Dialectical materialism definition in philosophy. Dialectical materialism means the knowability of the world

In the USSR, the state forcibly supports a certain philosophical system, namely the materialism of Marx and Engels, called dialectical (diamat for short). Up until 1925, many Soviet philosophers, especially naturalists, although emphasizing their allegiance to Marxism, were not clear enough about the difference between dialectical and mechanical materialism. In 1925, Engels's manuscript "Dialectics of Nature" (written in the period 1873-1882) was first published, causing a sharp division of Soviet Marxists into "dialectics" and "mechanists"; at the same time, a fierce struggle flared up "on two fronts": against "Menshevik idealism and mechanistic materialism." The foundations of dialectical materialism were clearly defined 325 .

Let us first consider how the term "materialism" is understood by its adherents. Engels and after him Lenin argue that philosophers are divided into materialists, idealists and agnostics. For materialists, says Lenin, matter, nature (physical being) is primary, and spirit, consciousness, sensation, mentality are secondary. For idealists, on the contrary, the spirit is primary. Agnostics deny that the world and its basic principles are knowable.

“There is nothing in the world,” wrote Lenin, “except moving matter, and moving matter cannot move except in space and time.”326

“... the basic forms of any being are space and time; being outside of time is just as great nonsense as being outside of space.

Based on this, it may seem that dialectical materialism is based on the same clear and definite concept of matter as mechanical materialism, according to which matter is an extended, impenetrable substance that moves, i.e., changes its position in space. We will see, however, that the situation is different.

“The concept of matter,” writes Bykhovsky, “is used in two senses. We distinguish between the philosophical concept of matter and its physical concept. These are not two contradictory concepts, but the definition of a single matter from two different points of view” (78). Following Holbach and Plekhanov and quoting Lenin, Bykhovsky defines matter from a philosophical, epistemological point of view, as “that which, acting on our sense organs, produces sensation; matter is an objective reality given to us in sensation, etc. ”328.

This definition contains a simple recognition of the objective reality of matter, in other words, that it exists independently of our consciousness, and the statement about the “sensory origin of knowledge about it” (78), but does not break its nature.

One would expect this to be done by defining matter from a physical point of view. Vain hopes!

What does it mean to "define"? - asks Lenin, Bykhovsky and others. This means, first of all, to bring the given concept under another, wider generic concept as one of its types and indicate its specific difference (for example, in the definition “a square is an equilateral rectangle”, “rectangle” is a generic concept, and “equilateral” is a specific difference) .

But “matter cannot be defined through its genus and species difference, since matter is everything that exists, the most general concept, the genus of all genera. All that is is different types matter, matter itself cannot be defined as a special case of some kind. Therefore, it is impossible to indicate the species difference of matter. If matter is everything that exists, then it is unthinkable to look for its distinguishing features from something else, since this other can only be something that does not exist, that is, it cannot be” (78).

Thus, dialectical materialists have greatly simplified the task of finding a basis for a materialistic worldview. Without any evidence, they claim that "everything that there is, there is material being... Being by its very essence is a category material"(Deborin, XLI 329).

This statement makes it possible, in accordance with the requirements of modern science and philosophy, to attribute to "being" all sorts of manifestations, properties and abilities, very far from being material, and yet call this theory materialism on the ground that "everything what is, is material being".

Engels in his "Dialectics of Nature" indicates the path that can lead us to the knowledge of what matter is: "Once we have known the forms of motion of matter (for which, however, we still lack a lot due to the short duration of the existence of natural science), then we have known matter itself, and this is the end of knowledge. This statement sounds very materialistic, if we understand the word "motion" in the way it is usually understood in science, namely as movement in space. However, elsewhere Engels writes that dialectical materialism understands motion as "change in general" 331.

All dialectical materialists accept this word usage: they designate by the word "movement" not only movement in space, but also any qualitative change. Thus, everything that has been said to us about matter so far boils down to the fact that matter is everything that exists and changes. But we must not despair: a consideration of the struggle of the "dialectics" with mechanistic materialism and other theories will give us a more definite idea of ​​the character of their philosophy.

Metaphysical philosophy, says Engels, including mechanical materialism in this term, deals with "immovable categories", while dialectical materialism deals with "fluid ones".

So, for example, according to mechanistic materialism, the smallest particles are unchanging and uniform. However, says Engels: “When natural science sets itself the goal of finding uniform matter as such and reducing qualitative differences to purely quantitative differences formed by combinations of identical smallest particles, then it acts in the same way as if it wanted to see instead of cherries, pears, apples fruit as such, instead of cats, dogs, sheep, etc. - mammal as such, gas as such, metal as such, stone as such, chemical compound as such, movement as such... this "one-sided mathematical point of view" , according to which matter is only quantitatively determinable, and qualitatively the same from the beginning, is "nothing but the point of view" of the French materialism of the eighteenth century" 333 .

Dialectical materialism is free from the one-sidedness of the mechanistic point of view, since it proceeds from the following three laws of dialectics, derived from the "history of nature and human society": "The law of the transition of quantity into quality and vice versa. The law of mutual penetration of opposites. The law of negation of negation" 334 . The second and third laws have been mentioned by us in connection with Hegel's dialectical method; The first law is that, at a certain stage, quantitative changes lead to sudden changes in quality. Moreover, generally speaking, "there is no quality without quantity, and there is no quantity without quality" (Deborin, LXX).

Movement, i.e., any change in general, is dialectical through and through. “The main, main feature of any change,” writes Bykhovsky, “as we know, is that a certain thing in its movement is denied, that it ceases to be what it was, acquires new forms of existence ... In the transition to a new quality, in the process of the emergence of a new one, the former quality is not destroyed without a trace and without a trace, but enters the new quality as a subordinate moment. There is a negation, using the usual term in dialectics, "sublation". The removal of something is such a negation of the thing, in which it ends and at the same time is preserved on a new level ... Thus, food or oxygen is doubled by the body, transforming into it; in this way the plant retains the nutritive juices of the soil; so the history of science and art absorbs the legacy of the past. What remains of the previous, old, is subject to new laws of development, it falls into the orbit of new movements, harnessed to the chariot of a new quality. The transformation of energy is, at the same time, the conservation of energy. The destruction of capitalism is, at the same time, the absorption of the technical and cultural results of the development of capitalism. The emergence of higher forms of movement is not the destruction of the lower ones, but their removal. Mechanical laws exist within the higher forms of motion, as secondary, subordinate, sublated.

“How is the further development of the thing proceeding? After some thing has turned into its opposite and “removed” the previous state, development continues on new basis, moreover, at a certain stage of this development, the thing again, for the second time, turns into its opposite. Does this mean that at the second negation the thing returns to its original state?.. No, it doesn't. The second negation, or, using the terminology common among dialecticians, the negation of negation is not a return to the original state. The negation of negation means the removal of both the first and the second stages of development, the rise above both” (Bykhovsky, 208-209). Lenin wrote: "...development...in a spiral, not in a straight line" 335 .

The opposite, into which a thing turns in its development, is “something more than a simple difference,” explains Bykhovsky. Opposite is "qualified difference". Opposite is an internal, essential, necessary, irreconcilable difference in a certain respect... the whole world is nothing but the unity of such opposites, a bifurcated unity containing polarities... Electric and magnetic processes are a unity of opposites... Matter is the unity of protons and electrons, the unity of a continuous wave and a discontinuous particle. There is no action without reaction. Every emergence is necessary at the same time as the annihilation of something!.. The survival of the more adapted is the extinction of the less adapted. Class society is a unity of opposites. "The proletariat and the bourgeoisie are social categories in which the difference is at the level of opposition" (Bykhovsky, 211).

Thus, "the moving world is a self-contradictory unity" (Bykhovskii, 213). The basic principle of the dialectical interpretation of the world is that "the world is a unity bifurcated in itself, a unity of opposites, a carrier of internal contradictions" (Bykhovsky, 213; Pozner, 59). “...objective dialectics [i.e. e. development through contradictions. - N. L. reigns in all nature» 336 .

"The condition for the cognition of all the processes of the world in their 'self-movement'," writes Lenin, "in their spontaneous development, in their living life, is their cognition as a unity of opposites."

Now the profound difference between dialectical and mechanistic materialism becomes apparent. “For a mechanist,” Bykhovsky points out, “contradiction is a mechanical contradiction, a contradiction of colliding things, oppositely directed forces. With a mechanical understanding of movement, a contradiction can only be external, not internal, it is not a contradiction contained and accomplished in unity, there is no internal necessary connection between its elements ... A clearly expressed model of methodology based on the substitution of the dialectical principle of the unity of opposites with the mechanical principle of collision oppositely directed forces, the “theory of equilibrium” (A. Bogdanov, N. Bukharin) can serve. According to this theory, “balance is such a state of a thing when it by itself, without externally applied energy, cannot change this state ... An imbalance is the result of a collision of oppositely directed forces”, i.e. forces located in a certain system and her environment.

The main differences between the mechanistic theory of equilibrium and dialectics are as follows: “Firstly ... from the point of view of the theory of equilibrium, there is no immanent emergence of differences, bifurcation of the single, mutual penetration of opposites ... The opposite breaks away from unity, antagonistic elements are external, alien to each other each other, are independent of each other, their contradiction is random. Secondly, internal contradictions driving force development are replaced by external contradictions, the collision of the system and the environment. Self-movement is replaced by movement due to external influence, push. Internal relations in the system are reduced to the level of derivatives dependent on external relations of objects. Thirdly, the theory of equilibrium reduces the whole variety of forms of motion to a mechanical collision of bodies. The equilibrium scheme borrowed from mechanics absorbs the richness of higher supra-mechanical (biological, social) types of development. Fourth, in the theory of equilibrium, the relationship between motion and rest is put on its head. It is the doctrine of equilibrium, albeit mobile, relative. Movement in the theory of equilibrium is a form of rest, and not vice versa. It is not movement that brings peace, balance, but balance is the carrier of movement. Fifth, the theory of equilibrium is the theory of abstract quantitative change. A greater force determines the direction of a smaller one... The transition to a new quality, the emergence of new forms of development, other patterns - all this does not fit into a flat, oaky balance scheme. Finally, sixthly, the negation of negation, the removal of the positive and negative moments of development, the emergence of a new mechanist, is replaced by the restoration of balance between the system and the environment” (Bykhovsky, 213-215).

