeness. Trying to preserve at least the appearance of human activity (without which there can be no talk of guilt and sin), Luther was forced to allow the free will of people in relation to what is below them, for example. to property, and claim that they still sin of their own free will. Calvin deprives a person of the ability to contribute to salvation, but allows the ability to make himself worthy of salvation. But here any connection between action and result is severed. Already Philip Melanchthon (“Augsburg Confession”, 1531, 1540) abandoned Luther’s extremes, and Arminius directed the Remonstrant movement against Calvinist predestination.

Post-Tridentine Catholicism took a more cautious position on the issue of julial freedom: the Council of Trent (1545–63) condemned the Protestant “slavery of the will,” returning to the Pelagian-Erasmian idea of ​​​​cooperation between man and God, the connection between action and retribution. The Jesuits I. Loyola, L. de Molina, P. da Fonseca, F. Suarez and others declared grace to be the property of every person, and salvation is the result of its active acceptance. “Let us expect success only from grace, but let us work as if it depends only on us” (I. Loyola). Their opponents, the Jansenists (C. Jansenius, A. Arno, B. Pascal, etc.) leaned toward the moderate Augustinian version of predestination, arguing that free will was lost after the Fall. The Jesuit apology for free will and “small deeds” often turned into arbitrariness in the interpretation of moral norms (the doctrine "probabilism" ), and Jansenist moral rigorism bordered on fanaticism.

Theological disputes about free will determined the demarcation of positions in European philosophy of the New Age. According to Descartes, in man the spiritual substance is independent of the physical, and free will is one of its manifestations. Human free will is absolute, since the will can make a decision in any situation and even contrary to reason: “The will is by nature free to such an extent that it can never be forced.” This neutral ability of voluntary choice (Liberum arbitrium indifferentiae) is the lowest level of free will. Its level increases with the expansion of reasonable grounds for choice. Illness and sleep fetter free will, a clear mind contributes to its highest manifestation. Due to Cartesian dualism, it turned out to be impossible to explain how the will invades the chain of changes in bodily substance.

Trying to overcome this dualism, representatives occasionalism A. Geulinx and N. Malebranche emphasized the unity of human and Divine will.

On Protestant soil, supranaturalistic determinism was transformed into naturalistic (T. Hobbes, B. Spinoza, J. Priestley, D. Hartley, etc.). In Hobbes, Divine Providence is pushed back to the beginning of a continuous chain of natural causes; all events in the world and human actions are causally determined and necessary. Human freedom is defined by the absence of external obstacles to action: a person is free if he does not act out of fear of violence and can do what he wants. The desire itself is not free, it is caused by external objects, innate properties and habits. Choice is only a struggle of motives, “alternating fear and hope”; its outcome is determined by the strongest motive. The illusion of free will arises due to the fact that a person does not know the force that determined his action. A similar position is reproduced by Spinoza: “People are aware of their desire, but do not know the reasons by which they are determined” and Leibniz: “...In man everything is known and determined in advance... and human soul in a way there is a spiritual automaton.”

Moral concepts and motives are placed on a par with natural causes.

The relationship between free will and causal determination is one of the central problems of Kant's philosophy. As an empirical subject, man is subject to immutable natural laws, and with knowledge of all previous conditions, his actions can be predicted with the same accuracy as solar and lunar eclipses. But how "thing in itself" , not subject to the conditions of space, time and causality, a person has free will - the ability to self-determination regardless of sensory impulses. Kant calls this ability practical reason. Unlike Descartes, he does not consider the idea of ​​free will to be innate: he derives it from the concept of ought (sollen). The highest form of free will (“positive freedom”) consists of moral autonomy, the self-legislation of reason.

Fichte sharply shifted the emphasis from being to activity, declaring the entire world (“not-I”) a product of the free creativity of the I and completely subordinating theoretical reason to practical reason, knowledge (Wissen) to conscience (Gewissen). Cause-and-effect relationships become alienation of target relationships, and the world of natural dependencies becomes an illusory form of perception of the products of the unconscious activity of the human imagination. Finding freedom is the return of the Self to itself, its awareness of the fact that it has unconsciously made an ascent from sensory attraction to conscious goal-setting, limited only by the presence of other reasonable selves; Through law, freedom is realized in society. The movement towards free will is the content of Hegel’s psychology of spirit, and history appears in Hegel as the formation of objective forms of freedom: abstract law, morality, morality. In the culture of the Western world, which was born along with Christianity, the acquisition of freedom is understood as a person’s destiny. Arbitrariness is only a step in the development of freedom, its negative rational form (abstraction from everything random), revealing free will as the ability to self-determination. The highest manifestation of free will is a moral act; its act coincides with the decision of reason.