Since change is a dialectical self-movement based on internal contradictions, it deserves the name of "development" and, as Lenin says and Deborin following him, has immanent character, “... the subject,” writes Deborin, “ necessary develops in certain direction and cannot develop in another direction thanks to its "immanent nature, thanks to its essence" (Deborin, XCVI).

It is not surprising, therefore, that Lenin points out that development is creative character. He distinguishes "two ... concepts of development (evolution) are: development as a decrease and increase, as a repetition, and development as a unity of opposites (a bifurcation of the one into mutually exclusive opposites and the relationship between them)... The first concept is dead, poor, dry. The second is vital. Only the second gives the key to the "self-movement" of all things; it alone gives the key to the "leaps", to the "break in gradualness", to the "transformation into the opposite", to the destruction of the old and the emergence of the new.

In his article “Karl Marx”, Lenin points out the following features of the dialectical theory of development: “Development, as it were, repeating the steps already passed, but repeating them differently, on a higher basis (“negation of negation”), development, so to speak, in a spiral, not in a straight line; - development is spasmodic, catastrophic, revolutionary; - "breaks of gradualness"; the transformation of quantity into quality; - internal impulses to development, given by contradiction, clash of various forces and tendencies acting on a given body either within a given phenomenon or within a given society; - interdependence and the closest, inseparable connection all aspects of each phenomenon (moreover, history reveals more and more new aspects), a connection that gives a single, natural world process of movement - these are some of the features of dialectics, as a more meaningful (than usual) doctrine of development.

If, according to Lenin, evolution is creative and is immanent and spontaneous self-movement containing “internal impulses”, it is clear that one can speak of the transition from certain stages of being to other stages not just as a fact, but as a process with intrinsic value, “... any process of development,” writes Deborin, - there is an ascent from lower forms or steps to higher ones, from abstract, poorer definitions to richer, more meaningful, concrete definitions. The higher level contains the lower ones as "removed", i.e., as being independent, but becoming dependent. The lower form developed into the higher; thus, it did not disappear without a trace, but itself turned into a different, higher form ”(Deborin, XCV).

From this it is clear, moreover, that the dialectical development may be called historical process, “... the higher form,” continues Deborin, “is connected with the lower one, and therefore the result does not exist without ways of development, leading to him. Every given phenomenon, or every given form, must be regarded as developed, how which has become i.e., we must consider them as historical formations.” "Marx and Engels," Ryazanov writes, "establish the historical character of phenomena in nature and society" 340 .

Even inorganic nature is in a state of development and transformation. Ryazanov cites the following words of Marx: “Even the elements do not remain calm in a state of separation. They continually transform into each other, and this transformation constitutes the first stage of physical life, the meteorological process. Every trace of the various elements as such disappears in the living organism.

These words clearly express Marx's conviction that the higher levels of cosmic existence are profoundly qualitatively different from the lower ones and therefore cannot be regarded only as more and more complex aggregates of lower, simpler elements.

This idea is persistently emphasized by Soviet dialectical materialism. In this it differs sharply from mechanistic materialism. “To reduce the complex to the simple,” writes Bykhovsky, “means to refuse to understand the complex. To reduce the whole variety of laws of the world to mechanical laws means - to refuse to know any laws, except for the simplest mechanical ones, it means to limit knowledge to understanding only elementary forms of motion ... An atom consists of electrons, but the laws of existence "of an atom are not exhausted by the laws of motion of individual electrons. A molecule consists of atoms, but is not exhausted by the laws of the life of atoms. A cell consists of molecules, an organism - of cells, a biological species - of organisms, but they are not exhausted by the laws of life of their elements. Society consists of organisms, but its development cannot be known from laws of life of organisms.

There are three main, main areas of reality: the inorganic world, the organic world (in which the emergence of consciousness, in turn, forms a break of paramount importance), and the social world. The forms of movement of each of these areas are irreducible to others, qualitatively unique and at the same time arising from others. The mechanistic materialist reduces the laws of the organic world to mechanical ones, “and at the same time social laws, reduced to biological, also dissolve in the laws of mechanics. Sociology turns into a collective reflexology (Bekhterev). In reality, however, each higher stage is subject to its own special laws, and these "specific regularities, supra-mechanical types of development, do not contradict mechanical laws and do not exclude their presence, but rise above them as secondary, subordinate" 342 .

Engels writes: “... each of the higher forms of motion is not always necessarily connected with some real mechanical (external or molecular) motion, just as higher forms of motion simultaneously produce other forms of motion, and just as chemical action impossible without a change in temperature and electrical state, and organic life is impossible without mechanical, molecular, chemical, thermal, electrical, etc. change. But the presence of these secondary forms does not exhaust the essence of the main form in each case under consideration. We will doubtless "reduce" thought sometime experimentally to molecular and chemical movements in the brain; but is this the essence of thinking? 343 . Thus, everything obeys not only the laws of mechanics.

The view that the laws of higher forms of being cannot be completely reduced to the laws of lower forms is widespread in philosophy. Thus, it can be found in Comte's positivism; in German philosophy, it is associated with theories that the higher levels of being have the lower ones as their basis, but are qualitatively different from them; in English philosophy, this view appears in the form of the theory of "emergent evolution", i.e., creative evolution that creates new levels of being, the qualities of which do not follow exclusively from the qualities of the components 344 . Those who believe that "everything there is, there is material being..."(Deborin, XI), and at the same time recognizes creative evolution, must attribute to matter the capacity for creative activity. “Matter,” Yegorshin writes, “is exceptionally rich and has a variety of forms. She does not receive her properties from the spirit, but she herself has the ability to create them, including the spirit itself” (I68) 345.

What then is this mysterious matter in which so many forces and abilities are embedded and which, however, dialectical materialism does not give any ontological definition? It is permissible to ask a question, which is essential for ontology (the science of the elements and aspects of being), about whether the material is substance or only by a complex of events, i.e., temporal and space-time processes. If matter is a substance, it is the carrier and creative source of events - the beginning, which as such is something more than an event.

Revolutionary materialists, who study philosophy not out of love for truth, but for purely practical purposes, in order to use it as a weapon to destroy the old social order, bypass questions that require subtle analysis. Nevertheless, Lenin's attacks on Mach and Avenarius, who denied the substantive foundations of reality, provide some data to answer the question that interests us.

Criticizing Mach and Avenarius, Lenin writes that their rejection of the idea of ​​substance leads them to consider "sensation without matter, thought without brain" 346 . He considers absurd the teaching that "... if instead of a thought, idea, sensation of a living person, a dead abstraction is taken: no one's thought, no one's idea, no one's feeling ..." 347 .

But , Perhaps Lenin considers that sentient matter (the brain) in itself is only a complex of movements? Nothing of the kind, in a paragraph entitled "Is motion conceivable without matter?", he sharply criticizes all attempts to represent motion separately from matter and quotes from the works of Engels and Dietzgen to confirm his point of view. “The dialectical materialist,” writes Lenin, “not only considers motion to be an inseparable property of matter, but also rejects a simplified view of motion, etc.” 348, i.e., the view that motion is “no one’s” motion: “Moves” - and that's it" 349 .

Deborin, therefore, is right in introducing the term “substance” (“In the materialistic “system” of logic, the central concept should be matter as substance") and supporting Spinoza's concept of substance as a "creative force" (XC, XCI).

Lenin himself does not use the term "substance"; he says that it is “a word which Messrs. professors like to use "for the sake of importance" instead of the more precise and clear: matter" 350 . However, the above excerpts show that Lenin had sufficient insight to distinguish between two important aspects in the structure of reality: the event, on the one hand, and the creative source of events, on the other. Therefore, he should have understood that the term "substance" is necessary for clarity and certainty, and not "for the sake of importance."

Let us pass on to a question which is of decisive importance both for the defense and for the refutation of materialism, the question of the place of consciousness and mental processes in nature. Unfortunately, speaking of this question, dialectical materialists do not make a distinction between such different subjects of study as consciousness, mental processes, and thought. They also refer to this category sensation as the lowest form of consciousness.

It is necessary to say a few words about the difference between all this, so that we can better understand the theory of dialectical materialism. Let's start with an analysis of human consciousness.

Consciousness always has two sides: there is someone who is conscious and something that he is conscious of. Let us call these two sides respectively the subject and the object of consciousness. When it comes to human consciousness, the conscious subject is a human person.

The nature of consciousness is that its object (an experienced joy, an audible sound, a visible color, etc.) exists not only for itself, but also in a certain internal relation. for the subject. Most modern philosophers and psychologists believe that in order for cognition to take place, there must be, in addition to the subject and object, a special mental act of awareness directed by the subject to the object (to joy, sound, color). Such mental acts are called intentional. They are directed at the object and have no meaning apart from it. They do not change the object, but place it in the field of consciousness and cognition of the subject.

To be aware of an object is not yet to know it. A member of the winning football team, while talking animatedly about the game, may experience a sense of joyful excitement, in the absence of observations behind this feeling. If it turns out that he is a psychologist, he can focus on his feelings of joy and know his, as, say, high spirits, with a touch of triumph over the defeated enemy. In this case, he will not only experience a feeling, but will have an idea and even a judgment about it. In order to cognize this feeling, it is necessary, in addition to the act of awareness, to perform a number of other additional intentional acts, such as the act of comparing this feeling with other mental states, the act of discrimination, etc.

According to the theory of knowledge, which I call intuitionism, my knowledge of my feeling in the form of a representation or even in the form of a judgment does not mean that the feeling is replaced by its image, copy or symbol; my knowledge of my feeling of joy is the direct contemplation of this feeling as it exists in itself, or intuition, directed at this feeling in such a way that by comparing it with other states and establishing its relationship with them, I can give an account of it to myself and other people, highlight its various sides (make its mental analysis) and indicate its connection with the world.

It is possible to be aware of a certain mental state without directing intentional acts of discrimination, comparison, etc. to it; in this case there is awareness, not knowledge. Mental life can take on an even simpler form: a certain mental state can exist without an act of awareness directed at it; in this case it remains a subconscious or unconscious psychic experience.

Thus, a singer may make critical remarks about the performance of his rival under the influence of an unconscious feeling of envy, which the other person may see in his facial expression and in his tone of voice. It would be completely wrong to assert that the unconscious mental state is not mental at all, but is a purely physical process in the central nervous system. Even such a simple act as an unconscious desire to take and eat during a lively conversation at the table a piece of bread lying in front of me cannot be considered as a purely physical process, not accompanied by internal mental states, but consisting only in centrifugal currents in the nervous system.

It has already been noted that even in inorganic nature the act of attraction and repulsion can take place only by virtue of a previous internal psychoid striving for attraction and repulsion in a given direction. If we are aware of such domestic condition like pursuit, and in such an external process as moving material particles in space, we will see with absolute certainty that these are profoundly different, though closely related, phenomena.

Thus, consciousness and mental life are not identical: perhaps unconscious or subconscious mental life. In fact, the distinction between "conscious" and "mental" goes even further. According to the theory of intuitionism, the cognizing subject is able to direct his acts of awareness and acts of cognition not only on his mental states, but also on his bodily processes and on the external world itself. I can be directly aware and have direct knowledge of the falling stone and the crying child who has his finger caught in the door, and so on, as they really are, independently of my acts of attention directed at them. The human personality is so intimately connected with the world that it can look directly into the existence of other beings.

According to this theory, when I look at a falling stone, this material process becomes immanent in my consciousness staying transcendent in relation to me, as to the knower subject, in other words, it does not become one of my mental processes. If I am aware of this object and know it, my acts of attention, discrimination, and so on, belong to the psychic sphere, but what I distinguish - the color and shape of the stone, its movement, etc. - is a physical process.

In consciousness and in cognition, a distinction must be made between the subjective and objective aspects; only the subjective side, in other words, my intentional acts, are necessarily psychic.

From this it is obvious that "mental" and "consciousness" are not identical: the mental may be unconscious, and consciousness may contain non-psychic elements.

Thinking is the most important aspect of the cognitive process. It is an intentional mental act directed at the intelligible (non-sensory) or ideal (i.e., non-spatial and non-temporal) aspects of things, for example, relationship. The object of thought, such as relations, is present in the knowing consciousness, just as it exists in itself, and, as already said, this is not a mental, not a material process; it is the ideal object.

What is the sensation, say, the sensation of the color red, the note la, warmth, etc.? It is obvious that colors, sounds, and so on, are something essentially different from mental states subject, from his feelings, desires and aspirations. They are physical properties associated with mechanical material processes; thus, for example, sound is associated with sound waves or, in general, with the vibration of material particles. Only acts of awareness, acts of feeling directed at them, are mental processes.

After this long digression, we may attempt to sort out the muddled theories of dialectical materialism relating to psychic life.

“Sensation, thought, consciousness,” writes Lenin, “are the highest product of matter organized in a special way. Such are the views of materialism in general and of Marx-Engels in particular.

Lenin apparently identifies sensation with thought, consciousness, and mental states (see, for example, p. 43, where he speaks of sensation as thought). He considers sensations to be "images of the external world," 352 precisely copies of it, and according to Engels, Abbild or Spiegelbild (reflection or mirror image).

“Otherwise, as through sensations, we cannot learn anything about any forms of matter and about any forms of movement; sensations are caused by the action of moving matter on our senses... The sensation of red color reflects the vibrations of the ether, occurring at a speed of approximately 450 trillion per second. The sensation of blue reflects the fluctuations of the ether at a speed of about 620 trillion per second. The vibrations of the ether exist independently of our sensations of light. Our sensations of light depend on the action of ether vibrations on the human organ of vision. Our sensations reflect objective reality, i.e., that which exists independently of humanity and human sensations” 353 .

It might seem that this means that Lenin holds a "mechanistic" view, according to which sensations and mental states are generally caused by mechanical processes of movement that take place in the sense organs and in the cerebral cortex (see, for example, p. 74). This doctrine has always been regarded as the weak point of materialism. Dialectical materialism understands this and rejects it, but puts forward nothing clear and definite in its place.

Lenin says that the true materialist doctrine consists not in deriving sensation from the motion of matter or reducing it to the motion of matter, but in recognizing sensation as one of the properties of moving matter. Engels, on this question, took the point of view of Diderot. By the way, Engels fenced himself off from the "vulgar" materialists Focht, Büchner and Mole-Schott, by the way, precisely because they strayed into the view that the brain secretes thought same way, how the liver secretes bile.

Logical sequence requires that we then admit that, besides movement, sensation (or some other, more elementary, but analogous internal state or mental process) is also the original feature matter.

It is this idea that we find in Lenin. “Materialism,” he writes, “in full agreement with natural science, takes matter as the primary given, considering secondary consciousness, thinking, sensation, because in a clearly expressed form, sensation is associated only with higher forms of matter (organic matter), and “in the foundation of the building itself matter," one can only assume the existence of a faculty similar to sensation. Such is the assumption, for example, of the well-known German naturalist Ernst Haeckel, the English biologist Lloyd Morgan and others, not to mention Diderot's guess, which we cited above.

It is obvious that here Lenin has in mind what I have called psychoid processes. V. Posner, quoting Lenin, also says that “the ability to feel” is a property of highly organized matter, but that internal states are also inherent in unorganized matter (46).

Adherents of metaphysical and mechanistic materialism, he says, do not see "that the faculty of reflection cannot simply be reduced to the external movement of material particles, that it is connected with the internal state of moving matter" (67).

At the same time, V. Pozner, attacking Plekhanov for sharing the hylozoist point of view on the animation of matter (64), does not at all try to show how Plekhanov's point of view differs from Lenin's assertion that even unorganized matter has internal states. similar to sensations.

Bykhovsky also does not give a clear answer to the question. He says that “consciousness is nothing but a special property of a certain type of matter, matter organized in a certain way, very complex in its structure, matter that arose at a very high level of the evolution of nature ...

The consciousness inherent in matter makes it seem to be two-sided: physiological, objective processes are accompanied by their internal reflection, subjectivity. Consciousness is an internal state of matter, an introspective expression of certain physiological processes...

What is the type of connection between consciousness and matter? Is it possible to say that consciousness is causally dependent on material processes, that matter affects consciousness, resulting in a change in consciousness? Material change can only bring about material change.”

Assuming that mechanical processes are not the cause of consciousness and mental states, Bykhovsky comes to the conclusion that “consciousness and matter are not two heterogeneous things... Physical and mental are one and the same process, but only viewed from two sides... What's on the front objective side represents a physical process, the same from within by this material being itself is perceived as a phenomenon of will, as a phenomenon of sensation, as something spiritual” (Bykhovsky, 83-84).

He further writes that "this ability itself, consciousness, is a property due to the physical organization, similar to its other properties" (84). This statement contradicts his assertion that "material change can only bring about material change."

Inconsistency can only be avoided with the following interpretation of his words: the material basis of the world (not defined by dialectical materialism) first creates its mechanical manifestations, and then at a certain stage of evolution, namely in animal organisms, in addition to external material processes, also internal mental processes.

With this interpretation, the difference between the theories of Lenin and Pozner, on the one hand, and Bykhovsky, on the other, is as follows: according to Lenin and Pozner, the material basis of the world creates from the very beginning at all stages of evolution not only external material processes, but also internal processes. or sensations, or at least something very close to sensations; according to Bykhovsky, the material basis of the world supplements external processes with internal ones only at a relatively high stage of evolution.

However, whichever of these opposing points of view is accepted, it will be necessary to answer the following question: if the beginning underlying cosmic processes creates two series of events that make up a single whole, but cannot be reduced to one another, namely, external material and internal mental (or psychoid) events - what right did we have to call this creative source and carrier of events "matter"?

It is obvious that this beginning, which goes beyond both series, is metapsychophysical Start. The true worldview is to be sought not in one-sided materialism or idealism, but in ideal realism, which is the actual unity of opposites. It is significant that Engels and Lenin, speaking of primary reality, often call it nature, which implies something more complex than matter.

One could defend the use of the term "matter" in the sense of primary reality on the basis of the doctrine that the mental is always secondary in the sense that it is always a copy or "reflection" of the material process, in other words, always serves the purposes knowledge of material changes.

However, it is obvious that such an intellectualistic theory of mental life is untenable: the most important place in mental life is occupied by emotions and volitional processes, which, of course, are not copies or "reflections" of the material changes with which they are associated. As we have seen, striving is the starting point of all interaction, even such a simple form as collision.

Dialectical materialists believe that mental processes are something sui generis, 356 different from material processes. It is now necessary to ask whether, in their opinion, mental processes have any influence on the further course of cosmic changes, or are they completely passive so there is no need to mention them when explaining the development of the world.

Lenin believes that materialism does not at all assert a lesser reality of consciousness. Therefore, consciousness is just as real as material processes. One might think that this means that mental processes influence the course of material processes in the same way that the latter influence the occurrence of mental events. However, Marx asserts that it is not consciousness that determines being, but being that determines consciousness. And all dialectical materialists invariably repeat this saying, understanding by the word "consciousness" all mental processes. If we accept Marx's saying as a law of nature, this would force us to admit that all the highest expressions of mental and spiritual life - religion, art, philosophy, etc. - are passive superstructure over social material processes. The essence of the historical and economic materialism preached by Marxists lies precisely in the doctrine that the history of social life is conditioned by the development of productive forces and production relations. Economic relations, Marxists say, are real basis social life, while political forms - law, religion, art, philosophy, etc. - are only superstructure over the basis and depend on it.

Marx, Engels and true Social Democrats adhere to this doctrine, believing that the social revolution will take place in countries with a highly developed industry, where the dictatorship of the proletariat arises of itself, thanks to the enormous numerical superiority of workers and employees over a small group of owners. However, Russia was an industrially backward country, and the communist revolution in it was carried out by a relatively small Bolshevik party. The revolution resulted in the development in the USSR of a terrible form of tyrannical state capitalism; the state is the owner of property and, concentrating in its hands both military and police forces, as well as the power of wealth, exploits the workers on a scale that the bourgeois capitalists could not dream of.

Now that the state has shown itself in its true light and the peasants have been transformed from small landowners into collective farmers, there can be no doubt that the Soviet regime is supported by a small group of communists against the will of the vast majority of the population; to preserve it, those in power must strain their will to the limit and use skillful propaganda, advertising, take care of the appropriate education of young people and use other methods that clearly prove importance ideology and deliberate conscious activity for the maintenance and development of social life.