Schelling, having adopted the ideas of J. Boehme and F. Baader, emphasized the moment of antinomy in the concept of free will. Human free will is not rooted in reason and its autonomy, but has metaphysical depth; it can lead to both good and sin, vice: in the desire for self-affirmation, a person is able to consciously choose evil. This irrationalistic understanding of free will excluded its interpretation as the dominance of reason over sensuality.

Marxism, following the Hegelian tradition, sees the main content of free will in the degree of practical awareness. According to the formula of F. Engels, free will is “the ability to make a decision with knowledge of the matter.” A. Schopenhauer returns to Spinoza’s interpretation of free will as an illusion of the human mind: the attribute of freedom is applied not to phenomenal action, but to noumenal being (will as a thing in itself) and practically comes down to fidelity to one’s intelligible character.

In the 20th century in the “new ontology” of N. Hartmann, the concepts of freedom and activity, freedom and independence are separated. The lower layers of being - inorganic and organic - are more active, but have less freedom, the higher layers - mental and spiritual - are more free, but do not have their own activity. The relationship between negative freedom (arbitrariness) and positive freedom (reasonable value determination) is rethought: a person has free will not only in relation to lower physical and mental determination, but also in relation to God, in other words, to the objective hierarchy of values, the world of which does not have an immutable determining force. Ideal values ​​guide a person, but do not predetermine his actions. To the Kantian antinomy of freedom and natural causality, Hartmann adds the antinomy of the ought: the ought determines the behavior of the individual ideally, i.e. range of possibilities, but for the choice to take place, real will is necessary, which is associated with the autonomy of the person, and not the autonomy of the principle.

The ontological justification for free will was contained in the works of such representatives phenomenology, like M. Scheler, G. Rainer, R. Ingarden). A kind of “idolatry of freedom” (S.A. Levitsky) presented existentialism , bringing the antinomy of human existence to deep tragedy - the “healthy tragedy of life” by K. Jaspers or the “tragic absurdity” by J.-P. Sartre and A. Camus. Religious existentialism interprets free will as following the instructions of the transcendent (God), expressed in the form of symbols and codes of existence, which are voiced by conscience. In atheistic existentialism, free will is the ability to preserve oneself, rooted in nothing and expressed in denial: values ​​do not have objective existence, man himself constructs them in order to realize his freedom. Necessity is an illusion that justifies “flight from freedom,” as the neo-Freudian E. Fromm put it. Absolute freedom makes the burden of responsibility so heavy that the “heroism of Sisyphus” is necessary to bear it.

Russian religious philosophy of the 20th century. (N.A. Berdyaev, S.N. Bulgakov, N.O. Lossky, B.P. Vysheslavtsev, G.P. Fedotov, S.A. Levitsky, etc.) proceeds from the combination of Divine grace with the free self-determination of man. The most radical position is Berdyaev, who believes, following J. Boehme, that freedom, rooted in the “abyss” coeternal with God, precedes not only nature, but also being in general; the free creative act becomes a supreme and self-sufficient value for Berdyaev. In the concrete ideal-realism of N.O. Lossky, free will is declared an essential attribute of “substantial figures” who independently create their character and their destiny (including from their body, character, past and even from God himself), independent of the external world, since all events are only reasons for their behavior, not reasons.

Literature:

1. Windelband V. About free will. - In the book: It's him. Spirit and history. M., 1995;

2. Vysheslavtsev B.P. Ethics of transformed Eros. M., 1994;

3. Levitsky S.A. The tragedy of freedom. M., 1995;

4. Lossky N.O. Free will. - In the book: It's him. Favorites. M., 1991;

5. Luther M. About the slavery of the will;

6. Erasmus of Rotterdam. Diatribe, or Discourse on Free Will. – In the book: Erasmus of Rotterdam. Philosopher. prod. M., 1986;

7. Hartmann N. Ethik. V., 1926.

the concept of European moral philosophy, finally formed by I. Kant in the meaning of an individual’s intelligible ability to moral self-determination. In retrospect, the term “free will” can be considered as a historical and philosophical metaphor: its historically recorded connotations are much broader than the possible normative meaning of the term, which emphasizes the meaning of the concept of “freedom”, and “will” can be replaced by “decision”, “choice” and etc. equivalents. However, over the course of many centuries, the meaningful “core” of the metaphor demonstrates a high degree of invariance of the main problems: what is moral action; Does sanity imply free will? In other words: should moral autonomy exist (as a condition of morality and as the ability to generate extra-natural causation) and what are its limits, i.e., how does natural (divine) determinism relate to the intellectual and moral freedom of the subject?

In the history of philosophy, two main ways of deducing the concept of free will can be distinguished. The first (it was adhered to by Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas and Hegel) comes down to the analytical deduction of the concept of free will from the very concept of will as the ability of the mind to self-determinate and generate special causality. The second method (traced from Plato and the Stoics through Augustine and most of the scholastics up to Kant) is the postulation of free will as independence from external (natural or divine) causality and, therefore, as the ability to self-determination. For the second method, there are two types of justification. First, the theodicy (known since the time of Plato and found completion in Leibniz), where free will is postulated to prove the innocence of the deity in world evil. Secondly, the Kantian method of proof, opposite in its initial premise (denial of any theodicy), but similar in principle, where free will is postulated by morally legislating reason. These two proofs are similar in the sense that they do not depend on the substantive definition of the will: it is enough to assume a certain quantity that ensures the formal correctness of the “moral equations.” That is why “free will” is equivalent here to “freedom of choice”, “decision”, etc.

“Free will” in ancient and medieval thought (Greek less common; Latin arbitrium, liberum arbitrium). Greek moral reflection originated in a universal cosmological paradigm, which made it possible to explain the moral, social and cosmic orders through each other: morality acted as one of the characteristics of an individual’s “involvement” during cosmic events. The law of cosmic retribution, appearing in the guise of fate or fate, expressed the idea of ​​impersonal compensatory justice (clearly formulated, for example, by Anaximander - B I): what is of fundamental importance is not subjective guilt, but the need to compensate for the damage caused to the order by any “culprit” or “cause” " In archaic and pre-classical consciousness the thesis dominates: responsibility does not presuppose free will as an indispensable condition (for example, II. XIX 86; Hes. Theog. 570 sq.; 874; Opp. 36; 49; 225 sq.; Aesch. Pers. 213214 ; 828; Soph. Col. 528;

Socrates and Plato discovered new approaches to the problem of freedom and responsibility: imputation is more firmly associated with the arbitrariness of decisions and actions, morality is understood as an epiphenomenon of the highest moral good, and freedom as the ability to do good. Responsibility in Plato has not yet become a fully moral category, but it no longer remains only a problem of violation of the cosmic order: a person is responsible because he has knowledge of moral duty (parallels in Democritus - 33 pp.; 601-604; 613-617; 624 Lurie). The virtue of an action is identified with its rationality: no one sins voluntarily (Gorg. 468 cd; 509 e; Legg. 860 d sq.). From the need to justify the deity, Plato develops the first theodicy: each soul chooses its own lot and is responsible for the choice (“It is the fault of the chooser; God is innocent” - (Rep. 617 e, cf. Tim. 29 e sd.). However, freedom for Plato lies not in the autonomy of the subject, but in the ascetic state (in participation in knowledge and the intelligible highest good).

Plato's theory represents a transitional stage from archaic schemes to Aristotle, with which an important point in understanding free will is associated: the understanding of “volitional” as the self-determination of the mind, which allows us to talk about the “spontaneity” of arbitrariness and analytically derive the concept of the independence of decisions of the mind from the concept of the decision itself; definition of voluntary as “what depends on us” and an indication of the unconditional connection of imputation with the voluntariness of the act. Reason is first understood as a source of specific causality, different from other types - nature, necessity, chance, habit (Nie. Eth. Ill 5,1112a31 s.; Rhet.l 10,1369 a 5-6); arbitrary - as something the cause of which is in the performer of the action (Nie. Eth. Ill 3,1111 a 21 s.; III5, 1112 a 31; Magn. Mog. 117, 1189 a 5 sq.), or “that which is from depends on us” () - imputation makes sense only in relation to rationally voluntary actions Nie. Eth. Ill I, 1110 b l s.; Magn. Could. 113.1188" a 25 s.). The concept of "guilt" receives, therefore, a subjective and personal meaning. Aristotle outlined the future semantic circle of the terms "will", "choice" ("decision"), "arbitrary", " goal”, etc. All terms were adopted by the Stoa, and through it passed to Roman authors and into patristics. Aristotle’s conclusions are extremely productive, but they are often presented in a social context (the morality of free citizens).