Therefore, the Bolsheviks now quite definitely began to talk about the influence of ideology on the economic basis of life. Political and legal relations, philosophy, art and other ideological phenomena, says Posner, "... are based on economics, but they all influence each other and the economic basis" (68). Curiously enough, on the same page he says that "it is not the consciousness of people that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being determines their consciousness" (68) 1 . And further: when “... enormous productive forces...” create “... a classless society... there will be a systematic, conscious leadership of the process of social production and all social life. Engels calls this transition a leap from the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom” (68).

Lenin, writes Luppol, assumed that "final causes" are real and knowable, in other words, he argued that certain processes are purposive or teleological (186).

Bykhovsky, who is generally more systematic than Posner, gives an equally vague answer to this question. “The materialistic understanding of society,” he writes, “is such an understanding of it, which believes that it is not social consciousness, in all its forms and types, that determines social being, but it itself is determined by the material conditions of people’s existence ... not mind, not will people, people, races, nations determine the course, direction and nature of the historical process, and they themselves are nothing more than a product, expression and reflection of the conditions of existence, a link in the objective course of historical events, that is, the result of how it develops from the will independent relations between nature and society and relations within society itself” (Bykhovsky, 93). Below, however, Bykhovsky states: “A malicious and false caricature of the Marxist understanding of society is the assertion that it brings together entire social life to the economy, denies any historical meaning states, sciences, religions, turns them into shadows that accompany economic transformations ... Materialism does not deny the reverse influence of the "superstructure" on its "foundation", but it explains the direction of this influence and its possible limits ... Thus, religion is not only the generation of certain social relations, but also affects them inversely, affecting, for example, the marriage institution ... manifestations of social life that are more remote from the production basis not only depend on those that are less remote, but also, in turn, affect them ... Based this method production and around the production relations corresponding to it, a most complex system of interacting and intertwining relations and ideas grows. The materialist conception of history does not at all favor dead schematism" (106).

Recognizing that other sociologists (Jores, Kareev) "argue that being affects consciousness, but consciousness also affects being" (93), he declares this view of theirs "eclectic"; however, he considers himself entitled to say the same thing, since his materialism "explains the direction" of the influence of consciousness and "its possible limits." As if his opponents did not pay attention to the direction of the influence of consciousness or imagined that this influence is boundless!

The vagueness of the dialectical-materialist concept of consciousness stems both from the desire to subordinate non-material processes to material processes at all costs, and from the fact that dialectical materialism does not distinguish between “consciousness” and “mental process”.

Consciousness presupposes the existence of a certain reality for subject: it is the consciousness of reality. In this sense, all consciousness is always determined by reality.

In the same way, all knowledge and thought have reality as their object and, according to the intuitive theory, actually include it as directly contemplated, therefore, all knowledge and thought are always determined by reality.

The mental side of consciousness, cognition and thought consists only of intentional mental acts, aimed at reality, but not influencing it; investigator, consciousness, knowledge and thought as such determined by reality, not defined by it. However, other mental processes, namely volitional processes, always associated with emotions, aspirations, attachments, desires, have a very strong influence on reality and determine it. Moreover, since volitional acts are based on cognition and thought, through them, cognition also significantly affects reality.

The fact that modern Marxists admit the influence of mental life on material processes clearly shows that dialectical materialism is in fact not materialism at all. We know from the history of philosophy that one of the most difficult problems for human thought is to explain the possibility of the influence of the spirit on matter and vice versa (backwards). Monistic and dualistic philosophical systems cannot solve this problem due to the deep qualitative difference between physical and mental processes.

The only way to explain their interconnection and the possibility of their mutual influence while denying their causal interdependence is to find a third principle that creates and unites them and is neither mental nor material. According to the theory of ideal-realism outlined above, this third principle is specifically ideal being, supra-spatial and extra-temporal substantial factors 357 .

Being hostile to mechanistic materialism, dialectical materialists do not seek to replace philosophy with natural science. Engels says that naturalists, who denounce and reject philosophy, unconsciously for themselves submit to wretched, philistine philosophy. He believes that in order to develop the ability for theoretical thinking, it is necessary to study the history of philosophy. Such a study is necessary both for the improvement of our abilities for theoretical thinking, and for the development of a scientific theory of knowledge. Bykhovsky writes that "philosophy is the theory of science" (9). According to Lenin, "dialectic and eat theory of knowledge...» 358 .

The interest shown by dialectical materialists in the theory of knowledge is understandable. They fight against skepticism, relativism and agnosticism and claim that reality is knowable. If dialectical materialists want to defend their assertion, they must work out a theory of knowledge.

Referring to Engels, Lenin writes: “...human thinking is by its nature capable of giving and gives us absolute truth, which is made up of the sum of relative truths. Each stage in the development of science adds new grains to this sum of absolute truth, but the limits of the truth of each scientific position are relative, being either expanded or narrowed by the further growth of knowledge.

Lenin believes that the source of true knowledge lies in sensations i.e., in the data of experience, interpreted as that which is caused by "the action of moving matter on our senses" 360 . Luppol rightly describes this theory of knowledge as a materialistic sensationalism (182).

One might think that it inevitably leads to solipsism, i.e., to the doctrine that we know only our own, subjective states, generated by an unknown cause and, perhaps, completely different from it.

Lenin, however, does not draw this conclusion. He asserts confidently that "our sensations are images of the external world" 361 . Like Engels, he is convinced that they similar or correspond reality outside of us. He contemptuously rejects Plekhanov's assertion that human sensations and ideas are "hieroglyphs", i.e. "not copies of real things and processes of nature, not images of them, but conventional signs, symbols, hieroglyphs, etc.". He understands that the "theory of symbols" logically leads to agnosticism, and argues that Engels is right when he "does not speak of symbols or hieroglyphs, but of copies, photographs, images, mirror images of things" 362 .

Engels "... constantly and without exception speaks in his writings about things and about their mental images or reflections (Gedanken-Abbilder), and it goes without saying that these mental images arise only from sensations" 363 .

Thus, the theory of knowledge of Engels and Lenin is a sensationalist theory of copying or reflection. It is obvious, however, that if truth were a subjective copy of transsubjective things, it would at any rate be impossible to prove that we have an exact copy of a thing, i.e., the truth about it, and the theory of copying itself could never get a genuine proof.

Indeed, according to this theory, everything that we have in our minds is only copies, and it is absolutely impossible to observe a copy together with the original in order to establish by direct comparison the degree of similarity between them, as, for example, it can be done by comparing a marble bust with the face he portrays. Moreover, for materialism, the situation is even more complicated; really, how can mental image to be an exact copy material things? To avoid the absurdity of such a statement, it would be necessary to accept the theory panpsychism, i.e., to assume that the external world consists entirely of mental processes and that my ideas of, say, the anger or desire of another person are exact copies of this anger or desire.

The example given by Lenin concerning sensations as a "reflection" fully reveals his views. “The sensation of red reflects the fluctuations of the aether, occurring at a speed of approximately 450 trillion per second. The sensation of blue reflects the fluctuations of the ether at a speed of about 620 trillion per second. The vibrations of the ether exist independently of our sensations of light. Our sensations of light depend on the action of ether vibrations on the human organ of vision. Our sensations reflect objective reality, that is, that which exists independently of humanity and of human sensations” 364 .

Of the colors red and blue it cannot be said in any sense that they are "similar" to the vibrations of the ether; considering also that, according to Lenin, these vibrations are known to us only as "images" in our mind and composed of our sensations, which can be grounded for asserting that these images correspond to external reality.

Plekhanov understood that the theories of reflection, symbolism and the like could not explain our knowledge of the properties of the external world or prove the existence of this world. Therefore, he was forced to admit that our belief in the existence of an external world is an act of faith, and argued that "such a" faith "is a necessary preliminary condition for thinking critical, v best sense this word..." 365 .

Lenin felt, of course, the comic nature of Plekhanov's assertion that critical thought is based on faith, and did not agree with him. We shall soon see how he resolves the difficult question himself, but first we shall conclude our consideration of his sensationalist theory.

Does human cognition really consist only of sensations? Relationships like unity properties
object, causation, and so on, cannot, apparently, be sensations; it would be absurd to assert that the yellowness, hardness and coldness of an apple are given to us in three sensations (visual, tactile and thermal), and the unity of these properties is the fourth sensation.

People who have a better knowledge of philosophy than Lenin, even if they are dialectical materialists, understand that knowledge includes both sensible and non-sensuous elements.

So, Bykhovsky writes: “A person has two main tools at his disposal, with the help of which cognition is carried out - his experience, the totality of data acquired through his senses, and the mind, ordering the data of experience and processing them” (13). “The data of observation and experiment should be comprehended, thought over, coordinated. With the help of thinking, connections and relationships of facts must be established, they must be systematized and evaluated, their laws and principles must be revealed ... At the same time, thinking uses numerous general terms, by means of which the connections between things are expressed and determined, a scientific assessment is given to them. These concepts and logical categories are completely necessary element in all branches of knowledge at any cognitive process... Their significance for science can hardly be overestimated, their role in the formation of consciousness is enormous” (18-19).

Knowledge of these aspects of the world is achieved, of course, by abstracting on the basis of experience. Lenin cites the following words of Engels: "... Thought can never draw and derive forms of being from itself, but only from the external world..." 366 .

This is true, but it means that experience certainly does not consist of sensations alone, and that nature, from which ideal principles are derived by abstraction, contains these principles in its very structure. Deborin rightly argues that categories “are nothing more than a reflection, result and generalization of experience. But observation and experience are by no means reduced to direct sensation and perception. There is no scientific experience without thinking” (Deborin, XXIV).

These extracts from Bykhovsky and Deborin show that, having a certain idea of ​​Kant, Hegel and modern epistemology, they cannot defend pure sensationalism or deny the presence of non-sensory elements in cognition; however, they fail to explain them. They are too strongly dominated by the traditions of mechanistic materialism.

For mechanistic materialists, the world consists of impenetrable moving particles, the only form of interaction between which is a push; our sense organs respond to these jolts by means of sensations-, according to such a theory, all knowledge as a whole proceeds from the experience produced by shocks, and consists only of sensations. (Lenin develops exactly the same theory as the mechanistic materialists.)