The Stoics cleared the “metaphysical” core of the problem from the social “husk” and came close to the concept of “pure” autonomy of the subject. Their theodicy, or rather cosmodicy, developed the ideas of Plato: if evil cannot be a property of cosmic causality, it stems from man. Imputability requires the independence of a moral decision from external causality (Cic. Ac. rg. II 37; Gell. Noct. Att. VII 2; SVF II 982 sq.). The only thing that “depends on us” is our “consent” () to accept or reject this or that “representation” (SVF 161; II 115; 981); The idea of ​​moral obligation was based on this basis. The Stoic scheme of free will was, therefore, conceived with a double "margin of safety." The decision of reason is the source of spontaneous causality and, by definition, cannot but be free (Aristotelian train of thought). Secondly, it must be free in order for its imputation to be possible in principle (conclusions from a theodicy of the Platonic type). However, such autonomy did not fit into the deterministic picture of Stoic cosmology.

The alternative concept of Epicurus, developed somewhat earlier, proceeded from almost the same premises, seeking to free arbitrariness from external determinism and connect imputation with the arbitrariness of action (Diog. L. X 133-134; fatis avolsa voluntas - Lucr. De rer. nat. II 257). However, having replaced the determinism of fate with the equally global determinism of chance, Epicurus lost the opportunity to explain the final basis of a moral decision, and his concept remained a marginal phenomenon.

Thus, the idea of ​​moral autonomy and the unconditional connection between freedom and imputability of action became dominant no earlier than the 3rd century BC. e. and found its paradigmatic expression in Plotinus (Epp. VI 8.5-6). At the same time, internal responsibility in the ancient understanding has a strong legal connotation: for the ancient consciousness, the difference between morality and law did not have the fundamental character that it acquired in the era of Christianity, and especially in modern times. The universal imperative of antiquity can be formulated as follows: the goal is one’s own perfection and the right of one’s neighbor. Normative terms conveying the concept of free will in the texts of non-Christian authors were Greek. sometimes less often (mainly in Epikgetus), even less often (including derivatives, e.g. Epict. Diss. IV 1.56; 62; Procl.-In Rp. II

R. 266.22; 324.3 Kroll; In Tim. Ill p. 280., 15 Diehl), lat. arbitrium, potestas, in nobis (Cicero, Seneca).

Christianity 1) radically transformed the moral imperative, declaring the goal of the good of one’s neighbor and thereby separating the sphere of ethics from the sphere of law; 2) modified the theodicy, replacing impersonal cosmic determinism with unique divine causality. However, the problematic side of the issue has not undergone significant changes. The established semantic field and proven trains of thought are invariably present in eastern patristics from Clement of Alexandria (Strom. V 14,136,4) and Origen (De rg. I 8,3; III 1,1 sq.) to Nemesius (39-40) and John Damascene (Exp. fid. 21; 39-40); Along with the traditional one, the term () is beginning to be widely used. The formula of Nemesius, going back to Aristotle, “reason is something free and autocratic” (De nat. horn. 2, p.36,26 sq. Morani) is typical of a large period of Christian reflection (cf. rig. In Ev. loan. fr.43) .

At the same time, the issue of free will increasingly became the property of Latin Christianity (starting with Tertullian - Adv. Henn. 10-14; De ex. cast, 2), finding its culmination in Augustine (he uses the technical term liberum arbitrium, normative for scholasticism as well) . In his early works - the treatise “On Free Decision” (“De libero arbitrio”) and others - a classical theodicy was developed, based on the idea of ​​a rationalistically understood world order: God is not responsible for evil; the only source of evil is the will. For morality to be possible, the subject must be free from external (including supernatural) causality and able to choose between good and evil. Morality consists in following moral duty: the very idea of ​​a moral law acts as a sufficient motive (although the content of the law is of a divinely revealed nature). In the later period, this scheme is replaced by the concept of predestination, which reaches its completion in the anti-Pelagian treatises (“On Grace and Free Decision”, “On the Predestination of the Saints”, etc.) and leads Augustine to a final break with ethical rationalism. The antagonists of the late Augustine, Pelagius and his followers, defended the same classical theory of free will and imputation (in the form of “synergy,” i.e., the interaction of human and divine will) that Augustine developed in his early writings.

The medieval problem of free will in its main features goes back to the tradition of Augustine’s “De libero arbitrio”; The mediators between Augustine and scholasticism are Boethius (Cons. V 2-3) and Eriugena (De praed, div. 5;8;10). Early scholasticism - Anselm of Canterbury, Abelard, Peter of Lombardy, Bernard of Clairvaux, Hugo and Richard of Saint-Victor - steadily reproduced the classical scheme, focusing on the Augustinian version, but not without some nuances. In particular, Anselm of Canterbury understands liberum arbitrium not as a neutral capacity of arbitrariness (later its liberum arbitrium indifleurentiae), but as freedom to good (De lib. art." 1;3). High scholasticism presented the classical tradition with a noticeable peripatetic accent: in the 13th century. the basis of the argument becomes the Aristotelian doctrine of the self-movement of the soul and the self-determination of the mind, while the Augustinian theodicy with the postulation of free will recedes into the background. This position is typical of Albertus Magnus and especially of Thomas Aquinas, who uses direct borrowings from Aristotle, in particular Sth. q.84,4= Eth. Nie. Ill 5.1113 a 11-12). Liberum arbitrium is a purely intellectual ability, close to the ability of judgment (I q.83,2-3). The will is free from external necessity, since its decision is itself a necessity (I q. 82.1 cf. Aug. Civ. D. V 10). A key aspect of the problem of free will is imputation: an act is imputed on the basis that a rational being is capable of self-determination (I q.83,1).

Lit.: VerweyenJ. Das Problem der Willensfreiheit in der Scholastic. Hdib., 1909; Saarinen R. Weakness of the nill m mediaeval thought. From Angusfinc to Buridan. Helsinki, 1993; RoMeshM. Griechische Freiheit.esen und Werden eines Lebensideals. Hdib., 1955; dark M. T. Augustutine. Philosopher of Freedom. A Study in comparative philosophy N.Y.-R, 1958; AdkinsA. Merit and Responsibility A Study in Greek Values. (M., I960; Die goldene Regel. Eine Einfuhrung in die Geschichte der antiken und friichristlichen Vulgarethik. Gott., 1962; HollJ. Historische und systematische Untersuchungen zum Bedingungsverhaltnis von Freiheit und ferantwonlichkeit. Konigstein, 1980; PohlentM. che Freiheit. Werden eins Lebensideals, 1955; ClarkM. Augustine. Philosopher of Freedom. A study in comparative philosophy.

A. A. Stolyarov

The Renaissance, with its characteristic anthropocentrism, and the Reformation gave particular urgency to the problem of free will. Pico della Mirandola saw the dignity and originality of man in free will as a gift of God, thanks to which creative participation in the transformation of the world is possible. God does not predetermine either man's place in the world or his responsibilities. By his own will, a person can rise to the level of the stars or angels or descend to a bestial state, for he is the product of his own choice and effort. The original sinfulness of human nature recedes into the shadows.

The rise of human free will forced us to return to the problem of its reconciliation with the omnipotence and omniscience of God. Erasmus of Rotterdam (De libero arbitrio, 1524) insisted on the possibility of “synergy” - the combination of Divine grace and human free will, subject to a willingness to cooperate. Luther (De servo arbitrio, 1525) declared free will to “pure deception” to be an “illusion of human pride”: the will of man is not free for either good or evil, it is in absolute slavery either to God or to the devil; the outcome of all actions is predetermined by God's will. In the human soul spoiled by the Fall, pure thoughts cannot arise without Divine grace. An even tougher position on the issue of predestination was taken by J. Calvin in the Institutes of the Christian Faith (1536): even faith in Christ itself is an action of Divine grace, people are eternally predestined to salvation or damnation, and no act can either gain or lose grace her.