For dialectical materialists, true cognition consists of subjective mental states that must reproduce external reality. But why do they think that this miracle of reproduction of material things in mental processes really takes place? Engels answers this question in the following way: "... our subjective thinking and the objective world are subject to the same laws and... therefore they cannot contradict each other in their results, but must agree with each other" 367 .

This statement, he writes, is "...a prerequisite for our theoretical thinking" 368 . Posner, quoting Lenin, says that dialectics is the law of objective reality and at the same time the law of knowledge (34).

The doctrine that subjective dialectics corresponds to objective dialectics cannot be proved if we accept the theory of knowledge of dialectical materialism. According to this theory, we always have in our minds only subjective dialectics, and its correspondence to objective dialectics must forever remain a hypothesis that cannot be proved. Moreover, this hypothesis does not explain how the truth about the external world is possible.

Dialectical materialists regard the law of dialectical development as a law of universal application. Therefore, not only thought, but also all other subjective processes, such as, for example, imagination, fall under its action. But if the subjective process of imagination does not give an exact reproduction of external reality, but obeys the same law, the subjective process of thinking may not reproduce it either.

Trying to set a criterion compliance between the subjective knowledge of the external world and the actual structure of this world, Engels, following Marx, finds it in practice, namely in experience and industry.

“If we can prove the correctness of our understanding of a given natural phenomenon by the fact that we ourselves produce it, call it from its conditions, make it also serve our goals, then Kant's elusive (or incomprehensible: unfassbaren - this important word is also omitted in Plekhanov's translation , and in the translation of Mr. V. Chernov) “things-in-themselves” comes to an end. The chemicals produced in the bodies of animals and plants remained such "things-in-themselves" until organic chemistry began to prepare them one by one; thus the “thing-in-itself” was transformed into a “thing for us”, like, for example, alizarin, the coloring matter of madder, which we now obtain not from the roots of madder grown in the field, but much cheaper and easier from coal tar” 369 .

Dialectical materialists found this argument of Engels quite to their liking; they enthusiastically repeat and develop it 370 . Indeed, successful practical activity and its progressive development give us the right to assert that we Can have true knowledge of the world. This, however, leads to a conclusion unfavorable for the sensationalist theory of "copying" reality. It is important to develop a theory of knowledge and the world that would give a reasonable explanation of how a subject can have true knowledge not only about his experience, but also about the real nature of the external world, independent of our subjective cognitive acts.

The theory of knowledge of dialectical materialism, according to which only our subjective mental the process (images, reflections, etc.) is directly given in consciousness, cannot explain the possibility of true cognition of the external, especially the material world. It cannot even explain how, proceeding from its subjective mental processes, the human person can ever come to the idea of ​​the existence of matter in general.

Modern epistemology can help materialists in this matter, but only on condition that they abandon their one-sided theory and admit that cosmic existence is complex and that matter, although it is a part of it, is not the main principle. Such a view of the world can be found, for example, in the intuitionist theory of knowledge, in its combination with ideal-realism in metaphysics. The doctrine of ideal realism presupposes, among other things, "pansomatism", that is, the concept that every concrete phenomenon has a corporeal aspect.

Lenin, who supposed "in the foundation of the very edifice of matter" ... the existence of a faculty similar to sensation, 371 apparently approached the point of view of ideal-realism.

“Philosophical idealism,” writes Lenin, “is only nonsense from the point of view of crude, simple, metaphysical materialism. On the contrary, in terms of dialectical materialism philosophical idealism is unilateral, exaggerated uberschwengliches (Dietzgen) development (inflation, swelling) of one of the lines, sides, facets of knowledge into the absolute, torn off from matter, from nature, deified” 372 .

It must be added, however, that an adequate expression of truth, free from one-sided exaggeration of any particular element of the world, is to be sought not in idealism, not in any form of materialism (including dialectical materialism), but only in ideal-realism.

Dialectical materialists reject traditional logic with its laws of identity, contradiction, and the excluded middle, and want to replace it with dialectical logic, which Bykhovsky calls "the logic of contradictions" because "contradiction is its cardinal principle" (232). It has already been shown above that these attacks on traditional logic stem from a misinterpretation of the laws of identity and contradiction (see, for example, B. Bykhovsky, Outline of the Philosophy of Dialectical Materialism, pp. 218-242).

Materialists who try to base their entire worldview on experience and at the same time are forced by their theory of knowledge to assert that it is not matter that is given to us in experience, but only its images, find themselves in a hopelessly difficult situation. Therefore, it would be expected that an attempt would be made to intuitively interpret Lenin's words that "all matter has a property essentially akin to sensation, the property of reflection ..." 373 .

Such an attempt was indeed made by the Bulgarian T. Pavlov (P. Dosev) in his book The Theory of Reflection, published in Russian translation in Moscow.

In this book, Pavlov opposes the intuitionism of Bergson and especially Lossky. Bergson's name appears fifteen times in this book, and Lossky's name more than forty. And yet, considering the relationship between “a thing and an idea about a thing,” Pavlov writes: “... dialectical materialism does not raise an impassable abyss between ideas about things and the things themselves. This question is resolved by him in the sense that in their form (namely, in their awareness) ideas differ from things, but in their content they coincide with them, although not completely and not absolutely, not immediately” (187). But this point of view is precisely Lossky's intuitionism,

Party fanaticism, like any strong passion, is accompanied by a decrease in intellectual abilities, especially the ability to understand and criticize the ideas of other people. Pavlov's book is a prime example of this. T. Pavlov constantly draws absurd and completely unjustified conclusions from Lossky's theories. Thus, for example, he says that Bergson and Lossky discredited the word "intuition" and that for intuitionists logical thinking "has no real scientific value." Pavlov does not notice the main difference between the intuitionism of Bergson and Lossky. Bergson's theory of knowledge is dualistic: he believes that there are two essentially different kinds of knowledge - intuitive and rationalistic. Intuitive knowledge is the contemplation of a thing in its true real essence; it is absolute knowledge; rationalistic knowledge, i.e., discursive-conceptual thinking, consists, according to Bergson, only of symbols and therefore has only a relative value.

Lossky's theory of knowledge is monistic in the sense that he regards all kinds of knowledge as intuitive. He attaches particular importance to discursive thinking, interpreting it as an exceptionally important kind of intuition, precisely as intellectual intuition, or the contemplation of the ideal foundation of the world, which gives it a systematic character (for example, the contemplation of the mathematical forms of the world).

With characteristic sharpness, he expressed it in the work "German Ideology" with the words: "Philosophy and the study of the real world are related to each other, like onanism and sexual love." At the same time, Marx not only knew perfectly well, but also masterfully applied dialectical approaches in his works, including Capital. Marx spoke of "materialist dialectics" and "materialist understanding of history", which Friedrich Engels later referred to as "historical materialism". The term "dialectical materialism" was introduced into Marxist literature by the Russian Marxist Georgy Plekhanov. Vladimir Lenin actively used this term in his works.

The next stage in the development of materialist dialectics was the work of G. Lukacs History and class consciousness, where he defined the orthodoxy of Marxism on the basis of loyalty to the Marxist method, and not to dogma. For this book, together with the work of Karl Korsch, Marxism and Philosophy became the subject of condemnation at the Fifth Congress of the Comintern by Grigory Zinoviev. In biology and other sciences, the promoters of dialectical materialism were Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Lewontin.

Popper notes that the vagueness of the basic concepts of dialectics (“contradiction”, “struggle”, “denial”) leads to the degeneration of dialectical materialism into pure sophistry, making any criticism meaningless under the pretext of “misunderstanding” by critics. dialectical method, which later serves as a prerequisite for the development of "dialectical" dogmatism and the cessation of any development of philosophical thought.

- Popper K. Logic and the growth of scientific knowledge. - M ., 1983. - S. 246.

Along with this, Dr. philosophical sciences Metlov V.I. believes that Popper's criticism of dialectics is untenable, justifying it as follows:

It is impossible not to pay attention to the fact that the inconsistency of the proper dialectical order arises in Hegel in fact in the course and on the basis of the relationship between the subject and object levels as a form of development of the relationship between the “I” and the “thing” and that, consequently, the possibility of a collision of this kind inconsistency with rational thinking, at the level of which linguistic and logical activity is described, subject to the action of the well-known law of formal logic - logic, as already noted, of the same level, is completely excluded here, and Popper's criticism of dialectics misses the mark. ... Dialectical contradiction is ultimately a certain type of relationship between the subject and the object and, further, the material and the ideal, it is not something completed once and for all, it has its own history, unfolding from the initial forms, antinomy, to more developed forms in which the removal of inconsistency is carried out, the acquisition by the subject of a thing in itself, overcoming alienation, both epistemological (I. Kant) and social (A. Smith). This two-dimensionality of the dialectical contradiction, which is realized in the relationship of these levels, excludes the very possibility of correlating it with a formal-logical contradiction, and therefore makes criticism of Popper's type of dialectics irrelevant.

Dogmatism

A clear confirmation of Popper's words was the fate of dialectical materialism in the USSR and other socialist countries. A tough and cruel struggle for power, the desire to introduce unanimity and suppress any intellectual competition led to the fact that dialectical materialism became a quasi-religious cult with its own "holy scripture" - the works of the "classics of Marxism-Leninism" considered infallible, quotes from which were absolute arguments in any discussion. The dogmatism of dialectical materialism found its extreme expression in the Short Course on the History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, which became the catechism of this cult.

see also

Notes

Links

• The most accessible textbook in reading, even rather just a book on this philosophy - Rakitov "Marxist-Leninist Philosophy"
• Marx K., Engels F., Lenin V.I.
• Stalin I. V. On dialectical and historical materialism
• Lucio Colletti Hegel and Marxism
• Ilyenkov E. Top, end and new life of dialectics
• Ilyenkov E. Falsification of Marxist dialectics for the sake of Maoist politics
• Althusser L. Contradiction and overdetermination
• Lauren Graham"Natural science, philosophy and the sciences of human behavior in the Soviet Union" - a book about the interaction of Soviet science with the prevailing philosophical trend at that time - dialectical materialism
• Bertel Allman Dance of the Dialectic: Steps in Marx's Method
• Yuri Semyonov"Dialectical (pragmo-dialectical) materialism: its place in the history of philosophical thought and contemporary significance"

Literature

• Ai Si-chi. Lectures on Dialectical Materialism. M., 1959.
• Cassidy F. H. Heraclitus and Dialectical Materialism // Questions of Philosophy. 2009. No. 3. P.142-146.
• Oizerman T. I. Dialectical materialism and the history of philosophy (historical and philosophical essays). Moscow: Thought, 1979 (2nd edition - 1982, on English language- Dialectical Materialism and the History of Philosophy: Essays on the History of Philosophy, Moscow: Progress, 1984).
• Rutkevich M. N. Dialectical materialism. M., 1973.