Thus, the founders of Protestantism took the providentialist point of view of the late Augustine to its logical extreme. The consistent implementation of such “supranaturalistic determinism” led to contradiction, if not absurdity. Luther and Calvin excluded the possibility of free self-determination, but thereby denied man's ability to be an agent, a subject, and not an object of action, and called into question human godlikeness. Trying to preserve at least the appearance of human activity (without which there can be no talk of guilt and sin), Luther was forced to allow the free will of people in relation to what is below them, for example. to property, and claim that they still sin of their own free will. Calvin deprives a person of the ability to contribute to salvation, but allows the ability to make himself worthy of salvation. But here any connection between action and result is severed. Already Philip Melanchthon (“Augsburg Confession”, 1531, 1540) abandoned Luther’s extremes, and with his Armies he directed the Remonstrant movement against Calvinist predestination.

Post-Tridentine Catholicism took a more cautious position on the issue of free will; The Council of Trent (1545-63) condemned the Protestant “slavery of the will,” returning to the Pelagian-Erasmus idea of ​​cooperation between man and God, the connection between action and retribution. The Jesuits I. Loyola, L. de Molina, P. da Fonieca, F. Suarez and others declared grace to be the property of every person, and salvation is the result of its active acceptance. “Let us expect success only from grace, but let us work as if it depended only on us” (I. Loyola). Their opponents, the Jansenists (C. Jansenius, A. Arno, B. Pascal, etc.) leaned toward the moderate Augustinian version of predestination, arguing that free will was lost after the Fall. The Jesuit apology for free will and “small deeds” often turned into arbitrariness in the interpretation of moral norms (the doctrine of “probabilism”), and Jansenist moral rigorism bordered on fanaticism.

Theological disputes about free will determined the demarcation of positions in European philosophy of the New Age. According to Descartes, in man the spiritual substance is independent of the physical, and free will is one of its manifestations. Human free will is absolute, since the will can make a decision in any situation and even contrary to reason: “The will is by nature free to such an extent that it can never be forced.” This neutral ability of voluntary choice (Liberum arbitrium indifferentiae) is the lowest level of free will. Its level increases with the expansion of reasonable grounds for choice. Illness and sleep fetter free will, a clear mind contributes to its highest manifestation. Due to Cartesian dualism, it turned out to be impossible to explain how the will invades the chain of changes in bodily substance.

Trying to overcome this dualism, representatives of occasionalism A. Geiliix and N. Malebranche emphasized the unity of human and Divine will.

On Protestant soil, supranaturalistic determinism was transformed into naturalistic (T. Hobbes, B. Spinoza, J. Priestley, D. Hartley, etc.). In Hobbes, Divine Providence is pushed back to the beginning of a continuous chain of natural causes; all events in the world and human actions are causally determined and necessary. Human freedom is determined by the absence of external obstacles to action: a person is free if he does not act out of fear of violence and can do what he wants. The desire itself is not free, it is caused by external objects, innate properties and habits. Choice is only a struggle of motives, “alternating fear and hope”; its outcome is determined by the strongest motive. The illusion of free will arises due to the fact that a person does not know the force that determined his action. A similar position is reproduced by Spinoza: “People are aware of their desire, but do not know the reasons by which they are determined” and by Leibniz: “... In man, everything is known and determined in advance... and the human soul is in some way a spiritual automaton.”

Moral concepts and motives are placed on a par with natural causes. The relationship between free will and causal determination is one of the central problems of Kant's philosophy. As an empirical subject, man is subject to immutable natural laws, and with knowledge of all previous conditions his actions can be predicted with the same accuracy as solar and lunar eclipses. But as a “thing in itself”, not subject to the conditions of space, time and causality, a person has free will - the ability to self-determination regardless of sensory impulses. Kant calls this ability practical reason. Unlike Descartes, he does not consider the idea of ​​free will to be innate: he derives it from the concept of ought (sollen). The highest form of free will (“positive freedom”) consists of moral autonomy, the self-legislation of reason.