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Dialectical materialism- the worldview of the Marxist party, created by Marx and Engels and further developed by Lenin and Stalin. This worldview is called dialectical materialism because its method of studying the phenomena of nature, human society and thinking is dialectical, anti-metaphysical, and its idea of ​​the world, its philosophical theory, is consistent scientific-materialistic.

The dialectical method and philosophical materialism mutually penetrate each other, are in an inseparable unity and constitute an integral philosophical worldview. Having created dialectical materialism, Marx and Engels extended it to knowledge social phenomena. Historical materialism was the greatest achievement of scientific thought. Dialectical and historical materialism constitutes the theoretical foundation of communism, the theoretical foundation of the Marxist party.

Dialectical materialism arose in the 1940s as an integral part of the theory of proletarian socialism and developed in close connection with the practice of the revolutionary labor movement. Its appearance marked a real revolution in the history of human thought, in the history of philosophy. It was a revolutionary leap in the development of philosophy from the old state to the new state, which marked the beginning of a new, scientific worldview. But this revolution included continuity, a critical revision of everything advanced and progressive that had already been achieved by the history of human thought. Therefore, in developing their philosophical outlook, Marx and Engels relied on all the valuable acquisitions of human thought.

Everything that was best created in the past by philosophy was critically reviewed by Marx and Engels. Marx and Engels considered their dialectical materialism a product of the development of the sciences, including philosophy, in the previous period. From dialectics (see) they took only its “rational grain” and, discarding the Hegelian idealistic husk, developed dialectics further, giving it a modern scientific look. Feuerbach's materialism was inconsistent, metaphysical, anti-historical. Marx and Engels took from Feuerbach's materialism only its "basic grain" and, discarding the idealistic and religious-ethical stratifications of his philosophy, developed materialism further, creating the highest, Marxist, form of materialism. Marx and Engels, and then Lenin and Stalin, applied the principles of dialectical materialism to the politics and tactics of the working class, to the practical activity of the Marxist party.

Only the dialectical materialism of Marx showed the proletariat a way out of the spiritual slavery in which all the oppressed classes vegetated. In contrast to the numerous currents and currents of bourgeois philosophy, dialectical materialism is not just a philosophical school, a philosophy of individuals, but the militant teaching of the proletariat, the teaching of millions of working people, whom it equips with knowledge of the ways of struggle for the radical reorganization of society on communist principles. Dialectical materialism is a living, constantly developing and enriching doctrine. Marxist philosophy develops and enriches itself on the basis of a generalization of the new experience of the class struggle of the proletariat, a generalization of natural scientific discoveries. After Marx and Engels, the greatest theoretician of Marxism, V.I. Lenin, and after Lenin, I.V. Stalin and other disciples of Lenin were the only Marxists who advanced Marxism.

Lenin, in his book "" (see), which was the theoretical preparation of the Marxist party, defended the enormous theoretical wealth of Marxist philosophy in a decisive struggle against all and sundry revisionists and degenerates. Having crushed Machism and other idealistic theories of the era of imperialism, Lenin not only defended dialectical materialism, but also developed it further. In his work, Lenin summarized the latest achievements of science since the death of Engels and showed natural science the way out of the dead end into which idealistic philosophy. All Lenin's works, no matter what questions they may be devoted to, are of great philosophical significance, they are an example of the application and further development of dialectical materialism. A great contribution to the further development of Marxist philosophy was made by the works of I. V. Stalin "O" (see), "" (see) and his other works.

Compound, inseparable parts of dialectical materialism are (see) and (see). Dialectics provides the only scientific method of cognition, which makes it possible to correctly approach phenomena, to see those objective and most general laws that govern their development. Marxist dialectics teaches that the correct approach to the phenomena and processes of nature and society means taking them in their connection and mutual conditioning; consider them in development and change; understand development not as simple quantitative growth, but as a process in which quantitative changes at a certain stage naturally turn into fundamental qualitative changes; proceed from the fact that the internal content of the development and transition from the old quality to the new is the struggle of opposites, the struggle between the new and the old. Lenin and Stalin called dialectic "the soul of Marxism."

Marxist dialectics is organically linked with Marxist philosophical materialism. The basic principles of philosophical materialism are the following: the world is material in nature, it consists of moving matter, transforming from one form to another, matter is primary, and consciousness is secondary, consciousness is a product of highly organized matter, the objective world is cognizable and our sensations, ideas, concepts are reflections of the external world that exists independently of human consciousness.

Dialectical materialism was the first to create a scientific theory of knowledge, which is of inestimable importance for understanding the process of cognition of objective truth.

Dialectical materialism is a revolutionary theory of the transformation of the world, a guide to revolutionary action. Marxist philosophy is deeply alien to a passive, contemplative attitude towards the surrounding reality. Representatives of pre-Marxian philosophy aimed only at explaining the world. The task of the Marxist-Leninist Party is the radical revolutionary change of the world. Dialectical materialism is an effective tool for the reorganization of society in the spirit of communism. “Marx defined the main task of the tactics of the proletariat in strict accordance with all the premises of his materialistic-dialectical worldview”

The theory of Marxism-Leninism - dialectical and historical materialism - has withstood a comprehensive test on the experience of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the building of socialism in the USSR, the victory of the USSR in the Great Patriotic war, on the experience of the development of countries (see), the victory of the Great Chinese Revolution, etc. The teaching of Marxism-Leninism is omnipotent because it is true, because it gives a correct understanding of the objective laws of the development of reality. Only the revolutionary worldview of a Marxist-Leninist party allows us to correctly understand the historical process and formulate militant revolutionary slogans.

A distinctive feature of dialectical materialism is its revolutionary-critical character. The philosophy of Marxism-Leninism took shape and developed in a constant and uncompromising struggle against various bourgeois, opportunist and other reactionary philosophical currents. All the works of the classics of Marxism are permeated with a critical spirit, proletarian partisanship. The unity of theory and practice finds its highest expression in dialectical materialism. In practice, dialectical materialism proves the correctness of its theoretical propositions. Marxism-Leninism generalizes the practice, the experience of the peoples, and shows the greatest revolutionary, cognitive significance for the theory, for the philosophy of the historical experience of the masses of the people. The connection between science and practical activity, the connection between theory and practice, their unity are the guiding star of the party of the proletariat.

Dialectical materialism as a worldview is of great importance for all other sciences. Each separate science studies a certain range of phenomena. For example, astronomy studies the solar system and the stellar world, geology studies the structure and development of the earth's crust, and the social sciences (political economy, history, law, and others) study various aspects of social life. But a separate science and even a group of sciences cannot give a picture of the world as a whole, cannot give a worldview, since a worldview is knowledge not about certain parts of the world, but about the laws of development of the world as a whole.

Only dialectical materialism is such a worldview that gives a scientific view of the world as a whole, reveals the most general laws of the development of nature, society and thinking, embraces with a single understanding the complex chain of natural phenomena and human history. Dialectical materialism did away with the old philosophy forever, which claimed to be the "science of sciences", which sought to replace all other sciences. Dialectical materialism sees its task not in replacing other sciences - physics, chemistry, biology, political economy, etc., but in relying on the achievements of these sciences and constantly enriching themselves with the data of these sciences, to equip people with scientific knowledge. method of knowing objective truth.

Thus, the significance of dialectical materialism for other sciences lies in the fact that it provides a correct philosophical outlook, knowledge of the most general laws of the development of nature and society, without which no field of science or practical activity of people can do. The significance of dialectical materialism for the development of natural science is exceptionally great. The development of the natural sciences in the USSR shows that only guided by the philosophy of dialectical materialism can natural science achieve the greatest success.

The philosophy of Marxism-Leninism is a party philosophy, it openly expresses and defends the interests of the proletariat and all the working masses and fights against any form of social oppression and slavery. The worldview of Marxism-Leninism combines science and consistent revolutionary spirit. The irresistible attractive force that draws socialists of all countries to this theory lies in the fact that it combines strict and highest scientificity (being the last word of social science) with revolutionaryism, and it does not combine it by chance, not only because the founder of the doctrine personally combined in itself the qualities of a scientist and a revolutionary, but unites in the theory itself internally and inseparably.

Modern bourgeois philosophy is undertaking one campaign after another with the aim of refuting Marxist philosophy and undermining its influence on the consciousness of the masses. But all the attempts of the reactionaries are in vain. The victory of people's democracy in a number of countries significantly expanded the sphere of influence of the Marxist-Leninist worldview; it became the dominant worldview not only in the USSR, but also in the people's democracies. The influence of Marxist philosophy is also great in the capitalist countries. The strength of the Marxist-Leninist worldview is irresistible.

Yu.M. Bochensky

A. Dialectical materialism. Characteristic

Dialectical materialism occupies a very special position in the total European philosophy. First of all, it has almost no supporters in academic circles, with the exception of Russia, where it is the official philosophy and, therefore, enjoys advantages like no other school of modern times. Further, it is the philosophy of one political party, namely the Communist Party, and in this way it is most closely associated with the economic and political theories, as well as with the practical activities of this party, which regards it as its "general theory" - also a unique situation. In Russia, where the Communist Party rules, no philosophy other than dialectical materialism can be taught, and even the interpretation of its classical texts is very strictly monitored. This surveillance, but apparently also the Russian national character, also explains the peculiar outward form of the publications of the dialectical materialists. These publications differ from all others primarily in their uniformity - all authors say exactly the same thing, as well as the presence of countless references to the classics, which at every step should reinforce the propositions put forward. It is possible that surveillance is also to blame for the fact that the philosophers of this school are so mediocre. In any case, it is responsible for the extreme dogmatism, chauvinism and aggressive position of the dialectical materialists.

But even more important than these features, which could be transient, is the reactionary character of dialectical materialism: in fact, this philosophy takes us back to the middle of the 19th century, trying to revive the spiritual situation of that time in an unchanged form.

B. Origins and Founders

The famous theoretician of science Karl Heinrich Marx (1818-1883), with whom Friedrich Engels (1820-1895) worked closely, is considered the founder of dialectical materialism among Russians. Marx was a student of Hegel. During the period when he studied at the University of Berlin (1837-1841), "right" and "left" had already emerged in the Hegelian school. Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872) was a notable representative of these leftists, who interpreted the Hegelian system materialistically and presented world history as the development not of spirit, but of matter. Marx closely adhered to Feuerbach, at the same time being influenced by the rising natural-scientific materialism. This explains his admiration for science, his deep and naive faith in progress, and his fascination with Darwinian evolutionism. At the same time, Marx himself was an economist, sociologist and social philosopher; he founded historical materialism, while the general philosophical basis of the system, dialectical materialism - basically the work of Engels. This dialectical materialism consists in the combination of Hegelian dialectics with the materialism of the nineteenth century.

Subsequently, the teachings of Marx and Engels were taken up by Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov (Lenin, 1870-1924), who interpreted them and prescribed them to the Communist Party. Lenin slightly changed the Marxist doctrine, but he developed it further in the course of polemics with its mechanistic and empirio-criticist interpretations. Joseph Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili (Stalin, 1879-1953), who collaborated with him and succeeded him in the leadership of the party, systematized the teachings of Marx in accordance with his Leninist interpretation. The philosophy formed in this way is called "Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism" and is regarded in Russia as an indivisible whole. It is expounded in encyclopedias, in mediocre works and small catechisms, and in higher educational institutions the Soviet state, she compulsory subject. As for the authors of the relevant textbooks, they hardly deserve mention, since, as already mentioned, they only repeat the arguments of Lenin and Stalin.

B. Course of events in Russia

Here it is worth adding something about philosophy in Soviet Russia, since Soviet-Russian philosophy is identical with dialectical materialism, and its Western European adherents are important only insofar as they agree with Russian philosophers. This is explained by the fact that dialectical materialism owes its influence almost exclusively to the support of the Party, while the Party is strictly centralized and allows only a philosophy that corresponds to Russian standards.

There are four periods in the history of Soviet-Russian philosophy. 1) After a short war period (1917-1921), during which relative freedom still reigned, all non-Marxist philosophers were arrested, expelled from Russia or liquidated. 2) In the period 1922-1930. sharp discussions unfolded between the so-called "mechanistic" and "Menshevik-idealist" schools. The first of them presented dialectical materialism as pure materialism, and the second, led by A.M. Deborin, sought to keep both of its elements in balance. 3) On January 15, 1931, both schools were condemned by the Central Committee of the Party, and from this the third period (1931-1946) began, during which, except for the publication of Stalin’s work (1938) (“On Dialectical and Historical Materialism” - ed.), philosophical life in Russia completely froze. Philosophers published only commentaries or popularizing books. 4) The fourth period opens with A.A. Zhdanov, delivered on June 24, 1947 on behalf of the Central Committee and Stalin personally. In this speech, Zhdanov condemns one of the leading Russian philosophers, G.F. Aleksandrov, and demands more active systematic work from all Russian philosophers. The response to this request was immediate. At the present time (1950) sharp discussions are going on in Russia about the interpretation of the "classics" in connection with some special areas in which it has not yet been dogmatically approved by Stalin's pamphlet. In this regard, we can mention the condemnation of the “Logic” by V.F. Asmus due to her "apolitical and objectivist character" (1948), recantation by B.M. Kedrov from his attempt to muffle wild nationalism (1949), the current (1950) attacks on the "Foundations general psychology» S.L. Rubinshtein and especially the discussion around the significant work of M.A. Markov "On the nature of physical knowledge" (1947), which A.A. Maksimov branded as unfaithful (1948).

Corresponding processes also took place in the field of psychology. If earlier the word “psychology” itself was considered incorrect and they tried to replace it with “reactology” or other names, then in Lately psychology is admitted as a legitimate academic subject (as, indeed, the previously rejected logic). In all these discussions, as in the well-known discussion about genetics (1948), M.B. Mitin. He was considered the spokesman for the views of the government and participated in all the condemnations of his too independent-minded colleagues. Meanwhile, Mitin can be considered the most prominent philosophical representative of contemporary dialectical materialism.

It is also worth noting that all these discussions take place strictly within the framework of dialectical materialism, without encroaching on any of the main provisions of the system determined by Stalin, and the debating methods consist in the fact that opponents seek to convict each other of infidelity to Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin. At the same time, it should be noted, they refer least of all to Marx himself, and mainly to Engels and Lenin.

D. Materialism

According to materialism, the only real world is the material world, and the spirit is only the product of a material organ, the brain. The opposition of matter and consciousness has only an epistemological meaning, and only matter exists ontologically. True, the dialectical materialists criticize the former materialist theories, but this criticism concerns not materialism as such, but only the absence of a "dialectical" element, the absence of a correct understanding of development.

Of course, the assessment of dialectical materialism depends on what meaning is put into the word "matter". In this regard, there is a certain difficulty associated with its Leninist definition.

According to Lenin, matter is only "a philosophical category for denoting objective reality", and in the theory of knowledge, matter is always opposed to consciousness and identified with "objective being". Meanwhile, there should be no doubts here, because, on the other hand, dialectical materialists assert that we cognize matter with the help of our senses, that it obeys deterministic and purely causal laws and opposes consciousness. In general, it is clear that the word "matter" among the dialectical materialists has no other meaning than the ordinary one. Dialectical materialism is classical and radical materialism.

At the same time, this materialism not mechanical. According to the accepted teaching, only inorganic matter is subject to mechanical laws, but not living matter, which, although subject to deterministic-causal, but not mechanical laws. Even in physics, dialectical materialists do not advocate unconditional atomism.

D. Dialectical development; monism and determinism

Matter is in constant development, as a result of which more and more complex things arise - atoms, molecules, living cells, plants, people, society. Thus, development is seen not as circular, but as linear and, moreover, in an optimistic spirit: every last is always more complex, which is identified with the best and highest. The dialectical materialists fully preserved the nineteenth-century belief in progress through development.

But this development occurs, from their point of view, through a whole series of revolutions: small quantitative changes accumulate in the essence of each thing; there is tension, struggle, and at a certain point the new elements become strong enough to upset the balance; then from the previous quantitative changes a new quality arises abruptly. Thus, the struggle is the driving force of development, which proceeds in leaps and bounds: this is the so-called "dialectical development".

This whole process of development is carried out without a goal, occurring under the pressure of purely causal factors through shocks and struggles. Strictly speaking, the world has neither meaning nor purpose; it develops blindly in accordance with eternal and calculable laws.

Nothing is sustainable dialectical development covers the whole world and all its constituent parts; everywhere and everywhere the old dies and the new is born. There are no immutable substances, no "eternal principles". Only matter as such and the laws of its change are eternally preserved in universal motion.

The world is seen as a whole. In contrast to metaphysics, which (according to this doctrine) saw in the world a multitude of unrelated entities, dialectical materialists defend monism, and in two senses: the world for them is the only reality (besides him there is nothing and especially no God) and he is in principle homogeneous all dualism and pluralism are rejected as false.

The laws that govern this world are deterministic laws in the classical sense of the word. True, for some reason, dialectical materialists do not want to be called "determinists." According to their teaching, for example, the growth of a plant is determined not simply by the laws of this plant, because due to some external cause, say hail, these laws may not be valid. But in relation to the whole universe, according to the dialectical materialists, all chance is obviously excluded; the totality of world laws unconditionally determines the entire movement of the world whole.

E. Psychology

Consciousness, spirit is only an epiphenomenon, a "copy, reflection, photograph" of matter (Lenin). Without the body, consciousness cannot exist; it is a product of the brain. Matter is always primary, and consciousness or spirit is secondary. Consequently, it is not consciousness that determines matter, but, on the contrary, matter determines consciousness. Thus, Marxist psychology is materialistic and deterministic.

At the same time, this determinism is more subtle than that of the former materialists. First of all, as we have already noted with regard to chance, dialectical materialists do not at all want to be considered determinists. From their point of view, there is an opportunity to use the laws of nature, this is freedom. True, man himself remains conditioned by his own laws, but he is aware of this, and Liberty consists (as in Hegel) in consciousness of necessity. Furthermore, according to dialectical materialists, matter does not directly determine consciousness; rather, it operates through the medium of society.

The fact is that a person is inherently social, without society he cannot live. Only in society can he produce vital goods. The tools and methods of this production determine, first of all, the interhuman relations based on them, and indirectly, through these latter, the consciousness of people. This is the thesis historical materialism: everything that a person thinks, desires, wants, etc., is ultimately the result of his economic needs, which are formed on the basis of the modes of production and social relations created by production.

These ways and attitudes are constantly changing. Thus, society is brought under the law of dialectical development, which manifests itself in the social class struggle. For its part, the entire content of human consciousness is conditioned by society and it changes in the course of economic progress.

G. Theory of knowledge

Since matter determines consciousness, cognition must be understood realistic: the subject does not produce the object, but the object exists independently of the subject; knowledge lies in the fact that there are copies, reflections, photographs of matter in the mind. The world is not unknowable, it is fully knowable. Of course, the true method of cognition is only in the science associated with technical practice; and the progress of technology sufficiently proves how untenable any agnosticism is. Cognition is, in essence, sensory cognition, but rational thinking is also necessary in order to order the data of experience. Positivism is "bourgeois quackery" and "idealism"; in fact, through phenomena, we comprehend the essence of things.

In all this, Marxist epistemology appears as an unconditional and naive realism of the well-known empiricist type. The originality of dialectical materialism lies in the fact that with these realist views it connects others, namely, pragmatist. From the fact that the entire content of our consciousness is determined by our economic needs, it follows, in particular, that each social class has its own science and its own philosophy. An independent, non-partisan science is impossible. That which leads to success is true; the criterion of truth is only practice.

These two theories of knowledge exist side by side in Marxism, and Marxists do not try very hard to harmonize them with each other. At most, they refer to the fact that our knowledge strives for perfect truth, but for the time being it is relative according to our needs. Here, apparently, the theory runs into a contradiction, because even if truth were determined through needs, knowledge could not be any, even partial, copy of reality.