Fichte sharply shifted the emphasis from being to activity, declaring the whole world (“not-I”) a product of the free creativity of the I and completely subordinating theoretical reason to practical reason, knowledge (Wissen) to conscience (Gewissen). Cause-and-effect relationships become alienation of target relationships, and the world of natural dependencies becomes an illusory form of perception of the products of the unconscious activity of the human imagination. Finding freedom is the return of the Self to itself, its awareness of the fact that it has unconsciously made an ascent from sensory attraction to conscious goal-setting, limited only by the presence of other reasonable selves; Through law, freedom is realized in society. The movement towards free will is the content of Hegel’s psychology of spirit, and history appears in Hegel as the formation of objective forms of freedom: abstract law, morality, morality. In the culture of the Western world, which was born along with Christianity, the acquisition of freedom is understood as a person’s destiny. Arbitrariness is only a step in the development of freedom, its negative rational form (abstraction from everything random), revealing free will as the ability to self-determination. The highest manifestation of free will is a moral act; its act coincides with the decision of reason.

Schelling, having adopted the ideas of J. Boehme and F. Baader, emphasized the moment of antinomy in the concept of free will. Human free will is not rooted in reason and its autonomy, but has metaphysical depth; it can lead to both good and sin, vice: in the desire for self-affirmation, a person is able to consciously choose evil. This irrationalistic understanding of free will excluded its interpretation as the dominance of reason over sensuality.

Marxism, following the Hegelian tradition, sees the main content of free will in the degree of practical awareness. According to the formula of F. Engels, free will is “the ability to make a decision with knowledge of the matter.” A. Schopenhauer returns to Spinoza’s interpretation of free will as an illusion of the human mind: the attribute of freedom is applied not to phenomenal action, but to noumenal being (will as a thing in itself) and practically comes down to fidelity to one’s intelligible character.

In the 20th century in the “new ontology” of N. Hartmann, the concepts of freedom and activity, freedom and independence are separated. The lower layers of being - inorganic and organic - are more active, but have less freedom, the higher layers - mental and spiritual - are more free, but do not have their own activity. The relationship between negative freedom (arbitrariness) and positive freedom (reasonable price determination) is being rethought; a person has free will not only in relation to the lower physical and mental determination, but also in relation to God, in other words, to the objective hierarchy of values, the world of which does not have an immutable determining force. Ideal values ​​guide a person, but do not predetermine his actions. To the Cantonese antinomy of freedom and natural causality, Hartmann adds the antinomy of obligation; the proper determines the behavior of the individual ideally, i.e., by the spectrum of possibilities, but for the choice to take place, a real will is necessary, which is associated with the autonomy of the person, and not the autonomy of the principle.

The ontological justification for free will was contained in the works of such representatives of phenomenology as M. Scheler, G. Rainer, R. Ingarden). A kind of “idolatry of freedom” (S. A. Levitsky) was presented by existentialism, which brought the antinomy of human existence to deep tragedy - the “healthy tragedy of life” by K. Jaspers or the “tragic absurdity” by J.-P. Sartre and A. Camus. Religious existentialism interprets free will as following the instructions of the transcendent (God), expressed in the form of symbols and codes of existence, which are voiced by conscience. In atheistic existentialism, free will is the ability to preserve oneself, rooted in nothingness and expressed in negation: values ​​do not have objective existence, man himself constructs them in order to realize his freedom. Necessity is an illusion that justifies “flight from freedom,” as the neo-Freudian E. Fromm put it. Absolute freedom makes the burden of responsibility so heavy that the “heroism of Sisyphus” is necessary to bear it.

Russian religious philosophy of the 20th century. (N.A. Berdyaev, S.N. Bulgakov, N.O. Lossky, B.P. Vysheslavtsev, G.P. Fedotov, S.A. Levitsky, etc.) proceeds from the combination of Divine grace with the free self-determination of man. The most radical position is Berdyaev, who, following J. Boehme, believes that freedom, rooted in the “abyss” coeternal with God, precedes not only nature, but also being in general; the free creative act becomes a supreme and self-sufficient value for Berdyaev. In Lossky’s concrete ideal-realism, free will is declared to be an essential attribute of “substantial figures” who independently create their character and their destiny (including from their body, character, past and even from God himself), independent of the external world, so how all events are only reasons for their behavior, not reasons.

Lit.: Windelband V. About freedom of will. - In the book: He. Spirit and history. M., 1995; Vysheslavtsev B.P. Ethics of the transformed Eros. M., 1994;.D"vm

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