H. Values

According to historical materialism, the entire content of consciousness depends on economic needs, which, for their part, are constantly evolving. This is especially true of morality, aesthetics and religion.

In a relationship morality dialectical materialism does not recognize any eternal laws; each social class has its own morality. For the most progressive class, the proletariat, the highest moral rule is this: only that is morally good that contributes to the destruction of the bourgeois world.

V aesthetics the matter is more complicated. We have to admit that in reality itself, in things themselves, there is an objective element that forms the basis of our aesthetic evaluation, prompting us to consider something beautiful or ugly. But on the other hand, evaluation also depends on the development of the classes: since different classes have different needs, each evaluates in its own way. Accordingly, art cannot be separated from life, it must take part in class struggle. Its task is to depict the heroic efforts of the proletariat in its struggle and in the building of a socialist society (socialist realism).

Finally, with regard to religions The theory is again somewhat different. According to dialectical materialists, religion is a collection of false and fantastic assertions condemned by science. Only science gives us the opportunity to know reality. The root of religion is fear: being powerless in relation to nature, and then in relation to the exploiters, people began to deify these forces and pray to them; in religion, in faith in the other world, they found solace, which they could not find in their slavish existence of the exploited. For the exploiters (feudal lords, capitalists, etc.), religion turned out to be an excellent tool for keeping the masses in check: on the one hand, it accustoms them to obedience to the exploiters, and on the other, by promising a better life after death, it distracts the proletarians from revolution. But the proletariat, which does not exploit anyone, does not need religion. If morality and aesthetics are only to change, then religion must disappear completely.

Published according to ed.

Bohensky Yu.M. Modern European Philosophy. M.: Scientific world, 2000

The Rise of Dialectical Materialism

Dialectical-materialist philosophy arose in the mid-40s of the 19th century, when in a number of countries Western Europe already established capitalism. The conquest of political power by the bourgeoisie paved the way for its accelerated development. The consequence of this was, on the one hand, the rapid development of capital, large-scale machine industry, and on the other, the formation of an industrial proletariat.

The researchers note that big influence on the formation of philosophical views
K. Marx was rendered by Hegel and Feuerbach.

However, the philosophical theory created by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels differs significantly from all previous teachings, primarily in that philosophical ideas are very closely interconnected with the political-economic and scientific-social aspects of the worldview.

Dialectical materialism

Dialectical materialism (diamat)- a philosophical doctrine that affirms the epistemological primacy of matter and postulates three basic laws of its movement and development:

The law of unity and struggle of opposites

The law of transition of quantitative changes into qualitative ones

The law of negation of negation

Law of Unity and Struggle of Opposites

"core" of materialistic dialectics

every object contains opposites

By opposites, diamat understands such moments that:

(1) are in inseparable unity,

(2) mutually exclusive,

(3) interpenetrate.

The Law of the Transition of Quantitative Changes into Qualitative

Every new quality is only the result of accumulated quantitative changes.

In support of this thesis, Hegel cited changes state of aggregation substances (melting, boiling) where the appearance of a new quality, such as fluidity, is the result of quantitative changes, such as an increase in temperature.

Law of Negation

- any development in animate and inanimate nature is carried out in a spiral.

- as an example of the operation of the third law of dialectics, all textbooks cite an ear of wheat. (The ear grows out of the grain, denying it. However, when the ear itself ripens, new grains appear in it, and the ear itself dies, and it is cut with a sickle)

Basic System Forming Principles of Dialectical Materialism

The principle of unity and integrity of being;

The principle of the materiality of the world,

The principle of the cognizability of the world;

Principle of development;

The principle of world transformation;

The principle of partisanship of philosophy.

Principle of Unity and Integrity of Being

The principle of the unity and integrity of being as a developing universal system that includes all manifestations, all forms of reality: from objective reality (matter)
to subjective reality (thinking);

Principle of the Materiality of the World

The principle of the materiality of the world, which states that matter is primary in relation to consciousness, is reflected in it and determines its content;

"It is not the consciousness of people that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being determines their consciousness." (K. Marx, "On the Critique of Political Economy")

Principle of Knowability of the World

The principle of the knowability of the world, proceeding from the fact that the world around us is knowable
and that the measure of its knowledge, which determines the degree of correspondence of our knowledge to objective reality, is social production practice;

Development Principle

The principle of development, summarizing the historical experience of mankind, the achievements of the natural, social and technical sciences, and on this basis asserting that all phenomena in the world and the world as a whole are in continuous, constant, dialectical development, the source of which is the emergence and resolution of internal contradictions, leading to negation of some states and the formation of fundamentally new qualitative phenomena and processes;

World Transformation Principle

The principle of transforming the world, according to which the historical goal of the development of society is to achieve freedom, which ensures the all-round harmonious development of each personality, in the disclosure of all its creativity on the basis of a radical transformation of society and the achievement of social justice and equality of members of society;

Principle of Party Philosophy

The principle of the partisanship of philosophy, which establishes the presence of a complex objective relationship between philosophical concepts and the worldview of a person, on the one hand, and the social structure of society, on the other.

Goals of Dialectical Materialism

· -Diamat strives for a creative combination in a single teaching of all the achievements of philosophical materialism and dialectics as a method of cognition and transformation of reality.

· -Diamat differs from all previous forms of materialism in that it extends the principles of philosophical materialism to the understanding of the development and functioning of society.

First Function of Dialectical Materialism

The ideological function is a theoretical substantiation and synthesis (based on the achievements of modern science) of a single picture of the world, in substantiating a scientific materialistic worldview that answers the question of a person’s place in the world, his essence, purpose and meaning of life, the prospects for the development of mankind and its relationship with natural environment.

Second Function of Dialectical Materialism

methodological function. On the basis of a holistic worldview, dialectical materialism develops and substantiates a system of norms, standards and rules for cognitive and subject-practical activities in modern conditions for the most effective and adequate knowledge of the world.

Question 40. Domestic economists of the early XX century on the subject and method of political economy.

The last decade of the 19th century - the first quarter of the 20th can be described as the period of the rise of domestic economic science. This is partly due to the rapid economic development, with the growth of industry, the banking sector, and the transport system. This development of the economy stimulated research in the field, which is usually called a specific economy - research in various industries, agriculture, military economics. questions, finances, etc. there has been an increase in the interest of Russian economists in political economy issues, including the problems of methodology, economic ethics, and the history of economic doctrines. Representatives of Russian economists of the pre-October period: Bulgakov, Bazarov, Bunge, Vorontsov, Danielson, Dmitriev, Zheleznov, Isaev, Kulisher, Miklashevsky, Levitsky, Ilyin, Svyatlovsky, Struve, Tugan-Baranovsky, Yanzhul. Their students in the 1920s: Kondratiev, Chayanov, Feldman, Slutsky.

In the pre-October period eq. science has its own versatility. The problems were considered in line with philosophical, sociological, historical and religious problems. Russian economists were immersed in social issues. They did not seek to clearly distinguish between the practical and theoretical part of eq. Sciences.

The most influential in Russian eq. science directions: Marxism (class approach), the German historical school (the principle of methodological holism, consideration of economic life from a national-state position), liberal populism. Russian economists paid little attention to theory marginal utility and marginalism=> on this basis, the gap between Western and Russian science. There was a final removal of domestic science from Western.

Some accepted the ideas of marginalism, replacing them with the ideas of Marxism - for example, P. Struve, V. Voitinsky, V.K. Dmitriev.

Some tried to harmonize the theory of value of marginalism and Marx's labor theory of value - S. Frank, M. Tugan-Baranovsky.

It is worth noting the great interest of Russian economists in the problem of the subject and method of eq. sciences - Levitsky, Struve, Isaev, Tareev, Miklashevsky, etc.

In studies of the problems of money, monetary circulation, interest, markets of cycles and crises, Russian economists kept pace with their Western colleagues, and in some cases outstripped them (Tugan-Baranovsky's market theory).

Exam questions for the course "History and methodology of economic science"

1. Philosophical and economic ideas of Plato.

2. What did Aristotle see as the advantages of private property?

3. The Social Contract by Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

4. Science as a means of understanding the surrounding world and as a social institution.

5. The role of philosophy in the formation and development of economic science.

6. Economic ideas of Seneca and Cicero.

7. A. Smith and D. Ricardo on the subject of political economy.

8. What and why did the mercantilists and representatives of the bourgeois classical school understand by wealth?

9. "Capital" by K. Marx as a political and economic work.

10. Neoclassics on the tasks and subject of economic theory.

11. Main schools and directions of historical and economic analysis (general characteristics).

12. Did mercantilism exist in Russia?

13. Old Russian documents and works of economic content.

14. French historical school Annals.

15. Civilization and formational approaches to the study of the process of historical and economic development.

16. Institutional approach to economic history.

17. The teachings of LN Gumilyov about ethnogenesis.

18. Why did the German historical school gain recognition in Russia?

19. What is the world-systems approach in historical and economic analysis?

20. Features of the formation and development of economic science in Russia.

21. Populism as a peculiar form of utopian socialism.

22. Why did the “legal Marxism” movement emerge in Russia?

23. The historical fate of Marxism in Russia.

24. general characteristics and an assessment of the marginalist revolution in political economy.

25. Subject of study and methodology of J. St. Mill.

26. Keynesian revolution in economics.

27. The problem of the correlation of morality and entrepreneurship in the economic science of the past and present.

28. Reformation and development of the bourgeois type of thinking.

29. Protestant ethics as a factor in the development of capitalism.

30. General characteristics of the history of domestic economic science in the twentieth century.

31. " open society» in the philosophy of K. R. Popper.

32. What does J. Soros mean by the term “market fundamentalism”?

33. Anarchism M.A. Bakunin and P.A. Kropotkin: common features and differences.

34. Was V.I. Lenin an economist?

35. The teachings of A.V. Chayanov about labor peasant economy

36. What is the material basis of the large cycles of N.D. Kondratiev's conjuncture?

37. The main discussions of Soviet economists in the 20-30s.

38. Philosophical and ideological views of A.A. Bogdanovat and his “general organizational science”.

39. The main ideas of economic construction in the USSR in the works of L.D. Trotsky, N.I. Bukharin and I.V. Stalin.

40. Domestic economists of the early twentieth century on the subject and method of political economy.

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